A new book from the author of the bestsellers “Penal Battalions and Barrier Detachments of the Red Army” and “Armored Troops of the Red Army.” THE FIRST study of the history of the creation and combat use of Soviet tank armies during the Great Patriotic War.

They have come a long and difficult path from the first failures and defeats of 1942 to the triumph of 1945. They distinguished themselves in all the major battles of the second half of the war - on the Kursk Bulge and in the Battle of the Dnieper, in the Belarusian, Yasso-Kishinev, Vistula-Oder, Berlin and other strategic offensive operations. Possessing crushing power and phenomenal mobility, the Guards tank armies became the elite of the Red Army and the main striking force of the “Russian blitzkriegs” that broke the back of the previously invincible Wehrmacht.

In Eastern Pomerania, the 2nd Field Army of the Vistula Army Group, commanded by Reichsführer SS G. Himmler, defended. It consisted of 230 thousand people, 2.9 thousand guns and mortars, 382 tanks and assault guns, 300 aircraft. Ground troops supported the 6th Air Fleet and the German naval forces in the Baltic. The enemy in Eastern Pomerania created the so-called “Pomeranian fortification line” (Pomeranian Wall), built in 1933 along the former Polish-German border with a front to the east and southeast. This line passed along the line Stolp (Slupsk), Rummelsburg (Miastko), Neustettin (Szczecinek), Schneidemühl (Pila). The left flank of the Pomeranian Wall adjoined and was supported by the seaside fortifications in the Stolpmünde area, and the right flank – to the fortifications on the Warta and Oder rivers. The basis of the Pomeranian fortifications were long-term defensive structures (pillboxes, reinforced concrete caponiers and half-caponiers), designed for garrisons ranging in strength from a platoon to a company. These structures were reinforced with field-type fortifications. They and the approaches to long-term structures were covered by a developed network of anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers in the form of minefields, reinforced concrete obstacles, wire fences, and anti-tank ditches filled with water. The cities of Stolp, Rummelsburg, Neustettin, Schneidemuhl, and Deutsch-Krone were key strongholds in the Pomeranian fortification system. Around them there was a large number of long-term fire installations (points), field-type structures, anti-tank and anti-personnel obstacles. On the coast in the area of ​​Danzig (Gdansk) and Gdynia and on the Putziger-Nerung spit in the Hel area, the enemy had coastal fortified areas, and in the area of ​​Leba, Stolpmünde, Rügenwaldemünde and Kolberg (Kołobrzeg) - equipped artillery positions of a semi-casemate type for heavy coastal artillery. In addition, the defense system included the heavily fortified Danzig and Gdynia defensive areas, built with a front to the southwest.

Initially, the defeat of the enemy in Eastern Pomerania was entrusted to the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front. However, having gone on the offensive on February 10, they made little progress, since they had to overcome heavily fortified defenses. At the same time, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front repelled the fierce counterattacks of the enemy 11th Army. Stalin, realizing that the forces of one front were not enough to defeat the enemy’s East Pomeranian grouping, which had received a significant strengthening, involved in the operation the troops of the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front (2nd Guards Cavalry Corps, 1st Army of the Polish Army, 3rd Shock , 61st, 47th armies, 1st and 2nd Guards Tank and 16th Air Armies; total 770 thousand people, 16.8 thousand guns and mortars, 2050 tanks and self-propelled guns, 965 aircraft). The enemy, consisting of the 2nd and 11th armies (from February 25 - the 3rd Tank Army) and parts of the 6th Air Fleet, had 605 thousand people, 6.5 thousand guns and mortars, 1,500 tanks and assault guns , 850 aircraft.

The idea of ​​the Supreme High Command Headquarters was to dismember the Vistula Army Group with attacks from the 2nd Belorussian Front on Kezlin (Koszalin) and the troops of the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front on Kolberg, cut off its main forces from the rest of the troops and destroy it in cooperation with the Baltic fleet. Subsequently, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front had to attack Danzig and Gdynia, clear the eastern part of Pomerania from the enemy and capture the coast of the Baltic Sea.

Taking into account the plans of the Supreme Command Headquarters, the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front, Marshal G.K. On February 16, Zhukov introduced I.V. To Stalin, report No. 00318/op of the offensive plan in the Stettin direction. The main blow was to be delivered by the 61st Army, 2nd Guards Tank Army, 7th Guards Cavalry and 9th Tank Corps with the support of two artillery divisions from the Reetz, Brallentin, Piritz, Bahn line through Stargard in a northwestern direction. They had to push the enemy back to the north and, having reached the line of Blankehagen (6 km southwest of Wangerin), Kannenberg (6 km northwest of Freienwalde), Massow, Gollnow (Goleniow), Stettin, cut off the retreat of the enemy Pomeranian group to the west. An auxiliary strike was carried out by the forces of the 1st Polish Army and two rifle corps of the 3rd Shock Army from the line of Rederitz, Märkisch-Friedland, Kallis, (claim) Reetz with the goal of, in cooperation with the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front, pushing the enemy back to the north and reach the line Lubov, Tempelburg, Falkenburg, Dramburg, Wangerin.

The 12th Guards Rifle Corps of the 3rd Shock Army and the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps were supposed to hold their positions. As the left flank of the 2nd Belorussian Front advanced, the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps was ordered to move sequentially from right to left from defense to offensive in a western direction.

The tank armies were to be brought into battle after the rifle divisions had broken through the enemy's main defense line. The 1st Guards Tank Army was to develop its success to the north and capture Kolberg, and the 2nd Guards Tank Army was to advance in a northwest direction and capture Kammin (Kamen-Pomorski) and Gollnow.

There have been some changes in the combat composition of the 1st Guards Tank Army compared to January 1, 1945 (see table No. 20). It received additional self-propelled artillery and anti-tank artillery brigades, a guards mortar regiment, an anti-aircraft artillery division and a motorized pontoon-bridge regiment. The army consisted of about 550 tanks and self-propelled guns.

Table No. 20

On the morning of February 24, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front went on the offensive. His 19th Army broke through the enemy’s defenses and advanced 10–12 km by the end of the day. On the morning of February 25, the 3rd Guards Tank Corps (274 tanks and self-propelled guns) of General A.P. was brought into battle in the army zone. Panfilov, reinforced by the 313th Infantry Division. Developing the offensive, the forward detachment of the corps (3rd Guards Tank Brigade) captured Baldenberg (Bialy-Bur) on the morning of February 26. However, the troops of the 19th Army made little progress, as they had to fight heavily with enemy strongholds, which were bypassed by the tank corps. By the evening of February 25, the troops of the 70th Army advanced only 6 km on their left flank. Formations of the 49th, 65th and 2nd shock armies fought stubborn defensive battles. On February 28, units of the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps of General N.S. Oslikovsky captured Neustettin on February 28, meeting west of the city with a reconnaissance detachment of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps of the 1st Belorussian Front. By this time, the troops of the 70th Army had advanced 12 km in a northwestern direction. On March 4, the 3rd Guards Tank Corps, together with the 310th Rifle Division of the 134th Rifle Corps, occupied Kezlin (Koszalin). As a result, the 10th SS Corps and the Tettau Corps Group were surrounded west of Neustettin.

The offensive of the troops of the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front began on March 1. The enemy offered fierce resistance to the formations of the 3rd Shock Army. In the current situation, Marshal Zhukov ordered General Katukov to bring into action the forward detachments of the 1st Guards Tank Army - the 1st and 44th Guards Tank Brigades. Having broken away from the infantry and bypassing enemy strongholds, by 5 o'clock in the evening they broke through the entire tactical zone of enemy defense and advanced to a depth of 15 km.

To develop the success, General Katukov decided to introduce the main forces of the army into battle at noon on March 2. The powerful impact of the tanks widened the throat of the breakthrough. By 8 o'clock on March 4, the 45th Guards Tank Brigade of the 11th Guards Tank Corps broke through to the Baltic Sea and began fighting for Kolberg, and the 40th Guards Tank Brigade under Lieutenant Colonel M.A. Smirnova captured Treptow (Trzebiatów).

Marshal of Armored Forces M.E. In this regard, Katukov cites the following interesting fact.

On the evening of March 4, a liaison officer from the 11th Guards Tank Corps, a tired young lieutenant, arrived at the headquarters of the 1st Guards Tank Army:

- Allow me to report, Comrade Commander! From Lieutenant Colonel Smirnov.

The lieutenant opened his raincoat and handed the army commander a bottle of cloudy liquid.

- What is this? – Katukov did not understand.

The officer smiled contentedly:

- Water, comrade commander. Baltic. Lieutenant Colonel Smirnov scooped it up with his own hand and ordered it to be delivered to you. You could say this is his combat report.

Formations of the 8th Guards Mechanized Corps of General I.F. Dremov, having broken the resistance of enemy troops, captured Bellegarde (Bialogard) and Keslin on March 5.

The 2nd Guards Tank Army of General S.I. also advanced successfully. Bogdanov. Its 9th Guards Tank Corps reached the Baltic Sea coast on March 5 and captured Kammin and Tessin. Units of the 12th Guards Tank Corps, together with formations of the 3rd Shock Army, occupied Gollnov on March 7.

The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front resumed their offensive on the morning of March 6. On the right wing they occupied the city of Preusisch-Stargard (Starogard-Gdanski), and on the left wing they reached the line of Altenhagen, Rützow, Fritzow, Altlulfitz, Darkow. The 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps took up defense on the Baltic Sea coast in the sector of Rügenwalde, Grossmelen, (law) Kolberg.

Thus, the troops of the 2nd and 1st Belorussian Fronts achieved major successes - they reached the coast of the Baltic Sea, cut the East Pomeranian group into two parts and surrounded several divisions. The troops of both fronts began preparing for military operations with the goal of eliminating the enemy’s 2nd and 3rd tank armies. The troops of the 1st Guards Tank Army were given the task, together with the 1st Army of the Polish Army and part of the forces of the 19th and 3rd Shock Armies, to destroy enemy troops surrounded west of Neustettin, and the 2nd Guards Tank Army was supposed to work together with the 61st The 1st and 47th armies defeat the Altdamm group.

As a result of simultaneous attacks on converging directions of troops of the 1st Guards Tank Army from the north, the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps, the 1st Army of the Polish Army from the east and southeast and the 7th Rifle Corps of the 3rd Shock Army from the south and from the west, by the end of March 7, the encircled enemy group consisting of five divisions of the enemy's 10th SS Corps was destroyed. At the same time, more than 8 thousand soldiers and officers were captured, including the commander of the 10th SS Corps with his headquarters.

With the defeat of the Altdamm group, the fighting of the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front in Eastern Pomerania ended. Preparations began for the Berlin offensive operation.

At the same time, the pace of advance of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front decreased noticeably. For more active actions there were not enough mobile connections. Therefore, Marshal Rokossovsky turned to Stalin with a request to place at his disposal, at least temporarily, one of the two tank armies of the 1st Belorussian Front. On March 5, Stalin ordered, no later than March 8, to temporarily (until March 24) transfer the 1st Guards Tank Army to Marshal Rokossovsky, including the tank brigade of the 1st Polish Army. At the same time, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front were ordered to defeat the enemy group in the area of ​​Danzig, Stolp, capture the cities of Danzig, Gdynia and reach the Baltic Sea coast no later than March 20. The 1st Guards Tank Army and the tank brigade of the 1st Polish Army were ordered to be used to develop an attack on the left wing of the front.

In order to quickly develop the offensive of the troops of the left wing of the 2nd Belorussian Front, where it was planned to soon introduce the 1st Guards Tank Army into battle, Marshal Rokossovsky brought the 3rd Guards Tank Corps into the battle. This, as well as the deep penetration of the troops of the front’s right wing into the enemy’s position, dramatically changed the situation in the central sector of the front. The enemy, convinced that it would not be possible to hold defensive positions here, began to hastily withdraw the main forces of the 2nd Army to the positions of the Danzig-Gdynia fortified area. The withdrawal of troops was covered by strong rearguards.

On March 8, units of the 3rd Guards Tank and 132nd Rifle Corps of the 19th Army captured the city of Stolp (Slupsk). In order to speed up the advance of troops, Marshal Rokossovsky ordered the 8th and 1st Guards Tank Corps on the shoulders of the enemy to capture Danzig with a daring blow. The 3rd Guards Tank Corps was supposed to occupy Gdynia. The troops of the 1st Guards Tank Army had to overtake the formations of the 19th Army and capture the crossings across the river. Leba and the Brenkenhof Canal, defeat the opposing enemy units and reach the coast of the Danzig Bay no later than March 12. The troops of the 2nd Shock Army were to attack Danzig from the south.

Reichsführer SS Himmler, demanding that Danzig be defended at all costs, threatened officers who showed cowardice with severe punishment. These measures had an effect. The enemy desperately resisted, launched counterattacks, throwing dozens of tanks into battle. However, tank formations and the rifle units of the 2nd Belorussian Front, which relentlessly followed them, immediately broke through the enemy’s defenses at the line of Zukau, Karthaus, Witzkov, Shurov, Shmolzin. Units of the 3rd Guards Tank Corps were the first to cross the river. Leba in the area of ​​the city of Lauenburg (Lembork) and together with formations of the 19th Army liberated this city on March 10.

The 1st Guards Tank Army with the Polish tank brigade went on the offensive on March 9, having 455 tanks and self-propelled guns. Advance detachments of the army under the command of Colonel V.I. Zemlyakov and Lieutenant Colonel V.N. Musatova north-west of Lauenburg captured bridges across the river. Leba. Taking advantage of the favorable situation, the lead tank brigades crossed the Leba and began to advance towards the Danzig Bay. The 8th Guards Mechanized Corps, in cooperation with units of the 19th Army, occupied Neustadt (Wejherowo) on March 12. On the same day, the 11th Guards Tank Corps reached the coast of Danzig Bay.

Despite the measures taken by Marshal Rokossovsky, the enemy still managed to retreat to the Gdynia-Danzig fortified area. Retreating, he destroyed and mined roads, lowered dams, and flooded entire areas. The advance of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front was also hampered by refugees who clogged highways and country roads. Marshal Rokossovsky, trying not to give the enemy time to organize a defense, decided not to make complex regroupings, but to immediately begin an assault on the fortifications when the armies arrived. At the same time, he took into account that the offensive zone had narrowed significantly. If at the beginning of the East Pomeranian operation it was 240 km, now it did not exceed 60. The width of the strip of each of the armies operating in the main direction was only 10–12 km.

The main blow by the forces of the 2nd shock and 65th armies was delivered in the direction of Zoppot at the junction of the Danzig and Gdynia defensive regions in order to dissect the enemy’s defending group and destroy it piece by piece. The troops of the right wing of the front were to strike Danzig from the south and west. On the left wing, it was planned to use the forces of the 1st Guards Tank Army, in cooperation with the 19th Army, to capture the city of Gdynia, with part of the forces to occupy the Oxheft, Mechlinken, Casimir area, and with a separate detachment to assist rifle units in capturing the Putziger-Nerung Spit. The commander of the 4th Air Army was ordered to assist the advancement of the advancing troops and fight enemy ships by bombing and assaulting the battle formations of the defending enemy.

On March 14, troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front launched an offensive against the Danzig-Gdynia group of the enemy, which offered stubborn resistance. Despite this, the troops of the 70th Army, having broken through three lines of enemy fortifications, together with the 3rd Guards Tank Corps and part of the forces of the 49th Army occupied Tsoppot on March 25. After that, they rushed to Oliva, a suburb of Danzig.

At this time, formations of the 1st Guards Tank Army, having overthrown the enemy barriers, reached Putziger-Wik Bay. After this, they began to advance along the shore of the bay to strike Gdynia from the north. Together with the tankers, units of the 19th Army also advanced here. By March 23, General Katukov's troops made their way to the last line of enemy defense. Attempts to immediately break into Gdynia were unsuccessful. The tankers were met by heavy fire from anti-tank guns, tank destroyers, mines, and metal hedgehogs.

With the arrival of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front to the Gulf of Danzig, the enemy group was cut into three parts: one of them held Danzig, the second held Gdynia, and the third held the Putziger-Nerung Spit.

Marshal Rokossovsky entrusted the liquidation of the Gdynia group to the 70th, 19th, and 1st Guards Tank Armies, which were supported by the 4th Air Army. Overcoming enemy defenses, the troops of these armies approached Gdynia and started street battles. By the decision of General Katukov, assault detachments were created, each of which included a motorized rifle battalion, a tank company, a battery of self-propelled guns, a division of 76 mm guns, a battery of 152 mm howitzers, a platoon of M-13, M-31 and armored personnel carriers, as well as a sapper company. In fierce battles, assault troops liberated house by house, block by block. On March 28, the city was completely liberated from the enemy. On March 30, troops of the 2nd Shock, 65th, 49th and 70th armies occupied Danzig. The remnants of the German 2nd Army, blocked in the Gdynia region, were defeated by April 4 by the troops of the 19th Army. The Danzig group capitulated on May 9.

During the East Pomeranian offensive operation, troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front and the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front defeated 21 divisions and 8 brigades of the enemy, liberated East Pomerania and reliably provided the right wing of the Soviet troops operating in the Berlin direction. The enemy lost more than 100 thousand soldiers and officers as prisoners alone. Soviet troops captured about 3,000 guns, about 2,000 mortars, up to 1,000 tanks and self-propelled guns, more than 8,000 machine guns, several warships, 50 submarines (out of order). The losses of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front and the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front that took part in the operation were: irrevocable - 55.3 thousand, sanitary - 179 thousand people, 1027 tanks and self-propelled guns, 1005 guns and mortars, 1073 combat airplane

Success in the operation was the result of rapid and continuous combat operations, the correct choice of the direction of the main attack, and the timely introduction of additional forces into the battle both from the reserves of the Supreme Command Headquarters and through extensive maneuver by troops, especially tank and mechanized formations. Their rapid actions in operational depth did not allow the enemy to organize defense on lines prepared in advance. During the pursuit of the enemy, advanced detachments were widely used.

For exemplary performance of command tasks, the Order of Lenin was awarded to the 40th and 45th Guards Tank Brigades, and the Order of Suvorov, 2nd degree, to the 11th Guards Tank and 8th Guards Mechanized Corps of the 1st Guards Tank Army. Many units and formations were given the honorary names Pomeranian, Gdynia and Gdańsk.

On March 8, 1945, the commander of the armored and mechanized forces of the 1st Belorussian Front, Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces G.N. The eagle signed the award sheet with the following content:

“...1st Guards. tank army led by the Guards. Colonel General t/v comrade KATUKOV, in 1945 she participated in two large combat operations of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, showing examples of bold and swift strikes against the enemy.

In the Warsaw operation of the 1st Belorussian Front, the 1st Guards. The tank army, after entering the breakthrough from the Varka bridgehead, crossed the river. Pilica in the Nowe Miasto region and, developing a rapid offensive, captured the city of Lodz. Subsequently, having crossed the river. Varta, army comrade. KATUKOVA reached the city of Poznan and, cutting off the escape routes for the enemy’s Poznan group, without stopping, rushed to the borders of Germany. Having invaded the Brandenburg province and overcoming fierce enemy resistance, the 1st Guards. tank army under the leadership of comrade. KATUKOVA was the first to reach the Oder River.

In the Pomeranian operation of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front / March 1-7, 1945 / troops of the 1st Guards. The tank army, having entered the breakthrough with a swift blow, cut through the defenses of the 11th German Army and decisively rushed towards its retreat. Overcoming stubborn enemy resistance and developing a rapid offensive, on the 4th day of the operation the army, led by Comrade. KATUKOV, reached the Baltic Sea near the city of Kolberg, thereby brilliantly completing the task assigned to it.

CONCLUSION: For the skillful and successful conduct of an offensive operation, as a result of which the enemy was disorganized and deprived of the opportunity to regroup his forces, and thereby inflicting great damage on the enemy in manpower and equipment, Guards. Colonel General of Tank Forces Comrade. KATUKOV is worthy of being awarded the Order of “SUVOROV, FIRST DEGREE...” .

The Military Council of the 1st Belorussian Front, having considered this petition, made its conclusion: “Worthy of being awarded the title of twice Hero of the Soviet Union.” The Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council dated April 6, 1945 stated: “For the exemplary performance of combat missions of the Command on the front of the fight against the German invaders, which gives the right to receive the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, award M.E. Katukov with the second Gold Star medal.

	Eastern Pomerania, northern Poland
	Victory of the USSR
Opponents
	Germany
Commanders
K. Rokossovsky	G. Himmler
Strengths of the parties
26 divisions	920,500 people + 75,600 (1st Polish Army)
More than 90,000 killed, 100,000 prisoners, 500 tanks, about 3,500 guns and mortars, 430 aircraft, a large number of ships	225,692 (of which 52,740 are irrevocable) + 8,668 in the 1st Polish Army

(1945) - a strategic military operation of the USSR armed forces against German troops during the Great Patriotic War. (map)

Background

As a result of the Vistula-Oder operation, Soviet troops reached the Oder and captured bridgeheads on its western bank. The troops of the 1st Belorussian Front crossed the Oder in the Küstrin area and were only 60 km from Berlin. The German command began

deployment in Eastern Pomerania of part of the forces of the Vistula Army Group under the command of Reichsführer SS G. Himmler with the task of striking the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front, defeating its troops in the Küstrin area and disrupting the preparations for the Soviet offensive on Berlin.

Having learned about the concentration of German forces in Eastern Pomerania, the Soviet Supreme High Command on February 8 ordered the 2nd Belorussian Front to defeat the East Pomeranian group, establish control over the Danzig-Gdynia region and clear the Baltic Sea coast from the mouth of the Vistula to the Oder from the enemy.

On the Soviet side, troops of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts were involved in the operation - 2nd Shock, 3rd Shock, 19th, 47th, 49th, 61st, 65th, 70th Army, 1st and 2nd Guards Tank Armies, 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps, 1st Army of the Polish Army, 4th, 6th and 18th Air Armies. In total, the armies of the fronts included 78 rifle divisions, 10 tank and mechanized corps, 4 brigades, 2 fortified areas, in the Polish Army - 5 infantry divisions, 1 cavalry brigade and 1 separate tank brigade - a total of 920,500 soldiers. The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front consisted of 45 rifle divisions, 3 cavalry divisions, 3 tank and 1 mechanized corps, 1 separate tank brigade and 1 fortified area; the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front involved in the operation included 27 rifle divisions, 3 cavalry divisions, 2 mechanized and 4 tank corps, 2 separate tank brigades, 1 self-propelled artillery brigade and 1 fortified area. Initially, the task of defeating German troops in Eastern Pomerania was assigned to the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front under the command of Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky, but later the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front were also involved in participation.

The German Army Group "Vistula", which occupied the defense in Eastern Pomerania, on February 10, 1945, consisted of the 2nd, 11th Armies (39th Panzer Corps and 3rd SS Panzer Corps, 10th Panzer Division, 11th I SS Grenadier Division "Nordland", 15th SS Grenadier Division), 3rd Panzer Army. In total, Army Group Vistula consisted of more than 30 divisions and brigades, including 8 tank divisions, fortress garrisons and 8 battle groups. About 300 aircraft for various purposes were based at the airfields of Eastern Pomerania. Active support for the ground units was provided by the German fleet, based in Gdynia, Danzig and Kolberg, carrying out transportation, transferring units, and also providing fire support to the troops with large and medium-caliber guns. The German group in Eastern Pomerania was personally led by SS Reichsführer Heinrich Himmler.

Troop positions at the start of the operation

In front of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front, units of the 2nd German Field Army stood in defense. Opposite the right wing of the front in the sector from Elbing to Shvets were the 20th, 23rd Army Corps and the Rappard Corps Group. They occupied defenses along the left banks of the Nogat and Vistula rivers, and also held the Graudenz fortress. On the Vistula River, in the Shvets-Linde sector, formations of the German 27th Army, 46th Tank and 18th Mountain Rifle Corps defended. There were up to 12 divisions in the first line, and 4-6 divisions in the second line of defense.

In front of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, formations of the 11th German Army operated: in the Linde-Kallis sector, the Tettau corps group, two landwehr divisions and troops of the 10th SS Corps; in the Kallis - Grabov sector there are formations of the 2nd Army, 3rd and 39th Tank Corps, 10th SS Corps and three reserve divisions.

The troops of the Soviet Army had to overcome the most powerful fortified defenses, saturated with all types of engineering structures. Eastern Pomerania is a hilly plain with areas of forest. The highest point is Mount Turmberg, 331 meters high. Many rivers, lakes and canals were used for defensive purposes, fortified and adapted for long-term defense.

The main line of defense of the Germans in Pomerania is the so-called “Pomeranian Wall”, built on the Polish-German border in 1933, and running from the Stolpmünde area to the Warta and Oder rivers along the line: Stolp, Rummelsburg, Neustettin, Schneidemuhl. The basis of the Pomeranian fortifications were reinforced concrete structures - pillboxes, caponiers and half-caponiers, covered field-type structures, numerous minefields, gouges, anti-tank ditches filled with water, and a network of wire barriers. The cities of Stolp, Rummelsburg, Deutsch-Krone, Schneidemuhl, Neustettin were key strongholds of the Pomeranian Wall, in fact, fortress cities. In the coastal area, near Danzig, Gdynia and in the Hel region, fortified areas were prepared, and artillery positions for heavy artillery were equipped in the areas of Leba, Rügenwaldemünde, Stolpmünde and Kolberg. The most powerful defense centers were the cities of Gdynia and Danzig, the most heavily fortified and prepared for long-term defense.

In the Danzig area, two defense lines were prepared with a large number of trenches, trenches, machine gun points and bunkers. The first defensive line consisted of 5 lines of trenches with a depth of 3 to 5 km and ran along the lines of Bürgerwiesen, Ora, Praust, Unter Kalbude and Glettkau. The second line of defense had three components: the first - the defensive line - Bankau, height 160, Oliva, with a depth of 1 to 2.5 km, the second - the defensive line - Takendorf, Lauenthal, Brösen, it consisted of two lines of trenches. The third defensive line ran directly along the outskirts of Danzig. The second line of defense ran 5-7 km from the city.

In the southeast of Danzig there was a canal and the area as a whole was impassable for tanks, in addition, on the same side there were forts of the old fortress, adapted for defense. In Danzig itself, all stone buildings were prepared for firing, numerous machine gun points and artillery positions were equipped, and the windows of the houses were covered with sandbags and bricks. The blocks were connected by trenches, barricades were erected on the main streets, and all street intersections were shot at from several directions from pillboxes and bunkers.

Gdynia was also strongly fortified. The defensive area near Gdynia included two defense lines. Within a radius of 12-15 km from the city, an almost continuous chain of trenches, obstacles and trenches with artillery positions, pillboxes and bunkers, reinforced with minefields and several strips of barbed wire, was prepared. The first line of defense ran along the line of Tsoppot, Kvashin, Kolleckau, Reda, Reva and had a depth of 3 to 5 km. The second line of defense consisted of three lines of trenches and was prepared 5-7 km from Gdynia, at the line of Kolibken, Weltzendorf and Yanovo; there were 4-5 pillboxes and bunkers per 1 km of the front. Gdynia was also prepared for street battles, the city was blocked off with barricades, tank-hazardous areas were mined, all streets and intersections were shot through, numerous artillery positions, mortar and machine gun positions, and ammunition positions were prepared.

To the north of Gdynia, on the heights near the settlements of Oxheft, Oblusz and Kazimierz, a defensive line was also prepared, on which German troops were to gain a foothold in the event of a withdrawal from Gdynia.

Between the Gdynia and Danzig defensive areas, along the line of Zukau, Exau, Koble, Kolletzkau, height 221, a defensive position of three trenches was built, and a continuous minefield was built in front of the position.

A strong defensive line, 3-5 km deep, was also built on the left bank of the Vistula River, from Bydgoszcz to the mouth of the Vistula River, with a large number of field-type structures - bunkers, with prepared anti-tank obstacles and a large number of wire barriers.

The troops of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts had to overcome such a complex defense. Preparation for the operation required the transfer of a large number of troops, the acceleration of the repair of railways and roads in the front zone in order to speed up the delivery of ammunition and other equipment for the troops, a lot of work was done by automobile, railway, sapper and engineering units.

Progress of the operation

On February 10, 1945, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front from the Graudenz, Zempelburg line went on the offensive and advanced from 5 to 10 km during the day of battle. The troops of the 2nd Shock Army completed the defeat of the garrison of the previously blocked city of Elbing (Elblag) and liberated the city. The troops of the 65th Army occupied the cities of Shvets and Schönau, units of the 49th Army encountered very strong resistance and were able to advance only 2-3 km. The Germans launched numerous counterattacks using tanks to prevent the advance. The advance was also greatly hampered by muddy conditions and swampy terrain. In five days, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front advanced 15-40 km, overcoming stubborn resistance. On February 15, 1945, units of the 70th Army, the 1st Guards Tank Corps and the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps occupied the city of Chojnice - a powerful fortified point and a large transport hub, where 8 highways and 6 railways converged. The fighting for the city was fierce. The tankers of the 1st Guards Tank Corps were the first to break into the streets of the city and captured the station; rifle units, block by block, knocked out the Germans from their positions. On February 16, 1945, Moscow saluted the valiant troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front with 21 salvos from 220 guns, which liberated the city of Chojnice. Many units and formations were awarded high government awards, and some of them were given the honorary title of “Khoinicki”.

Also, on February 15, units of the 70th Army occupied the city of Tukhel (Tukholya). On February 16, 1945, units of the 2nd Shock Army joined the operation, completing the regrouping and reaching their original positions. The German resistance was extremely fierce; Soviet troops had to literally gnaw out strongholds and nodes of resistance from the Germans. In particular, the troops of the 76th Guards and 385th Rifle Divisions occupied the settlements of Guttowitz, Johannesberg, Kweki and Klodnya only after stubborn fighting, often ending in hand-to-hand combat.

Fierce fighting took place in the Chersky direction, where the troops of the 49th Army were advancing. On the night of February 17, units of the 385th and 191st Infantry Divisions managed to cross the Schwarzwasser River near the village of Sauermühle using available means and occupy the city of Oshe, a strong stronghold on the way to the city of Chersk. On the approaches to this city, along the line - heights 122.1 and 129.3, Lake Tuchno, the right bank of the river. Wilgarten, a strong defense was created. Repeated attempts by the 199th Infantry Division to overcome this defense were unsuccessful. Taking into account the failures of past battles, the commander of the 492nd Infantry Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Lyamaev, decided to break through the enemy defenses in this area with a surprise attack by a small detachment at night. The rapid attack stunned the enemy, and he did not open fire for the first 15–20 minutes. This was enough for the detachment to break into the depths of the enemy’s defenses and attack their positions at a height. 122.1. The capture of an enemy stronghold by units of the 492nd Infantry Regiment disrupted the entire system of its defense at this line. The enemy, not knowing the current situation and the number of our forces that went on the offensive at night, fearing encirclement, began to withdraw his forces to the northwest to Chersk. Units of the 199th Infantry Division, having established that the enemy had begun to retreat, went into pursuit. Together with the 492nd Infantry Regiment, the neighboring 584th Infantry Regiment began to advance. They quickly moved forward and literally on the shoulders of the retreating enemy burst into the city of Chersk and by one in the morning cleared it of the enemy.

Heavy fighting took place in the offensive zone of the 238th and 139th rifle divisions of the 49th Army, in the area of ​​st. Lonsk and the village of Gonskinets.

At the line of Meve, Czersk, Chojnice, the offensive of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front was temporarily suspended due to increasing resistance and the need to strengthen the attacking groups. Units of the 19th Army under Lieutenant General G.K. Kozlov advanced to the offensive area.

Advancing for several days, by February 19, 1945, the front troops advanced 50-70 km deep into the German defense, but, nevertheless, were unable to complete the initially assigned tasks.

The offensive in the zone of the 1st Belorussian Front, where units of the 47th, 61st, 1st and 2nd Guards Tank Armies, the 1st Army of the Polish Army and the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps were advancing, also developed slowly. On February 10, units of the 1st Army of the Polish Army took the city of Merkisz-Friedlyand (Miroslavets), on February 11, units of the 47th Army occupied the city of Deutsch-Krone. On February 16, 1945, the Germans, with the forces of six tank divisions, launched a counterattack on the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front from the Stargard area and forced the 47th Army to retreat 8-12 km, occupying the cities of Piritz (Pyritz), Ban (Bang), but on February 20 everywhere went on the defensive. The 93rd, 126th, 225th and 290th infantry divisions were transferred from Courland to reinforce Army Group Vistula. It was also planned to transfer units of the 6th Panzer Army, but an even more difficult situation on the southern wing of the front, in Hungary, forced the German command to transfer tank units to this area of ​​the front.

On February 24, 1945, the Soviet offensive resumed. It was supposed to strike in the direction of the city of Kezlin and cut the German group in Pomerania into two parts, which were later supposed to be destroyed: the eastern one by the forces of the 2nd Belorussian Front, the western one by the 1st Belorussian Front. The task of the 2nd Belorussian Front was to defeat the 2nd German Army in the area of ​​Gdynia and Danzig and clear the sea coast, the 1st Belorussian Front was to destroy units of the 11th German Army with attacks on Altdamm, Gollnow and Kamin and reach the coast of the Gulf of Stettin and Pomeranian Bay.

On February 24, troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front delivered the main blow with the forces of the 19th and 70th armies from the area southwest of Chojnice in the direction of Kezlin. The German defense was broken through the front along a 12 km long section, and the army troops managed to advance 10-12 km during the day of fighting. The Germans launched multiple counterattacks, supported by tanks and aircraft, but were forced to retreat. On February 25, the breakthrough front was expanded to 30 km. On February 26, units of the 19th Army captured large German defense points - the cities of Baldenberg (Bialy-Bur) (together with units of the 3rd Guards Tank Corps), Pollnow (Polanow), Schlochau (Czluchow) and Stegers (Rzeczenica). By the end of February 27, front troops had advanced into the depths of German defenses up to 70 km, occupying the cities of Bublitz and Hammerstein (Charne). On February 28, units of the 19th and 70th armies cleared the cities of Neustettin (Szczecinek) and Prechlau (Przechlewo) from the Germans.

On March 1, 1945, after powerful artillery preparation, the offensive of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front began, the 3rd Shock Army of General N.P. Simonyak, the 61st Army of General P.A. Belov and the 1st Army went forward Polish. As a result of a strong blow from our rifle and tank formations, the German defense in the offensive zone of the 3rd Shock Army was broken through by the end of March 1 to a depth of 15-25 km. The 5th German Infantry Division, which was hit by Soviet troops, was defeated. Its remnants began to retreat along forest roads to Dramburg. The defeated units of the German 14th Panzer Division in scattered groups also began to retreat to Wangerin, abandoning convoys, military equipment and weapons.

The battles to break through the German defenses in the offensive zone of the 61st Army proceeded somewhat differently. Taking up defensive positions in pre-prepared positions, at the turn of the river. Inna, the Germans put up fierce resistance. The troops of the 61st Army first had to overcome the water barrier and only after that, turning around on the opposite bank of the river. Inna, they could attack enemy positions.

Later, the 1st and 2nd Guards Tank Armies entered the battle. During March 2-4, the most stubborn and bloody battles took place throughout the entire offensive zone. During the first two days of the offensive, our troops advanced 90 km with advanced units and 65 km with main forces. Front troops met especially fierce resistance in Bellegarde, Neustettin and Rummelsburg. On March 3, Berwalde (by the forces of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps, Lieutenant General V.V. Kryukov), Wangerin (265th Infantry Division, Major General D.E. Krasilnikov), Labes, Tempelburg (Chaplinek), Freienwalde (Hoziwel), Schiefelbein were occupied (Svidvin), March 4, part of the 3rd Shock Army, 1st Guards. tank army and the 1st Army of the Polish Army liberated the cities of Dramburg and Falkenburg (Zlocenets), on March 5 - tankmen of the 8th Guards Mechanized Corps of Major General I.F. Dremov took Bellegarde (Bialogard) from the 1st Guards Tank Army, 2 the 1st Guards Army - the cities of Greifenberg, Gulzow, Naugard and Plate (Rafts), and the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps - the city of Polcin (Połczyn-Zdrój). As a result of a rapid offensive in the area southeast of Bellegarde, at the end of the day on March 4, it was surrounded 4 German divisions of the 10th SS Corps (on March 7 this group was destroyed). The Germans understood the complexity of the current situation and sought to delay the advance of the Red Army troops at any cost; in particular, the Jutland and Netherlands regiments, the non-commissioned officer school, the Charlemagne infantry brigade and the Esber battalion were transferred to the Kezlin area.

But, despite all this, on March 5, soldiers of the 19th Army took Kezlin by storm, in the battles for which units of the 32nd and 15th Infantry Divisions, the 1st SS Infantry Division, the Polizei Division and the Tank Division were defeated. SS division "Totenkopf", and the front troops managed to reach the sea coast, the German group in Pomerania was cut into two parts. The tankmen of the 45th Guards Tank Brigade, Colonel N.V. Morgunov, were the first to reach the sea. Tankers of the 1st Guards Tank Army managed to occupy the city of Kerlin on the same day. During March 5-13, 1945, troops of the 1st Belorussian Front fought with defeated units of the 11th German Army, completely defeating the 5th Light Infantry Division and causing serious damage to the 15th, 163rd Infantry, 402nd Reserve infantry divisions and the Berwalde infantry division blocked the garrison of Kolberg, which continued to resist. On March 5, units of the 61st Army, with the support of the 16th Air Army, took the city of Stargard (Stargard-Szczecinski). On March 6, tankers of the 2nd Guards Tank Army occupied a large fortified point - the city of Kamin, and on March 7, after three days of stubborn fighting, the city of Gollnov was taken by storm, in the battles for which units of the 52nd Guards Rifle Division distinguished themselves.

On the same day, March 7, troops of the 61st Army took the city of Massov (Mashevo), and the 3rd Shock Army took the city of Stepenitz (Stepnitsa). The main forces of the German 11th Army retreated to Altdamm, attempts to take which failed on the move. The Germans managed to occupy defensive lines and met the attackers with a shower of artillery, mortar and machine gun fire and counterattacks.

The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front continued the offensive, knocking out the stubbornly defending enemy. Aviation actively assisted the advancing troops, bombing enemy battle formations, rear areas, roads and communications points, almost continuously carrying out bombing strikes, including at night. On March 3, the 19th Army liberated the city of Rummelsburg (Miastko), stubbornly defended by the Germans, the garrison of which was further reinforced by the 4th SS Panzer Group, the 203rd Infantry Division and the 549th Volkssturm Division; on March 4, tank crews of the 1st Guards Tank Army took Treptow (Trzebiatow) and Regenwalde (Resko). On March 6, troops of the 2nd Shock Army drove the Germans out of Grudziadz and Preussisch-Stargard (Starogard-Gdanski), and on March 7 they took the city of Mewe (Wrath). On March 8, units of the 49th Army - 191st Infantry Division, Major General Lyaskina G.O., part of the forces of the 385th Infantry Division, Major General Suprunova M.F., took the city of Berent, troops of the 70th Army - 38th Guards. SD Colonel Abdullaev Yu.M., 165th SD Colonel Kaladze N.I., 369th SD Colonel I.A. Golubev - the city of Byutov (Bytuv), and units of the 19th Army and 4th Air Army - Stolp (Slupsk).

Units of the left flank of the 2nd Belorussian Front moved forward 75-80 km in 4 days of fighting - March 10 - 13, and approached the fortifications of the Gdynia and Danzig fortified areas, where they were delayed by the stubborn resistance of the Germans, who had prepared for defense.

On March 10, units of the 49th Army took the city of Karthaus, and units of the 19th Army took the city of Lauenburg (Lembork). On March 11, units of the 2nd Shock Army occupied the city of Dirschau (Tczew), on March 12, 1945, formations of the 40th Guards Rifle Corps of the 19th Army and the 8th Guards Mechanized Corps of the 1st Guards Army captured the city of Neustadt (Wejherowo) . A large German garrison in this city was defeated, more than 1,000 soldiers and officers surrendered. In addition, units of the 1st Guards Tank Army also occupied the city of Putzig (Putsk) and reached the Baltic Sea coast in the area of ​​the Danzig Bay, occupying about 100 more settlements, including Kvashin, Gniewau, Gross-Schschlatau, Zellistrau, Shlavoshin, Polzin, Karven, Kolletzkau, Reschke, Werblin.

On March 14-18, there were bloody battles in Kolberg, on the outskirts of which parts of the Soviet army reached on March 5, and where the Germans offered fierce and fierce resistance, with the despair of the doomed. On March 18, units of the 1st Army of the Polish Army and tankers of the 1st Guards Tank Army completely defeated the German garrison of Kolberg and liberated the city.

On March 16-20, troops of the 1st Belorussian Front fought to eliminate German units that had retreated to the Altdamm area. Units of the 4th SS Mechanized Division, 28th SS Infantry Division, 1st Marine Division and the 379th Infantry Regiment of the 169th Infantry Division defended here. The average density was 5-7 km of front per division. The defending enemy forces were reinforced by one brigade of assault guns (108 assault guns), five artillery divisions of the RGK artillery, one anti-tank division (in addition to 36 75-mm anti-tank guns, this division had three companies of tank destroyers armed with Faustpatrons).

On March 20, 1945, after stubborn and bloody battles, Altdamm was taken by the troops of the 61st Army. In total, as a result of the defeat of the Altdamm group, the Germans lost more than 40,000 soldiers killed, more than 12,000 prisoners, 126 tanks and self-propelled guns, more than 200 guns of various calibers, 154 mortars and many other weapons and military equipment were captured. During the capture of the city, units of the 12th and 75th Guards Rifle Divisions, the 23rd, 212th and 234th Rifle Divisions, tank crews of the 312th Guards, 1811th, 1818th, 1899th self-propelled artillery regiments distinguished themselves , artillerymen of the 63rd Howitzer Brigade and the 97th Heavy Howitzer Brigade, the 32nd and 41st Guards Mortar Divisions, pilots of the 3rd Bomber Air Corps and the 3rd Fighter Air Corps of the 16th Air Army. In Moscow, in honor of the troops who liberated Altdamm, a salute was given with 12 artillery salvoes from 124 guns.

The troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, having defeated the German group east of the Oder, thus ensured the safety of their flank and could concentrate on preparing the Berlin operation.

The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front had to defeat the strongest part of the East Pomeranian group - the 2nd Army, which occupied the Gdynia and Danzig defensive fortified areas. From March 14 to March 22, 1945, there were fierce battles to break through the German defense. Fierce fighting ensued along the entire offensive front, which continued day and night with short breaks. The troops of the 49th and 70th armies advanced on Zoppot, with the task of cutting the Danzig-Gdynia enemy group into two isolated groups, capturing the line of Oliva, Zoppot, Kolibken and reaching the Danzig Bay at this line. Overcoming stubborn German resistance, formations of the 49th and 70th armies slowly moved towards their intended target, literally gnawing away one position after another. The fighting was so stubborn that the advance of Soviet troops on some days was only hundreds of meters. Sometimes the destruction of a large defense stronghold took several days.

The Germans sometimes carried out up to twenty counterattacks with the support of tanks in order to hold the occupied lines. On March 25, troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front took the village of Zoppot and reached the coast of the Danzig Bay, cutting the German group into two parts - Gdynia and Danzig. Units of the 46th and 7th Tank Corps found themselves in Gdynia - the 32nd, 73rd, 215th, 227th, 252nd, 389th Infantry Divisions, 4th and 7th Tank Divisions, in Danzig - units of the 18th Mountain Jaeger, 20th, 23rd, 27th Army Corps - 7th, 23rd, 31st, 35th, 83rd, 251st and 337th -1st Infantry Division, 12th Airfield Division and 549th Volkssturm Division, Kampfgruppe Gumpel and two penal battalions. On the Putziger-Nerung spit, the enemy's 55th Army Corps, consisting of the 61st Infantry Division, coastal defense units and the remnants of various units, occupied the defense.

On the approaches to Gdynia, the Germans created a powerful defense, full of long-term reinforced concrete, concrete-stone and wood-earth structures, stone buildings adapted for long-term defense, a large number of trenches and various kinds of barriers. In the defense system, when organizing strongholds, the Germans widely used the construction of stationary anti-aircraft batteries, the guns of which were used to fire at both air and ground targets.

The creation of a strong defense around Gdynia was facilitated by the presence of reinforced concrete buildings and structures and favorable terrain conditions. The coastal strip in the Gdynia region is especially convenient for organizing defense. Hilly ridges with elevations up to 160-170 m above sea level cover the city from the southwest. Numerous ravines, heights with steep slopes, and dense forest covering almost 75% of this area give the area a sharply rugged character. The only good road leading from the west to Gdynia for 12 km in front of the city passes through a continuous chain of settlements (Janowo, Zagorz, Zissau, Killau, Grabau), which mainly consisted of strong stone buildings and were easily adapted for defense.

To the north of Gdynia there is a small plateau that rises 60-80 m above the surrounding area. This plateau, or the so-called Oxhefst bridgehead, is surrounded on the east and partly on the south by the sea, and on the north, west and southwest by marshy lowlands. On this plateau, the enemy created strong fortifications, which, combined with the natural conditions of the area, covered the approaches to Gdynia from the north. Terrain conditions (rough terrain, swamps, forest and sea) strengthened the German defense and, on the contrary, made the advance of the Soviet troops extremely difficult. Given the relative lack of roads, it was impossible to use tanks and self-propelled artillery with full efficiency.

Soviet attacks were followed by German counterattacks. In some areas, units of the 19th Army repelled 15-20 German counterattacks per day. In Gdynia, the Germans made extensive use of coastal and naval artillery - 12 batteries of coastal artillery and the artillery of 10-12 warships fired almost continuously at the attackers.

On March 24, troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front broke into the suburbs and streets of Gdynia, and on March 26 they began an assault on the city. On the night of March 27, the Germans began to retreat to the Oxhöft bridgehead. During the day, defeated German units, resisting in the city center, abandoning military equipment, ammunition and other military equipment and the wounded, partly tried to board ships in the port, and partly retreated fighting to a bridgehead in the Oxhöft area.

On March 28, 1945, after long, stubborn and bloody battles in the city, where the Germans fought for every house and trench, units of the 19th, 70th, and 1st Guards Tank Armies stormed the liberation of Gdynia, the largest port of Pomerania, and its suburbs Killau, Grabau and Zissau. In the battles in the Gdynia region, German troops lost more than 50,000 soldiers and officers killed, 229 tanks and self-propelled guns, 387 field guns, more than 70,000 rifles and machine guns, 1,003 machine guns, and more than 3,500 vehicles. Soviet troops took 18,985 prisoners, captured about 200 tanks and self-propelled guns, 600 guns of various calibers and purposes, 1,068 machine guns, 71 aircraft, 6,246 cars, 20 different ships, including the faulty cruisers "Schleswig", "Schleswig Holstein", " Gneisenau." Part of the Gdynia group - one tank, one motorized, one infantry division, one artillery brigade and six marine battalions - was blocked on the Oxheft bridgehead and continued resistance, fighting until April 4, 1945, when it was finally defeated. In the battles for Gdynia, units of the 38th Guards distinguished themselves. SD Colonel Abdullaev Yu.M., 369th SD Colonel I.A. Golubev, 1890th self-propelled artillery regiment Lieutenant Colonel Ignatov P.F., artillerymen of the 56th gun brigade Colonel F.G. Mezentsev, 75th light artillery brigade Colonel Olifer A.V., 77th Howitzer Brigade Colonel A.I. Kharlamov, 19th Anti-Tank Artillery Brigade Colonel G.G. Sukachev, 4th Guards Mortar Brigade Colonel I.A. Sukhushin (70th Army) , 313th Infantry Division Colonel Asafiev V.A., 310th Infantry Division Colonel N.V. Rogov, 27th Infantry Division Colonel E.V. Korshunov, 205th Infantry Division Major General Beloskursky M.A., 272nd Infantry Division Colonel Meshkova V.M., 1525th self-propelled artillery regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Danilov I.G., 10th Guards. SD Major General Khudalov Kh. A., 102nd Guards. SD Colonel S.I. Khramtsov, 7th Separate Guards Heavy Tank Regiment Lieutenant Colonel A.A. Povarov, 108th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment Major A.M. Potapov, 342nd Guards Heavy Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment Major S.B. Fishelson. , 1531st self-propelled artillery regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Balykov S.F., 156th heavy howitzer brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Kuznetsov D.M., 166th light artillery brigade, Colonel Mikhailenko M.A., 167th howitzer brigade, Colonel Tkachenko T.E. ., 9th heavy mortar brigade, Colonel D. T. Bryukhov, 41st mortar brigade, Colonel Zaretsky I. S., 58th howitzer brigade Colonel Skorobogatov D.I., 42nd mortar brigade Colonel Kirgetov I.A., 120th high-power howitzer brigade Colonel Turoverov M.I., 4th Guards mortar division Colonel Zhukov F. N., 27th anti-tank artillery brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Voitsekhovsky V.M., 44th anti-tank artillery brigade, Colonel N.G. Syrovatkin, 204th army cannon artillery brigade, Colonel A.N. Belov, 12th engineer-sapper brigade Colonel Kokorin N.V., 41st mine-engineering brigade Colonel N.V. Klementyev, 11th Guards Tank Corps Colonel A.Kh. Babajanyan, 4th assault air corps, aviation lieutenant general G.F. Baidukova .

Storm of Danzing

The culmination of the fighting in Eastern Pomerania was the assault on Danzig. Stubborn and fierce fighting took place here as well. Danzig was surrounded by a chain of newly built forts: Weiselmünde, Westerplatte, Neuharwasser and Heubude. All forts were well camouflaged and armed with powerful firepower. Danzig's land fortifications consisted of an old fortification belt surrounding the city from the south and east, and an outer fortification belt of modern construction with two heavily built fortified areas Bischofsberg and Hagelsberg. Both of these areas had a large number of reinforced concrete and stone-concrete fire structures, which were located at commanding heights. The territory adjacent to the city from the southeast and south could be flooded if necessary. The system of long-term structures was supplemented by defensive buildings of field fortification; in addition, buildings and entire blocks of the city were adapted for defense. All settlements located within a radius of 15 km from the city were also prepared for defense as strongholds and centers of resistance and had permanent garrisons. Thus, in the Danzig area, the Germans had a strong fortified area, equipped not only with field-type fortification buildings, but also with powerful long-term military structures. The Germans understood the strategic importance of the city and desperately resisted, defending themselves on prepared lines. On the evening of March 26, formations of the 2nd Shock Army and the 65th Army began fighting directly in the suburbs of Danzig. On the morning of March 27, the assault on Danzig began. Units of the 2nd Shock, 49th, 65th, 70th Armies, with the support of aviation from the 4th and 18th Air Armies, had to fight to knock out the Germans from every house, intersection, and street. For two days there were stubborn battles in the area of ​​a paper mill and a chemical plant in the northern part of the city - units of the 199th Infantry Division stormed these heavily fortified points with the support of 18 heavy guns placed on direct fire. But, despite all the determination of the German resistance, the resilience, courage and heroism of the German soldiers and Volkssturm militia, the soldiers of the Soviet army could no longer be stopped. During the fighting in Danzig, 10,000 soldiers and officers were captured, 140 tanks and assault guns, 358 field guns, and 45 disabled submarines were captured. The remnants of the German units of the 2nd Army were blocked on the Hel Spit and at the mouth of the Vistula River, capitulating only on May 9, 1945.

In the battles for Danzig, units of the 2nd Shock Army distinguished themselves - the 46th Infantry Division under Major General S.N. Borshchev, the 90th Infantry Division under Major General Lyashchenko N.G., the 372nd Infantry Division under Lieutenant Colonel P.V. Melnikov, 281 1st SD Colonel P. A. Kureni, 142nd SD Colonel G. L. Sonnikov, 381st SD Major General Yakusheva A. V., 326th SD Major General Kolchanov G. S., 321st SD Colonel Chesnokov V.K.; 8th Guards Tank Corps under Lieutenant General A.F. Popov; 1st Anti-Tank Artillery Brigade Colonel E.N. Malyavsky, 2nd Corps Artillery Brigade Major General A.I. Malofeev, 4th Anti-Tank Artillery Brigade Colonel A.S. Rybkin, 81st Army Cannon artillery brigade of Colonel Gnidin V.S., 1st Guards Assault Engineer Brigade of Colonel Vizirov A.F.; 65th Army - 354th SD of Major General Dzhandzhgava V.N., 193rd SD of Major General Skorobogatkin K.F., 44th Guards SD of Major General Borisov V.A., 186th SD of Colonel Velichko S.S., 108th Infantry Division under Major General Teremov P.A., 413th Infantry Infantry under Colonel Afanasyev F.S., 69th Infantry Infantry under Major General Makarov F.A., 15th Infantry Infantry under Colonel Varyukhin A. P., 37th Guards SD, Major General K.E. Grebennik, 8th Mechanized Corps, Major General A.N. Firsovich, 21st High Power Guards Howitzer Brigade, Colonel T.I. Bondarev, 38th heavy artillery brigade of Colonel A.A. Katunin, 79th light artillery brigade of Colonel Alferov P.N., 96th heavy howitzer brigade of Colonel A.F. Gorobets, 112th high-power howitzer brigade of Colonel G.P. Kuleshov, 28th mortar brigade Colonel F.N. Belyaev, 15th anti-tank artillery brigade Colonel S.I. Vasilenko, 147th army cannon artillery brigade Colonel M.S. Akimushkin, 19th mortar brigade Colonel M.M. Korolev ., 1st assault engineer brigade, Colonel Shitikov P. A., 14th engineer brigade, Colonel Vinkov M. M.

49th Army - 238th SD of Major General I.D. Krasnoshtanov, 139th SD of Major General Kirillov I.K., 330th SD of Major General Gusev V.A., 199th SD of Major General Kononenko M.P., 200th Infantry Division Colonel I.I. Melder, 380th Infantry Division Colonel A.D. Gorichev, 1st Guards Tank Corps Major General Panov M.F., 10th Guards Howitzer Brigade Colonel Vakhromeeva I.M., 16th Guards Cannon Artillery Brigade Colonel V.V. Sadkovsky, 20th Light Artillery Brigade Lieutenant Colonel F.M. Dolinsky, 48th Guards Heavy Howitzer Brigade Colonel L.A. Khvatov, 121st high-power howitzer brigade of Colonel Solovyov V.P., 5th mortar brigade of Colonel Bryukhanov V.F., 3rd assault engineer brigade of Colonel V.S. Zaitsev, 11th engineer brigade of Colonel Mirotvorsky G.M. .

70th Army - 136th Infantry Division Colonel V.I. Trudolyubov, 71st Infantry Division Colonel N.Z. Belyaev, 3rd Guards Tank Corps Lieutenant General A.P. Panfilov, 19th Anti-Tank Artillery Brigade Colonel G. G. Sukachev, 148th Army Cannon Artillery Brigade, Colonel S. A. Barmotin, 13th Guards Mortar Brigade, Colonel R. D. Kulichuk, 48th Engineer Brigade, Colonel P. N. Dobychin.

4th Air Army - 230th Assault Air Division, Major General Aviation Getman S.G., 233rd Assault Air Division, Colonel Smolovik V.I., 260th Assault Air Division, Colonel Kalugin G.A., 332nd Assault Air Division Colonel Tikhomirov M.I., 215th Fighter Air Division Colonel M. Yakushin, 229th Fighter Air Division Colonel M. Volkov, 309th Fighter Air Division Colonel V. N. Wuss, part of the forces of the 323rd Fighter Air Division Colonel Rybakova P.P., 329th Fighter Air Division of Colonel Osipov A.A., 327th Bomber Air Division of Colonel Pushkarev N.F., 325th Night Bomber Air Division of Colonel Pokoevoy G.P. 18th Air Army - 1st Guards Bomber Air Corps of Lieutenant General of Aviation Tupikov G.N., 2nd Guards Bomber Air Corps of Lieutenant General of Aviation Loginov E.F., 14th Guards Bomber Air Division of Colonel Kozhemyakin I.I., 45th Bomber Air Division of Major General aviation Lebedev V.I.

Results

During the East Pomeranian operation, 21 German divisions and 8 brigades were defeated, of which 6 divisions and 3 brigades were completely destroyed, eliminating the threat of a German attack from East Pomerania. German losses amounted to 90,000 soldiers and officers killed, 100,000 soldiers and officers captured, Soviet troops captured 850 tanks and assault guns, 430 aircraft, over 5,500 guns and mortars, and over 8,000 machine guns. The troops of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Front liberated 54 cities and hundreds of other settlements, freed thousands of Soviet prisoners of war and citizens of other European countries who were taken to work in Germany; with the occupation of Danzig and Gdynia, the Germans lost the shipyards where submarines were built , dozens of industrial enterprises, the most important seaports for communication with the blocked group in Courland. The historical Polish lands, once occupied by Germany, were returned to Poland and the Polish people.

The victory in Eastern Pomerania came at a high price. The losses of the Soviet army during the East Pomeranian operation amounted to more than 225,000 soldiers and officers, including irretrievable losses - 52,740 people, 172,474 people were wounded. On the territory of the Pomeranian Voivodeship of Poland, the former Eastern Pomerania, thousands of soldiers and officers of the Soviet army who died in the last battles of the Great Patriotic War are buried in dozens of settlements. In the village of Boyano, Pomeranian Voivodeship - 6055 soldiers, in Gdansk - 3092 (1206 known and 1886 unknown soldiers), in Gdynia - 1316 soldiers, including 132 known and 1184 unknown, in Wejherowo - 728 people, in Kartuzy - 1011 soldiers, in Sopot, the center of music festivals, and during the war, a former site of fierce battles - 932 soldiers and officers, in Tczew - 469 soldiers, in Chojnice - 844 soldiers, in the village of Lenzhice - 4249 soldiers, in Zhukovo - 3999 soldiers, in Chersk - 1141 soldiers, and thousands more soldiers and officers in dozens of other settlements.

The breakthrough of the Pomeranian Wall fortifications became the largest battle of the Second World War with the participation of Polish troops, 85 thousand military personnel of the 1st Army of the Polish Army took part in it. The irretrievable losses of the 1st Army of the Polish Army amounted to 2,575 soldiers and officers. 1,027 tanks and 1,073 aircraft were lost.

The exit of Soviet troops to the coast of the Baltic Sea over a long distance ensured the security of the flank of the group of Soviet troops operating in the Berlin direction, the basing system of the Baltic Fleet expanded, providing a blockade from the sea of ​​the encircled German groups in Courland and at the mouth of the Vistula. The 10 Soviet armies that completed the East Pomeranian operation began to regroup in the Berlin direction. Ahead were battles for the capital of Germany - Berlin.

Report-inventory No. 30504 of lists of irretrievable losses of sergeants and privates in the 369th Infantry Karachevsky Red Banner Division.

The names of some soldiers of the 1223rd Infantry Regiment of the 369th Infantry Division who died on February 17, 1945 and were buried in the Catholic cemetery near the village of Lichnowy, Chajlice County (Chojnice):

Azizov Nikolay Pavlovich - senior Sergeant, squad leader;

Jaman Alexey Semenovich - Red Army soldier, shooter;

Kozlov Vladimir Dmitrievich - sergeant, squad commander;

Kolesnik Ivan Osipovich - sergeant, medical instructor;

Kosolapov Grigory Aleksandrovich - junior sergeant, mortar gunner

Lisogor Ivan Vasilievich - Red Army soldier, mortar man;

Ptitsyn Mikhail Semenovich – junior sergeant, mortar gunner;

Bubble Ivan Ivanovich - charge. mortarman;

Sobolev Ivan Fedorovich - senior Sergeant, commander of the Ministry of Accounting;

Strokov Nikolai Prokofievich - sergeant, squad commander;

Chinaev Kuzma Leontyevich – charger. mortarman;

America? Your America is no more...

excerpt from a book
Alexey Valerievich Isaev Defeat 1945. Battle for Germany

"Solstice"

The start of the German offensive in Pomerania was eagerly awaited on both sides of the front. Zhukov expected the enemy to launch a counteroffensive from the first days of February. While the 2nd Belorussian Front was gnawing away at the defenses of the 2nd German Army, and the 1st Ukrainian Front was fighting with a front to the southwest, the 11th SS Panzer Army of Felix Steiner was concentrated on the northern flank of the 1st Belorussian Front. Arriving units could not always bring equipment with them and received it from factories. In Stettin, the Nordland division received 30 assault guns and 30 Panthers and gradually began to be drawn into battles in separate battle groups.

The strongest unit of the 11th Army was the 10th SS Panzer Division Frundsberg. On February 1, 1945, it consisted of 20,104 people (432 officers, 3,470 non-commissioned officers and 16,202 soldiers) - a high number of personnel in divisions, unlike the Red Army, was not uncommon in German formations in 1945. Commanded "Frundsberg" SS Major General Heinz Harmel is an experienced SS officer who went through the school of the largest battles of the Eastern Front. In the battles near Kharkov in February-March 1943, he commanded a motorized infantry regiment of the Das Reich division. In January 1945, Frundsberg took part in the German counter-offensive in the West in Upper Alsace (Operation Nordwind), and only on February 5 did the division embark on echelons. The formation's journey from west to east took place under Allied air attacks. On February 10, the first units of the division arrived in the area of ​​Stettin and Aldamma.

Solstice also involved the recently deployed “Führer Grenadiers” and “Führer Escorts” from the brigades in the division. The first numbered 9,775 people on February 15 (272 officers, 39 officials, 2,014 non-commissioned officers and 7,450 privates, including 327 “hiwis”). In fact, the Fuhrer Grenadiers remained a brigade - it included one tank-grenadier regiment of three battalions (including one battalion with armored personnel carriers). The division's tank fleet consisted of 28 Pz.IV and 28 Pz.V "Panther". The “Führer Grenadiers” were tactically subordinate to the 911th Assault Gun Brigade (32 StuG III). The Fuehrer-Begleit-Division (Fuehrer-Begleit-Division) numbered 9,506 people on February 15 (280 officers, 49 officials, 1,972 non-commissioned officers, 7,205 privates, including 339 Hiwis). Just like the Fuhrer Grenadiers, the division did not yet reach the division level - there was one tank-grenadier regiment of three battalions (one of them on an armored personnel carrier). In both divisions there was no reconnaissance battalion - it was replaced by a reconnaissance company. Of the two divisions, only the Führer Grenadiers could boast self-propelled artillery.

The scale of the planned Operation Solstice was gradually reduced in accordance with the forces allocated for it. As Guderian writes: “All that remained from the planned offensive plan was the idea of ​​​​a strike from the Arnswalde area with the aim of defeating the Russians north of the river. Wart, strengthen in Pomerania and maintain contact with West Prussia." Throughout the first half of February, in the areas of Arnswald and Stargard, the parties' forces accumulated and exchanged blows. The main participant in the battles with the concentrated units of Steiner’s army was the 61st Army of P.A. Belova, who was part of the 1st Belorussian Front. Already late in the evening of February 2, Belov wrote in an order to the corps subordinate to him: “The 61st army is regrouping with the front to the north.” The 89th Rifle Corps of the 61st Army on the perimeter of the encirclement of Schneidemuhl, starting from February 3, was replaced by units of the 47th Army. The 61st Army moved north, shifting the line from which a German counterattack could begin. At the same time, potential participants in the counterattack were eliminated; in particular, the garrison of the city of Nantik was destroyed.

It is interesting to note a fairly high percentage of heavy tanks in the armored units of Belov’s army. During the period described, there were 8 T-34 tanks only in the 85th Tank Regiment. There were 30 ISs in the 88th Heavy Tank Regiment and the 11th Guards. heavy tank brigade. The most numerous were the SU-76 - there were 43 of them in three self-propelled artillery and two tank regiments.

The city of Arnswalde mentioned by Guderian was surrounded on February 6, and about 3 thousand garrison men under the command of Major General Voght and 11 thousand refugees were blocked in it. The backbone of the garrison consisted of spare parts for rocket mortars and units of Steiner's army arriving in Eastern Pomerania. Thus, the Arnswald garrison included seven “Royal Tigers” from the 503rd battalion of SS heavy tanks, which only unloaded in the Wedella area, not far from Arnswald, on January 28th. The Royal Tigers were used to defend Arnswald in a very unique way: several vehicles were loaded onto railway platforms and became an improvised armored train. He moved along the railway that bypassed Arnswalde, and tanks fired at the attacking Soviet troops. The remaining tanks were used to maneuver through the city streets in the direction of Soviet attacks. The Arnswald garrison had no artillery: Soviet troops noted the presence of only two batteries of 81-mm mortars. The defense system was based on machine gun fire. At night, Yu-52 transport workers dropped cargo to the besieged garrison. In general, the defense of Arnswald developed according to a typical scenario for the “festungs” of the second half of the war: stubborn defense in complete encirclement, meager air supplies and illusory hopes for relief. However, Arnswalde was not in a worse position. On February 12, the garrison was asked to capitulate; General Voght rejected this offer: he already knew about the impending offensive.

On February 13, Zhukov, by operational directive No. 00813/op, ordered Belov to surrender sections of the front on the right flank of the army to units of the 7th Rifle Corps of the 3rd Shock Army and the 7th Guards. cavalry corps. After the surrender of their combat sectors, the corps of the 61st Army were transferred further to the west and replaced the 2nd Guards. tank army and 8th Guards. Tank Corps 1st Guards. tank army. Accordingly, the 47th Army reached the Oder line and took up positions on the left flank of the 61st Army. It was this directive from the front commander that determined the position of the Soviet troops at the beginning of the Solstice. The 80th Rifle Corps remained to storm Arnswalde, while the 9th Guards and 89th Rifle Corps moved into new areas and took up positions south of Stargard. Thus, the infantry of two rifle corps of the 61st Army advanced under the attack of the most powerful XXXIX Tank Corps. To strengthen the defense of the 9th Guards. Rifle Corps Zhukov sent the fresh 1818th self-propelled artillery regiment of the RGK, armed with the SU-85 (21 self-propelled guns).

The general offensive of Steiner's army began on February 16, 1945. On the right flank, the XXXIX Panzer Corps advanced, consisting of the Schlesien Panzer Division, the 10th SS Panzer Division Frundsberg, the 4th SS Grenadier Division Polizei and the 28th SS Division "Wallonia". Initially, Frundsberg and Schlesien attacked the left flank of the 12th Guards. tank corps. In the direction of the German offensive, units of the 34th Guards took up defensive positions. motorized rifle and 48th Guards. tank brigade. The newcomers were lucky: by 16.00 “Schlesien” and “Wallonia” occupied the city of Verben on the shores of Lake Madusee, and by 20.00 - Schöningen, thereby intercepting the Reichsstrasse No. 158 highway running from Piritz to Stargard. During the offensive, units of the “Politsai” captured a bridgehead on the river. Faule Ina south of Bloomberg.

The SS division "Frundsberg" went into battle literally "from the wheels." On the morning of February 16, one battalion of the tank regiment and the 22nd Panzer-Grenadier Regiment were still on the road. The tanks unloaded at the railway station south of Stargard and drove straight into battle. As a result, the Frundsberg offensive was less successful - Varnitz was held by units of the 66th Guards. tank brigade. It is significant that the brigades that found themselves under the blow of the German offensive were already pretty battered: in the 48th Guards. As of February 15, the tank brigade had only 20 T-34 tanks, and in the 66th Guards. tank brigade - 15 T-34 tanks. Since the 12th Guards. The tank corps turned out to be a tough nut to crack; Frundsberg’s actions on February 17, at Wenck’s insistence, were transferred to the direction of the Polizei’s advance. The 22nd Panzergrenadier Regiment "Frundsberg", arriving by rail, was already unloaded in Blumberg. A new blow came at the junction of the 75th and 12th Guards. rifle divisions of the 61st Army. The “Polizei” captured Delitz on February 17, and because of its right flank, “Frundsberg” developed an attack on Musherin, on the flank and rear of the 12th Guards. tank corps and the 75th rifle division. A counterattack was immediately launched on Musherin with the support of the 6th Guards. heavy tank regiment. Meanwhile, Frundsberg turned further west and captured Zallentin on February 17, further enveloping the right flank of the 12th Guards. tank corps. After the capture of Zallentin, Musherin was occupied. The situation was unstable - the German units that had captured Musherin were under continuous mortar fire. Tankers even preferred not to leave their tanks, hiding from the hail of shrapnel under their armor. Frundsberg's right neighbor, the 28th SS Volunteer Division, captured the Lindenbeg Hills on February 17.

From Musherin, the Frundsberg units began an attack south on the morning of February 18, to the area of ​​Lubtow and the Schönninger Canal. But this offensive no longer achieved its goals. By that time, the 397th Rifle Division of the 89th Rifle Corps of the 61st Army was advancing to the Lyubtov area. On February 17, 17 tanks of the 65th Guards were sent to Zallentin. tank brigade of the 9th Guards. tank corps with the task of knocking out the enemy from the master's yard on the southern outskirts of Zallentin. But instead of attacking at 19.00 on February 18, the tanks of the 65th Tank Brigade retreated northwest to Clemmen. As a result of the proceedings that soon followed, the commander of the 1st tank battalion of the brigade was removed from his post and put on trial by the Military Tribunal. He was reminded of Order No. 227 of 1942. The commander of the 65th Tank Brigade was reprimanded. The 66th Guards was sent to repel the growing threat. tank brigade that recaptured Zallentin by 18.00 on February 19. The next day, Musherin was recaptured by the 75th Infantry Division and the 6th Guards. heavy tank regiment.

In the center of the formation of the 11th SS Panzer Army in the direction of Arnswald, the III SS Panzer Corps, consisting of the tank-grenadier divisions Nordland and Nederland, was advancing. Behind them were the 281st Infantry Division and the 27th SS Division Langemarck. The SS Corps supported the 503rd SS heavy tank battalion (17 combat-ready Royal Tigers on February 15). On the left flank the divisions “Führer Escort” and “Führer Grenadiers” were advancing under the control of the headquarters of the X SS Army Corps. The German units moved forward with great difficulty. The offensive of "Nordland" in the zone defended by cavalrymen of the 7th Guards. The cavalry corps developed relatively successfully, but the tasks of the day were not completed. In particular, the Norge regiment was unable to capture Schlagentin. Attempts by the Nederland and Fuhrer Escort divisions to capture the Ritz road junction with an attack from two sides were unsuccessful, crashing against strong anti-tank defenses. The 7th Rifle Corps of the 3rd Shock Army defended here. It should be noted that the German command managed to support the offensive with some aircraft. If in the first ten days of February in the zone of the 61st Army, VNOS posts noted only 45 sorties, mainly of a reconnaissance nature, then in the second ten days there were already 208. German planes in groups of 5-14 vehicles attacked the battle formations of the Soviet troops.

Meanwhile, units of the 80th Rifle Corps of the 61st Army began an assault on Arnswald on the morning of February 16, regardless of its release by the enemy advancing from the north. A peculiar, but typical for the last period of the war, situation arose of mixing the formations occupying the front and storming the German “festungs”: the 7th Guards. The cavalry corps defended with a front to the north, and in its rear the 80th Rifle Corps stormed the encircled city. The main tank units of the P.A. army were sent to capture Arnswald. Belova: 11th Guards. heavy tank brigade, 85th tank regiment and 1899th self-propelled artillery regiment. In addition, the 80th Rifle Corps was temporarily transferred to the 415th Rifle Division and the 60th Guards. corps artillery regiment from the 9th Guards. rifle corps. A brigade of heavy ISs with the forces of the 91st (6 IS-2) and 92nd (5 IS-2) tank regiments supported the 356th Infantry Division, the 85th Tank Regiment also supported the 356th Infantry Division, and the 1899th Self-Propelled artillery regiment - 311th rifle division. However, due to the small number of infantry, it was not possible to break into the city. In the report on the results of the operation, the leadership of the 80th Rifle Corps indicated as one of the reasons for the delay in the assault on Arnswalde: “insufficient number of infantry: 600 active bayonets in two divisions (356 infantry division - 260 people, 212 infantry division - 300 people); late approach of infantry reinforcement (311 and 415 infantry divisions). Late because by this time the enemy had introduced new tank motor units and launched decisive attacks from the north.” Also, the lack of heavy artillery was pointed out as the reason for the failure of the first days of the assault - for a long time the assaulters did not have guns with a caliber of over 122 mm.

On the morning of February 17, the assault on Arnswald continued; 14 IS-2s of the 90th Tank Regiment joined the attackers. The 356th Infantry Division with an IS brigade occupied a gas plant on the outskirts of Arnswald and became involved in street fighting in the city. But the increase in the number of tanks did not turn the situation in favor of the attackers: the few infantry were cut off by fire from the upper floors of the buildings, and the ISs were hit by the Royal Tigers cruising the streets. During the day of the battle, 4 IS-2 tanks were burned and 3 were knocked out.

At 16.00 on February 17, the advanced units of “Nordland” reached Arnswalde and relieved the encircled garrison of the city. The artillery of the 80th Rifle Corps came under attack from the relief force. “It should be noted that the existing divisional artillery could not fight the enemy’s heavy tanks due to the lack of special shells, and the infantry did not have a sufficient number of means of combat, due to which the tanks almost unhinderedly reached the artillery outposts and inflicted significant losses on them in the material part, damaged and 60 guns and mortars were destroyed.”

However, this was where the successes of the day ended for Steiner's troops. The neighboring XXXIX Tank Corps did not make progress and, under the influence of counterattacks by Soviet troops, went on the defensive. Also on the morning of February 18, a counterattack followed on the flank of the Fuhrer Grenadiers and Fuhrer Escort divisions in the Nantique area. On the afternoon of February 19, the Führer Grenadiers division attempted to resume the offensive and stormed Libenow. But these were already the convulsions of Operation Solstice. On the evening of February 19, an order was issued from the headquarters of Army Group Vistula to stop the offensive. Exactly the same order to go on the defensive followed on the other side of the front. On the evening of February 19, P.A. Belov orders the 23rd Rifle Division to relieve units of the 7th Guards. cavalry corps and go on the defensive throughout the entire army zone. The 80th Rifle Corps, which stormed Arnswald, also went on the defensive. To continue the street battle to capture the city, assault groups were allocated from the first echelon divisions.

On the evening of February 21, under the influence of intense artillery fire, which destroyed up to 90% of the city's buildings, Arnswald was abandoned, and the Germans retreated northward. From Arnswald the Germans retreated north to the line of the Ina River. The III Panzer Corps was followed by the XXXIX Panzer Corps. After retreating to their original positions, the 11th SS Panzer Army ceased to exist. At the beginning of February, the control of the 3rd Panzer Army, led by Colonel General Erhard Routh, was removed from East Prussia. On February 24, the troops under the control of the 11th SS Panzer Army became subordinate to the 3rd Panzer Army. Initially, it was planned to transfer part of the forces to Steiner's army under the control of Routh's army, but ultimately the control of one army was replaced by the control of another. “Solstice” was conducted by Steiner, and it was Routh who had to deal with the consequences of this attack.

Simultaneously with the change of command, the dismantling of the Solstice strike force began. The control of the XXXIX Panzer Corps left for Saxony. The crisis that arose in connection with the formation of a bridgehead on the Oder by the troops of the 69th Army required the strengthening of the 9th Army. The Schlesien Panzer Division was sent to the Frankfurt-on-Oder area. On February 25, the Frundsberg division began being sent to the Frankfurt-on-Oder area.

Units of the 61st Army began pursuing units of the enemy's now 3rd Tank Army. P.A. Belov ordered units of the 80th and 89th Rifle Corps, 7th Guards. cavalry corps at 10.00 on February 23 to go on the offensive with the aim of reaching the river. Ina and capture of bridgeheads. During February 23, two rifle and cavalry corps reached the southern bank of the Ina. Attempts to seize bridgeheads on the first day were unsuccessful. During February 1945, the 212th Rifle Division of the 80th Rifle Corps lost 1384 people (410 killed, 864 wounded and 110 for other reasons), the 356th Rifle Division - 2257 people (720 killed, 1439 wounded and 98 for other reasons ), 415th Infantry Division - 2353 people (443 killed, 1805 wounded, 105 for other reasons). The 311th Infantry Division was also seriously damaged, losing 1,636 men (376 killed, 1,165 wounded, 95 from other causes). During the encirclement of Arnswald from February 4 to 10, 1945, the 80th Rifle Corps lost 280 people killed, from February 10 to 20 - 656 people killed and 1,571 people wounded. The reinforcements received by the divisions of the 61st Army fighting for Arnswald did not cover the losses even to a first approximation. The 212th Infantry Division received 139 people, the 356th - 350 people, the 415th - 477 people and the 311th - 301 people. By March 1, 1945, these divisions numbered 4,361, 3,868, 4,418, and 3,817 men, respectively. The 12th Guards, which came under attack from the “Police” The rifle division lost 2,291 people in February 1945 (588 killed, 1,469 wounded, 234 from other causes). The total losses of units and formations of the 61st Army in February amounted to 3,748 people killed, 9,721 wounded, 1,217 from other causes, and a total of 14,686 people.

Nevertheless, the capture by P.A. troops. Belova bridgeheads on the river. Ina at the end of February 1945 was already a matter of time. On the night of February 28, battalions from the 311th and 234th rifle divisions crossed the river and went on the offensive at 8.00. At 12.00 the crossing of Ina was carried out by two reinforced battalions from the 415th and 212th rifle divisions of the 80th rifle corps. During the day, the leading battalions were followed by the main forces of the divisions. 2nd Guards Until February 24, the tank army surrendered its positions to the rifle corps of the 47th and 61st armies and concentrated in the second echelon of the 61st Army. The 1st Mechanized Corps was left subordinate to the 47th Army. March 1, 61st and 2nd Guards. The tank army had to go on the offensive. But not to Berlin.

K.K. Rokossovsky named February 22–23 as the approximate date for the start of the offensive, since the approach to the deployment line of the 19th Army and the 3rd Guards. The tank corps needed to make a 160-kilometer march. To fulfill the previously set task, the front commander asked to strengthen his left wing with two combined arms armies with two tank corps and to provide 80 thousand reinforcements for rifle divisions and 20 thousand people for special troops.

On the evening of February 17, directives of the Supreme Command Headquarters Nos. 11024 and 11026 approved the plans for operations in Pomerania presented by the commanders of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts. As a replacement for the requested K.K. Rokossovsky of two combined arms armies G.K. Zhukov was ordered: “47th Army and 1st Guards. have a tank army in reserve closer to the right wing of the front so that, if necessary, they can be used at the junction with the 2nd Belorussian Front.” In connection with the new tasks of the fronts, the dividing line between them was redrawn; by decision of Headquarters, it ran along the line Bromberg, Flederborn, Neustettin, Kolberg. The defeat of the main forces of the enemy's 11th Army G.K. Zhukov intended to carry out the cleansing of the entire territory of Pomerania west of the Neustettin, Kerlin, Kolberg meridian to the river. Oder - within 14–16 days.

Initially, as the date for the start of the offensive of the 1st Belorussian Front, the Headquarters accepted what was proposed by G.K. Zhukov on February 19. However, due to the onset of the German offensive, the start date of the operation was shifted. As recorded in the combat log of the 2nd Guards. tank army: “Based on the specified directive, the army commander at 13.00 on 17.2.45 gave the army troops combat order No. 09/op, but the implementation of this order was suspended by active enemy actions.” On the originally appointed day of February 19, units of the 12th Guards. tank and 9th Guards. The rifle corps fought heavy defensive battles, and going on the offensive was out of the question. In addition, a more powerful blow was expected from the Kallis, Stargard line on the flank and rear of the armies operating in the Berlin direction. Under these conditions, G.K. Zhukov decided to go on the defensive along the entire front of the right wing armies in order to repel this blow. The prisoners' testimonies included reports of the arrival of the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler division at the front, i.e. there was reason to believe that the 6th SS Panzer Army would still be involved in the Berlin direction. Accordingly, over the next 5–6 days, i.e. until approximately February 25–26, the troops of the right wing of the front were supposed to bleed the enemy’s attacking formations in defensive battles, and then go on the offensive themselves. As a result, the 2nd Belorussian Front was supposed to go on the offensive on February 24, and the 1st Belorussian Front on March 1.

To repel a possible attack from the north by the troops of the 1st Guards. The tank army was concentrated in the Berlinchen area and southeast of the city. They were tasked with covering the directions to Landsberg and Driesen (30 km south and southeast of Arnswald). After the situation was defused - Arnswald was evacuated - the corps of Katukov's army were supposed to go to the starting area for a new offensive in the period from February 25 to 28, by night marches. The troops of the 2nd Guards Tank Army, which were still engaged in stubborn battles with the enemy's XXXIX Tank Corps in the area south of Stargard, were supposed to surrender their combat areas to rifle formations deployed in this direction, and by February 27 concentrate in the Arnswalde area.

Rokossovsky advances alone

Meanwhile, the battle unfolded on the left wing of the K.K. front. Rokossovsky. The march of the troops of the 19th Army into its assigned offensive zone was fraught with great difficulties. On February 20, 1945, due to the fact that the troops of the 19th Army were late in entering their offensive zone and therefore could not take over combat sectors in a timely manner and replace the army units of the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front operating there, K.K. Rokossovsky was forced to urgently move the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps to this sector. The Cavalry Corps was ordered to advance in a forced march to the Linde area and by 24 hours on February 20, replace formations and units of the right-flank army of the 1st Belorussian Front, occupy the designated area and firmly defend it. By the end of February 23, the troops of the 19th Army replaced the left flank units of the 70th Army and units of the 3rd Shock Army and occupied the initial areas for the offensive.

The 19th Army's band in the upcoming offensive was 17 km, with the total width of the 2nd Belorussian Front's band being 212 km. The operational formation of the 19th Army for the offensive was envisaged in two echelons: two rifle corps in the first echelon and one in the second echelon. The battle formation of the corps of the first echelon of the army was adopted for the right-flank corps in two echelons, for the left-flank - in three echelons. In the breakthrough area, which was 10 km, the average artillery density reached 152 guns and mortars (from 75 mm caliber and above). There were no direct infantry support tanks. The offensive operation of the 19th Army was planned in two stages. The first stage included breaking through the enemy’s defenses, destroying its opposing units and capturing the Flötenstein-Neustettin line. The time to complete the tasks of the first stage is two days, the rate of advance is 20–25 km per day. At this stage it was planned to introduce the 3rd Guards into the breakthrough. tank corps, strengthening it with one rifle division at the expense of the second echelon corps. The second stage included the defeat of the enemy’s operational reserves and repelling possible counterattacks by enemy infantry and tanks, reaching the Baltic Sea coast and turning the main forces of the army to attack eastward towards the city of Gdynia. The time to complete tasks at this stage is two days. The planned rate of advance is 30–35 km. The depth of the entire operation was 114 km, the average planned rate of attack was 25–30 km per day.

A damaged Panther tank of the 10th SS Panzer Division "Frundsberg". Eastern Pomerania, February 1945

In the direction planned for the offensive of the 19th Army, the XVIII Mountain Corps of the 2nd Army defended. It consisted of the 32nd Infantry Division taken from Courland, Group Aks (remains of the 15th Latvian SS Division), a regiment of the SS Division Nederland, various training units and the 33rd SS Division Charlemagne (1st French SS) as a reserve in the second line.

On the morning of February 24, the operation began. The 19th Army went on the offensive after forty minutes of artillery preparation. On the very first day, she advanced 10–12 km and expanded the breakthrough area to 20 km. The 3rd Guards acted on the left flank of the army. cavalry corps. However, the battles of the first day showed that rifle formations without tanks for direct infantry support were not moving fast enough, and this could affect the implementation of the operation plan. Taking this into account, the commander of the 19th Army decided to introduce the 3rd Tank Corps of General A.P. into the battle. Panfilov (274 tanks and self-propelled guns) somewhat earlier than planned.

By decision of the corps commander, formations were brought into battle along two routes. The combat formation of the corps was built in two echelons: in the first echelon there were two tank brigades with reinforcements, in the second echelon there was one motorized rifle brigade. Each tank brigade of the first echelon was given one rifle regiment of the 313th Infantry Division for reinforcement. At 11 a.m. on February 25, the tank corps formations went on the offensive. The advanced detachments of the 3rd and 18th Guards Tank Brigades with assault forces of machine gunners on tanks, having overtaken the infantry at this line, rushed forward. Having entered the operational space, units of the 3rd Guards Tank Corps, shooting down enemy covering detachments, began to quickly develop an offensive. During the day of the battle, the tank corps advanced to a depth of 40 km and by the morning of February 26, the advance detachment of the 3rd Guards Tank Brigade captured Baldenberg. At this time, the 18th Guards Tank Brigade, having defeated a strong enemy defense center in the Shenau area, captured this city and station.

However, the offensive of the 19th Army, although it accelerated, still did not reach the planned pace. This was explained, in particular, by the fact that parts of the tank corps operated in a relatively narrow zone and in one direction, and therefore large enemy strongholds remained in its rear, the resistance of which reduced the rate of advance of rifle formations. In addition, the units of the 19th Army that fought on the quiet sector of the front in Karelia did not have combat experience comparable to the veterans of the western direction. As a result, by the end of February 25 (i.e., in two days of the operation), the army’s troops had advanced only 20–25 km, with a planned rate of advance of 20–25 km per day. The troops of the 70th Army, advancing to the right of the 19th Army, had little progress within two days of fighting within 4–6 km.

After a number of measures were taken to streamline the command and control of the 19th Army and the withdrawal of some formations to new directions, the offensive resumed on the morning of February 26. Meanwhile, the 3rd Guards Tank Corps captured the settlements of Sidov and Poret with its advanced units, and soon Draven and Bublitz fell under the attacks of the corps units. Having defeated the enemy garrisons in Schlochau, Barenwald and Hammerstein, the troops of the 19th Army advanced up to 22 km into the territory of Eastern Pomerania during the day of battle and expanded the breakthrough along the front to 60 km.

However, the pace of the infantry advance was still far behind the tankers. The 3rd Guards Tank Corps, which had advanced far to the north-west and was located 30–40 km from the rifle formations of the 19th Army, could have found itself in a very difficult situation and could have been subjected to a flank attack from the south-west, where the enemy had a strong a grouping of mobile troops of the 3rd Tank Army defending against the troops of the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front. In addition, the offensive of Rokossovsky’s strike force drove a rather narrow wedge with initially weak flanks into the formation of the 2nd German Army. Despite the fact that it was 1945, the danger of flank attacks was still great. The 3rd Guards was deployed on the left flank. cavalry corps advancing on Neu-Stettin. To protect the right flank K.K. Rokossovsky ordered the troops of the 70th Army, together with the right-flank formations of the 40th Rifle Corps of the 19th Army, to capture the Prechlau area by the morning of February 27.

One should not think that Rokossovsky was afraid of some phantoms. Flank attacks on units of the 19th Army and 3rd Guards that had penetrated to Bublitz. tank corps were planned by the command of Army Group Vistula, and at the end of February activities began to gather forces for a counterattack. The formations were assembled by dismantling the strike groups of the Solstice, which had already lost its relevance. To attack the right flank of the 19th Army, a group of troops was assembled under the control of the VII Panzer Corps of General Mortimer von Kessel. It consisted of the 7th Panzer Division from the left flank of the 2nd Army, the 4th SS Polizei Division, transported from the Stargard area, and the 226th Assault Gun Brigade. To attack the left flank of the 19th Army, the so-called corps group von Tettau (named after its commander, Lieutenant General Hans von Tettau) was created. It included: the Holstein tank division, the Pommerland and Baerwalde infantry divisions. The Holstein Division was hastily formed in February 1945 from the 233rd Reserve Tank Division. It was relatively small: on February 15, it consisted of 7028 people (195 officers, 25 officials, 1427 non-commissioned officers and 5441 privates, including 198 Hiwis) and 25 Pz.IV tanks in one three-company battalion. The Holstein artillery consisted of two divisions, one of which was armed with twelve 88-mm anti-aircraft guns instead of howitzers. Von Tettau's group and the VII Panzer Corps were supposed to strike in converging directions and cut off the units of the 3rd Guards that had rushed forward. Tank Corps and 19th Army. It was to direct the actions of the X SS Corps and the von Tettau group that it was originally planned to use the control of the 3rd Panzer Army of Erhard Routh.

The created situation forced the commander of the 2nd Belorussian Front to temporarily suspend the advance of the tank corps and pull up the main forces of the 19th Army to the line it captured. The front stopped when only about 50 km remained to the Baltic Sea coast. On February 27, 1945, the troops of the 19th Army of the Front, having stopped at the lines reached the day before, put themselves in order, part of the forces of their right flank, in cooperation with their neighbor on the right (units of the 70th Army), fought an offensive battle in the Prechlau area, repelling numerous enemy counterattacks. 3rd Guards The cavalry corps blocked Neu-Stettin.

In principle, with access to the area of ​​Neu-Stettin and Bublitz by the troops of K.K. Rokossovsky, the task assigned to the front by Headquarters on February 8 was partially completed. However, the armies of the right wing and center of the 2nd Belorussian Front were not successful during February 24 and 25 and fought on the same lines. Accordingly, the 2nd Shock Army, reinforced by the 8th Guards. tank corps, continued to fight, being divided into two groups: besieging Graudenz and occupying the front section in front of the enemy’s 2nd Army. The 65th and 49th armies advanced 6-10 km, the 70th army 25–35 km.

"Royal Tigers" of the 503rd SS Heavy Tank Battalion. Eastern Pomerania, Arnswalde region, February 1945.

On the last day of February, the commander of the 2nd Belorussian Front assigned tasks to his subordinate troops that were more related to consolidating what had been achieved and protecting the flanks, rather than aimed at advancing to the treasured shore of the Baltic Sea. Rokossovsky was clearly waiting for the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front to go on the offensive. On February 28, the 3rd Guards Tank Corps, stopped by K.K. Rokossovsky in the Bublitsa area, organized a perimeter defense in this area. The 8th Mechanized Corps of Major General Tank Forces A.N., which was in reserve. Firsanovich was concentrated in the Chojnice area with the task of supporting the offensive of the 70th Army. By the end of February 28, 1945, the troops of the 70th Army had advanced 10 km and broken enemy resistance in the Prechlau area, eliminating the threat to the flank of the 19th Army. Despite the loss of 2,529 people in February 1945, the 4th Panzer Division, which cemented the German defense in the Chojnice area, was maintained at a high level of strength. As of March 1, it consisted of 12,249 people out of 14,968 on staff, 13 Pz.IV tanks, 19 Pz.V Panther tanks and Jagdpanther self-propelled guns, 3 Sturmgeschutz self-propelled guns, 4 PzJag.IV self-propelled guns, 230 armored personnel carriers , armored vehicles and command tanks. The equipment level of the 4th Tank Division even increased compared to February 1, 1945: there were more armored personnel carriers, machine guns, artillery pieces and vehicles. The division maintained a structure with two tank battalions, one of the four motorized infantry battalions was completely transferred to an armored personnel carrier. In a word, the Germans managed to maintain their tank formations in good shape up to a certain point.

At the same time, Soviet intelligence discovered the concentration of the strike group of the VII Panzer Corps in the Rummelsburg area. On the last day of February, K.K. Rokossovsky assigned the 40th Guards Rifle Corps of the 19th Army the task of changing the direction of its offensive from the north to the northeast. The corps was ordered to reach the Rummelsburg area and, having captured this city, have at least one rifle division with forward detachments at the Georgendorf-Voknin line northeast of the city. Thus, it was intended to defeat the group assembled by the enemy for a counterattack before it went on the offensive. The commander of the 19th Army was ordered to reinforce the 40th Guards Rifle Corps with cannon, howitzer and anti-tank artillery. Covering the left flank has so far been limited to the fact that the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps captured the city of Neu-Stettin.

Coup de grace

As we see, even introducing a fresh army into the battle, the 2nd Belorussian Front did not achieve a decisive result. The defeat of the left wing of the Vistula Army Group in Pomerania could only be achieved by joint actions of the two fronts. Even before Rokossovsky’s troops went on the offensive, on February 22, Zhukov, with operational directives No. 00343/op, 00344/op and 00349/op (the 47th and 1st Polish armies were assigned tasks in separate directives), assigned the armies of the right wing of the 1st Belorussian front task for the preparation and conduct of an offensive operation. Compared to the version of the offensive plan in Pomerania presented to Headquarters on February 16, significant changes followed by February 22. According to the adjusted decision of the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front, the main blow was delivered by two combined arms (61st and 3rd shock armies) and two tank armies. In addition, two auxiliary attacks were carried out (by the 47th Army and the 1st Polish Army), their offensive was supposed to begin on the second day of the operation. The 3rd Shock Army was reinforced by the 9th Tank Corps from the front reserve, and the 47th Army received the 1st Mechanized Corps from the 2nd Guards for reinforcement. tank army. Army commanders were ordered to submit detailed operational plans for approval by 25 February. According to the report submitted by Zhukov to the Supreme Commander a week earlier (February 16), it was planned to use only the 2nd Guards. tank army, the main blow to be delivered by the 61st Army, and the auxiliary blow by the 3rd Shock Army. According to the new plan, the 3rd Shock Army became one of two armies in the direction of the main attack, and its success was to be developed by the 1st Guards. tank army. The 47th Army and the 1st Army of the Polish Army became “attached”.

The preparation of the operation was accompanied by appropriate precautions:

"8. I give permission to familiarize the chief of staff, the chief of the operations department of the army headquarters and the commander of the army artillery with the directive. The rest of the performers are assigned tasks within the limits of their duties. Regimental commanders should not be given written orders; tasks should be set verbally in two to three days. Regarding the rear service, do not give general directives, limit yourself to verbal orders.

9. Explain to all army personnel that our task is stubborn defense for a long time. Jr. announce the offensive task to the command staff and Red Army soldiers 2 hours before the attack.”

The upcoming offensive was supposed to set in motion an almost 200-km front occupied by the armies of the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front. The regrouping of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front was completed by the end of February 28. As a result of the regrouping, thirty-two rifle divisions, four cavalry divisions, four tank corps, two mechanized corps with reinforcement units were assembled on a 250 km front. Eighteen rifle divisions, one cavalry division, four tank corps and one mechanized corps were concentrated in the offensive zone of the front’s strike group, 75 km wide. 70–75% of the artillery units and formations allocated for the operation were assembled here. The artillery of the tank armies was involved in the general artillery preparation. The average density per rifle division in the direction of the main attack was 4 km, with an average operational density of 8 km per rifle division. The strength of the rifle formations of the 1st Belorussian Front was traditionally low for 1945. The average strength of the rifle division in the 3rd Shock Army was 4900 people, the 61st Army - 4300 people, the 47th Army - also 4300 people. Each of these three armies had nine rifle divisions. Only the divisions of the 1st Army of the Polish Army (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 6th Infantry Divisions) were distinguished by their relatively high strength - an average of 7,400 people. As of March 1, the 1st and 2nd Guards Tank Armies had 1,067 tanks and self-propelled guns.

Commander of the 10th SS Panzer Division, SS Brigadeführer Heinz Harmel.

The January offensive and the February battles in Pomerania significantly reduced the capabilities of the 2nd Guards. tank army. The 12th Guards suffered the most. tank corps. According to the “Certificate on the condition of units and formations of the 2nd Guards. TA at 13.00 February 28, 1945.” In service in the corps there were 77 T-34s, 12 SU-85s, 5 SU-76s and 12 IS-2s. Another 124 tanks were undergoing repairs, most of them major ones. In the 48th Guards. The tank brigade holding back the Frundsberg onslaught on Varnitz was left with only 6 T-34 tanks on the move. The 9th Guards was in slightly better condition. tank corps. In the combat formations of the corps, according to the same certificate dated 13.00 on February 28, there were: 120 T-34, 1 Valentine Mk.IX, 18 ISU-122, 7 SU-85 and 2 SU-76. There were 35 tanks under repair. Tank Army M.E. Katukova suffered much smaller losses in the January and February battles and on March 1, 1945, had 23 IS-2 tanks, 401 T-34, 11 ISU-122, 32 SU-85, 28 SU-76 and 83 SU-57 tanks in service . A more significant problem was the engine hour consumption of the tanks. 62.8% of T-34 tanks had an engine hour consumption of 180–200, 22% - 225. These figures came close to the core of the tank fleet of the M.E. Army. Katukov to mass failure due to technical reasons.

In front of the front of the 3rd Shock and 61st armies that delivered the main blow, units of the III Panzer and X SS Army Corps were defending. In the offensive zone of the 61st Army, the defenders were: the 27th SS Volunteer Division "Langemarck", the 28th Volunteer Division "Wallonia" and one regiment each from the tank-grenadier divisions "Nordland" and "Nederland". At that time, parts of these two divisions acted separately. Thus, the 24th Panzer-Grenadier Regiment "Nordland" defended itself in isolation from other parts of the division south of Stargard. The 5th Jaeger Division of the X SS Army Corps defended in the offensive zone of the 3rd Shock Army.

On March 1, after 50 minutes of artillery and aviation preparation, the troops of the 3rd Shock and 61st Armies of the 1st Belorussian Front went on the offensive. By 10.00 am, the army troops had captured the main enemy defense position and were successfully advancing in the northern and northwestern directions. What followed from Zhukov’s side was the typical “Konevshchina,” i.e., the introduction of tank armies into battle, and not into a breakthrough. In the zone of action of the 3rd Shock Army, the 1st Guards was brought into the battle to develop success. tank army. Advance detachments of army formations M.E. Katukova (1st and 44th Guards Tank Brigades with reinforcement units) began their advance to the front line 15 minutes before the end of artillery preparation. This ensured that they entered the battle formations of rifle formations an hour after the start of the movement and already at a depth of 2 km behind the front line of the enemy’s defense. The forward detachments of the 1st Tank Army, increasing infantry strikes, entered the battle. Developing the offensive together with rifle formations, the advanced detachments soon broke away from the infantry and rushed forward. The main forces of the 1st Tank Army, having begun moving from the initial area at 14.00 on March 1, passed infantry battle formations at about 17.00, overtaking rifle formations. With a powerful blow, they finally broke the enemy’s resistance and advanced 20–25 km in depth. The greatest success was achieved by the 11th Guards. tank corps advancing along the road: its advanced detachment reached the outskirts of Nerenberg by 22.00. Moving along country roads along a parallel route of the 8th Guards. the mechanized corps covered a significantly shorter distance.

Due to the onset of mud, the fighting took place mainly along the roads. As noted in the report compiled at the headquarters of the 1st Guards. tank army, following the results of the operation, “movement along the side of the road, and even more so off the roads, was impossible.” In conditions of constrained maneuver, road mining and forest debris became a significant problem. Corps of the 1st Guards. tank army on March 2 swapped places: 1st Guards. tank brigade of the 8th Guards. mechanized corps took the lead, 10 km ahead of the 44th Guards. tank brigade, which started fighting on the outskirts of Wangerin by 18.00. Army units M.E. Katukova left the forests to Reichsstrasse No. 162.

Since on March 2 the mobile units of the 2nd Belorussian Front reached the Baltic Sea in the Keslin area, there was a danger of a breakthrough in the western direction by units of the enemy’s 2nd Army. In order to prevent such enemy actions, Katukov decided to deploy the 8th Guards. the mechanized corps fronted to the east, occupying the Bellegarde and Kerlin road junctions.

According to a similar scenario, events initially developed in the zone of the 61st Army of P.A. Belova. According to the initial decision, the introduction of mobile formations into the battle was planned to be carried out in the second half of March 1 from the Falkenwalde, Rafenstein, Schlagentin line. Since this milestone was not reached, the 2nd Guards. The tank army was ordered, together with the rifle formations of the right flank of the 61st Army, to complete the breakthrough of the enemy’s defense. Already by 14.00 on March 1, not only the advanced detachments of tank formations, but also their main forces were deployed and entered the battle. However, the offensive developed here somewhat worse than in the zone of the 3rd Shock Army. On the first day of the operation, it was not possible to complete the breakthrough of the enemy’s defenses. Rifle and tank formations of the 61st and 2nd Guards. During the day of battle, the tank armies captured only the main line of enemy defense, advancing to a depth of 5–7 km.

Temporary commander of the III SS Panzer Corps, Lieutenant General Martin Unrein.

The commander of the III SS Panzer Corps, Unrein, in the face of a powerful blow from the Soviet troops, saw no other solution than to gradually bend the left flank of his corps. It was supposed to move away from Ritz on Freiewald, holding Stargard. Next, Unrein decided to try to stay on the Reichsstrasse No. 158 line (Stargard - Freewald). Also, after identifying the direction of the main attack, the 24th Panzer-Grenadier Regiment of the Nordland Division was replaced by a fusilier battalion and transferred to the corps reserve. However, maintaining control of the troops became increasingly difficult. The rapid penetration of advancing tanks and infantry into the depths led to the disorganization of the German troops: supply columns did not find “their” tanks and self-propelled guns, and sometimes even came under attack from Soviet tanks. On the morning of March 2, the advancing Soviet units reached Reichsstrasse No. 158. All remaining tanks of the 11th Panzer Regiment Nordland and the Royal Tigers of the 503rd SS Heavy Tank Battalion were brought in for a counterattack in the Vosberg area. This counterattack stopped the offensive for a short time.

The 10th SS Panzer Division Frundsberg, which had been withdrawn from Eastern Pomerania to the command of Busse's 9th Army, was returned to battle. Initially, it was planned to use the division in the Keslin area to prevent a breakthrough of Soviet tanks to the Baltic Sea. However, the division was soon reassigned to the III SS Panzer Corps and unloaded in the area of ​​Massow, Plate and Naugaard.

The problem of the lag of the second strike group of the front (2nd Guards Tank and 61st Armies) G.K. Zhukov decided very simply. Commander of the 2nd Guards troops. tank army S.I. Bogdanov was ordered, covering himself with part of the forces from the front, with the main forces, in a deep maneuver, to bypass the fortified positions and strike at the flank and rear of the defending enemy group. Following these instructions from the front commander, the troops of the tank army maneuvered through the offensive zone deeper than the advanced neighboring 3rd Shock Army, bypassing the flank of the opposing enemy. Next, the tankers attacked Naugaard on the flank and rear of the III SS Panzer Corps, which was defending in front of the front of the 61st Army. The bold maneuver brought success. Although the SS were still able to hold Stargard and Freenwalde on March 3, the front between them and north of Freenwalde collapsed. The German command decided to form a new front along the Stargard-Mass line. Thus, the front of the III SS Panzer Corps turned 90 degrees: if previously its line ran from east to west, now it ran from north to south.

By the end of March 4, the troops of the 2nd Guards. The tank army began fighting for Naugard, developing part of its forces to attack Gollnow. The enemy's advance to the Naugard area and to the area between Naugard and Massow of the SS division Frundsberg was already overdue. On March 5, Naugaard was cleared of the enemy. The defeated units of the III SS Panzer Corps began to retreat to the west and northwest. Hot on their heels, the troops of the 61st Army advanced more than 30 km in three days and occupied Stargard on March 4. However, the resistance of the III SS Panzer Corps forced the plans for using the 2nd Guards to be adjusted. tank and 61st armies. In Directive No. 00362/op dated February 28, G.K. Zhukov aimed these two armies to attack in a northeast direction. 2nd Guards The tank army was given the task: “with access to the area of ​​Freienwalde, Rossow, Sheneber, continue the offensive in the general direction towards Naugard, Goltsov, Kammin.” Tank Army S.I. Bogdanova was supposed to go to the coast of the Baltic Sea and take up positions on the eastern shore of Stettin harbor, blocking Reichstrasse No. 111 (at Wollin) and Reichstrasse No. 165 (at Divenov on the coast). The 61st Army was supposed to take positions from the southern flank of the 2nd Guards. tank army to Altdamm. However, tankmen of the 2nd Guards. The tank army was not destined to send bottles of sea water as reports, as their colleagues from the 1st Tank Army did. Army S.I. Bogdanov and P.A. Belov were deployed to the west and were supposed to defeat the main strike force of the Solstice on the eastern bank of the Oder.

The turn of the two armies to the west soon had an impact on the development of the operation as a whole. In the zone of the 3rd Shock Army, events initially developed in accordance with directives No. 00343/op and 00362/op of the front headquarters. Soviet troops successfully breached the defenses of the enemy's 5th Jaeger Division. Unlike the mechanized formations of Unrein's corps, the infantry could not effectively counter the Soviet offensive. The formations of Katukov's tank army that had escaped into operational space quickly advanced in a northern direction, moving further and further away from Berlin. While the 8th Mechanized Corps gradually turned its front to the east, its neighbor was moving north. 45th Guards tank brigade of the 11th Guards. tank corps A.Kh. Babajanyan on March 4, by 12.00, captured the southwestern outskirts of Kolberg. At 9.00 on March 5, units of the SS Charlemagne division were knocked out of the Bellegarde road junction. The land communications of the German 2nd Army, which stood in the way of the advance of the 2nd Belorussian Front into Pomerania, were finally intercepted.

Ironically, about a month before the events described in Germany, the film “Kolberg” directed by Veit Harlan about the defense of the city during the Napoleonic wars was released. This was the last, and color, film of the Third Reich. One of the scriptwriters was Joseph Goebbels. The film was shot for two years, and its screening began on January 30, 1945. However, in life it turned out completely differently than on the silver screen.

The fire is carried out by the 105-mm light field howitzer of the 4th SS Division "Polizei". Eastern Pomerania, February 1945

Kolberg was declared a "festung" in November 1944, and by February 1945 fortifications had been erected around it. On March 1, 1945, there was a construction battalion, a Volkssturm battalion and an anti-aircraft gun battalion in the city. On March 2, eight light field howitzers arrived in Kolberg, and on March 3, the 51st Fortress Machine Gun Battalion arrived. The combat log of the Wehrmacht High Command on March 5 noted with annoyance: “there is only a weak garrison of our troops in the fortress.” It is not surprising that Kohlberg became one of the shortest-lived "festungs". The city's garrison numbered 4,000 people with six faulty tanks and a battery of 88-mm anti-aircraft guns. The garrison was commanded by Colonel Fritz Fulride, who was wounded in July 1941 in the Baltic states, who served after recovery in Tunisia, Italy, and in 1944 near Warsaw. The destroyer Z-43 provided artillery support to the Kolberg garrison. Here the German sailors came in handy with the 150-mm guns of the destroyers, which were too heavy for ships of this class. After a two-week assault, the city was 90% destroyed. On March 18, 1945, under pressure from formations of the 1st Army of the Polish Army and the 2nd Guards. Kolberg's cavalry corps stopped resisting. According to the OKW ZhBD, 68 thousand refugees, 1223 wounded and 5213 military personnel were evacuated from the city by sea (about 800 soldiers and officers of combat units, and the rest were railway workers, the Todt organization, etc.). According to Soviet data, 6,292 soldiers and officers were captured at Kolberg. Kohlberg's commandant, Colonel Fulride, was not captured; after the evacuation, he was promoted to the rank of major general and in the last days of the war he commanded the 3rd Marine Division and surrendered to the Americans.

With the transition of the 1st Belorussian Front to the offensive, combat operations in the zone of the 2nd Belorussian Front intensified. It was not for nothing that Rokossovsky suspended the offensive of his troops in anticipation of a strike from Zhukov’s troops. On March 3, the advance of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front amounted to 6-15 km. Advance detachments of the front's mobile units reached the Baltic Sea coast in the area northeast of Kezlin. The advancing units of the 19th Army captured the city of Rummelsburg. On March 4, Kezlin, a communications hub and a major industrial center of Pomerania, was taken by a roundabout maneuver and assault. March 6 K.K. Rokossovsky got rid of the Graudenz “festung” hanging around his neck. Defended by a garrison of 7,000, the city was taken by storm by units of the 2nd Shock Army. Only on March 5, over 2,000 enemy soldiers and officers were captured, including the commandant of the fortress, Major General Fricke, and his staff. On March 7, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front reached the eastern outskirts of Kolberg and linked up with the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front.

Group von Tettau: flight instead of counterattack

Breakthrough of the 1st Guards. tank army to the Baltic Sea put a bold end to the German plans for a counterattack on the flank of the 19th Army, covered by Oslikovsky's cavalry, by von Tettau's group. The planned counterattack never took place: neither the VII Panzer Corps nor the von Tettau group were able to go on the offensive. On the evening of March 4, General von Tettau gave the order to break through to the west. It was also joined by the remnants of the XVIII Mountain Corps defeated by the 19th Army - the SS division "Charlemagne" and the Latvian 15th SS division. On March 5, it became clear that the escape route along the highway through Regenwalde was blocked by Soviet troops. Von Tettau decided to fight his way in a northwestern direction, into the gap between the rifle units and corps of Katukov’s army, which had made its way to the sea.

The position of von Tettau's group was somewhat alleviated by the fact that to the southwest of it, in the Dramburg area, the X SS Army Corps was surrounded. The main efforts of the combined arms armies of the 1st Belorussian Front were concentrated against him. Zhukov ordered the commander of the 3rd Shock Army to prevent the enemy from retreating to the west and northwest. At the same time, the front commander ordered the 1st Army of the Polish Army to accelerate its advance and, in cooperation with other formations, defeat the encircled enemy. Somewhat later, the commander of the front troops ordered the 1st Guards. The tank army, with part of its forces, assisted the 1st Army of the Polish Army in destroying the encircled X SS Corps of the enemy, leaving small covering detachments in the areas of Bellegarde and Kerlin. In order to prevent the enemy from retreating from the Kerlin area to the west, it was ordered to destroy all crossings on the river. Perzante in the area of ​​Bellegarde, Kerlin, Kolberg.

Tank T-34-85 2nd Guards. tank army in ambush. Eastern Pomerania, February 1945

Captured commanders of the German divisions (commander of the Berwalde division Reitel and the 402nd reserve division Speinitz) indicate that the order to withdraw was given on the night of March 4-5 or on the morning of March 5. But by then he was already too late. In the combat log of the Wehrmacht High Command on March 5 it is written: “Our troops, which are still in their old positions, are united under the command of General Krappe and are making attempts to break through in a westerly direction to Labes.” That is, while Babajanyan’s tankers had already reached Kolberg, they still occupied the same positions as on March 1. During March 4 and 5, fierce fighting broke out in the area east and northeast of Labes. The 3rd Shock Army with the 12th Guards and 79th Rifle Corps advanced to the west, and the 7th Rifle Corps was left to cover the right flank and fight the encircled enemy group. Subsequently, the 79th Rifle Corps reached the Pomeranian Bay and the river. Oder on the Valddivenov site, Kammin. There he replaced parts of the success development echelon of the 3rd Shock Army - 9th Guards. tank corps. This was how the outer front of the encirclement of the von Tettau group and the remnants of the Krappe group was formed. The German High Command responded to the collapse of the Pomeranian front in the traditional way: on March 8, Erhard Routh was removed from his post as commander of the 3rd Panzer Army, and his place was taken by Panzer General Hasso von Manteuffel. Before this, Manteuffel commanded the 5th Panzer Army in the west and in this position received diamonds for the Knight's Cross in February 1945.

After receiving the order to withdraw, the German formations between the adjacent flanks of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts could only try to break through to their own. The commander of the Berwalde division, Lieutenant General Reitel, during interrogation in Soviet captivity, explained the logic of his actions as follows: “I based the breakthrough plan on my experience in tank warfare: after the tanks have passed, the infantry moves at certain intervals and a continuous front is established gradually. I expected to get into the gaps between the infantry." Soon the division had to abandon its artillery and rear. However, Reitel misjudged the location of the gap between the tanks and the infantry. He withdrew his units strictly to the west and soon encountered strong barriers. The fuel for the Sturmgeschütz self-propelled guns ran out, and the division lost the means of making its way forward. The division was scattered, and Reitel himself was captured by the Poles. The 402nd reserve infantry division of General von Speinitz had to abandon its artillery on March 5, and after that the defeat of the formation was a foregone conclusion. From March 6 to March 16, Speinitz himself tried to escape the encirclement through the forests, but was captured.

Only von Tettau's group succeeded in escaping the encirclement. At night, containers with ammunition and fuel were dropped on the group. On March 5, elements of von Tettau's group concentrated in the area east of Schiefelbein. The path to the west along Reichsstrasse No. 162 was blocked by units of the 8th Guards. mechanized corps. A fatal mistake was made at that moment by the commander of the 1st Guards. tank brigade Colonel A.M. Temnik. His brigade continued the battle for Bellegarde, begun on March 4, instead of intercepting the enemy's escape routes in the Grosse Rambin area (halfway from Schiefelbein to Bellegarde). Thus A.M. Temnik ignored M.E.’s evening order. Katukov, who ordered his brigade to go to the Gross Rambin area by 7.00 on March 5 and leave a barrier from a company of tanks against Bellegarde. The breakthrough routes from Bellegarde to the west were to be covered by the 20th Guards. mechanized brigade. As a result, the 1st Guards. The tank brigade was released only at 13.30, turned south and only by 18.00 was fighting in the Gross Rambin area with a front to the east and southeast. Advancement to the area north of Schiefelbein by the 64th Guards. tank brigade of the 11th Guards. The tank corps also ended only by 18.00 on March 5. However, it was on the morning of March 5, in a snowstorm, that the divisions of the von Tettau group began to break through to the west. In the center were units of the Pommerland division, on the left - "Berwalde", on the right - "Holstein", and the SS men were moving in the rearguard. Faced with barriers on Reichsstrasse No. 162 near Schiefelbein, the group bypassed the city from the north and slipped through the gap between the main forces of the 8th Guards. mechanized corps and 1st Guards. tank brigade. Only those lagging behind the group were left to be “torn to pieces” by Katukov’s tankers.

On March 6, von Tettau’s group took up a “hedgehog” position (all-round defense) in the forests southeast of Witzmitz. Here radio contact was established with the headquarters of the 3rd Tank Army. Von Tettau received crucial information from Routh: the German bridgehead at Wollin (due west of Witzmitz) had been lost. This information forced the group commander to decide to break through to the north-west to the bridgehead held by German units near the sea coast - in the Divenov area. On the night of March 8–9, von Tettau's group made its way to the Baltic Sea and formed a bridgehead in the Horst area. However, after reaching the coast, the advancing Soviet troops came to grips with the remnants of von Tettau’s group.

IS-2 tank in Stargard. March 1945

Strictly speaking, in the original plan of the operation (reflected in Directive No. 00362/op), everything was structured in such a way that there was no chance for those surrounded to escape. According to the plan, the external front of the encirclement was formed by formations of the 2nd Guards. tank army. During the first week of March, the Army units generally stuck to plan. 9th Guards The tank corps, after capturing Naugaard, continued its advance to the northwest. 65th Guards tank brigade of the 9th Guards. tank corps on March 5 reached the approaches to Kammin, and the 47th and 50th Guards. tank brigades of the same corps - to Wollin. On March 6, Kammin was captured, and an advance detachment was sent to the sea towards Valdivenova. However, the 12th Guards, which was advancing south towards Gollnov, battered in the February battles. the tank corps was not successful. Added to the low completeness were management errors, as a result of which the corps on March 6 trampled in front of a stream 2–2.5 m wide. Despite artillery preparation with 152 artillery barrels at 13.00 on March 6, the battalions were raised to attack only with the participation of the chief of artillery of the army, Major General Plaskov and the head of the operational department of the army headquarters, Colonel Lyatetsky. Plaskov subsequently wrote in his report: “I gathered all the sappers (everyone was hiding in the forest, everyone had to be collected by force), and within 30 minutes the bridge was ready, I forced the guns to roll out on our hands, we transported tanks, artillery, cars, people [... ] Everything moved forward at 18.00 only after Lyatetsky and I arrived at the battalions and all living things and all the equipment were moved forward.” Based on the results of the trial, corps commander General N.M. Telyakov received a reprimand. One way or another, Gollnov 12th Guards. It was not taken by the tank corps, which gave the enemy the opportunity to organize its defense with units of the SS division Frundsberg. Therefore, already on March 7, 9th Guards. The tank corps was deployed to the south (actually 180 degrees) and on March 8 it attacked Gollnov from the north. 65th Guards On March 7, the tank brigade surrendered its positions to the 713th Infantry Regiment of the 171st Infantry Division (79th Rifle Corps of the 3rd Shock Army) and also turned south.

Due to the turn of units of the 2nd Guards. tank army to the west and south, the 3rd Shock Army was forced to take upon itself the formation of both the internal and external fronts of encirclement. Instead of advancing in marching columns behind the steam roller, the 1st Guards. In the tank army, the formations of the 3rd Shock Army fanned out along a wide front. The main forces of the army (12th Guards and 79th Rifle Corps) were involved in capturing the shore of Stettin harbor. In this situation we had to improvise. Zhukov ordered the forces of the 7th Rifle and 7th Guards Cavalry Corps to defeat enemy troops in this area. I note that according to Directive No. 00362/op of the 7th Guards. The cavalry corps was planned to be “moved to the front reserve on the fifth day of the operation.” The leadership of the operation to defeat groups of German troops breaking through from encirclement was entrusted to the commander of the 3rd Shock Army, Major General N.P. Simonyak. Hero of the Soviet Union Nikolai Pavlovich Simonyak took part in the defense of Hanko and Leningrad, and led the 3rd Shock Army in October 1944 in Courland, having been promoted from the post of corps commander.

In accordance with the order of the front commander and the instructions of the commander of the 3rd Shock Army, the 207th Infantry Division, Colonel V.M. Asafova was supposed to, advancing in the general direction towards Gross-Justin, Renwald, take possession of the Baltic Sea coast in the Renwald, Pusthof sector. The task of the formation was to prevent enemy troops from loading onto ships in the Goffa area, and with part of the forces reaching the sea to take up defense on the front to the east. Colonel Asafov's division was reinforced by the 5th motorcycle regiment (transferred from the 2nd Guards Tank Army), the 163rd Guards Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment and the 2nd Division of the Corps Artillery Brigade. Thus, a barrier was created on the path of von Tettau’s group from a reinforced rifle division.

In the short term, the 7th Rifle Corps of the 3rd Shock Army, with the forces of two divisions, was supposed to take up defense in the Dargen, Shtukhov, Klein-Justin sector by the morning of March 10 and prevent an enemy breakthrough in the western and southwestern directions. The corps was ordered to have one rifle division in the second echelon in the area south of Shtukhov. The pressure on the encircled enemy was supposed to be carried out by the 7th Guards. cavalry corps. The cavalrymen had to develop an attack on Karnitz, pushing the enemy further to the east.

On the morning of March 10, the 207th Infantry Division went on the offensive in a given direction and, bypassing Gross-Justin, by the end of the day captured the village of Pusthof and began fighting for Goff. Thus, von Tettau’s group had its escape route along the Baltic Sea cut off. However, if the construction of the barrier was relatively successful, then the compression of the “cauldron” by the cavalry did not lead to the desired result. In the area of ​​​​operations of the 7th Guards Cavalry Corps, the enemy counterattacked the 16th and 15th Guards Cavalry Divisions from Karnitz. This forced N.P. Simonyak to change the task of the formations of the 7th Rifle Corps. Already at 14.30 on March 10, the corps was ordered with two divisions to go on the offensive towards Karnitz and provide assistance to parts of the cavalry divisions. The reinforcement of the 207th Infantry Division has been postponed for now. The enemy soon took advantage of this.

Tank T-34-85 1st Guards. tank army in the Ritsa area. March 1945

The breakthrough of von Tettau's group to the west was scheduled for 22.00 on March 10. It was led by the Holstein tank division (no longer having tanks). As a result of the intense battle, units of the 207th Infantry Division had to retreat 5–8 km to the west, although they retained the western outskirts of Pusthof. The breaking through enemy attacked units of the 171st Rifle Division of the 79th Rifle Corps. By the morning of March 11, a corridor was formed along which the gradual withdrawal of units from the bridgehead began. On March 12, the last units of the Tettau group made their way to the bridgehead at Divenow, which was held by units from the Kriegsmarine. From the 5th Jäger and 402nd Infantry Divisions came 180 officers, 1,000 non-commissioned officers and 4,300 privates, from the divisions "Berwalde", "Pommern" and the 163rd Infantry Division came 150 officers, 650 non-commissioned officers and 3,000 privates. The Holstein tank division was preserved in the best condition - 90 officers, 500 non-commissioned officers and 3,000 privates.

Everything suggests that it was the breakthrough of von Tettau’s group that cost the commander of the 3rd Shock Army N.P. his position. Simonyak - on March 16 he was replaced by V.I. Kuznetsova. Accordingly, Simonyak, instead of participating in the assault on Berlin, was sent to a much less prestigious position - finishing off Army Group Courland as commander of the 67th Army. IN AND. Kuznetsov served as deputy commander of the 1st Baltic Front until March 1945 and was released due to its disbandment.

If the Tettau group was able to break through on its own, the encircled Krappe group could not break through the barriers of the Soviet troops without outside help. The plan for the release of the X Army Corps of the SS is present in the entry dated March 6 in the OKW ZhBD: “From 6.3 the Panzer Division Silesia arrives in Stettin.” To the north of Gollnow there are marine units. Attacks to the east will clear the way for Krappe's group." However, all these measures are already hopelessly late. During March 6 and 7, formations of the 7th Rifle Corps, in cooperation with the troops of the 1st Army of the Polish Army, completed the defeat of the enemy X SS Corps. After the end of the fighting with the encirclement, the 7th Rifle Corps was withdrawn to the second echelon of the 3rd Shock Army. Polish units captured 262 guns of various calibers, 39 self-propelled guns, 31 tanks, 345 heavy machine guns, 126 mortars. The commander of the X SS Army Corps, Lieutenant General Günter Krappe, was captured by the Poles on March 6, 1945. He was released in 1949 and died in 1981. Contrary to statements in the memoirs of S.G. Poplavsky that Krappe commanded a corps at Stalingrad and was taken out by plane; the German general during the Battle of Stalingrad was just a military attache in Madrid. Krappe arrived at the front as commander of the 61st Infantry Division only in February 1943 in the 18th Army near Leningrad. With Army Group North, he retreated to Courland, and was then appointed commander of the SS Corps. The paradoxical situation, when the corps was called the SS, had army divisions subordinate to it, and was commanded by an army general, was explained quite simply. The corps administration was formed from units of the XIV SS Corps in Pomerania, and the first commander of the corps was Obergruppenführer Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski. Next, the formed headquarters was used to control army formations, and Bach-Zelewski was replaced by Krappe. Obergruppenführer Bach-Zelewski was better known for his “exploits” in the field of fighting partisans and participating in the suppression of the Warsaw Uprising than for his success in commanding troops on the battlefield.

The 10th SS Panzer Division "Frundsberg", which retreated to the Gollnow area, was unable to launch an effective counterattack, but made it difficult for units of the 2nd Guards to break through to the Oder. tank and 3rd shock armies. The city of Gollnov is located among forests that cover the approaches to it from all sides. The forests are largely swampy. Four highways converge in the city. The wooded and swampy terrain did not allow for wide maneuver. Upon arrival in Gollnow, the Frundsberg units immediately received reinforcements from Luftwaffe personnel and sailors. But, despite these difficulties, Soviet troops, after three days of stubborn fighting, took the city by storm by 4:00 on March 8. The decisive role in the capture of Gollnov was played by units of the 9th Guards that approached the city from the north. tank corps. River crossings Ina in the Gollnow area were blown up by the enemy, but by 9.00 on March 8 a crossing was built for wheeled vehicles and artillery, and by 17.00 - for tanks. The offensive continued, Frundsberg retreated towards Altdamm. With the capture of Gollnow, the troops of the 3rd Shock Army completed their task, and they were ordered, after transferring combat areas to the formations of the 1st Army of the Polish Army and the 7th Guards Cavalry Corps, to concentrate 60 km south of Stettin by March 16.

Elimination of the Altdamm bridgehead

The last battle of the 1st Belorussian Front in Pomerania was the defeat of the II Army Corps (soon renamed the XXXII Army Corps), the III SS Panzer Corps and the struggle for the bridgehead at Altdamm. Expanding the front of hostilities in Eastern Pomerania, on March 2 the troops of the 47th Army went on the offensive. Army F.I. Perkhorovich was opposed by the 9th Parachute Division, the 1st Marine Division and the 281st Infantry Division. On the first day of the battle, formations of the 77th and 125th Rifle Corps of the 47th Army broke through the enemy's main line of defense. To build on the success, the 1st Mechanized Corps was introduced into the battle in the morning of the second day of the offensive. However, difficult terrain conditions and stubborn enemy resistance did not allow our troops to develop an offensive at a high pace. By the end of March 3, the troops of the 47th Army had advanced only 20 km into the depths of the enemy’s defenses. The fighting became stubborn and fierce. By March 6, the troops of the 47th Army reached a large enemy stronghold on the approaches to Altdamm - Klebov. By that time, the II Army Corps had been reinforced by the 549th People's Grenadier Division from East Prussia.

After a week of the Soviet offensive in Eastern Pomerania, the front of the 3rd Panzer Army on the eastern bank of the Oder and Stettin Bay began to gradually shrink to a point. Parts of the SS formations from different directions retreated to Altdamm, a road junction east of Stettin. The troops of the 61st Army, advancing on Altdamm from the east, met stubborn resistance from the III Panzer Corps in the Massow area and south of this point. Over the course of three days, they advanced only 10–12 km in a westerly direction. The enemy offered especially stubborn resistance in the city of Massov, where Soviet troops had to fight for every house. The city was defended by units of the SS division "Nederland".

IS-2 tanks on the march. 1st Belorussian Front, Eastern Pomerania, March 1945

Massov was soon surrounded from the flanks, and on March 7 at 3.00 the divisions of the III Panzer Corps received orders to withdraw. It was not possible to catch hold of Reichsstrasse No. 163 (the Stargard-Massow-Naugard highway). During March 7 and 8, parts of the SS divisions retreated to the west in the direction of Aldamm. On the left flank of the III Panzer Corps, Frundsberg units retreated from Gollnow. The formation of the bridgehead at Altdamm was completed by the offensive of the 47th Army. Overcoming stubborn enemy resistance and difficult terrain conditions, units of Perkhorovich's army captured the southern outskirts of Greifenhagen by March 10. However, the attackers' attempts to crush the thickened defenses of the bridgehead at Aldamm on the move were unsuccessful.

Under these conditions, Zhukov decided to suspend the offensive. Directive No. 00426/op dated March 12, 1945 stated: “As a result of particularly stubborn enemy resistance, troops of the 61st Army, 47th Army and 2nd Guards. The TA were not successful for three days and were unable to break through the enemy’s defenses on the move.” The three armies were ordered to “suspend the offensive for two days and gain a foothold in their positions.” Within two days it was planned to prepare for continued attacks on the bridgehead. It was necessary to conduct a thorough reconnaissance of the enemy's front line of defense, his fire system, artillery firing positions, anti-tank weapons, to establish whether the enemy had tanks and their concentration areas. When preparing for the offensive and organizing the battle, special attention was ordered to be paid to organizing clear interaction between the infantry and tanks, artillery and aviation. To carry out artillery preparation for the attack, it was ordered to reinforce the armies in this direction with four breakthrough artillery divisions. In the main attack areas, the army was ordered to create an artillery density of 250 guns (61st Army) and 280 guns (47th Army) per 1 km of front. Also in the zone of the 47th Army, aviation efforts were concentrated: the commander of the 16th Air Army was ordered to support the offensive with attacks from attack aircraft at the rate of 40% of sorties to support the 61st Army and 60% to the 47th Army. The artillery preparation was planned to begin at 7.30, and the infantry and tank attack at 8.30 on March 14, 1945.

The main idea of ​​the new offensive was to transfer the efforts of tank forces from the 61st Army zone to the 47th Army zone. Thus, the tanks were withdrawn from the unfavorable wooded area and were to be used in a treeless area south of Altdamm. Directive No. 00426/op ordered: “Commander of the 2nd Guards. The TA mechanized and tank corps of the army will be used for the offensive in the main attack area 47 A, in close cooperation with the infantry." Thus, withdrawn from the tank army by S.I. Bogdanov, the 1st mechanized corps returned to it again. During the two-day pause, the tank army, having surrendered its combat areas to the rifle formations of the 61st Army, was supposed to move to the right flank of the 47th Army. At 15.00 on March 12, as part of the 12th Guards. The tank corps had 206 tanks and self-propelled guns according to the list (of which only 52 vehicles were in battle formations), in the 9th Guards. tank corps - 191 tanks and self-propelled guns according to the list (78 vehicles in battle formations), in the 1st mechanized corps - 206 tanks and self-propelled guns according to the list (116 in battle formations). Thus, the strike capabilities (in terms of the number of combat-ready vehicles) of the 2nd Guards. tank army were significantly reduced.

By mid-March 1945, quite large forces of the German 3rd Tank Army had been assembled on the bridgehead at Aldamm. The southern front of the bridgehead was defended by the 1st Marine Division, the 25th Panzergrenadier Division and the Schlesien Panzer Division. The eastern front was defended by the 549th People's Grenadier Division, the 281st Infantry Division and the 10th SS Panzer Division Frundsberg. Finally, the Nordland and Nederland divisions defended in the northern part of the bridgehead.

IS-2 tank of the 1st Polish Army in Eastern Pomerania. March 1945

On the planned day of March 14, the offensive did not take place and was postponed to the next day. At 9.00 on March 15, after artillery and aviation training, the troops of the 2nd Guards. The tank, 47th and 61st armies resumed the offensive. The first position was suppressed by artillery and aviation, and rifle units, accompanied by tanks and artillery-self-propelled guns, began to move forward, destroying the remaining pockets of enemy resistance along the offensive path. As a result of three days of stubborn fighting, Soviet troops, having eliminated a significant number of enemy strongholds and centers of resistance, reached the last zone of enemy fortifications on the Altdamm bridgehead.

In order to deliver the final crushing blow to G.K. Zhukov again ordered a temporary halt to the offensive and some regrouping of artillery and tanks. In accordance with this order, formations of the 61st, 47th and 2nd Guards Tank Armies, having stopped the offensive, again prepared for its resumption within two days.

On March 18, 1945, at 9.00 am, after an hour and a half artillery preparation, the front troops resumed the offensive. In the zone of action of the strike group of the 47th Army, Soviet troops broke enemy resistance in the area 2 km north of Klebov, broke through his last line of defense and began to develop an offensive in the western and southwestern directions. On March 19, rifle formations of the 47th Army together with tank units of the 2nd Guards. The tank army reached the bridges over the Oder north of the autobahn. The bridges were prudently blown up by the Germans on the night of March 16-17. Thus, the attackers cut the Altdamm enemy group into two parts.

The German command quickly drew conclusions about the prospects of holding the bridgehead. Already on the night of March 18-19, heavy weapons and equipment began to be withdrawn to Stettin. Sappers began to undermine buildings and structures in Altdamm that could be useful to Soviet troops. The bunker in which the headquarters of the Nordland division was located was even liberated and blown up. On March 19, the command of the 3rd Panzer Army sent a report to the headquarters of Army Group Vistula, which offered a withdrawal and a transparent choice: “either take everything to the west bank tonight and save or lose everything tomorrow.” The withdrawal was unexpectedly quickly approved by Hitler. The withdrawal of troops to Stettin continued on the night of March 20, and after the Dierix battalion (the remnants of Wallonia were brought into it) and two tanks crossed to the western bank of the Oder, the last bridge blew up. A few hours later, Greifenhagen fell under the attacks of the 47th Army. As a result of the defeat of the Altdamm group, Soviet troops took more than 12 thousand prisoners, 126 tanks and self-propelled guns, more than 200 guns of various calibers, 154 mortars and many other weapons and military equipment.

As a result of three weeks of fighting during the East Pomeranian operation, the combat effectiveness of the 2nd Guards significantly decreased. tank army. According to the “Certificate on the condition of units and formations of the 2nd Guards. TA at 15.00 March 21, 1945.” The army's tank fleet dropped to 162 vehicles in service in three corps, less than in one corps at the start of the Vistula-Oder operation. In the 12th Guards. The tank corps had only 28 T-34s and 9 SU-76s left. There was not a single combat-ready IS-2 tank or SU-85 self-propelled gun in the corps. If the February battles led to large losses in the 12th Guards. tank corps, the East Pomeranian operation led to the thinning out of the 9th Guards. tank corps. The corps had only 18 T-34s and 5 SU-85s in service on March 21. All self-propelled guns SU-76 and ISU-122 were listed as being overhauled. In the 1st Mechanized Corps, 43 M4A2 Sherman, 9 SU-85, 16 SU-76 and 9 ISU-122 remained in service. Another 6 T-34s, 13 M4A2 Shermans and 1 SU-76 were in service in army units.

In the history of the III SS Panzer Corps, the result of the battle is described as follows: “Thus ended the fighting in Pomerania. They also ended with the almost complete destruction of the III SS Panzer Corps. He fought to the point of self-sacrifice to help evacuate the population of Pomerania. As a result, only battalions and regiments that suffered heavy losses remained. Entire companies were completely destroyed" ( Tieke W. Tragedy of the Faithful: A History of the III. (germanisches) SS-Panzer-Korps, p.264). According to a report from the headquarters of Army Group Vistula to the OKH on March 23, the total personnel strength of the SS division "Nederland" was 3,955 people, and the "combat strength" (Kamfstaerke) was 1,355 people.

In seven days of positional battles, the troops of the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front defeated enemy troops in the western part of Eastern Pomerania, who were trying to retain an important operational bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Oder in the Altdamm region. On March 21, the regrouping of the main forces participating in the East Pomeranian army operation began in the Berlin direction.

Forward, to the east!

In the zone of the 2nd Belorussian Front, events in March 1945 developed according to a similar pattern, but much more dramatic. Despite the generally successful offensive, personnel changes followed as a result of the fighting in the initial phase of the operation. On March 6, the commander of the 19th Army G.K. Kozlov was replaced by Lieutenant General V.Z. Romanovsky. Vladimir Zakharovich Romanovsky was distinguished from the previous commander by his serious experience of positional battles near Demyansk and Leningrad in 1942–1943.

After the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front reached the Baltic Sea at Keslin, the Supreme Command Headquarters, by directive No. 11035, assigned K.K. Rokossovsky's task is to defeat the enemy group in the area of ​​Danzig, Stolp, capture the cities of Danzig, Gdynia and, no later than March 20, reach the entire front line on the Baltic Sea coast. This unusual combination of Polish and German names (Danzig and Gdynia) in one place is due to the fact that the port of Danzig had the status of a free city. Poland, in need of a port on the Baltic, built it from scratch. The city of Gdynia grew in 1920–1930. from the small fishing village of Gdingen. After the occupation of Poland in 1939, the Germans renamed Gdynia to Gotenhafen. But the name was difficult to take root, and the Germans often call the city of Gdansk in their memoirs by the name of the village of Gdingen.

The defense of Gdynia from land relied on a system of air defense points erected to defend the base from the air. They surrounded the city in a continuous ring within a radius of 12–15 km from its center. The location of air defense points at heights dominating the terrain, the presence of ready-made artillery positions and permanent structures, a ready-made surveillance and communications network gave undeniable advantages to the defenders. The air defense system of the naval base was supplemented by a network of trenches, anti-tank obstacles and barbed wire. Anti-aircraft artillery with a caliber of up to 128 mm was prepared to fire at ground targets.

Machine gunners of the 1st Army of the Polish Army on the streets of Kolberg.

To develop the success of the 2nd Belorussian Front, by Headquarters Directive No. 11034 on March 6, the 1st Guards was transferred from the 1st Belorussian Front. tank army. Together with the tank army M.E. Katukov, the 1st Polish Tank Brigade was transferred to the 2nd Belorussian Front. Of course, the transition of tank formations from the subordination of one front to the subordination of another did not happen instantly. Officially, the army was transferred to the subordination of K.K. Rokossovsky from 12.00 March 8. March 6, 1st Guards. The tank army continued fighting to destroy surrounded enemy groups in the Schiefelbein area. During these battles, 1,960 enemy soldiers and officers were captured. On March 7, the battle with scattered detachments rushing to the west continued. At 7.30 on March 7, one of these groups attacked units of the army headquarters of M.E. Katukova. The headquarters units suffered losses in personnel and vehicles. Only in the afternoon of March 7, the troops of the 1st Guards. The tank army began to surrender the occupied positions of the 1st Army of the Polish Army. The advance to the Kezlin area began on the night of March 8th. The first combat order from the headquarters of K.K. The army received Rokossovsky on March 8. It instructed to go on the offensive on the morning of March 10th. Combat potential of the 1st Guards. the tank army was still preserved at that time. Army M.E. Katukova on March 10, 1945 had 302 T-34 tanks, 17 IS-2 tanks, 27 SU-85, 34 SU-76 and 75 SU-57 tanks in service. The army's artillery consisted of 285 guns, 79 120 mm mortars and 35 rocket artillery installations.

Cut off from the main forces of Army Group Vistula by the breakthrough of Soviet troops to the Baltic Sea, the formations of the German 2nd Army in mid-March still retained combat capability (see table). For comparison: the 9th Army under the command of Walter Model advanced in July 1943 on the northern front of the Kursk ledge with an average “combat” strength of divisions of 3,500 people. Lagging behind the 2nd Belorussian Front in the total number of formations, the 2nd Army surpassed the Soviet troops in the average number of divisions.

Table

TOTAL AND “BATTLE” NUMBER OF FORMATIONS OF THE 2ND ARMY AS OF MARCH 9, 1945

Even the subordination of the 2nd Belorussian Front to the tank army did not ensure the solution of the task within the time frame established by Headquarters. Tank Army M.E. Katukova could intercept the retreat routes of the enemy’s 2nd Army and prevent the Germans from settling on the fortifications near Danzig and Gdynia. But this did not happen: the tank army was used to simply push the enemy back to the Danzig area. Rokossovsky formulated the task of the 1st Guards. tank army like this: “go on the offensive in the direction of Lauenburg, Neustadt and no later than 12.3 reach the coast of the Danzig Bay in the Gdynia, Putzig sector.” That is, the tank army should have simply moved along the coast and reached the bay north of Danzig. No attempts were made to cut off enemy formations leaving Danzig and Gdynia to the east.

To the fortifications on the approaches to Gdynia 1st Guards. The tank army left on March 12. Their assault was scheduled for March 13, and a detachment of the 40th Guards was assigned to clear the Putziger-Nerung Spit from enemy troops. tank brigade consisting of 7 tanks, a battery of 76-mm guns, two platoons of machine gunners and a platoon of sappers. However, attempts to break into the enemy's defenses together with the infantry of the 19th Army were unsuccessful. During March 13–15, units of the army M.E. Katukov rammed the enemy’s defenses, subjected to fire from heavy guns from ships and coastal batteries. Detachment of the 40th Guards. The tank brigade on the Putziger-Nerung (Hel) spit encountered a ditch filled with water, a mined highway, and anti-tank obstacles. An enemy armored train covered the engineering barriers. The stubborn defense of the sand dunes was explained by the fact that huge masses of refugees had accumulated on the spit, gradually evacuating by sea to Germany. The surrender of the Hel Spit was delayed for a long time: it was surrendered only in May 1945.

Self-propelled guns "Vespe", abandoned in Eastern Pomerania. They didn’t even have time to unload them from the railway platforms.

As they retreated, the grouping of the German 2nd Army gradually collapsed to a point with an increase in formation density and a concomitant increase in resistance to the advance of Soviet troops. If at the beginning of the East Pomeranian operation the length of the front of the armies of the 2nd Belorussian Front was about 240 kilometers, now it did not exceed 60 km. The width of the band of each of the armies operating in the strike direction was only 10–12 kilometers. As the front thickened, the battles quickly moved into a positional phase. In addition, Danzig has been surrounded by fortifications since ancient times. In 1734, Russian troops under the command of Field Marshal B.K. Minich took Danzig after a 135-day siege; in 1807, Napoleon's army needed 87 days of siege to take the city. At the end of the 19th century, Danzig's fortifications were significantly strengthened in accordance with the requirements of the time. Therefore, Danzig could not be classified as a naval base that was poorly protected from land. In addition, from the southeast the city was covered by a tank-impassable water barrier - the Motlau Umfliter Canal.

The status of a naval base provided Danzig with support from the Kriegsmarine, in particular the “largest gunboat in the Baltic” - the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen. During the 26 days of the siege, the cruiser fired 4871 20.3 cm caliber shells and 2644 10.5 cm caliber shells. When he left Danzig Bay, only 40 20.3-cm caliber shells remained in the cellars. In connection with all of the above, one cannot help but note a certain arrogance of K.K. Rokossovsky, who refused to encircle the enemy group retreating to Danzig before it reached the outer perimeter of the city’s fortifications.

But one way or another, the enemy divisions that prevented the advance of the 2nd Belorussian Front into Eastern Pomerania were punished. They were cut off from the main forces of the German army and squeezed into a narrow space on the seashore without any hope of salvation. The German 2nd Army was transferred from Army Group Vistula to Army Group North. On March 12, the commander of the 2nd Army, Colonel General Walter Weiss, was appointed commander of Army Group North, and his successor as commander of the 2nd Army was the commander of the 4th Panzer Division, General of the Panzer Forces, Dietrich von Saucken.

K.K. Rokossovsky outlined the following plan for the defeat and destruction of the enemy group. The main blow was to be delivered in the direction of Zoppot (a small resort town between Danzig and Gdynia) in order to dissect the defending enemy group and destroy it piece by piece. It was decided to break through the enemy’s defenses and reach the coast of the Danzig Bay in the Zoppot area, then, with attacks from various directions on Danzig and Gdynia, capture these cities and complete the defeat of the 2nd Army. In accordance with the decision made, the front commander assigned tasks to the troops. The main task of dissecting the enemy group was entrusted to the troops of two armies, reinforced by two tank corps. They were supposed to, continuing the offensive towards the Bay of Danzig, break through the defenses in the Espenkrug, Witzlin sector and, no later than March 14, capture the suburb of Oliva and the port of Zoppot. Subsequently, one of the armies aimed to attack Danzig from the north-west, and the second was to attack Danzig from the north along the shore of Danzig Bay. To combat enemy warships and prevent them from approaching the piers, the commander of the 49th Army was ordered to deploy long-range artillery to the shore of the bay and use its fire to prevent enemy ships from approaching Danzig.

Launched on the morning of March 14, 1945, the Soviet offensive towards the city of Tsoppot developed very slowly. The troops of the 49th and 70th armies advanced on Zoppot with adjacent flanks, with the task of cutting the Danzig-Gdynia enemy group into two isolated groups, capturing the Oliva, Zoppot, Kolibken line and reaching the Danzig Bay at this line. In the combat report of the headquarters of the 2nd Belorussian Front to the General Staff, the position of the armies is described quite succinctly: “49 and 70 A - at 12.00 went on the offensive, in cooperation with units of the 1st and 3rd Guards. tk. We repelled a counterattack by enemy infantry with self-propelled guns in the Barnin area. We had no success."

At 2.30 on March 18, K.K. Rokossovsky reported to the General Staff a plan of action to destroy the enemy group that had withdrawn to the area of ​​Danzig and Gdynia. The front commander estimated its strength at 100–120 thousand people. The operation was supposed to be divided into three stages. At the first stage, the task of the troops was to reach the coast in the Zoppot area and capture the Gdynia region. This stage was planned to be completed on March 22–23. At the second stage, the goal of the offensive was to capture the forest areas west of Kolibken, Danzig and the encirclement of Danzig. The tasks of this stage according to the plan of K.K. Rokossovsky were to be resolved on March 23–27. Finally, the third stage was the assault on Danzig. Three days were allotted for it.

The fighting was so stubborn that the advance of Soviet troops on some days was only hundreds of meters. Until March 22, the troops of K.K. Rokossovsky advanced at a pace of no more than 1–1.5 km per day. The Soviet offensive was drowning in the March mud. In the report of the headquarters of the 1st Guards. tank army noted: “Terrain conditions for tanks to operate were very limited. There was only one highway in the direction of the corps' action. The muddy roads and rugged terrain covered with forest forced us to operate along the highway, since attempts to advance off roads led to tanks getting stuck in the mud, becoming a target for enemy self-propelled guns and artillery.” The task of capturing two large ports was seriously complicated by anti-aircraft guns from their air defense, deployed for direct fire.

The 2nd shock, 65th, 49th and 70th armies acted against the strongest Danzig group. The 19th Army, one rifle corps of the 70th Army and formations of the 1st Guards acted against the Gdynia group. tank army. During March 23–26, the offensive continued in the direction of Danzig and Gdynia. Destroying individual enemy strongholds, the troops of the 49th and 70th armies by March 24 broke through two lines of enemy fortifications and reached the third and last line of fortifications covering Tsoppot from the west. This line of fortifications, created 3 km from the shore of the Danzig Bay, ran through the Danzig Royal Forest and the heights adjacent to Zoppot and the Danzig Bay from the west. In turn, the 1st Guards. The tank and 19th armies captured Klein Katz on March 24 and advanced from the south towards Gdynia.

A group of “tank destroyers” with faustpatrons disembarks from a truck. Such teams were an inferior replacement for self-propelled tank destroyers.

The Soviet command sought to end the enemy encircled and pressed to the sea as quickly as possible in order to throw the main forces of the 2nd Belorussian Front towards the Berlin direction. In addition, the issue of liquidating the remnants of the 2nd German Army was of political importance. In February 1945, at the Yalta Conference, representatives of England raised the question of Soviet troops occupying Danzig and Gdynia as quickly as possible, since 30 percent of new German boats were allegedly being built in shipyards there. This was motivated by the fact that “it will be very difficult for the Allied aviation and surface fleet to fight against the new series of submarines, since they have high speed under water and are equipped with the latest technology.” We are talking about submarines of the XXI series, the high technical characteristics of which created considerable difficulties for the Allies. Participants in the Yalta Conference on the Soviet side confirm the Allies' interest in Danzig. N.G. Kuznetsov recalled:

“The British spoke not from Field Marshal A. Brooke, as expected, but from Admiral E. Cuningham. In his report there was a familiar note about the difficulties of fighting German submarines and a plea for British help in this fight. Noting that German boats are being built mainly in Danzig, the admiral ended his speech with the words: “As a sailor, I want the Russians to occupy Danzig as soon as possible.”

It must be said that the Allies not only demanded the quickest capture of Danzig, but also provided all possible assistance to the assaulters. On March 12, 700 Flying Fortresses and Liberators of the American Air Force dropped 1,435 bombs on the city and port. The attack of heavy bombers somewhat diversified the almost continuous raids of the Il-2 and Pe-2.

On March 23, an ultimatum signed by K.K. was sent to the German troops defending Danzig. Rokossovsky. In addition to the official appeal, 4.5 million leaflets with the text of the ultimatum were poured onto the burning city and German positions. Psychological pressure on German troops from the population intensified. They were told: “The Russians guarantee your life, and you, like bad bulls, climb under the ax yourself and direct the terrible Russian fire at us!” However, resistance has not yet weakened. All advancing armies met stubborn resistance and desperate counterattacks.

However, it was on March 23 that the turning point in the battle came. On the night of March 23, Soviet troops with a night assault broke through the last line of enemy fortifications at the junction between Danzig and Gdynia and at 6.00 am they broke into Zoppot. During street fighting, Tsoppot was captured and the enemy group was finally divided into two parts. Units of the XXIII, XXVII and XX Army Corps, the XVIII Mountain Jaeger Corps, and part of the forces of the XLVI Panzer Corps remained in the Danzig area. In the Gdynia area, the remnants of the VII and XLVI tank corps were blocked. At the same time, a chain of heights west of Danzig was captured. The city and the entire German defense system were clearly visible.

The troops of the 19th Army, after a slight regrouping of their forces and the movement of artillery, resumed their actions to capture Gdynia. Conquering one strong point after another, they broke through the enemy’s defenses; and on March 26 they began the assault on the city. On this day, units of the 310th and 313th Rifle Divisions finally broke through the defenses on the near approaches to Gdynia and broke into the city. The 310th Rifle Division was supported by the 40th, 44th and 45th Guards. tank brigades of the 11th Guards. tank corps. The 313th Rifle Division was supported by the 1st Polish Tank Brigade. In fierce battles they captured thirteen quarters of the city. March 27, 1st Guards. The tank army was withdrawn from the 2nd Belorussian Front and returned to the Berlin direction. Tanks and self-propelled guns were sent by rail, and the remaining units returned under their own power.

On March 28, troops of the 19th Army completely captured the city and port of Gdynia. Soviet troops took 18,985 prisoners, about 200 tanks and self-propelled guns, 600 guns of various calibers and purposes, 1,068 machine guns, 71 aircraft, 6,246 cars, 20 different ships, including the old battleship "Schleswig-Holstein" blown up by the crews (the ship which started World War II) and the battleship Gneisenau.

Simultaneously with the offensive in the Zoppot and Gdynia directions, intense battles took place on the right wing of the front, where the troops of the 2nd Shock and 65th Armies were attacking Danzig in the shortest direction from the south and southwest. On March 27, Soviet troops began storming the city. Conducting an attack on Danzig simultaneously from three directions, they captured most of the city by March 29. Units of the 2nd Shock Army fought for the southern part of Danzig, units of the 65th Army broke into the central part of the city, and troops of the 49th and 70th armies captured its northern part. On March 30, Danzig fell. The defenders of Danzig crossed the Vistula branch to the island of Høybud. In Danzig, Soviet troops captured 45 submarines that were so troubling the Allies.

The heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen, which played an important role in the defense of the city, left Danzig Bay forever, arriving in Copenhagen on April 20. After the war, under the terms of the Potsdam Agreement between the USA, USSR and Great Britain, the Prinz Eugen went to the United States. In 1946, the ship was sunk during atomic weapons testing at Bikini Atoll. At the same time as the Prinz Eugen, the old battleship Schlesien, a sister ship of Schleswig-Holstein, built in Danzig at the Schichau shipyard, left Danzig Bay. He ended his days in Swinemünde in May 1945.

After the capture of Danzig, the East Pomeranian operation was formally completed. Enemy troops blocked in the area north of Gdynia were defeated and captured by the 19th Army by April 4. From February 10 to April 4, troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front captured 63,577 enemy soldiers and officers, captured 3,470 guns and mortars, 681 tanks and assault guns, 431 aircraft, 23,989 vehicles and 2,730 motorcycles. 32,170 servicemen of the Red Army and 25,872 servicemen of other countries were released from captivity. Actually in Danzig and Gdynia, 32,775 prisoners, 201 tanks and self-propelled guns, 134 aircraft (faulty), 727 guns, 566 mortars, 162 tractors and tractors, 15 armored trains, 151 ships and other property and weapons were captured. In addition, two camps of “armed prisoners of war” remained: on the Hel Spit and in the Vistula River delta southeast of Danzig. These units of the German 2nd Army capitulated after 9 May. By May 15, 1945, 15,134 people surrendered in the area southeast of Danzig, 96,470 people on the Putziger-Nerung spit, another 12,616 people surrendered on the island. Bornholm. Among those who surrendered were 12 generals, including the army commander, Panzer General von Saucken, the commander of the IX Army Corps, Artillery General Wutman, the commander of the XX Army Corps, Infantry General Spechte, and others.

The East Pomeranian operation cost the 2nd Belorussian Front quite high losses. From February 10 to April 4, 1945, the troops of K.K. Rokossovsky lost 173,389 people (40,471 irretrievable losses and 132,918 sanitary losses), i.e., almost a third of its original number. The numbers of irretrievable and total losses of the front are quite comparable with the losses of G.K. troops. Zhukov in the Berlin operation. The total losses of the 1st Belorussian Front in the East Pomeranian operation were significantly less - 52,303 people.

1st Guards The tank army from March 9 to March 27, 1945 irretrievably lost 68 tanks and self-propelled guns (57 T-34, 8 SU-76 and 3 SU-57), 120 combat vehicles received combat damage (98 T-34, 12 SU-85, 6 SU-76 and 4 SU-57), 33 were stuck (31 T-34 and 2 SU-85) and 67 vehicles were withdrawn from combat formations due to natural wear and tear. After the return of the 1st Guards. The tank army in Landsberg removed another 115 tanks and self-propelled guns from combat formations due to the exhaustion of engine hours, and all of them were handed over for major repairs. G.K.'s wish Zhukov to return the 1st Guards. a tank army safe and sound could now only cause a bitter smile.

Upper Silesian operation

The 1st Ukrainian Front was not allowed to rest and recuperate before the final push to Berlin. While the troops of Zhukov and Rokossovsky fought for Danzig, the Altdamm bridgehead and Küstrin, several armies of Konev fought the last battle before Berlin on their left flank. The offensive operation was initiated by Headquarters. Even during the February offensive of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front in Lower Silesia, the Supreme High Command repeatedly drew the attention of I.S. Konev to a serious lag of the troops of the left wing of the front. It emphasized that this circumstance could subsequently complicate the preparation and conduct of operations by front forces in the Berlin direction.

To be precise, it was not so much the flank of the 1st Ukrainian Front that lagged behind, but rather the 4th Ukrainian Front of I.E. Petrov, advancing into Upper Silesia from the east. Back on February 13, 1945 I.E. Petrov presented a report to Headquarters with an operation plan to capture the Moravian-Ostravian industrial region. The purpose of the operation in the report was formulated as follows: “dealing a concentrated blow with the forces of two armies (38 and 1 Guards A) in the direction of Olomouc, Pardubice, defeat the opposing enemy and, reaching the line of the river with the main forces. Vltava, take possession of Prague." To carry out the operation, the 126th and 127th light mountain rifle corps and the 5th Guards were transferred to the 4th Ukrainian Front. mechanized body. By Directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters No. 11029 of February 17, the plan presented by the command of the 4th Ukrainian Front was approved. I.E. Petrov was recommended: “The operation should begin no later than March 10.” In terms of the March offensives, the desire of the Soviet command to carry out a coordinated operation on adjacent flanks of two fronts is clearly visible. Advancing into Upper Silesia from the north, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front went to the flank and rear of the Heinrici army group, which was defending itself in front of the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front.

Following the instructions of Headquarters, the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front developed an offensive plan in Upper Silesia and on February 28 submitted it for approval. In his memoirs, Konev described his plan as follows: “When planning the Upper Silesian operation, we counted primarily on the encirclement of that part of the Nazi troops that were located on the Oppeln ledge itself and directly in Oppeln.” On March 1, the plan submitted to Headquarters was approved.

To solve the problem posed by Headquarters, I.S. Konev decided to use the overhanging position of the bridgehead captured by Soviet troops in the Grottkau area. To some extent, it repeated the operation to encircle Breslau, carried out in February 1945. In Upper Silesia, it was also planned to launch attacks in converging directions from two bridgeheads on the Oder. In accordance with the general plan for the operation, the front commander created two strike groups - the Oppeln group (in the ledge northwest of Oppeln) and the Ratibor group (on the bridgehead north of Ratibor).

The shelling of Gdynia is carried out by a 203-mm howitzer B-4.

The Oppeln group included the 21st Combined Arms and 4th Tank Armies, the 34th Guards. Rifle Corps 5th Guards. army and 4th Guards. tank corps. It was supposed to strike in the general direction of Grottkau, Neisse, Neustadt, where it would connect with the Ratibor group. The Ratibor group included the 59th and 60th armies, the 7th Guards. mechanized and 31st tank corps. This group had the task of striking from a bridgehead north of Ratibor in a westerly direction towards the troops of the Oppeln group and by the end of the third day of the operation connecting with it in the area of ​​Neustadt and Sülz.

Possessing strategic initiative, the Soviet command could concentrate tank rams in any direction, providing itself with at least the advantage of the first strike. The 4th Panzer Army, which had just operated in a westerly direction between the Beaver and Neisse rivers, was moving far to the southeast. In particular, the 6th Guards. The mechanized corps of the 4th Panzer Army withdrew from the bridgehead at Steinau on March 4–6 and set off on night marches past the encircled Breslau to the southeast. He concentrated in the designated area by March 10th. The corps, battered in the February battles, left the 49th Guards. mechanized brigade in the previous area of ​​deployment. There were only 4 T-34 tanks left in it. But in general, in 1945, equipment was replenished regularly. During the preparation for the operation, the 4th Tank Army received 159 T-34-85, 45 IS-2, 21 SU-100 and 2 °SU-76 for completion. The newest SU-100s were received in the form of a brand new 1727th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment. In total, by March 14 in the army D.D. Lelyushenko there were combat-ready 302 T-34-85, 11 T-34-76, 47 IS-2, 2 SU-122, 21 SU-100, 5 SU-85, 52 SU-57, 38 SU-76 and 4 Valentine » Mk.IX/X. Another 6 vehicles (2 T-34-85, 3 IS-2 and 1 SU-85) were under ongoing repair due to minor malfunctions and were put into service by the morning of March 15.

The 3rd Guards, which survived the meat grinder at Lauban in early March. the tank army was not ready for a new operation. Therefore, the second “claw” in the encirclement operation was made up of separate mobile units of the front. The 7th Guards, which surrounded Breslau in February. mechanized and 4th Guards. The tank corps moved along with the 4th Panzer Army to the south and concentrated on the bridgehead at Ratibor. This maneuver allowed the Soviet command to achieve superiority in forces in the selected area of ​​​​operations. The enemy could only react by moving reserves to the emerging crisis after the success of the first strike of the Soviet troops.

"Cauldron" on the banks of the Oder

Information about the impending Soviet offensive leaked to the Germans in early March 1945. From interrogations of prisoners, data was even obtained about the approximate start date of the offensive - March 10. Colonel General Heinrici decided to launch a pre-emptive strike on the Soviet bridgehead between Kozel and Ratibor. With a counterattack on the launch site of the Soviet offensive, it was necessary to defeat the concentrating troops and reduce the bridgehead. The maximum program was the elimination of the bridgehead. For the counterattack, a Jaeger battle group was created consisting of the 97th Jaeger Division and part of the 1st Ski Jaeger Division. It concentrated against the southern front of the bridgehead. The battle group was led by Lieutenant General von Pappenheim. Also, the units of General von Bünau's XI Army Corps, the 371st Infantry Division and the 18th SS Division Horst Wessel, defending along the perimeter of the bridgehead were to participate in the offensive. Since the Germans considered the start date of the Soviet operation to be March 10, the counterattack was supposed to be launched on the night of March 8.

The German counter-offensive began at the appointed time. The Jaeger battle group advanced north along the banks of the Oder. The 371st Infantry Division advanced towards the rangers from the west. Two strike groups were supposed to connect and encircle Soviet units in the southern part of the bridgehead. At first the offensive developed successfully, but after three days of fighting it fizzled out. The Germans failed to encircle at least part of the Soviet troops on the bridgehead. Only a few kilometers were recaptured on the southern front of the bridgehead. After stopping the counteroffensive, the Germans regrouped units along the perimeter of the bridgehead. They had to wait for its “opening” by Soviet troops.

The offensive of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front began on March 15 with the actions of the advanced battalions of the 21st and 5th Guards armies from the Grottkau region. Artillery preparation began at 7.00 and lasted 1.5 hours. At 8.40 the main forces of the 21st and 4th tank armies went on the offensive. Overcoming the enemy's stubborn fire resistance and repelling repeated counterattacks from his tactical reserves, by the end of the first day of the offensive, the army formations broke through two fortified enemy positions on an 8-kilometer front and advanced 8 km into the depths of the enemy defense.

The troops of the 59th and 60th armies, advancing from the bridgehead north of Ratibor in the direction of Neustadt, went on the offensive after 80 minutes of artillery preparation. Having broken the enemy's resistance, they broke through the main line of his defense on a 12-kilometer front and advanced 6–8 km during the day of fighting.

The relatively low rate of advance on the first day of the operation was explained by a number of reasons. Firstly, the enemy’s defense system was not completely suppressed by artillery preparation. Aviation training on March 15, due to bad weather, turned out to be less intensive than planned. Until 12.00, due to bad weather, Soviet aviation did not carry out combat sorties. Only from 12.00, as the weather improved, aviation began to carry out bombing attacks on enemy strongholds, headquarters and communications centers. However, instead of 2,995 sorties planned for the first day of the operation, aviation carried out only 1,283 sorties. Secondly, the fighting was inevitably influenced by the spring thaw. In the combat log of the 6th Guards. The mechanized corps noted: “The terrain in the area of ​​action is moderately rough and open. The soil is loamy and sandy loam in places; spring made the soil loose and muddy, as a result the tanks could only operate on roads, which deprived the corps of the main element in the offensive - maneuver on the battlefield." It was much easier for the enemy to build defenses along roads than to maintain a continuous front. Also in the offensive, the “edge effect” manifested itself - the advance of the 4th Guards Front, which was on the right flank of the Oppeln group. the tank corps on the first day of the operation was insignificant. However, in general, the Soviet offensive developed successfully: the defenses of the 45th Infantry Division in the Grottkau area were breached, and the division's regiments lost contact with each other.

Self-propelled gun SU-85 on the approaches to Gdynia.

Despite the information received from prisoners about the impending Soviet offensive, the Germans clearly underestimated its scope. Therefore, before the start of the operation, they did not accumulate reserves in close proximity to the Soviet bridgeheads. The actual scale of the Soviet offensive was realized by the German command only after it began. On March 16, an entry appeared in the combat log of the Wehrmacht operational leadership headquarters: “South of Grottkau, the enemy managed to drive a deep wedge. The 4th Tank Army appeared here, the location of which remained unknown." Mechanized units could become a “lifesaver.” The 20th Panzer, 10th Panzergrenadier and 19th Panzer divisions were withdrawn from the Strehlen and Schwednitsa area and rushed to the rescue. They still retained their combat capability. On March 15, the 20th Panzer Division had 9 Pz.V "Panther", 21 Pz.IV, 13 StuGIII self-propelled guns, 10 PanzerjaegerIV/70 and 2 FlakpanzerIV, in the 10th Panzer-Grenadier Division - 29 StuGIII and StuGIV self-propelled guns and 9 PanzerjaegerIV/70, in the 19th Panzer Division - 17 Pz.V “Panther”, 20 Pz.IV and 11 PanzerjaegerIV/70. Not all of these divisions were actually tank divisions by name. The 10th Panzer-Grenadier Division was reduced in number to a battle group. The name “battle group” itself meant a temporary unification of tank, motorized infantry, engineer and artillery units under a single command to solve a tactical problem. As a rule, a tank, tank-grenadier or infantry division was split into two or three battle groups. The fact that a division became a "battlegroup" meant that only half, a third, or even a smaller proportion of its strength remained. In other words, the remaining units from the division were only sufficient to create one standard battle group. Separate units were also deployed to repel the Soviet offensive. The 300th assault gun brigade was transferred from the Striegau area.

The arrival of enemy reserves inevitably complicated the situation on the flank of the Oppeln group of the 1st Ukrainian Front. In this regard, one cannot help but note Konev’s thoughtful construction of the front’s right-flank strike group in the Upper Silesian operation. Two tank and mechanized corps walked parallel routes and began to move in a ledge in the depths of the enemy’s defense. 4th Guards Tank Corps and 6th Guards. The mechanized corps of the 4th Tank Army operated on the outer front of the emerging encirclement, the 10th Guards. tank corps - on the inside. The movement of the ledge led to the fact that a possible counterattack on the flank of the 10th Guards. tank corps in the direction from west to east inevitably came under attack from the 6th Guards. mechanized corps moving from north to south. The attack on the flank of the entire tank army was under attack from the north of the 4th Guards. tank corps. The Germans met the expectations of the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front and acted exactly as he expected. Therefore, the greatest burden in the operation fell on the 4th Guards. tank and 6th Guards. mechanized body. They were supposed to prevent the direct impact of German reserves on the enveloping maneuver and repel relief attacks.

March 16 became the day of the attackers’ fight against the arriving mechanized enemy formations. As usually happens, reserves were brought into battle in parts. The first to enter the battle were the 19th Panzer Division and the 10th Panzer-Grenadier Division. They could not fill the front torn into shreds. Therefore, the 10th Guards. Tank Corps 4th Guards. The tank army quickly found a gap in the enemy's formation and moved far forward, beginning a maneuver to encircle the enemy. Two other corps of the Oppeln group of the 1st Ukrainian Front were drawn into battles with enemy reserves. The battle group of the 10th Panzer-Grenadier Division covered the city of Neisse from the north. The 19th Panzer Division encountered a dense barrier at the base of the breakthrough created by the 4th Guards. tank corps and the 34th Guards. rifle corps. 6th Guards The mechanized corps, meanwhile, felt for gaps in the restored defenses for a breakthrough to the southwest. 16th and 17th Guards. Mechanized brigades began to bypass the Neisse from the west. Opposition was provided by counterattacks by units of the 10th Panzer-Grenadier Division and artillery of the 405th People's Artillery Corps. The intensity of the fighting increased sharply. If on March 15, 6th Guards. The mechanized corps lost 7 people killed and 18 wounded, 16 tanks burned out and damaged, then on March 16, corps losses amounted to 149 people killed and 247 wounded, 36 tanks and 2 SU-100. The number of tanks in the 16th and 17th Guards. The corps' mechanized brigades dropped to 16 vehicles.

Street fighting in Gdynia. For the 1st Guards. for the tank army they became a rehearsal for the battles for Berlin.

March 17 became the day of throwing. On the previous day of the 10th Guards. The tank corps successfully advanced towards the river. Neisse is east of the town of Neisse. At 3.00 am D.D. Lelyushenko ordered the 6th Guards. the mechanized corps should turn around after its faster advancing neighbor and cross the Neisse at Rotthaus. However, the corps commander could send only one 16th Guards to Rotthaus. mechanized brigade. 17th Guards the mechanized brigade was left on the line captured the previous day as flank cover. At 8.20, the commander of the 4th Tank Army changed his decision and ordered the 6th Guards. the mechanized corps to capture the city of Ottmahau, and the 10th Guards. building - the city of Neisse.

10th Guards The tank corps crossed the river at 13.00 on March 17. Neisse at Rotthaus with the forces of the 61st Guards. tank brigade and expanded its success to Neustadt. 62nd Guards The tank brigade was placed in a flank barrier to avoid counterattacks from Neisse. In a futile attempt to stop the advance of Soviet tanks towards units of the 10th Panzer Corps, police from Neisse, armed only with light small arms, were sent in. This led to the immediate destruction of the Nijsen city police. Naturally, people who went into battle with unsuitable weapons and without hope of success tried to look for a better fate for themselves. However, Scherner restored order with draconian measures: deserters were mercilessly shot.

It cannot be said that overcoming the 10th Guards. tank corps of the Neisse River passed painlessly. The commander of the 10th Guards died in battle near Rotthaus. Tank Corps Colonel N.D. Chuprov. Major General E.E. took command of the corps. Belov - Deputy Commander of the 4th Tank Army. 6th Guards The mechanized corps had to reap the consequences of throwing between two directions on the afternoon of March 17. The stumbling block was the settlement of Stephansdorf on the way to Ottomachau. In the middle of the day it was stormed by the 17th Guards. mechanized brigade, and in the afternoon - the 16th Guards, returned from Rotthaus. mechanized brigade. 17th Guards In the afternoon, the mechanized brigade defended with a front to the west - the advanced units of the enemy’s 20th Tank Division pulled up to the battlefield.

At the height of the battle in Upper Silesia, March 17, 1945, the 4th Panzer Army D.D. Lelyushenko received the rank of Guards. Of the six Soviet tank armies that existed at that time, the army of D.D. Lelyushenko was the last to receive the guard. Formed in 1944, the 6th Tank Army A.G. Kravchenko received a guards rank in September of the same year. Formed almost simultaneously with the 4th Tank Army, the 2nd Tank Army became a guards army in November 1944. 1st Tank Army M.E. Katukova joined the Soviet Guard in April 1944. The 3rd and 5th Tank Armies had held the Guard rank since the spring of 1943.

ISU-122 in Danzig.

The 4th Tank Army celebrated its conferment of the guards rank with successes on the battlefield. The task of closing the ring around the formations of the LVI tank corps was successfully solved by the 10th Guards. tank corps. At the end of the day on March 18, the 61st Guards. The corps' tank brigade and the 93rd separate tank brigade reached the Buchensdorf area, where they linked up with units of the 7th Guards. mechanized corps and the 31st tank corps, advancing from the east. The lid of the “cauldron” for four German divisions slammed shut. The following were surrounded: the 20th SS Infantry Division (1st Estonian), the 168th and 344th Infantry Divisions, part of the forces of the 18th SS Division Horst Wessel.

Expected I.S. The horse's counterattacks could no longer prevent the ring from closing. They were carried out by formations of Army Group Center, transferred from other sectors of the front. The delay was caused by the need to make long marches to reach the Neisse area. Already on the first day of the Soviet offensive, March 15, 1945, the 1st Parachute Tank Division "Hermann Goering" received an order to move to a new concentration area. By that time, the division had been withdrawn from the bridgehead at Muskau and was on vacation in the Görlitz area. The first parts of the Hermann Goering were unloaded from the trains at Ottmachau on March 17. The division was given the task of attacking the extended flank of the "claw" of Soviet troops surrounding the LVI Panzer and XI Army Corps. The starting positions for the counterattack were the area southeast of the city of Neisse. However, the offensive of the Soviet troops disrupted the concentration of the Hermann Goering at the initial positions for the counteroffensive. If not for the throwing of the 6th Guards. mechanized corps between the two directions on March 17, the starting positions for the counterattack would have simply been captured by Soviet troops.

On March 18, the reserves thrown into battle by the Germans encountered aggressive cover of the flank of the Oppeln group of the 1st Ukrainian Front. 6th Guards The mechanized corps advanced in a southwestern direction. The task of the corps was to capture Ottmachau - the very station at which Hermann Goering was unloaded. In the early morning of March 18, the 16th and 17th Guards. The mechanized brigades jointly captured the Stephansdorf road junction, which they had stormed individually the previous day, and continued their attack on Ottmachau. However, the advanced detachments of the corps were met by ambushes, and further advance was stopped. The Soviet mechanized corps stretched out like a wedge in the direction of Ottmachau.

The middle of the day was spent repelling counterattacks by the arriving units of Hermann Goering and the 20th Panzer Division. 6th Guards the mechanized corps created a direct threat to the Hermann Goering flank and thereby prevented an effective counterattack. Resistance from the front was weak, but the threat to the flank forced the Germans to stop their advance to the east and deal with the threat from the north. Massive fire of the 17th Guards. mechanized brigade, as well as all artillery of the 16th Guards. mechanized brigade and corps artillery group, all counterattacks of Hermann Goering units were repulsed. Also unsuccessful was the offensive of the 20th Panzer Division on the flank of the 6th Guards. mechanized corps. The received 4th Guards took part in repelling enemy attacks. tank army shortly before the operation in Upper Silesia self-propelled guns SU-100. Realizing the importance of covering the flank, the commander of the 4th Guards. The tank army also sent units of army subordination to support the mechanized corps: the 22nd self-propelled artillery brigade with Lend-Lease SU-57s and the 57th motorcycle battalion.

Commander of the 6th Guards. Mechanized Corps Colonel V.I. Koretsky.

The repulsion of German counterattacks was personally led by the commander of the 6th Guards. mechanized corps. However, an excellent view of the battlefield from the front line also had a downside - the risk of falling under enemy fire. A shell that exploded at the command post mortally wounded the commander of the 6th Guards. Mechanized Corps General V.F. Orlov, head of the corps' reconnaissance department, Major Chernyshev, and commander of the 17th Guards. mechanized brigade Hero of the Soviet Union Lieutenant Colonel L.D. Churilov. The chief of staff of the guard, Colonel V.I., took command of the corps. Koretsky. Despite the fairly calm development of events, the Upper Silesian operation became for the 4th Guards. tank army during a period of loss of command personnel. Total losses of the 6th Guards. Mechanized corps on March 18 amounted to 99 people killed, 318 wounded, 8 tanks burned.

The commander of the Fuhrer Escort division, Otto-Ernst Römer (pictured with the rank of lieutenant colonel).

Formations transferred from other sectors of the Army Group Center front were also brought into battle immediately south of the newly formed “cauldron”. An enemy well known to the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, the XXIV Panzer Corps of Nering, was advancing to the Leobschütz area. The 16th and 17th Panzer Divisions, the 78th Assault Division and the Fuhrer Escort Division were subordinate to him. On March 15, the 16th Panzer Division had 14 Pz.V "Panther" and 31 self-propelled guns "Hetzer" combat-ready, the division "Fuhrer Escort" - 10 Pz.V "Panther", 7 Pz.IV, 2°StuGIII, 12 PanzerjaegerIV /70 and 2 FlakpanzerIV. The condition of all these formations was far from brilliant, but they could still play their role in the battle.

However, the encircled German divisions did not wait for relief. In the second half of the war, waiting for outside help could already lead to fatal consequences. Memories of the fate of the destroyed “festungs” made me nervous. The commander of the 344th Infantry Division, General Jolasse, recalled: “Responses to all requests from the division regarding a possible breakthrough to the south through Deutsch-Rasselwitz were slowed down by the XXIV Panzer Corps.” At 15.00 on March 19, Jolasse decided “to act independently in the face of a rapidly deteriorating situation.” He signed the order for the breakthrough, which was originally scheduled for 17.00. The general insisted in his memoirs that he made the decision to break through on his own. The breakthrough began at 19.00 on the same day. The 18th SS Division and the 344th Infantry Division made the breakthrough. To call a spade a spade, the German troops southwest of Oppeln (north of the positions of the Jolasse division) were thrown to the mercy of fate by this breakthrough. They soon found themselves in a separate “cauldron” with no hope of salvation. When the commanders of the formations believed less and less in the promises of the command about a speedy release, the principle of “every man for himself” inevitably began to operate.

The target of the breakthrough was the village of Deutsch-Rasselwitz. The area was open, without any natural shelter. As a result, the fire of Soviet guns and mortars punched holes in the ranks of the German units, mixed with refugees, going to break through. A desperate dash paved the way to salvation for a lucky few. Deutsch-Rasselwitz was captured around 10 p.m. There was a river 2 km from the village, but the bridge across it was blown up. Some sought salvation by swimming, others waited until a ford was found. The next point of breakthrough was the village of Hotzenplotz on the banks of the river of the same name. Here the bridges across the river were also prudently blown up by Soviet sappers. General Jolasse recalled: “The river bank was turned into a continuous muddy mess and was under continuous enemy artillery fire. Here we suffered significant losses. Many vehicles, guns and the last self-propelled guns got stuck trying to cross Hotzenplotz. They were all blown up and abandoned." Those who were able to break through Hotzenplotz soon reached the positions of units of the XXIV Panzer Corps.

If the threat from the west from “Hermann Goering”, the 19th and 20th Panzer Divisions managed to fend off the 4th Guards. tank and 6th Guards. mechanized corps, then Nering’s XXIV Panzer Corps could well have delivered a strong relief blow. However, without waiting for outside help, the remnants of the encircled troops made a breakthrough. Therefore, the XXIV Panzer Corps had to restore the integrity of the front, in which, after the encirclement of the LVI Panzer Corps, a large gap had formed.

While the encircled German units were breaking out of the encirclement, to the north-west of the city of Neisse, Soviet troops repelled enemy counterattacks. 6th Guards The mechanized corps itself did not move forward, but retained the positions captured in the previous days. In the combat log of the Wehrmacht operational leadership headquarters, the situation on March 20 was described as follows: “The troops cut off between the bridgeheads are retreating. The attacks of the Hermann Goering division failed. The enemy managed to finally link the bridgeheads and form a large bridgehead on the western bank of the [Oder]."

T-34-85 tank with infantry landing in the Danzig area.

Within five days, troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front encircled and eliminated a large enemy group on the western bank of the Oder. As a result of this, the possibility of an enemy flank attack on front troops from Upper Silesia during the Berlin operation was eliminated. The Soviet offensive also forced the German command to remove the mechanized formations concentrated in the area of ​​​​Zobten and Schweidnitz and throw them into battle in the Neisse area. Thus, plans to release Breslau were thwarted. On March 5, Lieutenant General Hermann Niehoff was appointed commandant of Breslau. He flew to the fortress by plane with Scherner's promise to break through to the surrounded city from the outside. This promise remained unfulfilled. The losses of the 1st Ukrainian Front at the first stage of the operation can be assessed as moderate. The irretrievable losses of armored vehicles in the front forces for the period from March 15 to March 20 amounted to 259 armored units (196 tanks and 63 self-propelled guns).

Losses of equipment of the 4th Guards. tank army for the period March 15–22 and their distribution by nature of damage is shown in the table. There were no losses from aviation or from faustpatrons in parts of Lelyushenko’s army during this period. This is explained by the dominance of the Soviet Air Force in the air and the absence of street fighting. Failures due to technical faults mainly fell on the development of the engine's service life in throwing on the roads of Poland and Germany. By the beginning of the operation, the 4th Tank Army had 123 tanks that had worked 1.5–2 times the norm.

Table

LOSSES of the 4th Guards. TANK ARMY IN THE PERIOD FROM MARCH 15 TO MARCH 22, 1945 AND THEIR DISTRIBUTION BY CAUSE OF DAMAGE

Just like the East Pomeranian operation of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian fronts, the Upper Silesian operation took place in conditions of spring thaw. This inevitably affected the losses. In the report of the armored supply and repair department of the 4th Guards. tank army states that “the operation in the period from 15.3 to 22.3.45 took place during the spring thaw, off-road movement was impossible even for tanks, which explains the large number of stuck tanks; stuck tanks, as a rule, were hit by the enemy.”

Failure I.E. Petrova and its consequences

If the offensive of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front was quite successful, then the 4th Ukrainian Front could not boast of any significant achievements. The ambitious plan of I.E. Petrova began to collapse without even having time to achieve the goals of the first stage of the operation. The armies in the direction of the main attack were commanded by future dignitaries of the upper echelon of power of the Soviet Union of the Brezhnev era. The 38th Army was led by K.S. Moskalenko, 1st Guards Army - A.A. Grechko. In the auxiliary direction, the 18th Army of Lieutenant General A.I. was deployed on a 70-kilometer front. Gastilovich. Like most Soviet armies on the Soviet-German front, they could not boast of a good complement of rifle formations. The number of personnel in the rifle divisions of the 18th and 38th armies ranged from 3 to 4 thousand people. Only two divisions of the 38th Army had 5 thousand people each. The number of rifle divisions of the 1st Guards Army ranged from 4 to 5.5 thousand people.

The reasons for the failures were quite trivial. Firstly, the date for the start of the operation - March 10 - was perceived as unshakable. Perhaps the fact that the notorious L.Z. was a member of the front’s Military Council played a role here. Mehlis. It is his pressure that can explain the impeccable fulfillment of the Headquarters instructions “to begin the operation no later than March 10.” As a result, the offensive began in conditions of incomplete preparation of troops for it. Instead of reporting to the top about the troops’ unpreparedness for an offensive, the front command chose to remain silent about the difficulties that arose.

Secondly, the technique of withdrawing troops from the first trench worked against the strike force of the 4th Ukrainian Front. Information about the Soviet offensive leaked to the Germans. The start date has become known - March 10. On the evening of March 9, the German units defending in the direction of the supposed attack of the Soviet troops received an order to withdraw to the second line of trenches. The withdrawal was completed before dawn on March 10th. The withdrawal, carried out under the cover of a snowstorm, was not noticed and the artillery strike hit an almost empty area. The results of this blunder were immediate. Instead of breaking through to a depth of 23–25 km, army troops on March 10 wedged 3–4 km into enemy defenses on a 15 km front. The penetration of Soviet troops into the defense of the Heinrici group attracted mobile reserves in the form of the 8th Panzer Division. As of March 15, this division included 42 Pz.IV (of which 11 were serviceable), 10 Pz.V “Panther” (of which 9 were serviceable) and 30 PanzerjaegerIV/70 (of which 6 were serviceable). By the end of March 17, in the direction of the main attack, the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front managed to advance only 12 km.

The obvious failure, as usual, was followed by organizational conclusions. Directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters No. 11045 I.E. On March 25, Petrov was removed from the post of commander of the 4th Ukrainian Front with the wording: “for attempting to deceive Headquarters about the true position of the front troops, who were not fully prepared for an offensive at the appointed time.” Place I.E. Petrov was taken over by A.I. Eremenko. A few days later, the chief of staff of the front was replaced: General F.K. Korzhenevich was replaced by Colonel General L.M. Sandalov.

Commander's armored personnel carrier SdKfz.251 abandoned on the shore of Danzig Bay. Pay attention to the “broom” of the antenna of a powerful radio station.

To bring the offensive of the 4th Ukrainian Front out of the crisis, a proven method was used - shifting the direction of the main attack. K.S. Moskalenko, who commanded the 38th Army, described in his memoirs his impressions of observing the front line in the new direction:

“One and a half kilometers south of the height was the small town of Zorau. It was small, but it was a junction of seven highways and three railways, radiating in all directions. Even closer, directly at the slopes of the height, a small river flowed. Its valley, up to 500 m wide, was a wetland with many artificial ponds and covered Sorau from the northeast. We approached the city even closer, as far as the front line allowed. Now we were separated from Sorau by a distance of up to 1 km. The streets were clearly visible, quiet and calm. Soldiers walked slowly and just as calmly along them. They didn't seem to expect the blow. Meanwhile, it should have been applied right here. Moreover, to the northeast of Sorau a forest was visible, which could provide a secret concentration of troops and equipment" ( Moskalenko K.S. In a south-west direction. M.: Science. P. 568).

The decision to attack through Zorau was approved by I.E. Petrov, but A.I. had to reap its results. Eremenko. For the breakthrough, the 95th Rifle and 126th Light Mountain Rifle Corps of the 38th Army were concentrated. Each of them received a tank brigade. The offensive in the new direction began on March 24 and developed much more successfully than on March 10. In the main direction, the 95th Rifle Corps and the 126th Light Mountain Rifle Corps that day advanced to a depth of 7 km, and the 101st Rifle Corps in the auxiliary direction - by 4 km.

The German command tried to plug the breakthrough that had formed at Sorau with the 715th Infantry Division of General von Rohr, which arrived by rail. The division arrived from Italy, and its soldiers and officers were completely unprepared for the realities of the Eastern Front. Having come under attack from the mountain rifle units of the 38th Army, it was scattered into pieces and suffered heavy losses. For the failure of his division, its commander was instantly demoted to the rank of colonel “by order of the Fuhrer.” Also, by order of Hitler, soldiers and officers of the 715th Infantry Division were stripped of all awards and insignia.

During March 25–28, the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front advanced at an average daily pace of 4–5 km. By March 28, they were 20 km from Moravian Ostrava. At this line they encountered increased enemy resistance and were unable to advance further. Realizing the importance of the Moravian-Ostravian industrial region, the enemy nominated the 16th and 19th tank divisions and the 10th tank-grenadier division to defend it. The 8th Panzer Division also moved here, successfully participating in repelling the Soviet offensive on March 10–18. The fighting here froze until mid-April.

Second phase of the Upper Silesian Operation

With the 4th Ukrainian Front hopelessly stuck, after the encirclement and defeat of the LVI Panzer and XI Army Corps divisions, the 1st Ukrainian Front's operation did not stop. The collapse of the enemy front made it possible to move forward the rifle divisions of the combined arms armies and reinforce the mechanized and tank brigades with them. 6th Guards The mechanized corps, in cooperation with the 382nd and 72nd rifle divisions, was supposed to attack the city of Neisse from the north and clear the northern bank of the Neisse River from the enemy. The next task was to advance along the northern bank of the river towards Ottmahau. The task of flank cover was entrusted to the 128th Infantry Division. Closing the encirclement of the 10th Guards. The tank corps was turning around and, in cooperation with the 55th Rifle Corps, was supposed to attack the city of Neisse, which had been bypassed a few days earlier, from the southeast.

SU-76 enter the streets of Neisse.

March 23, 6th Guards. The mechanized corps and the approaching rifle divisions solved two tasks simultaneously: they defended with a front to the west and advanced to the south. The part of the city of Neisse lying on the northern bank of the Neisse was captured. By 20.00 on March 23, the 10th Guards reached the eastern outskirts of Neisse. tank and 55th rifle corps. The defenders of the city had only one way to escape - to the west.

The city of Neisse was once a fortress, but in 1945 it was completely unsuitable for this role. As the commander of the 17th Army, General Schultz, put it, “the fortifications of Neisse were suitable for battle in the time of Frederick the Great, but not during the Second World War.” The main problem was the lack and limited capabilities of defenders. In the city of Neisse at the end of January the 273rd and 274th Volkssturm battalions were formed. But their capabilities were simply insignificant. Each consisted of four companies numbering about 60 people. Each company had one heavy machine gun and up to 15 Faust cartridges. The Volkssturmists had about 60 cartridges per carbine. In addition, circumstances did not allow the Volkssturm to take advantage of the battle on the city streets. The 273rd Volkssturm Neisse battalion was withdrawn from the city and took up the battle in open areas. Under these conditions, the outcome of the struggle for Neisse was a foregone conclusion. By the end of the day on March 24, the southern part of the city was cleared of German troops by the forces of the 10th Guards. tank and 55th rifle corps.

A Volkssturmist examines holes from Faust cartridges in the sides of the turret and hull of the Soviet T-34-85 tank.

After the surrender of Neisse, the commander of Army Group Center, Scherner, demanded a death sentence for its commandant, Colonel Georg Sparre. Neisse, like many other German cities, was declared a "festung" (fortress). Sparre managed to save his life only by bluffing, revealing that he was the brother-in-law of Reichsleiter Bormann. Having heard the name of one of the highest dignitaries of the Third Reich, the judge stopped the trial with a predetermined result. Therefore, instead of appearing before a squad of soldiers with rifles, Colonel Sparre went to the Glatz fortress for further proceedings. There, from a prisoner, he soon became a prisoner of war of the Soviet troops.

In the meantime, it was necessary to galvanize the offensive of the 1st Ukrainian Front in the Ratibor area. The 60th Army of P.A. was advancing here. Kurochkina. On the first day of the offensive, she advanced 8 km. In the memoirs of I.S. Konev wrote: “Such a pace of advance did not suit us in any way, and I brought in two corps of the 4th Guards Tank to help the 60th Army. The tankers were supposed to deliver an additional blow from the north." To be precise, army units and one of the army corps were initially deployed to the new direction. On the morning of March 24, 10th Guards. tank corps of the 4th Guards. The tank army was ordered to continue fighting for the southern part of Neisse in cooperation with the 55th Rifle Corps. Corps E.E. Belov also transferred the 1727th self-propelled artillery regiment to the SU-100. The remaining forces of the D.D. army Lelyushenko was supposed to be withdrawn from the Neisse area and already on March 25 go on the offensive in a new direction.

Damaged SU-85M. Silesia, March 1945

In addition, the 4th Guards. The tank army received a new formation with which it had to end the war. From March 24, 1945, the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps of Major General of Tank Forces B.M. was included in the tank army. Skvortsova. Initially, it was part of the 4th Ukrainian Front, but failure to carry out an offensive operation led to the transfer of the corps to the subordination of the more effective advancing 1st Ukrainian Front. Completeness of the 5th Guards. mechanized corps can be assessed as high. By the time of transfer to the subordination of D.D. Lelyushenko mechanized corps B.M. Skvortsov counted 171 tanks and self-propelled guns in service (116 T-34-85, 17 IS-2, 18 SU-85, 2 °SU-76). Since June 1944, Skvortsov's corps has been in reserve at the Supreme Command Headquarters, and by February 7–8, 1945 it was fully equipped with tanks. However, the corps was sorely lacking in vehicles. Commander of the 4th Ukrainian Front I.E. Petrov was annoyed in February: “5 Mk, concentrated in the Debica area, is fully staffed with personnel and tanks, but does not have vehicles - the shortage is expressed in 1243 units. The 800 planned vehicles for the corps are on the way and some have not yet been shipped. Their delivery to the building is scheduled for February 20, 1945.” . As a result, the corps went into battle only on March 10 and managed to irretrievably lose only 35 T-34-85s. Therefore, the 5th Guards. The mechanized corps was well preserved by the time when most of the mobile formations of the 1st Ukrainian Front were thoroughly beaten in battle. Entering control, army units and one badly battered corps of the 4th Guards. tank army, the front commander did not so much strengthen the 60th Army as strive to increase the level of command and control in the Ratibor area.

New formation of the 4th Guards. The tank army was the first to launch an offensive at the new stage of the operation. 5th Guards The mechanized corps at 8.00 on March 24 went on the offensive in the direction of Leobschütz-Troppau. On the first day of the offensive towards the corps of B.M. Skvortsov was joined only by certain units of army subordination: the 93rd separate tank and 22nd self-propelled artillery brigades. However, instead of a gap in the collapsed front of the 4th Guards. The tank army met the defense of the XXIV Panzer Corps. As a result, the advance of Soviet troops was only 3–4 km.

Stubborn resistance instead of loose ruins of defense on the site of the liquidated “cauldron” was an unpleasant surprise. Conclusion of the 4th Guards. The tank army followed the new direction in a modified order relative to the original plan. The first to be withdrawn from the captured city of Neisse was the 10th Guards. tank corps. Corps E.E. Belova was brought into battle on March 25 to build up the attack to the left of the 5th Guards. mechanized corps. But by coincidence, several German tank formations were assembled in the planned direction of attack, sent to Oppeln and Ratibor as a “fire brigade”: the 16th and 17th tank divisions, the Fuhrer Escort division, the 254th Infantry and the 78th I am an assault division. Despite the fact that the 17th Panzer Division was in the status of a “battle group”, it could boast on March 15 14 PzKpfw.IV (of which 10 were serviceable), 23 PzKpfw.V “Panther” (of which only 4 were serviceable), 19 PanzerjaegerIV/70 (of which 18 are operational) and 3 anti-aircraft Flakpanzer.IV.

The unfinished XXI series submarines captured by Soviet troops in Danzig are a matter of concern for the Allies.

However, German reserves in 1945 could not be omnipresent. The path to success lay in testing new directions with blows. 6th Guards The mechanized corps surrendered its positions to the infantry after a two-day pause. The transfer of positions by the corps to the formations of the 21st Army took place on the night of March 27, and already in the morning of March 28 it was necessary to go on the offensive. D.D.’s decision Lelyushenko explained in his memoirs this way: “I decide on March 28 to bring the corps into battle in the direction of Steuberwitz, where the enemy did not expect our attack at all.” By that time, the 6th Guards. the mechanized corps consisted of 15 T-34s in the 16th Guards. mechanized brigade, 16 T-34s in the 17th Guards. mechanized brigade, 9 IS-2 in the 28th Guards. heavy tank regiment, 17 T-34s in the 95th separate motorcycle battalion and 14 SU-76s in the 1433rd self-propelled artillery regiment. Compared to the mass of tanks in Skvortsov’s mechanized corps, Koretsky’s mechanized corps, which remained in two brigades, was much weaker. But even two brigades at the right time in the right place could play a significant role. The 107th Infantry Division was supposed to make a hole in the enemy’s defenses, and the 6th Guards. The mechanized corps was tasked with attacking Troppau from the northeast. This blow brought the mechanized corps to the rear of the enemy's XXIV Tank Corps. According to the plan of the 6th Guards unit. The mechanized corps were supposed to break into Troppau on the evening of March 28. 5th Guards mechanized and 10th Guards. The tank corps were to advance in the same direction, leading to Troppau from the north. Thus, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front were supposed to form another “cauldron” in Upper Silesia.

The operation began at 12.00 on March 28 with the offensive of the 107th Infantry Division and the 31st Tank Corps. At 18.00 he was joined by units of the 6th Guards. mechanized corps. The offensive progressed on the whole successfully, but the pace was still much lower than the planned rush to Troppau. The approaches to the Stolmotz road junction, which lay on the path of advance of the corps brigades, were heavily mined, and the bridge over the Zinna River was blown up. The enemy also prevented the outflanking maneuver with fire from Stolmotz. Clearing the roads, searching for a ford and crossing Zinna took time, and Stolmotz was taken by the 17th Mechanized Brigade by 1.00 on March 29th. The defense of Stolmotz was surrendered to the 95th Motorcycle Battalion, and the two mechanized brigades continued the advance.

By the evening of March 29, the 31st Tank Corps captured Ratibor and linked up with units of the 60th Army advancing on the city from the east. It should be noted the decisive role of artillery in the battles for Ratibor. For several days, the troops of the 60th Army unsuccessfully tried to capture this strong point of enemy resistance. Then I.S. Konev ordered the concentration of the 17th breakthrough artillery division, the 25th breakthrough artillery division, which had just arrived at the front, in the Ratibor area, as well as most of the army’s military artillery. The enemy's resistance was quickly broken by the massive fire of this artillery, and Soviet troops captured the city.

The capture of Ratibor reliably covered the left flank of the 6th Guards. mechanized corps. On the contrary, the remaining formations of the 4th Guards. The tank army could not yet boast of great successes. Right flank of the 10th Guards. tank corps and the left flank of the 5th Guards. The mechanized corps advanced only 2 km. At 18.00 D.D. Lelyushenko ordered the commander of the 6th Guards. mechanized corps to create a mobile detachment and throw it forward to intercept the communications of the surrounded enemy. The detachment was created from the 95th separate motorcycle battalion, battalion of the 17th Guards. mechanized brigade and two IS-2 tanks of the 28th Guards. heavy tank regiment. In total, the detachment consisted of 14 T-34s and 2 IS-2s. The detachment was headed by the commander of the 17th Guards. Mechanized Guard Brigade Major Bushmakin. The detachment received orders to advance through Reisnitz to Piltsch.

However, the moment for a sudden breakthrough into depth was missed. In the direction of the attack of the 6th Guards. The Fuhrer Escort division was deployed to the mechanized corps. On March 30, Bushmakin’s detachment came under counterattacks from newly arrived units, lost 10 tanks and 110 infantry and retreated. Two brigades of the 6th Guards. The mechanized corps continued to push forward.

On the last day of March, the right-flank strike force of the 4th Guards finally achieved some success. tank army. By the morning of March 31, the 61st Guards. tank brigade of the 10th Guards. tank corps reached Reisnitz, and the 62nd Guards. tank brigade - to Dirschel. In conditions of a decline in the number of tanks in tank brigades, units in key directions were replenished at the expense of secondary ones. Commander of the 61st Guards. tank brigade recalled: “When we occupied the village of Nassidel by the end of the day on March 30, the commander of the guard, Colonel General D.D., called me to the phone. Lelyushenko. He said that units from other parts of the 10th Guards Tank Corps were sent to replenish the brigade, and ordered an offensive to begin immediately after their arrival and to capture the village of Reisnitz by the morning of March 31. Already in the dark, 11 tanks and self-propelled guns and two artillery regiments arrived at our disposal.”

The group of German troops defending in the Karcher area found themselves semi-surrounded. From the front it was pinned down by the 386th Infantry Division and the 22nd Self-Propelled Artillery Brigade of the 4th Guards. tank army. An attempt by the 1st Ski Jaeger Division to deliver a flank attack and break through to freedom through the rear of the 6th Guards. mechanized corps ended in failure. In the battle to repel the counterattack, the head of the operational department of the 6th Guards was killed. Mechanized Guard Corps Major Rybakov.

On April 1, the last act of the drama followed, for the sake of which the 4th Guards. The tank army was withdrawn from the Berlin direction and sent to Upper Silesia. The task of the 6th Guards. The mechanized corps made a breakthrough towards the 61st Guards. tank brigade in Reisnitz. However, solving the problem head-on promised only heavy losses - it was necessary to ram the defenses of the Fuhrer Escort division. Under these conditions, the commander of the 16th Guards. mechanized brigade Lieutenant Colonel G.M. Shcherbak approached the corps commander with a proposal to get to Reisnitz via a different route. He proposed to strike where the Germans had launched a counterattack the previous day. This decision brought success, and parts of two corps of the 4th Guards. tank army united at Reisnitz. Units of the 1st Ski-Jäger Division, the 500th Penal Battalion and part of the forces of the Fuhrer Escort division were surrounded. It is interesting to note that Lieutenant Colonel G.M., who proposed a successful solution to the problem. Shcherbak was appointed to the post of brigade commander only on March 29. He replaced the suspended Lieutenant Colonel Makhno. The latter withdrew from leading the battle and was removed by order of the corps commander. G.M. Shcherbak was previously the chief of staff of the brigade. For the successful solution of the assigned task to all personnel of the 6th Guards. The mechanized corps was thanked on behalf of the front commander. Colonel Vasily Ignatievich Koretsky received a high assessment of his first days as commander of the mechanized corps. In the combat characteristics of the new commander of the 6th Guards. mechanized corps it was recorded: “Koretsky commanded the corps during three private operations to capture Neustadt, Neisse, Ratibor. In the battles he showed good organizational skills and fighting qualities. Brave He knows how to organize a corps battle in difficult conditions.”

In general, I.S. Konev was unhappy with the developments in the last days of March. He later recalled: “We continued to advance, but still extremely slowly. Day after day there were stubborn battles for the capture of small settlements, road junctions, heights and skyscrapers. The troops suffered considerable losses. This naturally caused a feeling of dissatisfaction. The operation clearly did not proceed in the spirit, at the pace, at the level that we had the right to count on, based on our own experience, from our recent combat past.”

Indeed, the March offensives were difficult. The number of equipment and personnel of the formations, which significantly decreased due to losses in the winter months, and the period of spring thaw - all this influenced the pace of operations. The specificity of the Upper Silesian operation was that the Sudetenland lay behind the enemy. This limited the depth of strikes and, accordingly, the number of enemy formations surrounded in one operation. In fact, both encirclements were close to the mountains. During the Upper Silesian offensive operation, the troops of the left wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front captured the southwestern part of Upper Silesia, encircled and defeated five enemy divisions, and threw the rest of their forces into the foothills of the Sudetenland. The enemy's losses in prisoners alone amounted to 18,518 soldiers and officers.

By April 2, as part of the 6th Guards. The mechanized corps had 3 tanks left in the 16th Guards. mechanized brigade, 10 tanks in the 17th Guards. mechanized brigade, 5 IS-2 tanks in the 28th Guards. heavy tank regiment and 5 tanks in the 95th motorcycle battalion. Another 4 vehicles remained in the 49th Guards. mechanized brigade that did not participate in the operation. In the 61st Guards. tank brigade of the 10th Guards. The tank corps had only 8 tanks left. Total losses of the army D.D. Lelyushenko in the second phase of the Upper Silesian operation are shown in the table.

Table

LOSSES OF TANKS AND SAU 4th Guards. TANK ARMY IN THE PERIOD FROM MARCH 23 TO APRIL 2, 1945 AND THEIR DISTRIBUTION BY CAUSE OF DAMAGE

Most of the losses occurred in the 5th Guards. mechanized body. As noted in the report of the armored supply and repair department of the 4th Guards. tank army, “a high percentage of vehicles irretrievably lost, especially during the Ratibor operation, is explained by the army’s action in mountainous areas and partly due to insufficient skill in skillfully maneuvering on the battlefield (when operating in mountainous areas), which led to the failure of the tank” . The main enemy of Soviet tanks remained artillery (in this case, “artillery” should be understood not only as anti-tank guns, but also as guns of tanks and self-propelled guns). This is explained by the fact that the enemy of the army formations D.D. Lelyushenko had enemy tank divisions. They were armed with equipment, in particular the latest Panzerjaeger.IV/70, capable of hitting all types of Soviet tanks.

In early April, three corps of the 4th Guards carried out the Upper Silesian operation. Tank Army and 7th Guards. The mechanized corps was withdrawn for replenishment and rest before the attack on Berlin. As a “legacy” from the Upper Silesian operation of the army of D.D. Lelyushenko went to the 5th Guards. mechanized corps The tank army became three-corps. In exchange for this acquisition, the 31st Tank Corps remained in Silesia, which began the Vistula-Oder operation as part of the 1st Ukrainian Front, and ended the war in the Moravian-Ostravian operation as part of the 4th Ukrainian Front.

Discussion

In March 1945, the fronts operating in the Berlin direction carried out two operations, during which the advancing troops did not approach Berlin, but moved away from it. In the case of the 1st Belorussian Front, they retreated, advancing to the north, and the 1st Ukrainian Front, to the south. In the final stage of the operation, the 2nd Belorussian Front generally advanced to the east. The pattern of actions of Soviet troops in Eastern Pomerania and Upper Silesia was similar. In both cases, the neighbor from the Berlin direction provided assistance to the enemy, who was stuck in an attack on the enemy defending his front to the east. In the case of Eastern Pomerania, the 2nd Belorussian Front failed - its offensive, launched on February 10, developed without much success. In the case of Upper Silesia and the Moravian-Ostrava industrial region, the 4th Ukrainian Front found itself lagging behind. To solve the problems of the lagging fronts, their neighbors aimed at Berlin were deployed to attack the flank and rear of the successfully defending German armies. In Eastern Pomerania it was the 2nd Army, in Upper Silesia it was the Heinrici Army Group. The introduction of large forces into the battle from the Berlin direction immediately changed the situation in favor of the Soviet troops. The operation was especially enlivened by the participation of tank armies.

The East Pomeranian operation of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts can be assessed as generally successful. The enemy, hanging over the flank of the 1st Belorussian Front, was defeated or driven into “armed prisoner of war camps.” On the contrary, the March offensives of the 1st and 4th Ukrainian Fronts cannot be assessed positively positively. If the 1st Belorussian Front managed to level the line of contact with the enemy along the Oder from the Baltic to Frankfurt-on-Oder by the beginning of the Berlin operation, then the 1st Ukrainian Front did not even have a bridgehead on the western bank of the Neisse. In addition, on I.S.’s neck. Konev was left hanging as ballast in the face of the extended left wing of the front, which devoured two armies. Also in his jurisdiction remained the besieged Breslau, which absorbed another army. Accordingly, less forces remained in the Berlin direction. There are fewer forces left not only in terms of combined arms armies. The operation, with local successes, had a negative impact on the condition of the most valuable mechanized formations of the 1st Ukrainian Front. The 5th and 7th Guards Mechanized Corps, which had gone through the Upper Silesian operation, entered the Battle of Berlin as mere ruins.

In the face of defeats on all fronts, local successes caused Hitler great delight. General Gotthard Heinrici, who successfully defended against the 4th Ukrainian Front, was favored by the Fuhrer. It was he who on March 21 replaced Himmler as commander of Army Group Vistula, which defended the Berlin direction. However, in his new position he had an opponent who was much more experienced and qualified than I.E. Petrov and L.Z. Mehlis. It should also be remembered that in Upper Silesia, Soviet and German troops solved different problems. German troops defended a strategically important industrial area with the involvement of fairly large forces of mechanized formations. The 1st and 4th Ukrainian Fronts solved the local problem of reducing the front line.

The offensives in the March mud seriously battered the most valuable formations of the 1st Belorussian Front - the 1st and 2nd Guards Tank Armies. Both of them required urgent replenishment of people and equipment. But the most serious loss in the East Pomeranian operation was time. The synchronized offensive of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts on the Oder did not work. Having completed the defeat of the Danzig-Gdynia enemy group, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front in the period from April 4 to April 15, 1945, fulfilling the Directive of the Supreme High Command Headquarters No. 11 053, made a combined march of 250–350 km. When, by the end of April 16, the troops of K.K. Rokossovsky was just taking the starting position for the offensive, the 1st Belorussian Front was already fighting for the Seelow Heights, shrouded in smoke.

The East Pomeranian operation during the Second World War of 1939-1945 - combat operations in Eastern Pomerania on February 10 - April 4, 1945 of the 1st Belorussian (Marshal G.K. Zhukov) and 2nd Belorussian (Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky) fronts. They were opposed by 28 divisions of the Vistula Army Group under the command of Reichsführer SS G. Himmler. The task of eliminating this group was initially assigned to the 2nd Belorussian Front, which launched its offensive on February 10. However, having advanced 60 km, the Soviet units got stuck in the German defense and stopped the onslaught,

Meanwhile, the Germans tried to strike from Eastern Pomerania on the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front. On February 16, 1945, 6 German tank divisions went on the offensive from the Stargard area, trying to reach the rear of the units advancing on Berlin (see Vistula-Oder operation). In the first days, the Germans advanced 8-12 km, but were unable to break through the Soviet defenses. This blow forced the Soviet command to postpone the attack on Berlin and allocate part of the forces of the 1st Belorussian Front against the East Pomeranian group.

Strikes by troops on both fronts from February 24 to March 5 turned out to be more effective. On March 5, Soviet troops reached the Baltic Sea and cut the East Pomeranian group in two. Further, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front cleared the Baltic coast from Kolberg to the lower reaches of the Oder, and the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front, turning to the northeast, captured Danzig (Gdansk) on March 30. The remnants of German troops were blocked east of Danzig (they held out on the coast until May 9, 1945). After the liquidation of the East Pomeranian group, conditions were created for the Berlin operation. The losses of the Red Army in the East Pomeranian operation amounted to over 225 thousand people.

Book materials used: Nikolai Shefov. Battles of Russia. Military-historical library. M., 2002.

East Pomeranian operation of 1945, an offensive operation of the troops of the 2nd and 1st Belarusian fronts in the Great Patriotic War, carried out on February 10 - 4 Anr. with the assistance of part of the forces of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet (KBF). As a result of the successful January offensive of 1945 (see Vistula-Oder operation 1945), the Soviets. troops reached the river Oder (Odra) and captured bridgeheads on its west. shore. (For the map, see the inset to pp. 64-65.) Part of the forces of the Vistula Army Group (2nd and 11th armies, a total of 22 divisions, including 4 tanks, and 2 motorized units. ; 5 brigades, 8 battle groups and 5 garrisons of fortresses; command. G. Himmler) managed to hold the East. Pomerania. Between the 1st and 2nd Belarus, fronts by the beginning of February. 1945 a gap formed in St. 100 km. German-fascist The command was preparing with the forces of the Vistula Army Group to strike a blow from the north at the morale, wing of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, and to defeat them in the north. R. Wart, strengthen his position in Pomerania and strengthen his position in Berlin. direction. Sov rate Top. The High Command, taking into account the current situation, released the 2nd Belorussian Front (commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovsky) from further participation in the East Prussian operation of 1945 and ordered it to defeat the East Pomeranians. grouping pr-ka, take possession of the East. Pomerania from Danzig (Gdansk) to Stettin (Szczecin) and reach the coast of the Baltic Sea. Center troops and lion. wing of the 2nd Belorussian Front, with the assistance of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet (command, adm. V.F. Tributs) launched an offensive on February 10. from the bridgehead on the Vistula north. Bromberg (Bydgoszcz) in the general direction to Stettin. In difficult conditions of muddy roads and wooded-lake terrain, overcoming the fierce resistance of the enemy, who relied on strong and deep echelons. defense, they are at the end of February 19. managed to advance to the department. directions up to 70 km, but were stopped at the line Gniew, Czersk, Chojnice, Ratsebur (Okonek). 16 Feb pr-k (6 divisions) launched a counterattack south of Stargard, pushed back the troops of the 47th Army by 8-12 km and captured the city. Piritz (Pyrzyce), Ban (Bang). It became obvious that the forces of the 2nd Belorussian Front alone were not enough to defeat the Eastern Pomeranians. up grouping, which already numbered 29 infantry, "3 tanks, 3 motorized divisions, and therefore the number of separate units. Therefore, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front (commander Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov) and the 1st Army of the Polish Army (command, general division S.G. Poplavsky).The idea of ​​the Supreme High Command Headquarters was to deliver 2 strikes with the left wing of the 2nd Belorussian front from the northern area. Zempelburg (Sempolno) in the direction of Közlin (Koszalin) and the 1st Belorussian, front - from the Arnswalde (Hoschpo) district to Kolberg (Kołobrzsg), ​​go to the Baltic Sea, cut through the eastern Pomeranian. group, and then destroy it piecemeal. The Red Banner Baltic Fleet was supposed to disrupt the sea by active actions of aviation, submarines and torpedo boats. messages pr-ka in the south. parts of the Baltic Sea, as well as to promote land transport. troops in capturing the coast of the Baltic Sea from the mouth of the river. Vistula to the mouth of the river. Oder. Despite the complexity of the situation, the front troops prepared for the offensive on time. With a slight overall superiority of owls. the command managed to create the necessary superiority in the directions of Ch. blows. So, in the 2nd Belorussian Front, reinforced on the eve of the offensive by the 19th Army and the 3rd Guards. tank corps, in the direction of the main attack in a strip 17 km wide. the troops had superiority: almost 3 times in infantry, 2 times in tanks, 3 times in guns. When conducting party politics. work, special attention was paid to creating a high offensive in the troops. impulse, swiftness and decisiveness of actions in the depths of the defense of the pr-ka. The importance of this operation to ensure the advance of the Owls was emphasized. troops in the Berlin direction. 24 Feb The 2nd Belorussian Front (2nd Shock, 65th, 49th, 70th, 19th Combined Arms and 4th Air Armies) went on the offensive. 1st Belorussian, front, creating on the right wing a strike group consisting of the 3rd shock, 61st, 47th combined arms, 1st and 2nd Guards. tank armies, the 1st Army of the Polish Army, launched an offensive on March 1. Having broken through the defenses and broken the stubborn resistance of the pr-ka, the owls. By March 5, troops reached the Baltic Sea in the districts of Közlin and Kolberg. East Pomeranian the enemy group was dismembered. Having reached the coast, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front launched an offensive in the north-east. direction, and the 1st Belorussian front - in the north-west. During the operation, the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, using aviation, submarines, boats and torpedo boats, carried out a blockade from the sea around the area. groupings of the pr-ka in the Danzig region, acted on the sea. communications in the south parts of the Baltic metro station 16th and 4th air. armies, aviation of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet and the 4th Polish mixed air division of the Polish Army carried out massacres. attacks on troops and military. pr-ka objects. By March 10, units of the 1st Belorussian Front had basically completed the liberation of the coast of the Baltic Sea to the mouth of the river. Oder, except for the Kolberg district, where a large garrison of the pr-ka defended itself with great ferocity. The operation to destroy it was entrusted to the 1st Army of the Polish Army, which successfully completed its task and captured the Kolberg fortress on March 18. 2nd Belorussian, front with the 1st Guards transferred to it. tank. The army successfully advanced to the Bay of Danzig. On March 28, his troops were brutalized. battles occupied Gdynia, and on March 30 - Danzig, completing the V.-P. O. Remains of the 2nd German. The armies blocked in the Gdynia region were finally defeated and captured by the troops of the 19th Army on April 4. Pressed to the sea, the grouping of the pr-ka in the region of the east. Danzig capitulated on May 9, 1945. Liquidation of a large Nazi group. troops in the East. Pomerania had great strategic importance. With the completion of this task, the threat of a flank attack on the Soviets was eliminated. troops advancing to the Oder in the Berlin direction. Vost was liberated. Pomerania, returned to Polish. to the people of Boe Polsk. Pomerania with major cities and important ports. The pr-k suffered serious losses in manpower and equipment. St. 21 divisions and 8 brigades were defeated, of which 6 divisions and 3 brigades were destroyed. 2nd Belorussian, the front captured St. 63.5 thousand German soldiers and officers, captured approx. 680 tanks and assault guns, 3470 ord. and mortars, 431 aircraft and many other weapons. The exit of the owls. troops to the coast of the Baltic Sea in the area from Danzig to Stettin Bay reliably provided the flank of the main. strategist, group operating in the Berlin direction; The basing system of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet was expanded, which gave the opportunity to more effectively carry out a blockade from the sea around. groupings pr-ka on the Courland Peninsula and eastern. Danzig. The defeat of the mute. Army Group Vistula made it difficult for the pr-ku to implement its plans for organizing defense on the approaches to Berlin. After completion of V.-P. O. 10 armies were released, which began to regroup in the Berlin direction. Highly appreciating the merits of the Polish troops in this operation, Sov. the command awarded the 1st Polish Tank Brigade with the Order of the Red Banner. A number of Soviet formations and units. and Polish The troops were given the honorary name of Kolberg and Pomerania.

N. A. Svetlishin

Materials from the Soviet Military Encyclopedia in 8 volumes, volume 2 were used.

Literature:

Zavyalov A. S., Kalyadin T. E. East Pomeranian offensive operation of the Soviet troops. February - March 1945. M., 1960.