Russian-Turkish War 1806-1812 Political circumstances and diplomatic pressure from Russia forced the Ottoman Empire to issue a decree (hatisherif) on privileges for Moldova, confirming the provisions of the Sultan's decrees (firmans) of 1774, 1783, 1791, which determined the material obligations of Moldova to the Porte: a 7-year term of rule for the ruler, the possibility of the ruler's resignation earlier than the established period only with the consent of both parties. But these measures were far from realizing the hopes and true goal of the Moldovans - liberation from the Ottoman yoke. This goal coincided with the interests of Russia: strengthening its positions in the Balkans and on the Danube. The prerequisites for a new Russian-Turkish military conflict were obvious. On November 29, 1806, Russian troops penetrated Moldova and entered Iasi. On December 24, the Porte declared war on Russia.
In 1807, Turkey and Russia concluded the Slobodzeya Truce in Wallachia, but in 1809 hostilities resumed. A year earlier, on September 30, 1808, Russia and France concluded a secret convention in Erfurt, according to which Napoleon I gave his consent for Moldova to be included in the Russian Empire. In return, Russia recognized the suzerainty of France over Spain. In the spring of 1811, M.I. was appointed commander-in-chief of the Russian troops on the Danube. Kutuzov. As a result of a bold military operation, Russian troops won a final victory in the Battle of Rushchuk (10/14 - 11/18/1811).
Peace negotiations began on October 19, 1811 in Giurgiu and continued in Bucharest. Russia demanded that both principalities, Moldova and Wallachia, which it controlled at that moment, be transferred to it. Since neither of the two powers intended to concede, peace negotiations began in a rather tense atmosphere.
From November 1811, the French ambassador in Constantinople, Latour-Maubourg, urged the Turks to hold out until a future French campaign against Russia. But the Turks, bribed by the generosity of Russian gold, began to yield. In November 1811, they had already agreed that the territory between the Prut and the Dniester should go to Russia, except for the south, which included Cetatya Albe, Izmail and Kilia. But in March 1812, the Turks lost Cetatya to Alba, and a month later, two other fortresses.
The dynamics of Russian-Turkish negotiations and the participation of external forces are reflected in the correspondence of the American Ambassador Adams in St. Petersburg. On March 21, 1811, he wrote: “The obstinacy of the Turkish Divan in negotiating (with Russia) is due to the influence of France, whose charge d'affaires said that he convinced them (the Turks) not to agree to the concession of Moldova and Wallachia, which had already been declared part of the Russian empire." On June 22, 1811, he noted that “peace is expected with Turkey” and that “in order to conclude it, there are rumors that Russia has decided to withdraw from the two principalities that it has already annexed to its empire, and leave them to be governed by princes independent of her and from the Porte." Finally, on July 13 of the same year, Adams pointed out a serious increase in Turkish claims: “It is said that in proportion to Russia’s desire to make peace, the Turks are increasing their demands so much that, instead of yielding, they even began to demand monetary compensation for losses for themselves. But the fact remains that for the sake of peace, Russia will not return anything that it seized.”
In addition to France, Austria and Prussia, Russia's rivals in the region, encouraged the Porte not to concede and themselves made overtures to Russia. Thus, on April 30, 1811, the Austrian ambassador in St. Petersburg suggested to the tsar “to obtain peace, be content with the border on the Prut River instead of the Danube.” However, the king wanted to expand the borders at least to Siret. In correspondence with Prince Adam Czartoryski, he “offered” Wallachia and part of Moldova between the Carpathians and Siret to Austria, while Russia was to receive Galicia from Austria and occupy Moldova from Siret to the Dniester.
But the Turks were adamant. Only on March 22, 1812, Emperor Alexander I agreed to “the Prut as a border to the mouth of the Danube.” In the end, the Turks gave in, and the Russian-Turkish peace was concluded with great solemnity on May 16/28, 1812 in Bucharest. Articles IV and V legitimized the division of the Principality of Moldova into two parts:
"Article IV: It was decided that the Prut River from its entry into Moldavia to its junction with the Danube and the left bank of the Danube from this junction to the mouth of the Chilia and to the sea will form the border of both empires, for which this mouth will be common.
Article V: E . led imp. and padishahs of all Russia. gives and returns to the Illustrious Porte of the Ottoman the land of Moldova, lying on the right bank of the Prut River, as well as large and small Wallachia with fortresses, in such a state as: they are now located, with cities, towns, villages, dwellings and with everything that is in These provinces are not included, together with the Danube islands...
Under the terms of the treaty, the Ottoman Empire ceded to Russia part of the Moldavian territory: the cinuts of Khotin, Soroca, Orhei, Lapusna, Greceni, Hoterniceni, Codru, Tighina, Carligetura, Falciu, the eastern part of the Iasi cinut and Budjak, for a total of 45,630 km² with 482,630 inhabitants , 5 fortresses, 17 cities and 695 villages. Thus, Moldova was divided into Western and Eastern Moldova, which the Russian authorities called Bessarabia.
Consequences of the peace treaty in Bucharest. Chronicler Manolake Dragici (1801-1887) in his work “History of Moldova for 500 years. Until today” (Iasi, 1857) quite emotionally described the dramatic moment of the division of Moldova: “The fateful day came when the agreement expired, and everyone had to stay where he chose to settle permanently; those unforgettable times were full of tears and complaints, because the people, like flocks of sheep, filled the entire bank of the Prut from edge to edge in a huge crowd, gathering from villages and towns for weeks and saying goodbye to their parents, brothers and relatives with whom they grew up and lived before until now and now we have parted forever.”
The same Manolake Dragic spoke about the feelings of the population in the years following the partition of Moldova: “Nevertheless, the residents of Moldova considered the agreement signed in Bucharest to be short-lived, expecting any day now the return of the land taken by the Russians and the restoration of the previous borders, but they were deceived in their expectations "
The year 1812 was a turning point in the history of Moldova. The Bucharest Peace Treaty led to a tragic break, Moldova was torn into two parts, and its fate was changed irreversibly.
In 1812, as a result of the Treaty of Bucharest, which ended the Russian-Turkish war of 1806-1812, the territory between the Dniester and the Prut became part of the Russian Empire, which, due to its territorial expansion to the east, strengthened its position in this region of South-Eastern Europe, and the newly annexed territory was seen as a springboard for further advances into the Balkans.
After the division of Moldova, the fate of its eastern part was determined by the aspirations, priorities and geostrategic interests of the Russian Empire. From that moment on, events in this part of Moldova were subject to the logic and interests of the Russian Empire.
The partition of Moldova in 1812 was illegal because Moldova was not a Turkish province, but a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire, and Turkey did not have the right to dispose of its territory. Thus, the process of division of Moldova, which began in 1775, was continued, when Bukovina, part of the Moldavian state, was annexed by Austria. And in this process, along with Russia, Turkey, France, Austria-Hungary, Great Britain and Prussia participated.
Although the division of Moldova occurred in violation of international law (of that era), not a single European state and not a single political force in Moldova expressed protest, which allows us to assume that in 1812 Moldova became the victim of a large conspiracy of internal and external forces.
At that time, Moldovans were unable to determine their own destiny. M. Eminescu rightly believed that our motto should be the words: “Expect nothing and fear nothing. Without hoping for anything, we will not trust strangers as we trusted, but we will rely only on ourselves and those who are forced to be with us; fearing nothing, we do not need to ask for generosity where it is an exotic plant.”
However, the events of 1812 are often considered unilaterally, only as annexation of the Prut-Dniester space by the Russian Empire. But another aspect of this historical event is forgotten, consciously or not, namely the liberation from Ottoman suzerainty, which dominated Moldova for centuries. Some historians tend to downplay the importance of this factor, claiming that Ottoman suzerainty had become purely formal, incomparable with previous centuries. We cannot agree with this statement, because if Ottoman suzerainty was formal, why was Romania (the state that arose after the unification of Western Moldova with Wallachia) able to achieve independence from the Ottoman Empire only after the war of 1877-1878. at the cost of bloody battles and huge casualties?
We should not forget the fact that the Russian Empire in that era was perceived as the state that liberated the peoples of the Balkan Peninsula from the power of the Ottoman Empire. Serbs, Croats, Greeks, Bulgarians, Moldovans saw in the Russians salvation from the oppressive Ottoman yoke, which over time acquired sophisticated forms.
After the inclusion of the eastern part of Moldova into the Russian Empire, political, socio-economic, administrative, religious and cultural processes in the region developed under the influence of new realities. However, the new government did not immediately and radically dismantle the existing administrative structures in Eastern Moldova, nor did it curtail the privileges of the boyars and other social strata.
Immediately after the annexation, Eastern Moldova was destined for the role of bait for Christians in South-Eastern Europe. The tsarist government wanted to show the Balkan peoples a model of enlightened absolutism and liberal ambitions, offering people opportunities for development and prosperity. The tactics of small steps were used, the gradual introduction of the Russian tax system, judicial practice, and exemption from compulsory military service (until 1874). After 1812, in order to avoid social tension, the new authorities created temporary administrative structures in Bessarabia, which had much in common with those that existed in Moldova. Eastern Moldova acquired the status of a province in the 80s of the nineteenth century. The transition from the previous administrative organization to the new one required a 60-year period.
In the context of the above, it should be emphasized that we must perceive history in all its diversity and complexity, without simplifying anything, and not look for enemies now, based on historical facts that are not always objectively interpreted.
In this regard, we should remember that:
Thanks to Russia's victory over Turkey, Wallachia and Moldova gained significantly more independence: in 1832, Organic Regulations (constitutional acts of the principalities) developed by the Russian governor in these countries were adopted, significant development of the economy and education system was noted, the formation of a people's militia began, Parliaments were created, all attributes of statehood have been strengthened.
. The arrival of the Russians was desired and expected by the population. Moreover, delegations from Moldova and Wallachia repeatedly visited the king with a request to free them from the hated Turks. It was the liberation of Orthodox principalities from Muslims that was the main goal of the Russian military campaign.
. We should not forget that the south of Bessarabia, the original Moldavian territory, by 1812 had not been controlled by Moldova for several centuries, but was a Turkish paradise.
. At the same time, it should be noted that in that era, the decisive importance was given to people’s religious self-identification, and to a lesser extent, ethnic or state identity. This was a specificity of the era that cannot be ignored from the perspective of today.
. Having occupied these principalities, Russia was ready to grant both Wallachia and Moldova complete freedom. This was prevented by other states that were not interested in strengthening the position of Russia and Orthodoxy in the region.
. The Turks, who were supported by France and Austria-Hungary, did not want this.
. Having won the war, completely liberating the part of Basarabia occupied by the Turks (south of the Leova-Bendery line), Russia could not be left with anything.
. Thus, the blame for the division of Moldova cannot be placed on Russia alone. France, Turkey and Austria-Hungary are equally guilty of this.
. If we talk about the interests of the population, their standard of living, the economic development of the left and right banks of the Prut, then, of course, the population in Bessarabia has always lived better than on the right bank of the Prut.
. Finally, perhaps, thanks to the Peace of Bucharest, the Moldovan nation was preserved, and Moldovan statehood was revived again in new historical conditions, giving the entire Romanian people a chance to return to their ancient roots.
ENSURING THE NEUTRALITY OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE
In October 1806, Russian troops under the command of General I. I. Mikhelson occupied Moldavia and Wallachia, and in 1807 a squadron under the command of Rear Admiral D.N. Senyavina inflicted a heavy defeat on the Ottoman fleet in the Dardanelles and Athos battles. The Serbs, who had been fighting for their independence since 1804, came to the aid of Russia. After a long siege, they captured Belgrade. But the Russian troops achieved particular success after they were appointed commander-in-chief in March 1811. He did not divide the army to besiege individual fortresses, as his predecessors had done, but concentrated his main forces at the large fortress of Ruschuk on the right bank of the Danube. Here in June 1811 he inflicted a crushing defeat on the Ottoman army, then with successive blows he defeated the main forces of the Turks on the left bank of the Danube. The rest of them laid down their arms and surrendered. In October 1811, peace negotiations began in Bucharest. According to the peace concluded on May 16, 1812 (a month before Napoleon’s invasion of Russia), Bessarabia with the fortresses of Khotyn, Bendery, Akkerman and Izmail went to Russia. The new border was established along the river. Rod. But in Transcaucasia, Russia returned to the Ottoman Empire the territories with fortresses captured by Russian troops. Bessarabia, which became part of Russia, received the administrative status of the Bessarabia region. Bia was granted autonomy to Serbia, and the autonomy of the Danube principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia was expanded, although they continued to remain under the vassalage of the Ottoman Empire. The Peace of Bucharest ensured the neutrality of the Ottoman Empire during the 1812 war between Russia and France.
SIGNING OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT
The Treaty of Bucharest of 1812 ended the Russo-Turkish War of 1806–12. Signed on May 16 (28) in Bucharest on the part of Russia by the chief commissioner M.I. Kutuzov, on the part of the Ottoman Empire by Ahmed Pasha. Peace negotiations began in October 1811 in Zhurzhev, after the defeat of the main Turkish forces near Ruschuk and the encirclement of most of them at Slobodzeya. Despite the attempts of the authorized Sultan Galib Effendi to delay the negotiations, the Russian commander-in-chief M.I. Kutuzov achieved their completion a month before the invasion of Napoleon I’s army into Russia. This was Russia’s main political gain: its southern borders were safe, and its Danube Army could be redeployed to reinforce the troops covering its western borders. Türkiye left the alliance with France.
The Bucharest Peace Treaty consisted of 16 public and 2 secret articles. Article 4 established a new Russian-Turkish border along the Prut River (instead of the Dniester), as a result of which Bessarabia went to Russia. Article 6 obliged Russia to return to Turkey all points in the Caucasus “conquered by arms....” This wording of the article was the basis for the return of Anapa, Poti and Akhalkalaki taken from battle, but at the same time it was also the reason for the retention of Sukhum and other points acquired by Russia as a result of the voluntary transfer to Russian citizenship of the rulers of Western Georgia. Thus, Russia for the first time received naval bases on the Caucasian coast of the Black Sea. The Treaty of Bucharest ensured the privileges of the Danube principalities and the internal self-government of Serbia, marking the beginning of its complete independence, which was a step forward in the national liberation of the Balkan peoples. The main provisions of the Bucharest Peace Treaty were confirmed by the Ackerman Convention of 1826.
Fadeev A.V. Bucharest Peace Treaty of 1812 // Great Soviet Encyclopedia.
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DANUBE PRINCIPALITIES AND SERBIA
The Bucharest Peace basically posed the problem of the political existence of the Danube principalities and Serbia. Among the numerous Orthodox peoples who inhabited the Ottoman Empire, only Serbs, Moldovans and Wallachians could claim both independent political existence and political support from Russia, since only they had formed and developed internal governance bodies and represented regions of high political interest for the Russian authorities . It was the Danube principalities that were a strategically important region, border lands between Russia and Turkey, which have long had a number of political privileges. It was here that the Russian-Turkish wars began and were fought, and the local population turned their gaze towards Russia with hope. The adopted provisions on the autonomy of these components of the Ottoman Empire, along with the annexation of Bessarabia and the opening up of opportunities for commercial shipping along the Danube with access to the Black Sea - everything was connected with the strengthening of the commercial (and, if possible, military) presence of the Russian fleet in the Straits, and, consequently, , and in the Mediterranean. Thus, the conditions of the Bucharest Peace, which solved specific problems of Russian foreign policy, contained the basis for subsequent agreements built on the foundation laid in 1812. First of all, this concerned the fate of the Christian peoples of Turkey.
Supporting the political status of Serbia and the Danube principalities as autonomies within the Ottoman Empire was of utmost importance for the further development of the independence of the future Balkan states. The Treaty of Bucharest provided for ensuring the rights of Serbia “as far as possible in accordance with the wishes of the Serbian nation,” which was used by the Serbian side in the coming years to create its own constitution - the Charter, in the development of which Russian diplomats took an active part.
The beginning of the Russian-Turkish war of 1806-1812.
On May 16 (28), 1812, Sultan Mahmud II convened an emergency council, which was supposed to discuss the terms of a peace agreement between the Russian and Ottoman empires. Of its 54 participants, 50 voted for peace, and the Turks agreed to conclude the Bucharest Peace Treaty.
Thus ended the Russian-Turkish war of 1806-1812, the beginning, course and completion of which completely depended on the contradictions of Russia’s European policy and its relations with France.
The war was provoked by Napoleon's diplomacy. Having been forced to join it together with allied England, St. Petersburg soon found itself in an extremely curious situation - after Tilsit, our partners (in the Balkans and Straits Russia did not have and cannot have real allies, much less friends) and opponents swapped places.
In 1806-1812 Russia was forced to wage wars with France, England, Sweden and Austria (with the latter almost exclusively formally). In addition, the Russian-Persian War began in 1804, which certainly had an impact in 1806-1812. on the progress of affairs in Transcaucasia. The war years in Turkey were also very turbulent. During the war, three coups d'état took place here, and three sultans were replaced on the throne. Each of these shocks affected the prospects for ending the Russo-Turkish War. Long truces, such as Slobodzeya (late August 1807 - March 1809), ended with the resumption of hostilities. The Russian pacification program of this time is the recognition of the independence of Serbia under the auspices of Turkey and Russia, the annexation of Kartli-Kakheti and Imereti, Mingrelia and Guria by Turkey, the abandonment of Abkhazia by Turkey and the drawing of the border in Europe along the Danube (i.e. the annexation of Bessarabia, Moldova and Wallachia), was unacceptable to the Turks. At the time of the signing of the Bucharest Peace, another change was brewing in Russian-French and Russian-British relations, which forced St. Petersburg to rush to end this war, albeit by abandoning some of its plans. The Turks were unable to correctly navigate the international situation, and, frightened by the prospect of Russian-French rapprochement, they also made concessions. Kutuzov skillfully used the fears of Turkish diplomacy, which caused rumors about a possible agreement between Russia and France regarding the division of the Ottoman Empire.
In fact, in the spring of 1812, the situation on the western borders of Russia was very alarming; the principle of concentrating forces in the main direction required peace in the east. Meanwhile, at the beginning of the 19th century, nothing seemed to foreshadow a conflict between St. Petersburg and Constantinople. In the first years of his reign, Alexander I adhered to the policy of preserving the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and resolving controversial issues within the framework of bilateral relations. Continuing the traditions of 1799, Russia and Turkey concluded an alliance treaty in 1805, confirming the right of passage of Russian ships through the Bosporus and Dardanelles. True, even before its signing, Russian-Turkish relations were overshadowed by the complications of affairs in the Balkans - the outrages of the Janissaries, weakly controlled by Istanbul, became the reason for the outbreak of the First Serbian Uprising (1804-1813).
In order to consolidate their power in Serbia, the Daii - the heads of the Janissaries - on February 4, 1804, organized the extermination of the Serbian elders ("Knezov's Slaughter"). 72 people were killed, but one of those invited to the meeting where this massacre took place, Kara-George, managed to avoid murder and led the uprising. Initially, it was directed exclusively against the Janissaries, and not against the power of the Sultan, who entered into negotiations with the rebels and in March 1804 even intended to assist them. Later the Sultan abandoned this idea. He did not have a significant force at his disposal; in the immediate vicinity of the Turkish capital - in Bulgaria - detachments of deserters and robbers - the Kirdzhali - followed the path of the Belgrade Janissaries, against whom the most combat-ready part of the Turkish army was thrown.
The rebels were concerned about the lack of any clear response from their rightful monarch. On the other hand, they obviously understood well that the initial favor of Constantinople was due to weakness, and was therefore temporary and in no way guaranteed anything in the future. Already in May 1804, the leaders of the rebels and representatives of the clergy of Serbia sent a letter to the Russian envoy to Turkey A.Ya. Italian. Listing the reasons that caused the uprising, they asked for mediation and intercession. Naturally, Italinsky could not support these requests without the sanction of St. Petersburg, and was forced to leave this letter unanswered. However, he immediately notified the prince. A. Czartoryski about the appeal of the rebels, inviting Russia to act as a mediator.
In June of the same year, the leaders of the rebels addressed a request for intercession to Emperor Alexander I: “Now we keep Beligrad in disarray, since we do not have such military weapons with which they could be used. However, we hope in every possible way to take possession of it with the help of God. However, after taking possession of it, if Your Imperial Majesty does not extend an all-merciful hand, then we are completely lost. It is true that the Sultan promises us his mercy and leaves us tribute for 9 years. But who can hope for mercy from the Christian enemy, since after the expulsion of the forces of the rebels (i.e., the rebels - A.O.), the Sultan will send another garrison, and they will begin to deal with us in the same way, and they will take revenge on us even more bitterly. They haven’t listened to the Sultan before, but now they are all Sultani (the original spelling has been preserved - A.O.).” In St. Petersburg they perfectly understood the situation in the Balkans. “It is very likely,” Czartoryski reported to the emperor in July 1804, “that although at the beginning of the Serbian uprising the Porte seemed favorable to them, it was only because it did not want to declare them rebels that it was not able to suppress them; Despite the fact that she has every reason to be dissatisfied with the Belgrade dahiyas, she secretly encourages them and prefers that they maintain the upper hand than to see the Christian province significantly strengthened after the capture of this fortress (i.e. Belgrade - A.O.). » Italinsky was recommended, in case of favorable circumstances, to intercede for the Serbs, without putting at risk either the interests of Russia or the interests of the rebels themselves.
This was a completely logical position. Before the capture of Belgrade, there was no possibility of providing any serious assistance to the Serbs, and excessive interest on the Russian side could, under these conditions, arouse suspicion on the part of the Turks and would rather harm than help the rebels. In August 1804, a delegation of 4 people was sent from Serbia to Russia with a request for intercession. Two of them were allowed by the Russian authorities to proceed to St. Petersburg. Already in November 1804, the delegates received an audience with Alexander I, who promised the rebels diplomatic and financial support. However, this did not at all mean a course for the deterioration of Russian-Turkish relations, especially against the backdrop of the increasingly dangerous situation in Europe due to Napoleon’s actions. Russia gently supported the Serbian autonomy program. In December 1804, it boiled down to proposals for the liberation of the territory of the principality from the presence of Turkish troops, as well as the right to its own ruler and court, an army of 5,000 to protect against raids by robbers, subject to the payment of an annual tribute to the Sultan.
At the beginning of 1805, Kara-George defeated the Janissaries. The Dayi were captured and executed. In May-August of the same year, the Serbs tried to start negotiations with the Turks, proposing the following program to the Sultan: autonomy and recognition of the administration formed during the uprising, cleansing Serbia of Turkish military units, payment of tribute. These proposals were rejected by Constantinople. The goals of the Serbian uprising changed after this, and the War of Independence began. In September 1805, the rebels managed to defeat a Turkish punitive expedition sent to their country. Following this, the Turks immediately began preparing the next one. On November 30, 1805, Karageorgi again turned to Alexander I for intercession. Russia, as the patroness of the Orthodox subjects of Turkey, could not remain indifferent to the fate of Serbia, but it also needed cooperation with Constantinople in order to eliminate the danger of the Sultan being drawn into the sphere influence of French politics.
On September 11 (23), 1805, a Russian-Turkish allied defense treaty was signed in the Turkish capital, according to which, in the event of an attack on one of the parties by a third power, the ally was to provide assistance with a force of 10 thousand people. infantry, 2 thousand cavalry and a squadron of at least 6 battleships and 4 frigates. The secret articles of the agreement actually joined Turkey to the anti-Napoleonic coalition, the success of which was supposed to protect the Ottoman Empire “from the implementation of the sinister plans of France...” Until 1806, due to complications in the European direction, Russia limited itself to financial and moral support for the Serbs, trying to keep the Turks from a large-scale repetition campaign against the rebels. At the end of 1805 - beginning of 1806. the situation began to change. Impressed by Napoleon's military successes in 1805-1806. the Sultan was drawn into the orbit of French politics. Influenced by news of the failure of the Allies in Austria, already at the beginning of 1806, despite pressure from Russia, he began to be inclined to recognize Napoleon’s right to the imperial title. At the end of January 1806, Turkey officially recognized the French emperor and refused to renew the alliance treaty with England.
This was followed by a political rapprochement between Constantinople and Paris, and, as a consequence, a tightening of the Turkish position on the Serbian issue. On April 30 (May 12), 1806, Alexander I personally addressed Selim III with a letter, recommending him to refrain from suppressing the uprising. “My confidence in this regard is so positive,” the emperor wrote, “that I do not hesitate at all to ask Your Sultan Majesty to preferably use meekness and kindness against this people, who will gladly submit if decisions are made with them on a fair basis, and turn their weapons for the defense and glory of your empire. Otherwise, the measures now being taken against him will produce the only famous reduction in the strength and power of Your Sultan Majesty.” At the same time, on March 1 (13), 1806, the emperor instructed the Russian envoy to Turkey Italinsky “... to assure the Porte, in the most positive way, that I have not changed my disposition towards her and am ready to be her protector against any external attack, to fly to the aid of Sultan Selim as soon as he will find it necessary. That I do not demand anything from him except the fulfillment of the treaties concluded with the Porte, which I fulfill religiously.” All these wishes and proposals were not accepted by Constantinople, and Russian diplomacy was at a dead end.
This was immediately taken advantage of by French diplomacy in the person of Ambassador Napoleon General. O. Sebastiani. Going to Constantinople, he chose the land route through Austria and the Danube principalities. Refusal to travel by sea was natural - the English fleet dominated there. In Bucharest, a French representative tried to persuade the Wallachian ruler Constantin Ypsilanti to increase the number of his pandurs and turn this police force into an army. According to him, Moldova and Wallachia should each have 20,000 troops, because Napoleon wants to see them as a barrier between Russia and Austria, which at the same time will remain the inalienable possession of the Sultan. The French diplomat explained Turkey's problems, including the unrest of the Montenegrins who refused to recognize Napoleon's power, solely by the machinations of St. Petersburg. “But you will see,” he assured the ruler, “how this will end. The emperor vowed to exterminate this people, and will set a terrible example on them. The Serbs will face the same fate if they do not submit immediately. Everything else will not dare to raise its head. We already have a significant army in Dalmatia; she will enter Serbia if necessary. We know Russia's plans. She wants to set the Danube as a border and take possession of both principalities. She has already made similar proposals to France, which rejected them. During the peace in Presburg, Austria also asked to be given Moldavia and Wallachia as a reward, but Emperor Napoleon replied that he would not allow the slightest encroachment on the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. If the Porte throws itself into the arms of France, it will not only survive, but may even be reborn.”
These conversations did not receive support from Constantine Ypsilanti, nor from the ruler of Moldavia, Alexander Muruzi, but they were favorably received in Constantinople. Sebastiani actively used the effect produced by the Battle of Austerlitz in order to drag Turkey into the war and distract Russia from supporting it. Already in April 1806, the Sultan warned St. Petersburg of his desire to stop the passage of Russian military ships and transports with troops through the Straits. This news caused deep surprise in Russia, because this right was primarily necessary to protect the Sultan’s possessions according to the Russian-Turkish alliance treaty. But in Constantinople they were no longer afraid of the invasion of France; the power of Napoleon aroused not only fear there, but also respect. Italinsky recalled: “The Porta, blocking the passage of Russian ships through the Dardanelles, could not do this without the influence of Bonoparte, who had in mind to rely on the rebellious Janissaries, excellent shooters, to whom France promised help and protection. It is known that with dexterity and money you can achieve anything with these people.” In addition, Napoleon, in a personal letter, advised the Sultan to remove the Russian-oriented rulers of Moldavia and Wallachia. Sebastiani constantly acted in the same direction. He convinced the Sultan that Napoleon was ready to send troops into the principalities in order to act from there together with the Turks against the Russian army.
The attempt of the Russian government in August 1806 to solve the problem diplomatically and thus demand from the Sultan the protection of Russian trade, as well as the rulers ruling in Moldavia and Wallachia, did not end in success. In September 1806, Türkiye closed the Straits to any Russian ships. In Constantinople they were sure that Russia was in deep decline, and therefore it would be unable to defend its interests. Turkey considered it safer for itself to risk a war with Russia than to risk a deterioration in relations with France. On August 26 (September 7), Italinsky was sent an order to evacuate the embassy property to Odessa and hire a ship so that, if necessary, he would be ready to immediately leave Constantinople. At the same time, Sebastiani increased the influence of France in Constantinople, offering the Sultan the transfer of Crimea in the event of a general victory over Russia. If such generous gifts were not accepted, the French ambassador turned to threats, hinting at the possibility of an attack on Turkish territory from Dalmatia. Things got to the point that in September 1806, Turkish ministers began to complain to Italinsky “about the immodesty of the French, about their arrogance, arrogance and threatening tone.”
On September 10 (22), Italinsky appealed to the Sultan with a protest against the closure of the Straits at the request of the French, warning Selim III that the real threat to his empire came from joining Napoleon’s plans, and not from his non-existent troops in Dalmatia. The Sultan had to choose allies for himself. They could be either Russia and England, or France. “Please, Your Imperial Majesty,” wrote the Russian diplomat, “weigh, with your inherent deep wisdom, the advantages and disadvantages of both one and the other decision. Order a geographical map to be presented to you and carefully study what the capabilities of Russia and England, on the one hand, and France, on the other, are, both for protecting your possessions and for attacking them.” Nevertheless, the combination of carrot and stick ended in success with the French. On September 17 (29), Italinsky was forced to warn the Turkish government that if the displaced rulers of Moldavia and Wallachia were not restored, he would be forced to leave Constantinople.
In August 1802, the emperor already spoke out against the removal of the same rulers and the excessive burden of the principalities with extortions, and his opinion was listened to. Now nothing similar to such an attitude towards the statements of Russian diplomats was observed in Constantinople. The current situation fully met the interests of Napoleon, who sought to pull part of the Russian forces from the West to the East. As a result, St. Petersburg, wanting to avoid war, was forced to use force and change its policy of covertly supporting potential allies. September 22 (October 4) gen. I.I. Mikhelson received an order to transfer 13 thousand chervonets to Kara-George. On October 16 (28), 1806, the Highest Rescript addressed to Michelson followed, ordering him to cross the Dniester and occupy Moldavia and Wallachia. Formally, Alexander I had grounds for such actions.
Since 1774, the Sultan's suzerainty over the Danube principalities was no longer unconditional. Restoration of Turkish power over these territories after the Russian-Turkish war of 1768-1774. was associated with a number of obligations that Constantinople had assumed and which were now being violated. Article 16 of the Kuchuk-Kainardzhi Peace (1774) granted Russia the right to patronage the Danube principalities. Paragraph 10 of this article, which was entirely devoted to the conditions for the return of Moldavia and Wallachia to the Porte, read: “It is also agreed that, according to the circumstances of both of these Principalities, the Ministers of the Russian Imperial Court, located at the Sublime Porte, could speak in favor of the two Principalities and (the Porte - A.O. )promises to listen to them with respect similar to friendly and respectful Powers.” This promise was not kept in 1806. The demonstration of force on the Danube, according to plans, was supposed to have a cooling effect on the Sultan and prevent war, especially since Turkey was not ready for it.
These calculations did not rest in a vacuum; at the last moment the Turks declared their readiness to concede on the issue of the rulers. True, this step of the Sultan did not inspire much confidence in St. Petersburg. Budberg wrote to Italinsky: “You, of course, were not unaware that the main goal of the Imperial Court was to ascertain, in the most positive way, the location of the Porte; a concession made under duress is not enough and does not give us the necessary guarantees.” However, only force could provide a guarantee of this kind. In fact, having prevented the danger of the restoration of Turkish military control over the principalities and the inevitable massacre in this case, the Russian army could not prevent a war that was undesirable for Russia. A demonstration that would have guaranteed peace failed due to insufficient force. According to the lists, the Russian army in the Danube principalities had about 60 thousand people. with 268 guns, but due to illness and escapes in the recruiting teams, it was one third less than the payroll - about 40 thousand people. The Turks had about 70 thousand people concentrated in fortresses along the Danube, and, in addition, there were about 80 thousand people in reserve in the Constantinople area. Unable to strengthen Michelson's army, the emperor from the very beginning recommended that he limit himself to defensive actions.
Before the formal declaration of war, some of the garrisons of Turkish fortresses did not offer active resistance, leaving behind the Danube. In January 1807, even before the successors of the pro-Russian rulers arrived in Bucharest and Iasi, the entire territory of the Danube principalities was occupied by Russian troops. On November 15 (27), 1806, proposals were sent to Italinsky, the acceptance of which by the Sultan could lead to overcoming the crisis. The Sultan had to restore the rights and privileges of Moldavia and Wallachia, refuse to interfere with the passage of Russian ships through the Straits, and restore the alliance treaty with England. This attempt came to nothing. The Turkish note dated December 11 (23), 1806, handed to Italinsky, stated: “Russia is clearly violating friendly ties with Porto. She outraged the Greeks and Serbs against the Turkish government, insidiously took possession of the fortress of Fashi (i.e. Bendery - A.O.), persuaded the inhabitants of Rumelia and Albania to serve, and, despite the satisfaction given by the Porte with the restoration of the princes of Moldova and Wallachia, she occupied Moldova and does not stop further its actions.” The Russian embassy was supposed to leave the Turkish capital within three days. On December 18 (30), 1806, the Sultan issued a manifesto on the war with Russia. A Russian brig located in the Golden Horn harbor, sent to evacuate the embassy, was arrested, and Italinsky, forced to linger in Constantinople because of this, was saved by finding refuge on a British ship.
This is how this war began, at the beginning of which in St. Petersburg and London they hoped for its speedy end. The initial plan of Russian military operations envisaged the opening of a joint and simultaneous fleet with the allied British fleet in the Straits area. On February 1 (13), 1807, it was submitted to the emperor by the head of the Naval Ministry, Vice Admiral P.V. Chichagov. It was planned, together with the British, to launch a joint attack on the Dardanelles and the Bosporus, cross the Straits and land troops in Constantinople, the main forces of which were to be transported by the Black Sea Fleet. At the same time, the army of Gen. Mikhelson was supposed to draw back the main forces of the Turks. In the spring of 1807, the general began to act, achieving success in a series of clashes on March 5-6 (17-18) in the area of the Zhurzhevo fortress. However, it was not possible to achieve a turning point in the Straits; the breakthrough of the squadron of Vice Admiral J. Duckworth, not supported by a landing force and an attack from the Bosphorus, ended in failure. It was no longer possible to count on a quick turnaround in events. The war dragged on for many years.
Soloviev S.M. Emperor Alexander the First. Politics-diplomacy. SPb.1877. P.222.
Petrov A. [N.] The war between Russia and Turkey 1806-1812. St. Petersburg 1887. T.2. 1808 and 1809 Book Prozorovsky and Prince. Bagration. SS.177-178.; First Serbian Uprising 1804-1813 and Russia. M.1983. Book 2. 1808-1813. P.56.
History of Russian foreign policy. The first half of the 19th century (From Russia’s wars against Napoleon to the Peace of Paris in 1856). M.1995. SS.33-34.
The first Serbian uprising... M.1980. Book 1. 1804-1807. P.17.
Stavrianos L.S. The Balkans since 1453. Lnd. 2002. P.246.
The first Serbian uprising... M.1980. Book 1. 1804-1807. P.29.
Foreign policy of Russia in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Documents of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. M.1961. Ser.1. 1801-1815. T.2. April 1804 – December 1805 SS.78-79; 91-92.
The first Serbian uprising... M.1980. Book 1. 1804-1807. P.36.
Right there. P.40.
Foreign policy of Russia in the 19th and early 20th centuries... M.1961. Ser.1. 1801-1815. T.2. April 1804 – December 1805 SS.203-204.
The first Serbian uprising... Book 1. 1804-1807. P.75.
Foreign policy of Russia in the 19th and early 20th centuries... M.1961. Ser.1. 1801-1815. T.2. April 1804 – December 1805. SS.248-249.
The first Serbian uprising... M.1980. Book 1. 1804-1807. SS.116-119.
Right there. SS.178-182.
Foreign policy of Russia in the 19th and early 20th centuries... M.1961. Ser.1. 1801-1815. T.2. April 1804 – December 1805 SS.589-594.
First Serbian Uprising 1804-1813 and Russia. M.1980. Book 1. 1804-1807. SS.211-212.
Foreign policy of Russia in the 19th and early 20th centuries... M.1963. Ser.1. 1801-1815. T.3. January 1806 – July 1807 SS.38-39; 76.
The first Serbian uprising... M.1980. Book 1. 1804-1807. P.240.
Petrov A. [N.] Uk.soch. St. Petersburg 1885. T.1. 1806 and 1807 Michelson and Meyendorff. P.29.
Right there. P.39.
Foreign policy of Russia in the 19th and early 20th centuries... M.1963. Ser.1. 1801-1815. T.3. January 1806 – July 1807. P.191.
Petrov A. [N.] Uk.soch. St. Petersburg 1885. T.1. 1806 and 1807 Michelson and Meyendorff. P.33.
Foreign policy of Russia in the 19th and early 20th centuries... M.1963. Ser.1. 1801-1815. T.3. January 1806 – July 1807. P.267.
Petrov A. [N.] Uk.soch. St. Petersburg 1885. T.1. 1806 and 1807 Michelson and Meyendorff. SS.33; 40-41.
Foreign policy of Russia in the 19th and early 20th centuries... M.1963. Ser.1. 1801-1815. T.3. January 1806 – July 1807. S.SS.276-278.
Petrov A. [N.] Uk.soch. St. Petersburg 1885. T.1. 1806 and 1807 Michelson and Meyendorff. P.32.
Foreign policy of Russia in the 19th and early 20th centuries... M.1963. Ser.1. 1801-1815. T.3. January 1806 – July 1807. P.304.
Petrov A. [N.] Uk.soch. St. Petersburg 1885. T.1. 1806 and 1807 Michelson and Meyendorff. P.58.
Foreign policy of Russia in the 19th and early 20th centuries... M.1963. Ser.1. 1801-1815. T.3. January 1806 – July 1807. P.321.
Right there. P.325.
Right there. P.330.
Foreign policy of Russia in the 19th and early 20th centuries... M.1960. Ser.1. 1801-1815. T.1.March 1801 - April 1804 SS.276-278; 280-281.
Foreign policy of Russia in the 19th and early 20th centuries... M.1963. Ser.1. 1801-1815. T.3. January 1806 – July 1807. P.333.
Palauzov S.N. Romanian dominions of Wallachia and Moldavia in historical and political terms. St. Petersburg 1859. SS.147; 153-154.
Yuzefovich T.[P.] Political and trade agreements between Russia and the East. SPb.1869. P.34.
Petrov A. [N.] Uk.soch. St. Petersburg 1885. T.1. 1806 and 1807 Michelson and Meyendorff. SS.42-43.
Right there. P.59.
Right there. P.54.
Shcherbatov [A.] [P.] Field Marshal Prince Paskevich. His life and work. SPb.1888. T.1. 1782-1826. SS.14-15.
Petrov A. [N.] Uk.soch. St. Petersburg 1885. T.1. 1806 and 1807 Michelson and Meyendorff. SS.88-89; 92-93; 102-103.
Foreign policy of Russia in the 19th and early 20th centuries... M.1963. Ser.1. 1801-1815. T.3. January 1806 – July 1807 SS.384-387.
Petrov A. [N.] Uk.soch. St. Petersburg 1885. T.1. 1806 and 1807 Michelson and Meyendorff. P.123.
Shcherbatov [A.] [P.] Uk.soch. SPb.1888. T.1. 1782-1826. P.14.
Petrov A. [N.] Uk.soch. St. Petersburg 1885. T.1. 1806 and 1807 Michelson and Meyendorff. P.124.
Shcherbachev O. Battle of Athos. // Marine collection (hereinafter MS.). 1915. No. 12. SS.12-13.
Shcherbatov [A.] [P.] Uk.soch. SPb.1888. T.1. 1782-1826. SS.15-21.
For more information about this, see: Airapetov O.R. On the issue of the project to capture the Bosphorus (from the history of foreign policy and strategy of Russia 1806-1884). // Etudes Balkaniques. Sofia. 2009. N1. CC.137-142.
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The Bucharest Peace Treaty was concluded on May 16 (28), 1812 between Russia and Turkey following the results of the Russian-Turkish War of 1806-1812. The agreement consisted of 16 open and 2 secret articles.
In accordance with the agreement, Russia received Bessarabia with the fortresses of Khotin, Bendery, Akkerman, Kiliya and Izmail. The Russian-Turkish border was established along the Prut River before it flows into the Danube and the Chilia channel. Russia reserved significant territories in Transcaucasia and received the right of commercial navigation along the entire course of the Danube.
The conclusion of the Treaty of Bucharest ensured the neutrality of the Ottoman Empire in the coming war with Napoleonic France.
Text of the Treaty of Bucharest 1812
In the name of the Lord Almighty!
His Imperial Majesty, the Most Serene and Most Powerful Great Sovereign, the Emperor and Autocrat of All Russia, and His Majesty, the Most Serene and Most Powerful Great Sovereign, the Ottoman Emperor, having a sincere mutual desire that the ongoing present war between the two powers be stopped, and that peace, friendship and good harmony be firmly restored, decided for the good of this righteous and saving matter to entrust to the efforts and leadership of the main authorized representatives, namely: from His Imperial Majesty the Autocrat of All Russia, the most illustrious Count Golenishchev-Kutuzov, General of the Infantry, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, all Russian orders, Grand Cross of the Imperial-Austrian Order Maria Theresa, Knight and Commander of the Sovereign Order of St. John of Jerusalem, and from His Majesty the Ottoman Emperor, the Most Excellent and Excellent Mr. Supreme Vizier of the Sublime Porte of the Ottoman Aghmed Pasha, so that for the resolution, conclusion and signing of a peace treaty they are elected, appointed and subject to full worthy persons were provided with power of attorney from both parties; as a result of which the excellent and highly respected gentlemen were elected, appointed and authorized by the Russian Imperial side: Andrey of Italy, His Imperial Majesty's Privy Councilor, and so on, Ivan Sabaneev, from the army of His Imperial Majesty, Lieutenant General, Chief of the General Staff of the Danube Great Army, and so on , and Joseph Fonton, His Imperial Majesty's actual state councilor, and so on; on the part of the Sublime Ottoman Porte, the excellent and highly respected gentlemen: Esseid Said Magommed Khalib-efendi, actual kegaya bey of the Sublime Ottoman Porte; Mufti-zade Ibrahim Selim-efendi, Kazi-askir of Anadol, an actual judge of the Ottoman army, and Abdul Hamid-efendi, an actual enicherileri kiatibi, who, having gathered in the city of Bucharest, upon the exchange of their powers, decided the following articles:
Article 1.
The enmity and disagreement that existed hitherto between both high empires will henceforth cease with this treaty, both on land and on water, and may there forever be peace, friendship and good agreement between His Imperial Majesty the autocrat and the Padishah of All Russia and His Majesty the emperor and the padishah of the Ottoman Empire, their heirs and successors to the thrones and their mutual empires.
Both Highly Contracting Parties will make constant efforts to avert everything that could cause enmity between mutual subjects; They will carry out exactly everything established by this peaceful treaty, and will strictly observe that in future neither one nor the other side, either openly or secretly, will act contrary to this treaty.
Article 2.
Both High Contracting Parties, thus restoring sincere friendship among themselves, deign to grant amnesty and general forgiveness to all those of their subjects who, during the now ended war, participated in hostilities, or in any way contrary to the interests of their sovereigns and states. As a result of this amnesty granted to them, none of them will henceforth be offended or oppressed for their past actions, but everyone who returns to his home will enjoy the property that he previously owned, under the protection and patronage of the laws, on an equal basis with others.
Article 3.
All treatises, conventions, acts and regulations, executed and concluded at different times between the Russian Imperial Court and the Sublime Ottoman Porte, are completely confirmed by both this treaty and the previous ones, excluding only those articles that were subject to change from time to time; and both High Contracting Parties undertake to observe them sacredly and inviolably.
Article 4.
The first article of the preliminary clauses, already signed in advance, stipulated that the Prut River from its entrance into Moldova to its connection with the Danube and the left bank of the Danube from this connection to the mouth of the Chilia and to the sea, will form the border of both empires, for which this mouth will be common . Small islands, which were not inhabited before the war, and starting opposite Ishmael to the aforementioned mouth of the Kiliya are closer to the left bank, which belongs to Russia, will not be owned by either of the two powers, and no fortifications or buildings will be made on them in the future, but These islands will remain empty, and mutual subjects can come there only for fishing and logging. The sides of the two large islands lying opposite Izmail and Chilia will also remain empty and uninhabited for an hour's distance, starting from the nearest point of the aforementioned left bank of the Danube; this space will be marked with signs, and the dwellings that existed before the war, as well as the old Kilia, will remain behind this boundary line. As a result of the above-mentioned article, the Sublime Ottoman Porte cedes and gives to the Russian Imperial Court the lands lying on the left bank of the Prut, with fortresses, towns, villages and dwellings located there, while the middle of the Prut River will be the border between both high empires.
Merchant ships of both Courts can, as before, enter the aforementioned Kiliya estuary, as well as along the entire course of the Danube River. As for the warships of the Russian Imperial Court, they can sail there from the Kiliya mouth to the junction of the Prut River with the Danube.
Article 5.
His Majesty the Emperor and Padishah of All Russia gives and returns to the Illustrious Porte of the Ottoman the land of Moldova, lying on the right bank of the Prut River, as well as Greater and Lesser Wallachia, with fortresses, in the same condition as they are now, with cities, towns, villages, dwellings and with everything that is contained in these provinces, including the Danube islands, excluding what was said above in the fourth article of this treatise.
The acts and regulations regarding the privileges of Moldavia and Wallachia, which existed and were observed before this war, are confirmed on the basis as stated in the fifth article of the preliminary paragraphs. The conditions depicted in the fourth article of the Treaty of Jassy will be exactly fulfilled, and which read as follows: not to demand any payment for old accounts, nor taxes for the entire wartime, on the contrary, the inhabitants of these two provinces will be exempted from all taxes henceforth for two years, counting from the day exchange of ratifications; and give a period of time to the inhabitants of these provinces who wish to move from there to other places. It goes without saying that this period will be extended for four months, and that the Sublime Porte will agree to adjust the taxes of Moldavia according to the proportionality of its current land.
Article 6.
Except for the border of the Prut River, the borders on the side of Asia and other places are restored exactly as they were before the war, and as stated in the third article of the preliminary paragraphs. As a result, the Russian Imperial Court gives and returns to the Illustrious Ottoman Porte, in the same condition as the fortresses and castles that lie within this border and were conquered by its weapons, together with cities, towns, villages, dwellings and everything that this land contains.
Article 7.
The Mohammedan inhabitants of the lands ceded to the Russian Imperial Court, who might be located there due to the war, and the natural inhabitants of other places who remained in the same ceded lands during the war, may, if they wish, move to the area of the Sublime Porte with their families and name and there to remain forever under her rule; In which not only will the slightest obstacle not be put in their way, but they will also be allowed to sell their property to whomever they wish among the local subjects and transfer the proceeds to Ottoman lands. The same permission is given to the natural inhabitants of the aforementioned ceded lands, who have their own possessions there and are now located in the areas of the Sublime Porte.
At this end, both are given a period of eighteen months, starting from the day of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, to dispose of their above-mentioned affairs. In the same way, the Tatars of the Edyssapian horde, who moved from Bessarabia to Russia during this war, can, if they wish, return to the Ottoman regions, but with the fact that the Sublime Porte will then be obliged to pay the Russian Imperial Court for the costs that could have been used for transportation and the establishment of these Tatars.
On the contrary, Christians who have possessions in the lands ceded to the Russian court, as well as those who, being natives of these lands themselves, are now in other Ottoman places, can, if they wish, move and settle in the aforementioned ceded lands, with their families and property; in which no obstacle will be placed in their way, and they are allowed to sell all kinds of estates that they own in the regions of the Sublime Porte to the inhabitants of the same Ottoman places, and transfer the proceeds to the regions of the Russian Empire, they will also be given eighteen months at the end period, counting from the day of exchange of ratifications of this peace treaty.
Article 8.
In accordance with what is established by the fourth article of the preliminary points, although there is no doubt that the Sublime Porte, according to its rules, will use leniency and generosity against the Serbian people, as from ancient times subjects of this power and paying tribute to it, however, looking at the participation that the Serbs took in the actions of this war, it is considered decent to establish special conditions for their safety. As a result, the Sublime Porte grants forgiveness and a general amnesty to the Serbs, and they can in no way be bothered for their past deeds. The fortresses that they could build on the occasion of the war in the lands they inhabited, and which were not there at all before, will be, since they are useless for the future, destroyed, and the Sublime Porte will continue to take possession of all the fortresses, padanki and other fortified in places always existing, with artillery, military supplies and other items and military supplies, and she will establish garrisons there at her discretion. But so that these garrisons do not do any oppression to the Serbs, contrary to the rights of their subjects; then the Sublime Porte, driven by a feeling of mercy, will take the measures necessary for their safety towards the end of the Serbian people. She grants the Serbs, at their request, the same benefits that the subjects of her islands of the Archipelago and other places enjoy, and allows them to feel the effect of her generosity, leaving them to manage their internal affairs, determining the measure of their taxes, receiving them from their own hands, and she will finally manage all these items in common with the Serbian people.
Article 9.
All prisoners of war, both male and female, of whatever nation or condition they may be, located in both empires, must, soon after the exchange of ratifications of this peace treaty, be returned and handed over without the slightest ransom or payment, excluding, however, Christians who accepted of their own free will, the Mohammedan faith in the regions of the Sublime Porte, and the Mohammedans, who also, according to their absolute desire, accepted the Christian faith in the regions of the Russian Empire.
The same will be done with those Russian subjects who, after signing this peace treaty, would by some chance be captured, and who may be in the regions belonging to the Sublime Porte. The Russian court, for its part, promises to deal equally with all the subjects of the Sublime Porte.
No payment shall be required for the sums spent by both High Contracting Parties for the maintenance of prisoners. Moreover, each of both sides will provide these prisoners with everything they will need on their way to the border, where they will be exchanged by mutual commissars.
Article 10.
All cases and demands of mutual subjects postponed due to war will not be abandoned, but will again be considered and decided, by virtue of the laws, upon the conclusion of peace. Debts that mutual subjects may have on each other, as well as debts on the treasury, must be paid immediately and in full.
Article 11.
Upon the conclusion of a peace treaty between both high empires, and upon the exchange of ratifications of both sovereigns, the ground forces and flotilla of the Russian Imperial Court will leave the pretexts of the Ottoman Empire. But as this exit must be taken into account with the distance of the places and their circumstances, both High Contracting Parties agreed to set a period of three months, counting from the day of the exchange of ratifications, for the final withdrawal, both on the part of Moldavia and Wallachia, and on the part of Asia. As a result, from the day of the exchange of ratifications until the expiration of the mentioned period, the ground forces of the Russian Imperial Court will completely withdraw from both the European and Asian sides, from all the lands returned to the Sublime Ottoman Porte by this treaty; the flotilla and all warships will also leave the waters of the Sublime Ottoman Porte.
As long as the Russian troops remain in the lands and fortresses that are to be returned to the Sublime Ottoman Porte in accordance with the present peace treaty, until the expiration of the deadline for the withdrawal of the troops, until then the administration and order of things will remain in the state in which they now exist, under the authority of the Russian of the Imperial Court, and the Sublime Ottoman Porte will in no way interfere with this until the expiration of the time appointed for the departure of all troops, who will supply themselves with all food supplies and other necessary items until the last day of their departure, in the same way as they have supplied themselves there until now .
Article 12.
When a minister or chargé d'affaires of the Russian Imperial Court, staying in Constantinople, submits a note to demand, by virtue of Article VII of the Treaty of Jassy, satisfaction for losses caused to the subjects and merchants of the Russian Imperial Court by the corsairs of the Algerian, Tunisian and Trypillian governments or to make protests on the subject , relating to the provisions of the trade treaty, confirmed, and which would cause disputes and complaints; in this case, the Sublime Ottoman Porte will turn its attention to the implementation of what the treatises prescribe, and that the mentioned subjects will be examined and resolved, without any omission of the instructions and publications issued at the end of the day. The Russian Imperial Court will observe the same thing in the reasoning of the subjects of the Sublime Porte in accordance with trade regulations.
Article 13.
Upon the conclusion of this peace treaty, the Russian Imperial Court agrees that the Sublime Ottoman Porte, due to the similarity of worship with the Persians, will use its good services so that the war between the Russian Court and the Persian power will be over, and peace will be restored between them by mutual agreement.
Article 14.
After the exchange of ratifications of this peace treaty by the chief plenipotentiaries of both empires, orders will be sent mutually and without delay to all commanders of troops, both land and sea, to cease hostile actions; those who followed after the signing of this treaty will be honored as if it had not happened, and will not cause any change in the regulations depicted in this treaty. Likewise, everything that would have been won by one or the other of the High Contracting Parties during this interim will be returned immediately.
Article 15.
Upon signing of this peace treaty by mutual plenipotentiaries, the Chief Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of All Russia and the Supreme Vizier of the Sublime Ottoman Porte will confirm it, and the acts will be exchanged with the same powers within ten days after the signing of this treaty, and as soon as possible.
Article 16.
This treaty of eternal peace on the part of His Majesty the Emperor and Padishah of the All-Russian and on the part of His Majesty the Emperor and Padishah of the Ottoman Empire, shall be approved and ratified by solemn ratifications signed by the personal hands of Their Majesties, which must be exchanged by mutual plenipotentiaries in the same place where this very The peace treaty was concluded in four weeks, or as soon as possible, counting from the date of the conclusion of this treaty.
This peace act, containing sixteen articles, and which will be accomplished by the exchange of mutual ratifications within the prescribed period, is signed by the force of our powers, approved by our seals and exchanged for another similar one, signed by the above-mentioned plenipotentiaries of the Sublime Ottoman Porte and approved by their seals.
Done in Bucharest, May 16th, 1812.
The Ottoman Empire was forced to agree to these conditions even earlier, when the Treaty of Bucharest was signed in 1812, according to which Russia, in addition, received naval bases on the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus. This agreement summed up the results of the Russian-Turkish war, which began in 1806. The war, started by the Turks in the hope of weakening Russia after Austerlitz, was fought with varying success until in 1811 M.I. was appointed commander of the Danube Army. Kutuzov. He defeated the Turkish forces at Ruschuk and Slobodzeya and forced the Porte to make peace. This was the first enormous service provided by Kutuzov to Russia in 1812. Under the terms of the Peace of Bucharest, Russia received the rights of guarantor of the autonomy of Serbia, which strengthened its position in the Balkans.
Greek question. The Viennese system of European balance did not apply to the Ottoman Empire. The Holy Alliance, if interpreted literally, implied the unity of European Christian monarchs against the infidels. Russia made extensive use of its opportunities to provide patronage to the Sultan's Christian subjects. With the knowledge of the Russian authorities in Odessa, Moldova, Wallachia, Greece and Bulgaria, Greek patriots were preparing an uprising, the goal of which was the independence of Greece. Based on the principle of legitimism, Alexander I did not approve of the idea of Greek independence, but he did not find support either in Russian society or even in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where I. Kapodistrias played a prominent role.
In 1821, the Greek national liberation revolution began, led by Russian service general Alexander Ypsilanti. Alexander I condemned the Greek revolution and insisted on resolving the Greek question through negotiations. Instead of independence, he offered the Greeks autonomy within the Ottoman Empire. The rebels, who relied on the sympathy of the progressive European public, rejected this plan. The Ottoman authorities did not accept him either. To resolve the Greek issue, a conference of the great powers met in St. Petersburg at the beginning of 1825, where England and Austria rejected the Russian program of joint action. After the Sultan refused the mediation of the conference participants, Alexander I decided to concentrate troops on the Turkish border. Thus, he crossed out the policy of legitimism and moved on to open support for the national liberation movement.
Alexey Petrovich Ermolov and his activities in the North Caucasus. At the same time, Russia sharply increased its military presence in the North Caucasus, a territory that was ethnically diverse and whose peoples were at very different levels of socio-economic and political development. There were relatively stable state formations there - the Avar and Kazikumyk khanates, the Tarkov shamkhalate; patriarchal “free societies” dominated in the mountainous regions, the prosperity of which largely depended on successful raids on their lowland neighbors engaged in agriculture.
In the second half of the 18th century. The Northern Ciscaucasia, which was the object of peasant and Cossack colonization, was separated from the mountainous regions by the Caucasian line, which stretched from the Black to the Caspian Sea and ran along the banks of the Kuban and Terek rivers. A postal road was built along this line, which was considered almost safe. In 1817, the Caucasian cordon line was moved from the Terek to Sunzha, which caused discontent among the mountain peoples. For the Russian authorities, the inclusion of the Caucasian peoples in the orbit of imperial influence was a natural consequence of the successful establishment of Russia in Transcaucasia. In military, trade and economic terms, the authorities were interested in eliminating the threats that lurked in the raiding system of the highlanders. The support that the latter received from the Ottoman Empire justified Russia's military intervention in the affairs of the North Caucasus.
Appointed to the post of chief administrator of the civilian unit in Georgia and the Caucasus and at the same time commander of the Separate Caucasian Corps, General A.P. Ermolov considered his main task to ensure the security of Transcaucasia and the inclusion of the territory of mountainous Dagestan, Chechnya and the North-West Caucasus into the Russian Empire. From Tsitsian’s policy, which combined threats and monetary promises, he moved on to a drastic suppression of the raiding system, for which he widely used deforestation and the destruction of rebellious villages. Ermolov felt like a “proconsul of the Caucasus” and did not hesitate to use military force. Under him, the fortresses Groznaya, Vnezapnaya, Burnaya were built, which became strongholds of the Russian troops.
Yermolov’s military expeditions aroused opposition from the highlanders of Chechnya and Kabarda. In the 1820s. it grew into organized military-political resistance, the ideology of which became muridism - a type of Islam adapted to the concepts of mountain peoples.
We can say that under Ermolov, events began that contemporaries called the Caucasian War. In reality, these were multi-temporal actions of individual military detachments, devoid of an overall plan, which either sought to suppress the attacks of the mountaineers, or undertook expeditions deep into the mountainous regions, without representing the enemy’s forces and without pursuing any political goals. Military operations in the Caucasus became protracted.
