Orsha Division 3 Belarusian Front

17 To the front During my stay in Odessa in a hotel, or perhaps even earlier, in Novorossiysk, I again became infected with typhus, but this time it was relapsing. I felt the first attack on the ship on the way to Novorossiysk, then, as usually happens when returning

Formed in the western direction on April 24, 1944 on the basis of the directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters of April 19, 1944 as a result of the division of the Western Front into the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian Fronts. Initially, it included the 5th, 31st, 39th Armies and the 1st Air Army. Subsequently it included the 2nd and 11th Guards, 3rd, 21st, 28th, 33rd, 43rd, 48th, 50th Armies, 5th Guards Tank and 3rd - I'm an air army.

In May - the first half of June 1944, front troops conducted local military operations on the territory of Belarus. Participating in the Belarusian strategic operation (June 23 - August 29, 1944), the front carried out the Vitebsk-Orsha operation on June 23 - 28 (together with the 1st Baltic Front), June 29 - July 4 - the Minsk operation (together with the 1st Baltic Front). and 2nd Belorussian Fronts), July 5 - 20 - Vilnius operation and July 28 - August 28 - Kaunas operation. As a result of operations, his troops advanced to a depth of 500 km. They liberated Vitebsk (June 26), Orsha (June 27), Borisov (July 1), Minsk (July 3), Molodechno (July 5), Vilnius (July 13), Kaunas (August 1), other cities and reached the state border of the USSR with East Prussia.

In October 1944, the front, with the forces of the 39th Army and the 1st Air Army, participated in the Memel operation (October 5 - 22) of the 1st Baltic Front, as a result of which the enemy Courland group was isolated and pressed to the Baltic Sea. Front troops advanced to a depth of 30 to 60 km into East Prussia and North-Eastern Poland, captured the cities of Stallupenen (Nesterov) (October 25), Gołdap, Suwalki.

In January - April 1945, troops participated in the East Prussian strategic operation, during which the Insterburg-Koenigsberg operation was carried out on January 13 - 27. In cooperation with the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front, they broke through the deeply echeloned defense, advanced to a depth of 70 - 130 km, reached the approaches to Konigsberg (Kaliningrad) and blocked the East Prussian enemy group, and then (March 13 - 29) liquidated it and went to Frishes Huff Bay.

From April 6 to April 9, 1945, front troops carried out the Königsberg operation, as a result of which on April 9 they captured the fortress and city of Königsberg.

On April 25, having completed the liquidation of the Zemland enemy group, front troops captured the port and city of Pillau (Baltiysk).

The front was disbanded on August 15, 1945 on the basis of the order of the USSR NKO dated July 9, 1945. Its field control was directed to the formation of the administration of the Baranovichi Military District.

Troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front participated in the following operations:

• Strategic Operations:
• Belarusian strategic offensive operation of 1944;
• East Prussian Strategic Offensive Operation 1945;
• Baltic strategic offensive operation of 1944.
• Front-line and army operations:
• Brownsburg Offensive 1945;
• Vilnius offensive operation of 1944;
• Vitebsk-Orsha offensive operation of 1944;
• Gumbinnen offensive operation of 1944;
• Zemland offensive operation of 1945;
• Insterburg-Konigsberg offensive operation of 1945;
• Kaunas offensive operation 1944;
• Königsberg offensive operation 1945;
• Memel offensive operation 1944;
• Minsk offensive operation 1944;
• Rastenburg-Heilsberg offensive operation of 1945.

Zemland Group of Forces.

• Commander of the Armed Forces of the Zemland Group of Forces:
• Guards Lieutenant General t/v SKORNYAKOV Konstantin Vasilievich [on April. 1945]
• Chief of Staff of the UK BTiMV Zemland Group of Forces:
• Guards major general RODIONOV Mikhail Iosifovich [on April. 1945]

Current page: 8 (book has 25 pages total) [available reading passage: 17 pages]

In turn, a blow to the west by the 6th Guards. The army could get stuck in a series of inter-lake fashion shows. Therefore, the concern of I. Kh. Bagramyan and his chief of staff is at least understandable.

3rd Belorussian Front. In essence, the 3rd Belorussian Front was the heir and, so to speak, the “successor” of the Western Front. Moreover, the new front commander, Colonel General Ivan Danilovich Chernyakhovsky, managed to briefly occupy the post of commander of the Western Front on April 15, 1944, and on April 24, 1944, he officially became the commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front. It must be said that before this, 38-year-old I. D. Chernyakhovsky had no experience of commanding a front; he began the war as just a colonel and commander of a tank division. Until April 1944, he commanded the 60th Army for a long time. Now he had to lead a large mass of troops against an experienced and powerful enemy. However, it should be noted that Chernyakhovsky received a strong and strong headquarters headed by Lieutenant General A.P. Pokrovsky, which significantly facilitated the young general’s debut as a front commander. General Pokrovsky, contrary to his own expectations, was not removed as a result of the work of the GKO commission and retained his position until the very end of the war. Chernyakhovsky relied on his headquarters and, as A.P. Pokrovsky noted, “was alien to the vicious practice when a relocated manager drags some of his colleagues to a new duty station.” 138
Liberation of Belarus... P.184.

It will be soon. A. M. Vasilevsky and commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front I. D. Chernyakhovsky interrogating German General Hitter

The directive from the Supreme Command Headquarters to the 3rd Belorussian Front was the last in a series of directives that defined the tasks of the fronts in Operation Bagration. The front's task was formulated as follows:

"1. Prepare and conduct an operation with the goal of, in cooperation with the left wing of the 1st Baltic Front and the 2nd Belorussian Front, defeating the enemy’s Vitebsk-Orsha grouping and reaching the river. Berezina, why break through the enemy’s defenses by delivering two blows:

a) one strike by the forces of the 39th and 5th armies from the area west of Liozno in the general direction of Bogushevskoye, Senno; part of the forces of this group to advance in the north-west direction, bypassing Vitebsk from the south-west, with the goal of, in cooperation with the left wing of the 1st Baltic Front, defeating the enemy’s Vitebsk group and capturing the city of Vitebsk;

b) another attack by the 11th Guards. and the 31st Army along the Minsk highway in the general direction to Borisov; part of the forces of this group to capture the city of Orsha with a blow from the north.

2. The immediate task of the front troops is to capture the Senno-Orsha line.

In the future, develop the attack on Borisov with the task, in cooperation with the 2nd Belorussian Front, to defeat the enemy’s Borisov grouping and reach the western bank of the river. Berezina in the Borisov region" 139
Russian archive: The Great Patriotic War. Supreme Command Headquarters: Documents and materials 1944–1945. T. 16 (5–4). M.: Terra, 1999. P. 95.

As we see, despite the negative experience of offensives along the Minsk highway in the fall of 1943 and early 1944, Soviet troops were again given the task of attacking Orsha along the highway and railway axis. This time it was decided to try to break through along the highway with the forces of the elite 11th Guards Army. It was transferred from the 1st Baltic Front as part of the 8th, 16th and 36th Guards Rifle Corps. In addition, the 3rd Belorussian Front received from the Headquarters reserve the 5th Guards Tank Army, the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps, and the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps. Returned to the front after completing the 2nd Guards. tank corps of A. S. Burdeyny. Since the 3rd Belorussian Front was the heir to the Western Front, it would be more correct to say “returned”, since Burdeyny’s corps had already participated in the battles in the Western direction in the winter of 1943/44.

The use of the listed mobile formations was assumed after breaking through the enemy’s defenses. They wanted to avoid the nightmare of introducing mechanized formations into battle with a pre-breakthrough with heavy losses to the enemy defense at all costs. Accordingly, the horse-mechanized group (KMG) as part of the 3rd Guards. mechanized and 3rd Guards. It was planned to introduce the cavalry corps in the general direction of Bogushevskoye, Senno, Lukoml, Moiseevshchina, Pleshchenitsy, and the 5th Guards. tank army - in the strip of the Minsk highway to Borisov. The 2nd Guards received the auxiliary task according to the plan. tank corps. With the exit of the southern group of front troops (11th Guards A and 31st A) to the Orsha region, the 2nd Guards. The tank corps was supposed to be sent to Staroselye for subsequent actions in the direction of Krutoye, Ukhvala, Chernyavka in order to protect the front forces operating along the Minsk highway from an attack from the south.

The task of the tank army and the cavalry-mechanized group (CMG) was (as formulated in the review of the operation, compiled in hot pursuit of the events), “to break through the enemy’s defenses to its entire operational depth, destroy oncoming operational reserves and thereby create conditions for the rapid development of the operation, i.e., bring the main forces of the front to the river. Berezina north and south of Borisov no later than the tenth day from the beginning of the offensive" 140
TsAMO RF. F. 241. Op. 2593. D. 504. L. 31.

Both the KMG mobile formations and the tank army were ordered to reach the western bank of the river. Berezina. Accordingly, KMG - to the area of ​​Voloka, Pleschenitsa, Zembin, and the 5th Guards. tank army - to the forest area directly west of Borisov. By the end of the sixth day of the operation, they were supposed to provide bridgeheads for the deployment of the main forces of the front on the western bank of the river. Berezina for the purpose of subsequent development of the operation to Minsk. That is, the main task of the KMG and the tank army was a quick breakthrough to the Berezina in order to prevent the formation of a new front of resistance by the enemy at its border and to seize a bridgehead for a further offensive.

Fulfillment of the assigned task of the 5th Guards. The tank army, depending on the success of breaking through the enemy’s defenses, was planned according to two options:

1) in the Orsha direction along the Moscow-Minsk highway to Borisov;

2) in the Bogushevsky direction with access to the highway in the Ozertsy area (5 km east of Tolochin) and further along the highway to Borisov.

Please note that the Orsha direction is listed as the first option. In Soviet historical works, the question of which direction was considered the main one (Orsha or Bogushevsky), and which auxiliary, was not exactly hidden, but avoided. Both directions were positioned as equal. Nevertheless, even during the period of closed documents, quite authoritative voices were heard dotting the “e”. Thus, the former chief of staff of the front, A.P. Pokrovsky, spoke quite clearly on this matter: “The main option was the first” 141
Liberation of Belarus. P.190.

The reporting documents of the 1st Air Army of the Front (which was not directly interested in glossing over reality and projecting plans onto the reality of ground battles) directly stated:

“Of the two strike directions - Bogushevsky and Orsha - the decisive one, according to the command’s plan, was the Orsha direction, which provided major difficulties for overcoming the enemy’s highly developed defensive system, but at the same time made it possible to more widely develop the actions of large formations in the enemy’s operational rear.” 142
TsAMO RF. F. 241. Op. 2593. D. 478. L. 38.

It is usually stated that in terms of using P. A. Rotmistrov’s tank army there were two options for introducing it into a breakthrough, without specifying which of them was the main one. By the way, Rotmistrov himself, in an interview with the Military Historical Journal in 1964, in response to a question about plans to bring his army into battle, completely definitely denied this. Pavel Alekseevich then spoke in a very definite way: “The decision of the commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front was to bring the 5th Guards Tank Army into battle in the 11th Guards zone.” 143
VIZH. 1964. No. 6. P. 27.

“Despite the fact that before the start of the front offensive, our army was not focused on entering the battle in the 5th Army zone, I, on my own initiative, with a small group of officers (after planning was completed and all reconnaissance was carried out for entering the battle in strip of the 11th Guards Army) just in case, carried out reconnaissance in its stripes as well" 144
Right there.

Moreover, P. A. Rotmistrov took it upon himself to assert that “the second option of bringing the 5th Guards Tank Army into battle by the front was not envisaged” 145
Right there.

However, according to the reporting documents of the 5th Guards. tank army and the 3rd Belorussian Front, this version is not traceable. Discussion and allegations about the absence of a second option could only arise in the years when independent researchers did not have access to operational documents of the war. The army of P. A. Rotmistrov was initially intended to be used to develop the success of the front in the general direction of the city of Borisov according to two options. One can debate here about which of the two was the priority and the main one. The fact that the Orsha direction was the main one, and not one of two equal ones, is also evidenced by the events of the last hours before the start of the operation. Commander of the 5th Guards. tank army in a 1970 article described the situation as follows:

“The army received an order on the night of June 22-23 to move forward 25 km along the Minsk Highway strip, with the intention of introducing it into a breakthrough in the strip of the 11th Guards Army, i.e., as planned in the first option.” 146
Liberation of Belarus... P. 404.

These words of his are confirmed by other sources. P. A. Rotmistrov calls the advance advance “hasty,” but there is a simpler explanation - they really initially wanted to introduce his army into a breakthrough on the highway. The second option, although it was being worked on, albeit not proactively, was considered a backup. Considering the failures of the winter offensives, it was necessary to be prepared for any surprises, and a powerful means of combat (which was the 5th Guards Tank Army) was worked out to be used in different versions in order to depend less on the successes and failures of a particular direction.

Also, the Orsha direction received priority in the use of aviation in the operation plan. During the first three days of the offensive, it was planned to carry out 10,785 sorties, of which 8,540 were aimed at the Orsha direction and 2,245 at the Vitebsk direction. 147
Operations of the Soviet armed forces in the Great Patriotic War 1941–1945. Volume III. Operations of the Soviet armed forces during the period of decisive victories (January - December 1944). M.: Voenizdat, 1958. P. 310.

Thus, almost 80% of the sorties were aimed at the Orsha direction. A hail of aerial bombs and RSov was supposed to pave the way for the tanks of Rotmistrov’s army.

Most eloquently, the importance attached to each of the directions of the 3rd Belorussian Front's offensive is evidenced by the distribution of forces and means between the armies subordinate to I. D. Chernyakhovsky's front.

The numerical composition of the armies and units subordinate to the front of the 3rd Belorussian Front on June 20, 1944148
Compiled according to the 3BF combat and numerical strength statements. TsAMO RF. F.241. Op. 2628. D. 48. Lll. 266rpm, 274rpm, l. 288 rev, 302 rev, 322 rev, 329 rev, 332 rev, 359 rev, 375.

I would like to note that the given data on the total number of armies (the “Total” column) does not take into account civilian personnel and the wounded in hospitals. The discrepancies in the figures given in different publications are explained by the inclusion or, conversely, underestimation of different categories of military personnel. The number of wounded in hospitals as of June 20, 1944 was characterized by the following figures 149
TsAMO RF. F. 241. Op. 2628. D. 48. L. 352.

5th Army - 2543 people;

11th Guards army - 1356 people;

31st Army - 1489 people;

39th Army - 2000 people.

Units subordinate to the front - 17,959 people.

From the data presented, it is clearly visible how numerous and well-armed the 11th Guards unit was at the beginning of the operation. army of Lieutenant General K.N. Galitsky. After these figures, there remains no doubt about the direction in which the main attack of the 3rd Belorussian Front was delivered according to plan.

In total, as of June 20, 1944, as of June 20, 1944, out of 679,614 people on staff, there were 564,097 people on the list, as well as 13,546 civilian people 150

Civilian hirelings were mainly concentrated in the rear units; there were only a few of them in the combat troops.

New commander of the 39th Army Ivan Ilyich Lyudnikov

By June 20, 1944, the artillery “fist” of the 3rd Belorussian Front numbered 135 203-mm howitzers, 6 152-mm cannons, 391 152-mm howitzers, 100 122-mm cannons, 672 122-mm howitzers, 12,107 -mm guns, 1513 76mm divisional guns, 397 76mm regimental and mountain guns, 1087 45mm guns and 55 57mm guns 151
TsAMO RF. F. 241. Op. 2628. D. 48. L. 376v.

It is impossible not to note the small number of 57-mm ZIS-2 anti-tank guns. Guns of these types entered the army rather slowly, and the basis of anti-tank defense, despite the enemy’s presence of “tigers” and “panthers” with thick armor, were 76-mm guns.

Plan of the Vitebsk operation

Tasks for detailing the operation plan were assigned to army commanders shortly after receiving the Headquarters directive. As the commander of the 39th Army, I. I. Lyudnikov, later recalled:

“On June 1, 1944, the commander of the 39th Army at the headquarters of the 3rd Belorussian Front (commander Colonel General I. D. Chernyakhovsky, member of the Military Council V. E. Makarov, chief of staff Lieutenant General A. P. Pokrovsky) was awarded private directive of the Military Council of the front on the offensive and ordered to begin preparations for the Vitebsk operation" 152
Lyudnikov I. I. Decree. op. P. 13.

Actually, it makes sense to start describing the offensive plan of the 3rd Belorussian Front with Lyudnikov’s army. This was one of two armies aimed at the Bogushev direction. Just like on the 1st Baltic Front, the principle of striking “shoulder to shoulder” with multidirectional tasks was used. That is, the armies broke through in adjacent areas of the breakthrough, avoiding the problem of a narrow and isolated area of ​​the breakthrough being shot from the flanks. Accordingly, the 39th and 5th armies had adjacent breakthrough areas with a total width of 16 km 153
Radzievsky A. I. Development of the theory and practice of breakthrough (based on the experience of the Great Patriotic War). In 2 volumes. Volume 2. M.: Military Academy named after. M. V. Frunze, 1977. P. 60.

The 39th Army was assigned to attack in the sector where the last spring (March 21–28, 1944) offensive of the 33rd Army took place. It would be irresponsible to attack from the top of a ledge driven into the German defense - the shortest route to the Orsha-Vitebsk railway was the best defended. A breakthrough from the southern face of the ledge increased the distance to the target, but increased the chances of breaking through the less dense enemy defense.

The task of I. I. Lyudnikov’s army was set quite ambitious. The main task of the 39th Army, according to the directive of the front, was to encircle and destroy, together with the troops of the 43rd Army, the Vitebsk enemy group. The army troops were ordered: with the forces of the 5th Guards Rifle Corps (three divisions), the 251st and 164th rifle divisions to strike from the front of Makarov, Yazykovo in the general direction of Pesochna, Plissa, Gnezdilovichi and, joining with the troops of the 43rd Army 1 of the Baltic Front in the area north of Ostrovno, together with them, encircle and destroy the enemy in the Vitebsk area and capture the city. Part of the army's forces were to continue the offensive in the direction of Beshenkovichi.

According to the plan developed by I. I. Lyudnikov’s headquarters, the army went on the offensive in a two-echelon formation. In the first echelon there were five rifle divisions of the 84th and 5th Guards. rifle corps, in the second echelon - two rifle divisions. The main blow was delivered on the left flank of the army by the forces of the 5th Guards. the rifle corps of Major General I. S. Bezugloy, who broke through the defense in a 6 km area with the forces of three rifle divisions. By the beginning of the operation, these three divisions had been brought to a strength of about 7 thousand people with a staff strength of 10,670 people (staff 04/500). 17th Guards SD on June 20, 1944 numbered 6,761 people, 19th Guards. SD - 7144 people, 91st Guards. SD - 6760 people. It would not be out of place to say that I. S. Bezugly was one of the veterans of the airborne troops of the Red Army, who became the commander of a regiment of an airborne brigade back in 1933. He met the war as commander of the 5th Airborne Corps and fought in the Baltic states.

The tank forces allocated to the 39th Army cannot be said to be impressive (shown as of 24.00 06/22/44) 154

28th Guards tank brigade 32 T-34, 13 T-70, 4 SU-122, 3 SU-76, 2 Pz.VI "Tiger";

The 735th and 957th SAPS have 21 SU-76 each.

The tank brigade and both self-propelled regiments were supposed to support the offensive of the 5th Guards. rifle corps.

To the south of the army of I. I. Lyudnikov in the Bogushevsky direction, the 5th army of N. I. Krylov, who remained the permanent commander of the army since the fall of 1943, was supposed to attack. Its task was to strike with the forces of eight rifle divisions from the front of Efremenki, Yulkovo in the direction on Bogushevskoe. With access to the river line. Luchesa's army was supposed to ensure the introduction of a cavalry-mechanized group into the breakthrough, aimed at Bogushevsk and Chereya.

To break through the enemy’s defenses, according to the plan of the commander of the 5th Army, the 72nd and 65th Rifle Corps were deployed, forming their battle formation in two echelons. Some of the strongest formations were allocated to the first echelon:

63rd and 277th Rifle Divisions of the 72nd Rifle Corps;

371st and 97th Rifle Divisions of the 65th Rifle Corps.

In the second echelon were the 215th and 144th rifle divisions.

The strength of N. I. Krylov’s army formations was characterized by the following figures 155
TsAMO RF. F. 241. Op. 2628. D. 48. Lll. 259rpm, 260rpm, 261rpm.

45th sk: 159th SD 4663 people, 184th SD 6909 people, 338th SD 6877 people;

65th sk: 97th SD 6651 people, 144th SD 6910 people, 371st SD 6625 people;

72nd Infantry Division: 63rd Infantry Division 6,789 people, 215th Infantry Division 6,368 people, 277th Infantry Division 6,821 people.

The formations of the 5th Army were maintained under State No. 04/550 with a staff strength of 9,435 people. It is clearly seen that the strength of the formations has increased significantly in comparison with the winter battles, when divisions of about 5 thousand people went into battle in the first line.

As direct support armored vehicles, the 5th Army received two tank brigades and three self-propelled artillery regiments on the SU-76 (shown as of 24.00 06/22/44) 156
TsAMO RF. F. 241. Op. 2658. D. 45. L. 60.

153rd Tank Brigade - 2 T-34, 30 MkIII, 3 M3s, 14 M3l;

2nd Guards tank brigade - 34 T-34, 10 T-70, 1 °SU-85;

953, 954 and 958th SAP - 21 SU-76 each.

Considering the threat of an encounter with the “tigers” (at least based on the experience of winter battles), the collection of Lend-Lease antiques in the 153rd brigade is not at all impressive. At the same time, a large number of SU-76s undoubtedly solved the problem of accompanying infantry with fire.

The 11th Guards was supposed to attack in the direction of the main attack of the front. army. She was part of a couple from the 11th Guards. and the 31st armies, aimed at the Orsha direction. The principle of adjacent breakthrough areas was also used here; as a result, the two armies had adjacent breakthrough areas with a total width of 16 km 157
Radzievsky A. I.S. 60.

In the final version, the action plan of the 11th Guards. army was formulated in Army Headquarters Order No. 024/op dated June 22, 1944. Its objectives were as follows:

"11th Guards. The army with the forces of nine rifle divisions (1, 11, 31, 5, 26, 83, 16, 18, 84 Guards Infantry Division) with all means of reinforcement, strike in the highway strip in the direction of Tolochin, Borisov.

The immediate task is to break through the enemy’s defenses in the Ostrov Yuryev, Kireeva sector and, in cooperation with the troops of the 5th and 31st armies, defeat the Orsha-Bogushevskaya group of the enemy.

By the end of the second day, reach the border of the lake. Devinskoye, Badgers.

By the end of the third day, reach the line Yanovo, Molotany, Lamachin" 158
TsAMO RF. F. 358. Op. 5916. D. 645–649. L. 22.

In the future, it was planned to develop the offensive along the highway and reach the river by the end of the tenth day. Berezina to the area of ​​​​the city of Borisov and to the north.

The main idea of ​​the 11th Guards offensive plan. army was as follows. Intensifying the attack along the Smolensk-Minsk highway, it was planned to defeat the opposing enemy and, using the wooded area north of the highway to quickly advance part of the forces with the goal of subsequently enveloping the enemy defending in the direction of the Minsk highway from the north, to capture the river line by the end of the second day. Orshitsa. At the same time, it was planned that a group of right-flank divisions and the 152nd fortified area, together with the left-flank units of the 5th Army, would complete the destruction of the enemy by encircling him in the forests in the area of ​​Bogushevsky, Lake Orehi, and Babinovichi. The build-up of efforts according to plan was carried out with the introduction of the 2nd Guards on the first day. tank corps and one rifle division, on the second day - three rifle divisions and on the third day - one rifle division.

In the future, building on the success along the highway, it was planned to defeat the enemy reserves approaching the front and, covering their left flank from Orsha and Shklov, to reach the front by the end of the fifth day of the offensive. Oboltsy, Bol. Mihenichi, Perevolochnaya, having advanced the 2nd Guards. tank corps to the Tolochin or Senno area.

Break through the enemy front command of the 11th Guards. The army decided on the Yuryev Island, Kireeva section, with a length of 10.5 km. Actually, this section covered the entire space from the highway and railway to the vast swampy tract Vereteysky Mokh. This was the direction of the main attack; here, four rifle divisions (31st, 26th, 84th and 16th Guards Infantry Divisions) were involved in the first echelon. Accordingly, the auxiliary strike was supposed to be delivered in an area 3 km wide south of Lake Sitnyanskoye, at the northern tip of the same Vereteysky Mokha. Six battalions of the 152nd fortified area were deployed in this direction.

In the second echelon there were five divisions (1st, 5th, 11th, 18th and 83rd Guards Divisions), including the 83rd Guards Division, which was part of the army reserve. rifle division. Of these, all five divisions could be involved in the main attack direction, and three or four divisions in the auxiliary direction.

In accordance with the decision made, tasks were distributed between the buildings.

16th Guards The rifle corps of Major General Ya. S. Vorobyov carried out a breakthrough of the enemy’s defensive line in the direction of Yuriev Island, followed by a detour from the north of the enemy group defending the direction of the Minsk Highway, using for this the wooded area in its zone. In the first echelon of the corps there was one rifle division (31st Guards), in the second - two (1st and 11th Guards Infantry Division). Ya. S. Vorobyov’s corps was also entrusted with the task of encircling and destroying, together with units of the 5th Army, the 256th and parts of the 78th German infantry divisions in the forests in the area of ​​Bogushevsky, Lake. Nuts, Babinovichi.

On the 8th Guards. Rifle Corps of Major General M. N. Zavadovsky and the 36th Guards. The rifle corps of Major General P. G. Shafranov was entrusted with the task of breaking through the enemy’s defensive line. Moreover, the first participated in the breakthrough with the forces of one rifle division in the first echelon (26th Guards Infantry Division), and the second - two (84th and 16th Guards Infantry Divisions). Next, the corps of M. N. Zavadovsky was supposed to play the main role in pursuing the enemy, and the corps of P. G. Shafranov was to pursue the enemy with part of the forces, and partly to provide the left flank of the army. The staffing of the buildings was characterized by the following figures 159
TsAMO RF. F. 241. Op. 2628. D. 48. Lll. 280rpm, 281rpm

8th Guards sk: 5th Guards SD 7401 people, 26th Guards. SD 7406 people, 83 Guards. SD 7423 people;

36th Guards sk: 16th Guards. SD 7363 people, 18th Guards. SD 7428 people, 84 Guards. sd 7354 people.

Breakthrough site of the 31st Guards. rifle division (7362 people) was 3 km, and the 26th, 84th and 16th Guards. rifle divisions - 2.5 km. The latter by June 20, 1944 numbered 7406, 7354 and 7363 people, respectively. That is, wider offensive zones compared to winter battles were determined by the larger number of personnel in the guards rifle divisions of Galitsky’s army. Units of the 11th Guards. the armies were maintained according to staff 04/500, providing for a total strength of 10,670 people.

Artillery breakthrough group of the 11th Guards. The army was divided into corps breakthrough groups and subgroups of corps divisions.

Tank units of the 11th Guards. the armies were distributed among the first echelon divisions as follows (numbers given as of 24.00 06.22.44 160
TsAMO RF. F. 241. Op. 2658. D. 45. L. 60.

26th Guards SD - 120 TBR (34 T-34, 20 T-60-70, 3 SU-122) and 1435 SAP (23 SU-85);

84 Guards SD - 35 Chamber of Commerce and Industry and 345 SAP;

16th Guards SD - 63 TPP (14 KV, 13 SU-152) and 348 SAP.

In the zone of the last two divisions, it was also planned to use minesweeper tanks - T-34 with a trawl from the 148th Tank Engineer Regiment. In the second echelon there was a regiment of flamethrower tanks. In a word, it was planned to ram positional defenses using the latest technical means. In general, equipping the 11th Guards with armored vehicles. army contrasts markedly with the neighboring 5th Army, primarily in terms of quality - ISs, KVs and heavy self-propelled guns.

Paired with the 11th Guards. The army was supposed to attack one of the “losers” of the winter battles - the 31st Army. Like a number of other formations in the Western direction, the 31st Army received a new commander - Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant General V.V. Glagolev. In this case, this was not a formal promotion - previously V.V. Glagolev commanded the 46th Army of the 3rd Ukrainian Front. General Glagolev did not have an academic education, only academic courses; he met the war as the commander of a cavalry division. From 1941 to May 1944 he fought in the southern sector of the front - in the Crimea and the Caucasus. It was difficult to call him a specialist in positional battles.

However, the 31st Army received the task of breaking through a strong positional front in the new operation. According to the plan, the 31st Army, with the forces of six rifle divisions, struck on both banks of the river. The Dnieper in the direction of Dubrovna, Orsha and then advanced on Vorontsevichi and Vydritsa. The army's immediate task was to break through the enemy's defenses in the Kireev sector (exclusively, the village itself fell within the zone of the 11th Guards Army), Zagvazdino. By the end of the first day it was planned to capture Dubrovno, and by the end of the third day - Orsha.

The 71st Rifle Corps was to attack north of the Dnieper, and the 36th Rifle Corps to the south. The width of the breakthrough front of the 71st Rifle Corps was about 4 km. The combat formation of the corps was built in two echelons: in the first - the 88th and 331st rifle divisions, in the second - the 192nd rifle division. The 36th Corps had the task, with the forces of the 220th and 352nd Rifle Divisions (both in the first echelon), to break through the enemy’s defenses on the front of the left bank of the Dnieper, the village of Zastenok Yuryev; The width of the breakthrough site was 6 km.

The strength of V.V. Glagolev's army formations was characterized by the following figures (as of June 20, 1944):

36 sk 220 sd – 6881 people, 173 sd – 6055 people, 352 sd – 6921 people;

71 sk 88 sd – 5798 people, 192 sd – 5758 people, 331 sd – 7073 people;

113 sk 62 sd – 4856 people, 174 sd – 4602 people.

It is clearly visible that the best-quality formations were deployed to break through the defense. However, in general, the strength of the 31st Army is not impressive, especially the 71st Rifle Corps, aimed at positional defense with a rifle division strength of less than 6 thousand people. The rifle formations of the 31st Army were maintained according to the above-mentioned state No. 04/550.

For direct infantry support, V.V. Glagolev’s army was assigned one tank brigade and several self-propelled artillery regiments (shown as of 24.00 06/22/44 161
TsAMO RF. F. 241. Op. 2658. D. 45. L. 60.

213th Tank Brigade (34 T-34, 12 T-60-70, 3 SU-122, 4 SU-76);

1445th SAP 2 °SU-152;

926, 927 and 959th SAPS with 21 SU-76 each.

The tank brigade was supposed to be used in the zone of the 71st Rifle Corps. Also subordinate to the 31st Army was the 52nd armored train division (2 armored trains).

Concluding the story about the combined arms armies of the 3rd Belorussian Front, it should be noted that the previously mentioned letter from I. A. Tolkonyuk “at the top” was carefully read and responded to. Thus, the front command requested 400 light and 500 heavy machine guns from the GAU as a replenishment. The GAU supplied 1000 light and 700 heavy machine guns, i.e. 250% and 140% of the request 162
TsAMO RF. F. 81. Op. 12079. D. 204. L. 8.

At the same time, for the remaining weapons positions, the application was satisfied by 60-100%.

11th Guards the army was supposed to pave the road to Borisov for the 5th Guards. tank army of P. A. Rotmistrov. For the first time in many months, almost a year, a tank army class unification appeared in the Western strategic direction. In the winter campaign, tank armies were involved in Ukraine, where there were appropriate conditions for them, first of all, there was no positional front that would be lethal for tanks.

5th Guards The tank army of P. A. Rotmistrov at that time was not the strongest of the tank armies. It consisted of two (the strongest numbered three) corps, both of which were tank corps. The size of the army is shown in the table.

The numerical composition of armored vehicles of the 5th Guards. tank army on June 22, 1944163
TsAMO RF. F. 241. Op. 2658. D. 25. Lll. 391–392.

The rather motley composition of the army is clearly visible, and there were no T-34-85 tanks in P. A. Rotmistrov’s army at that moment. If necessary, the SU-85 was supposed to repel attacks by “tigers” and “panthers”, as well as artillery - the army had 12 85-mm cannons and 36 57-mm ZIS-2 cannons. Speaking about the artillery of the 5th Guards. tank army, it should be noted that it included a howitzer artillery regiment of 24 122-mm howitzers. This, of course, was significantly weaker than the artillery regiment of the average German tank division, but still a noticeable step forward from arming independent mechanized formations with only 76 mm artillery, RA combat vehicles and mortars. Another feature of the combat composition of the 5th Guards. tank army, which I would like to draw attention to are 29 U-2 aircraft for communications and reconnaissance. They were used for communication with front headquarters and partially with corps.

Having mentioned the U-2 biplanes in the tank army of P. A. Rotmistrov, we smoothly moved from the kings of the land front to the rulers of the fifth ocean. The 1st Air Army was inherited by the 3rd Belorussian Front from the Western Front during its disintegration in the spring of 1944. At that time, the army was commanded by one of the most famous Soviet pilots, Hero of the Soviet Union M. M. Gromov, who began flying in the tsarist army, and before the war, he flew across the North Pole on an ANT-25 and set one of the range records. However, with all the desire, it is difficult to call him an experienced specialist specifically in the combat use of the Air Force. He headed the air force (air division) only from the end of 1941. Before that, he did not even command an air regiment, being engaged in test and instructor work. Already in July 1944, Gromov left the post of commander of the air army and headed the Main Directorate of Combat Training of Front-line Aviation.

On June 1, 1944, the 1st Air Army consisted of only four air divisions: the 303rd Fighter, 311th Attack, 3rd Guards Bomber and 213th Night Bomber. In total, the army had several more than 400 aircraft, including 120 fighters, 80 attack aircraft, 80 day bombers and 80 night bombers. This was an impressive number of aircraft for 1942, but it was difficult to carry out a large offensive operation with such a composition in the realities of 1944. Therefore, shortly before the start of the operation, the 1st Air Army was additionally transferred to large forces of strike and fighter aircraft. Three fighter air corps were transferred to the army (1st Guards IAK, 2nd 164
Consists of 51 Yak-1, 81 Yak-9, 120 La-5.

And 3rd 165
It consists of 258 Yak-1 and Yak-9 aircraft.

IAK) and the 240th IAD (109 Yak-9, 3 Yak-7b, 12 Yak-1), one attack air corps (3rd ShAK) and 1st Guards. ShAD, one bomber air corps (1st Guards BAC, two air divisions, 170 Pe-2 aircraft), two bomber air divisions (6th Guards BAC consisting of 63 Pe-2 and 39 A-20 Boston, 113- I DBAD as part of 90 IL-4). The latter (113th DBAD) was a unique three-regiment air force of its kind, armed with Il-4 bombers. Despite their large carrying capacity, these aircraft were a “sitting duck” for German fighters and therefore were more often used in Long-Range Aviation at night. The experience of using them in the summer of 1943 as part of the 113th Air Division during the counteroffensive near Kursk was not very successful. The use of Il-4 and DB-3 in June 1941 in Belarus to attack advancing German mechanized units was practically suicidal. However, in the summer of 1944, the situation in the air changed and the conditions for using the strike power of the Il-4 promised to be much more favorable than in 1941 and 1943.

The Belarusian Front is a union of Soviet troops that was first created on September 11, 1939, and was intended to defend the territory of Western Belarus.

The meaning of the word "front"

The word “front” in military science has different meanings. In ordinary life, the word “front” means “area of ​​military operations.” That is, this is the place where warring states come into contact with each other.

Military science interprets the word “front” as the largest military formation, which includes various military units. The front includes infantry and tank armies, artillery corps, and separate battalions of troops, for example, engineering and repair ones.

During the Second World War, such formations did not have numbers, but had names, for example, Belorussian Front,.

The reason for the creation of this front was the attack on Poland by German troops. Therefore, it was decided that it was necessary to begin strengthening the border near Poland, the deployment of district field offices began, and the reserve began to be mobilized.

Before the outbreak of hostilities, the force was fully equipped, and the front strength was 200,000 people. On September 17, 1939, Soviet troops crossed the border and occupied part of Polish territory.

First Belarusian Front

In 1944, a new formation of troops received the title of the First Belarusian Front. This happened on February 24th. The new front appeared on the basis of a directive from the Supreme Command Headquarters; it included: 3, 10, 47, 48, 60, 61, 65, 69, 70 combined arms armies; 16th and 6th air armies; 8th Guards, etc.

In 1944, military formations of this front conducted military operations in Belarus. Then Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovsky, a famous military leader whose career began during the Civil War, was appointed commander-in-chief of the Belarusian Front. Colonel General M. S. Malinin became the chief of staff.

Rokossovsky developed a plan for an offensive operation with the goal of defeating the enemy troops. On June 22, 1944, the victorious march of Soviet troops to the west began. This operation dealt a crushing blow to the forces of the German fascists.

Commanders of the 1st Front:

• Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky;
• marshal

Second Belarusian Front

This front was created on April 24, 1944 based on an order from Headquarters. It included: 33, 47, 49 combined arms armies; 4, 6 air armies, 1.5 guards tank armies, etc. At the beginning of the summer, troops of this front carried out a major strategic operation in Bobruisk, during which significant parts of the enemy were destroyed.

The spring of 1944 was marked by local battles. Our troops launched a major offensive on June 23. At the end of June Mogilev was liberated, and in July Minsk. August and November were marked by battles for the liberation of Western Belarus, as well as the fight against the Nazis in Eastern Poland. After this, their task was to liberate Berlin.

On April 16, the Oder River was taken under control by Soviet troops, and on May 19, the same army liberated the Danish island of Bornholm.

Commanders of the 2nd Front:

• Colonel General P.A. Kurochkin;
• Colonel General I.E. Petrov;
• Army General G.F. Zakharov;
• marshal

Third Belarusian Front

This front was formed on April 24, 1944. It was originally called the Western Front. It consisted of the 5th, 31st, and 39th combined arms armies. 1 air, 5 guards tank, etc. Conducted the Vilnius and Kaunas operations of 1944, the Gumbinnen and Koenigsberg operations. Task of the 3rd front: in January - April 1945, the East Prussian strategic operation was carried out, and as a result, in April they occupied the fortress and the city of Koenigsberg. The front was disbanded on August 15, 1945, and the Baranovichi Military District was created in its place.

Commanders of the 3rd Front:

• army General ;
• marshal;
• General of the Army I.Kh. Bagramyan.