It says that things without an expiration date (books, ideas, technologies, etc.) for each successfully lived day in the human world add a day to the duration of their existence. For example, we can assume that the car will be with us for about 250 years. In terms of forecasting, the theory is controversial, but its practical application is extremely elegant.
The effect is most clearly manifested in literature, where great works can become popular years after they were written (hello to Faulkner’s “The Sound and the Fury”).
Encouraging you to read the most ancient literature you can find, I will introduce you to several quotes from the treatise on the art of war, “The Art of War,” by the Chinese commander and sage Sun Tzu. The purpose of writing this article is to show that the ancients had fundamental knowledge that can and should be applied in modern life.
In general, business development is similar to military strategy. At the head of the company is a commander who leads the army towards a single goal through hostile external factors. In this regard, Sun Tzu’s practical recommendations are extremely relevant. So...
1. About creativity
Control your army so that in battle with the enemy the warriors do not see the possibility of defeat. To do this, you need to alternate direct actions with unusual ones. In war, direct actions are used to unite, and victory is achieved through unusual actions. One must be inexhaustible in the search for paths, like the strong flows of great rivers. Before the war, make sure to make all the appointments. Whoever already clearly sees the interaction of the tortuous and the straight in the plan will win. This is how they gain superiority.The combination of an empirically proven approach combined with innovation and creativity gives maximum results in capturing the market. Proven business methods minimize the risks of failure at the start and create a pragmatic foundation that will not collapse when exposed to threats. At the same time, “unusual actions” make a company stand out from the crowd.
From the point of view of the barbell theory, described in the book of the American economist Nassim Taleb "Antifragile" (a must read for everyone), 80% of the activity should be devoted to something permanent and stable, while 20% should belong to venture activity, which has a small chance for extremely effective results.
2. On the need for comprehensive information
Whoever calculates more wins more. Whoever calculates less wins less. What can we say about someone who doesn’t calculate anything at all? From this point of view, it is always clear who will win and who will lose.
3. On the importance of analysis and purposeful movement
The winners first win and then go to war, while the vanquished first attack and then seek victory. Don't act without benefit. Don't move without seeing your prey. Take useful actions. If you don't see the benefit, don't act. Be sure that you will not be defeated in a hundred battles out of a hundred if you understand both yourself and the enemy equally. When, without understanding the enemy, you clearly see your own state of affairs, for every victory there will be one defeat. If you do not understand either the enemy or yourself, there will be defeat in every battle.
4. About risk management and saving resources
If the country dies, you cannot bring it back. You cannot resurrect from the dead. No one has anything extra, not because they don’t like good things. Nobody expects longevity, not because they don’t want to live long. Always be prepared for any threat. Avoid a strong opponent.
When creating a business, it is necessary to carefully study vulnerabilities
5. About managing people
There can be three threats from a ruler to his own army: Not understanding that it is impossible to attack, he orders an attack. Not understanding that retreat is impossible, he orders a retreat. Thus, he deprives the army of freedom of action. Without understanding the internal life of the army, he interferes in the administration, causing discord in the souls of the soldiers. Not understanding the order of distribution of responsibilities among positions, the ruler interferes in appointments, sowing confusion in the minds of the soldiers. If there is turmoil and discord in the souls and minds, do not expect help from there in difficult times. This is called: giving victory to the enemy by sowing confusion in your army. The ruler, without limiting the freedom of action of an intelligent commander, confidently moves towards victory.
6. About competition
An indicator of the highest art of war will be victory over the enemy without fighting him. The perfect warrior will strike according to plans. At a lower level, they destroy enemy alliances. At the lowest level, fortresses are besieged. The siege of fortresses is a forced action. For a siege, you need to build barrier shields, battering machines, and prepare the necessary weapons and equipment. All this will take three months. Three more months to build siege towers. If, having lost patience, they rush into an assault without preparation, a third of the soldiers will die, and the fortress will not be taken.
Victory without fighting means that the company does not have to fight a competitor on its field. “Beating the idea” means fighting within the ideologies of companies, realizing the dominance of the “idea” of your product over the idea of a competitor. “The siege of a fortress” can be interpreted as the lowest level of competition. That is, within the details of the implementation of similar elements in a competitive product. To create a product better than a competitor's that performs the same functions as a competitor's, you will have to spend an incredible amount of resources, and the chance of winning will be low. This position on doing business is perfectly revealed in the book “Rework” by Jason Fried and David Hensson.
7. On solving complex problems
To cope with large numbers, you need to act through small ones. This is the essence of dividing numbers.
I used this quote to refer to an equally significant treatise from antiquity. Lao Tzu, "Book of Truth and Power":
The hard part consists of a lot of easy steps. And the Great consists of a large number of small parts. Difficulties need to be dealt with. The greatest problems must be solved by taking small actions that make up these problems, influencing their simple components. That is why wise people do not do any great things, but their achievements are great.
Decomposition of complex processes is our everything. Short-term planning, achieving small goals and maximum control over activities are the vintage key to successful project completion.
If you would like to become more familiar with the libraries of our ancestors, then I can consider myself a successful man and, in turn, I would advise you to read the immortal Machiavellian “The Prince” and the cherry on the Japanese battle cake, “The Book of Five Rings” by Miyamoto Musashi.
I hope this was helpful. If the community likes it, I will further expand on the topic of parallels between the knowledge of the past and the present.
Thank you for your attention.
Of all the Seven Canons of War, Sun Tzu's Military Strategy, traditionally known as the Art of War, is the most widely adopted in the West. First translated by a French missionary about two centuries ago, it was constantly studied and used by Napoleon, and perhaps by some members of the Nazi High Command. Over the past two millennia, it remained the most important military treatise in Asia, where even ordinary people knew its name. Chinese, Japanese, and Korean military theorists and professional soldiers were sure to study it, and many of the strategies played an important role in the legendary military history of Japan, starting from the 8th century. For more than a thousand years, the book's concept has generated continuous discussion and passionate philosophical debate, attracting the attention of highly influential figures in various fields. Although the book has been translated into English many times, and the translations of L. Giles and S. Griffith have not lost their significance to this day, new ones continue to appear.
Sun Tzu and text
It has long been believed that The Art of War is China's oldest and most profound military treatise, and all other books are second-rate at best. Traditionalists attributed the book to the historical figure Sun Wu, whose activity was active at the end of the 6th century. BC, starting from 512 BC, recorded in the "Shi Chi" and in the "Springs and Autumns of Wu and Yue". According to them, the book should date from this time and contain the theories and military concepts of Sun Wu himself. However, other scholars, firstly, identified numerous historical anachronisms in the surviving text, such as: terms, events, technologies and philosophical concepts; secondly, they emphasized the absence of any evidence (which should have been in the Zuo Zhuan, the classic chronicle of political events of that time) confirming the strategic role of Sun Wu in the wars between Wu and Yue; and, thirdly, they paid attention to the discrepancy between the concept of large-scale war discussed in The Art of War, on the one hand, and, on the other, remembered only as an atavism of the battle of the late 6th century. BC.
The traditional interpretation sees significant evidence of its correctness in the fact that numerous passages from The Art of War can be found in many other military treatises, which, it is proven, could not have happened if the text had not been earlier. It is even believed that such widespread imitation means that The Art of War is the earliest military treatise, valued above any other work, oral or written. The emergence of some analytical concepts, such as the classification of localities, is also associated with Sunzi; further, their use by the compilers of Sima Fa is considered indisputable evidence of the historical primacy of Sunzi, and the possibility that Sunzi himself proceeded from other works is not taken into account.
However, even if one discounts the likelihood of later developments and changes, the traditional position still ignores the fact that warfare dates back more than two thousand years and that tactics existed before 500 BC. and credits the actual creation of the strategy to Sunzi alone. The condensed, often abstract nature of its passages is cited as evidence that the book was composed at an early stage in the development of Chinese writing, but an equally compelling argument can be made that such a philosophically sophisticated style is only possible with experience of combat and a tradition of serious military study. . Basic concepts and general passages are more likely to speak in favor of a vast military tradition and progressive knowledge and experience than in favor of "creation from nothing."
With the exception of the outdated position of skeptics who considered the work a late fake, there are three points of view on the time of creation of The Art of War. The first attributes the book to the historical figure Sun Wu, believing that the final edition was made shortly after his death at the beginning of the 5th century. BC. The second, based on the text itself, attributes it to the middle - second half of the Warring Kingdoms period; that is, by the 4th or 3rd centuries. BC. The third, also based on the text itself, as well as on previously discovered sources, places it somewhere in the second half of the 5th century. BC. It is unlikely that the true date will ever be established, for traditionalists are extremely emotional in defending the authenticity of Sunzi. However, it is likely that such a historical figure existed, and Sun Wu himself not only served as a strategist and possibly a commander, but also compiled the outline of the book that bears his name. Then, the most essential things were passed down from generation to generation in the family or school of the closest students, being corrected over the years and becoming increasingly widespread. The earliest text was probably edited by Sun Tzu's famous descendant Sun Bin, who also made extensive use of his teachings in his Military Techniques.
The Shi Ji contains biographies of many outstanding strategists and generals, including Sunzi. However, "Spring and Autumn of Wu and Yue" offers a more interesting option:
“In the third year of Helu Wang’s reign, the generals from Wu wanted to attack Chu, but no action was taken. Wu Zixu and Bo Xi said to each other: “We are preparing warriors and crews on behalf of the ruler. These strategies will be beneficial to the state, and therefore the ruler must attack Chu. But he does not give orders and does not want to gather an army. What should we do?"
After some time, the ruler of the Wu kingdom asked Wu Zixiu and Bo Xi: “I want to send an army. What do you think about this?” Wu Zixu and Bo Xi replied, “We would like to receive orders.” Lord Wu secretly believed that the two harbored a deep hatred for Chu. He was very afraid that these two would lead an army only to be destroyed. He climbed the tower, turned his face to the south wind and sighed heavily. After some time, he sighed again. None of the ministers understood the ruler’s thoughts. Wu Zixu guessed that the ruler would not make a decision, and then recommended Sunzi to him.
Sunzi, named Wu, was from the kingdom of Wu. He excelled in military strategy, but lived far from the court, so the common people did not know about his abilities. Wu Zixu, being knowledgeable, wise and insightful, knew that Sunzi could penetrate the ranks of the enemy and destroy him. One morning, when he was discussing military affairs, he recommended Sunzi seven times. Ruler Wu said, “Since you have found an excuse to nominate this husband, I want to see him.” He asked Sunzi about military strategy, and every time he laid out this or that part of his book, he could not find enough words to praise.
Very pleased, the ruler asked: “If possible, I would like to subject your strategy to a small test.” Sunzi said, "It is possible. We can carry out the test with the help of the women from the inner palace." The ruler said: “I agree.” Sunzi said: "Let your Majesty's two favorite concubines lead two divisions, each leading one." He ordered all three hundred women to put on helmets and armor, carry swords and shields, and line up. He taught them the rules of war, that is, to go forward, retreat, turn left and right, and turn around in accordance with the beat of the drum. He reported the prohibitions and then ordered: “With the first beat of the drum, you must all gather, with the second beat, advance with weapons in your hands, with the third, line up in battle formation.” Here the women covered their mouths with their hands and laughed.
Sunzi then personally took up the chopsticks and beat the drum, giving orders three times and explaining them five times. They laughed as before. Sunzi realized that the women would continue to laugh and would not stop.
Don't lose it. Subscribe and receive a link to the article in your email.
"Art of War. The Laws of War of the Venerable Teacher Sun" is the most famous ancient Chinese treatise on the topic of military strategy and politics, the fundamental text of the "school of military philosophy." This treatise was used in warfare by such generals as Vo Nguyen Giap and Takeda Shingen, and is also used in military training in the US Army, including the Navy.
The author of the treatise is the strategist and military leader Sun Tzu. Initially, the treatise was dated to the end of the 6th - beginning of the 5th centuries BC, but after its expanded version was discovered in a burial at the beginning of the Han era in 1972, some researchers began to believe that it was created in the second half of the 5th BC . In any case, this treatise is a very important historical document, and it is great happiness that today every person has the opportunity to familiarize themselves with it.
Sun Tzu is a Chinese thinker and strategist who presumably lived in the 6th century BC. He served as a mercenary commander of Prince Ho Lu, who ruled in the kingdom of Wu, and managed to defeat the strongest kingdom of Chu and capture its capital city of Ying, as well as defeat the kingdoms of Jin and Qi. It was the merits of Sun Tzu that made the kingdom of Wu very powerful and allowed it to become part of civilized China.
Fulfilling the request of Prince Ho Lu, Sun Tzu wrote a treatise on the art of war, “The Art of War. The laws of war of the venerable teacher Sun,” after which he returned to his native kingdom of Qi, where he lived the rest of his days. By the way, many years later, members of the Sun clan - Sun Quan, Sun Ce and Sun Jian, who lived during the era of the Three Kingdoms, claimed descent from Sun Tzu.
Summary of the treatise “The Art of War. The laws of war of the venerable teacher Sun"
The treatise consists of thirteen chapters, each of which is devoted to a specific aspect of warfare. Below you can read some provisions of several sections of the treatise.
Preliminary calculations
War is an extremely important process in the life of any state, and in order to come to an understanding of its prospects, it is necessary to understand its five components and answer seven questions.
The five components of war are:
- “The Way” is the attitude of the people towards their ruler, trust in him, readiness to die for him. This includes human resources and that the ruler has
- “Sky” is the time that the warring party has at its disposal
- “Earth” - the disadvantages and advantages that the terrain provides the commander
- “Commander” - troops, his courage, impartiality and intelligence
- “Law” is everything directly related to troops: training, level of officers, etc.
Questions to answer:
- Which ruler has the most pronounced “Path”?
- Which commander can be called talented?
- Which generals already have experience in using “Heaven” and “Earth”?
- Whose army is the most disciplined?
- Whose army is better trained?
- Which commander better understands what is happening in his troops: who deserves a reward and who should be punished?
Waging war
In the process of waging war, it is necessary to conduct the most careful work, both obvious and transport, repair, and household. It is important to understand what harm should be expected from war in order to be able to assess the benefits that war will bring.
If the war drags on, then all the warring parties will suffer losses. A competent commander, who was able to correctly calculate the needs, recruits soldiers only once and stocks up with provisions.
Strategic attack
Battle and victory are far from the best that a ruler can do for his state, and it is much more competent to win a victory by avoiding battle altogether. It is most effective to preserve the enemy’s state and its armed forces. The victorious without destruction, sieges and battles can count on much more than he originally had.
A ruler who controls an army can turn out to be a big problem for the entire state. And victory can be won if the commander knows how to choose the moment for battle and the moment when it needs to be avoided, is able to conduct battles using both large and small armies, knows how to wait and take advantage of the enemy’s negligence, and is able to independently control the army.
Form
It is important to be able to distinguish between victory and invincibility. Invincibility is the ability to preserve oneself, and therefore depends on the one who intends to be invincible. The ability to win is influenced by the enemy, based on which there are no guaranteed victories. Victory is associated with offense, and invincibility is associated with defense.
A smart leader initially calculates everything, and only after that enters into battle - this is the predetermination of his victory. An illiterate leader initially enters into battle, and only after that discusses what needed to be done to win - this is a predetermination of defeat.
Power
It is not so important whether the leader controls small detachments or numerous armies; the correct conduct of battle and the effectiveness of maneuver are much more important. If the battle is conducted correctly, an effective maneuver will be ensured, ensuring victory, because There are a great variety of combat options.
It is also important to take into account the power and degree of timing of the blow. Power is the collection and control of force, and calculation is the purpose. During a fight, power must correspond to the changing situation, and timing guarantees a lightning-fast attack.
Fullness and Emptiness
The one who finds himself on the battlefield before the enemy saves a huge amount of strength, and the leader who sends troops into battle immediately after the end of the march will have to control a tired army, even if before that it was stronger than the enemy’s army.
The strong must be weakened, those who have provisions, the strengthened must be forced to move. To disorient the enemy, you must initially move in the direction in which he expects, and then change direction and go a different way. Even if there is no ambush along the long route, the army will arrive at the battlefield full of strength.
An effective attack requires attacking an unprotected area. Effective defense requires defending a place that is not attacked. When the enemy does not know where to attack and where to defend, he will scatter his forces.
Fight in the war
The struggle in time of war is difficult, and the most difficult thing in it is the ability to take advantage of disaster, and turn a roundabout way into a direct one. When moving along a roundabout path, it is necessary to distract the enemy, luring him with benefits, thereby forcing him to slow down. Fighting during war is dangerous, because trying to gain profit can lead to losses, and an army that does not have supplies is likely to die.
The importance of information cannot be overstated. If you do not know the intentions of potential allies, you should not enter into an agreement with them. If you do not know the situation and the terrain, it is impossible to send troops and achieve advantages on the ground.
Five dangers
Terrain features must always be taken into account. There is no need to set up a camp in the center of the off-road; there is no need to stand for a long time where there is no water, forest or natural shelter. In places where many paths connect, it is necessary to enter into alliances with neighbors in order to prevent a surprise attack on any of the paths.
The five dangers of a commander are:
- The desire to die at any cost - the commander can be killed
- The desire to survive at all costs - the commander can be captured
- - the commander may begin to despise
- Excessive sensitivity - a commander may be offended by too many things
- Excessive philanthropy - a commander can quickly become exhausted
These dangers are not just shortcomings of the commander, but also a disaster for the entire army.
Instead of a conclusion
Of course, we have mentioned only a few of the ideas that he talks about in his treatise “The Art of War. The laws of war of the venerable teacher Sun" Sun Tzu. But this has its advantage - the desire to study this unique work becomes even stronger, and this is far from accidental.
Two and a half thousand years is a long time for any book. And the book that has been used as a textbook by various people throughout this time is truly a unique case, unless, of course, we consider the various sacred scriptures. But even with them, “The Art of War” can compete in popularity - every paragraph of this book hides the invaluable experience of an outstanding philosopher and commander, which can be useful not only in war, but also in ordinary peaceful life.
“There was a man who had only 30,000 troops and no one in the Celestial Empire could resist him. Who is this? I answer: Sun Tzu.”
According to the Notes of Sima Qian, Sun Tzu was the commander of the Principality of Wu during the reign of Prince Ho-lui (514-495 BC). It is to the merits of Sun Tzu that the military successes of the Principality of Wu are attributed, which brought his prince the title of hegemon. According to tradition, it is generally accepted that it was for Prince Kho-lyu that the “Treatise on the Art of War” was written (500 BC).
Sun Tzu's treatise had a fundamental influence on the entire military art of the East. Being the first of all treatises on the art of war, Sun Tzu's treatise is constantly cited by military theorists of China from Wu Tzu to Mao Tse-tung. A special place in the military theoretical literature of the East is occupied by commentaries on Sun Tzu, the first of which appeared in the Han era (206 BC - 220 AD), and new ones continue to be created to this day , although Sun Tzu himself did not bother to accompany his treatise with examples and explanations.
Of all the Seven Canons of War, Sun Tzu's "Military Strategy", traditionally known as the "Art of War", has received the most widespread use in the West. First translated by a French missionary about two centuries ago, it was constantly studied and used by Napoleon, and perhaps by some members of the Nazi High Command. Over the past two millennia, it remained the most important military treatise in Asia, where even ordinary people knew its name. Chinese, Japanese, and Korean military theorists and professional soldiers were sure to study it, and many of the strategies played an important role in the legendary military of Japan, starting from the 8th century.
The Art of War has long been considered to be China's oldest and most profound military treatise. However, even if we ignore the likelihood of later developments and changes, we cannot ignore the fact that there is more than two thousand years of history of warfare and the existence of tactics before 500 BC. and attribute the actual creation of the strategy to Sun Tzu alone. The condensed, often abstract nature of its passages is cited as evidence that the book was composed at an early stage in the development of Chinese writing, but an equally compelling argument can be made that such a philosophically sophisticated style is only possible with experience of combat and a tradition of serious military study. . Basic concepts and general passages are more likely to speak in favor of a vast military tradition and progressive knowledge and experience than in favor of "creation from nothing."
Currently, there are three points of view about the time of creation of The Art of War. The first attributes the book to the historical figure Sun Wu, believing that the final edition was made shortly after his death at the beginning of the 5th century. BC. The second, based on the text itself, attributes it to the middle - second half of the period of the “Warring Kingdoms” (IV or III centuries BC). The third, also based on the text itself, as well as on previously discovered sources, places it somewhere in the second half of the 5th century. BC.
It is unlikely that the exact date will be established, however, it is likely that such a historical figure existed, and Sun Wu himself not only served as a strategist and possibly a commander, but also compiled the outline of the book that bears his name. Then, the most essential things were passed down from generation to generation in the family or school of the closest students, being corrected over the years and becoming increasingly widespread. The earliest text was probably edited by Sun Tzu's famous descendant Sun Bin, who also made extensive use of his teachings in his Methods of War.
Sun Tzu is mentioned in many historical sources, including the Shih Chi, but Spring and Autumn of Wu and Yue offers a more interesting version:
“In the third year of Helu Wang’s reign, the generals from Wu wanted to attack Chu, but no action was taken. Wu Zixu and Bo Xi said to each other: “We are preparing warriors and crews on behalf of the ruler. These strategies will be beneficial for the state, and therefore the ruler must attack Chu. But he does not give orders and does not want to raise an army. What should we do? " After some time, the ruler of the kingdom of Wu asked Wu Zixiu and Bo Xi: “I want to send an army. What do you think about this? Wu Zixu and Bo Xi replied, "We would like to receive orders." Lord Wu secretly believed that the two harbored a deep hatred for Chu. He was very afraid that the two would lead an army only to be destroyed. He climbed the tower , turned his face to the south wind and sighed heavily. After some time, he sighed again. None of the ministers understood the ruler’s thoughts. Wu Zixu guessed that the ruler would not make a decision, and then recommended Sun Tzu to him.
Sun Tzu, named Wu, was from the kingdom of Wu. He excelled in military strategy, but lived far from the court, so the common people did not know about his abilities. Wu Zixu, being knowledgeable, wise and insightful, knew that Sun Tzu could penetrate the ranks of the enemy and destroy him. One morning, when he was discussing military matters, he recommended Sun Tzu seven times. Ruler Wu said, “Since you have found an excuse to nominate this husband, I want to see him.” He asked Sun Tzu about military strategy and every time he laid out this or that part of his book, he could not find enough words to praise him. Very pleased, the ruler asked: “If possible, I would like to subject your strategy to a small test.” Sun Tzu said: “It is possible. We can conduct an inspection with the help of the women from the inner palace.” The ruler said: “I agree.” Sun Tzu said: “Let your Majesty’s two favorite concubines lead two divisions, each leading one.” He ordered all three hundred women to put on helmets and armor, carry swords and shields, and line up. He taught them the rules of war, that is, to go forward, retreat, turn left and right, and turn around in accordance with the beat of the drum. He reported the prohibitions and then ordered: “With the first beat of the drum, you must all gather, with the second beat, advance with your hands, with the third, line up in battle formation.” Here the women covered their mouths with their hands and laughed. Sun Tzu then personally took up the chopsticks and beat the drum, giving orders three times and explaining them five times. They laughed as before. Sun Tzu realized that women would continue to laugh and would not stop. Sun Tzu was furious. His eyes were wide open, his voice was like the roar of a tiger, his hair stood on end, and the strings of his cap were torn at his neck. He said to the Master of Laws: “Bring the executioner’s axes.”
[Then] Sun Tzu said: “If the instructions are not clear, if the explanations and orders are not trusted, then it is the commander’s fault. But when these instructions are repeated three times, and the orders are explained five times, and the troops still do not carry them out, then it is the fault of the commanders. According to military discipline, what is the punishment?” The legal expert said, “Beheading!” Then Sun Tzu ordered the heads of the commanders of the two divisions, that is, the ruler’s two favorite concubines, to be cut off.
Lord Wu went onto the platform to watch as his two favorite concubines were about to be beheaded. He hastily sent the official down with the order: “I realized that a commander can control troops. Without these two concubines, food will not be a joy for me. It's better not to behead them." Sun Tzu said: “I have already been appointed commander. According to the rules for generals, when I command an army, even if you give orders, I can carry them out.” [And beheaded them].
He hit the drum again, and they moved left and right, forward and backward, turning around in a circle according to the prescribed rules, not even daring to squint. The units were silent, not daring to look around. Sun Tzu then reported to Lord Wu: “The army is already obeying well. I ask Your Majesty to take a look at them. Whenever you want to use them, even make them go through fire and water, it will not be difficult. They can be used to put the Celestial Empire in order.”
However, Ruler Wu was unexpectedly dissatisfied. He said, “I know that you lead the army excellently. Even if this makes me the hegemon, there will be no room for them to train. Commander, please disband the army and return to your place. I don't want to continue." Sun Tzu said: “Your Majesty loves only words, but cannot comprehend the meaning.” Wu Zixu exhorted: “I heard that the army is a thankless task and should not be randomly inspected. Therefore, if one forms an army but does not launch a punitive campaign, the military Tao will not manifest itself. Now, if Your Majesty is sincerely looking for talented people and wants to gather an army in order to punish the cruel kingdom of Chu, become the hegemon in the Celestial Empire and intimidate the appanage princes, unless you appoint Sun Tzu as commander-in-chief, who can cross the Huai, cross the Si and walk a thousand to join the battle?
Then Ruler Wu became inspired. He ordered the beating of drums to assemble the army headquarters, summoned the troops and attacked Chu. Sun Tzu took Shu, killing two defecting generals: Kai Yu and Zhu Yong."
The biography contained in the Shi Ji further states that “in the west, he defeated the powerful kingdom of Chu and reached Ying. In the north he intimidated Qi and Jin, and his name became famous among the appanage princes. This happened due to the power of Sun Tzu."
After 511 BC Sun Tzu was never mentioned in written sources either as a commander-in-chief of troops or as a courtier. Apparently, Sun Tzu, being a purely military man, did not want to participate in the court political games of that time and lived away from palace intrigues and chroniclers.
Translation from English completed P. A. Samsonov according to the publication: “THE ART OF WAR” / by Sun Tzu. Comments Lionel Giles
© Translation. Edition in Russian. Decor. Potpourri LLC, 2015
* * *
Chapter I
Preliminary calculations
[Tsao Kung, commenting on the meaning of the hieroglyphs used in the original title of this chapter, says that we are talking about the thoughts of the commander in the temple allocated to him for temporary use - in a camp tent, as we would say now (see paragraph 26).]
1. Sun Tzu said: “War is the most important matter for the state.”
2. This is a matter of life and death, this is the path to salvation or destruction. Therefore, it must be studied without neglecting anything.
3. The basis of the art of war is laid by five constant factors that must be taken into account when determining your combat readiness.
4. These are: (1) Moral Law, (2) Heaven, (3) Earth, (4) General, (5) Order and Discipline.
[From the following it follows that by Moral Law Sun Tzu understands the principle of harmony, something similar to what Lao Tzu calls Tao (Way) in its moral aspect. There is a temptation to translate this concept as “fighting spirit,” if in paragraph 13 this was not mentioned as a necessary quality of a sovereign.]
5, 6. The moral law is when the people are in complete agreement with the sovereign, ready to follow him regardless of any dangers, and give their lives for him.
7. The sky is night and day, cold and heat, it is the passage of time and the seasons.
[Commentators, I think, needlessly get lost here in two pines. Meng Shi interprets Heaven as “hard and soft, expanding and falling.” However, Wang Xi is probably right when he believes that we are talking about the “heavenly economy as a whole,” which includes the five elements, four seasons, wind and clouds and other phenomena.]
8. Earth is distances, far and near, it is danger and safety, open areas and narrow passages, chances to survive and die.
9. A commander is wisdom, justice, philanthropy, courage and severity.
[For the Chinese, the five cardinal virtues are: humanism, or philanthropy; honesty; self-respect, decency, or "right feeling"; wisdom; justice, or sense of duty. Sun Tzu puts “wisdom” and “justice” ahead of “philanthropy”, and “honesty” and “decency” are replaced by “courage” and “rigor”, which are more appropriate in military affairs.]
10. Order and discipline are the organization of the army, the order of military ranks, the maintenance of roads and the management of supplies.
11. Every commander should know about these five factors: whoever knows them wins, whoever doesn’t know them loses.
12. Therefore, when you evaluate combat conditions, these five factors should serve as a basis for comparison as follows:
13. (1) Which of the two princes is endowed with the Moral Law?
[that is, “is in harmony with his subjects” (cf. paragraph 5).]
(2) Which of the two generals is more capable?
(3) On whose side are the advantages of Heaven and Earth?
[(See paragraphs 7, 8.)]
(4) In whose army is discipline stricter?
[The Du Mu in this connection mention the remarkable story of Cao Cao (155–220 CE), who was such a disciplinarian that he sentenced himself to death for violating his own orders not to let his crops be poisoned, when his war horse, fearfully shying away, trampled the corn. However, instead of cutting off his head, he satisfied his sense of justice by shaving his hair. Cao Cao's own commentary on this story is quite laconic: “When you issue an order, see that it is carried out; if the order is not carried out, the offender must be executed."]
(5) Whose army is stronger?
[Both physically and mentally. In Mei Yaochen's free interpretation it sounds like this: “High morale and numerical superiority.”]
(6) Whose commanders and soldiers are better trained?
[Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzu: “Without constant practice, commanders will become nervous and hesitant when going into battle; even a military leader without constant practice will hesitate and doubt at critical moments.”]
(7) In whose army are they justly rewarded and punished?
[Where people are absolutely confident that their services will be fairly rewarded and their crimes will not go unpunished.]
14. Based on these seven indicators, I can predict who will win and who will lose.
15. The commander who listens to my advice and uses it will certainly win - and he must be left in command! The same commander who does not listen to my advice or does not want to use it must be removed!
[The very form of this paragraph reminds us that Sun Tzu wrote his treatise specifically for his patron He Lu, the ruler of the kingdom of Wu.]
16. Benefit from my advice, take advantage of any favorable circumstances that go beyond the usual rules.
17. Plans should be adjusted depending on the circumstances that are favorable.
[Sun Tzu acts here not as a theorist, not as a “bookworm,” but looks at things from a practical point of view. He warns us against dogmatism, against excessive preoccupation with abstract principles. As Zhang Yu says, “although the basic laws of strategy must be known and respected, in a real battle, the most favorable positions must be taken taking into account the enemy’s response.” On the eve of the Battle of Waterloo, Lord Uxbridge, commanding the cavalry, came to the Duke of Wellington to find out what his plans and calculations were for the next day, since, as he explained, the situation might suddenly turn so that at a critical moment he would have to take over the supreme command . Wellington calmly listened to him and asked: “Who will attack first tomorrow, me or Bonaparte?” “Bonaparte,” replied Uxbridge. “Well, know that Bonaparte did not notify me of his plans, and since my plans directly depend on his plans, how can I tell you what my plans are?”]
18. Every war is based on deception.
[The truth and depth of these words is recognized by any soldier. Colonel Henderson states that Wellington, an outstanding military leader in all respects, was particularly distinguished for his "extraordinary ability to conceal his movements and deceive both friend and enemy."]
19. Therefore, when you are able to attack, show yourself incapable; when you move forward, pretend that you are standing still; when you are close, show as if you are far away; when you are far away, show that you are close.
20. Lure the enemy by feigning disruption in your ranks and crush them.
[All commentators, with the exception of Zhang Yu, write this: “When the enemy is upset, destroy him.” This interpretation seems more natural if we assume that Sun Tzu continues here to give examples of the use of deception in the art of war.]
21. If he is confident in his abilities, be ready; if he is stronger, dodge him.
22. If your opponent has a violent temper, try to piss him off. By adopting a humble appearance, induce self-conceit in him.
[Wang Tzu, quoted by Du Yu, says that a good tactician plays with the enemy like a cat with a mouse, first feigning weakness and immobility, and then striking a sudden blow.]
23. If his strength is fresh, tire him out.
[The meaning is probably this, although Mei Yaochen interprets it slightly differently: “When resting, wait until the enemy is exhausted.”]
If his forces are united, separate them.
[The interpretation proposed by most commentators seems less convincing: “If the sovereign and the people are united, create discord between them.”]
24. Attack him when he is not ready; perform when he doesn't expect it.
25. All these military tricks leading to victory cannot be disclosed in advance.
26. The winner is the military leader who makes these numerous calculations in his temple on the eve of the battle.
[Zhang Yu reports that in ancient times it was the custom to assign a special temple to a military leader going on a military campaign so that he could calmly and thoroughly prepare a plan for the campaign.]
The one who doesn’t make calculations in advance loses. He who counts a lot wins; whoever counts little does not win; Moreover, the one who doesn’t count at all loses. So for me, this factor alone is enough to predict who will win and who will lose.
Chapter II
Waging war
[Cao Kung has a note: “Whoever wants to fight must first count the costs.” This statement indicates that this chapter is not exactly about what you might expect from the title, but rather about resources and tools.]
1. Sun Tzu said: “If you went to war with a thousand fast and as many heavy chariots and a hundred thousand soldiers,
[Fast or light chariots, according to Zhang Yu, were used for attack, and heavy ones for defense. Li Chuan, however, holds the opposite opinion, but his point of view seems less likely. It is interesting to note the analogy between the ancient Chinese military equipment and the Greek of the time of Homer. For both, war chariots played an important role; each served as the core of the detachment, accompanied by a certain number of infantry. We are informed that one fast chariot was accompanied by 75 foot-soldiers, and a heavy one by 25 foot-soldiers, so that the whole army may be divided into a thousand battalions, each consisting of two chariots and a hundred foot-soldiers.]
and provisions must be sent a thousand li,
then the expenses, internal and external, expenses for entertaining guests, material for varnish and glue, equipment for chariots and weapons, will amount to a thousand ounces of silver per day. That’s how much it costs to raise an army of one hundred thousand.”
2. If you are waging a war and victory is delayed, then the weapon becomes dull and enthusiasm fades. If you besiege a fortress for a long time, your strength becomes exhausted.
3. Again, if the campaign is delayed, there are not enough state resources.
4. When the weapon becomes dull and enthusiasm fades, strength is exhausted and resources dry up, other princes, taking advantage of your weakness, will rise up against you. And then even the wisest person will not be able to prevent the consequences of this.
5. Therefore, although there is unreasonable haste in war, slowness is always unreasonable.
[This laconic and difficult-to-translate phrase has been commented on by many, but no one has given a satisfactory explanation. Cao Kung, Li Chuan, Meng Shi, Du Yu, Du Mu and Mei Yaochen interpret the author's words to mean that even the most naturally stupid commander can achieve victory through sheer speed of action. Ho Chi says: “Haste may be stupid, but in any case it allows you to save strength and resources, while the most reasonable, but time-drawn military operations bring only troubles.” Wang Xi avoids difficulties with the following maneuver: “A long campaign means that the soldiers grow old, resources are used up, the treasury is empty, the people become poorer. Thus, the one who avoids these troubles is truly wise.” Zhang Yu says: “Foolish haste, if it brings victory, is preferable to reasonable leisure.” But Sun Tzu says nothing of the kind, and perhaps only indirectly from his words one can conclude that ill-considered haste is better than well-thought-out but too long operations. He speaks much more carefully, only hinting that, although haste in some cases may be unreasonable, excessive slowness cannot bring anything but harm - at least from the point of view that it entails the impoverishment of the people. When thinking about the question raised by Sun Tzu here, the classic story of Fabius Cunctator inevitably comes to mind. This commander deliberately tried to starve out Hannibal's army, avoiding skirmishes and believing that a long stay in a foreign country would more likely exhaust the enemy army than his own. But whether his tactics were successful in the long term is debatable. Yes, it is true that the exact opposite tactics followed by the military leaders who replaced Fabius resulted in a heavy defeat at Cannes, but this does not at all prove the correctness of his tactics.]
6. It has never happened before that a protracted war has benefited the state.
7. Therefore, only those who are able to fully understand all the evils caused by war can fully understand all the benefits of war.
[This is again about timing. Only those who understand the disastrous consequences of a protracted war can understand how important a quick victory is. It seems that only two commentators agree with this interpretation, but it is the one that fits well into the logic of the context, while the interpretation “He who does not fully understand all the harm from war cannot appreciate all the benefits from war” seems completely out of place here. ]
8. A skilled commander does not recruit recruits a second time and does not load carts with provisions more than twice.
[When war is declared, a skilled commander does not waste precious time waiting for reinforcements and does not return with the army for fresh supplies, but immediately crosses the border and invades enemy territory. Such a policy may seem too adventurous to recommend, but all great strategists, from Julius Caesar to Napoleon Bonaparte, valued time. It is the ability to get ahead of the enemy that is much more important than numerical superiority or some other staff calculations.]
9. Take military equipment from home, but take provisions from the enemy. And then your army will not remain hungry.
[What is translated here from the Chinese phrase “military equipment” literally means “that which is used” and can be understood in the broadest sense. This includes all equipment and property of the army, with the exception of provisions.]
10. The poverty of the state treasury forces the army to provide supplies from afar. Due to the need to supply a far-flung army, the people become poorer.
[The beginning of this phrase does not agree with the subsequent text, although it should. Moreover, the construction of the sentence is so clumsy that I can't help but suspect that the original text is corrupted. It never seems to have occurred to the Chinese commentators that the text needs correction, and therefore no help can be expected from them. The words Sun Tzu used indicate a supply system in which the peasants directly supplied food to the army. But why are they given such a responsibility - if not because the state is too poor to do this?]
11. On the other hand, the proximity of the army leads to an increase in prices, due to which the people's funds are depleted.
[Wang Xi says that price increases occur before the army leaves its territory. Cao Kung understands this to mean that the army has already crossed the border.]
12. When the people’s funds are depleted, it becomes increasingly difficult for the peasants to fulfill the duties assigned to them.
13, 14. When funds are exhausted and strength fails, people's houses become bare and three-tenths of their income is taken away.
[Du Mu and Wang Xi are unanimous that taxes are not 3/10, but 7/10 of income. But this hardly follows from the text. Ho Chi has a characteristic statement on this subject: “If PEOPLE are considered a necessary part of the state, and FOOD is a necessary means of subsistence for people, shouldn’t the government value people and take care of food for them?”]
The government's expenses in the form of broken chariots and driven horses, expenses on armor and helmets, bows and arrows, spears, shields and mantlets, on oxen and carts reach four-tenths of the gross income.
15. Therefore, a smart commander tries to feed himself at the expense of the enemy. Moreover, one cart of provisions received from the enemy is equivalent to twenty carts of one’s own provisions, and one picul of forage captured from the enemy is equivalent to twenty piculs of forage from one’s own reserves.
[This is because the army will have time to consume twenty wagons of provisions before one wagon reaches the front line from its homeland. A pikul as a unit of mass is equal to 133.3 pounds (65.5 kilograms).]
16. In order for our warriors to kill their enemies, they need to be instilled with rage; in order for them to have an interest in defeating the enemy, they must receive their reward.
[Du Mu says: “Soldiers must be rewarded to motivate them to win, so any loot taken from the enemy should be used to reward the warriors so that they will remain willing to fight and risk their lives.”]
17. If ten or more chariots are captured during a chariot battle, distribute them as a reward to those who captured them. Change their banners and use these chariots with yours. Treat captured soldiers well and take care of them.
18. This is called increasing your strength at the expense of a defeated enemy.
19. Thus, the goal of war should be a quick victory, and not a long campaign.
[Ho Chi remarks: “War is no joke.” Sun Tzu here once again repeats the main thesis to which this chapter is devoted.]
20. Therefore, we must understand that the fate of the people, the prosperity or death of the state depends on the commander.
Chapter III
Stratagems
1. Sun Tzu said: “In the practical art of war it is best to capture the enemy's country safe and sound; ruining and destroying it would be worse. It is also better to capture the enemy’s army entirely than to destroy it; to capture a regiment, battalion or company intact than to destroy them.”
[According to the Sima Fa, the army corps in the Chinese army consisted of nominally 12,500 troops; a military unit corresponding to a regiment, according to Tsao Kung, consisted of 500 soldiers, the size of a unit corresponding to a battalion ranged from 100 to 500 people, and the size of a company could range from 5 to 100 people. However, Zhang Yu gives more specific figures for the last two: 100 and 5 people, respectively.]
2. Therefore, the highest art of war is not to fight and win every battle, but to overcome enemy resistance without fighting.
[And here again, any modern strategist will readily confirm the words of the ancient Chinese commander. Moltke's greatest success was the surrender of the huge French army at Sedan, achieved with virtually no bloodshed.]
3. Thus, the greatest form of generalship is to thwart the enemy's plans;
[Perhaps the word “prevent” does not quite convey all the shades of the corresponding hieroglyph; it does not imply a defensive approach, adhering to which you are content only with exposing and nullifying all the enemy’s military tricks one after another, but an active counter-attack. Ho Chi says this very clearly: “When the enemy plans to attack us, we must anticipate his actions by attacking first.”]
in second place - to prevent the union of enemy forces;
[You must isolate the enemy from his allies. It should not be forgotten that when speaking of enemies, Sun Tzu always means the numerous states or principalities into which China was fragmented at that time.]
then there is an attack on the enemy army in an open field;
[When the enemy is already at full strength.]
and the worst option is the siege of fortresses.
4. General rule: it is better not to besiege a fortress if it can be avoided.
[Another wisdom of military theory. If the Boers had known this in 1899 and not wasted their forces besieging Kimberley, Mafeking or even Ladysmith, they would have had a much better chance of taking control of the situation before the British were strong enough to resist them.]
Preparing mantels, mobile shelters and other equipment for waging a siege will take a full three months;
[There is no complete clarity regarding the hieroglyph translated here as "mantlets". Tsao Kung defines them simply as “large shields,” but Li Chuan clarifies that they were designed to protect the heads of those who attack the fortress walls. Apparently, we are talking about an analogue of the ancient Roman “turtle”. Du Mu believes that these were wheeled mechanisms designed to repel attacks, but Chen Hao disputes this (see above Chapter II, paragraph 14). The same hieroglyph is applied to the turrets on the fortress walls. As for “mobile shelters,” we have a fairly clear description given by several commentators. These were wooden structures on wheels, driven from the inside and used to enable the soldiers of the attacking army to approach the ditch surrounding the fortress and fill it up. Du Mu adds that such mechanisms are now called “wooden donkeys.”]
and another three months will be required to build earthen embankments opposite the fortress walls.
[They were poured to the height of the walls for reconnaissance purposes, to discover weak points in the enemy’s defenses, as well as to destroy the aforementioned defensive turrets.]
5. A commander who cannot control his impatience sends soldiers to attack like ants;
[This vivid comparison is given by Tsao Kung, vividly imagining an army of ants crawling along a wall. The idea is that the general, losing patience with the long delay, may launch an assault before all the siege weapons are ready.]
in this case, a third of the soldiers die, and the fortress remains untaken. Such are the disastrous consequences of a siege.
[From the most recent events, one can recall the terrible losses the Japanese suffered during the siege of Port Arthur.]
6. Therefore, he who knows how to wage war conquers another's army without fighting; takes other people's fortresses without besieging them; crushes a foreign state without keeping his army on the march for a long time.
[Jia Lin notes that such a conqueror only overthrows the government of the enemy state, but does not harm the people. A classic example is Wu Wang, who put an end to the Yin Dynasty and was hailed as the “Father and Mother of the People.”]
7. Having kept his forces intact, he has grounds to claim power over the entire Empire and can thus achieve complete triumph without losing a single man.
[Due to the ambiguity of the original Chinese text, this phrase can be given a completely different meaning: "And thus the weapon is not dulled and remains perfectly sharp."]
This is the stratagem method of warfare.
8. The rule of war is: if you have ten times more forces than the enemy, surround him on all sides; if you have five times more strength, attack him;
[That is, without waiting for reinforcements and any additional advantages.]
if you have twice the strength, divide your army in two.
[Du Mu disagrees with this thesis. And indeed, at first glance it seems to go against the fundamental principles of military art. Cao Kung, however, helps to understand what Sun Tzu really means: “Having two troops against one enemy, we can use one of them as a regular army, and the second for sabotage operations.” Zhang Yu expands on this theme further: “If our forces are twice as large as the enemy’s, they should be divided in two, so that one part of the army attacks the enemy from the front, and the second from behind. If the enemy responds to an attack from the front, he can be crushed from behind; if he turns back, he can be crushed from the front. This is what Cao Kung means when he says that “one army should be used as a regular army, and the second should be used for sabotage operations.” Du Mu does not understand that dividing the army is a non-standard strategic method (the standard is concentration of forces), and hastily calls it a mistake.”]
9. If the forces are equal, we can fight;
[Li Chuan, followed by Ho Chi, paraphrase it this way: “If the strength of the attackers and defenders are equal, the more capable commander wins.”]
if our forces are somewhat inferior to those of the enemy, we can avoid battle;
[The option “we can OBSERVE the enemy” sounds much better, but, unfortunately, we have no serious reason to consider this a more accurate translation. Zhang Yu reminds that what has been said only applies to the situation when other factors are equal; the slight difference in troop numbers is often more than counterbalanced by higher morale and stricter discipline.]
if the forces are not equal in all respects, we can escape.
10. Although those who persist may fight with small forces, they are eventually defeated by a stronger enemy.
11. A commander is like a bastion of the state. If it is strengthened on all sides, the state is strong, but if there are weak points in the bastion, the state turns out to be weak.
[As Li Chuan succinctly puts it, “If a general's ability is flawed, his army will be weak.”]
12. An army suffers from its sovereign in three cases:
13. (1) When he orders an army to march or retreat, not knowing that it is unable to carry out the order. Thus he puts the army in a difficult position.
[Li Chuan adds this comment: “It is like tying the legs of a stallion so that he cannot gallop.” The idea suggests itself that we are talking about a sovereign who remains at home and tries to lead the army from a distance. However, commentators understand this in the opposite sense and quote Tai-kung: “Just as a country cannot be controlled from the outside, so an army cannot be controlled from within.” Of course, it is true that when an army comes into direct contact with the enemy, the commander should not be in the thick of things, but must observe what is happening from the side. Otherwise, he is doomed to misunderstand the whole situation and give erroneous orders.]
14. (2) When he tries to lead the army the same way he runs the country, without understanding the peculiarities of army service. This causes ferment in the minds of the soldiers.
[Here is Cao Kung's commentary, freely translated: “The military and civil spheres are completely different; You can’t run an army with white gloves.” And here’s what Zhang Yu says: “Humanism and justice are the principles of governing a country, but not an army. On the other hand, opportunism and flexibility are virtues of military rather than civil service."]
15. (3) When he is indiscriminate in the appointment of commanders,
[That is, does not exercise sufficient caution when assigning people to various command positions.]
because he does not know the military principle of adaptation to circumstances. This throws the army into confusion.
[Here I follow Mei Yaochen. Other commentators do not mean the sovereign, as in paragraphs. 13 and 14, and the commanders appointed by him. Thus, Du Yu says: “If the commander does not understand the principle of adaptability, he cannot be trusted with such a high position.” And Du Mu quotes: “An experienced employer will hire a wise man, a brave man, a greedy man and a foolish man. For the wise man strives for rewards, the brave man is glad to show his prowess in action, the greedy man is quick to take advantage of the advantages he has achieved, and the foolish man is not afraid of death.”]
16. When the army becomes confused and confused, it is overtaken by misfortune from other appanage princes. As a result, we simply plunge our army into anarchy and give victory to the enemy.
17. Thus, we know five necessary rules for a victorious war: (1) he who knows when it is better to fight and when it is better not to do so wins;
[Zhang Yu says: those who can fight advance, and those who cannot, retreat and take up defense. The one who knows when to attack and when to defend inevitably wins.]
(2) the winner is the one who knows how to use superior forces and what to do when forces are few;
[This is not only about the commander’s ability to correctly estimate the number of troops, which Li Chuan and others point to. Zhang Yu gives a more convincing interpretation: “By using the art of war, one can defeat superior forces with fewer forces. The secret is to choose the right place for the fight and not miss the most opportune moment. As the Wu Tzu teaches, when you have superior forces, choose flat terrain, but when your forces are small, choose rough terrain that is difficult to move.”]
(3) the one in whose army the highest and lowest ranks are moved by the same spirit wins;
(4) the winner is the one who, being prepared himself, takes the enemy by surprise;
(5) the winner is the one who has military leadership talent and whom the sovereign does not interfere with leading the army.
[Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzu: “The function of a sovereign is to give general instructions, but to make decisions on the battlefield is the function of a general.” There is no need to enumerate how many catastrophes there have been in the history of wars, caused by the unreasonable interference of civil rulers in the affairs of generals. One of the factors in Napoleon's success was, without a doubt, the fact that no one dominated him.]
18. That is why it is said: if you know the enemy and know yourself, success is guaranteed to you in a hundred battles. If you know yourself, but do not know the enemy, victories will alternate with defeats.
[Li Chuan gives the example of Fu Jian, the ruler of the state of Qin, who in 383 AD. e. went with a huge army on a campaign against the Jin Emperor. When he was warned against an arrogant attitude towards the enemy army, which was led by such generals as Xie An and Huan Chong, he boastfully replied: “Behind me are the population of eight provinces, infantry and cavalry, totaling up to a million. Yes, they can dam the Yangtze River just by throwing their whips there. What should I be afraid of? However, very soon his army suffered a crushing defeat at the Fei River, and he was forced to hastily retreat.]
If you don’t know either the enemy or yourself, you will lose in every battle.
[Zhang Yu said: “When you know the enemy, you can attack successfully; when you know yourself, you can defend yourself successfully. Attack, he adds, is the secret of successful defense; defense is planning an offensive.” It is difficult to think of a more laconic and successful description of the fundamental principle of the art of war.]
Translation from Chinese and commentary by British sinologist Lionel Giles (1875–1958). He held the position of head of the department of oriental manuscripts and books of the British Museum. He is best known for his translations of Sun Tzu's Treatise on the Art of War (1910) and Confucius's Analects.
