Karyagin Pavel Mikhailovich - without exaggeration great person, concurrently a talented colonel, commander of the seventeenth regiment of chasseurs during the war between the Russians and the Persians. Our people do not often remember the feat of the detachment under his leadership, but this is a considerable contribution to history.
On May 14, 1805, the two parties entered into an agreement called Korekchay. Subsequently, this treaty, Russia included the Karabakh Khanate in its composition.
Raid Karyagin
Naturally, the Persians were not going to put up with this, therefore, after waiting for the right moment, they decided to return what was taken away. The period chosen for revenge was really successful, since at that time Russia directed all its forces to the confrontation with the French. Angry attackers, whose number reached forty thousand people, rushed to Arakas. Then the regiment under the command of Lisanevich tried to defend the border, which eventually had to retreat in anticipation of reinforcements. To help him, the king sent a detachment of Karyagin of five hundred people. That's where it all started...
Legendary battle with the Persians
The fight was long and fierce. As a result of the Persian attack on the Karkarchay River, the detachment lost two hundred soldiers. For the Russian side, this was a significant loss.
Colonel Karyagin
And later, after enemy shelling, only one hundred and fifty people could continue the battle. Soberly assessing the possibilities of 150 people against tens of thousands, in truth, it would be worth leaving the battlefield and retreating.
But, as they say, Russians don't give up! It was decided to take the enemy by cunning, attacking one of his fortresses (Shahbulag). The plan was successfully put into practice, but our people there were blocked by the Persians for two weeks. At that moment, Karagin decided to negotiate the alleged surrender in order to win at least some time, and then he fled and settled in the Mukhrat fortress to continue the battle.
As a result, the Persians were driven away, and the confrontation ended there. Karyagin was awarded a golden sword - a symbol of valor and honor, and the surviving soldiers received a salary. So history shows that even if the enemy is hundreds of times stronger, wisdom and intelligence will always help to win a well-deserved victory.
COLONEL KARYAGIN'S CAMPAIGN
(summer 1805)
At a time when the glory of the emperor of France Napoleon was growing on the fields of Europe, and the Russian troops fighting against the French were performing new feats for the glory of Russian weapons, on the other side of the world, in the Caucasus, the same Russian soldiers and officers performed no less glorious deeds. One of the golden pages in the history of the Caucasian wars was written by the colonel of the 17th Chasseur Regiment Karyagin and his detachment.
The state of affairs in the Caucasus in 1805 was extremely difficult. The Persian ruler Baba Khan was eager to regain the lost influence of Tehran after the arrival of the Russians in the Caucasus. The impetus for the war was the capture by the troops of Prince Tsitsianov Ganzha. Because of the war with France, St. Petersburg could not increase the strength of the Caucasian Corps; by May 1805, it consisted of about 6,000 infantry and 1,400 cavalry. Moreover, the troops were scattered over a vast territory. Due to illness and poor nutrition, there was a large shortage, so according to the lists in the 17th Jaeger Regiment, there were 991 privates in three battalions, in fact there were 201 people in the ranks.
Having learned about the appearance of large Persian formations, the commander of the Russian troops in the Caucasus, Prince Tsitsianov, ordered Colonel Karyagin to delay the advance of the enemy. On June 18, the detachment set out from Elisavetpol to Shusha, with 493 soldiers and officers and two guns. The detachment included: the patron battalion of the 17th Jaeger Regiment under the command of Major Kotlyarevsky, the company of the Tiflis Musketeer Regiment of Captain Tatarintsov and the artillerymen of Lieutenant Gudim-Levkovich. At that time, Major of the 17th Jaeger Regiment Lisanevich was in Shusha with six companies of rangers, thirty Cossacks and three guns. On July 11, Lisanevich's detachment repulsed several attacks of the Persian troops, and soon an order was received to join the detachment of Colonel Karyagin. But, fearing an uprising of a part of the population and the likelihood of the Persians capturing Shusha, Lisanevich did not do this.
On June 24, the first battle took place with the Persian cavalry (about 3,000) who crossed the Shah-Bulakh River. Several attacks of the enemy who tried to break through the square were repulsed. Having passed 14 versts, the detachment camped at the mound of the Kara-Agach-BaBa tract on the river. Askaran. In the distance one could see the tents of the Persian armada under the command of Pir-Kuli Khan, and this was only the vanguard of the army, commanded by the heir to the Persian throne, Abbas Mirza. On the same day, Karyagin sent a demand to Lisanevich to leave Shusha and go to him, but the latter, due to the difficult situation, could not do this.
At 18.00 the Persians began to storm the Russian camp, the attacks continued with a break until the very night. Having suffered heavy losses, the Persian commander withdrew his detachments to the heights around the camp, and the Persians installed four false batteries to conduct shelling. From the early morning of July 25, the bombardment of our location began. According to the memoirs of one of the participants in the battle: “Our situation was very, very unenviable and was getting worse hour by hour. The unbearable heat exhausted our strength, thirst tormented us, and shots from enemy batteries did not stop ... ". 1) Several times the Persians offered the commander of the detachment to lay down their arms, but they were invariably refused. In order not to lose the only source of water on the night of June 27, a sortie was made by a group under the command of Lieutenant Klyupin and Lieutenant Prince Tumanov. The operation to destroy the enemy batteries was successfully carried out. All four batteries were destroyed, the servants were partly killed, partly fled, and the falconets were thrown into the river. It must be said that by this day 350 people remained in the detachment, and half had wounds of varying severity.
From the report of Colonel Karyagin to Prince Tsitsianov dated June 26, 1805: “Major Kotlyarevsky was sent by me three times to drive out the enemy who was ahead and occupied elevated places, drove away his strong crowds with courage. Captain Parfyonov, Captain Klyukin throughout the battle on various occasions were sent by me with fittings and hit the enemy with fearlessness.
At dawn on June 27, the attack on the camp was launched by the approaching main forces of the Persians. The attacks continued throughout the day. At four o'clock in the afternoon there was an incident that forever remained a black spot in the glorious history of the regiment. Lieutenant Lisenko and six lower ranks ran over to the enemy. Having received information about the plight of the Russians, Abbas Mirza threw his troops into a decisive assault, but having suffered heavy losses, he was forced to abandon further attempts to break the resistance of a desperate handful of people. At night, another 19 soldiers ran across to the Persians. Realizing the gravity of the situation, and the fact that the transition of comrades to the enemy creates unhealthy moods among the soldiers, Colonel Karyagin decides to break through the encirclement, go to the river. Shah Bulakh and take a small fortress standing on its shore. The commander of the detachment sent a report to Prince Tsitsianov, in which he wrote: “... in order not to subject the remnant of the detachment to complete and final death and save people and guns, he made a firm decision to break through with courage through the numerous enemy who surrounded from all sides ... ". 2)
The conductor in this desperate enterprise was a local resident, an Armenian Melik Vani. Leaving the convoy and burying captured weapons, the detachment moved on to a new campaign. At first they moved in complete silence, then there was a collision with the enemy's cavalry and the Persians rushed to catch up with the detachment. True, even on the march, attempts to destroy this wounded and mortally tired, but still the battle group did not bring good luck to the Persians, moreover, most of the pursuers rushed to rob the empty Russian camp. According to legend, the castle Shah-Bulakhbal was built by Shah Nadir, and got its name from the stream that flowed nearby. In the castle there was a Persian garrison (150 people) under the command of Emir Khan and Fial Khan, the suburbs occupied enemy posts. Seeing the Russians, the sentries raised the alarm and opened fire. Shots of Russian guns rang out, a well-aimed cannonball smashed the gate, and the Russians broke into the castle. In a report dated June 28, 1805, Karyagin reported: “... the fortress was taken, the enemy was driven out of it and out of the forest with a small loss on our part. On the enemy side, both khans were killed ... Having settled in the fortress, I await the orders of your excellency. By evening, there were only 179 people in the ranks, and 45 charges for guns. Upon learning of this, Prince Tsitsianov wrote to Karyagin: “In unheard-of despair, I ask you to back up the soldiers, and I ask God to back you up.” 3)
Meanwhile, our heroes suffered from lack of food. The same Melik Vani, whom Popov calls the "Good genius of the detachment", volunteered to get supplies. The most surprising thing is that the brave Armenian did an excellent job with this task, the second operation also bore fruit. But the position of the detachment became more and more difficult, especially since the Persian troops approached the fortification. Abbas Mirza tried to drive the Russians out of the fortification on the move, but his troops suffered losses and were forced to go over to the blockade. Being sure that the Russians were trapped, Abbas-Mirza offered them to lay down their arms, but was refused.
From the report of Colonel Karyagin to Prince Tsitsianov dated June 28, 1805: “Lieutenant Zhudkovsky of the Tiflis Musketeer Regiment, who, despite the wound, volunteered to be a hunter when taking batteries and acted as a brave officer, and Lieutenant Gudim-Levkovich of the 7th Artillery Regiment, who, when almost all his gunners were wounded, he himself loaded the guns and knocked out the gun carriage under the enemy cannon.
Karyagin decides to take an even more incredible step, to break through the hordes of the enemy to the fortress of Mukhrat, unoccupied by the Persians. On July 7, at 22.00, this march began, a deep ravine with steep slopes arose on the way of the detachment. People and horses could overcome it, but the guns? Then Private Gavrila Sidorov jumped down to the bottom of the ditch, followed by a dozen more soldiers. The first gun, like a bird, flew to the other side, the second fell off and the wheel hit Private Sidorov in the temple. Having buried the hero, the detachment continued its march. There are several versions of this episode: “... the detachment continued to move, calmly and unhindered, until the two guns that were with it were stopped by a small ditch. There was no forest nearby to make a bridge; four soldiers volunteered to help the cause, crossed themselves in the ditch and carried the guns over them. Two remained alive, and two paid for their heroic self-sacrifice with their lives.
On July 8, the detachment came to Ksapet, from here Karyagin sent forward carts with the wounded under the command of Kotlyarevsky, and he himself moved after them. Three versts from Mukhrat, the Persians rushed to the column, but were repulsed by fire and bayonets. One of the officers recalled: “... but as soon as Kotlyarevsky managed to move away from us, we were brutally attacked by several thousand Persians, and their onslaught was so strong and sudden that they managed to capture both of our guns. This is no longer a thing. Karyagin shouted: "Guys, go ahead, save the guns!" Everyone rushed like lions, and immediately our bayonets opened the way. Trying to cut off the Russians from the fortress, Abbas-Mirza sent a cavalry detachment to capture it, but the Persians failed here too. The disabled team of Kotlyarevsky threw back the Persian horsemen. By evening, Karyagin also came to Mukhrat, according to Bobrovsky, this happened at 12.00.
Having received a report dated July 9, Prince Tsitsianov gathered a detachment of 2371 people with 10 guns and went out to meet Karyagin. On July 15, the detachment of Prince Tsitsianov, having driven back the Persians from the Tertara River, camped near the village of Mardagishti. Upon learning of this, Karyagin leaves Mukhrat at night and goes to connect with his commander.
Having made this amazing march, the detachment of Colonel Karyagin for three weeks attracted the attention of almost 20,000 Persians and did not allow them to go deep into the country. For this campaign, Colonel Karyagin was awarded a golden sword with the inscription "for courage". Pavel Mikhailovich Karyagin has been in the service since April 15, 1773 (Smolensk Coin Company), since September 25, 1775, a sergeant of the Voronezh Infantry Regiment. Since 1783, he was a lieutenant of the Belarusian Jaeger Battalion (1st Battalion of the Caucasian Jaeger Corps). Member of the storming of Anapa June 22, 1791, received the rank of major. Head of defense of Pambak in 1802. Chief of the 17th Jaeger Regiment since May 14, 1803. For the assault on Ganja, he was awarded the Order of St. George, 4th degree.
Major Kotlyarevsky awarded the order St. Vladimir of the 4th degree, the surviving officers of the Order of St. Anna of the 3rd degree. Avanes Yuzbashi (melik Vani) was not left without a reward, he was promoted to ensign and received 200 silver rubles in a lifetime pension. The feat of private Sidorov in 1892, in the year of the 250th anniversary of the regiment, was immortalized in a monument erected at the headquarters of the Erivans Manglise.
Notes and sources.
1)
. Popov K. Temple of Glory Paris 1931, vol. I, p. 142.
2)
. Popov K. Decree. op., p.144.
3)
. Bobrovsky P.O. History of the 13th Life Grenadier Erivan Regiment of His Majesty for 250 years St. Petersburg 1893., vol. III, p. 229.
4)
. Popov K. Decree op., p.146.
5)
. Viskovatov A. The exploits of the Russians beyond the Caucasus in 1805 // Northern Bee 1845, 99-101.
6)
. Library for reading / / Life of a Russian nobleman in different eras of his life, St. Petersburg 1848., v.90., p.39.
At a time when the glory of the emperor of France Napoleon was growing on the fields of Europe, and the Russian troops fighting against the French were performing new feats for the glory of Russian weapons, on the other side of the world, in the Caucasus, the same Russian soldiers and officers performed no less glorious deeds. One of the golden pages in the history of the Caucasian wars was written by the colonel of the 17th Chasseur Regiment Karyagin and his detachment.
The state of affairs in the Caucasus by 1805 was extremely difficult. The Persian ruler Baba Khan was eager to regain the lost influence of Tehran after the arrival of the Russians in the Caucasus. The impetus for the war was the capture by the troops of Prince Tsitsianov Ganzha.
The moment was chosen extremely well: Petersburg could not send a single extra soldier to the Caucasus. In one of the reports to the emperor, Prince Tsitsianov complained about the lack of troops to fulfill the will of the monarch to capture the Erivan and Baku khanates during the spring and autumn of 1804. In May 1804, Tsitsianov undertook a campaign against the Erivan Khanate, for which Russia competed with Persia. The Persian Khan did not answer and in June 1804 sent a detachment there led by Abbas Mirza. After a series of clashes with the Persians, the assault on Erivan began. The literature describes a number of Russian exploits associated with these events, "the likes of which can only be found in the epic creations of Greece, and in the glorious Caucasian war of the times of Tsitsianov and Kotlyarevsky." For example, it is said about Major Nold, who, with 150 people, defended an earthen redoubt from the attacks of several thousand Persians and managed to defend it. After the arrival of Baba Khan with reinforcements of 15 thousand people, Tsitsianov retreated from Erivan to Georgia in late summer - early autumn, where the riots that had begun, moreover, demanded his presence.
Because of the war with France, St. Petersburg could not increase the strength of the Caucasian Corps; by May 1805, it consisted of about 6,000 infantry and 1,400 cavalry. Moreover, the troops were scattered over a vast territory. Due to illness and poor nutrition, there was a large shortage. So, according to the lists in the 17th Jaeger Regiment, there were 991 privates in three battalions - in fact, there were 201 people in the ranks.
In June 1805, the Persian prince Abbas Mirza launched an attack on Tiflis. In this direction, the Persians had a huge superiority in forces. Georgia faced the threat of a repetition of the massacre of 1795. Shah Baba Khan swore to massacre and exterminate all Russians in Georgia before last man. The campaign began with the fact that the enemy crossed the Arak at the Khudoperin crossing. The battalion of the 17th Jaeger Regiment, which was covering it, under the command of Major Lisanevich, was unable to hold back the Persians and retreated to Shusha. On the part of Erivan, its actions were limited only to the fact that on June 13 Mehdi Khan of the Qajar brought a three thousandth Persian garrison into the fortress and, having arrested the old ruler Mamed, he himself accepted the title of Erivan Khan.
Upon learning of the appearance of large Persian formations, the commander of the Russian troops in the Caucasus, Prince Tsitsianov, sent all the help that he could send (all 493 soldiers and officers with two guns, Karyagin, Kotlyarevsky (which is a separate story) and the Russian military spirit), ordering Colonel Karyagin stop the advance of the enemy. The strength of both detachments together, if they had managed to unite, did not exceed nine hundred people, but Tsitsianov knew the spirit of the Caucasian troops well, knew their leaders and was calm about the consequences.
The Shusha fortress lay only 80 versts from the Persian border and gave the enemy the opportunity to concentrate significant forces under its cover for action against Georgia. Disorders had already begun in Shusha, which broke out, of course, not without the participation of Persian politics, and Lisanevich clearly saw that in the absence of troops, treason could easily open the fortress gates and let the Persians in. And if the Persians occupied Shusha, then Russia would lose the Karabakh Khanate for a long time and would be forced to wage war on its own territory. Tsitsianov himself was aware of this.
So, on June 18, Karyagin's detachment set out from Elisavetpol to Shusha, having 493 soldiers and officers and two guns. The detachment included: the patron battalion of the 17th Jaeger Regiment under the command of Major Kotlyarevsky, the company of the Tiflis Musketeer Regiment of Captain Tatarintsov and the artillerymen of Lieutenant Gudim-Levkovich. At that time, Major of the 17th Jaeger Regiment Lisanevich was in Shusha with six companies of rangers, thirty Cossacks and three guns. On July 11, Lisanevich's detachment repulsed several attacks of the Persian troops, and soon an order was received to join the detachment of Colonel Karyagin. But, fearing an uprising of a part of the population and the likelihood of the Persians capturing Shusha, Lisanevich did not do this. Tsitsianov's fears were justified. The Persians occupied the Askaran castle and cut off Karyagin from Shusha.
On June 24, the first battle took place with the Persian cavalry (about 3,000) who crossed the Shah-Bulakh River. Not at all at a loss (at that time in the Caucasus, battles with less than a tenfold superiority of the enemy were not considered battles and officially took place in reports as "exercises in conditions close to combat"), Karyagin built an army in a square and continued to go his own way, until the evening repulsing the fruitless attacks of the Persian cavalry. Having traveled 14 versts, the detachment camped, the so-called wagenburg or, in Russian, a walk-city, when the defense line is lined up from carts (given the Caucasian off-road and the lack of a supply network, the troops had to carry significant supplies with them), at the mound (and Tatar cemetery) the Kara-Agach-Baba tract on the river. Askaran. Numerous tombstones and buildings (gyumbet or darbaz) were scattered on the hilly square, representing some protection from shots.
In the distance one could see the tents of the Persian armada under the command of Pir-Kuli Khan, and this was only the vanguard of the army, commanded by the heir to the Persian throne, Abbas Mirza. On the same day, Karyagin sent a demand to Lisanevich to leave Shusha and go to him, but the latter, due to the difficult situation, could not do this.
At 1800, the Persians began to storm the Russian camp, the attacks continued intermittently until the very night, after which they made a forced break for clearing piles of Persian bodies, funerals, crying and writing postcards to the families of the dead. The Persian losses were enormous. There were also losses on the part of the Russians. Karyagin held out at the cemetery, but it cost him one hundred and ninety-seven people, that is, almost half of the detachment. “Neglecting the large number of Persians,” he wrote to Tsitsianov on the same day, “I would make my way with bayonets to Shusha, but the great number of wounded people, whom I have no means to raise, makes it impossible for any attempt to move from the place I occupied.” By morning, the Persian commander withdrew his troops to the heights around the camp.
Military history does not offer many examples where a detachment, surrounded by a hundred times the strongest enemy, would not accept an honorable surrender. But Karyagin did not think to give up. True, at first he counted on help from the Karabakh khan, but soon this hope had to be abandoned: they learned that the khan had betrayed and that his son with the Karabakh cavalry was already in the Persian camp. Several times the Persians offered the commander of the detachment to lay down their arms, but they were invariably refused.
On the third day, June 26, the Persians, wanting to speed up the denouement, diverted water from the besieged and placed four falconet batteries over the river itself, which day and night shelled the walk-city. From that time on, the position of the detachment becomes unbearable, and losses quickly begin to increase. According to the memoirs of one of the participants in the battle: “Our situation was very, very unenviable and was getting worse hour by hour. The unbearable heat exhausted our strength, thirst tormented us, and shots from enemy batteries did not stop ... ". Karyagin himself, already shell-shocked three times in the chest and in the head, was wounded by a bullet through the side. Most of the officers also left the front, and there were not even a hundred and fifty soldiers left fit for battle. If we add to this the torments of thirst, unbearable heat, anxious and sleepless nights, then the formidable persistence with which the soldiers not only irrevocably endured incredible hardships, but still found enough strength in themselves to make sorties and beat the Persians becomes almost incomprehensible.
From the report of Colonel Karyagin to Prince Tsitsianov dated June 26, 1805: “Major Kotlyarevsky was sent by me three times to drive out the enemy who was ahead and occupied elevated places, drove away his strong crowds with courage. Captain Parfyonov, Captain Klyukin throughout the battle on various occasions were sent by me with fittings and hit the enemy with fearlessness.
In order not to lose the only source of water, on one of these sorties on the night of June 27, soldiers, under the command of Lieutenant Ladinsky (according to other information, Lieutenant Klyukin and Lieutenant Prince Tumanov), penetrated even to the Persian camp itself and, having mastered four batteries on Askoran, not only destroyed the batteries and obtained water, but also brought fifteen falconets with them. However, this did not save the situation. It must be said that by this day 350 people remained in the detachment, and half had wounds of varying severity.
The success of this sortie exceeded Karyagin's wildest expectations. He went out to thank the brave rangers, but, finding no words, ended up kissing them all in front of the whole detachment. Unfortunately, Ladinsky, who survived on enemy batteries while performing his daring feat, was seriously wounded by a Persian bullet the next day in his own camp.
For four days a handful of heroes stood face to face with the Persian army, but on the fifth day there was a shortage of ammunition and food. The soldiers ate their last crackers that day, and the officers had long been eating grass and roots. At dawn on June 27, the attack on the camp was launched by the approaching main forces of the Persians. The attacks continued throughout the day. In this extreme, Karyagin decided to send forty people to forage in the nearest villages so that they could get meat, and if possible, bread. At four o'clock in the afternoon there was an incident that forever remained a black spot in the glorious history of the regiment. The foraging team went under the command of an officer who did not inspire much confidence in himself. It was a foreigner of unknown nationality, calling himself the Russian surname Lisenkov (Lysenko); he was the only one of the entire detachment who was apparently weary of his position. Subsequently, from the intercepted correspondence, it turned out that it was indeed a French spy. Lieutenant Lisenko and six lower ranks ran over to the enemy.
By the dawn of the twenty-eighth, only six people from the sent team appeared - with the news that the Persians had attacked them, that the officer was missing, and the rest of the soldiers were hacked to death. Here are some details of the unfortunate expedition, recorded then from the words of the wounded sergeant major Petrov. “As soon as we arrived at the village,” Petrov said, “lieutenant Lisenkov immediately ordered us to pack up our guns, take off our ammunition and walk along the sacks. I reported to him that in the enemy's land it is not good to do this, because, not even the hour, the enemy may come running. But the lieutenant shouted at me and said that we had nothing to fear. I dismissed the people, and myself, as if sensing something unkind, climbed the mound and began to inspect the surroundings. Suddenly I see: the Persian cavalry is galloping ... “Well, I think, it’s bad!” I rushed to the village, and there were already Persians. I began to fight back with a bayonet, but meanwhile I shouted for the soldiers to rescue their guns as soon as possible. Somehow I managed to do it, and, having gathered in a heap, we rushed to make our way. “Well, guys,” I said, “strength breaks straw; run into the bushes, and there, God willing, we’ll also sit out!” - With these words, we rushed in all directions, but only six of us, and then wounded, managed to get to the bush. The Persians poked their nose at us, but we received them in such a way that they soon left us alone.
There are other versions of this event - Lysenko's betrayal. This was an officer who distinguished himself during the assault on Ganzha and in the battle on June 24, 1805, during the reflection of Pir-Kuli Khan, when Karyagin himself recommended him “especially”, just two days before his betrayal. In view of this, it seems more likely to allow Lysenko to be simply careless. It is noteworthy that there is no positive information about the further fate of Lysenko.
Having received information from defectors about the plight of the Russians, Abbas-Mirza threw his troops into a decisive assault, but, having suffered heavy losses, was forced to abandon further attempts to break the resistance of a desperate handful of people.
The fatal failure with foraging made a striking impression on the detachment, which lost here, from a small number of people left after the defense, thirty-five selected fellows at once. At night, another 19 soldiers ran across to the Persians.
But Karyagin's energy did not waver. Having fought another day, Karyagin began to suspect that he would not be able to kill the entire Persian army with 300 Russians. Realizing the gravity of the situation, and the fact that the transition of comrades to the enemy creates unhealthy moods among the soldiers, Colonel Karyagin decides to break through the encirclement, go to the river. Shah Bulakh and occupy a small fortress standing on its shore. The commander of the detachment sent a report to Prince Tsitsianov, in which he wrote: “... in order not to subject the remnant of the detachment to complete and final death and save people and guns, he made a firm decision to break through with courage through the numerous enemy who surrounded from all sides ... ".
The Armenian Yuzbash (melik Vani) undertook to be the guide of the detachment in this desperate enterprise. For Karyagin, in this case, the Russian proverb came true: "Throw bread and salt back, and she will find herself in front." He once did a great favor to one Elizabethan resident, whose son fell in love with Karyagin so much that he was always with him on all campaigns and, as we shall see, played a prominent role in all further developments. Another favorable factor was the lack of proper sentry service among the Persian troops, when at night their camp location was never guarded.
Leaving the convoy and burying the captured falconets, praying to God, they loaded the guns with grapeshot, took the wounded onto a stretcher and quietly, without noise, at midnight on the twenty-ninth of June, set out from the camp on a new campaign. Due to the lack of horses, the huntsmen dragged guns on straps. Only three wounded officers rode on horseback: Karyagin, Kotlyarevsky and Lieutenant Ladinsky, and even then because the soldiers themselves did not allow them to dismount, promising to pull out guns on their hands where necessary. And we will see further how honestly they fulfilled their promise.
At first they moved in complete silence, then there was a collision with the enemy's cavalry and the Persians rushed to catch up with the detachment. True, even on the march, attempts to destroy this wounded and mortally tired, but still battle group, did not bring good luck to the Persians. The impenetrable darkness, the storm, and especially the dexterity of the guide once again saved Karyagin's detachment from the possibility of extermination. Moreover, most of the pursuers rushed to rob the empty Russian camp. By daylight, he was already at the walls of Shah Bulakh, occupied by a small Persian garrison. According to the legends, the Shah-Bulakhbal castle was built by Shah Nadir, and got its name from the stream flowing nearby. In the castle there was a Persian garrison (150 people) under the command of Emir Khan and Fial Khan, the suburbs occupied enemy posts.
Taking advantage of the fact that everyone was still sleeping there, not thinking about the proximity of the Russians, Karyagin fired a volley of guns, broke the iron gates and, rushing to attack, captured the fortress ten minutes later. Its head, Emir Khan, a relative of the Persian crown prince, was killed, and his body remained in the hands of the Russians. The garrison fled. In a report dated June 28, 1805, Karyagin reported: “... the fortress was taken, the enemy was driven out of it and out of the forest with a small loss on our part. On the enemy side, both khans were killed ... Having settled in the fortress, I await the orders of your excellency. By evening, there were only 179 people in the ranks, and 45 charges for guns. Upon learning of this, Prince Tsitsianov wrote to Karyagin: “In unheard-of despair, I ask you to back up the soldiers, and I ask God to back you up.”
The Russians barely had time to repair the gates, as the main Persian forces appeared, worried about the loss of their beloved Russian detachment. Abbas Mirza tried to drive the Russians out of the fortification on the move, but his troops suffered losses and were forced to go over to the blockade. But this was not the end. Not even the beginning of the end. After an inventory of the property remaining in the fortress, it turned out that there was no food. And that the convoy with food had to be abandoned during a breakthrough from the encirclement, so there was nothing to eat. At all. At all. At all. For four days the besieged ate grass and horse meat, but at last these meager supplies were also eaten.
The same melik Vanya, whom Popov calls the "Good genius of the detachment", volunteered to get supplies. The most surprising thing is that the brave Armenian did an excellent job with this task, repeated operations also bore fruit. Several such excursions allowed Karyagin to hold out for another whole week without any particular extremity. But the position of the detachment became more and more difficult. Being sure that the Russians were trapped, Abbas-Mirza offered them to lay down their arms in exchange for great rewards and honors if Karyagin agreed to go into the Persian service and surrender Shah Bulakh, and promising that not the slightest insult would be inflicted on any of the Russians. Karyagin asked for four days for reflection, but so that Abbas-Mirza would feed the Russians with food during all these days. Abbas Mirza agreed, and the Russian detachment, regularly receiving everything they needed from the Persians, rested and recovered.
Meanwhile, the last day of the truce had expired, and by evening Abbas-Mirza sent to ask Karyagin about his decision. “Tomorrow morning, let His Highness occupy Shah-Bulakh,” Karyagin answered. As we shall see, he kept his word. Karyagin decides to take an even more incredible step, to break through the hordes of the enemy to the fortress of Mukhrat, not occupied by the Persians.
It is said that there was once an angel in Heaven who was in charge of monitoring the impossibility. This angel died on July 7 at 10 p.m., when Karyagin set out with a detachment, led by Yuzbash, from the fortress to storm the next, even larger fortress, Mukhrat, which, due to its mountainous location and proximity to Elizavetpol, was more convenient for protection. It is important to understand that by July 7, the detachment had been fighting continuously for the 13th day.
By roundabout roads, through the mountains and slums, the detachment managed to bypass the Persian posts so covertly that the enemy noticed Karyagin's deception only in the morning, when Kotlyarevsky's vanguard, composed exclusively of wounded soldiers and officers, was already in Mukhrat, and Karyagin himself with the rest of the people and with guns he managed to pass dangerous mountain gorges. Even the soldiers who remained to call to each other on the walls managed to get away from the Persians and catch up with the detachment.
If Karyagin and his soldiers were not imbued with a truly heroic spirit, then it seems that local difficulties alone would be enough to make the whole enterprise completely impossible. Here, for example, is one of the episodes of this transition, a fact that stands alone even in the history of the Caucasian army.
On the route of the detachment, a deep ravine or ravine arose (according to the description of Lieutenant Gorshkov, the bed of the Kabartu-chaya river) with steep slopes. People and horses could overcome it, but the guns?
Guys! the battalion leader Sidorov suddenly shouted. Why stand and think? You can’t take the city standing, better listen to what I tell you: our brother has a gun - a lady, and a lady needs help; so let's roll it on guns."
Private Gavrila Sidorov jumped down to the bottom of the ditch, followed by a dozen more soldiers.
There are several versions of this episode: “... the detachment continued to move, calmly and unhindered, until the two guns that were with it were stopped by a small ditch. There was no forest nearby to make a bridge; four soldiers volunteered to help the cause, crossed themselves, lay down in the ditch and carried the guns over them. Two remained alive, and two paid for their heroic self-sacrifice with their lives. In an earlier book, Potto retells the description thus: the guns were stuck into the ground with bayonets as a kind of piles, other guns were laid on them like crossbars, and the soldiers propped them up with their shoulders; the second cannon fell off during the crossing and with all its might hit the head of two soldiers, including Sidorov, with a wheel. The soldier only had time to say: "Farewell, brothers, do not remember dashingly and pray for me a sinner."
No matter how the detachment was in a hurry to retreat, however, the soldiers managed to dig a deep grave, into which the officers lowered the bodies of their dead colleagues in their arms.
On July 8, the detachment came to Ksapet, from here Karyagin sent forward carts with the wounded under the command of Kotlyarevsky, and he himself moved after them. Three versts from Mukhrat, the Persians rushed to the column, but were repulsed by fire and bayonets. One of the officers recalled: “... but as soon as Kotlyarevsky managed to move away from us, we were brutally attacked by several thousand Persians, and their onslaught was so strong and sudden that they managed to capture both of our guns. This is no longer a thing. Karyagin shouted: "Guys, go ahead, save the guns!" Everyone rushed like lions, and immediately our bayonets opened the way. Trying to cut off the Russians from the fortress, Abbas-Mirza sent a cavalry detachment to capture it, but the Persians failed here too. The disabled team of Kotlyarevsky threw back the Persian horsemen. By evening, Karyagin also came to Mukhrat, according to Bobrovsky, this happened at 12.00.
Only now Karyagin sent a letter to Abbas-Mirza in response to his offer to transfer to the Persian service. “In your letter, please say,” Karyagin wrote to him, “that your parent has mercy on me; and I have the honor to notify you that, when fighting with the enemy, they do not seek mercy, except for traitors; and I, who have turned gray under arms, will consider it a happiness to shed my blood in the service of His Imperial Majesty.
In Mukhrat, the detachment enjoyed comparative calm and contentment. And Prince Tsitsianov, having received a report on July 9, gathered a detachment of 2371 people with 10 guns and went out to meet Karyagin. On July 15, the detachment of Prince Tsitsianov, having driven back the Persians from the Tertara River, camped near the village of Mardagishti. Upon learning of this, Karyagin leaves Mukhrat at night and goes to the village of Mazdygert to connect with his commander.
There the commander-in-chief received him with extraordinary military honours. All troops dressed in dress uniform, were lined up with a deployed front, and when the remnants of a brave detachment appeared, Tsitsianov himself commanded: "On guard!". “Hurray!” thundered through the ranks, the drums beat the march, the banners bowed ...
It must be said that as soon as Tsitsianov left Elizavetpol, Abbas-Mirza, counting on the weakness of the garrison left there, broke into the Elizavetpol district and rushed to the city. Although Karyagin was exhausted from the wounds received at Askoran, the sense of duty in him was so strong that, a few days later, the colonel, neglecting his illness, again stood face to face with Abbas Mirza. The rumor that Karyagin was approaching Elizavetpol forced Abbas-Mirza to evade a meeting with the Russian troops. And near Shamkhor, Karyagin, with a detachment not exceeding six hundred bayonets, put the Persians to flight. This is the finale that ended the Persian campaign of 1805. “Fabulous things are happening to you,” Count Rostopchin wrote to Prince Pavel Tsitsianov, “hearing about them, you marvel at them and rejoice that the name of the Russians and Tsitsianov thunders in distant countries ...”
Having made this amazing march, the detachment of Colonel Karyagin for three weeks attracted the attention of almost 20,000 Persians and did not allow them to go deep into the country. Colonel Karyagin's courage bore enormous fruit. Detaining the Persians in Karabagh, it saved Georgia from being flooded by Persian hordes and made it possible for Prince Tsitsianov to gather troops scattered along the borders and open an offensive campaign. And although in February 1806, Prince Tsitsianov was treacherously killed while allegedly handing over the keys to the city of Baku, on the whole, the campaign of 1805 ended with the conquest of the Sheki, Shirvan, Kuban and Karabakh (and in October 1806 and Baku) khanates by Russia.
For his campaign, Colonel Karyagin was awarded a golden sword with the inscription "For Courage". Major Kotlyarevsky was awarded the Order of St. Vladimir of the 4th degree, the surviving officers were awarded the Order of St. Anna of the 3rd degree. Avanes Yuzbashi (melik Vani) was not left without a reward, he was promoted to ensign, received gold medal and 200 silver rubles for a lifetime pension. The feat of private Sidorov in 1892, in the year of the 250th anniversary of the regiment, was immortalized in a monument erected at the headquarters of the Erivans Manglise.
Continuous campaigns, wounds, and especially fatigue during the winter campaign of 1806 upset Karyagin's health. He fell ill with a fever that turned into yellow rotten fever, and on May 7, 1807, this “gray-haired under arms” hero was gone (excluded from the army lists on July 31, 1807). His last award was the Order of St. Vladimir of the 3rd degree, received a few days before his death. Historian of the Caucasian War V.A. Potto wrote: "Amazed by his heroic deeds, the fighting offspring gave the personality of Karyagin a majestically legendary character, created from him the favorite type in the military epic of the Caucasus."
Finally, the picture of F.A. Roubaud (1856-1928) "The Living Bridge, an episode from the campaign of Colonel Karyagin to Mukhrat in 1805", created by a battle painter for the Tiflis Museum, which depicts an embellished image of this event of the campaign ("The path was blocked by a deep ravine, to overcome which two cannons in the detachment "They couldn't. There was neither time nor materials for the construction of the bridge. Then Private Gavrila Sidorov, with the words: "The cannon is a soldier's mistress, she needs help," was the first to lie at the bottom of the pit. Ten more people rushed after him. The cannons were transported over the bodies of the soldiers, while Sidorov himself died from a cranial injury."). No wonder, because the painting was painted by the artist in 1892, and was first demonstrated 93 years after the campaign - in 1898. From statements at one military-historical forum: “It is not clear why Roubaud's guns lie on the sidelines, instead of putting and distributing them on top of themselves load. And then you can see how one crazy man generally lay down under the wheels with his stomach up”; “The horses have already been eaten, the cannons were dragged along the mountain paths by the soldiers themselves”; “Roubaud has it amplified for drama, although I think it was enough.”
P.S. Unfortunately, I could not find a portrait of Karyagin, I found a portrait of Kotlyarevsky.
I am proud to be Russian. I myself have not done anything great, and maybe even more or less significant, but when I hear news of the glorious deeds of a Russian person, I am immensely glad. Whether I am subjectively exaggerating the greatness of these deeds, or whether they really stand apart from all the deeds of the sons of men, I do not know. But I guess :)
About one of these feats of Russian soldiers and will be discussed below.
The campaign of Colonel Karyagin in 1805 against the Persians cannot be called an ordinary military history. Rather, it resembles movie action movies, such as "300 Spartans" and even surpasses (!) them: 40 thousand Persians vs. 500 Russians, mountainous terrain, gorges, many days of pursuit of exhausted, hungry, out of ammunition Russians - brilliant bayonet charges - "This is madness!" - "No, this is the 17th Jaeger Regiment!"
This is the golden page of Russian history.
If you remember, in 1805 Russia fought with France as part of the Third Coalition, and fought not very well. France was strong with the genius of Napoleon, and our allies, the Austrians and the British, could not provide us with real support. Even the genius of Kutuzov did not make a decisive difference in the outcome of this confrontation. Apparently, only in such conditions the Persian Baba Khan could decide on the impudence that followed.
In 1805, Baba Khan again went to Russia, hoping to pay for the defeats of the previous year, 1804. It must be admitted that the moment for aggression was chosen quite well, since at that time there were from 8 to 10 thousand soldiers in the entire Caucasus, and, for a number of reasons, one could not count on reinforcements.
Further events developed as follows.
Upon learning that 40,000 Persians under the command of Crown Prince Abbas-Mirza were coming to the city of Shusha (now Nagorno-Karabakh), where 6 companies of the rangers of Major Lisanevich were located, Prince Tsitsianov sent him everything he could to help. Namely, a battalion of the 17th Chasseur Regiment of 493 soldiers and officers with two guns, under the command of the legendary Colonel Karyagin and under the leadership of the Russian military spirit.
They did not have time to reach Shushi, as the Persian vanguard of 10 thousand people had already intercepted them - on June 24, the bank of the Shah-Bulakh River.
Our battalion repulsed the fruitless attacks of the Persian cavalry in a square all day until only horns and legs were left of them. Then they went another 14 versts and set up a fortified camp, the so-called wagenburg (in Russian, walk-city): the defense line was lined up from wagons, which the troops were forced to carry with them in significant numbers.
The Persian attacks resumed in the evening and lasted until night, until they were forced to break off to clear the battlefield from piles of Persian corpses, funerals, weeping and other necessary formalities. By morning, the Persians began to bombard our camp with artillery bombs, but they did not succeed for long. The Russians, in response, launched a sortie: they made their way to the positions of the Persian battery, blew up its guns to the devil's grandmother, dropping the remnants of the guns into the river, and calmly returned to the camp with a sense of accomplishment of duty.
The siege continued: continuous shelling, heat, lack of water ... Defectors appeared: Lieutenant Lisenko fled to the Persians with six other cosmopolitans, a day later - 19 more "pacifists" joined them.
At the council of officers, it was decided to break through the encirclement, then to storm the nearby fortress, in order to then repel the attacks of the Persians already protected by walls.
No sooner said than done: at night, having cut out the sentries of the enemy, the Russian soldiers, trying not to make noise, had almost left the encirclement, but they stumbled upon a Persian patrol. The events of that night succeeded each other quickly: chase, skirmish, chase again - and ours nevertheless broke away from the enemy and went to the fortress, named after the nearby river - Shah-Bulahu.
Our soldiers were exhausted, and there was no time to talk, so they acted decisively: they immediately smashed the gates of Shah Bulakh with a cannonball and occupied the fortress. (Yes, I forgot to say that the garrison fled in a panic).
Our men barely had time to repair the gates, when the main forces of the Persians pursuing them appeared.
By this time, it turned out that there was no food in the fortress. But in view of the fact that the convoy with provisions had to be abandoned during a breakthrough from the encirclement, they realized that those who were not going to die of hunger needed to do something.
Nobody wanted to die of hunger. The remnants of forces were calculated: out of 493 people, 175 remained, most of whom were injured, and all of them were dehydrated, exhausted, tired to the limit. Ammunition running out...
They decided, leaving sentries on the walls of the fortress, to create the appearance of presence, the main forces would move out of the fortress at night in order to make a forced march and storm another, more suitable fortress.
On July 7, at 22:00, the remnants of the battalion under the command of Karyagin set out from the fortress. By this time, the detachment had been fighting uninterruptedly for the thirteenth day.
It was possible to advance, with God's help, quietly, although they went with guns and with carts of the wounded. A little later, the detachment was caught up by the soldiers remaining on the fortress walls. The rear guard was commanded by Kotlyarevsky, the future legendary general, "the second Suvorov" - "Conqueror of Azerbaijan".
... And here is a moat. It is necessary to go through it with cannons, because without them there can be no talk of storming the fortified fortress of Mukhrata. Only bad luck - there is nothing to fill it with: there is nothing suitable nearby, and time is running out. Four Russian soldiers - Gavrila Sidorov and three others, whose names, unfortunately, are not known today - silently jumped into the ditch. On the shoulders they laid out a gun as a bridge. The guns drove right over them. Two climbed out of the ditch.
On July 8, the detachment was in Kasapet, hastily refreshed itself and moved on - to Mukhrat. Three miles from the target, the detachment, at that time consisting of about a hundred people, was attacked by several thousand Persian cavalry, who managed to break through to the cannons and capture them. Here they hurried, although how could they know what kind of guns they were and at what cost they were dragged here.
... As one of the officers recalled: "Karyagin shouted:" Guys, go ahead, save the guns!"
The Persians did not survive the attacks - they fled in a panic. Not immediately, of course, but, you see, they fell quickly - and, presumably, ours did not look the most friendly. Well, Persians, they are Persians.
Mukhrat was taken immediately, and the next day, on July 9, Prince Tsitsianov, having received a report from Karyagin, immediately set out to meet the Persian army with 2,300 soldiers and 10 guns. On July 15, Tsitsianov defeated and drove out the enemy and joined with the remnants of the detachments of Colonel Karyagin.
Karyagin received a golden sword for this campaign, all officers and soldiers received awards and salaries, a monument was erected to Gavrila Sidorov at the headquarters of the regiment. Here is such a story.
Karyagin's words are significant in the surviving response to Abbas Mirza, who offered the colonel high ranks and huge money in the Persian service:
“Your parent has mercy on me; and I have the honor to notify you that, when fighting with the enemy, they do not seek mercy, except for traitors.
Everlasting memory heroes! Kingdom of Heaven to them!
- Non, je vous préviens que si vous ne me dites pas que nous avons la guerre [...] je ne vous connais plus, vous n "êtes plus mon ami [...] (No, I tell you ahead if you won't tell me that we're at war [...] I don't know you anymore, you're no longer my friend [...])".
"So spoke the famous Anna Pavlovna Sherer in July 1805" 1 .
Those who did not stop at the first page of "War and Peace" remember that the war with France - which the interlocutor of Prince Vasily Kurakin so longed for - soon really began. The heroic deed of Prince Bagration at Shengraben, the defeat of the Russians at Austerlitz - three to five months remained before all these events that thundered in the center of Europe.
But even on that day, when Mme Scherer was still only dreaming of a war, one with the participation of the Russians was already underway. Only in places not yet known to society - behind the "wall of the Caucasus", in Karabakh. And the feat accomplished there by the Russians just in June - July 1805 - even more impressive than the Schöngraben - remained then unnoticed by Russian society.
The feat is described in the reports of the detachment commander, which are confirmed by an independent source - the memoirs of a participant in the events (it is thought that officer Pyotr Ladinsky). It's still hard to believe what happened...
Early summer of 1805. Disposition
TO Russian-Iranian war 1804 - 1813 led to the annexation in 1801 by Russia of Eastern Georgia - the land that Iran (until 1935 we called Persia) considered its sphere of influence. In 1804, the Russians frustrated an attempt by the Persians to invade there, but in the summer of 1805, Shah Feth-Ali again moved troops to Karabakh in order to pass into Georgia and clear it of the Russians.
The invading army (commanded by Crown Prince Abbas Mirza) numbered about 30-40 thousand people. The Russians in Transcaucasia had only a little more than 8000 2 - and then scattered over a large area. It was necessary to protect Georgia both from the Dagestanis-Lezgins, and from the vassals of Iran - the Azerbaijani khans. It was necessary to control the newly annexed khanates - Ganja and Karabakh ...
Hopes for reinforcements fell away: the war with Napoleon was approaching, which means that Russia would not have free troops.
Russia itself is far beyond high mountains. Only a thread of the Georgian Military Highway leads there, which the "non-peaceful" highlanders will cut.
We must rely only on ourselves.
And then the Commander-in-Chief in Georgia, Lieutenant-General Prince Peter Tsitsianov, sent a detachment of the chief of the 17th Jaeger Regiment, Colonel Pavel Karyagin, towards Abbas-Mirza from Elisavetpol (now Ganja) to Shusha. (Chiefs then actually commanded the regiments.)
There are 493 soldiers and officers in the detachment - a battalion of the 17th Chasseurs, a company of the Tiflis Musketeers and a team of the 7th Artillery Regiment, heavily thinned by diseases. And two guns 3 .
Karyagin must give Tsitsianov the opportunity to gather disparate forces. And for this, having united in Shusha with six more companies of the 17th Chasseurs and bringing his army up to a thousand people, to detain the Persians.
Not thirty, not forty thousand...
Early summer of 1805. Personnel
The then Russian soldier was not an angel.
He poured out cynical sayings, unceremoniously extorted one or the other from the "man" at the lodge, and dragged from the layman everything that lay badly. Escapes were common. Of the 475 lower ranks of the Karyagin detachment, 56 4 deserted during the fighting - every ninth!
But in the ranks, the soldiers were firmly shackled by the discipline that had been implanted for years, consistently and harshly. Discipline was reinforced by something that we do not always remember - the desire not to let down comrades 5, which is especially understandable far from Russia.
And a strong force, a steadfast "soldier" went into battle.
Karyagin officers - children of small estate nobles or officials who served only personal nobility - did not finish cadet corps. "He knows how to read and write in Russian" - that's all their education. But for that era, this was more or less enough, and then the service in the Caucasus was a school. Where the Russians often acted in small detachments, where the enemy was always outnumbered, and the political situation was always confused, there the commander had to never get lost and think with his head.
The commander of the Jaeger battalion Pyotr Kotlyarevsky from a 16-year-old sergeant became a 27-year-old major in this school.
Passed it and Pavel Mikhailovich Karyagin.
A 54-year-old widower, the son of an officer who had served his family as a hereditary nobility, he was obviously born in the Smolensk region, since he began his service in 1773 when he entered the Smolensk Mint Company, guarding the mint in the village of Porechie (now the city of Demidov).
He had no serfs or real estate.
On the other hand, he served in the Caucasus from 1783, and fought in Georgia back in 1784-1787. second lieutenant of the Belarusian Jaeger battalion 6 .
In 1791, he took Anapa from the Turks.
In 1796 he went on the Persian campaign.
In 1804, at the age of 52, under stones and arrows, he climbed with his rangers onto the wall of the Azerbaijani fortress of Ganja.
And like every officer of that time, he knew about himself, first of all, that he was "HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY, THE GOVERNMENT, his servant."
June 24, 1805. The battle
Most of the way was left behind when, on the morning of June 24, 1805, across the Shah-Bulakh River, Karyagin's detachment was attacked by the vanguard of Abbas-Mirza. Up to 3000 horsemen flew into a handful of Russians from one side, then from the other.
But a handful is a regular army! Several teams - and now she is already in the ranks of a square, a quadrangle, meeting the enemy with volleys, no matter where he comes from. "Spitting" (as the Turks complained at the time of Suvorov) with fire, there are (and this is the expression of the Persians) "impregnable moving walls" 7 .
The top of the walls is black (these are cylindrical hats and caps).
Bottom - white (summer pantaloons).
The middle is colored. At three walls - light green, with a line of purple collars. These are the huntsmen of the 17th regiment. The fourth is dark green, with lines of blue collars and light crimson epaulettes. These are the Tiflis men of Captain Tatarintsov. After he was wounded, the huntsman, Lieutenant Rafail Yegulov, commanded this face of the square.
The Persians have matchlock guns of the 16th century model. Therefore, on the sides of the square there are chains of rangers with threaded fittings. From long distances, they hit the enemy of their choice, remaining invulnerable themselves.
The left chain is led by Lieutenant Prince Semyon Tumanov 1st (Simeon Tumanishvili). Right - Lieutenant Yemelyan Lisenko. From time to time, new batches of fittings are sent; they are led by captains Alexei Klyukin and Ivan Parfenov and lieutenant Yakov Kulyabka 2nd.
Three times Karyagin sends part of the rangers to clear the commanders over the high road. The future "Caucasian Suvorov" - Major Pyotr Kotlyarevsky - leads this handful of shooters in loose formation against the Asian crowds.
With orders to him and with reports from him, lieutenant Matvey Pavlenko jumps.
So, with a fight, the detachment moves for six hours - 14 miles.
In the evening, having reached the Askaran River, Karyagin stops to rest in the Kara-Agach-Baba tract, on a hill in the middle of a moated Muslim cemetery.
But here the main forces of Abbas-Mirza fall upon him.
This is from 10 to 15,000 people, and Karyagin has about 300 left in the ranks 8 .
However, European quality is once again taking precedence over Asian quantity. Three hours later, when all the attacks of the Persians were repulsed by fire, it turns out that for the whole day the Russians spent an average of only 23 rounds per arrow 9!
"They give three unlearned for a scientist, three is not enough for us, give us 6, we are not enough 6, give us 10 for one; we will beat them all, we will knock them down, we will take them in full!" 10
These Suvorov words are not jokes, but a formula derived in practice.
27th of June. Bayonet charge
Shusha is 25 versts away, and Karyagin is sure that he would have made his way there. But many horses have been killed, they are not enough to transport the wounded, and the wounded are already a third of the detachment. And the colonel decides to stay in the cemetery until Major Lisanevich comes up from Shusha with his six companies.
The cemetery ditch is supplemented with an earthen rampart. But he does not save from the heat, thirst and the nuclei of small-caliber guns - falconets, several batteries of which the Persians installed at the surrounding heights. On the evening of June 26, the falconets are no longer allowed to approach the only stream, and Karyagin organizes a sortie.
"Rota, listen to the command: be baptized, forward, with God!" - commanded by Captain Klyukin. (A year ago, he served in a garrison battalion deep in Russia.)
And the huntsmen with a bayonet charge capture four batteries with 15 falconets 11.
But on the 27th, the enemy clearly decides to finish off the detachment. Artillery bombardment and cavalry attacks last all day. The Russians already have little ammunition and medical supplies. Losses are growing, twice shell-shocked Karyagin is wounded in the back. Four shell-shocked artillery lieutenant Sidor Gudim-Levkovich, with 22 out of 23 gunners 12 killed or wounded, loads and aims both guns himself.
But Major Lisanevich is still missing.
He will not dare to leave Shusha without troops...
56 rangers and a musketeer run over to the Persians. And - the case has not yet been explained, but clearly speaking of the severity of the situation - the hero of the battle on June 24, Lieutenant Lisenko, goes to the enemy.
And then Karyagin dictates, drawing up another report to Tsitsianov: "In order to save people and guns [...] he made a firm decision to break through with courage through a numerous enemy [...] with the intention of taking a fortress on Shah-Bulakh" 13 . It is easier to defend in a fortress.
A squad on the brink of death is about to attack!
But the enemy does not expect this - and this is already the key to success. Especially if the enemy is undisciplined (and therefore impressionable).
About the battle with Abbas Mirza, the colonel ends in an everyday tone, I will report in detail already from the captured fortress ...
July 7th Breakthrough from the fortress of Shah Bulakh
On the night of June 28, the detachment advances to the Shah-Bulakh fortress. There are only enough horses for the seriously wounded, the convoy has to be abandoned. Nevertheless, the Persian cavalry, which discovered the departure of the Russians, again cannot overcome the regular square.
At dawn, the fortress is shown. There are 150 Persians there, but they are behind a high stone wall with six towers.
"Forward, forward, with God!" - gives his usual command 14 Karyagin.
The Russian core smashes the gates - and there, behind Major Kotlyarevsky, purple collars rush. Two bullets hit the major in the leg, a charge of rifle shot in the hand, but the rangers were dragged along by staff captain Fedor Vikhlyaev, lieutenant Astafy Chichkanov - and Shah-Bulakh was taken.
And two hours later, the Russians themselves have to repel the assault: Abbas Mirza arrived in time for Shah Bulakh.
But Persians are not Russians. They are thrown from the walls, and the prince is forced to limit himself to blockade the fortress with part of his forces. By July 1, the Karyaginians begin to eat grass and horse meat. And late in the evening on July 7, Karyagin secretly begins a breakthrough into a new stronghold - the empty fortress of Mukhrat, which is 30 miles away. The Persians do not notice his departure.
At dawn on July 8, the detachment stops in front of a deep, man-sized ravine. It is too wide to carry guns across it.
It is impossible to get around it, there are no trees nearby to build a bridge.
And then, at the initiative of the huntsman Gavrila Sidorov, a "living bridge" is being built.
At the bottom of the ravine huntsmen huddled. These are the pillars of the bridge.
Guns are stuck in the bottom with bayonets. These are additional supports.
Other guns were placed on the shoulders of the rangers and on the butts of their rifles. This is the deck of the bridge.
An 8-pound unicorn and a 6-pound cannon are rolled along this floor.
The first weighs 524 kilograms. The second could weigh up to 15 tons.
But the "living piles" remain alive.
Except for Gavrila Sidorov.
The wheel that jumped off the floor hit him in the temple.
July 15. Victory
Finally recollected, Abbas-Mirza throws his cavalry in pursuit. One part of it rushes to Mukhrat, but the detachment of Kotlyarevsky sent forward on carts has already occupied the fortress. There are only wounded in it, but the attempt of the Persians to break into Mukhrat is repulsed!
Even before 1500 cavalry pounce on the main forces of Karyagin. Again, as on June 24, they go, repelling countless attacks with fire. Again the Persians can do nothing with the regular army.
And after Karyagin occupied Mukhrat, the son of the Shah resigned himself to his fate - leaving only an observation detachment at the fortress.
Karyagin, on the other hand, received food from the Armenians, and on July 15 he joined up with the troops of Tsitsianov, who finally approached.
Detaining the enemy until the approach of the main forces, he saved Georgia from the Persian invasion. After the approach of Tsitsianov, the Persians were defeated (July 28, near Dzegam) and retreated to their own borders.
Of the 493 Karyaginians, 90 died, 58 deserted or were captured, and of the remaining 345, more than half were wounded. Of the 16 (without the traitor Lisenko) officers, only three had no wounds or contusions 16 .
Epilogue
Very few people managed to endure such labors in Transcaucasia for a long time.
Colonel Pavel Mikhailovich Karyagin already in June 1807 will be driven to the grave by "yellow fever".
Major Alexei Ivanovich Klyukin was dismissed in 1808 due to injuries.
Major Rafail Sergeevich Yegulov was dismissed in 1811 due to injuries.
Lieutenant-General Pyotr Stepanovich Kotlyarevsky - extracted from under a pile of bodies in the Lenkoran fortress he had taken - was dismissed in 1813 due to injuries. And for another thirty-eight years, until his death, he will suffer from pain in a crushed jaw.
Major Matvey Alekseevich Pavlenko was dismissed in 1814 due to injuries.
Major Yakov Osipovich Kulyabka was dismissed in 1815 due to injuries.
Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Ivanovich Parfenov was buried already in 1816.
Colonel Pyotr Antonovich Ladinsky was dismissed in 1822 due to illness.
The 17th Jaeger and Tiflis Musketeer Regiments, after a series of renamings, will become in 1864 the 13th Life Grenadier Erivan and the 15th Tiflis Grenadier. Together they will go to the First World War.
And on October 16, 1914, near the Polish city of Suwalki, in an attack that would disrupt the German breakthrough at the junction of two Russian corps, the grenadier of the 9th company of the Erivan regiment, Gavrila Sidorov, would die. Namesake and namesake of Gavrila Sidorov from the "living bridge". The German bullet will hit him right in the heart 17 .
Notes
1. Tolstoy L.N. War and Peace // Tolstoy L.N. Sobr. op. In 20 vols. T. 4. M., 1961. P.7.
2. Bobrovsky P.O. History of the 13th Erivan Life Grenadier Regiment of His Majesty for 250 years. 1642 - 1892. Part 3. Jaegers (1786 - 1816). SPb., 1893. S. 220, 221, 226.
3. Ibid. app. S. 310.
4. Calculated from: Ibid. pp. 226, 227; app. S. 310.
5. Lieven D. Russia against Napoleon. Fight for Europe. 1807 - 1814. M., 2012. S. 81-82.
6. See: Bobrovsky P.O. Decree. op. App. pp. 232-233.
7. Ibid. S. 218.
8. Ibid. pp. 224, 226; app. S. 311.
9. Calculated from: Ibid. App. pp. 310-311.
10. A.V. Suvorov. Documentation. T. III. 1791 - 1798. M., 1952. S. 508.
11. Bobrovsky P.O. Decree. op. S. 226.
12. Calculated from: Ibid. App. pp. 310-311.
13. Quoted. by: there. S. 227.
14. See: ibid. pp. 229, 233, 238.
15. With gun carriage. See: Nilus A.A. History of the material part of artillery. T. I. SPb., 1904. S. 258; Shirokorad A.B. Encyclopedia of domestic artillery. Mn., 2000. S. 35.
16. Bobrovsky P.O. Decree. op. S. 235; App. pp. 311-312.
17. Leib-Erivans in the Great War. Materials for the history of the regiment in the processing of the regimental historical commission. Paris, 1959. S. 35.
