Nevelsk offensive operation. Preparation and start of the offensive Nevelsk offensive operation of 1943

The Red Army launched a general offensive on the southern and central sectors of the Soviet-German front. In order to prevent the transfer of German divisions to the southwestern direction, the troops of the Western and left wing of the Kalinin fronts began the Smolensk offensive operation. Active actions were also required on the right wing of the Kalinin Front. Here, the Soviet troops were to advance on Nevel in order to cut the Wehrmacht's communications between Army Groups "North" and "Center" and divert its reserves from the Vitebsk direction.

German defense

The German defense was a system of strong strongholds and centers of resistance located on the ground with big amount lakes and deep ravines. In terms of engineering, the defense was well prepared and included a developed system of trenches, trenches, passages, full profile messages, as well as dugouts and bunkers with overlaps of several rolls. For machine guns, mortars and guns it was equipped a large number of spare positions. More than 100 firing points, up to 80 dugouts, 16-20 mortar positions, 12 artillery batteries and 12-16 separate guns were located in the direction where the Soviet troops intended to deliver the main blow. In addition, up to 8 artillery batteries could fire from neighboring areas. The front line of defense was covered by two lanes of minefields 40-60 m deep and two rows of barbed wire. The second defensive line passed along the river. Shestihe. The total tactical depth of defense was 6-7 km.

The nearest reserves of the Wehrmacht were up to four battalions and up to two infantry regiments.

The composition and strength of the parties

USSR

Part of the forces of the Kalinin Front:

357th Rifle Division (Major General A. L. Kronik)
28th Rifle Division (Colonel M. F. Bukshtynovich)
(Major General D. V. Mikhailov)
78th Tank Brigade (Colonel Ya. G. Kochergin)
(Major General S. I. Karapetyan)
100th Infantry Brigade (Colonel A. I. Serebryakov)
31st Infantry Brigade (Colonel L. A. Bakuev)

2nd Guards Rifle Corps (Lieutenant General A. P. Beloborodov)
- 360th Infantry Division (Colonel I. I. Chinov)
- 117th Infantry Division (Major General E. G. Koberidze)
- 16th Lithuanian Rifle Division (Major General V. A. Karvyalis)
Part of the forces of the 83rd Rifle Corps (Lieutenant General A. A. Dyakonov)
- 47th Infantry Division (Major General V. G. Chernov)
236th Tank Brigade (Colonel N. D. Chuprov)
143rd Tank Brigade (Colonel Podkovsky A. S.)

240th Fighter Aviation Division (Colonel G. V. Zimin)
211th Assault Aviation Division (Colonel P. M. Kuchma)

Germany

263rd Infantry Division (Lieutenant General W. Richter)
291st Infantry Division (Lieutenant General V. Geritz)

Part of the forces of the 2nd airfield corps:

2nd Airfield Division (Colonel G. Petzold)

To repel the Soviet offensive, the following were additionally involved:

58th Infantry Division (Artillery General K. Sievert)
83rd Infantry Division (Lieutenant General T. Scherer)
129th Infantry Division (Major General K. Fabiunke)
281st Security Division (Lieutenant General W. von Stockhausen)
20th Panzer Division (Major General M. von Kessel)

Operation plan

The idea of the operation was to quickly break through the German defenses, capture Nevel with a swift throw and take advantageous positions for further struggle. Surprise and swift action were of decisive importance. Any delay could lead to the disruption of the operation, since in this case the German command would have time to transfer reserves to the threatened direction and strengthen the defense.

The main role in the offensive was to be played by the 3rd shock army. To ensure the solution of the main task of the operation, Lieutenant-General K.N. Galitsky included four of the six rifle divisions, two of the three rifle brigades, all tanks and almost all the artillery of the army in the strike force. These forces were concentrated on a 4-kilometer section. The defense of the rest of the 100-kilometer section of the army front was entrusted to the remaining forces. In accordance with the plan of the operation, the option of deep operational formation of the strike force was chosen. The 28th and 357th rifle divisions, reinforced by two mortar regiments, were allocated to the first echelon, intended to break through the German defenses. To develop success after the breakthrough of the defense, the 78th Tank Brigade, the 21st Guards Rifle Division and three artillery regiments were assigned. The reserve (third echelon) consisted of the 46th Guards Rifle Division, the 31st and 100th Rifle Brigades. The operation plan included 5 stages. At the first stage, it was necessary to covertly concentrate troops intended for the offensive in the initial areas and complete the accumulation of materiel, primarily ammunition, necessary for the operation. At the second stage, the troops quickly and covertly occupied their initial position in the immediate vicinity of the forward edge. The third stage included artillery preparation, an attack, a breakthrough of the enemy defenses to a depth of 6-7 km to the river. Shestikha, ensuring the entry into the breakthrough of the echelon of the development of success, which at the fourth stage with a swift blow was to capture the inter-lake defile on the outskirts of Nevel and take over the city. At the fifth stage, it was necessary to gain a foothold north and west of Nevel, organize a solid defense and be ready to repel counterattacks from suitable enemy reserves.

According to the artillery support plan for the operation, 814 guns and mortars were concentrated in the breakthrough area, which accounted for 91% of all available in the army. The artillery was tasked with destroying enemy artillery and mortar batteries, suppressing firing points at the forefront and in the depths of the defense, preventing counterattacks and preventing the approach of reserves. Artillery actions were organized as an artillery offensive, in which 1.5 hours were allotted for artillery preparation and 35 minutes for supporting the attack with a barrage of fire.

In order to prevent a strike on the flank of the advancing army of K. N. Galitsky and cover its actions, the 4th shock army was to advance south of Nevel. The blow was delivered by the 360th and 47th rifle divisions in the direction of Lake Ezerishche and further to Gorodok. Success was to be developed by the 236th and 143rd tank brigades. Their main task was to cut the Gorodok-Nevel highway.

For aviation support of troops from the 3rd Air Army, the 211th assault and 240th fighter aviation divisions were allocated. During the preparation of the infantry for the attack, the pilots had to deliver bombing and assault strikes against strongholds located in the direction of the main strike. In the future, attack aircraft under the cover of fighters were supposed to ensure the advancement of the 28th Infantry Division and the breakthrough development echelon. In addition, aviation was assigned the task of covering the strike force from the air, disrupting the enemy’s railway communications in the Polotsk-Dretun and Nevel-Gorodok sections and conducting aerial reconnaissance in the direction of Pustoshka and Vitebsk in order to timely detect suitable German reserves.

Operation preparation

The command of the front and the armies paid great attention to the thorough preparation of the operation. At the headquarters of the 3rd shock army, all the details of the upcoming operation were worked out on maps and layouts of the area with the commanders of divisions, brigades and artillery units. In the rifle subunits that were part of the strike force, training was carried out in separate phases of the battle: covert exit to the starting position, interaction during the attack, overcoming wetlands, and maximum use of the results of artillery preparation. In the 28th Rifle Division, commanded by Colonel M. F. Bukshtynovich, about 50 company and battalion exercises were held, in which issues of interaction between infantry and artillery were worked out. Until the start of the operation, enhanced reconnaissance was carried out on the entire front of the army, which established with sufficient accuracy the enemy grouping, its strength, the system of fire and minefields.

Simultaneously with the strengthening of intelligence, measures were taken to keep the intentions of the Soviet command secret. Until the last moment, the decision to attack was known to a limited circle of people. Much attention was paid to operational camouflage. Forests were used to deploy troops in the initial areas, and the regrouping was carried out strictly at night. In order to hide the concentration of a large number of artillery, only one gun was allocated for sighting from each artillery regiment.

During the day preceding the start of the offensive, partisans operating in the areas of Nevel, Idritsa, Sebezh, Polotsk carried out a series of sabotage, as a result of which military echelons with people and ammunition were destroyed, several enemy garrisons were defeated.

On the night of October 6, all preparations were completed. Formations and units of the 1st and 2nd echelons of the shock group took their starting position for the offensive. Artillery moved into firing positions.

The course of hostilities

The Nevelsk operation began on October 6 at 5 o'clock in the morning with reconnaissance in force. In order to confuse the German command regarding the direction of the main attack, it was carried out in several sectors of the front. In the direction of the main attack, two rifle companies, one from each rifle division of the first echelon, went on the attack with the task of invoking enemy fire and thereby identifying new ones and clarifying the location of known firing points, positions of artillery and mortars. At 08:40, guns and mortars opened fire on the German defenses. The devastating shelling of the front line, strongholds, positions of artillery and mortar batteries of the enemy continued for an hour. Then more than 100 guns hit the firing points on the forward edge with direct fire. At the same time, the pilots of the 211th Assault Air Division launched a bombing and assault attack on enemy strongholds.

At 10:00, the infantry of the 28th and 357th rifle divisions of the 3rd shock army went on the attack and entered the battle for mastering the first trench. At the same time, the artillery moved the fire deep into the enemy defenses. In some sectors of the front, Soviet artillery managed to completely suppress enemy firing points, which allowed the infantry to overcome the front line on the move and engage in battle in the second German trench. An hour after the start of the attack, units of the 28th Infantry Division broke through the German defenses in a 2.5 km section and advanced up to 2 km in depth. In the zone of action of the 357th Infantry Division, the German defense was not completely destroyed by artillery fire, the attackers met strong resistance and could not advance.

The offensive in the 4th shock army began successfully. The 360th and 47th Rifle Divisions also went on the attack at 10 o'clock on October 6 after almost an hour and a half of artillery and aviation preparation. Encountering no serious resistance, they soon took possession of the first lines of trenches. At about 11:30, the 236th tank brigade of Colonel N. D. Chuprov was introduced into the battle. After 20 minutes, the second mobile group rushed into the gap, led by the commander of the 143rd tank brigade, Colonel A. S. Podkovsky. The tankers were given the task of cutting the highway Nevel - Gorodok.

The stubborn resistance of the Nazis in front of the front of the 357th Infantry Division of the 3rd Shock Army threatened to disrupt the entire operation, in which the main success factor was to be the swiftness of the offensive. In the current situation, the commander of the 3rd shock army decided to use the success of the 28th rifle division to bring the breakthrough development echelon into battle. The 78th Tank Brigade, one regiment of the 21st Guards Rifle Division in vehicles and reinforcements rushed forward. Following them on foot moved the remaining two regiments of the 21st Guards Division. Major-General Mikhailov led the development echelon of the breakthrough. Minefields and wetlands that lay in the path of the attackers greatly reduced the pace of the offensive. To overcome them, sapper units were used, infantrymen literally dragged vehicles through the mud and swamps on their hands. By 2 p.m., units of the breakthrough development echelon overcame the enemy’s defenses and soon, ahead of the retreating German units, reached the Shestikha River and captured bridges across it. The offensive developed successfully. Separate pockets of resistance encountered on the way were suppressed by the fire of ground forces and ground attack aircraft. The raids of enemy bombers were repelled by anti-aircraft gunners and cover fighters. By 4 p.m., the advance detachment had reached Nevel. The German garrison, taken by surprise, could not organize resistance and the battle in the city quickly ended. After occupying the railway station, 1,600 Nevelsk residents were released from two echelons prepared for shipment to Germany. At 16:40, the commander of the 78th tank brigade, Colonel Ya. G. Kochergin, handed over to the army headquarters a report on the capture of Nevel. Success was achieved so quickly that the front commander A. I. Eremenko doubted the accuracy of the report. K. N. Galitsky confirmed the information with a personal report and proposed to develop an offensive against Idritsa and Polotsk. But A. I. Eremenko, given the tense situation on the Kalinin front, did not support him and ordered to consolidate the success achieved. By the end of the day, units were entrenched to the northwest and west of the city.

As a result of the first day of the operation, the troops of the 3rd and 4th shock armies completed their tasks and knocked out units of the 263rd infantry and 2nd airfield divisions of the Nazis from the occupied lines. Parrying the blow, the German command began to hastily pull up reinforcements from other sectors of the front to the breakthrough area. Starting from October 7, units of the 58th and 122nd Infantry, as well as the 281st Security Division, began to appear in the combat area. Suitable troops began to make attempts to regain lost ground. At the same time, from October 7, the activity of German aviation began to increase sharply, which on that day completed 305 sorties. Continuously increasing, the number of sorties by October 11 reached 900. Fighting broke out in the air with the pilots of the 240th Fighter Aviation Division.

The Soviet command, in turn, sought to develop the offensive. To do this, the commander of the 3rd shock army on the night of October 7 brought the 31st rifle brigade into battle, which by morning widened the gap in the German defense to 10-12 km. In the afternoon of the same day, the 360th Rifle Division and the 236th Tank Brigade from the 4th Shock Army broke the enemy’s resistance in one of the major defense centers, went to Lake Ezerishche and began to bypass it from the north and south. Soon, the troops advancing on the right flank of the army managed to reach the Gorodok-Nevel highway and cut it.

On the morning of October 8, fierce battles unfolded with counterattacking German troops throughout the entire Soviet offensive zone. From the Soviet side, the 46th Guards Rifle Division was introduced into the battle, from the German side, reserves approached, with a total number of at least two divisions. The Germans made especially strong attacks on the positions of the 21st Guards Rifle Division and the 100th Rifle Brigade, which occupied the defenses northwest of Nevel. In the course of an intense many hours of battle, the Wehrmacht units first managed to break into the location Soviet troops and approach the city, but a timely organized counterattack made it possible to restore the situation soon. All subsequent attacks were also repulsed.

On October 9 and 10, intense fighting continued in all directions. The German command sought to regain lost positions. The Soviet troops, in turn, tried to hold the occupied lines and even expand the front of the breakthrough. And it has been successful in a number of ways. On October 9, units of the 28th Infantry Division broke through to Bolshoi Ivan Lake and occupied an inter-lake defile, which significantly improved the position of the defending units north of Nevel. On the night of October 10, the 46th Guards Rifle Division achieved significant success in its direction. These days, the 117th and 16th Lithuanian rifle divisions entered the battle in the zone of the 4th shock army to repel German counterattacks.

By October 11, the grouping of German troops had significantly increased due to the approaching reserves and the numerical superiority went over to the side of the Wehrmacht. The further advance of the Red Army units was stopped. In the current situation, the front commander ordered the troops to go on the defensive.

During the operation, partisans provided active support to the advancing troops. By their actions, they violated German communications and delayed the approach of the reserves.

Losses

Germany

During the battles German troops lost over 7400 people, 8 tanks, 236 guns, 215 mortars, more than 600 vehicles. The 2nd Airfield Division of the Luftwaffe suffered such heavy losses that it was disbanded.

USSR

There is no data on the losses of the Soviet troops.

Operation results

Careful two-month preparation led to the accomplishment of the main task of the operation in one day. Soviet command managed to hide the large-scale preparations for the operation, which made it possible to achieve surprise and ultimately led to success.

With the loss of Nevel, the Wehrmacht lost a major road junction, which fundamentally disrupted its entire communications system in this sector of the front and made it difficult to maneuver reserves. In the future, a gap in the German defense, formed by the penetration of the Soviet troops, brought a lot of anxiety to the German command. Hitler repeatedly demanded to eliminate the breakthrough, but all attempts to fulfill his order ended in failure. K. Tippelskirch wrote.

The main trump card of the Nevel campaign should were to become the suddenness and swiftness of the blow. For almost two months, the command of the Kalinin Front was carefully preparing for the future offensive. Our troops did not have a significant numerical superiority over the enemy, so it was decided to concentrate the main forces in the direction of the main attack. By the beginning of the assault on Nevel, the front command had only three tank brigades at its disposal, and the ground forces were covered by the 3rd Air Army of Major General Nikolai Filippovich Papivin.

The troops began work on training in combat operations in a wooded and swampy area, overcoming inter-lake fashion shows. The formation and training of assault detachments took place. The troops continuously worked out various phases of the battle, taking into account the terrain, overcoming wetlands, forcing water barriers. The interaction between artillery, infantry and tank formations was honed separately.

In early October 1943, the preparations were completed. Assault battalions and artillery began to advance to their original positions. The regrouping of forces took place in the strictest secrecy, under the cover of forests, all troop movements took place only at night, and only the top leadership of the front knew the time and place of the main attack. Special attention was paid to reconnaissance, data on the location of artillery and anti-aircraft batteries were constantly refined and corrected.

In order to divert attention, about a day before the onset, partisan detachments In the Pskov region, a series of sabotage and attacks were carried out by the security garrisons of the Nevelsk transport hub. At night, sappers cut the barbed wire and defused the mines, and reconnaissance in force was carried out. The attacking units, having caused fire on themselves, were thereby supposed to discover new ones and clarify the location of known enemy firing points.

The Nevelsk offensive operation began at 5 am on October 6, 1943.. The main blow to enemy positions was delivered by the 3rd and 4th shock armies under the command of Lieutenant General Kuzma Nikitovich Galitsky and Major General Vasily Ivanovich Shvetsov.

At 8:40 in the morning, massive artillery preparation began,which gradually moved into the depths of enemy defenses, a little later attack aircraft hit.

In some areas, the artillerymen managed to completely suppress the enemy's firing points. As the participants in the battle recalled, the advancing units began to move forward already during the artillery preparation.

The decisive role in the operation was to be played by the 3rd Shock Army.. It was in the direction of its strike, on a narrow four-kilometer section, that 90% of the artillery of the front was concentrated. Over 800 guns and mortars unleashed a flurry of fire on the German defensive positions. At 10 am, the infantry went into battle along the previously prepared passages in the minefields. In the first echelon of troops, the 28th Infantry Division of Colonel M.F. Bukshtynovich advanced on Nevel, whose task was to quickly and decisively break through the enemy defenses.

Simultaneously with the army of Lieutenant General Galitsky K.N., the 4th shock army of Major General V.I. Shvetsov launched an offensive. His troops were supposed to cover the southern flank of the forces advancing on Nevel and cut the Nevel-Gorodok highway.

An hour later, Shvetsov's troops managed to advance 2.5 km and capture the first line of enemy trenches. Volleys of our artillery caused panic among the Nazis. Enemies began to leave trenches and go to the second echelon of defense.

The first to break into the enemy trenches were the soldiers of Colonel Bukshtynovich. Having captured and cleared the first trench from the enemies, they, without stopping, moved into the second. The gun crew of senior sergeant Rudovikov destroyed ten enemy bunkers within a few minutes with well-aimed fire. As a result of a swift throw, the defense was broken through, tanks of the 78th brigade of the colonel rushed into the gap that had formed Ya.G. Kochergin and parts of the 21st Guards Rifle Division, Major General Denis Vasilyevich Mikhailov.

At the beginning general attack tanks and cars, not being able to move through the swampy areas of the area, were forced to move along the only road leading through the front line of the enemy's defense. This road was mined by the Germans in the Polityka area, and four tanks and several vehicles were blown up here. The shelling of the breakthrough area and, accordingly, the mobile group intensified with the retreat of the Germans. The minefields and swampy areas that lay in the path of the mobile detachment greatly reduced the pace of the offensive. Great assistance in overcoming these obstacles was provided by our sapper units, soldiers literally dragged cars through the mud and swamps on their hands. Kochergin and Mikhailov received a categorical order from the commander to speed up the advance of the column, not getting involved in battles with small groups of the enemy. A column of tanks and vehicles, breaking out onto the Usvyaty-Nevel highway, rapidly moved towards Nevel. Separate pockets of resistance encountered on its way were suppressed by artillery fire and ground attack aircraft. The raids of enemy bombers were repelled by anti-aircraft gunners and cover fighters. The offensive developed rapidly with the coordinated interaction of all branches of the armed forces.

After the division took part in the battles of defensive and offensive operations Battle of Kursk, she concentrated in the area of the village of Koshelev.

On August 11, 1943, the 16th division was transferred to another operational direction, from where the road to the Lithuanian SSR was opened. The division was withdrawn from the fighting and from the 42nd Rifle Corps. She made a march to the east, passed through the places she had conquered, concentrated in the Verkhnyaya Boevka - Sukhoe - Kholodovo region, 15 kilometers northwest of Kromy, in the reserve of the 48th Army of the Central Front. On August 12, she was withdrawn from the 48th Army and transferred to the reserve of the commander of the troops of the Central Front. August 21 to railway she departed for Tula for understaffing and rest. Three weeks while in reserve Supreme High Command, the division hastily prepared for new responsible battles, having received replenishment with personnel, weapons, equipment and transport.

On September 14, the leaders of the republic came to the division, got acquainted with the situation, moods, and the state of the division.

On September 23, the division was raised by order, loaded onto railway trains, and in five days along the route Tula - Moscow - Kunya was transported to the Velikiye Luki region on the Kalinin Front, where from September 27 it was included in the 2nd Guards Rifle Corps of the 4th shock army (commanded by Major General Shvetsov V.I. (1898–1958).

During the 1943 operations to liberate Belarus and prepare for the liberation of the Baltic states, the Stavka planned the Nevelsk operation - in October 1943, a strike at the junction of the German army groups North and Center by the forces of the 3rd and 4th shock armies.

The 4th shock army was to advance during this operation on the right wing of the Kalinin Front. The basis of its strike force was the 2nd Guards Rifle Corps, Major General A.P. Beloborodov (1903–1990). The 16th division was included in the corps of the famous commander and received Active participation in the Nevelsk, Gorodok and Ezerishche operations, freeing Belarus.

At the Kunya station, the arriving echelons were quickly unloaded, the regiments, one after the other, marched on foot to positions south of the village of Avenishche, where the division entered the second echelon of the 2nd Guards Rifle Corps.

On October 5, 1943, Snechkus came to the division again. For the first time in his speech, the fighters were reminded that the division was already really close to Lithuania, that the Lithuanian people were waiting for the fighters of the division as liberators.

By October 8, the division was transported by rail and concentrated in the Usov-Sirotok-Ostrov area, 20 kilometers southeast of Nevel. But on October 10, the division again received an order to march and the first combat mission on the Kalinin Front. It was an order from the commander of the 2nd Guards Rifle Corps A.P. Beloborodov on October 11, engage in battle near Lake Ordovo, expand the occupied bridgehead, advancing in the direction of the villages of Ezerishche, Rudnya, and liberate the village of Palkino. These positions were at the forefront of the Ezerishchenskaya grouping of our troops, blocking the narrow defile between the lakes Ordovo and Ezerishche, as well as the road to the town of Gorodok, Vitebsk region.

On the same day, the division went on the offensive. The 167th regiment advanced on the village of Palkino, and the 156th - on Lobok and Ezerishche. The Germans, with air strikes, strong mortar and machine-gun fire, using five tanks and several self-propelled guns, did not allow the offensive of our troops to develop. The advance was 200–300 meters.

During the night, a detour was made. A detachment of 195 soldiers from the 1st Battalion of the 249th Regiment was sent behind enemy lines. The detachment bypassed the forests of lakes Melkoe and Ordovo, went to the rear of the enemy’s defense near the village of Palkino, which in the morning was to be taken by a simultaneous attack of the regiments from the front and a strike by the detachment from the rear. But the regiments that went on the attack at 8 am on October 12 were unable to break through, as they suffered heavy losses from heavy fire and air strikes. The attack from the front failed. It turned out that the headquarters of the corps had already taken similar maneuvers more than once, and the Germans could expect such actions. The detachment, which was surrounded, could not break through the front line - only 47 soldiers and officers made their way, the rest died, some were taken prisoner. The captured Germans immediately shot.

On October 17, another detachment of the soldiers of the 249th regiment, numbering 317 people, left for the rear of the enemy, he was armed with mortars and three anti-tank guns. Communication was provided by two radio operators with walkie-talkies. The detachment had the task, bypassing Lake Ordovo, to go through the forests to the area west of Pankra. The detachment, constantly maintaining contact with the command, successfully operated in the German rear, diverting enemy forces. Having occupied the enemy's trenches, the soldiers repulsed the counterattacks of the Nazis, while destroying two tanks. On the fourth day, having successfully completed the task, by order of the command, the detachment returned to the regiment.

On October 18, the 167th regiment, after many days of heavy fighting, resumed the offensive and finally took the village of Palkino.

In general, the battles were fierce, our offensive was not successful, the enemy now and then turned into counterattacks. In the end, the command of the 4th shock army came to the conclusion that attempts to break through the enemy defenses with a frontal strike did not give positive results. The division, by order, ceased active operations and went on the defensive, successfully repelling several fierce counterattacks by the Nazis.

The fierceness of these battles was due to the fact that the Nazis occupied positions that were very convenient for defense. They prepared the defense here in advance, having equipped the area in terms of engineering: they saturated it with fire weapons. The reason for their desperate resistance was that the interlake Ezerishche - Ordovo, where the division broke through, led to important road junctions - Gorodok and Vitebsk, which the German command called "the gates to the Baltic."

In the second half of October 1943, the 3rd and 4th shock armies again successfully went on the offensive.

They went through the partisan region, forests and swamps, in the direction of Polotsk and Pustoshka (Vitebsk region). The troops moved forward 70–80 km and reached the approaches to Pustoshka and the distant approaches to Polotsk.

A risky configuration of the front line was formed. South of Nevel, the German defense was broken through in a very small area. The neck of the breakthrough to the north of the city of Ezerishche remained narrow - no more than 8-9 km along the front, including the water area of the lakes Nevel, Yemenets and Ordovo. It was through this narrow strip that the entire supply of the two shock armies with ammunition, fuel, and food was carried out. The road was extremely vulnerable, because it was shot through not only by artillery and mortar, but in a number of sections by machine-gun fire of the enemy.

The German attempt to cut this road so that two shock armies were in a bag suggested itself and was only a matter of time.

offensive battles on the Palkino - Loboc section continued until the end of October. During this time, the division destroyed more than a thousand soldiers and officers of the enemy and a lot of military equipment. The enemy sought at any cost to liquidate our group that had broken through to the west of Nevel. The German command all the time brought reserves to the battlefield. The troops of the 4th shock army, and among them the 16th Lithuanian division, developed success south of Nevel, fighting in the difficult conditions of the lake region.

With the capture of Nevel, the Kalinin Front opened lines of action to Polotsk and Vitebsk. Polotsk bordered on the vast Polotsk-Lepel partisan region. Vitebsk was considered by the Germans to be the "gateway to the Baltic". The loss of these two cities by the Germans led the Soviet troops to positions that threatened the rear of the Army Groups "North" and "Center".

Gorodok is located between Nevel and Vitebsk. Here, in an attempt to prevent further advance to the west of our advancing fronts, the Germans transferred two infantry divisions, removing them from near Leningrad, where they had to stop active operations, and from the southern wing of Army Group Center - five infantry and one tank division . The aviation group was reinforced.

To the north and south of Nevel and east of Vitebsk, fierce fighting continued throughout November and December 1943.

The division participated in these battles until October 25. Separate parts of the division and its artillery were used in battles north of Vitebsk. After heavy fighting, the division was replaced on October 25 by units of the 156th Infantry Division (II Formation) and withdrawn from the front line to rest, where it was stationed in the villages of Grishkovo, Matsilishche, Krasny Bor. These days, units and divisions of the division received reinforcements, put themselves in order.

On October 29, she left the 2nd Guards Rifle Corps and went under the direct control of the commander of the 4th Shock Army.

The division, changing the areas of concentration, by November 5, 1943, moved to the Vysotskoye, Ovinishte, Vashchily area. The headquarters of the division was located in the village of Kozly, Nevelsky district (10 kilometers northeast of Ezerishcha). The division was at that moment in the reserve of the 4th shock army. But a few days later, early in the morning of November 8, she was alerted.

The Germans delivered a strong blow at the junction of the 3rd and 4th shock armies, setting themselves the task of returning Nevel, capturing the inter-lake defile, closing the corridor through which the armies were kept in touch with the rear, and surrounding them. The danger of the environment became very real.

In this situation, at 07:30, the chief of staff of the 4th shock army began to transmit an urgent order from the chief of staff of the army to the commander of the Lithuanian division: “Under pressure from superior enemy forces, our units are fighting back. The task of the division is to stop the advance of the enemy and restore the original position. At this point, the connection was cut off. The regiments were alerted and deployed in the path of the advancing German divisions.

In pursuance of the order to counterattack the German troops advancing from the village of Lobok and restore the position, the division itself began to advance in the direction of Shchepikha, Borok and Blinki.

At noon on November 8, the regiments of the 16th Lithuanian Division met the enemy near the villages of Terpilovo, Belina, Blinki, Borok and height 191.6. On the evening of November 8, the Germans occupied the town of Borok. In all positions, the Lithuanian division defended its lines in a fierce battle.

The positions of the artillery regiment of the division (commander - Colonel Povilaitis Simonaitis) were in the depths of the division's defense just in the direction in which the Nazis struck. The advanced tanks that broke through, accompanied by infantry, unexpectedly appeared in front of the sixth battery of the regiment. When they were seen, they were already within 500 meters. The outcome of the battle was decided by seconds, and the gunners instantly opened accurate fire. The lead tank was knocked out with the very first shot from Sergeant Stanislovaitis' gun. The second tank exploded from artillery fire, after which the third tank disappeared from view. Following this, the battery fired on the infantry, inflicting heavy losses on them. The gunners of the neighboring battery had to fight off tanks and infantry that came close to its firing positions with grenades. The fourth battery managed to knock out several enemy tanks, but suffered heavy losses. However, the Germans were unable to break through to the north here either.

With heavy losses for the Germans, the subsequent attacks of enemy tanks and infantry against the positions of the Lithuanian division were repulsed. In all positions, the Lithuanian division defended its lines in a fierce battle.

On November 9, the 167th regiment (commander of the regiment, Colonel Vladas Moteka) took the town of Borok from the Germans.

Sergei Kostyukovich, a participant in this battle, who became a Belarusian academician after the war, recalls how V. Moteka behaved when German counterattacks were repelled near the town of Borok: “He rode a white horse from one battalion to another and in the most dramatic situations, keeping a calm expression face, encouraging the fighters, with all his appearance, as if saying: “Do not be afraid, guys, be bolder!”.

During stubborn defensive battles from November 8 to November 11, at the turn of the southern shore of Lake. Zaverezhye - Beliny - Borok - Blinky division defended for four days, resorting to counterattacks and bayonet strikes, in fierce battles, when the Germans even tried to resort to mental attacks.

The situation developed in such a way that, due to the fierce fighting, the rear of the division was not able to deliver food to the fighters at the forefront, and the soldiers were left without food for several days.

The task assigned to the division was completed, and the initial position of our defense was restored on this sector of the front.

In these defensive battles, the division inflicted heavy losses on the enemy (up to 3 thousand people), held the line of defense, knocked out and burned 12 tanks. The Germans also lost a lot of artillery pieces, vehicles and were driven back to their original positions. Together with other formations, the Lithuanian division thwarted the encirclement plan of our 3rd and 4th armies. The situation on the isthmus improved thanks to the exceptional heroism of the regiment of tank destroyers and three rifle divisions, including the 16th Lithuanian, which not only stopped the enemy’s advance towards Nevel, but also destroyed more than 10 thousand of his soldiers.

In these battles in the Lithuanian division, the artillerymen of the 224th artillery regiment, who occupied positions in the sector of the 167th regiment between the lakes Ordovo and Ezerishche, especially distinguished themselves. Under the onslaught of the advancing German troops, the 167th regiment was forced to retreat and take up new positions. Artillerymen of the 224th regiment, left for some time without infantry cover, held their positions, continuing to fire.

Having honorably held its positions and covered the defenseless communications of the advancing armies, the division ensured further strategic success and saved general position in front scale.

The enemy, having suffered heavy losses, went on the defensive. For courage and heroism shown in battles, 175 soldiers and officers were awarded. The front commander announced gratitude to all personnel of the division.

On the night of November 12, the Lithuanian formation was withdrawn from the front line. Only the 224th artillery regiment and artillery units of rifle regiments were left in firing positions. In positions, the small infantry units of the 16th division were replaced by soldiers of the 29th division (third formation).

A reminder of the price of victories, which marked the combat path of the division, were military cemeteries along the Nevel-Gorodok highway and a memorial stone near the road on a hill in Dubishche near the lake. There is a monument here fallen soldiers 16th Lithuanian Division, installed by its veterans after the war.

Nevel, who occupied a key position in the Vitebsk direction, was of great operational importance for the warring parties. With the liberation of this city, the operation of the Dno-Novosokolniki-Nevel road stopped, which allowed the Nazis to maneuver forces between Army Groups Center and North. At the junction of these two groupings of Nazi troops, a 20-kilometer gap formed, unfilled by troops. Realizing the danger of the current situation, the German command took all measures to eliminate the breakthrough of the Soviet troops, recapture Nevel, and restore the situation at the front. The opponents hastily transferred to this area 2 infantry divisions from near Leningrad, 5 infantry and tank divisions from the southern wing of Army Group Center. All squadrons of the 6th Air Fleet were also concentrated here. From October 11 to October 31, the counterattacks of the Nazis went one after another. As a result, the enemy managed to stop the movement of the Red Army troops, but failed to return Nevel. Nevertheless, the troops of the Kalinin Front, having lost 56,474 people in the October battles killed, wounded and missing, did not fulfill their task. They were forced to carry out a new regrouping of forces and prepare to continue the operation in the Vitebsk direction.

Preparations for the operation began long before it began. Despite the fact that the Headquarters did not officially give orders for the development, the operation was developed already before the troops entered the conditional positions. A.I. Eremenko recalls: “With the end of the Dukhovshchinsko-Demidov operation, the troops of the Kalinin Front developed an offensive against Vitebsk. The Nevelsk operation, which we also planned in advance, stood in line. A written directive on the preparation of this operation in order to maintain secrecy was not given. However, the commanders of the 3rd and 4th shock armies were assigned tasks for its preparation.

The nearest reserves of the Wehrmacht were up to four battalions and up to two infantry regiments.

In an effort to keep Belarus at all costs, the Nazi command concentrated huge forces here and created a powerful defense in depth. Cities and urban settlements were transformed into strongholds. Around Vitebsk and other large settlements a circular defense was created, which consisted of several trench-type defensive lines. Fortifications were erected along the banks of the rivers.

Despite the generally favorable situation, the future operation seemed to be a difficult undertaking. Here is how I.Kh. Bagromyan: "By the beginning of October 1943, the situation on the Soviet-German front was generally favorable for the Red Army. The troops of the Kalinin and Western fronts reached the approaches to Vitebsk, Orsha and Mogilev. The Central, Voronezh and Steppe fronts reached the middle reaches of the Dnieper and crossed everywhere him, having the task of continuing the liberation of Ukraine and southern Belarus. By the same time, the troops of our Bryansk Front, having defeated a large enemy grouping, advanced 250 kilometers, reaching the upper reaches of the Dnieper north of Gomel. "

The difficulty in conducting the operation was, first of all, that the Nazis were able to significantly strengthen the Nevel area. A.I. Eremenko recalls: “Occupying the defense in this area for 9-10 months, they created a well-developed engineering system of trenches, trenches, communication passages of a full profile. Dugouts and bunkers had overlaps in several rolls. Our artillery reconnaissance spotted a large number of spare positions for machine guns, mortars and guns.

The main goal of the offensive operation, in addition to occupying an important point, is to provide conditions for further actions in the direction of Gorodok and Vitebsk. The commander of the Kalinin Front recalled: “When planning the Nevelsk operation, it was meant to ensure the general offensive of the front in the direction of Vitebsk, and also to create conditions for the development of success in southbound to Gorodok, in the north and northwest - to capture the Novosokolniki resistance center. The attack on Nevel, in addition, diverted significant German forces, its success would have disrupted the entire communication system of the enemy.

The main role in the offensive was to be played by the 3rd Shock Army. To ensure the solution of the main task of the operation, Lieutenant General K.N. Galitsky included in the strike force four of the six rifle divisions, two of the three rifle brigades, all tanks and almost all of the army's artillery. These forces were concentrated on a 4-kilometer section. The defense of the rest of the 100-kilometer section of the army front was entrusted to the remaining forces. In accordance with the plan of the operation, the option of deep operational formation of the strike force was chosen. The 28th and 357th rifle divisions, reinforced by two mortar regiments, were allocated to the first echelon, intended to break through the German defenses. The 78th Tank Brigade, the 21st Guards Rifle Division, and three artillery regiments were assigned to develop success after the breakthrough of the defense. The reserve (third echelon) consisted of the 46th Guards Rifle Division, the 31st and 100th Rifle Brigades. The operation plan included 5 stages. At the first stage, it was necessary to covertly concentrate troops intended for the offensive in the initial areas and complete the accumulation of materiel, primarily ammunition, necessary for the operation. At the second stage, the troops quickly and covertly occupied their initial position in the immediate vicinity of the forward edge. The third stage included artillery preparation, an attack, a breakthrough of the enemy defenses to a depth of 6-7 km to the river. Shestikha, ensuring the entry into the breakthrough of the echelon of the development of success, which at the fourth stage with a swift blow was to capture the inter-lake defile on the outskirts of Nevel and take over the city. At the fifth stage, it was necessary to gain a foothold north and west of Nevel, organize a solid defense and be ready to repel counterattacks from suitable enemy reserves.

Lieutenant General K.N. Galitsky writes in his memoirs: “According to the plan for the artillery support of the operation, 814 guns and mortars were concentrated in the breakthrough area, which accounted for 91% of all available in the army. The artillery was tasked with destroying enemy artillery and mortar batteries, suppressing firing points at the forefront and in the depths of the defense, preventing counterattacks and preventing the approach of reserves. Artillery actions were organized as an artillery offensive, in which 1.5 hours were allotted for artillery preparation and 35 minutes for accompanying the attack with a barrage of fire.

In order to prevent a blow to the flank of the advancing army of K.N. Galitsky and cover her actions, the 4th shock army was supposed to advance south of Nevel. The blow was delivered by the 360th and 47th rifle divisions in the direction of Lake Ezerishche and further to Gorodok. Success was to be developed by the 236th and 143rd tank brigades. Their main task was to cut the Gorodok-Nevel highway.

For aviation support of troops from the 3rd Air Army, the 211th assault and 240th fighter aviation divisions were allocated. During the preparation of the infantry for the attack, the pilots had to deliver bombing and assault strikes against strongholds located in the direction of the main attack. In the future, attack aircraft under the cover of fighters were supposed to ensure the advancement of the 28th Infantry Division and the breakthrough development echelon. In addition, aviation was entrusted with the task of covering the strike force from the air, disrupting the enemy’s railway communications in the Polotsk-Dretun and Nevel-Gorodok sectors and conducting aerial reconnaissance in the direction of Pustoshka and Vitebsk in order to timely detect suitable German reserves.

From the memoirs of A.I. Eremenko: “By the end of the day on October 5, the last orders for the attack were given to the troops. Its beginning was scheduled for 10 o'clock on October 6, 1943.

By 3 o'clock on October 6, units and subunits of the 357th and 28th rifle divisions took up their starting position and dug in 300 meters from the enemy trenches. The sappers were finishing the trick of the passages in the minefields, cutting the wire. The enemy set up ambushes in two passages in the sector of the 28th division, sappers and infantry cover spotted them in time and drove them away with fire.

The operation in the very first hours acquired a favorable result for the Red Army. A breakthrough was quickly formed, where the tanks rushed, individual pockets of stubborn resistance were suppressed by the tactical advantage of the attackers. A.I. Eremenko recalled the results of the first day of the operation in this way: “As a result of the successful actions of our troops on the first day of the operation, units of the 263rd Infantry and 2nd Air Field Divisions of the Nazis were driven out of their lines. The German command began to hastily pull up new units from other sectors of the front to the breakthrough area. On October 7, units of the 58th Infantry Division appeared north of Nevel, arriving from the Krasnovaldaisk region, from the Volkhov Front section.

Careful two-month preparation led to the accomplishment of the main task of the operation in one day. The Soviet command managed to hide the large-scale preparation of the operation, which made it possible to achieve surprise and ultimately led to success.

On October 8, 1943, soldiers of the 84th Rifle Corps (commander General S.A. Knyazkov) and a maneuver group led by Colonel P.F. Dremov was released by Mr. Liozno. By order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, five formations and units of the front were given the honorary titles of "Liozno".

The directive of the Stavka dated October 16, 1943 noted: “The troops of the Kalinin Front did not fulfill the assigned task - to capture Vitebsk by October 10 - did not complete. One of the reasons for this is the unorganized advance of the troops of the front. The offensive is not carried out by all the forces of the front, more or less simultaneously, by separate armies in separate sectors of the front, which makes it possible for the enemy to maneuver with his own forces and create powerful defensive lines.

Commander of the Kalinin Front E.A. Eremenko writes in his memoirs: “As a result, the troops of the adjacent flanks of the 3rd and 4th shock armies brilliantly completed the task assigned to them. The city of Nevel, which had been under the heel of the German occupiers since July 16, 1941, was returned to the Motherland.

Thus, on October 6, after an hour and a half of artillery preparation, the right-flank armies of the Kalinin Front, the 3rd and 4th Shock Armies (commanders K.M. Galitsky and V.I. Shvetsov), went on the offensive. They delivered the main blow to Vitebsk from the north through Nevel at the junction of Army Groups Center and North. After two days of fighting on October 7, a large enemy resistance center, the city of Nevel, was liberated. 320 settlements were also cleared. The main evidence of the events are the memories of A.I. Eremenko and K.M. Galitsky, who described in detail all the nuances of the operation.

Commanders

Nevelsk offensive operation- front-line offensive operation of the Red Army against German troops during the Great Patriotic War. It was carried out from October 6 to October 10, 1943 by part of the forces of the Kalinin Front with the aim of capturing Nevel and disrupting enemy communications on the northern wing of the Soviet-German front.

Situation

German defense

German defensive fortifications in the Nevel area (December 1943)

The German defense was a system of strong strongholds and centers of resistance located on terrain with a large number of lakes and deep ravines. In engineering terms, the defense was well prepared and included a developed system of trenches, trenches, full-profile communication passages, as well as dugouts and bunkers with overlappings of several rolls. A large number of spare positions were equipped for machine guns, mortars and guns. In the direction where the Soviet troops intended to strike the main blow, there were more than 100 firing points, up to 80 dugouts, 16-20 mortar positions, 12 artillery batteries and 12-16 separate guns. In addition, up to 8 artillery batteries could fire from neighboring areas. The front line of defense was covered by two lanes of minefields 40-60 m deep and two rows of barbed wire. The second defensive line passed along the river. Shestihe. The total tactical depth of defense was 6-7 km.

The nearest reserves of the Wehrmacht were up to four battalions and up to two infantry regiments.

The composition and strength of the parties

USSR

Part of the forces of the Kalinin Front:

357th Infantry Division (Major General A. L. Kronik)
28th Rifle Division (Colonel M. F. Bukshtynovich)
21st Guards Rifle Division (Major General D. V. Mikhailov)
78th Tank Brigade (Colonel Ya. G. Kochergin)
46th Guards Rifle Division (Major General S. I. Karapetyan)
100th Infantry Brigade (Colonel A. I. Serebryakov)
31st Infantry Brigade (Colonel L. A. Bakuev)

2nd Guards Rifle Corps (Lieutenant General A.P. Beloborodov)
- 360th Rifle Division (Colonel I.I. Chinov)
- 117th Infantry Division (Major General E. G. Koberidze)
- 16th Lithuanian Rifle Division (Major General V. A. Karvyalis)
Part of the forces of the 83rd Rifle Corps (Lieutenant General A. A. Dyakonov)
- 47th Infantry Division (Major General V. G. Chernov)
236th Tank Brigade (Colonel N. D. Chuprov)
143rd Tank Brigade (Colonel Podkovsky A.S.)

240th Fighter Aviation Division (Colonel G. V. Zimin)
211th Assault Aviation Division (Colonel P. M. Kuchma)

Germany

Wehrmacht soldiers preparing for defense in the Nevel area (December 1943)

On the morning of October 8, fierce battles unfolded with counterattacking German troops throughout the entire Soviet offensive zone. From the Soviet side, the 46th Guards Rifle Division was introduced into the battle, from the German side, reserves approached, with a total number of at least two divisions. The Germans made especially strong attacks on the positions of the 21st Guards Rifle Division and the 100th Rifle Brigade, which occupied the defenses northwest of Nevel. During a tense many-hour battle, the Wehrmacht units first managed to break into the location of the Soviet troops and approach the city, but a timely organized counterattack made it possible to restore the situation soon. All subsequent attacks were also repulsed.

On October 9 and 10, intense fighting continued in all directions. The German command sought to regain lost positions. The Soviet troops, in turn, tried to hold the occupied lines and even expand the front of the breakthrough. And it has been successful in a number of ways. On October 9, units of the 28th Infantry Division broke through to Lake Bolshoy Ivan and occupied an inter-lake defile, which significantly improved the position of the defending units north of Nevel. On the night of October 10, the 46th Guards Rifle Division achieved significant success in its direction. These days, the 117th and 16th Lithuanian rifle divisions entered the battle in the zone of the 4th shock army to repel German counterattacks.

During the operation, partisans provided active support to the advancing troops. By their actions, they violated German communications and delayed the approach of the reserves.

Losses

Germany

During the fighting, German troops lost over 7400 people, 8 tanks, 236 guns, 215 mortars, more than 600 vehicles. The 2nd Airfield Division of the Luftwaffe suffered such heavy losses that it was disbanded.