In the late spring of 1944, relative calm reigned on the Soviet-German front. The Germans, having suffered major defeats during the winter-spring battles, strengthened the defense, and the Red Army rested and gathered strength for the next blow.
Looking at the map of the fighting of that time, you can see on it two large projections of the front line. The first is on the territory of Ukraine, south of the Pripyat River. The second, far to the east, is in Belarus, with a border along the cities of Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, Zhlobin. This ledge was called the "Belarusian balcony", and after a discussion that took place at the end of April 1944 in Headquarters Supreme High Command, it was on him that it was decided to fall upon him with all the might of the troops of the Red Army. The operation to liberate Belarus received the code name "Bagration".
The German command did not foresee such a turn. The terrain in Belarus was wooded and swampy, with big amount lakes and rivers and a rather poorly developed road network. The use of large tank and mechanized formations here, from the point of view of the Nazi generals, was difficult. Therefore, the Wehrmacht was preparing to repel the Soviet offensive on the territory of Ukraine, concentrating much more impressive forces there than in Belarus. So, under the command of the army group "Northern Ukraine" were seven tank divisions and four battalions of tanks "Tiger". And in the subordination of the Army Group "Center" - only one tank, two panzer-grenadier divisions and one battalion of "Tigers". In total, Ernst Busch, who commanded the Central Army Group, had 1.2 million people, 900 tanks and self-propelled guns, 9,500 guns and mortars, and 1,350 aircraft of the 6th Air Fleet.
The Germans created a fairly powerful and layered defense in Belarus. Since 1943, the construction of fortified positions has been underway, often based on natural obstacles: rivers, lakes, swamps, hills. Some cities at the most important communication nodes were declared fortresses. These included, in particular, Orsha, Vitebsk, Mogilev and others. The defensive lines were equipped with bunkers, dugouts, interchangeable artillery and machine-gun positions.
According to the operational plan of the Soviet high command, the troops of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Belorussian Fronts, as well as the 1st Baltic Front, were to defeat the enemy forces in Belarus. The total number of Soviet troops in the operation was approximately 2.4 million people, more than 5,000 tanks, about 36,000 guns and mortars. Air support was provided by the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 16th air armies (more than 5,000 aircraft). Thus, the Red Army achieved a significant, and in many respects, overwhelming superiority over enemy troops.
In order to keep the preparations for the offensive secret, the command of the Red Army prepared and carried out a huge amount of work to ensure the secrecy of the movement of forces and to mislead the enemy. Parts moved to their original positions at night, observing radio silence. During daylight hours, the troops stopped, settling in the forests and carefully disguised themselves. In parallel, a false concentration of troops was carried out in the Chisinau direction, reconnaissance was carried out in combat in the areas of responsibility of the fronts that did not take part in the Bagration operation, whole echelons with models of military equipment were taken from Belarus to the rear. In general, the measures achieved their goal, although the preparations for the offensive of the Red Army were not completely hidden. So, prisoners captured in the zone of action of the 3rd Belorussian Front said that the command German troops noted the strengthening of the Soviet units and expected active actions from the Red Army. But the time of the beginning of the operation, the number of Soviet troops and the exact direction of the strike remained unsolved.
Before the start of the operation, Belarusian partisans became more active, committing a large number of sabotage on the communications of the Nazis. More than 40,000 rails were blown up between 20 and 23 July alone. In general, the actions of the partisans created a number of difficulties for the Germans, but they still did not cause critical damage to the railway network, which was directly stated even by such an authority in reconnaissance and sabotage as I. G. Starinov.
Operation Bagration began on June 23, 1944 and was carried out in two stages. The first stage included the Vitebsk-Orsha, Mogilev, Bobruisk, Polotsk and Minsk operations.
The Vitebsk-Orsha operation was carried out by the troops of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts. The 1st Baltic Front of Army General I. Bagramyan, with the forces of the 6th Guards and 43rd Armies, hit at the junction of Army Groups "North" and "Center" in the general direction of Beshenkovichi. The 4th shock army was to advance on Polotsk.
The 3rd Belorussian Front, Colonel General I. Chernyakhovsky, attacked Bogushevsk and Senno with the forces of the 39th and 5th armies, and at Borisov with units of the 11th Guards and 31st armies. To develop the operational success of the front, the horse-mechanized group of N. Oslikovsky (3rd Guards Mechanized and 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps) and the 5th Guards Tank Army of P. Rotmistrov were intended.
After artillery preparation on June 23, the troops of the fronts went on the offensive. During the first day, the forces of the 1st Baltic Front managed to advance 16 kilometers into the depth of the enemy defense, with the exception of the Polotsk direction, where the 4th shock army met fierce resistance and special success Did not have. The width of the breakthrough of Soviet troops in the direction of the main attack was about 50 kilometers.
The 3rd Belorussian Front achieved significant success in the Bogushevsky direction, breaking through the German defense line more than 50 kilometers wide and capturing three serviceable bridges across the Luchesa River. For the Vitebsk grouping of the Nazis, there was a threat of the formation of a "cauldron". The commander of the German troops requested permission to withdraw, but the Wehrmacht command considered Vitebsk a fortress, and the retreat was not allowed.
During June 24-26 Soviet troops surrounded the enemy troops near Vitebsk and completely destroyed the German division, which covered the city. Four more divisions tried to break through to the west, however, with the exception of a small number of disorganized units, they did not succeed. On June 27, the encircled Germans capitulated. About 10 thousand Nazi soldiers and officers were taken prisoner.
Orsha was also liberated on June 27. The forces of the Red Army entered the Orsha-Minsk highway. On June 28, Lepel was released. In total, at the first stage, parts of the two fronts advanced to a distance of 80 to 150 km.
The Mogilev operation began on June 23. It was conducted by the 2nd Belorussian Front, Colonel-General Zakharov. During the first two days, Soviet troops advanced about 30 kilometers. Then the Germans began to retreat to the western bank of the Dnieper. Their pursuit was carried out by the 33rd and 50th armies. On June 27, Soviet forces crossed the Dnieper, and on June 28, Mogilev was liberated. The German 12th Infantry Division, which was defending in the city, was destroyed. A large number of prisoners and trophies were captured. The German units retreated to Minsk under the blows of the attack aircraft of the front. Soviet troops were moving towards the Berezina River.
The Bobruisk operation was carried out by the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, commanded by General of the Army K. Rokossovsky. According to the plan of the front commander, the blow was delivered in converging directions from Rogachev and Parichi with a general direction to Bobruisk in order to encircle and destroy the German group in this city. After the capture of Bobruisk, it was planned to develop an offensive against Pukhovichi and Slutsk. From the air, the advancing troops were supported by about 2,000 aircraft.
The offensive was carried out in an impenetrable wooded and swampy area, crossed by numerous rivers. The troops had to go through training in order to learn how to walk on bogshoes, overcome water obstacles on improvised means, and also build gati. On June 24, after a powerful artillery preparation, the Soviet troops went on the attack and by the middle of the day broke through the enemy defenses to a depth of 5-6 kilometers. The timely introduction of mechanized units into battle made it possible to reach a breakthrough depth of up to 20 km in some areas.
On June 27, the Bobruisk group of Germans was completely surrounded. There were about 40 thousand enemy soldiers and officers in the ring. Leaving part of the forces to destroy the enemy, the front began to develop an offensive against Osipovichi and Slutsk. The encircled units attempted to break through to the north. In the area of the village of Titovka, a fierce battle took place, during which the Nazis, under cover of artillery, regardless of losses, tried to break through soviet front. To hold back the onslaught, it was decided to use bombers. More than 500 aircraft continuously bombed the concentration of German troops for an hour and a half. Leaving the equipment, the Germans tried to break through to Bobruisk, but were unsuccessful. On June 28, the remnants of the German forces surrendered.
By this time, it was clear that Army Group Center was on the verge of defeat. German troops suffered huge losses in killed and captured, a large amount of equipment was destroyed and captured by Soviet forces. The depth of advance of the Soviet troops ranged from 80 to 150 kilometers. Conditions were created for the encirclement of the main forces of Army Group Center. On June 28, Commander Ernst Busch was removed from his post, and Field Marshal Walter Model took his place.
Troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front reached the Berezina River. In accordance with the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, they were ordered to cross the river and, bypassing the strongholds of the Nazis, develop a swift offensive against the capital of the BSSR.
On June 29, the advanced detachments of the Red Army captured bridgeheads on the western bank of the Berezina and in some areas deepened into the enemy’s defenses by 5-10 kilometers. On June 30, the main forces of the front crossed the river. On the night of July 1, the 11th guards army from the south and southwest broke into the city of Borisov, freeing it by 15:00. On the same day, Begoml and Pleschenitsy were liberated.
On July 2, Soviet troops cut off most of the retreat routes for the Minsk grouping of the enemy. The cities of Vileyka, Zhodino, Logoisk, Smolevichi, Krasnoe were taken. Thus, the Germans were cut off from all major communications.
On the night of July 3, 1944, the commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front, General of the Army I. Chernyakhovsky, ordered the commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army P. Rotmistrov, in cooperation with the 31st Army and the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps, to attack Minsk from the north and northwest direction and by the end of the day on July 3rd completely take over the city.
On July 3, at 9 o'clock in the morning, Soviet troops broke into Minsk. The battles for the city were fought by the 71st and 36th rifle corps of the 31st Army, the 5th Guards Tank Army and the tankers of the Tatsinsky Guards Corps. From the southern and southeastern outskirts, the offensive against the Belarusian capital was supported by units of the 1st Don Tank Corps of the 1st Belorussian Front. By 13:00 the city was liberated.
As mentioned above, Polotsk became a big obstacle for the Soviet troops. The Germans turned it into a powerful defense center and concentrated six infantry divisions near the city. The 1st Baltic Front, with the forces of the 6th Guards and 4th Shock Armies, in converging directions from the south and northeast, was to surround and destroy the German troops.
The Polotsk operation began on June 29. By the evening of July 1, the Soviet units managed to cover the flanks of the German group and reach the outskirts of Polotsk. Violent street fighting ensued, lasting until 4 July. On this day the city was liberated. The forces of the left wing of the front, pursuing the retreating German units, went west for another 110 kilometers, reaching the border of Lithuania.
The first stage of Operation Bagration brought Army Group Center to the brink of disaster. The total advance of the Red Army in 12 days amounted to 225-280 kilometers. A gap about 400 kilometers wide was formed in the German defense, and it was already very difficult to fully cover it. Nevertheless, the Germans tried to stabilize the situation by relying on individual counterattacks in key areas. At the same time, Model was building a new line of defense, including at the expense of units transferred from other sectors of the Soviet-German front. But even those 46 divisions that were sent to the "catastrophe zone" did not significantly affect the state of affairs.
On July 5, the Vilnius operation of the 3rd Belorussian Front began. On July 7, units of the 5th Guards Tank Army and the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps were on the outskirts of the city and began to cover it. On July 8, the Germans brought reinforcements to Vilnius. About 150 tanks and self-propelled guns were concentrated to break through the encirclement. A significant contribution to the failure of all these attempts was made by the aviation of the 1st Air Army, which actively bombed the main centers of resistance of the Germans. On July 13, Vilnius was taken, and the encircled group was destroyed.
The 2nd Belorussian Front developed an offensive against Bialystok. As a reinforcement, the 3rd Army of General Gorbatov was transferred to the front. During the five days of the offensive, the Soviet troops, without experiencing strong resistance, advanced 150 kilometers, liberating the city of Novogrudok on July 8. Near Grodno, the Germans had already gathered their forces, the formations of the Red Army had to repel a number of counterattacks, but on July 16 this Belarusian city was also cleared of enemy troops. By July 27, the Red Army liberated Bialystok and reached the pre-war border of the USSR.
The 1st Belorussian Front was to defeat the enemy near Brest and Lublin with strikes bypassing the Brest fortified area and reach the Vistula River. On July 6, the Red Army took Kovel and broke through defensive line Germans near Siedlce. Having traveled more than 70 kilometers until July 20, Soviet troops crossed the Western Bug and entered Poland. On July 25, a cauldron formed near Brest, but the Soviet soldiers failed to completely destroy the enemy: part of the Nazi forces were able to break through. By the beginning of August, Lublin was taken by the Red Army and bridgeheads on the western bank of the Vistula were captured.
Operation Bagration was a grandiose victory for the Soviet troops. During the two months of the offensive, Belarus, part of the Baltic states and Poland were liberated. During the operation, German troops lost about 400 thousand people killed, wounded and captured. 22 German generals were captured alive, 10 more were killed. Army Group Center was defeated.
A unit of the 3rd Belorussian Front is forcing the Luchesa River.
June 1944
This year marks 70 years since the Red Army carried out one of the largest strategic operations of the Great Patriotic War - Operation Bagration. In the course of it, the Red Army not only liberated the people of Belarus from occupation, but also significantly undermined the forces of the enemy, brought the collapse of fascism closer - our Victory.
Unparalleled in terms of spatial scope, the Belarusian offensive operation is rightfully considered the greatest achievement of the national military art. As a result, the most powerful grouping of the Wehrmacht was defeated. This became possible thanks to the unparalleled courage, heroism of determination and self-sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers and partisans of Belarus, many of whom died a heroic death on Belarusian soil in the name of Victory over the enemy.
Map of the Belarusian operation
After the offensive in the winter of 1943-1944. the front line formed in Belarus a huge ledge with an area of \u200b\u200babout 250 thousand square meters. km, facing east. It penetrated deeply into the location of the Soviet troops and was of great operational and strategic importance for both sides. The elimination of this ledge and the liberation of Belarus opened the Red Army the shortest route to Poland and Germany, endangered flank attacks by the enemy army groups "North" and "Northern Ukraine".
In the central direction, the Soviet troops were opposed by the Army Group Center (3rd Panzer, 4th, 9th and 2nd Armies) under the command of Field Marshal E. Bush. It was supported by aviation of the 6th and partly of the 1st and 4th air fleets. In total, the enemy grouping included 63 divisions and 3 infantry brigades, in which there were 800 thousand people, 7.6 thousand guns and mortars, 900 tanks and assault guns, and more than 1300 combat aircraft. The reserve of the Army Group "Center" had 11 divisions, most of which were involved in the fight against the partisans.
During the summer-autumn campaign of 1944, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command planned to conduct a strategic operation for the final liberation of Belarus, in which the troops of 4 fronts were to act in concert. The troops of the 1st Baltic (commander General of the Army I.Kh. Bagramyan), 3rd (commander Colonel General I.D. Chernyakhovsky), 2nd (commander Colonel General G.F. Zakharov) and 1st Belorussian Fronts (commander General of the Army K.K. Rokossovsky), Long-Range Aviation, the Dnieper Military Flotilla, as well as a large number of formations and detachments of Belarusian partisans.
Commander of the 1st Baltic Front General of the Army
THEIR. Baghramyan and Chief of Staff of the Front Lieutenant General
V.V. Kurasov during the Belarusian operation
The fronts included 20 combined arms, 2 tank and 5 air armies. In total, the grouping consisted of 178 rifle divisions, 12 tank and mechanized corps and 21 brigades. 5 air armies provided air support and cover for the troops of the fronts.
The idea of the operation was to break through the enemy defenses in 6 directions with deep strikes from 4 fronts, surround and destroy enemy groups on the flanks of the Belarusian ledge - in the areas of Vitebsk and Bobruisk, after which, advancing in converging directions on Minsk, surround and liquidate to the east of the Belarusian capital the main forces of Army Group Center. In the future, increasing the force of the strike, reach the line Kaunas - Bialystok - Lublin.
When choosing the direction of the main attack, the idea of concentrating forces in the Minsk direction was clearly expressed. The simultaneous breakthrough of the front in 6 sectors led to the dissection of the enemy's forces, making it difficult for him to use reserves in repelling the offensive of our troops.
To strengthen the grouping, in the spring and summer of 1944, the Headquarters replenished the fronts with four combined arms, two tank armies, four breakthrough artillery divisions, two anti-aircraft artillery divisions, and four engineering and engineer brigades. In the 1.5 months preceding the operation, the numerical strength of the grouping of Soviet troops in Belarus increased by more than 4 times in tanks, almost 2 times in artillery, and by two-thirds in aircraft.
The enemy, not expecting large-scale actions in this direction, expected to repel a private offensive of the Soviet troops with the forces and means of Army Group Center, located in one echelon, mainly only in the tactical defense zone, which consisted of 2 defensive lanes with a depth of 8 to 12 km . At the same time, using the terrain favorable for defense, he created a multi-lane, defense in depth, consisting of several lines, with a total depth of up to 250 km. Defense lines were built along the western banks of the rivers. The cities of Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, Bobruisk, Borisov, Minsk were turned into powerful defense centers.
By the beginning of the operation, the advancing troops included 1.2 million people, 34,000 guns and mortars, 4,070 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts, and about 5,000 combat aircraft. Soviet troops outnumbered the enemy in terms of manpower by 1.5 times, guns and mortars by 4.4 times, tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts by 4.5 times, and aircraft by 3.6 times.
In none of the previous offensive operations did the Red Army have such a quantity of artillery, tanks and combat aircraft, and such superiority in forces, as in the Belorussian one.
By the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the tasks for the fronts were determined as follows:
Troops of the 1st Baltic Front to break through the enemy defenses northwest of Vitebsk, capture the Beshenkovichi area, and part of the forces, in cooperation with the right-flank army of the 3rd Belorussian Front, encircle and destroy the enemy in the Vitebsk area. Subsequently, develop an offensive on Lepel;
Troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, in cooperation with the left wing of the 1st Baltic Front and the 2nd Belorussian Front, to defeat the enemy's Vitebsk-Orsha grouping and reach the Berezina. To accomplish this task, the front had to strike in two directions (with the forces of 2 armies in each): on Senno, and along the Minsk highway on Borisov, and part of the forces on Orsha. The main forces of the front must develop an offensive towards the Berezina River;
Troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front, in cooperation with the left wing of the 3rd and the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Fronts, to defeat the Mogilev grouping, liberate Mogilev and reach the Berezina River;
Troops of the 1st Belorussian Front to defeat the Bobruisk grouping of the enemy. To this end, the front was to deliver two blows: one from the Rogachev area in the direction of Bobruisk, Osipovichi, the second - from the area of the lower reaches of the Berezina to Starye Dorogi, Slutsk. At the same time, the troops of the right wing of the front were to assist the 2nd Belorussian Front in defeating the enemy's Mogilev grouping;
The troops of the 3rd and 1st Belorussian Fronts, after the defeat of the enemy's flank groupings, were to develop an offensive in converging directions to Minsk and, in cooperation with the 2nd Belorussian Front and partisans, encircle its main forces east of Minsk.
The partisans were also given the task of disorganizing the work of the enemy's rear, disrupting the supply of reserves, capturing important lines, crossings and bridgeheads on the rivers, and holding them until the approach of the advancing troops. The first undermining of the rails should be carried out on the night of June 20.
Much attention was paid to the concentration of aviation efforts on directing the main attacks of the fronts and maintaining air supremacy. Only on the eve of the offensive, aviation made 2,700 sorties and carried out powerful aviation training in areas of front breakthrough.
The duration of artillery preparation was planned from 2 hours to 2 hours and 20 minutes. Support for the attack was planned by methods of barrage, sequential concentration of fire, as well as a combination of both methods. In the offensive zones of the 2 armies of the 1st Belorussian Front, operating in the direction of the main attack, support for the attack of infantry and tanks was carried out for the first time using the double barrage method.
At the headquarters of the 1st Belorussian Front. The chief of staff, Colonel General M.S., is on the phone. Malinin, far left - Front Commander General of the Army K.K. Rokossovsky. Bobruisk region. Summer 1944
The coordination of the actions of the troops of the fronts was entrusted to the representatives of the Headquarters - Chief of the General Staff Marshal Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky and Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov. For the same purpose, General S.M., Chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff, was sent to the 2nd Belorussian Front. Shtemenko. The actions of the air armies were coordinated chief marshal Aviation A.A. Novikov and Air Marshal F.Ya. Falaleev. Marshal of Artillery N.D. arrived from Moscow to help the artillery commanders and headquarters. Yakovlev and Colonel-General of Artillery M.N. Chistyakov.
The operation required 400,000 tons of ammunition, about 300,000 tons of fuel, over 500,000 tons of food and fodder, which were delivered on time.
According to the nature of the hostilities and the content of the tasks, the operation "Bagration" is divided into two stages: the first - from June 23 to July 4, 1944, during which 5 front-line operations were carried out: Vitebsk-Orsha, Mogilev, Bobruisk, Polotsk and Minsk, and the second - from July 5 to August 29, 1944, which included 5 more front-line operations: Siauliai, Vilnius, Kaunas, Bialystok and Lublin-Brest.
The 1st stage of the Bagration operation included breaking through the enemy defenses to the entire tactical depth, expanding the breakthrough towards the flanks and defeating the nearest operational reserves and capturing a number of cities, incl. the liberation of the capital of Belarus - Minsk; Stage 2 - development of success in depth, overcoming intermediate defensive lines, defeating the main operational reserves of the enemy, capturing important lines and bridgeheads on the river. Wisla. Specific tasks for the fronts were determined to a depth of up to 160 km.
The offensive of the troops of the 1st Baltic, 3rd and 2nd Belorussian fronts began on June 23. A day later, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front joined the battle. The offensive was preceded by reconnaissance in force.
The actions of the troops during the operation "Bagration", as in no other operation of the Soviet troops before that, almost exactly corresponded to its plan and the tasks received. During 12 days of intense fighting in the first stage of the operation, the main forces of Army Group Center were defeated.
German captured soldiers of the Army Group "Center" are being escorted through Moscow.
July 17, 1944
The troops, advancing 225-280 km at an average daily pace of 20-25 km, liberated most of Belarus. In the areas of Vitebsk, Bobruisk and Minsk, a total of about 30 German divisions were surrounded and defeated. The enemy front in the central direction was crushed. The results achieved created the conditions for the subsequent offensive in the Siauliai, Vilnius, Grodno and Brest directions, as well as for the transition to active operations in other sectors of the Soviet-German front.
Fighter, liberate your Belarus. Poster by V. Koretsky. 1944
The goals set for the fronts were fully achieved. The success of the Belorussian operation was timely used by the Headquarters for decisive actions in other directions of the Soviet-German front. On July 13, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front went on the offensive. The general offensive front expanded from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathians. Soviet troops on July 17-18 crossed state border Soviet Union with Poland. By August 29, they reached the line - Jelgava, Dobele, Augustow and the Narew and Vistula rivers.
Vistula river. Crossing tanks. 1944
Further development of the offensive with an acute shortage of ammunition and fatigue of the Soviet troops would not have been successful, and by order of the Stavka they went on the defensive.
2nd Belorussian Front: Front Commander General of the Army
G.F. Zakharov, member of the Military Council, Lieutenant General N.E. Subbotin and Colonel General K.A. Vershinin are discussing a plan to strike the enemy from the air. August 1944
As a result of the Belorussian operation, favorable conditions were created not only for inflicting new powerful strikes against enemy groupings operating on the Soviet-German front in the Baltic States, East Prussia and Poland, in the Warsaw-Berlin direction, but also for deploying offensive operations of the Anglo-American troops, landed in Normandy.
The Belarusian offensive operation of the group of fronts, which lasted 68 days, is one of the outstanding operations not only of the Great Patriotic War, but of the entire Second World War. Her distinguishing feature- huge spatial scope and impressive operational and strategic results.
Military Council of the 3rd Belorussian Front. From left to right: Chief of Staff of the Front, Colonel-General A.P. Pokrovsky, a member of the Military Council of the Front, Lieutenant General V.E. Makarov, commander of the front troops, General of the Army I.D. Chernyakhovsky. September 1944
The troops of the Red Army, having launched an offensive on June 23 on a front of 700 km, by the end of August advanced 550-600 km to the west, expanding the front of hostilities to 1,100 km. The vast territory of Belarus and a significant part of eastern Poland were cleared of the German occupiers. Soviet troops reached the Vistula, on the approaches to Warsaw and to the border with East Prussia.
Battalion commander of the 297th Infantry Regiment of the 184th Division of the 5th Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front Captain G.N. Gubkin (right) with officers on reconnaissance. On August 17, 1944, his battalion was the first in the Red Army to break through to the border of East Prussia
During the operation, the largest German group suffered a crushing defeat. Of the 179 divisions and 5 brigades of the Wehrmacht, then operating on the Soviet-German front, 17 divisions and 3 brigades were completely destroyed in Belarus, and 50 divisions, having lost more than 50% of their personnel, lost their combat capability. German troops lost about 500 thousand soldiers and officers.
Operation "Bagration" showed vivid examples high skill Soviet generals and military leaders. She made a significant contribution to the development of strategy, operational art and tactics; enriched the art of war with the experience of encircling and destroying large enemy groupings in a short time and in the most various conditions environment. The task of breaking through the powerful defense of the enemy, as well as the rapid development of success in the operational depth through the skillful use of large tank formations and formations, was successfully solved.
In the struggle for the liberation of Belorussia, Soviet soldiers displayed mass heroism and high combat skills. 1500 of its participants became Heroes of the Soviet Union, hundreds of thousands were awarded orders and medals of the USSR. Among the Heroes of the Soviet Union and those awarded were soldiers of all nationalities of the USSR.
Partisan formations played an exceptionally important role in the liberation of Belarus.
Parade partisan brigades after release
the capital of Belarus - Minsk
Solving tasks in close cooperation with the troops of the Red Army, they destroyed over 15 thousand and captured more than 17 thousand enemy soldiers and officers. The motherland highly appreciated the feat of the partisans and underground fighters. Many of them were awarded orders and medals, and 87 who especially distinguished themselves became Heroes of the Soviet Union.
But the victory came at a high price. At the same time, the high intensity of hostilities, the advance transition of the enemy to the defensive, the difficult conditions of the wooded and swampy terrain, the need to overcome large water barriers and other natural obstacles led to heavy losses in people. During the offensive, the troops of the four fronts lost 765,815 people killed, wounded, missing and sick, which is almost 50% of their total strength at the start of the operation. And irretrievable losses amounted to 178,507 people. Our troops also had heavy losses in armament.
The world community appreciated the events on the central sector of the Soviet-German front. Political and military figures of the West, diplomats and journalists noted their significant influence on the further course of the Second World War. “The swiftness of the offensive of your armies is amazing,” wrote President of the United States of America F. Roosevelt on July 21, 1944 to I.V. Stalin. In a telegram to the head of the Soviet government dated July 24, British Prime Minister W. Churchill called the events in Belarus "victories of great importance." One of the Turkish newspapers on July 9 stated: "If the advance of the Russians continues to develop at the same pace, the Russian troops will enter Berlin faster than the allied troops will finish operations in Normandy."
Professor of the University of Edinburgh, a well-known English specialist in military-strategic problems, J. Erickson, in his book “The Road to Berlin” emphasized: “The defeat of the Army Group Center by the Soviet troops was their biggest success achieved ... as a result of one operation. For the German army... it was a catastrophe of unimaginable proportions, bigger than Stalingrad."
Operation Bagration was the first major offensive operation of the Red Army, carried out at a time when the armed forces of the United States and Great Britain began hostilities in Western Europe. However, 70% ground forces Wehrmacht continued to fight on the Soviet-German front. The catastrophe in Belarus forced the German command to transfer large strategic reserves here from the west, which, of course, created favorable conditions for the offensive operations of the Allies after the landing of their troops in Normandy and the conduct of a coalition war in Europe.
The successful offensive of the 1st Baltic, 3rd, 2nd and 1st Belorussian fronts in the western direction in the summer of 1944 radically changed the situation on the entire Soviet-German front, led to a sharp weakening of the combat potential of the Wehrmacht. By liquidating the Belarusian ledge, they eliminated the threat of flank attacks from the north for the armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front, which were advancing in the Lvov and Rava-Russian directions. The capture and retention of bridgeheads by the Soviet troops on the Vistula in the areas of Pulawy and Magnuszew opened up prospects for conducting new operations to defeat the enemy in order to completely liberate Poland and advance on the German capital.
Memorial Complex"Mound of Glory".
Sculptors A. Bembel and A. Artimovich, architects O. Stakhovich and L. Mitskevich, engineer B. Laptsevich. The total height of the memorial is 70.6 m. An earthen hill 35 m high is crowned by a sculptural composition of four bayonets lined with titanium, each 35.6 m high. The bayonets symbolize the 1st, 2nd, 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic fronts that liberated Belarus. Their base is surrounded by a ring with bas-relief images of Soviet soldiers and partisans. On the inside of the ring, made in the mosaic technique, the text is beaten off: "Glory to the Soviet Army, the Liberator Army!"
Sergey Lipatov,
Research Fellow at the Research
Institute of Military History of the Military Academy
General Staff of the Armed Forces
Russian Federation
On May 20, the General Staff completed the development of a plan for the Belarusian strategic offensive operation. She entered the operational documents of the Headquarters under the code name "Bagration".
In the first half of 1944, Soviet troops won major victories near Leningrad, in the Right-Bank Ukraine, in the Crimea and on the Karelian Isthmus. By the summer of 1944, these victories provided favorable conditions for the defeat of one of the largest strategic enemy groupings, Army Group Center, and the liberation of the Byelorussian SSR. Since the shortest route to the borders of Germany passed through Belarus, a major offensive operation was carried out here. The operation received the code name "Bagration", it was carried out by the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Belorussian (commanders K.K. Rokosovsky, G.F. Zakharov, I.D. Chernyakhovsky) and the 1st Baltic (Commander I .Kh. Bagramyan) fronts.
In the summer of 1944, the Nazi command was waiting for the main attack of the Red Army in the south - in the Krakow and Bucharest directions. Most of the Soviet tank armies were on the southwestern sector of the Soviet-German front. This was one of the reasons why the Germans expected the continuation of the offensive in the southwestern direction.
The ratio of forces of the parties to the beginning of the operation was in favor of the Soviet troops: in terms of people - by 2, by tanks and self-propelled guns - by 4, and by aircraft by 3.8 times. The decisive massing of forces and means in the breakthrough areas made it possible to achieve superiority over the enemy in manpower - 3-4 times, in artillery - 5-7 times and in tanks 5-5.5 times. Soviet troops occupied an enveloping position in relation to the troops of Army Group Center. This contributed to the infliction of flank strikes, their encirclement and destruction in parts.
The concept of the operation: it envisaged the simultaneous transition to the offensive of the troops of four fronts in the Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev and Bobruisk directions, the encirclement and destruction of enemy flank groupings in the areas of Vitebsk and Bobruisk, the development of gifts in directions converging on Minsk, the encirclement and destruction of the main enemy grouping east of Minsk.
The similarity of the concept of operation "Bagration" with the concept of operation "Uranus" was that both operations provided for a deep bilateral operational coverage, which led to the encirclement of a large strategic grouping of Nazi troops. The difference between the plans was that the plan of the operation "Bagration" provided for the initial encirclement of the enemy's flank groupings. This was supposed to lead to the formation of large operational gaps, which the enemy, due to insufficient reserves, could not quickly close. These gaps were to be used by mobile troops for the rapid development of the offensive in depth and for the encirclement of the 4th German Army in the area east of Minsk. In contrast to the dissecting flank attacks near Stalingrad, in Belarus the front was being crushed.
During the offensive of the Soviet troops that began on June 23, 1944, the German defense was broken through, the enemy began a hasty retreat. However, the Germans did not manage to retreat in an organized manner everywhere. Near Vitebsk and Bobruisk, 10 German divisions hit two "boilers" and were destroyed. On July 3, Soviet troops liberated Minsk. In the forests east of Minsk, a 100,000-strong enemy group was surrounded and destroyed. The defeats near Bobruisk, Vitebsk and Minsk were catastrophic for the German army. General Guderian wrote: “As a result of this blow, Army Group Center was destroyed. We suffered huge losses- 25 divisions. All available forces were thrown into the crumbling front. The German defense collapsed. The Germans were unable to stop the offensive of the Soviet troops. On July 13, units of the 3rd Belorussian Front liberated Vilnius. Brest and the Polish city of Lublin were soon occupied. Operation Bagration ended on August 29, 1944 - Soviet troops liberated all of Belarus, part of the Baltic states, entered the territory of Poland and East Prussia.
Tsobechia Gabriel
By June 1944, the Red Army had liberated almost the entire territory of the Ukrainian SSR. It was there, on Ukrainian soil, that the Wehrmacht suffered heavy losses. However, by the spring of the penultimate year of the war, the offensive of the Soviet troops slowed down: the enemy constantly transferred fresh forces from the western front, which, by imposing protracted battles, were able to stop the offensive of the Red Army.
The headquarters of the Supreme High Command could not put up with such a state of affairs. At the same time, the Stavka understood perfectly well that it was impossible to throw an army into battle without careful planning of operations. That is why the General Staff and the Headquarters made the only right decision in such a situation - to change the direction of the main strikes.
By that time, the front line passed along the line Vitebsk - Orsha - Mogilev - Zhlobin. On operational maps, it looked like a wedge, the tip of which was turned deep into the Soviet Union. The area of \u200b\u200bthe "balcony", the so-called ledge, was almost 250 thousand square kilometers.
In Berlin, the offensive of the Red Army in Belarus was not expected: the military leadership of the Third Reich was sure that the offensive should be expected north of Leningrad or in the direction of "Southern Poland - the Balkans".
The headquarters of the Supreme High Command, on the contrary, considered the complete liberation of Belarus to be the primary task of the summer-autumn campaign.
It was assumed that four Soviet fronts - 1st, 2nd, 3rd Belorussian under the command of K.K. Rokossovsky, G.F. Zakharova and I.D. Chernyakhovsky and the 1st Baltic Front under the command of I.Kh. Bagramyan, - inflicting deep blows in six directions at once, they will first break through the defenses, surround and destroy enemy groups that are on the flanks, eliminate the main forces of Army Group Center and reach the line Kaunas - Bialystok - Lublin.
In total, under the command of four commanders 27 armies: 20 combined arms, two tank and five air armies.
With the choice of the direction of the main attack, they quickly decided - the Minsk direction.
A rather difficult task was to break through the front in six sectors: however, the implementation of this particular decision could lead to a quick dissection of enemy forces and would make it difficult to use reserves.
On May 30, 1944, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command approved the final plan for the Belarusian offensive operation, which received the code name "Bagration".
Up to the start of the operation, the Headquarters replenished the fronts that were supposed to take part in the offensive: more than 100 trains with manpower, fuel, ammunition, and equipment were delivered to the front every day. The result was an almost fourfold advantage of the Red Army in tanks and guns, a threefold advantage in aircraft and one and a half times in manpower: before that, in none of the offensive operations, Soviet troops had such superiority.
At the same time, the enemy, who still did not expect a large-scale offensive in the Minsk direction, was confident that any local offensive by the Soviet troops would be calmly repelled by the main forces of Army Group Center. At the same time, the German command pinned great hopes on a multi-lane, defense in depth.
During three years Belarus was under the yoke of the enemy. The invaders plundered the territory of the republic: cities were devastated, more than a million buildings were burned in countryside, turned into ruins 7 thousand schools. The Nazis killed more than two million prisoners of war and civilians. In fact, there was no family in the Byelorussian SSR that did not suffer from the Nazis. White Rus' was one of the most affected territories of the Union. But people did not lose heart and resisted. Knowing that in the East the Red Army repulsed the enemy's onslaught on Moscow, Stalingrad and the Caucasus, defeated the Nazis on the Kursk Bulge, and liberated the regions of Ukraine, the Belarusian partisans were preparing for decisive action. By the summer of 1944, approximately 140 thousand partisans were operating on the territory of Belarus. The general leadership of the partisans was carried out by the underground organizations of the Communist Party of the BSSR, headed by Panteleimon Kondratievich Ponomarenko, who was also the head of the Central Headquarters partisan movement THE USSR. It should be noted that contemporaries noted his amazing honesty, responsibility and deep analytical abilities. Stalin highly appreciated Ponomarenko, some researchers believe that the leader wanted to make him his successor.
A few days before the start of the operation to liberate Belarus partisan detachments inflicted a series of sensitive blows on the Germans. The partisans destroyed their transport infrastructure, communication lines, actually paralyzed the rear of the enemy at the most crucial moment. During the operation, the partisans attacked individual enemy units and attacked the rear structures of the Germans.
Operation preparation
The operational plan of the Belarusian operation began to be developed back in April. The general plan of the General Staff was to crush the flanks of the German Army Group Center, encircle its main forces east of the capital of the BSSR and full release Belarus. It was a very ambitious and large-scale plan, the simultaneous crushing of an entire enemy army group was planned very rarely during World War II. It was one of the largest operations in the entire war of mankind.
By the summer of 1944, the Red Army had achieved impressive success in Ukraine - the Wehrmacht suffered heavy losses, the Soviet forces carried out a number of successful offensive operations, liberating most of the territory of the republic. But things were worse in the Belarusian direction: the front line approached the line Vitebsk - Orsha - Mogilev - Zhlobin, forming a huge ledge that was turned deep into the USSR, the so-called. "Belarusian balcony".
In July 1944, the German industry reached the highest point of its development in this war - in the first half of the year, the Reich factories produced more than 16 thousand aircraft, 8.3 thousand assault guns. Berlin carried out several mobilizations, and its strength armed forces consisted of 324 divisions and 5 brigades. Army Group Center, which defended Belarus, had 850-900 thousand people, up to 10 thousand guns and mortars, 900 tanks and self-propelled guns, 1350 aircraft. In addition, at the second stage of the battle, Army Group Center was supported by formations of the right flank of Army Group North and the left flank of Army Group Northern Ukraine, as well as reserves from the Western Front and various sectors Eastern Front. The Army Group "Center" included 4 armies: the 2nd field army, it held the Pinsk and Pripyat region (commander Walter Weiss); The 9th field army, it defended the area on both sides of the Berezina southeast of Bobruisk (Hans Jordan, after June 27 - Nikolaus von Forman); The 4th Field Army (Kurt von Tippelskirch, after June 30, the army was commanded by Vinzenz Müller) and the 3rd Panzer Army (Georg Reinhardt), which occupied the interfluve of the Berezina and the Dnieper, as well as a bridgehead from Bykhov to the area northeast of Orsha. In addition, formations of the 3rd Panzer Army occupied the Vitebsk region. The commander of Army Group Center was Field Marshal Ernst Busch (on June 28, Bush was replaced by Walter Model). His chief of staff was Hans Krebs.
If the command of the Red Army was well aware of the German grouping in the area of the future offensive, then the command of Army Group Center and the headquarters of the Reich ground forces had a completely wrong idea about Moscow's plans for the summer campaign of 1944. Adolf Hitler and the High Command of the Wehrmacht believed that a major Soviet offensive should still be expected in Ukraine, north or south of the Carpathians (most likely north). It was believed that from the area south of Kovel, Soviet troops would strike towards the Baltic Sea, trying to cut off Army Groups Center and North from Germany. Large forces were allocated to parry a possible threat. So, in the army group "Northern Ukraine" there were seven tank, two tank-grenadier divisions, as well as four battalions of heavy tanks "Tiger". And the Army Group "Center" had one tank, two tank-grenadier divisions and one battalion of heavy tanks. In addition, they feared an attack on Romania - on the oil fields of Ploiesti. In April, the command of Army Group Center submitted to the top leadership a proposal to reduce the front line and withdraw troops to better positions beyond the Berezina. But this plan was rejected, Army Group Center was ordered to defend in the same positions. Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev and Bobruisk were declared "fortresses" and fortified with the expectation of all-round defense, a possible struggle in the environment. For engineering works forced labor of local residents was widely used. , radio intelligence and German agents could not reveal the preparations by the Soviet command for a major operation in Belarus. Army Groups Center and North were predicted to have a "calm summer"; the situation inspired so little concern that Field Marshal Bush went on vacation three days before the start of the Red Army operation. But, it should be noted that the front in Belarus stood still for a long time, and the Nazis managed to create a developed defense system. It included "fortress" cities, numerous field fortifications, bunkers, dugouts, interchangeable positions for artillery and machine guns. The Germans assigned a large role to natural obstacles - wooded and swampy terrain, many rivers and streams.
Red Army. Stalin made the final decision to conduct the summer campaign, including the Belarusian operation, at the end of April. Deputy Chief of the General Staff A. I. Antonov was instructed to organize work in the General Staff on planning operations. The plan to liberate Belarus received a code name - Operation Bagration. May 20, 1944 General base completed the plan of the offensive operation. A. M. Vasilevsky, A. I. Antonov and G. K. Zhukov were called to the Headquarters. On May 22, the commanders of the fronts, I. Kh. Bagramyan, I. D. Chernyakhovsky, and K. K. Rokossovsky, were received at Headquarters to hear their views on the operation. The coordination of the troops of the fronts was entrusted to Vasilevsky and Zhukov, they left for the troops in early June.
The rate provided for the application of three powerful blows. The 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts advanced in the general direction towards Vilnius. The troops of the two fronts were supposed to defeat the enemy's Vitebsk grouping, develop an offensive to the west and cover the left-flank grouping of the Borisov-Minsk group of German forces. The 1st Belorussian Front was supposed to defeat the Bobruisk group of Germans. Then develop the offensive in the direction of Slutsk-Baranovichi and cover the Minsk group of German troops from the south and south-west. The 2nd Belorussian Front, in cooperation with the left-flank grouping of the 3rd Belorussian Front and the right flank of the 1st Belorussian Front, was to move in the general direction towards Minsk.
From the Soviet side, about 1 million 200 thousand people participated in the operation as part of four fronts: the 1st Baltic Front (General of the Army Ivan Khristoforovich Bagramyan); 3rd Belorussian Front (Colonel General Ivan Danilovich Chernyakhovsky); 2nd Belorussian Front (Colonel General Georgy Fedorovich Zakharov); 1st Belorussian Front (General of the Army Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovsky). Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov was the coordinator of the actions of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian fronts, and the chief of the General Staff Alexander Mikhailovich Vasilevsky was the coordinator of the actions of the 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic fronts. Took part in the operation and the Dnieper military.
Preparation of the Belarusian operation (from left to right) Varennikov I. S., Zhukov G. K., Kazakov V. I., Rokossovsky K. K. 1st Belorussian Front. 1944
Operation "Bagration" was supposed to solve several important tasks:
Completely clear of German troops Moscow direction, because the leading edge of the "Belarusian ledge" was 80 kilometers from Smolensk. The configuration of the front line in the BSSR was a huge arc extended to the east with an area of almost 250 thousand square kilometers. The arc stretched from Vitebsk in the north and Pinsk in the south to the Smolensk and Gomel regions, hanging over the right wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front. The German high command attached great importance to this territory - it protected the distant approaches to Poland and East Prussia. In addition, Hitler still cherished plans victorious war if a "miracle" is created, or major geopolitical changes occur. From the bridgehead in Belarus, it was possible to strike at Moscow again.
Complete the liberation of the entire Belarusian territory, parts of Lithuania and Poland.
Reach the Baltic coast and the borders of East Prussia, which made it possible to cut the German front at the junctions of Army Groups "Center" and "North" and isolate these German groups from each other.
To create profitable operational and tactical prerequisites for subsequent offensive operations in the Baltic states, in Western Ukraine, in the Warsaw and East Prussian directions.
Main milestones of the operation
The operation was carried out in two stages. At the first stage (June 23-July 4, 1944) the Vitebsk-Orsha, Mogilev, Bobruisk, Polotsk and Minsk front offensive operations were carried out. At the second stage of Operation Bagration (July 5–August 29, 1944), Vilnius, Shauliai, Bialystok, Lublin-Brest, Kaunas and Osovets front-line offensive operations were carried out.
The first stage of the operation
The offensive began on the morning of June 23, 1944. Near Vitebsk, the Red Army successfully broke through the German defenses and already on June 25 surrounded five enemy divisions to the west of the city. The liquidation of the Vitebsk "cauldron" was completed by the morning of June 27, on the same day Orsha was released. With the destruction of the Vitebsk German grouping, a key position on the left flank of the defense of Army Group Center was captured. The northern flank of the Army Group "Center" was actually destroyed, more than 40 thousand Germans died and 17 thousand people were captured. In the Orsha direction, after breaking through the German defenses, the Soviet command brought the 5th Guards Tank Army into battle. Having successfully crossed the Berezina, Rotmistrov's tankers cleared Borisov of the Nazis. The withdrawal of troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front to the Borisov region led to significant operational success: the 3rd Panzer Army of Army Group Center was cut off from the 4th Field Army. The formations of the 2nd Belorussian Front advancing in the Mogilev direction broke through the powerful and deeply echeloned defense of the Germans, which the enemy had prepared along the Pronya, Basya and Dnieper rivers. On June 28 they liberated Mogilev. The withdrawal of the 4th German Army lost organization, the enemy lost up to 33 thousand killed and captured.
The Bobruisk offensive operation was supposed to create a southern "pincer" of the huge encirclement conceived by the Soviet Headquarters. This operation was entirely carried out by the most powerful of the fronts - the 1st Belorussian under the command of K.K. Rokossovsky. The 9th Army of the Wehrmacht resisted the offensive of the Red Army. We had to advance through very difficult terrain - swamps. The blow was struck on June 24: from the southeast to the northwest, gradually turning to the north, the 65th army of Batov (reinforced by the 1st Don tank corps) moved, from the east to the west the 3rd army of Gorbatov advanced with the 9th tank body. For a quick breakthrough in the Slutsk direction, the 28th Army of Luchinsky and the 4th Guards Cavalry Corps of Pliev were used. The armies of Batov and Luchinsky quickly broke through the defenses of the stunned enemy (the Russians made their way through the swamp, which was considered impassable). But the 3rd army of Gorbatov had to literally bite into the orders of the Germans. The commander of the 9th Army, Hans Jordan, threw his main reserve against her - the 20th Panzer Division. But soon he had to redirect his reserve to the southern flank of the defense. The 20th Panzer Division was unable to close the gap. On June 27, the main forces of the 9th Field Army fell into the "boiler". General Jordan was replaced by von Forman, but this could not save the situation. Attempts to deblockade from the outside and from the inside failed. Panic reigned in encircled Bobruisk, and on the 27th its assault began. By the morning of June 29, Bobruisk was completely liberated. The Germans lost 74 thousand people killed and captured. As a result of the defeat of the 9th Army, both flanks of Army Group Center were open, and the road to Minsk was free from the northeast and southeast.
On June 29, the 1st Baltic Front attacked Polotsk. The 6th Guards Army of Chistyakov and the 43rd Army of Beloborodov bypassed the city from the south (the guards of the 6th Army also bypassed Polotsk from the west), the 4th shock army of Malyshev - from the north. Butkov's 1st Panzer Corps liberated the city of Ushachi south of Polotsk and advanced far to the west. Then, with a sudden attack, the tankers seized a bridgehead on the western bank of the Dvina. But it did not work out to take the Germans into the "ring" - Karl Hilpert, who commanded the garrison of the city, arbitrarily left the "fortress", without waiting for the withdrawal routes to be cut by the Russian troops. Polotsk was occupied on July 4th. As a result of the Polotsk operation, the German command lost a strong stronghold and a railway junction. In addition, the flank threat to the 1st Baltic Front was eliminated, the positions of the German Army Group North were outflanked from the south and were under the threat of a flank attack.
The German command, trying to rectify the situation, replaced the commander of Army Group Center Bush with Field Marshal Walter Model. He was considered a master defensive operations. Reserve units were sent to Belarus, including the 4th, 5th and 12th tank divisions.
4th german army in the face of the threat of imminent encirclement, it retreated across the Berezina River. The situation was extremely difficult: the flanks were open, the retreating columns were subjected to constant Soviet air strikes and partisan attacks. The pressure from the 2nd Belorussian Front, which was located directly in front of the 4th Army, was not strong, since the plans Soviet command did not include the expulsion of German troops from the future "boiler".
The 3rd Belorussian Front advanced in two main directions: to the southwest (toward Minsk) and west (to Vileyka). The 1st Belorussian Front advanced on Slutsk, Nesvizh and Minsk. German resistance was weak, the main forces were defeated. On June 30, Slutsk was taken, and on July 2, Nesvizh, the escape routes to the southwest were cut off for the Germans. By July 2, tank units of the 1st Belorussian Front approached Minsk. The advancing units of the 3rd Belorussian Front had to endure a fierce battle with the 5th German Panzer Division (reinforced by a battalion of heavy tanks), which arrived in the Borisov region on June 26-28. This division was full-blooded, did not participate in hostilities for several months. In the course of several bloody battles, the last one took place on July 1-2 north-west of Minsk, the tank division lost almost all its tanks and was driven back. On July 3, Burdeyny's 2nd Panzer Corps broke into Minsk from the northwest. At the same time with south direction advanced units of Rokossovsky approached the city. The German garrison was not numerous and did not last long, Minsk was liberated by lunchtime. As a result, units of the 4th Army and units of other armies that joined it fell into the encirclement. The Red Army actually avenged the "cauldrons" of 1941. The encircled were not able to organize a long resistance - the area of the encirclement was shot through with artillery fire, it was constantly bombed, the ammunition ran out, there was no outside help. The Germans fought until July 8-9, made several desperate attempts to break through, but were defeated everywhere. July 8 and. O. commander of the army, the commander of the XII Army Corps Vinzenz Müller signed the surrender. Even before July 12, there was a “cleansing operation”, the Germans lost 72 thousand killed and more than 35 thousand were captured.
The poverty of the road network in Belarus and the swampy and wooded terrain led to the fact that many kilometers of columns of German troops crowded together on only two major highways - Zhlobinsky and Rogachevsky, where they were subjected to massive attacks by the Soviet 16th Air Army. Some German units were practically destroyed on the Zhlobin highway.
Photo of destroyed German equipment from the area of the bridge across the Berezina.
The second stage of the operation
The Germans tried to stabilize the situation. The head of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, Kurt Zeitzler, proposed to transfer Army Group North to the south in order to build a new front with the help of its troops. But this plan was rejected by Hitler for political reasons (relations with the Finns). In addition, the naval command opposed - the withdrawal from the Baltic worsened communications with the same Finland and Sweden, led to the loss of a number of naval bases and strongholds in the Baltic. As a result, Zeitzler resigned and was replaced by Heinz Guderian. Model, for its part, tried to erect a new defensive line that ran from Vilnius through Lida and Baranovichi in order to close a hole in the front about 400 km wide. But for this he had only one whole army - the 2nd and the remnants of other armies. Therefore, the German command had to transfer significant forces to Belarus from other sectors of the Soviet-German front and from the West. Until July 16, 46 divisions were sent to Belarus, but these troops were not brought into battle immediately, in parts, often "from wheels", and therefore they could not quickly turn the tide.
From July 5 to July 20, 1944, the Vilnius operation was carried out by the forces of the 3rd Belorussian Front under the command of Ivan Danilovich Chernyakhovsky. The Germans did not have a continuous front of defense in the Vilnius direction. On July 7, units of the 5th Guards Tank Army of Rotmistrov and the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps of Obukhov reached the city and began to encircle it. An attempt to take the city on the move failed. On the night of July 8, new German forces were brought up to Vilnius. On July 8-9, the city was completely surrounded and its assault was launched. German attempts to unblock the city from the western direction were repulsed. The last centers of resistance were crushed in Vilnius on 13 July. Up to 8 thousand Germans were destroyed, 5 thousand people were taken prisoner. On July 15, units of the front occupied several bridgeheads on the western bank of the Neman. Until the 20th, there were battles for bridgeheads.
On July 28, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front went on a new offensive - they were aimed at Kaunas and Suwalki. On July 30, the German defense along the Neman was broken through; on August 1, the Germans left Kaunas so as not to be surrounded. Then the Germans received reinforcements and went on a counteroffensive - the battles went on with varying success until the end of August. The front did not reach several kilometers to the border of East Prussia.
Bagramyan's 1st Baltic Front received the task of reaching the sea to cut off the North group. In the Dvina direction, the Germans were initially able to hold back the offensive, since the front was regrouping forces and waiting for reserves. Dvinsk was cleared in cooperation with the troops of the 2nd Baltic Front advancing to the right only on July 27th. On the same day they took Siauliai. By July 30, the front managed to separate two enemy army groups from each other - the advanced units of the Red Army cut the last railway between East Prussia and the Baltic states in the Tukums region. On July 31 Jelgava was captured. The 1st Baltic Front went to the sea. The Germans began to try to reconnect with Army Group North. The fighting went on with varying success, and at the end of August there was a break in the battles.
The 2nd Belorussian Front advanced to the west - to Novogrudok, and then Grodno and Bialystok. The 49th army of Grishin and the 50th army of Boldin participated in the destruction of the Minsk "boiler", therefore, on July 5, only one army, the 33rd, went on the offensive. The 33rd Army advanced without encountering much resistance, covering 120-125 km in five days. On July 8, Novogrudok was liberated, on the 9th the army reached the Neman River. On July 10, the 50th Army joined the offensive and the troops crossed the Neman. On July 16, Grodno was liberated, the Germans were already putting up fierce resistance, a series of counterattacks was repulsed. The German command tried to stop the Soviet troops, but they did not have enough strength for this. July 27 Bialystok was recaptured. Soviet soldiers reached the pre-war border of the Soviet Union. The front was unable to carry out significant encirclements, since it did not have large mobile formations (tank, mechanized, cavalry corps) in its composition. On August 14, Osovets and the bridgehead beyond the Narew were occupied.
The 1st Belorussian Front advanced in the direction of Baranovichi-Brest. Almost immediately, the advancing units collided with German reserves: the 4th Panzer Division, the 1st Hungarian Cavalry Division, the 28th Light Infantry Division, and other formations went. July 5-6 was a fierce battle. Gradually, the German forces were crushed, they were inferior in number. In addition, the Soviet front was supported by powerful Air Force formations, which inflicted strong blows on the Germans. On July 6, Kovel was liberated. On July 8, after a fierce battle, Baranovichi was taken. On July 14 they took Pinsk, on the 20th Kobrin. On July 20, units of Rokossovsky crossed the Bug on the move. The Germans did not have time to create a line of defense along it. On July 25, a “cauldron” was created near Brest, but on the 28th, the remnants of the encircled German group broke out of it (the Germans lost 7 thousand people killed). It should be noted that the battles were fierce, there were few prisoners, but a lot of Germans were killed.
On July 22, units of the 2nd Panzer Army (which was attached to the front during the second phase of the operation) reached Lublin. On July 23, the assault on the city began, but due to the lack of infantry, it dragged on, the city was finally taken by the morning of the 25th. In late July - early August, Rokossovsky's front captured two large bridgeheads beyond the Vistula.
Operation results
As a result of the two-month offensive of the Red Army, White Rus' was completely cleared of the Nazis, part of the Baltic states and the eastern regions of Poland were liberated. In general, on a front of 1100 kilometers, the advance of troops to a depth of up to 600 kilometers was achieved.
It was a major defeat for the Wehrmacht. There is even an opinion that it was the largest defeat of the German armed forces in World War II. Army Group Center was defeated, Army Group North was threatened with defeat. The powerful line of defense in Belarus, protected by natural barriers (swamps, rivers), has been broken. The German reserves were depleted, which had to be thrown into battle in order to close the "hole".
An excellent groundwork has been created for a future offensive into Poland and further into Germany. Thus, the 1st Belorussian Front captured two large bridgeheads beyond the Vistula south of the capital of Poland (Magnushevsky and Pulawsky). In addition, during the Lvov-Sandomierz operation, the 1st Ukrainian Front occupied a bridgehead near Sandomierz.
Operation Bagration was a triumph of Soviet military art. The Red Army "answered" for the "boilers" of 1941.
Soviet army lost up to 178.5 thousand dead, missing and captured, as well as 587.3 thousand wounded and sick. The total losses of the Germans are about 400 thousand people (according to other sources, more than 500 thousand).
