German scouts in the Red Army. The actions of German intelligence at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. Why Stalin and Hitler failed to conclude a separate peace

In the Caucasus, German military intelligence, called the Abwehr, after the start of the war launched a vigorous activity to create anti-Soviet national movements, in this sense, Chechnya was ideal. There, even before the war, Muslim separatists campaigned and openly opposed the Soviet regime, their goal was to unite the Muslims of the Caucasus into a single state under the leadership of Turkey. In Checheno-Ingushetia, there was mass desertion, unwillingness to serve in the Red Army, disobedience to Soviet laws. The number of deserters who united in illegal armed groups amounted to 15,000 people by 1942, and this happened in the immediate rear Soviet army. Abwehr actively threw sabotage groups, weapons and equipment there, the Chechen rebels had experienced military specialists, masters of intelligence and sabotage. Uprisings and sabotage began, but they were suppressed, although, as it turned out in our time, not completely. There was no longer and no longer exists in Russia a general like the late Yermolov, only he knew and did so that later no one wanted to fight with him!

A TROUBLED REPUBLIC

An increase in the activity of religious and bandit authorities was observed in the ChI ASSR even before the start of the Great Patriotic War, thereby Negative influence on the situation in the republic. Focusing on Muslim Turkey, they advocated the unification of the Muslims of the Caucasus into a single state under the protectorate of Turkey.

To achieve their goal, the separatists called on the population of the republic to resist the measures of the government and local authorities, and initiated open armed uprisings. Particular emphasis was placed on indoctrinating Chechen youth against serving in the Red Army and studying in the schools of the FZO. At the expense of deserters who went underground, bandit formations were replenished, which were pursued by units of the NKVD troops.

So, in 1940, the rebel organization of Sheikh Mohammed-Khadzhi Kurbanov was identified and neutralized. In January 1941, a major armed uprising was localized in the Itum-Kalinsky region under the leadership of Idris Magomadov. In total, in 1940, the administrative bodies of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR arrested 1055 bandits and their accomplices, from whom 839 rifles and revolvers with ammunition were confiscated. 846 deserters who evaded service in the Red Army were put on trial. The beginning of the Great Patriotic War led to new series gangster raids in Shatoisky, Galanchozhsky and Cheberloevsky districts. According to the NKVD, in August - November 1941, up to 800 people took part in armed demonstrations.

A DIVISION THAT DID NOT REACH THE FRONT

Being in an illegal position, the leaders of the Chechen-Ingush separatists counted on the imminent defeat of the USSR in the war and led a widespread defeatist agitation for desertion from the Red Army, disruption of mobilization, and forging together armed formations to fight in favor of Germany. During the first mobilization from August 29 to September 2, 1941, 8,000 people were to be drafted into construction battalions. However, only 2,500 arrived at their destination, in the city of Rostov-on-Don, the remaining 5,500 either simply avoided appearing at recruiting stations or deserted along the way.

During the additional mobilization in October 1941, persons born in 1922 out of 4733 conscripts evaded 362 people from appearing at the recruiting stations.

By decision State Committee Defense in the period from December 1941 to January 1942, the 114th national division was formed from the indigenous population in the CHI ASSR. As of the end of March 1942, 850 people managed to desert from it.

The second mass mobilization in Checheno-Ingushetia began on March 17, 1942, and was supposed to end on the 25th. The number of persons subject to mobilization was 14577 people. However, only 4,887 were mobilized by the appointed time, of which only 4,395 were sent to military units, that is, 30% of the order. In this regard, the mobilization period was extended until April 5, but the number of mobilized increased only to 5543 people. The reason for the failure of mobilization was the massive evasion of conscripts from conscription and desertion along the way to assembly points.

At the same time, members and candidate members of the CPSU (b), Komsomol members, senior officials of district and rural Soviets (chairmen of executive committees, chairmen and party organizers of collective farms, etc.) evaded the draft.

On March 23, 1942, Daga Dadaev, a deputy of the Supreme Council of the Chi ASSR, mobilized by the Nadterechny RVC, fled from the Mozdok station. Under the influence of his agitation, 22 more people fled with him. Among the deserters were also several instructors of the Komsomol Committee, a people's judge and a district prosecutor.

By the end of March 1942, the total number of deserters and those who evaded mobilization in the republic reached 13,500 people. Thus, the active Red Army did not receive a full-fledged rifle division. In the conditions of mass desertion and the intensification of the rebel movement on the territory of the Chechen Republic of Ingushetia, in April 1942, the People's Commissar for Defense of the USSR signed an order to cancel the conscription of Chechens and Ingush into the army.

In January 1943, the regional committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the ChI ASSR addressed the NPO of the USSR with a proposal to announce an additional recruitment of volunteer military personnel from among the inhabitants of the republic. The proposal was accepted and the local authorities received permission to call for 3,000 volunteers. According to the order of the NPO, the conscription was ordered to be carried out in the period from January 26 to February 14, 1943. However, the approved plan for the next conscription this time was miserably failed both in terms of execution time and in terms of the number of volunteers sent to the troops.

So, as of March 7, 1943, 2986 “volunteers” were sent to the Red Army from those recognized as fit for military service. Of these, only 1806 people arrived in the unit. Only along the way, 1075 people managed to desert. In addition, another 797 "volunteers" fled from the district mobilization points and on their way to Grozny. In total, from January 26 to March 7, 1943, 1,872 conscripts deserted from the so-called last "voluntary" conscription to the CHI ASSR.

Among the fugitives again appeared representatives of the district and regional party and Soviet assets: Arsanukaev, secretary of the Gudermes Republican Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Magomaev, head of the department of the Vedensky Republican Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Martazaliev, secretary of the Komsomol regional committee for military work, Taimaskhanov, second secretary of the Gudermes Komsomol Republican Committee, chairman of the Galanchozh regional executive committee Khayauri.

IN THE REAR OF THE RED ARMY

The leading role in disrupting the mobilization was played by Chechen political organizations operating underground - the National Socialist Party of Caucasian Brothers and the Chechen-Gorsk National Socialist Underground Organization. The first was led by its organizer and ideologist Khasan Israilov, who became one of the central figures of the rebel movement in Chechnya during the Great Patriotic War. With the outbreak of war, Israilov went underground and until 1944 led a number of large bandit formations, while maintaining close contact with German intelligence agencies.

Another organization was headed by the brother of the well-known revolutionary in Chechnya A. Sheripov - Mairbek Sheripov. In October 1941, he also went underground and gathered around him several bandit detachments, which consisted mainly of deserters. In August 1942, M. Sheripov raised an armed uprising in Chechnya, during which the administrative center of the Sharoevsky district, the village of Khimoy, was defeated, and an attempt was made to capture the neighboring regional center, the village of Itum-Kale. However, the rebels lost the battle with the local garrison and were forced to retreat.

In November 1942 Mayrbek Sheripov was killed as a result of a conflict with accomplices. Some of the members of his bandit groups joined Kh. Israilov, some continued to act alone, and some surrendered to the authorities.

In total, the pro-fascist parties formed by Israilov and Sheripov consisted of over 4,000 members, and the total number of their rebel detachments reached 15,000 people. In any case, it was these figures that Israilov reported to the German command in March 1942. Thus, in the immediate rear of the Red Army, a whole division of ideological bandits was operating, ready at any moment to provide significant assistance to the advancing German troops.

However, the Germans themselves understood this. The aggressive plans of the German command included the active use of the "fifth column" - anti-Soviet individuals and groups in the rear of the Red Army. It certainly included the bandit underground in Checheno-Ingushetia as such.

ENTERPRISE "SHAMIL"

Having correctly assessed the potential of the insurgent movement for the advancing Wehrmacht, the German secret services set out to unite all gangs under a single command. To prepare a one-time uprising in mountainous Chechnya, special Abwehr emissaries were supposed to be sent as coordinators and instructors.

The 804th regiment of the division was aimed at solving this problem. special purpose"Brandenburg-800", aimed at the North Caucasian sector of the Soviet-German front. The subdivisions of this division, on the instructions of the Abwehr and the command of the Wehrmacht, carried out sabotage and terrorist acts and reconnaissance work in the rear of the Soviet troops, captured important strategic objects and held them until the main forces approached.

As part of the 804th regiment, there was a Sonderkommando of Ober-Lieutenant Gerhard Lange, conditionally called "Lange Enterprise" or "Shamil Enterprise". The team was staffed by agents from among former prisoners of war and emigrants of Caucasian nationalities and was intended for subversive activities in the rear of Soviet troops in the Caucasus. Before being sent to the rear of the Red Army, the saboteurs underwent a nine-month training at a special school located in Austria near the Moskham castle. Here they taught subversion, topography, taught how to handle small arms, self-defense techniques and the use of fictitious documents. The direct transfer of agents behind the front line was carried out by the Abwehrkommando-201.

On August 25, 1942, from Armavir, a group of Lieutenant Lange in the amount of 30 people, staffed mainly by Chechens, Ingush and Ossetians, was parachuted into the area of \u200b\u200bthe villages of Chishki, Dachu-Borzoy and Duba-Yurt, Ataginsky district of the CHI ASSR to commit sabotage and terrorist acts and the organization of the insurgent movement, timing the uprising to the beginning of the German offensive on Grozny.

On the same day, another group of six people landed near the village of Berezhki, Galashkinsky District, headed by a native of Dagestan, a former emigrant Osman Gube (Saidnurov), who, in order to give due weight among Caucasians, was called in the documents "colonel of the German army." Initially, the group was given the task of advancing to the village of Avtury, where, according to German intelligence, hiding in the forests a large number of Chechens who deserted from the Red Army. However, due to the error of the German pilot, the paratroopers were thrown out significantly to the west of the intended area. At the same time, Osman Guba was to become the coordinator of all armed gangs on the territory of Checheno-Ingushetia.

And in September 1942, another group of saboteurs in the amount of 12 people was thrown out on the territory of the CHI ASSR under the leadership of non-commissioned officer Gert Reckert. Arrested by the NKVD in Chechnya, the Abwehr agent Leonard Chetvergas from the Reckert group testified during interrogation about its goals: active struggle against the Soviet power at the entire stage of its existence, that the peoples of the Caucasus truly desire the victory of the German army and the establishment of German orders in the Caucasus. Therefore, upon landing in the Soviet rear, landing groups must immediately enter into contact with the active bandit formations and, using them, raise the peoples of the Caucasus to an armed uprising against Soviet power. overthrowing Soviet power in the republics of the Caucasus and passing it into the hands of the Germans, to ensure the successful advance of the advancing German army in Transcaucasia, which will follow in the coming days. The landing groups, preparing for landing in the rear of the Red Army, were also given the immediate task of preserving the oil industry of the city of Grozny at all costs from possible destruction by the retreating units of the Red Army.

EVERYBODY HELPED THE DIVERSEERS!

Once in the rear, paratroopers everywhere enjoyed the sympathy of the population, ready to provide assistance with food and accommodate for the night. The attitude of local residents towards saboteurs was so loyal that they could afford to walk in the Soviet rear in German military uniform.

A few months later, Osman Gube, who was arrested by the NKVD, described during interrogation his impressions of the first days of his stay in the Chechen-Ingush territory: “In the evening, a collective farmer named Ali-Mohammed came to our forest and with him another named Mohammed. At first they did not believe who we were, but when we took an oath on the Koran that we were indeed sent to the rear of the Red Army by the German command, they believed us. They told us that the area where we are is flat and it is dangerous for us to stay here. Therefore, they recommended leaving for the mountains of Ingushetia, since it would be easier to hide there. After spending 3-4 days in the forest near the village of Berezhki, we, accompanied by Ali-Mohammed, went to the mountains to the village of Khai, where Ali-Mohammed had good friends. One of his acquaintances turned out to be a certain Ilaev Kasum, who took us in, and we stayed overnight with him. Ilaev introduced us to his son-in-law Ichaev Soslanbek, who took us to the mountains ...

When we were in a hut near the village of Khai, various Chechens came to us quite often, passing along the nearby road, and usually expressed sympathy for us ... ".

However, Abwehr agents received sympathy and support not only from ordinary peasants. Both the chairmen of the collective farms and the leaders of the Party and Soviet apparatus willingly offered their cooperation. “The first person with whom I spoke directly about the deployment of anti-Soviet work on the instructions of the German command,” Osman Gube said during the investigation, “was the chairman of the Dattykh village council, a member of the CPSU (b) Ibragim Pshegurov. I told him that I was an emigrant, that we had been parachuted from a German plane, and that our goal was to assist the German army in liberating the Caucasus from the Bolsheviks and to continue the struggle for the independence of the Caucasus. Pshegurov said that he fully sympathized with me. He recommended that links should now be established with the right people, but to speak openly only when the Germans take the city of Ordzhonikidze.

A little later, the chairman of the Akshinsky village council, Duda Ferzauli, came to the Abwehr envoy. According to O. Gube, “Ferzauli himself approached me and proved in every possible way that he was not a communist, that he was obliged to fulfill any of my tasks ... At the same time, he brought half a liter of vodka and tried his best to appease me, as a messenger from the Germans. He asked to take him under my protection after their area was occupied by the Germans.

Representatives of the local population not only sheltered and fed the Abwehr saboteurs, but sometimes they themselves took the initiative to carry out sabotage and terrorist acts. The testimony of Osman Gube describes an episode when a local resident Musa Keloev came to his group, who said “that he was ready to carry out any task, and he himself noticed that it was important to disrupt the railway traffic along narrow gauge railway Ordzhonikidzevskaya - Muzhichi, because military cargo is transported along it. I agreed with him that it was necessary to blow up the bridge on this road. To carry out the explosion, I sent Salman Aguev, a member of my parachute group, with him. When they returned, they reported that they had blown up an unguarded wooden railway bridge.”

And if German intelligence officers during the Second World War are not written in Soviet-Russian histories, then the point is not only that it is not customary for the winner to confess his own miscalculations.

Reinhard Gehlen - first, in the center - with cadets of the intelligence school

In the case of German spies in the USSR, the situation is complicated by the fact that the head of the department " foreign armies- East "(in the German abbreviation FHO, it was he who was in charge of intelligence) Reinhard Galen prudently took care of preserving the most important documentation in order to surrender to the Americans at the very end of the war and offer them "goods in person".

His department dealt almost exclusively with the USSR, and in the conditions of the beginning " cold war» Gehlen's papers were of great value to the United States.

Later, the general headed the intelligence of the FRG, and his archive remained in the United States (some copies were left to Gehlen). Having already retired, the general published his memoirs “Service. 1942-1971", which were published in Germany and the USA in 1971-72. Almost simultaneously with Gehlen's book, his biography was published in America, as well as the book of British intelligence officer Edward Spiro "Ghelen - Spy of the Century" (Spiro wrote under the pseudonym Edward Cookridge, he was a Greek by nationality, a representative of British intelligence in the Czech resistance during the war). Another book was written by the American journalist Charles Whiting, who was suspected of working for the CIA, and was called Gehlen - German Master Spy. All of these books are based on the Gehlen archives, used with the permission of the CIA and the German intelligence BND. They contain some information about German spies in the Soviet rear.

Gehlen's personal card

General Ernst Kestring, a Russian German born near Tula, was engaged in "field work" in Gehlen's German intelligence. It was he who served as the prototype of the German major in Bulgakov's book Days of the Turbins, who saved Hetman Skoropadsky from reprisals by the Red Army (in fact, the Petliurites). Kestring was fluent in the Russian language and Russia, and it was he who personally selected agents and saboteurs from Soviet prisoners of war. It was he who found one of the most valuable, as it turned out later, German spies.

On October 13, 1941, 38-year-old Captain Minishkiy was taken prisoner. It turned out that before the war he worked in the secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, and earlier in the Moscow City Party Committee. From the moment the war began, he served as a political instructor at the Western Front. He was captured along with the driver when he was driving around the advanced units during the battle of Vyazemsky.

Minishky immediately agreed to cooperate with the Germans, citing some old grievances against the Soviet regime. Seeing what a valuable shot they got, they promised, when the time came, to take him and his family to the west with the provision of German citizenship. But first, business.

Minishki spent 8 months studying in a special camp. And then the famous operation "Flamingo" began, which Gehlen carried out in cooperation with the intelligence officer Bown, who already had a network of agents in Moscow, among which the radio operator with the pseudonym Alexander was the most valuable. Baun's men ferried Minishkiy across the front line, and he reported to the very first Soviet headquarters the story of his capture and daring escape, every detail of which was invented by Gelen's experts. He was taken to Moscow, where he was hailed as a hero. Almost immediately, mindful of his previous responsible work, he was appointed to work in the military-political secretariat of the GKO.

Real German agents; something like this could look like other German spies

Through a chain through several German agents in Moscow, Minishki began to supply information. The first sensational message came from him on July 14, 1942. Gehlen and Gerre sat all night, drawing up a report based on it to the Chief of the General Staff, Halder. The report was made: “The military conference ended in Moscow on the evening of July 13th. Shaposhnikov, Voroshilov, Molotov and the heads of the British, American and Chinese military missions were present. Shaposhnikov declared that their retreat would be as far as the Volga, in order to force the Germans to spend the winter in the area. During the retreat, comprehensive destruction should be carried out in the territory being abandoned; all industry must be evacuated to the Urals and Siberia.

The British representative asked for Soviet assistance in Egypt, but was told that the Soviet manpower resources were not as great as the Allies believed. In addition, they lack aircraft, tanks and guns, in part because part of the supply of weapons destined for Russia, which the British were supposed to deliver through the port of Basra in the Persian Gulf, was diverted to protect Egypt. It was decided to offensive operations in two sectors of the front: north of Orel and north of Voronezh, using large tank forces and air cover. A distraction attack must be carried out at Kalinin. It is necessary that Stalingrad, Novorossiysk and the Caucasus be kept.”

It all happened. Halder later noted in his diary: “The FCO has provided accurate information on the enemy forces newly deployed since June 28, and on the estimated strength of these formations. He also gave a correct assessment of the energetic actions of the enemy in the defense of Stalingrad.

The above authors made a number of inaccuracies, which is understandable: they received information through several hands and 30 years after the events described. For example, the English historian David Kahn gave a more correct version of the report: on July 14, the meeting was attended not by the heads of the American, British and Chinese missions, but by the military attaches of these countries.

Secret Intelligence School OKW Amt Ausland/Abwehr

There is no consensus on real surname Minishkia. According to another version, his surname was Mishinsky. But perhaps it is not true either. For the Germans, it passed under the code numbers 438.

Coolridge and other authors report sparingly on the further fate of Agent 438. The participants in Operation Flamingo definitely worked in Moscow until October 1942. In the same month, Gehlen recalled Minishkiy, arranging, with the help of Bown, a meeting with one of the leading reconnaissance detachments of the Wally, who ferried him across the front line.

In the future, Minishkiy worked for Gehlen in the information analysis department, worked with German agents, who were then transferred across the front line.

Minishkia and Operation Flamingo are also named by other respected authors, such as the British military historian John Eriksson in his book The Road to Stalingrad, by the French historian Gabor Rittersporn. According to Rittersporn, Minishkiy actually received German citizenship, after the end of the Second World War he taught at an American intelligence school in southern Germany, then moved to the United States, having received American citizenship. The German Stirlitz died in the 1980s at his home in Virginia.

Minishkiy wasn't the only super spy. The same British military historians mention that the Germans had many intercepted telegrams from Kuibyshev, where the Soviet authorities were based at that time. A German spy group worked in this city. There were several "moles" surrounded by Rokossovsky, and several military historians mentioned that the Germans considered him as one of the main negotiators for a possible separate peace at the end of 1942, and then in 1944 - if the assassination attempt on Hitler would be successful. For reasons unknown today, Rokossovsky was seen as a possible ruler of the USSR after the overthrow of Stalin in a coup of the generals.

It looked like a unit of German saboteurs from Brandenburg. One of his most famous operations was the capture of the Maykop oil fields in the summer of 1942 and the city itself.

The British knew well about these German spies (it is clear that they know now). This is also recognized by Soviet military historians. For example, the former military intelligence colonel Yuri Modin, in his book The Fates of the Intelligence Officers: My Cambridge Friends, claims that the British were afraid to supply the USSR with information obtained through the decoding of German reports, precisely because of the fear that there were agents in the Soviet headquarters.

But they personally mention another German superintelligence officer - Fritz Kauders, who created the famous Max intelligence network in the USSR. His biography is given by the aforementioned Englishman David Kahn.

Fritz Kauders was born in Vienna in 1903. His mother was Jewish and his father was German. In 1927 he moved to Zurich, where he began working as a sports journalist. Then he lived in Paris and Berlin, after Hitler came to power he left as a reporter in Budapest. There he found himself a profitable occupation - an intermediary in the sale of Hungarian entry visas to Jews fleeing Germany. He made acquaintances with high-ranking Hungarian officials, and at the same time met the head of the Abwehr station in Hungary, and began working for German intelligence.

He makes acquaintance with the Russian emigrant general A.V. Turkul, who had his own intelligence network in the USSR - later it served as the basis for the formation of a more extensive German spy network. Agents are thrown into the Union for a year and a half, starting in the autumn of 1939. The annexation of Romanian Bessarabia to the USSR helped a lot here, when at the same time they “attached” dozens of German spies, abandoned there in advance.

General Turkul - in the center, with a mustache - with fellow White Guards in Sofia

With the outbreak of war with the USSR, Kauders moved to Sofia, the capital of Bulgaria, where he headed the Abwehr radio post, which received radiograms from agents in the USSR. But who these agents were has not been clarified so far. There are only fragments of information that there were at least 20-30 of them in various parts of the USSR. The Soviet super-saboteur Sudoplatov also mentions the Max intelligence network in his memoirs.

As mentioned above, not only the names of German spies, but also the minimum information about their actions in the USSR is still closed. Did the Americans and the British pass information about them to the USSR after the victory over fascism? Hardly - they needed the surviving agents themselves. The maximum that was then declassified was secondary agents from the Russian émigré organization NTS.

(quoted from the book by B. Sokolov "Hunting for Stalin, hunting for Hitler", publishing house "Veche", 2003, pp. 121-147)

Indeed, it is hard to believe that the USSR managed to create an agent network in Germany and the countries occupied by it (the most famous is the Red Chapel), but the Germans did not. And if German intelligence officers during the Second World War are not written in Soviet-Russian histories, then the point is not only that it is not customary for the winner to confess his own miscalculations.

In the case of German spies in the USSR, the situation is complicated by the fact that the head of the Foreign Armies - East department (in the German abbreviation FHO, it was he who was in charge of intelligence) Reinhard Galen prudently took care of preserving the most important documentation in order to surrender to the Americans at the very end of the war and offer them a "goods face".

His department dealt almost exclusively with the USSR, and in the conditions of the beginning of the Cold War, Gehlen's papers were of great value to the United States.

Another book was written by the American journalist Charles Whiting, who was suspected of working for the CIA, and was called Gehlen - German Master Spy. All of these books are based on the Gehlen archives, used with the permission of the CIA and the German intelligence BND. They contain some information about German spies in the Soviet rear.

(Gelena's personal card)

Baun's men ferried Minishkiy across the front line, and he reported to the very first Soviet headquarters the story of his capture and daring escape, every detail of which was invented by Gelen's experts. He was taken to Moscow, where he was hailed as a hero. Almost immediately, mindful of his previous responsible work, he was appointed to work in the military-political secretariat of the GKO.

(Real German agents;
something like this could look like other German spies)

Not the only super spies

Shaposhnikov, Voroshilov, Molotov and the heads of the British, American and Chinese military missions were present. Shaposhnikov declared that their retreat would be as far as the Volga, in order to force the Germans to spend the winter in the area. During the retreat, comprehensive destruction should be carried out in the territory being abandoned; all industry must be evacuated to the Urals and Siberia.

It was decided to conduct offensive operations in two sectors of the front: north of Orel and north of Voronezh, using large tank forces and air cover. A distraction attack must be carried out at Kalinin. It is necessary that Stalingrad, Novorossiysk and the Caucasus be kept.”

(Secret intelligence school OKW Amt Ausland/Abwehr)

There is no consensus about the real name of Minishkia. According to another version, his surname was Mishinsky. But perhaps it is not true either. For the Germans, it passed under the code numbers 438.

Coolridge and other authors report sparingly on the further fate of agent 438. The participants in Operation Flamingo definitely worked in Moscow until October 1942. In the same month, Gehlen recalled Minishkiy, arranging, with the help of Bown, a meeting with one of the leading reconnaissance detachments of the Wally, which ferried him across the front line.

In the future, Minishkia worked for Gehlen in the information analysis department, worked with German agents, who were then transferred across the front line.

Minishkia was not the only super spy. The same British military historians mention that the Germans had many intercepted telegrams from Kuibyshev, where the Soviet authorities were based at that time. A German spy group worked in this city.

There were several "moles" surrounded by Rokossovsky, and several military historians mentioned that the Germans considered him as one of the main negotiators for a possible separate peace at the end of 1942, and then in 1944 - if the assassination attempt on Hitler would be successful. For reasons unknown today, Rokossovsky was seen as a possible ruler of the USSR after the overthrow of Stalin in a coup of the generals.

(This is how the unit of German saboteurs from Brandenburg looked like. One of its most famous operations was the capture of Maykop oil fields in the summer of 1942 and the city itself)

The British knew about German spies in the Red Army

(General Turkul - in the center, with a mustache - with fellow White Guards in Sofia)

(quoted from the book by B. Sokolov "Hunting for Stalin, hunting for Hitler", publishing house "Veche", 2003, pp. 121-147)

Why did Stalin and Hitler fail to conclude a separate peace?

In 1941-43, Germany and the USSR repeatedly tried to negotiate peace, but they were frustrated due to Hitler's stubbornness. Germany and the Anglo-American allies came much closer to a truce in World War II, but they also failed due to Hitler's fault.

In July 1941, through the departing Ambassador Schulenburg, Stalin addressed Hitler with a letter about the possibility of concluding peace. After that, one of the leaders of Soviet intelligence, General Sudoplatov, with the knowledge of Molotov, tried to negotiate through the Bulgarian ambassador in Moscow I. Stamenov, who was told that, according to the Soviet side, it was not too late to resolve the conflict peacefully.

But Stamenov, for some reason, did not inform the Germans about the proposals made to him. Through Beria and his agents, Stalin sought contacts with the Germans and sounded out the conditions for concluding peace in October 1941. G. Zhukov testified to this in an interview with the staff of the Military Historical Journal, Stalin's translator Berezhkov tells about this in his memoirs, and at the trial of Beria in 1953, these negotiations were brought against him as one of the charges.

According to Berezhkov, Germany was offered a "Brest type" peace - the transfer of Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, Bessarabia, the Baltic states, the free transit of German troops through Soviet territory to the Middle East, to the Persian Gulf. But Hitler was in euphoria from his victories, and such conditions did not satisfy him.

Another attempt of this kind was made in September 1942 after Churchill's visit to Moscow and his refusal to open the Second Front in the near future. former ambassador in Germany, V.G. Dekanozov and his assistant I.S. Chernyshev met in Sweden with the adviser to the German Foreign Ministry Schnurre, compromise options were again offered with many concessions, and again the Germans were not interested in this.

In August 1942, Schellenberg and Himmler came up with plans for a separate peace in the West. They came to the conclusion that it is more profitable to conclude it while Germany is winning - soberly assessing the potentials of the Germans and anti-Hitler coalition, both understood that soon the situation could change for the worse.

According to them, the first step for this was to discredit in the eyes of Hitler and remove the fanatic Ribbentrop, who was opposed to any kind of negotiations. Schellenberg, through his channels, established preliminary contacts with the Anglo-Americans and brought his proposals to them, assuring them of his unlimited possibilities and promising the imminent resignation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs - which supposedly was supposed to demonstrate to the West the change in the foreign policy of the Reich.

But all attempts to lay a mine under Ribbentrop failed. And Schellenberg's reputation with Western negotiating partners was undermined. They lost faith in his real capabilities and considered that they were either fooled by empty projects, or the proposals of the German special services were a provocation to spoil their relations with the USSR.

In December 1942, after the Allies landed in Africa, Mussolini put forward a proposal to make peace with the Russians and continue the war with the Anglo-Americans. And some contacts did take place. In 1942–43, negotiations with Soviet agents in Stockholm were conducted by Foreign Ministry official Peter Kleist, who acted on behalf of Ribbentrop.

But no data about them has been preserved, and, judging by subsequent events, no agreements could be reached. In 1942-43, Canaris also resumed negotiations with the Anglo-Americans, acting through their representatives in Switzerland and his colleague, the head of Italian intelligence, General Ame, who, together with the chief of the General Staff, Marshal Badoglio, was already looking for a way out of the war for Italy.

But one of the couriers, the businessman Schmidthuber, was caught smuggling currency abroad. The case was taken up by the Gestapo, and he spoke about attempts to establish contacts with the West. Persons directly involved in the negotiations were arrested.

The introduction of a provocateur

Then they introduced a provocateur into the so-called "Frau Solf's tea salon", which gathered people from high society who maintained ties with representatives of the Western powers. And in December 1943 they took everyone en masse, which was one of the reasons for the fall of Canaris and the defeat of the Abwehr.

In 1943-44, Schellenberg, on behalf of Ribbentrop, again tried to contact the Russians through Sweden and Switzerland with proposals for a compromise peace. But according to his testimony, Ribbentrop himself thwarted the meeting with Soviet representatives with excessive ambitions and a lack of understanding of the changed situation - he began to put forward preliminary demands, insist that there were no Jews among the participants in the negotiations, and everything went downhill. By the way, in circles close to Hitler, a very respectful attitude towards Stalin continued to be maintained during the war. Goebbels wrote in September 1943:

“I asked the Fuhrer if anything could be done with Stalin in the near future or in the long term. He replied that in this moment it is forbidden. The Führer thinks it is easier to deal with the British than with the Soviets. At some point, the Fuhrer believes, the British will come to their senses. I am inclined to consider Stalin more accessible, since Stalin is a more practical politician than Churchill.

By the end of the war, the "peacekeeping initiatives" of the Nazis, of course, intensified. Schellenberg was still focused on the Western powers, in the summer of 1944 he met in Sweden with Roosevelt's representative Hewitt, who promised to organize real business negotiations. At the beginning of 1945, Schellenberg's collaborator Hoettl, the head of the SD in Vienna, established contacts in Switzerland with the head of American intelligence, General Donovan, and Himmler's representatives Langben and Kersten were sent there for negotiations.

The questions of a separate peace were discussed if the Anglo-Americans weaken the pressure on the Rhine army group and make it possible to transfer troops to Eastern front. But according to radio intercepts, Muller found out about the dialogue that had begun. Relying on Kaltenbrunner, he immediately began an investigation, and Himmler, as soon as he learned from their reports that the game was lit up, got scared and cut it off.

Wolf's talks with Dulles

As for Wolf's negotiations with Dulles, the most famous in our country thanks to "Seventeen Moments of Spring", Y. Semenov added a large share of fiction to this story.

Firstly, Himmler and Schellenberg had nothing to do with these negotiations. The initiative came from Wolf himself, the chief commissioner of the SS and police in Northern Italy, and the industrialists Marinetti and Olivetti, who did not want Italy to become a battlefield with all the ensuing consequences.

Secondly, they were of a private nature, only for a given theater of operations - and conditions were proposed for discussion that seemed to be beneficial to both sides: the Germans surrender Italy without resistance, but without surrender, and the Americans and the British allow them to freely leave for the Alps .

And Germany thus gets the opportunity to use these troops in the East. And thirdly, Wolf did not dare to take such a step until he agreed it with Hitler. On March 6, 1945, he made a report to the Führer in the presence of Kaltenbrunner, convincing him of the benefits of contacts. Hitler was skeptical about the idea, but allowed to act.

And only after that, in Zurich, meetings between Wolf and Dulles began. The Americans were throwing baits about the surrender of Army Group C, led by Kesselring, and Wolf, secretly from Hitler, played his game - he began to ventilate the possibility of a separate peace or an alliance with the Americans if he managed to get rid of the Fuhrer (he also sent Himmler overboard, as a figure too odious).

And the partners were so carried away in their fantasies that they even began to draw up lists of the future German government - Kesselring, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Neurath, was predicted to be the head, and Wolff staked out the post of Minister of the Interior for himself. But his trips to Switzerland were spotted by the Gestapo, the information reached Himmler, and he gave Wolf a scolding for getting into such a case without his sanction, and forbade further actions.

Soviet Union it was not “Standartenführer Stirlitz” who informed about these negotiations at all - they were laid by the British themselves with the Americans. They didn’t want to spoil relations with Moscow at the end of the war, and after Wolf’s first meeting with Dulles, they became worried – what if Stalin finds out something and gets angry? And they decided to notify the USSR. Already on March 11, the US ambassador in Moscow officially notified Molotov of contacts with Wolf.

And the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs said that he would not object to the negotiations, provided that a Soviet representative participated in them. Then the allies realized that the Soviet emissary would surely scare off Wolf and thereby thwart the opportunity to occupy Italy without loss.

They began to get out, on March 16 they answered that there were no negotiations yet, but "preparation of the ground" for negotiations, and Russia's participation was premature. But it wasn’t there, Molotov immediately took a pose - they say “unwillingness to admit a Soviet representative is unexpected and incomprehensible”, and if so, then the USSR cannot give consent to negotiations. On March 23 and April 4, two letters from Stalin to Roosevelt followed, and on April 13, General Donovan summoned Dulles to Paris and announced that the USSR knew about their negotiations, so behind-the-scenes games should be stopped.

In the meantime, clouds were gathering over Wolf. The Gestapo dug hard under him and proved to Kaltenbrunner that he was a traitor. He was again called to Berlin, and Muller was really going to arrest him right at the airport, but Himmler did not allow this - however, he did not send Schellenberg to meet him, but his personal doctor and assistant Gebhard. Before the Reichsführer SS, Wolf managed to justify himself, referring to Hitler's permission.

And on April 18, the Fuhrer resolved all disputes, giving permission to continue negotiations. With the condition that their main goal is to quarrel the West and the USSR. But he had already lost his sense of reality, on April 16 the Russians broke through the front on the Oder, and the situation was rapidly getting out of control of the Nazi leadership.

And the next stage of negotiations with Wolf already took place in the presence of the Soviet representative, General A.P. Kislenko, from the intrigues of the special services, they went to the level of the military command, and the bargaining for them was only about the conditions for the surrender of the Italian group.

Himmler was persuaded to take charge and start negotiations with the West through the Swedish Count Bernadotte only on April 19, when Germany was rapidly descending into chaos and it was too late to take any action.

It is curious that until the last moment Hitler retained the hope of reaching an agreement with the USSR. So, in the entry for March 4, 1945. Goebbels notes:

"The Führer is right when he says that it is easiest for Stalin to make a sharp turn, since he does not have to take public opinion into account."

He also notes that in last days Hitler "felt even greater closeness to Stalin", called him "a man of genius" and pointed out that Stalin's "greatness and steadfastness know in their essence neither the vacillation nor the pliability characteristic of Western politicians."

And here is the entry dated March 5, 1945: “The Fuhrer is thinking of finding an opportunity to negotiate with the Soviet Union, and then with the most severe energy to continue the war with England. For England has always been a troublemaker in Europe. Soviet atrocities are, of course, horrendous and have a profound effect on the concept of the Fuhrer. But after all, the Mongols, like the Soviets today, were outrageous in their time in Europe, without having an impact on the political resolution of the then contradictions. Invasions from the East come and go, and Europe must deal with them.”

(Quotes - from the works of the historian Shambarov)

Trotsky could become the ruler of the USSR with the victory of Hitler

(Esteban Volkov in the house-museum of his grandfather)

Leon Trotsky was considered by the Germans in the late 1930s as the most realistic contender for the ruler of the defeated USSR. Trotsky's grandson Esteban Volkov spoke about this in the late 1980s.

In 1989, the correspondent of the Russian Yearbook, V. Leskov, met with the grandson of Leon Trotsky in Mexico. Leskov published a report on this meeting in the above-mentioned publication in 1990 (No. 2). We republish this report (with some abbreviations) from the paper edition of PE (it is not available on the Internet).

Esteban Volkov (Vsevolod Bronstein) was born in 1926. He was a son early dead daughter Trotsky (who committed suicide in a state of depression). The boy was then adopted by Trotsky's son, Lev Sedov. Esteban moved to live with his grandfather in Mexico in 1939.

Volkov completely forgot the Russian language, and the correspondent Leskov communicated with him in Spanish. Esteban trained as a pharmaceutical chemist, but devoted his life to looking after his grandfather's house-museum. Fortunately, he had something to live on - the Mexican government still subsidizes the activities of the house-museum.

(One of Leon Trotsky's guards is American James Cooper, photo - spring 1940)

Volkov recalls his grandfather's conversations with loved ones. Here is what he remembered from the main:

- It is necessary to create an independent, free Ukraine. In the event of a war, the USSR will face national uprisings.
- All real revolutionaries, opponents of Stalin will oppose him in the upcoming war (with Germany - BT). The enemy will be 70 km from the Kremlin, and that's when Stalin will surrender.
- With Hitler and Japanese it is possible to agree. For support to the Germans, Ukraine can be given under the protectorate, Japan - the Far East.
- The anti-fascist struggle is a Stalinist deceit and fiction, a coalition of countries against Hitler is alien to the interests of the Russian revolution; let Hitler crush the Western powers - he will unleash a revolution in Europe.
- The way to Paris and London lies through Afghanistan, Punjab and Bengal. Also normal life The USSR is unthinkable through a revolution in Germany or even the unification of two states into one.

Leon Trotsky was considered by the Germans as a possible ruler of the USSR in the event of the fall of the Stalinist regime. Esteban Volkov claims that the United States also saw him in this role. True, allegedly, the Americans considered Trotsky as the ruler of the USSR, in the event of the liberation of our country - but from Hitler. Shortly before his death, Leon Trotsky and his lawyers petitioned the US authorities for resettlement in this country.

(On the left is Trotsky's wife Natalya, in the center is the Mexican artist Frida Kahlo)

But even more surprising is that Trotsky was considered as the new ruler of the defeated USSR not only by Germany and the USA, but also by England, France and even Finland. Here are some secret intelligence reports from the above countries:

“In December 1939, the State Council of Finland discussed the formation of an alternative Russian government headed by Trotsky or A.F. Kerensky.

In connection with the information given in previous messages about the concentration of Anglo-French troops in Syria, the following reports and rumors, which were transmitted here by agents from France and Geneva, will probably also be of interest. According to them, England intends to deliver a surprise blow not only on the Russian oil regions, but will also try at the same time to deprive Germany of Romanian oil sources in the Balkans.

The agent in France reports that the British are planning, through Trotsky's group in France, to establish contact with Trotsky's people in Russia itself and try to organize a putsch against Stalin. These coup attempts must be seen as closely related to the British intention to seize Russian oil sources.

Crauel"

“British plans regarding the disruption of the oil supply to Germany and Russia from Geneva are secretly reported:

The British side wants to make an attempt to cut off the Russians from oil sources and at the same time intends to influence Romania in one form or another and, by causing a conflict in the Balkans, to deprive Germany of oil supplies. Having cut off the USSR and Germany from oil, the British hope to quickly and radically solve the problem; it is assumed that in a sharply deteriorating conditions these countries will go over to an open struggle against each other ...

Further English side an attempt will be made to mobilize the Trotsky group, that is, the Fourth International, and somehow transfer it to Russia. Agents in Paris report that Trotsky, with the help of the British, will have to return to Russia to organize a putsch against Stalin. It is difficult to judge from here (from Geneva) to what extent these plans can be implemented.

(In Mexico, Lev Davydovich Trotsky started a farm with rabbits and chickens, he worked on the farm himself (at least 2-3 hours every day). Work on the land seems to be contrary to Trotsky's theory that the peasantry is a reactionary, petty-bourgeois class. But Trotsky believed that only townspeople should work on the land - people who had cleansed themselves of peasant conservatism)

By killing Trotsky, Stalin may have prevented the collapse of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. If Trotsky had remained alive then, by the winter of 1941/42 he could have headed the collaborationist Russian government. And there was a great chance that this faithful Leninist would be followed not only by the surrendered Red Army soldiers and residents of the occupied territories, but also by Soviet citizens who had rebelled in the rear.

And so Hitler had to use the services of a minor character - General Vlasov. We know very well the results of Vlasov's propaganda on the Soviet rear.

Corruption and "socially close" security forces in Stalin's MGB

After the end of the Great Patriotic War, the Ministry of State Security was hit by mass corruption. The security guards stole wagons, opened underground workshops, closed cases for bribes. The head of the MGB, Abakumov, was eventually arrested. This example clearly shows how important it is to have competition among law enforcement agencies.

(In the picture: Abakumov, Merkulov and Beria)

In Russian public opinion (and earlier in the Soviet one) there is a strong opinion that "there was order under Stalin." However, the archives show that even the "Order of the Sword" and the "cadre elite" - the state security - was struck by corruption, arbitrariness, drunkenness and debauchery.

The Ministry of State Security (MGB) in 1946 was headed by Viktor Abakumov, who during the war headed SMERSH and worked as Deputy Minister of Defense (de jure - Stalin's deputy). KGB cadres Viktor Stepakov (the book "The Apostle of SMERSH"), Anatoly Tereshchenko, Oleg Smyslov (the book "Victor Abakumov: Executioner or Victim") in their biographies of the head of the MGB Abakumov recall how he and his apparatus went to domestic and official decay.

Victor Abakumov came from a working-class family, with virtually no education (4th grade at school). He was a product of the decomposition of the NEP system and the transition to a totalitarian state, combining a passion for a beautiful life and at the same time a rigid system. In the late 1930s - early 1940s, Stalin, seeing how dangerous it was to delegate power powers only to state security (the NKVD of the times of Yagoda and Yezhov, which became in fact a state within a state), began to create a system of checks and balances. The NKVD was divided into two parts - in fact, the Commissariat of Internal Affairs itself and state security; a little later, SMERSH also appeared - formally the army counterintelligence, but in fact the Chekist control over the army. At the same time, the Party Control Committee was also strengthened.

The MGB, headed by Abakumov, mainly accepted army personnel, as well as "jackets" - civilians who graduated from humanitarian universities. A significant percentage of the new ministry was occupied by partisans and security officers engaged in sabotage during the war. Stalin, who gave the go-ahead for such a staffing of the MGB, was sure that the ministry, unlike the NKVD of the 1930s, with such personnel would be guaranteed from “rebirth”. However, reality taught the darkest lessons.

The new Stalinist system of checks and balances in the second half of the 1940s led to the fact that the security forces with tripled energy were looking for dirt on each other. The MGB of Abakumov was the first to fall, plunging into the mud of “rebirth”, for which, as a result, the minister himself was arrested in 1951, and in 1954 he was shot.

But at the same time, the new Stalinist system at that time clearly began to demonstrate both class degeneration and the introduction of class justice (as under the tsar). The vast majority of cases against Chekist criminals ended with symbolic punishments, and even if prison terms were applied to them, they could not be compared with how much people from other classes received for similar crimes.

The dry summaries from the archives cited by the aforementioned authors speak best.

Immediately after the Second World War, many cases of trophy atrocities arose against high officials of the MGB, but most of them were put on the brakes. So, the head of the counterintelligence department of the USSR Navy in 1943-1946, Lieutenant-General P.A. He also transferred three cars to the personal property of his deputies - Generals Karandashev, Lebedev and Duhovich, organized the purchase of property in commission stores and from private individuals for employees of the counterintelligence department of the Navy for 2 million 35 thousand rubles (with an average salary of 600 rubles in the country then ). In 1947, Gladkov got off with an administrative penalty.

In March 1947, the head of the UMGB in the Arkhangelsk region, A.I. Brezgin, was removed from his post by the decision of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and was soon expelled from the party because, until the summer of 1945, he was the head of the Smersh counterintelligence department of the 48th Army V East Prussia, first organized the delivery of trophies (mainly furniture) on three trucks with two trailers to his Moscow apartment.

Then Brezgin assembled a train of 28 wagons with furniture, pianos, cars, bicycles, radios, carpets, etc., which arrived from Germany in Kazan, where the Chekist received the post of head of the counterintelligence department of the Volga Military District. All this property was appropriated by Brezgin and his deputies - Pavlenko, Paliev and others. The Chekists openly sold the surplus. Paliev, years later, also had to answer for excesses: in May 1949, he lost his post.

"Trophy cases" were investigated for a long time, and the perpetrators were often repressed in connection with the struggle of the clans of the Minister of State Security Abakumov and Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs I.A. Serov. The arrest in December 1952 of Lieutenant General N.S. Vlasik, in 1946-1952. who worked as the head of the Main Directorate of Security of the Ministry of State Security of the USSR, led to the subsequent conviction of the head of the Stalinist security (in January 1955) for official misconduct for 10 years of exile, after which an amnesty followed. In total, Vlasik was charged with stealing trophy property worth 2.2 million rubles. In 2000, he was fully rehabilitated (posthumously).

In the central apparatus of the MGB, not only the ministers and their deputies could count on receiving large illegal profits. It was not difficult for foreign intelligence officers to hide the expenditure of operational funds for their own needs.

The certificate of the Personnel Department of the MGB of the USSR dated January 30, 1947 indicated that the former deputy head of the 4th department of the MGB, Major General N.I. for the intended purpose of products and funds earmarked for operational purposes", about which the leadership of the MGB "with respect to Eitingon limited himself to analysis and suggestion." The accusatory certificate stated that Eitingon received only “gifts” for 705 thousand rubles.

The employees of the MGB abroad were also engaged in grabbing. The representative of the MGB task force on the Liaodong Peninsula, V.G. Sluchevsky, was expelled from the party in February 1949 for taking bribes from arrested Koreans from South Korea; The Chekist escaped with dismissal from the MGB. The adviser of the MGB in Czechoslovakia, Colonel V.A. Boyarsky, who had previously distinguished himself in robberies of the inhabitants of Manchuria, in February 1952 received a party reprimand for "excesses in the expenditure of funds for personal maintenance of himself and his apparatus" (about 500 thousand rubles). For Boyarsky, this episode did not have consequences - in 1951 he was transferred to the apparatus of the MGB-Ministry of Internal Affairs of Lithuania.

(Photo by Abakumov from the investigation file)

Some heads of local security agencies have been caught committing large speculative enterprises. K.O. Mikautadze, People's Commissar for State Security of the Adjara ASSR, was sentenced to 8 years in prison for malfeasance (released less than two years later due to amnesty and illness).

In 1944-1945, with the sanction of Mikautadze, his deputies Skhirtladze and Berulava, together with other NKGB officers, through the speculator Akopyan, carried out a number of frauds and speculative transactions.

Having provided Akopyan with a false certificate of a state security officer, the Chekists sent him to sell fruit, and he, under the guise of gifts for front-line soldiers and workers of the Leningrad car repair plant, took 10 tons of tangerines and other fruits to other regions (at the same time, Akopyan took five more speculators with him, from which he received for this trip 100 thousand rubles). Having sold fruits, Hakobyan bought cars, motorcycles, clothes and other goods, which were then dismantled by employees of the republican NKGB. Mikautadze's wife received 50 thousand rubles from the resale of various goods.

In 1946, the newly appointed head of the MGB department, V.I. Moskalenko, took hams, sausages and other products from the warehouse, illegally organized a sewing workshop in the internal prison of the MGB, sewed four suits for free in this workshop and allowed other employees of the UMGB to sew suits for free. Moskalenko pleaded guilty only to the fact that he used a prisoner tailor to sew costumes. In the allied MGB, they limited themselves to explaining Moskalenko, appointing him Minister of State Security of the Estonian SSR as a "punishment".

It turned out that during 1943-1947, family members of a number of senior officials of the UMGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, including the families of Borshchev and the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Major General I.G. etc.), foodstuffs”.

A frequent occurrence was the appropriation of secret amounts intended to pay for the services of agents. The head of the KRO UMGB in the Chita region, Z.S. Protasenko, was expelled from the party by the regional committee in June 1951 for the illegal expenditure of state funds: the KRO employees drank and squandered 9,000 rubles intended to pay for agents. The head of the Transport Department of the Ashgabat MGB A.G. Kochetkov was expelled from the party in July 1946 for misappropriation of state funds: he made 10 false receipts on behalf of informants and received 2,900 rubles on them. The punishment was light - three years probation.

A clear example of the low morality of the communists of the MGB was the frequent facts of theft of party contributions by party organizers of Chekist institutions. Party organizer of the UMGB in the Kemerovo region I.P. Emelyanov, a former experienced SMERSH counterintelligence officer, embezzled and squandered 63 thousand rubles in 1947-1949 by forging documents. party contributions. The party organizer (in 1949-1951) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the same region, B.I. Kholodenin, was expelled from the CPSU (b) for embezzling and drinking 3.662 rubles of party fees, removed from his post and then sentenced to 8 years in labor camp (left a year and a half later under an amnesty of 1953 of the year).

The party organizer of the Biysk city department of the UMGB for the Altai Territory, A.K. Savelkaev, was expelled from the party in May 1948 for embezzling 2.069 rubles. party fees "for drinking" and fired from the "organs".

The party organizer and head of the investigative department of the ROC of the MGB of the East Siberian Military District V.I.

It came to very sophisticated methods of theft. Thus, in 1944-1951, the party functionary A.I. In June 1952, Pulyakh was expelled from the party because he illegally received 42,000 rubles in royalties from the editor of the regional newspaper Kuzbass, both for unpublished articles and for materials from other authors and TASS. The criminal case against Pulyakh was terminated due to the 1953 amnesty.

Several bribe takers and scammers

Several bribe-takers and swindlers from Abakumov's inner circle received significant terms. For example, Colonel A. M. Palkin, head of department "D" of the Ministry of State Security of the USSR, received 15 years in the camps in October 1952 for theft (although he was released ahead of schedule in 1956). Colonel P.S. Ilyashenko, who worked as deputy head of one of the departments of the USSR Ministry of State Security, was sentenced to 10 years in prison in February 1953 for “theft of socialist property” (he was released in 1955).

Other corrupt officials got off much easier. The head of the counterintelligence department of the Central Group of Forces, Lieutenant-General M.I. Belkin, in the second half of the 40s, created a “black cash desk” and was engaged in speculation. In October 1951, he was arrested in connection with the defeat of Abakumov's entourage and was released in 1953. However, Belkin was then fired from the "bodies" "on the facts of discrediting."

Simultaneously with Belkin, Lieutenant-General P.V. Zelenin was arrested for embezzlement in Germany, in 1945-1947. worked as the head of the UKR "Smersh" - UKR MGB in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. In 1953, he was amnestied, but then stripped of his general rank. And the former Commissioner of the MGB in Germany, Lieutenant General N.K. Kovalchuk, who was promoted to the Minister of State Security of Ukraine, escaped repression, although in 1952 he was accused of “bringing two carloads of trophy items and valuables from the front”; however, in 1954 he was deprived of his title and awards.

(In the picture: Colonel-General S.A. Goglidze, Head of the Main Directorate of the Ministry of State Security of the USSR, officer and foreman of the security units of the Ministry of State Security of the USSR in transport. An officer in the form of the Main Directorate of State Security (GUGB) is visible behind. 1947-52)

The head of the personnel department of special workshops No. 4 of the USSR Ministry of State Security, Kuznetsov, was engaged in the theft of materials from the workshop and took bribes. So, in 1948, he received two bribes from the workers of the special workshops Vykhodtsev and Shevchuk in the amount of 850 rubles for issuing documents on their dismissal from the workshops. In the same year, for a bribe of 12 thousand rubles, Kuznetsov left the convicted Grinberg to serve his sentence in the Moscow region instead of deporting him to Vorkuta.

In 1947, he received 4,800 rubles from a certain Bogomolova for the transfer of her convicted husband from prison to a camp, and then early release. Also, Kuznetsov, for 20 thousand rubles, contributed to the release from the camp to freedom "as disabled" of two convicts under Article 58 - some Gorenshtein and Rivkin.

The arrest of the minister of the MGB Abakumov in July 1951 led to a massive purge in the leadership of the "organs". The data of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Party Control Committee showed that up to 40% of the MGB staff fell under various kinds of punishment. It was the largest purge of the security organs of the USSR during their entire existence (except for the “political” purges in the late 1930s and after the arrest of Beria; but in the case of Abakumov, these were punishments of the Chekists under non-political articles).

What lesson can be drawn from this story, besides the fact that it was at this time - in the late 1940s - early 1950s - that the establishment of class justice in the country (which is still in force now) was finally formalized? The system of checks and balances in law enforcement agencies contributes well to controlling them and preventing the final degeneration of the “organs”. "The war of all against all" - in the zero years, almost the same system was created by Putin.

Then each other was restrained by the prosecutor's office and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Federal Drug Control Service and the FSB, the army and later - the Investigative Committee. We witnessed large-scale purges in the "organs" that did not allow any department to take over. Today, there is only one link in the system that balances each other: the superdepartment of the Investigative Committee and the FSB. Outwardly, such a system looks monolithic, “stable”, but, as we know from the history of Russia, “stability” (stagnation) is the first step towards “perestroika”.

Russia again has a rural-KPSS State Duma

The new State Duma still continues to be part of the Soviet system. As before, it is dominated by people from villages and towns, released workers of the Komsomol and the CPSU. Only one thing distinguishes it from previous compositions - sports wrestlers and people who were associated with Germany in the past were introduced to this State Duma.

Despite the quantitative changes in the new State Duma (a decrease in the representation of United Russia and, accordingly, an increase in the presence of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, the SR and the Liberal Democratic Party), it remained the same - a village-KPSS. Just as nothing has changed in the country in recent decades, so within the walls of Okhotny Ryad everything remains the same.

The Interpreter's Blog has already analyzed the biographical characteristics of the deputies of the former State Duma, V convocation. Then we divided the entire composition of the parliament into several groups. By the same principle, we analyzed the new composition of the State Duma.

1-2) In the former State Duma, there were 124 and 33 people from villages and towns, respectively. The new one has 109 and the same 33 people. Rural - a decrease of 15 people. But still, their share - 24.2% of the total composition - is still even slightly higher than the total number of rural residents in the country (23%). And again there are deputies whose place of birth is difficult to classify, but we put them in the group born in the village. For example, Nikolai Makarov: he was born at stud farm No. 137 in the Saratov region. Well, then a standard Soviet-sovereign-democratic career: he worked in the prosecutor's office, as an instructor in the department of administrative bodies of the Saratov regional committee of the CPSU, and as a prosecutor in his native region.

As a rule, the deputies who come from the villages have a very rich professional experience, they have mastered several professions. Here is Ramazan Abdulatipov: he graduated from the medical and obstetric school, was in charge of the rural medical center, worked as a fireman, taught philosophy. And Alevtina Oparina was a laborer at the state farm, a cashier, an accountant, a pig farmer, a poultry keeper, a pioneer leader, and a teacher of the Russian language. From 1968 - secretary of the district committee of the Komsomol, from 1973 - head of the organizational department of the district committee of the CPSU, from 1976 - instructor of the Volgograd regional committee of the CPSU (well, further up the party line). Dmitry Vyatkin - worked as a turner, asphalt concrete worker, court clerk, teacher.

3) But the released workers of the Komsomol and the CPSU in the new State Duma even turned out to be more than in the previous one. It seems that the USSR is farther and farther away from us, and there are more and more people in power from that System. Previously, there were 62 partocrats on Okhotny Ryad, this time there are 65. Or 14.4% of the entire composition of the State Duma. The share of any secretaries of the CPSU or Komsomol on salary in Soviet times was no more than 1% of the total number of Russians. It turns out that there are now 14 times more Communist-Komsomol functionaries in parliament than there should have been "according to the proportional quota."

At the same time, many partocrats ended up in several of our groups at once. For example, the grandson of the Stalinist People's Commissar Molotov, Vyacheslav Nikonov, ended up in the group of partocrats and in the group of KGB siloviki. Here summary his life path: after studying, he worked at the faculty as the secretary of the Komsomol committee and the party committee, since 1989 he headed the sector of the ideological department of the Central Committee of the CPSU, in 1991-1992 he was an assistant to the head of the apparatus of the president of the USSR and the chairman of the KGB.

4) Siloviki - people from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB-FSB - there were 23 people on our list. There were 28 of them in the last State Duma. But here we must understand that these data are taken from the official biographies of the deputies, and the current members of the Okhrana (who are in the so-called "personnel reserve") are not very fond of making public information about themselves.

5) Indigenous Muscovites and Petersburgers in the new Duma - 43 and 16, respectively. In the past it was - 35 and 15, respectively. There are 8 more Muscovites, and this is progress: now their share of 9.5% even slightly exceeds the ratio of Muscovites and other Russians (8.1%).

6) The share of Chechens in the Duma is approximately 2 times higher than their ratio to the entire population of Russia - 8 people, or 1.8% of the parliament (whereas 1.4 million Chechens make up 1% of all Russians). There are also very respected people among them: for example, one of the streets in the Chechen village of Roshni-Chu is named after the now living deputy Vakha Agaev.

But the share of Dagestanis - 12 people, or 2.7% of the members of the Duma - approximately corresponds to their representation in Russia (2.3% of the Russian population).

7) New social group, highlighted by us - professional wrestlers who became deputies. There are 8 of them in the new Duma. The trend is clear: since Vladimir Vladimirovich is a wrestler (judoka), we must show respect for him. Moreover, some fighters are directly connected with Putin. For example, Vasily Shestakov. He graduated from the VTUZ at the Leningrad Mechanical Plant (1976). He was a member of the Leningrad judo team, which included Vladimir Putin. And later published in collaboration with him tutorial"Judo: history, theory, practice". Now knowledge of judo techniques helps him write laws.

8) Another new social group, and also associated with Putin's life path, are people, like the president, who have one or another relation to Germany. There are 7 such people in the Duma (this is with open biographies). Here are typical biographies of the Gerusses. Alexander Tarnaev: in 1982-1987 he served in the military counterintelligence department in Germany, today Gennady Zyuganov's chief bodyguard (head of his security service). Viktor Shudegov - trained in Technical University Dresden (1986). Maria Maksakova-Igenbergs - born in 1977 in Munich, since 2011 - soloist of the Mariinsky Theater, member of the Public Council under the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation.

What can be the conclusion from these statistics? He is the only one: since the State Dumas repeatedly reproduce the Soviet Union within themselves, then it is necessary to return to the main principles of the legislative system that existed in the post-Stalin USSR. Among them, the chief deputy is not a legislator released from his main work. He works at his workplace, and 2 times a year he comes to parliament sessions. The current activity is carried out by a small Presidium (15-30 people). The only material privilege of such a deputy is free travel (as well as a hotel during the session; well, travel allowance).

By the way, the deputies had the same privileges as now Stalin era. They, like the current State Duma members, received higher salaries. So, a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in 1938 received 600 rubles. monthly, and during the session 100 rubles. per day. Note that the average monthly salary of workers and employees then amounted to 330 rubles.

And one more provision needs to be returned: the right of citizens to write orders to their deputy on the ballots, and to the deputy to read these orders and carry them out (such ballots should be considered valid). How it then looked in practice, the deputy, writer and poet Tvardovsky wrote at one time:

“The elections were held on March 1, 1960. They voted for the candidate Tvardovsky with faith and hope that he would help, correct and improve, as evidenced by the inscriptions of voters on the ballot papers: “I vote for the best poet of our Motherland”; "Write more good poetry"; "Good man, let him go"; “Take care to keep the chickens in the village, not to take away the last piece of bread from the children. For example, I am not able to buy on the market, but here it is forbidden. I ask you to keep chickens in the village.

The late Walter Rathenau, who knew "Them" best, said: "They have such power that they can make half the world produce shit and the other half eat it." - What exactly is happening!

This planet is ruled by such creatures (meaning the Jews) who do not consider themselves one species with other people (non-Jews).

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Is it possible? Well, why not, on the other hand? The image of Stirlitz, although literary, has prototypes in reality. Who among those interested in that era has not heard of the "red chapel" - the Soviet intelligence network in higher structures Third Reich? And if so, then why not be similar to the Nazi agents in the USSR?
The fact that during the war there were no high-profile revelations of enemy spies does not mean that they did not exist. They really couldn't be found. Well, even if someone had been discovered, they would hardly have made a big deal out of this. Before the war, when there was no real danger, espionage cases were fabricated from scratch to settle scores with objectionable people. But when a disaster struck that was not expected, then any exposure of enemy agents, especially high-ranking ones, could lead to panic in the population and the army. How is it so, in the General Staff or somewhere else at the top - treason? Therefore, after the execution of the command of the Western Front and the 4th Army in the first month of the war, Stalin no longer resorted to such repressions, and this case was not particularly advertised.
But this is a theory. Is there any reason to believe that Nazi intelligence agents really had access to Soviet strategic secrets during the Great Patriotic War?

Agent network "Max"

Yes, there are such reasons. At the very end of the war, the head of the Abwehr department "Foreign armies - East", General Reinhard Gehlen, surrendered to the Americans. Subsequently, he headed the intelligence of Germany. In the 1970s, some documents from his archive were made public in the West.
The English historian David Ken spoke about Fritz Kauders, who coordinated the Max network of agents in the USSR, created by the Abwehr at the end of 1939. The famous general of state security Pavel Sudoplatov also mentions this network. Who was a part of it is unknown to this day. After the war, when the chief of Kauders changed owners, the Max agents began to work for US intelligence.
It is better known about the former employee of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Minishkiy (sometimes called Mishinsky). It is mentioned in several books of Western historians.

Someone Minishky

In October 1941, Minishkiy served as a political worker in the troops of the Soviet Western Front. There he was captured by the Germans (or defected) and immediately agreed to work for them, indicating that he had access to valuable information. In June 1942, the Germans smuggled him across the front lines, staging his escape from captivity. At the very first Soviet headquarters, he was greeted almost like a hero, after which Minishkiy established contact with the Abwehr agents previously sent here and began to transmit important information to Germany.
The most important is his report on the military conference in Moscow on July 13, 1942, which discussed the strategy of the Soviet troops in the summer campaign. The meeting was attended by the military attaches of the United States, Britain and China. It was stated there that the Red Army was going to retreat to the Volga and the Caucasus, to defend Stalingrad, Novorossiysk and the passes of the Greater Caucasus at any cost, and to organize offensive operations in the areas of Kalinin, Orel and Voronezh. Based on this report, Gehlen prepared a report to the Chief of the German General Staff, General Halder, who then noted the accuracy of the information received.
There are several absurdities in this story. All those who escaped German captivity were under suspicion and subjected to lengthy checks by SMERSH authorities. Especially the political workers. If the political worker was not shot by the Germans in captivity, this automatically made him a spy in the eyes of the inspectors. Further, Marshal Shaposhnikov, mentioned in the report, who allegedly attended that meeting, at that time was no longer the chief of the Soviet General Staff.
Further information about Minishki says that in October 1942 the Germans organized his return crossing through the front line. Until the end of the war, he was engaged in the analysis of information in the department of General Gehlen. After the war, he taught at a German intelligence school, and in the 1960s he moved to the United States and received American citizenship.

Unknown agent in the General Staff

At least twice the Abwehr received reports from an unknown agent in General Staff USSR about Soviet military plans. On November 4, 1942, the agent reported that until November 15 Soviet command plans to launch a series of offensive operations. Further, the areas of offensives were named, which almost exactly coincided with those where the Red Army launched offensives in the winter of 1942/43. The agent made a mistake only in the exact place of strikes near Stalingrad. According to historian Boris Sokolov, this can be explained not by Soviet disinformation, but by the fact that at that moment the final plan for the operation near Stalingrad had not yet been determined. The original date of the offensive was really planned for November 12 or 13, but then was postponed until November 19-20.
In the spring of 1944, the Abwehr received a new report from this agent. According to him, the Soviet General Staff considered two options for action in the summer of 1944. According to one of them, the Soviet troops plan to deliver the main blows in the Baltic states and Volhynia. In another way, the main target is the German troops of the Center group in Belarus. Again, it is likely that both of these options have been discussed. But in the end, Stalin chose the second one - to strike the main blow in Belarus. Hitler decided that it was more likely that his opponent would choose the first option. Be that as it may, the agent's report that the Red Army would launch an offensive only after the successful landing of the allies in Normandy turned out to be accurate.

Who is under suspicion?

According to the same Sokolov, a secret agent should be sought among those Soviet military men who fled to the West in the late 1940s while working in the Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SVAG). In the early 1950s in Germany, under the pseudonym "Dmitry Kalinov", a book by an allegedly Soviet colonel entitled "Soviet marshals have the floor" was published, based, as stated in the preface, on documents from the Soviet General Staff. However, it has now been clarified that the true authors of the book were Grigory Besedovsky, a Soviet diplomat, an émigré defector who fled the USSR back in 1929, and Kirill Pomerantsev, a poet and journalist, the son of a white émigré.
In October 1947, Lieutenant Colonel Grigory Tokaev (Tokaty), an Ossetian who was collecting information about the Nazi missile program in the SVAG, learned about his recall to Moscow and the impending arrest by the SMERSH authorities. Tokayev moved to West Berlin and asked for political asylum. Later he worked in various high-tech projects in the West, in particular - in the NASA Apollo program.
During the war years, Tokayev taught at the Zhukovsky Air Force Academy and worked on Soviet secret projects. Nothing says anything about his knowledge of the military plans of the General Staff. It is possible that the real agent of the Abwehr continued after 1945 to work in the Soviet General Staff for new, overseas masters.

History is written by the victors, and therefore it is not customary for Soviet chroniclers to mention German spies who worked behind the lines in the Red Army. And there were such scouts, and even in the General Staff of the Red Army, as well as the famous Max network. After the end of the war, the Americans transferred them to their place, to share their experience with the CIA.
Indeed, it is hard to believe that the USSR managed to create an agent network in Germany and the countries occupied by it (the most famous is the Red Chapel), but the Germans did not. And if German intelligence officers during the Second World War are not written in Soviet-Russian histories, then the point is not only that it is not customary for the winner to confess his own miscalculations. In the case of German spies in the USSR, the situation is complicated by the fact that the head of the Foreign Armies - East department (in the German abbreviation FHO, it was he who was in charge of intelligence) Reinhard Galen prudently took care of preserving the most important documentation in order to surrender to the Americans at the very end of the war and offer them a "goods face".
His department dealt almost exclusively with the USSR, and in the conditions of the beginning of the Cold War, Gehlen's papers were of great value to the United States. Later, the general headed the intelligence of the FRG, and his archive remained in the United States (some copies were left to Gehlen). Having already retired, the general published his memoirs “Service. 1942-1971", which were published in Germany and the USA in 1971-72. Almost simultaneously with Gehlen's book, his biography was published in America, as well as the book of British intelligence officer Edward Spiro "Ghelen - Spy of the Century" (Spiro wrote under the pseudonym Edward Cookridge, he was a Greek by nationality, a representative of British intelligence in the Czech resistance during the war). Another book was written by the American journalist Charles Whiting, who was suspected of working for the CIA, and was called Gehlen - German Master Spy. All of these books are based on the Gehlen archives, used with the permission of the CIA and the German intelligence BND. They contain some information about German spies in the Soviet rear.

(Gelena's personal card)
General Ernst Kestring, a Russian German born near Tula, was engaged in "field work" in Gehlen's German intelligence. It was he who served as the prototype of the German major in Bulgakov's book Days of the Turbins, who saved Hetman Skoropadsky from reprisals by the Red Army (in fact, the Petliurites). Kestring was fluent in the Russian language and Russia, and it was he who personally selected agents and saboteurs from Soviet prisoners of war. It was he who found one of the most valuable, as it turned out later, German spies.
On October 13, 1941, 38-year-old Captain Minishkiy was taken prisoner. It turned out that before the war he worked in the secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, and earlier in the Moscow City Party Committee. From the moment the war began, he served as a political instructor at the Western Front. He was captured along with the driver when he was driving around the advanced units during the battle of Vyazemsky.
Minishky immediately agreed to cooperate with the Germans, citing some old grievances against the Soviet regime. Seeing what a valuable shot they got, they promised, when the time came, to take him and his family to the west with the provision of German citizenship. But first, business.
Minishki spent 8 months studying in a special camp. And then the famous operation "Flamingo" began, which Gehlen carried out in cooperation with the intelligence officer Bown, who already had a network of agents in Moscow, among which the radio operator with the pseudonym Alexander was the most valuable. Baun's men ferried Minishkiy across the front line, and he reported to the very first Soviet headquarters the story of his capture and daring escape, every detail of which was invented by Gelen's experts. He was taken to Moscow, where he was hailed as a hero. Almost immediately, mindful of his previous responsible work, he was appointed to work in the military-political secretariat of the GKO.

(Real German agents; other German spies could look something like this)
Through a chain through several German agents in Moscow, Minishki began to supply information. The first sensational message came from him on July 14, 1942. Gehlen and Gerre sat all night, drawing up a report based on it to the Chief of the General Staff, Halder. The report was made: “The military conference ended in Moscow on the evening of July 13th. Shaposhnikov, Voroshilov, Molotov and the heads of the British, American and Chinese military missions were present. Shaposhnikov declared that their retreat would be as far as the Volga, in order to force the Germans to spend the winter in the area. During the retreat, comprehensive destruction should be carried out in the territory being abandoned; all industry must be evacuated to the Urals and Siberia.
The British representative asked for Soviet assistance in Egypt, but was told that the Soviet manpower resources were not as great as the Allies believed. In addition, they lack aircraft, tanks and guns, in part because part of the supply of weapons destined for Russia, which the British were supposed to deliver through the port of Basra in the Persian Gulf, was diverted to protect Egypt. It was decided to conduct offensive operations in two sectors of the front: north of Orel and north of Voronezh, using large tank forces and air cover. A distraction attack must be carried out at Kalinin. It is necessary that Stalingrad, Novorossiysk and the Caucasus be kept.”
It all happened. Halder later noted in his diary: “The FCO has provided accurate information on the enemy forces newly deployed since June 28, and on the estimated strength of these formations. He also gave a correct assessment of the energetic actions of the enemy in the defense of Stalingrad.
The above authors made a number of inaccuracies, which is understandable: they received information through several hands and 30 years after the events described. For example, the English historian David Kahn gave a more correct version of the report: on July 14, the meeting was attended not by the heads of the American, British and Chinese missions, but by the military attaches of these countries.

(Secret intelligence school OKW Amt Ausland/Abwehr)
There is no consensus about the real name of Minishkia. According to another version, his surname was Mishinsky. But perhaps it is not true either. For the Germans, it passed under the code numbers 438.
Coolridge and other authors report sparingly on the further fate of Agent 438. The participants in Operation Flamingo definitely worked in Moscow until October 1942. In the same month, Gehlen recalled Minishkiy, arranging, with the help of Bown, a meeting with one of the leading reconnaissance detachments of the Wally, which ferried him across the front line.
In the future, Minishkia worked for Gehlen in the information analysis department, worked with German agents, who were then transferred across the front line.
Minishkia and Operation Flamingo are also named by other respected authors, such as the British military historian John Eriksson in his book The Road to Stalingrad, by the French historian Gabor Rittersporn. According to Rittersporn, Minishkiy actually received German citizenship, after the end of the Second World War he taught at an American intelligence school in southern Germany, then moved to the United States, having received American citizenship. The German Stirlitz died in the 1980s at his home in Virginia.
Minishkia was not the only super spy. The same British military historians mention that the Germans had many intercepted telegrams from Kuibyshev, where the Soviet authorities were based at that time. A German spy group worked in this city. There were several "moles" surrounded by Rokossovsky, and several military historians mentioned that the Germans considered him as one of the main negotiators for a possible separate peace at the end of 1942, and then in 1944 - if the assassination attempt on Hitler would be successful. For reasons unknown today, Rokossovsky was seen as a possible ruler of the USSR after the overthrow of Stalin in a coup of the generals.

(This is how the unit of German saboteurs from Brandenburg looked like. One of its most famous operations was the capture of Maykop oil fields in the summer of 1942 and the city itself)
The British knew well about these German spies (it is clear that they know now). This is also recognized by Soviet military historians. For example, the former military intelligence colonel Yuri Modin, in his book The Fates of the Intelligence Officers: My Cambridge Friends, claims that the British were afraid to supply the USSR with information obtained through the decoding of German reports, precisely because of the fear that there were agents in the Soviet headquarters.
But they personally mention another German superintelligence officer - Fritz Kauders, who created the famous Max intelligence network in the USSR. His biography is given by the aforementioned Englishman David Kahn.
Fritz Kauders was born in Vienna in 1903. His mother was Jewish and his father was German. In 1927 he moved to Zurich, where he began working as a sports journalist. Then he lived in Paris and Berlin, after Hitler came to power he left as a reporter in Budapest. There he found himself a profitable occupation - an intermediary in the sale of Hungarian entry visas to Jews fleeing Germany. He made acquaintances with high-ranking Hungarian officials, and at the same time met the head of the Abwehr station in Hungary, and began working for German intelligence. He makes acquaintance with the Russian emigrant general A.V. Turkul, who had his own intelligence network in the USSR - later it served as the basis for the formation of a more extensive German spy network. Agents are thrown into the Union for a year and a half, starting in the autumn of 1939. The annexation of Romanian Bessarabia to the USSR helped a lot here, when at the same time they “attached” dozens of German spies, abandoned there in advance.

(General Turkul - in the center, with a mustache - with fellow White Guards in Sofia)
With the outbreak of war with the USSR, Kauders moved to Sofia, the capital of Bulgaria, where he headed the Abwehr radio post, which received radiograms from agents in the USSR. But who these agents were has not been clarified so far. There are only fragments of information that there were at least 20-30 of them in various parts of the USSR. The Soviet super-saboteur Sudoplatov also mentions the Max intelligence network in his memoirs.
As mentioned above, not only the names of German spies, but also the minimum information about their actions in the USSR is still closed. Did the Americans and the British pass information about them to the USSR after the victory over fascism? Hardly - they needed the surviving agents themselves. The maximum that was then declassified was secondary agents from the Russian émigré organization NTS.