Date of the battle July 5, 1943 - August 23, 1943 This battle was included in modern history as one of the bloodiest battles of World War II. It is also known as the largest in the history of mankind tank battle.
Conditionally the Battle of Kursk can be divided into two stages:
- Kursk defensive (July 5 - 23)
- Oryol and Kharkov-Belgorod (July 12 - August 23) offensive operations.
The battle lasted 50 days and nights and influenced the entire subsequent course of hostilities.
Forces and means of the opposing sides
Before the start of the battle, the Red Army concentrated an unprecedented number of troops: the Central and Voronezh Fronts numbered more than 1.2 million soldiers and officers, over 3.5 thousand tanks, 20 thousand guns and mortars and more than 2800 aircraft different types. In reserve was the Steppe Front numbering: 580 thousand soldiers, 1.5 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts, 7.5 thousand guns and mortars. Its air cover was carried out by over 700 aircraft.
The German command managed to pull up reserves and by the beginning of the battle it had fifty divisions with a total number of over 900 thousand soldiers and officers, 2700 tanks and self-propelled guns, 10 thousand guns and mortars, and also approximately 2.5 thousand aircraft. For the first time in the history of World War II, the German command used a large number of its latest technology: tanks "Tiger" and "Panther", as well as heavy self-propelled guns - "Ferdinand".
As can be seen from the above data, the Red Army had an overwhelming superiority over the Wehrmacht, being on the defensive, it could quickly respond to all offensive actions of the enemy.
defensive operation
This phase of the battle began with a pre-emptive massive artillery preparation by the Red Army at 2.30 am, at 4.30 it was repeated. The German artillery preparation began at 5 am, and the first divisions went on the offensive after it ...
During bloody battles German troops advanced 6-8 kilometers along the entire front line. The main attack fell on the Ponyri station, a key railway junction of the Orel-Kursk line, and the village of Cherkasskoye, on the section of the Belgorod-Oboyan highway. In these areas, the German troops managed to advance to the Prokhorovka station. It was here that the largest tank battle of this war took place. On the part of the Soviet Union, 800 tanks under the command of General Zhadov participated in the battle, against 450 German tanks under the command of SS Oberstgruppenführer Paul Hausser. In the battle near Prokhorovka, Soviet troops lost about 270 tanks - German losses amounted to over 80 tanks and self-propelled guns.
Offensive
July 12, 1943 Soviet command Operation "Kutuzov" began. In the course of which, after bloody battles of local significance, the troops of the Red Army on July 17-18 squeezed the Germans to the Hagen defensive line east of Bryansk. The fierce resistance of the German troops continued until August 4, when the Belgorod group of fascists was liquidated and Belgorod was liberated.
On August 10, the Red Army launched an offensive in the Kharkov direction, and on August 23, the city was stormed. City battles continued until August 30, but August 23, 1943 is considered the day of the liberation of the city and the end of the Battle of Kursk.
The result of the Battle of Kursk
It is difficult to sum up this epochal battle of the Second World War. According to estimates by Soviet and foreign historians, more than 3.5 million people died in the battle on both sides. The loss ratio for the entire operation is 4/1, not in favor of the USSR.
However, this victory was the beginning of the collapse of Nazi Germany.
The idea to advance near Kursk and cut off the ledge formed here Soviet front arose from Hitler and his military during the Wehrmacht counteroffensive near Kharkov in February-March 1943. This counteroffensive showed that the German army was still capable of seizing the strategic initiative. In addition, the Soviet command was afraid to repeat its mistake in the spring of 1942, when attempts to attack first led to a heavy defeat near Kharkov, which determined the unsuccessful course of the entire summer campaign of 1942. The Red Army has so far been very bad at conducting an offensive in the summer.
At the suggestion of the Deputy Supreme Commander G.K. Zhukov and Chief of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky this time was supposed to give the initiative of offensive operations to the enemy in advance, wear him out with a stubborn defense and, after he suffered heavy losses, go on the counterattack. That the Germans would advance precisely near Kursk was no secret to anyone.
This plan aroused objections from the commander of the Voronezh Front, N.F. Vatutin, who was to repel a German attack south of Kursk. In his opinion, it was inappropriate to give the initiative to the enemy. State Soviet troops and the balance of forces at the front made it possible to go on the assault. Waiting for a German strike meant, Vatutin believed, wasting time in vain. Vatutin suggested hitting the Germans first if they did not go on the offensive before the beginning of July. Stalin instructed the commanders of the Central and Reserve (Steppe) Fronts K.K. Rokossovsky and R.Ya. Malinovsky to present his views on this issue. But Zhukov and Vasilevsky defended the previously proposed plan. The Soviet offensive was to begin only after the breakdown of the German one.
Central Russia, Eastern Ukraine |
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Red Army victory |
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Commanders |
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Georgy Zhukov |
Erich von Manstein |
Nikolai Vatutin |
Gunther Hans von Kluge |
Ivan Konev |
Walter Model |
Konstantin Rokossovsky |
Herman Goth |
Side forces |
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By the beginning of the operation, 1.3 million people + 0.6 million in reserve, 3444 tanks + 1.5 thousand in reserve, 19,100 guns and mortars + 7.4 thousand in reserve, 2172 aircraft + 0.5 thousand in reserve reserve |
According to Soviet data - approx. 900 thousand people, According to him. data - 780 thousand people. 2758 tanks and self-propelled guns (of which 218 are under repair), approx. 10 thousand guns, approx. 2050 aircraft |
Defensive phase: Participants: Central Front, Voronezh Front, Steppe Front (not all) Irrevocable - 70,330 Sanitary - 107,517 Operation "Kutuzov": Participants: Western Front (left wing), Bryansk Front, Central Front Irrevocable - 112,529 Sanitary - 317 361 Operation "Rumyantsev": Participants: Voronezh Front, Steppe Front Irrevocable - 71 611 Sanitary - 183 955 General in the Battle of the Kursk Salient: Irrevocable - 189 652 Sanitary - 406 743 In the Battle of Kursk in general ~ 254 470 killed, captured, missing missing 608,833 wounded and sick 153,000 small arms 6,064 tanks and self-propelled guns 5,245 guns and mortars 1,626 combat aircraft |
According to German sources, 103,600 were killed and missing on the entire Eastern Front. 433,933 wounded. According to Soviet sources, 500 thousand total losses in the Kursk salient. 1000 tanks according to German data, 1500 - according to Soviet less than 1696 aircraft |
Battle of Kursk(July 5, 1943 - August 23, 1943, also known as Battle of Kursk) in terms of its scale, involved forces and means, tension, results and military-political consequences, is one of the key battles of the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War. In the Soviet and Russian historiography it is customary to divide the battle into 3 parts: the Kursk defensive operation (July 5-12); Orel (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3-23) offensive. The German side called the offensive part of the battle "Operation Citadel".
After the end of the battle, the strategic initiative in the war went over to the side of the Red Army, which until the end of the war carried out mainly offensive operations, while the Wehrmacht was on the defensive.
Preparing for battle
During the winter offensive of the Red Army and the subsequent counter-offensive of the Wehrmacht in Eastern Ukraine, a ledge up to 150 km deep and up to 200 km wide was formed in the center of the Soviet-German front, facing the west (the so-called "Kursk Bulge"). During April-June 1943, there was an operational pause at the front, during which the parties were preparing for the summer campaign.
Plans and forces of the parties
The German command decided to conduct a major strategic operation on the Kursk ledge in the summer of 1943. It was planned to launch converging strikes from the areas of the cities of Orel (from the north) and Belgorod (from the south). The shock groups were to link up in the Kursk region, surrounding the troops of the Central and Voronezh Fronts of the Red Army. The operation received the code name "Citadel". According to the German general Friedrich Fangor (German. Friedrich Fangohr), at a meeting with Manstein on May 10-11, the plan was adjusted at the suggestion of General Hoth: the 2nd SS Panzer Corps turns from the Oboyan direction towards Prokhorovka, where terrain conditions allow for a global battle with the armored reserves of Soviet troops.
For the operation, the Germans concentrated a grouping of up to 50 divisions (of which 18 were tank and motorized), 2 tank brigades, 3 separate tank battalions and 8 assault gun divisions, with a total strength, according to Soviet sources, about 900 thousand people. The command of the troops was carried out by Field Marshal Günther Hans von Kluge (Army Group Center) and Field Marshal Erich von Manstein (Army Group South). Organizationally, the strike forces were part of the 2nd Panzer, 2nd and 9th Armies (commander - Field Marshal Walter Model, Army Group Center, Orel region) and the 4th tank army, the 24th Panzer Corps and the Kempf task force (commander - General Herman Goth, Army Group South, Belgorod region). Air support for the German troops was provided by the forces of the 4th and 6th air fleets.
To carry out the operation in the Kursk region, several elite SS Panzer divisions were advanced:
- 1st Division Leibstandarte SS "Adolf Hitler"
- 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich"
- 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf" (Dead Head)
The troops received a number of new equipment:
- 134 Pz.Kpfw.VI Tiger tanks (another 14 command tanks)
- 190 Pz.Kpfw.V "Panther" (11 more - evacuation (without guns) and command)
- 90 assault guns Sd.Kfz. 184 Ferdinand (45 each in sPzJgAbt 653 and sPzJgAbt 654)
- only 348 relatively new tanks and self-propelled guns ("Tiger" was used several times in 1942 and early 1943).
At the same time, however, a significant number of frankly obsolete tanks and self-propelled guns remained in the German units: 384 units (Pz.III, Pz.II, even Pz.I). Also during the Battle of Kursk, the German Sd.Kfz.302 telewagons were used for the first time.
The Soviet command decided to conduct a defensive battle, wear down the enemy troops and inflict defeat on them, inflicting counterattacks on the attackers at a critical moment. To this end, a defense in depth was created on both faces of the Kursk salient. A total of 8 defensive lines were created. The average density of mining in the direction of the expected enemy strikes was 1,500 anti-tank and 1,700 anti-personnel mines per kilometer of the front.
The troops of the Central Front (commander - General of the Army Konstantin Rokossovsky) defended the northern front of the Kursk ledge, and the troops of the Voronezh Front (commander - General of the Army Nikolai Vatutin) - the southern front. The troops occupying the ledge relied on the Steppe Front (commanded by Colonel General Ivan Konev). The fronts were coordinated by representatives of the Headquarters Marshals of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky.
In the assessment of the forces of the parties in the sources, there are strong discrepancies associated with the different definitions of the scale of the battle by different historians, as well as the difference in the methods of accounting and classification military equipment. When assessing the forces of the Red Army, the main discrepancy is associated with the inclusion or exclusion from the calculations of the reserve - the Steppe Front (about 500 thousand personnel and 1500 tanks). The following table contains some estimates:
Estimates of the forces of the parties before the Battle of Kursk according to various sources |
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Source |
Personnel (thousand) |
Tanks and (sometimes) self-propelled guns |
Guns and (sometimes) mortars |
Aircraft |
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about 10000 |
2172 or 2900 (including Po-2 and far) |
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Krivosheev 2001 |
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Glantz, House |
2696 or 2928 |
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Mueller Gill. |
2540 or 2758 |
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Zett, Frankson |
5128 +2688 "rate reserve" total over 8000 |
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The role of intelligence
From the beginning of 1943, the intercepts of secret communications from the Nazi High Command and Hitler's secret directives increasingly referred to Operation Citadel. According to the memoirs of Anastas Mikoyan, on March 27 he was informed in general details by Stalin about the German plans. On April 12, 1943, the exact text of Directive No. 6 “On the Plan of Operation Citadel” translated from German by the German High Command, which was endorsed by all services of the Wehrmacht, but not yet signed by Hitler, was laid down on Stalin’s desk, who signed it only three days later. This data was obtained by a scout who worked under the name "Werther". The real name of this man is still unknown, but it is assumed that he was an employee of the Wehrmacht High Command, and the information he received came to Moscow through the Luci agent operating in Switzerland, Rudolf Rössler. There is an alternative suggestion that Werther is the personal photographer of Adolf Hitler.
However, it should be noted that back on April 8, 1943, G.K. Zhukov, relying on data from the intelligence agencies of the fronts of the Kursk direction, very accurately predicted the strength and direction of German attacks on the Kursk salient:
Although the exact text of the "Citadel" lay on Stalin's desk three days before Hitler signed it, four days before that, the German plan became obvious to the highest Soviet military command, and they knew the general details about the existence of such a plan at least for eight days before.
Kursk defensive operation
The German offensive began on the morning of July 5, 1943. Since the Soviet command knew exactly the start time of the operation - 3 a.m. (the German army fought according to Berlin time - translated into Moscow 5 a.m.), at 22:30 and 2:20 Moscow time, counter-barrage preparation was carried out by the forces of two fronts with the amount of ammunition 0.25 ammo. German reports noted significant damage to communication lines and minor losses in manpower. An unsuccessful air raid was also carried out by the forces of the 2nd and 17th air armies (more than 400 attack aircraft and fighters) on the Kharkov and Belgorod enemy air hubs.
Before the start of the ground operation, at 6 o'clock in the morning our time, the Germans also inflicted bombing and artillery strikes on the Soviet defensive lines. The tanks that went on the offensive immediately encountered serious resistance. The main blow on the northern face was inflicted in the direction of Olkhovatka. Having not achieved success, the Germans suffered a blow in the direction of Ponyri, but even here they could not break through the Soviet defenses. The Wehrmacht was able to advance only 10-12 km, after which, from July 10, having lost up to two-thirds of the tanks, the German 9th Army went on the defensive. On the southern front, the main blows of the Germans were directed to the areas of Korocha and Oboyan.
July 5, 1943 Day one. Defense of Cherkassky.
Operation "Citadel" - the general offensive of the German army on the Eastern Front in 1943 - was aimed at encircling the troops of the Central (K. K. Rokossovsky) and Voronezh (N. F. Vatutin) fronts in the area of the city of Kursk by counter attacks from the north and south under the base of the Kursk ledge, as well as the defeat of Soviet operational and strategic reserves east of the main direction of the main attack (including in the area of Prokhorovka station). Main blow from southern directions were applied by the forces of the 4th Panzer Army (commander - Herman Goth, 48th TC and 2nd SS TC) with the support of the army group "Kempf" (W. Kempf).
At the initial stage of the offensive, the 48th Panzer Corps (commander: O. von Knobelsdorf, chief of staff: F. von Mellenthin, 527 tanks, 147 self-propelled guns), which was the strongest formation of the 4th Panzer Army, consisting of: 3 and 11 Panzer divisions , mechanized (tank-grenadier) division "Grossdeutschland", 10 tank brigade and 911 det. division of assault guns, with the support of 332 and 167 infantry divisions, had the task of breaking through the first, second and third lines of defense of units of the Voronezh Front from the Gertsovka-Butovo area in the direction of Cherkasskoe-Yakovlevo-Oboyan. At the same time, it was assumed that in the Yakovlevo area, 48 TC would connect with units of the 2nd SS TD (thus surrounding units of the 52nd Guards Rifle Division and 67 Guards Rifle Division), change units of the 2nd SS TD, after which it was supposed to use units of the SS division against the operational reserves of the Red Army in the area of Art. Prokhorovka, and 48 shopping mall was supposed to continue operations in the main direction Oboyan - Kursk.
To accomplish the task, the units of the 48th TC on the first day of the offensive (Day "X") needed to crack the defenses of the 6th Guards. A (Lieutenant General I.M. Chistyakov) at the junction of the 71st Guards Rifle Division (Colonel I.P. Sivakov) and the 67th Guards Rifle Division (Colonel A.I. Baksov), capture the large village of Cherkasskoye and carry out a breakthrough with armored units in towards the village of Yakovlevo. The offensive plan of the 48th shopping mall determined that the village of Cherkasskoye was to be captured by 10:00 on July 5. And already on July 6, part 48 of shopping mall. should have reached the city of Oboyan.
However, as a result of the actions of the Soviet units and formations, their courage and stamina, as well as the preparation of defensive lines they carried out in advance, the plans of the Wehrmacht were “significantly adjusted” in this direction - 48 shopping mall did not reach Oboyan.
The factors that determined the unacceptably slow rate of advance of the 48th mk on the first day of the offensive were the good engineering preparation of the terrain by the Soviet units (starting from anti-tank ditches almost throughout the entire defense and ending with radio-controlled minefields), the fire of divisional artillery, guards mortars and the actions of assault aircraft on the accumulated front engineering obstacles to enemy tanks, competent location of anti-tank strongholds (No. 6 south of Korovin in the lane of the 71st Guards Rifle Division, No. 7 southwest of Cherkassky and No. 8 southeast of Cherkassky in the lane of the 67th Guards Rifle Division), rapid reorganization of the combat formations of battalions of the 196th Guards Rifle Division .sp (Colonel V. I. Bazhanov) in the direction of the enemy’s main attack south of Cherkassky, timely maneuver by divisional (245 otp, 1440 sap) and army (493 iptap, as well as 27 oiptabr colonel N. D. Chevola) anti-tank reserve, relatively successful counterattacks on the flank of the wedged units of the 3rd TD and 11th TD with the involvement of the forces of 245 otp (lieutenant colonel M.K. Akopov, 39 M3 tanks) and 1440 sap (lieutenant colonel Shapshinsky, 8 SU-76 and 12 SU-122), and also not completely suppressed resistance of the remnants of military outposts in the southern part of the village of Butovo (3 battalion. 199th guards regiment, captain V.L. Vakhidov) and in the area of workers' barracks southwest of the village. Korovino, which were the starting positions for the offensive of 48 TC (the capture of these starting positions was planned to be carried out by specially allocated forces of 11 TD and 332 RD before the end of the day on July 4, that is, on the day "X-1", however, the resistance of the combat guard was not completely suppressed by dawn on July 5). All of the above factors affected both the speed of concentration of units in their original positions before the main attack, and their advancement during the offensive itself.
Also, the shortcomings of the German command in planning the operation and the poorly developed interaction between tank and infantry units affected the pace of the corps' offensive. In particular, the Great Germany division (W. Heierlein, 129 tanks (of which 15 Pz.VI tanks), 73 self-propelled guns) and 10 tank brigade attached to it (K. Decker, 192 combat and 8 command tanks Pz.V) under the current conditions battles turned out to be clumsy and unbalanced formations. As a result, throughout the first half of the day, the bulk of the tanks were crowded in narrow "corridors" in front of engineering barriers (especially great difficulties were caused by overcoming the swampy anti-tank ditch west of Cherkassky), came under a combined attack by Soviet aviation (2nd VA) and artillery - from PTOP No. 6 and No. 7, 138 Guards Ap (Lieutenant Colonel M. I. Kirdyanov) and two regiments 33 from Pabr (Colonel Stein), suffered losses (especially in the officer corps), and could not deploy in accordance with the offensive schedule on tank-accessible terrain at the turn Korovino - Cherkasskoye for a further strike in the direction of the northern outskirts of Cherkassy. At the same time, infantry units that overcame anti-tank barriers in the first half of the day had to rely mainly on their own fire weapons. So, for example, the battle group of the 3rd Battalion of the Fusiliers Regiment, which was at the forefront of the strike of the VG division, at the time of the first attack, found itself without tank support at all and suffered significant losses. Possessing huge armored forces, the VG division could not actually bring them into battle for a long time.
The result of the resulting congestion on the routes of advance was also the untimely concentration of artillery units of the 48th tank corps in firing positions, which affected the results of the artillery preparation before the start of the attack.
It should be noted that the commander of the 48th TC became a hostage to a number of erroneous decisions of the higher authorities. Knobelsdorff's lack of an operational reserve had a particularly negative effect - all divisions of the corps were put into battle almost simultaneously on the morning of July 5, 1943, after which they were drawn into active hostilities for a long time.
The development of the offensive of 48 mk on the afternoon of July 5 was most facilitated by: active operations of sapper-assault units, aviation support (more than 830 sorties) and an overwhelming quantitative superiority in armored vehicles. It is also necessary to note the initiative actions of units 11 TD (I. Mikl) and 911 TD. division of assault guns (overcoming the strip of engineering obstacles and access to the eastern outskirts of Cherkassy by a mechanized group of infantry and sappers with the support of assault guns).
An important factor in the success of the German tank units was the qualitative leap that had taken place by the summer of 1943 in the combat characteristics of German armored vehicles. Already during the first day defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge, the insufficient power of the anti-tank weapons in service with the Soviet units manifested itself, when fighting both with new German tanks Pz.V and Pz.VI, as well as with modernized tanks of older brands (about half of the Soviet Iptaps were armed with 45-mm guns, the power of 76-mm Soviet field and American tank guns made it possible to effectively destroy modern or modernized enemy tanks at distances of twice three times less than the effective range of fire of the latter, heavy tank and self-propelled units at that time were practically absent not only in the combined arms 6th Guards A, but also in the 1st Tank Army of M. E. Katukov, which occupied the second line of defense behind it).
Only after overcoming in the second half of the day the main mass of tanks of anti-tank barriers south of Cherkassky, having repelled a number of counterattacks of the Soviet units, the units of the VG division and 11 TD were able to cling to the southeastern and southwestern outskirts of the village, after which the fighting moved into the street phase. At about 21:00 division commander A. I. Baksov ordered the withdrawal of units of the 196th Guards Rifle Regiment to new positions to the north and northeast of Cherkassky, as well as to the center of the village. During the withdrawal of units of 196 Guards Rifles, minefields were set up. At about 21:20, a battle group of grenadiers of the VG division, with the support of the Panthers of the 10th brigade, broke into the Yarki farm (north of Cherkassky). A little later, the 3rd TD of the Wehrmacht managed to capture the Krasny Pochinok farm (north of Korovino). Thus, the result of the day for the 48th TC of the Wehrmacht was the wedging into the first line of defense of the 6th Guards. And at 6 km, which can actually be considered a failure, especially against the background of the results achieved by the evening of July 5 by the troops of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (operating east in parallel with 48th Tank Corps), which was less saturated with armored vehicles, which managed to break through the first line of defense of the 6th Guards. A.
Organized resistance in the village of Cherkasskoe was crushed around midnight on July 5th. However, the German units were able to establish full control over the village only by the morning of July 6, that is, when, according to the offensive plan, the corps was already supposed to approach Oboyan.
Thus, the 71st Guards Rifle Division and the 67th Guards Rifle Division, not possessing large tank formations (they had only 39 American M3 tanks of various modifications and 20 self-propelled guns from the 245 otp and 1440 sap) were held for about a day in the area of the villages of Korovino and Cherkasskoe five enemy divisions (of which three are armored). In the battle on July 5, 1943, in the area of Cherkassky, the fighters and commanders of the 196th and 199th guards especially distinguished themselves. rifle regiments 67 guards. divisions. The competent and truly heroic actions of the fighters and commanders of the 71st Guards Rifle Division and the 67th Guards Rifle Division allowed the command of the 6th Guards. And in a timely manner to pull up the army reserves to the place where the units of the 48th TC were wedged in at the junction of the 71st Guards Rifle Division and the 67th Guards Rifle Division and prevent a general collapse of the defense of the Soviet troops in this sector in the following days of the defensive operation.
As a result of the hostilities described above, the village of Cherkasskoye actually ceased to exist (according to post-war eyewitness accounts, it was a “lunar landscape”).
The heroic defense of the village of Cherkasskoye on July 5, 1943, one of the most successful moments of the Battle of Kursk for the Soviet troops, is unfortunately one of the undeservedly forgotten episodes of the Great Patriotic War.
July 6, 1943 Day two. First counterattacks.
By the end of the first day of the offensive, 4 TA wedged into the defense of 6 Guards. And to a depth of 5-6 km in the area of offensive 48 TC (near the village of Cherkasskoe) and 12-13 km in the area of 2 TC SS (in the Bykovka-Kozmo-Demyanovka area). At the same time, the divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (Obergruppenführer P. Hausser) managed to break through the first line of defense of the Soviet troops to the full depth, pushing back units of the 52nd Guards Rifle Division (Colonel I. M. Nekrasov), and approached the 5-6 km front directly to the second the line of defense occupied by the 51st Guards Rifle Division (Major General N. T. Tavartkeladze), engaging in battle with its advanced units.
However, the right neighbor of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps - AG "Kempf" (W. Kempf) - did not complete the task of the day on July 5, encountering stubborn resistance from units of the 7th Guards. And, thereby exposing the right flank of the advancing 4th tank army. As a result, Hausser was forced from July 6 to 8 to use a third of the forces of his corps, namely the Dead Head TD, to cover his right flank against the 375th Rifle Division (Colonel P. D. Govorunenko), whose units brilliantly proved themselves in the battles of July 5 .
On July 6, the tasks of the day for units of the 2nd SS TC (334 tanks) were determined: for the Dead Head TD (brigadeführer G. Priss, 114 tanks) - the defeat of the 375th rifle division and the expansion of the breakthrough corridor in the direction of the river. Lipovy Donets, for TD "Leibstandarte" (brigadeführer T. Vish, 99 tanks, 23 self-propelled guns) and "Das Reich" (brigadeführer V. Kruger, 121 tanks, 21 self-propelled guns) - the fastest breakthrough of the second line of defense near the village. Yakovlevo and exit to the line of the bend of the river Psel - with. Teterevino.
At about 9:00 on July 6, 1943, after a powerful artillery preparation (carried out by artillery regiments of the Leibstandarte, Das Reich divisions and 55 mp six-barreled mortars) with the direct support of the 8th Air Corps (about 150 aircraft in the offensive zone), the divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps moved into offensive, delivering the main blow in the area occupied by 154 and 156 guards sp. At the same time, the Germans managed to identify the command and control posts of the regiments of the 51st Guards Rifle Division and launch a fire raid on them, which led to the disorganization of communications and command and control of its troops. In fact, the battalions of the 51st Guards Rifle Division repelled enemy attacks without communication with the higher command, since the work of communication officers was not effective due to the high dynamics of the battle.
The initial success of the attack of the Leibstandarte and Das Reich divisions was ensured due to the numerical advantage in the breakthrough area (two German divisions against two guards rifle regiments), as well as due to good interaction between the regiments of the divisions, artillery and aviation - the advanced units of the divisions, the main ramming force of which was the 13th and 8th heavy companies of the "Tigers" (7 and 11 Pz.VI, respectively), with the support of assault gun divisions (23 and 21 StuG) advanced to Soviet positions even before the end of the artillery and air strike, finding themselves at the moment of its end a few hundred meters from the trenches.
By 13:00, the battalions at the junction of the 154th and 156th Guards Rifle Regiments were knocked out of their positions and began a disorderly retreat in the direction of the villages of Yakovlevo and Luchki; the left-flank 158th Guards Rifle Regiment, having bent its right flank, generally continued to hold the line of defense. The withdrawal of units of the 154th and 156th Guards Rifle Regiments was carried out mixed with tanks and motorized infantry of the enemy and was associated with heavy losses (in particular, in 156 Guards Rifle Regiment out of 1685 people on July 7, about 200 people remained in the ranks, that is, the regiment was actually destroyed) . The general leadership of the retreating battalions was practically absent, the actions of these units were determined only by the initiative of junior commanders, not all of whom were ready for this. Some units of the 154th and 156th Guards Rifle Regiments went to the positions of neighboring divisions. The situation was partly saved by the actions of the artillery of the 51st Guards Rifle Division and the suitable 5th Guards Rifle Division from the reserve. Stalingrad tank corps - howitzer batteries of the 122nd Guards Ap (Major M.N. Uglovsky) and artillery units of the 6th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade (Colonel A.M. Shchekal) fought hard battles in the depths of the defense of the 51st Guards. divisions, slowing down the pace of the advance of the Leibstandarte and Das Reich combat groups in order to enable the retreating infantry to gain a foothold on new lines. At the same time, the gunners managed to save most of their heavy weapons. A fleeting but fierce battle flared up for the village of Luchki, in the area of \u200b\u200bwhich the 464th guards artillery division and 460th guards managed to deploy. mortar battalion 6 guards msbr 5 guards. Stk (at the same time, due to insufficient provision of vehicles, the motorized infantry of this brigade was still on the march 15 km from the battlefield).
At 14:20, the armored group of the Das Reich division as a whole captured the village of Luchki, and the artillery units of the 6th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade began to retreat north to the Kalinin farm. After that, up to the third (rear) defensive line of the Voronezh Front, there were actually no units of the 6th Guards in front of the Das Reich combat group. armies capable of holding back its offensive: the main forces of the anti-tank artillery of the army (namely, 14, 27 and 28 oiptabr) were located to the west - on Oboyanskoye Highway and in the offensive zone of 48 TC, which, according to the results of the battles on July 5, was assessed by the army command as the direction of the main German strikes (which was not entirely true - the strikes of both German tank corps 4 TA were considered by the German command as equivalent). To repel the strike of the TD "Das Reich" artillery from the 6th Guards. And by this point, it just wasn't.
The offensive of the Leibstandarte TD in the Oboyan direction in the first half of the day on July 6 developed less successfully than that of the Das Reich, which was due to the greater saturation of Soviet artillery in its offensive sector (the regiments of the 28th oiptabr of Major Kosachev were actively operating), timely strikes of the 1st Guards. brigade (colonel V. M. Gorelov) and 49 brigade (lieutenant colonel A. F. Burda) from the 3 mechanized corps 1 TA M. E. Katukov, as well as the presence of a well-fortified village of Yakovlevo in its offensive zone, in street battles in which for some time bogged down the main forces of the division, including its tank regiment.
Thus, by 14:00 on July 6, the troops of the 2nd SS TC basically completed the first part general plan offensive - the left flank of the 6th Guards. A was crushed, and a little later with the capture of s. Yakovlevo, on the part of the 2nd shopping mall of the SS, conditions were prepared for their replacement with units of the 48th shopping mall. The advanced units of the 2nd SS TC were ready to begin to fulfill one of the general goals of the Citadel operation - the destruction of the Red Army reserves in the area of st. Prokhorovka. However, Herman Goth (commander of 4 TA) failed to fully fulfill the offensive plan on July 6, due to the slow advance of the troops of 48 TC (O. von Knobelsdorf), who faced the skillful defense of Katukov's army that entered the battle in the afternoon. Although Knobelsdorff's corps managed to surround some regiments of the 67th and 52nd guards divisions of the 6th guards in the afternoon. And in the interfluve of the Vorskla and Vorsklitsa (with a total strength of about a rifle division), however, having stumbled upon the rigid defense of the brigades of the 3rd MK (Major General S. M. Krivoshein) on the second line of defense, the corps divisions could not capture bridgeheads on the northern bank of the Pena River, discard the Soviet mechanized corps and go to the village. Yakovlevo for the subsequent change of parts 2 shopping mall SS. Moreover, on the left flank of the corps, the combat group of the tank regiment of the 3rd tank regiment (F. Westkhoven), which gaped at the entrance to the village of Zavidovka, was shot by tankers and artillerymen of the 22nd tank brigade (Colonel N. G. Vennichev), which was part of the 6th tank regiment (Major General A D. Hetman) 1 TA.
Nevertheless, the success achieved by the divisions "Leibstandarte", and in particular "Das Reich", forced the command of the Voronezh Front, in conditions of incomplete clarity of the situation, to take hasty retaliatory measures to plug the breakthrough that had formed in the second line of defense of the front. After the report of the commander of the 6th Guards. And Chistyakov on the state of affairs on the left flank of the army, Vatutin, by his order, transfers the 5th Guards. Stalingrad shopping mall (Major General A. G. Kravchenko, 213 tanks, of which 106 are T-34 and 21 are Mk.IV Churchill) and 2 Guards. Tatsinsky Tank Corps (Colonel A.S. Burdeyny, 166 combat-ready tanks, of which 90 are T-34s and 17 are Mk.IV Churchills) under the command of the commander of the 6th Guards. And he approves his proposal to launch counterattacks on the German tanks that broke through the positions of the 51st Guards Rifle Division with the forces of the 5th Guards Rifle Division. Stk and under the base of the entire advancing wedge 2 TC SS with the forces of 2 Guards. TTK (straight through the battle formations of 375 rifle divisions). In particular, on the afternoon of July 6, I. M. Chistyakov puts the commander of the 5th Guards. Stk to Major General A. G. Kravchenko, the task of withdrawing from the defensive area he occupied (in which the corps was already ready to meet the enemy, using the tactics of ambushes and anti-tank strongholds) of the main part of the corps (two of the three brigades and a heavy tank breakthrough regiment), and the application by these forces of a counterattack on the flank of the Leibstandarte TD. Having received the order, the commander and headquarters of the 5th Guards. Stk, already knowing about the capture with. Luchki tanks of the division "Das Reich", and more correctly assessing the situation, tried to challenge the implementation of this order. However, under the threat of arrests and execution, they were forced to proceed with its implementation. The attack of the corps brigades was launched at 15:10.
Sufficient own artillery means of the 5th Guards. Stk did not have, and the order did not leave time to link the actions of the corps with neighbors or aviation. Therefore, the attack of tank brigades was carried out without artillery preparation, without air support, on level ground and with practically open flanks. The blow fell directly on the forehead of the Das Reich TD, which regrouped, setting up tanks as an anti-tank barrier and, having called in aviation, inflicted a significant fire defeat on the brigades of the Stalingrad Corps, forcing them to stop the attack and go on the defensive. After that, pulling up the anti-tank artillery and organizing flank maneuvers, units of the Das Reich TD between 17 and 19 hours managed to reach the communications of the defending tank brigades in the area of the Kalinin farm, which was defended by 1696 zenap (Major Savchenko) and 464 guards artillery that had withdrawn from the village of Luchki .division and 460 guards. mortar battalion of the 6th guards msbr. By 19:00, units of the Das Reich TD actually managed to surround most of the 5th Guards. Stk between s. Luchki and Kalinin farm, after which, building on success, the command of the German division of part of the forces, acting in the direction of Art. Prokhorovka, tried to seize the Belenikhino junction. However, thanks to the initiative actions of the commander and battalion commanders of the 20 brigade (lieutenant colonel P.F. Okhrimenko) of the 5th Guards, which remained outside the encirclement ring. Stk, who managed to quickly create a tough defense around Belenikhino from various parts of the corps that were at hand, managed to stop the offensive of Das Reich, and even force the German units to return back to x. Kalinin. Being without communication with the headquarters of the corps, on the night of July 7, the encircled units of the 5th Guards. Stk organized a breakthrough, as a result of which part of the forces managed to escape from the encirclement and connected with parts of the 20 brigade. During July 6, 1943, units of the 5th Guards. Stk for combat reasons, 119 tanks were irretrievably lost, another 9 tanks were lost for technical or unexplained reasons, and 19 were sent for repair. Not a single tank corps had such significant losses in one day during the entire defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge (losses of the 5th Guards Stk on July 6 exceeded even the losses of the 29th Tank Corps during the attack on July 12 near the Oktyabrsky temporary storage warehouse).
After the encirclement of the 5th Guards. Stk, continuing to develop success in the northern direction, another detachment of the Das Reich tank regiment, using the confusion during the withdrawal of Soviet units, managed to reach the third (rear) line of army defense, occupied by units 69A (Lieutenant General V. D. Kryuchenkon) , near the Teterevino farm, and for a short time wedged into the defense of the 285th joint venture of the 183rd rifle division, however, due to a clear lack of strength, having lost several tanks, he was forced to retreat. The exit of German tanks to the third line of defense of the Voronezh Front already on the second day of the offensive was regarded by the Soviet command as an emergency.
The offensive of the “Dead Head” TD did not receive significant development during July 6 due to the stubborn resistance of units of the 375th rifle division, as well as the counterattack of the 2nd guards carried out in the afternoon on its sector. Tatsinsky tank corps (Colonel A.S. Burdeyny, 166 tanks), which took place simultaneously with the counterattack of the 2nd Guards. Stk, and demanded the involvement of all the reserves of this SS division and even some parts of the Das Reich TD. However, to inflict losses on the Tatsinsky Corps even approximately commensurate with the losses of the 5th Guards. The Germans did not succeed in the Stk, even despite the fact that during the counterattack the corps had to cross the Lipovy Donets River twice, and some of its units were surrounded for a short time. Losses of the 2nd Guards. TTK for July 6 amounted to: 17 tanks burned out and 11 lined, that is, the corps remained fully combat-ready.
Thus, during July 6, formations of 4 TA managed to break through the second line of defense of the Voronezh Front on their right flank, inflicted significant losses on the troops of 6 Guards. A (of the six rifle divisions by the morning of July 7, only three remained combat-ready, of the two tank corps transferred to it - one). As a result of the loss of control of units of the 51st Guards Rifle Division and the 5th Guards Division. Stk, at the junction of 1 TA and 5 Guards. Stk formed a section not occupied by Soviet troops, which in the following days, at the cost of incredible efforts, Katukov had to plug up 1 TA brigades, using his experience in defensive battles near Orel in 1941.
However, all the successes of the 2nd SS TC that led to the breakthrough of the second defensive line again could not be translated into a powerful breakthrough deep into the Soviet defense to destroy the strategic reserves of the Red Army, since the troops of the Kempf AG, having achieved some successes on July 6, nevertheless again failed complete the task of the day. AG "Kempf" still could not provide the right flank of the 4th TA, which was threatened by the 2nd Guards. TTK supported by the still combat-ready 375 sd. Also significant to the further course of events was the loss of the Germans in armored vehicles. So, for example, in the tank regiment of the TD "Great Germany" 48 mk, after the first two days of the offensive, 53% of the tanks were considered incapacitated (Soviet troops disabled 59 out of 112 vehicles, including 12 "Tigers" out of 14 available), and in 10 tank brigade to on the evening of July 6, only 40 combat Panthers (out of 192) were considered combat-ready. Therefore, on July 7, less ambitious tasks were set for the 4th TA corps than on July 6 - expanding the breakthrough corridor and securing the flanks of the army.
The commander of the 48th Panzer Corps, O. von Knobelsdorf, on the evening of July 6 summed up the results of the day's battle:
Starting from July 6, 1943, not only the German command had to retreat from previously developed plans (which did this on July 5), but also the Soviet one, which clearly underestimated the strength of the German armored attack. Due to the loss of combat capability and the failure of the material part of most divisions of the 6th Guards. And, from the evening of July 6, the overall operational control of the troops holding the second and third lines of the Soviet defense in the area of the breakthrough of the German 4th TA was actually transferred from the commander of the 6th Guards. And I. M. Chistyakov to the commander of 1 TA M. E. Katukov. The main frame of the Soviet defense in the following days was created around the brigades and corps of the 1st Panzer Army.
Battle of Prokhorovka
On July 12, the largest (or one of the largest) in the history of the oncoming tank battle took place in the Prokhorovka area.
According to data from Soviet sources, from the German side, about 700 tanks and assault guns participated in the battle, according to V. Zamulin - the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which had 294 tanks (including 15 "Tigers") and self-propelled guns.
On the Soviet side, the 5th Panzer Army of P. Rotmistrov, numbering about 850 tanks, participated in the battle. After a massive air strike was launched, the battle on both sides entered its active phase and continued until the end of the day.
Here is one of the episodes that clearly shows what happened on July 12: the battle for the Oktyabrsky state farm and high. 252.2 looked like a sea surf - four tank brigades of the Red Army, three SAP batteries, two rifle regiments and one battalion motorized rifle brigade waves rolled on the defense of the SS Grenadier Regiment, but, having met fierce resistance, retreated. This went on for almost five hours, until the guards drove the grenadiers out of the area, suffering enormous losses in the process.
From the memoirs of a participant in the battle, Untersturmführer Gurs, commander of a motorized rifle platoon of the 2nd grp:
During the battle, a lot of tank commanders (platoon and company) were out of action. High level losses of command personnel in the 32nd brigade: 41 tank commander (36% of the total), commander of a tank platoon (61%), company (100%) and battalion (50%). Very high losses were suffered by the command link and in the motorized rifle regiment of the brigade, many commanders of companies and platoons were killed and seriously injured. His commander, Captain I. I. Rudenko, failed (evacuated from the battlefield to the hospital).
Grigory Penezhko, a participant in the battle, deputy chief of staff of the 31st brigade, later Hero of the Soviet Union, recalled the condition of a person in those terrible conditions:
... Heavy pictures remained in my memory ... There was such a roar that the membranes pressed, blood flowed from the ears. The continuous roar of engines, the clanging of metal, the roar, the explosions of shells, the wild rattle of torn iron ... From point-blank shots, turrets turned, twisted guns, armor burst, tanks exploded. From shots into gas tanks, the tanks instantly flared up. Hatches opened, and tank crews tried to get out. I saw a young lieutenant, half burnt, hanging from his armour. Wounded, he could not get out of the hatch. And so he died. There was no one around to help him. We lost the sense of time, we felt neither thirst, nor heat, nor even blows in the cramped cockpit of the tank. One thought, one desire - while alive, beat the enemy. Our tankers, who got out of their wrecked vehicles, searched the field for enemy crews, also left without equipment, and beat them with pistols, grabbed them hand-to-hand. I remember the captain, who, in some kind of frenzy, climbed onto the armor of a wrecked German "tiger" and hit the hatch with his machine gun in order to "smoke out" the Nazis from there. I remember how bravely the commander of the tank company Chertorizhsky acted. He knocked out the enemy "Tiger", but he himself was shot down. Jumping out of the car, the tankers put out the fire. And went to fight again |
By the end of July 12, the battle ended with unclear results, only to resume on the afternoon of July 13 and 14. After the battle, the German troops were unable to move forward in any significant way, despite the fact that the losses of the Soviet tank army, caused by the tactical errors of its command, were much greater. Having advanced 35 kilometers over July 5-12, Manstein's troops were forced, having trampled on the achieved lines for three days in vain attempts to break into the Soviet defenses, to begin the withdrawal of troops from the captured "bridgehead". During the battle there was a turning point. The Soviet troops, which went on the offensive on July 23, threw back the German armies in the south of the Kursk Bulge to their original positions.
Losses
According to Soviet data, about 400 German tanks, 300 vehicles, over 3,500 soldiers and officers remained on the battlefield in the battle of Prokhorovka. However, these numbers are being questioned. For example, according to the calculations of G. A. Oleinikov, more than 300 German tanks could not take part in the battle. According to the research of A. Tomzov, referring to the data of the German Federal Military Archive, during the battles of July 12-13, the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler division irretrievably lost 2 Pz.IV tanks, 2 Pz.IV and 2 Pz.III tanks were sent for long-term repairs , in the short term - 15 tanks Pz.IV and 1 Pz.III. The total losses of tanks and assault guns of the 2nd SS TC on July 12 amounted to about 80 tanks and assault guns, including at least 40 units lost by the Totenkopf Division.
At the same time, the Soviet 18th and 29th tank corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army lost up to 70% of their tanks.
According to the memoirs of Major General of the Wehrmacht F.V. von Mellenthin, in the attack on Prokhorovka and, accordingly, in the morning battle with the Soviet TA, only the Reich and Leibstandarte divisions, reinforced by a battalion of self-propelled guns, took part - up to 240 vehicles in total, including including four "tigers". It was not supposed to meet a serious enemy, according to the German command, TA Rotmistrova was involved in the battle against the “Dead Head” division (in fact, one corps) and the oncoming attack of more than 800 (according to their estimates) tanks was a complete surprise.
However, there is reason to believe that the Soviet command “overslept” the enemy and the TA attack with dowry corps was not at all an attempt to stop the Germans, but pursued the goal of going into the rear of the SS tank corps, for which his division “Dead Head” was taken.
The Germans were the first to notice the enemy and managed to reorganize for battle, the Soviet tankers had to do this already under fire.
Results of the defensive phase of the battle
The central front involved in the battle in the north of the arc, for July 5-11, 1943, suffered losses of 33,897 people, of which 15,336 were irretrievable, its enemy, the 9th Army of the Model, lost 20,720 people over the same period, which gives a loss ratio of 1.64:1. The Voronezh and Steppe fronts, which participated in the battle on the southern face of the arc, lost 5-23 July 1943, according to modern official estimates (2002), 143,950 people, of which 54,996 were irrevocable. Including only the Voronezh Front - 73,892 total losses. However, the chief of staff of the Voronezh Front, Lieutenant General Ivanov, and the head of the operational department of the front headquarters, Major General Teteshkin, thought differently: they believed the losses of their front to be 100,932 people, of which 46,500 were irretrievable. If, contrary to Soviet documents of the war period, the official numbers of the German command are considered correct, then taking into account German losses on the southern front of 29,102 people, the ratio of losses of the Soviet and German sides is 4.95: 1 here.
According to Soviet data, only in the Kursk defensive operation from July 5 to July 23, 1943, the Germans lost 70,000 killed, 3,095 tanks and self-propelled guns, 844 field guns, 1,392 aircraft and over 5,000 vehicles.
During the period from July 5 to July 12, 1943, the Central Front used up 1079 wagons of ammunition, and the Voronezh - 417 wagons, almost two and a half times less.
The reason for the fact that the losses of the Voronezh Front so sharply exceeded the losses of the Central one is the smaller massing of forces and means in the direction of the German attack, which allowed the Germans to actually achieve an operational breakthrough on the southern face of the Kursk salient. Although the breakthrough was closed by the forces of the Steppe Front, it allowed the attackers to achieve favorable tactical conditions for their troops. It should be noted that only the absence of homogeneous independent tank formations did not give the German command the opportunity to concentrate their armored forces in the direction of the breakthrough and develop it in depth.
According to Ivan Bagramyan, the Sicilian operation did not affect the Battle of Kursk in any way, since the Germans were transferring forces from west to east, so "the defeat of the enemy in the Battle of Kursk facilitated the actions of the Anglo-American troops in Italy."
Oryol offensive operation (Operation Kutuzov)
On July 12, the Western (commanded by Colonel General Vasily Sokolovsky) and Bryansk (commanded by Colonel General Markian Popov) fronts launched an offensive against the 2nd Panzer and 9th German armies in the area of the city of Orel. By the end of the day on July 13, Soviet troops broke through the enemy defenses. On July 26, the Germans left the Orlovsky bridgehead and began to retreat to defensive line"Hagen" (east of Bryansk). On August 5, at 05-45, Soviet troops completely liberated Oryol. According to Soviet data, 90,000 Nazis were destroyed in the Oryol operation.
Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation (Operation Rumyantsev)
On the southern front, the counteroffensive by the forces of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began on August 3. On August 5, at about 18-00, Belgorod was liberated, on August 7 - Bogodukhov. Developing the offensive, the Soviet troops on August 11 cut railway Kharkov-Poltava, August 23 captured Kharkov. The German counterattacks were not successful.
On August 5, the first salute in the entire war was given in Moscow - in honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod.
Results of the Battle of Kursk
The victory near Kursk marked the transition of the strategic initiative to the Red Army. By the time the front was stabilized, Soviet troops had reached their starting positions for an offensive on the Dnieper.
After the end of the battle on the Kursk Bulge, the German command lost the opportunity to conduct strategic offensive operations. Local massive offensives, such as Watch on the Rhine (1944) or the Balaton operation (1945), were also unsuccessful.
Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, who developed and carried out Operation Citadel, later wrote:
According to Guderian,
Differences in loss estimates
The losses of the parties in the battle remain unclear. So, Soviet historians, including Academician of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR A. M. Samsonov, speak of more than 500 thousand killed, wounded and captured, 1500 tanks and over 3700 aircraft.
However, German archival data show that in July-August 1943, the Wehrmacht lost 537,533 people on the entire Eastern Front. These figures include those killed, wounded, sick, missing (the number of German prisoners in this operation was insignificant). In particular, based on 10-day reports of their own losses, the Germans lost:
Total total losses of enemy troops that took part in the attack on the Kursk salient for the entire period 01-31.7.43.: 83545 . Therefore, the Soviet figures for German losses of 500 thousand look somewhat exaggerated.
According to the German historian Rüdiger Overmans, in July and August 1943 the Germans lost 130,429 people killed. However, according to Soviet data, from July 5 to September 5, 1943, 420 thousand Nazis were exterminated (which is 3.2 times more than Overmans), and 38,600 were taken prisoner.
In addition, according to German documents, the Luftwaffe lost 1696 aircraft on the entire Eastern Front in July-August 1943.
On the other hand, even Soviet commanders during the war years did not consider the Soviet military reports about German losses to be true. So, the chief of staff of the Central Front, Lieutenant General M.S. Malinin wrote to the lower headquarters:
In works of art
- Liberation (movie epic)
- "Battle for Kursk" BattleofKursk, German Die Deutsche Wochenshau) - video chronicle (1943)
- "Tanks! Battle of Kursk" Tanks!The Battle of Kursk) — documentary, filmed by Cromwell Productions, 1999
- "War of the Generals. Kursk" (eng. GeneralsatWar) is a documentary by Keith Barker, 2009
- "Kursk Bulge" is a documentary film shot by V. Artemenko.
- Panzerkampf composition by Sabaton
Battle of Kursk
July 5 - August 23, 1943
By the spring of 1943, there was a lull on the battlefields. Both belligerents were preparing for the summer campaign. Germany, having carried out total mobilization, concentrated by the summer of 1943 on the Soviet-German front more than 230 divisions. The Wehrmacht received many new heavy tanks T-VI "Tiger", medium tanks T-V "Panther", assault guns "Ferdinand", new aircraft "Focke-Wulf 190" and other types of military equipment.
The German command decided to regain the strategic initiative lost after the defeat at Stalingrad. For the offensive, the enemy chose the "Kursk ledge" - a sector of the front, formed as a result of the winter offensive of the Soviet troops. The idea of the Nazi command was to encircle and destroy the group of Red Army troops with converging strikes from the Orel and Belgorod regions and again develop the offensive against Moscow. The operation was codenamed Citadel.
Thanks to the actions of Soviet intelligence, the plans of the enemy became known at headquarters Supreme High Command. It was decided to build a long-term defense in the depths of the Kursk ledge, wear down the enemy in battles and then go on the offensive. Troops of the Central Front (commanded by General of the Army K.K. Rokossovsky) operated in the north of the Kursk ledge, and troops of the Voronezh Front (commanded by General of the Army N.F. Vatutin) operated in the south. In the rear of these fronts there was a powerful reserve - the Steppe Front under the command of General of the Army I.S. Konev. Marshals A.M. were instructed to coordinate the actions of the fronts on the Kursk salient. Vasilevsky and G.K. Zhukov.
The German command concentrated around the Kursk ledge more than 900,000 people, 2,700 tanks and assault guns, 10,000 guns and mortars, and 2,000 aircraft.
At dawn on July 5, 1943, the enemy launched an offensive. Fierce fighting unfolded on the ground and in the air. At the cost of huge losses, the Nazi troops managed to advance 10–15 km north of Kursk. Particularly heavy fighting took place in the Oryol direction in the area of the Ponyri station, which the participants in the events called the "Stalingrad of the Battle of Kursk." A powerful battle took place here between the strike units of three German tank divisions with formations of Soviet troops: the 2nd Panzer Army (commanded by Lieutenant General A. Rodin) and the 13th Army (commanded by Lieutenant General N.P. Pukhov). In these battles, junior lieutenant V. Bolshakov accomplished a feat, who covered the embrasure of an enemy firing point with his body. Sniper I.S. Mudretsova in the battle replaced the commander who was out of action, but she was also seriously wounded. She was considered one of the best snipers in the army, destroyed 140 Nazis.
During the Battle of Kursk, Soviet aviation achieved strategic air supremacy and held it until the end of the war. The Il-2 attack aircraft, which widely used the new PTAB-2.5 anti-tank bombs, were especially helpful in the fight against German tanks. Together with Soviet pilots the French squadron "Normandie-Niemen" under the command of Major Jean-Louis Tulian fought courageously. In heavy battles in the Belgorod direction, the troops of the Steppe Front, commanded by Colonel General I.S. Konev.
On August 5, 1943, by order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin in Moscow was given the first artillery salute in the Great Patriotic War. On August 23, Moscow again saluted the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts in honor of the liberation of Kharkov. Since then, every major new victory of the Red Army has been celebrated with salutes.
Operation "Citadel" was the last offensive operation of the German Wehrmacht on eastern front in World War II. From now on, the fascist German troops forever switched to defensive actions in battles against the Red Army. In the Battle of Kursk, 30 enemy divisions were defeated, the Wehrmacht lost more than 500,000 people killed and wounded, 1,500 tanks and assault guns, about 3,100 guns and mortars, over 3,700 combat aircraft. The losses of the Red Army in the Battle of Kursk amounted to 254,470 people killed and 608,833 people wounded and sick.
The victory in the Battle of Kursk and the withdrawal of the Red Army troops to the Dnieper ended in a radical change in the course of World War II in favor of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition.
After the defeat of the Nazi troops in the Battle of Kursk, the Red Army began an offensive along the entire front from Velikiye Luki to the Black Sea. At the end of September 1943, the troops of the Red Army reached the Dnieper and, without an operational pause, began to force it. This thwarted the plan of the German command to detain the Soviet troops on the Dnieper, using the system of defensive fortifications "Vostochny Val" on the right bank of the river.
The Battle of Kursk (summer 1943) radically changed the course of World War II.
Our army stopped the advance of the fascists and irrevocably took the strategic initiative in the further course of the war into its own hands.
Wehrmacht plans
Despite huge losses, by the summer of 1943 the fascist army was still very strong, and Hitler intended to take revenge for his defeat in. To restore its former prestige, a major victory was needed at any cost.
To do this, Germany carried out total mobilization, strengthened the military industry, mainly due to the capabilities of the occupied territories Western Europe. This, of course, gave the expected results. And since there was already no second front in the West, the German government directed all its military resources to the Eastern Front.
He managed not only to restore his army, but also to replenish it with the latest models of military equipment. The largest offensive"Citadel", which was given a huge strategic importance. To implement the plan, the fascist command chose the Kursk direction.
The task was as follows: to break through the defenses of the Kursk ledge, reach Kursk, surround it and destroy the Soviet troops that defended this territory. All forces were directed to this idea of a lightning-fast defeat of our troops. It was planned to smash a million-strong group of Soviet troops on the Kursk ledge, encircle and take Kursk in just four days.
This plan is detailed in Order No. 6 of April 15, 1943, with a poetic conclusion: "The victory at Kursk should be a torch for the whole world."
On the basis of our intelligence data, the Headquarters became aware of the enemy's plans regarding the direction of his main attacks and the timing of the offensive. Headquarters carefully analyzed the situation, and as a result, it was decided that it would be more profitable for us to start the campaign with a strategic defensive operation.
Knowing that Hitler would attack in only one direction and concentrate the main striking forces here, our command came to the conclusion that it was defensive battles that would bleed German army, destroy its tanks. After that, it will already be advisable to crush the enemy by breaking his main grouping.
Marshal reported this to Headquarters on 04/08/43: "wear down" the enemy on the defensive, knock out his tanks, and then bring in fresh reserves and go on the general offensive, finishing off the main forces of the Nazis. Thus, the Headquarters deliberately planned to make the beginning of the Battle of Kursk defensive.
Preparing for battle
From mid-April 1943, work began on the creation of powerful defensive positions on the Kursk salient. They dug trenches, trenches and shell magazines, built bunkers, prepared firing positions, observation posts. Having finished work in one place, they moved on and again began to dig, build, repeating the work in the previous position.
At the same time, the fighters were also prepared for the upcoming battles, conducting training sessions close to the real battle. B. N. Malinovsky, a participant in these events, wrote about this in his memoirs in the book “They didn’t choose their fate.” During these preparatory work, he writes, received combat reinforcements: people, equipment. By the beginning of the battle, our troops here amounted to 1.3 million people.
steppe front
The strategic reserves, which consisted of formations that had already participated in the battles for Stalingrad, Leningrad and other battles of the Soviet-German front, were first united into the Reserve Front, which on 04/15/43. was called the Steppe Military District (commander I.S. Konev), and later - already during the Battle of Kursk - 07/10/43, it became known as the Steppe Front.
It included the troops of the Voronezh and Central fronts. The command of the front was entrusted to Colonel General I. S. Konev, who after the Battle of Kursk became an army general, and in February 1944 - Marshal of the Soviet Union.
Battle of Kursk
The battle began on July 5, 1943. Our troops were ready for it. The Nazis made fire raids from an armored train, bombers fired from the air, the enemies dropped leaflets in which they tried to intimidate the Soviet soldiers with the upcoming terrible offensive, claiming that no one would be saved in it.
Our fighters immediately entered the battle, earned "Katyushas", went to meet the enemy with his new "Tigers" and "Ferdinands", our tanks and self-propelled guns. Artillery and infantry destroyed their vehicles in prepared minefields, with anti-tank grenades and simply bottles of combustible mixture.
Already in the evening of the first day of the battle, the Soviet Information Bureau reported that on July 5, 586 fascist tanks and 203 aircraft. Until the end of the day, the number of downed enemy aircraft increased to 260. Until July 9, there were fierce battles.
The enemy undermined his forces and was forced to order a temporary cessation of the offensive in order to make some changes in the original plan. But then the fighting resumed. Our troops still managed to stop the German offensive, however, in some places the enemy broke through our defenses 30-35 km deep.
tank battle
A large-scale tank battle played a huge role in turning the Battle of Kursk near Prokhorovka. About 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns were involved in it from both sides.
General valor was shown in this battle by the general of the 5th Guards. tank army P. A. Rotmistrov, general of the 5th Guards Army A. S. Zhdanov and heroic fortitude - all personnel.
Thanks to the organization and courage of our commanders and fighters, the offensive plans of the Nazis were finally buried in this fierce battle. The enemy's forces were exhausted, he had already brought his reserves into battle, had not yet entered the stage of defense, and the offensive had already stopped.
This was a very convenient moment for the transition of our troops from defense to counteroffensive. By July 12, the enemy was drained of blood, and the crisis of his offensive was ripe. It was a turning point in the Battle of Kursk.
counteroffensive
On July 12, the Western and Bryansk fronts went on the offensive, on July 15 - the Central Front. And on July 16, the Germans had already begun to withdraw their troops. Then the Voronezh Front joined the offensive, and on July 18, the Steppe Front. The retreating enemy was pursued, and by July 23, our troops restored the situation that existed before the defensive battles, i.e. back to the starting point.
For the final victory in the Battle of Kursk, a massive introduction of strategic reserves was necessary, moreover, in the most important direction. The Steppe Front proposed such a tactic. But the Headquarters, unfortunately, did not accept the decision of the Steppe Front and decided to introduce strategic reserves in parts and not simultaneously.
This led to the fact that the end of the Battle of Kursk dragged on in time. From July 23 to August 3 there was a pause. The Germans retreated to pre-prepared defensive lines. And our command took time to study the enemy defenses and streamline the troops after the battles.
The commanders understood that the enemy would not leave their prepared positions, and would fight to the last, if only to stop the advance of the Soviet troops. And then our advance continued. There were also many bloody battles with huge losses on both sides. The Battle of Kursk lasted 50 days and ended on August 23, 1943. The plans of the Wehrmacht completely failed.
The meaning of the Battle of Kursk
History has shown that the Battle of Kursk became a turning point in the course of World War II, the starting point for the transition of the strategic initiative to Soviet army. lost half a million people and a huge amount of military equipment in the Battle of Kursk.
This defeat of Hitler also affected the situation on an international scale, because it gave the prerequisites for Germany to lose allied cooperation with. And in the end, the struggle on the fronts where the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition fought was greatly facilitated.
