Operation plan of the 1st Belorussian Front
The general plan of the operation of the 1st Belorussian Front under the command of Marshal G.K. Zhukov was to deliver a crushing blow to the Wehrmacht grouping covering Berlin from the east, to develop an offensive against the German capital, bypassing it from the north and south, followed by an assault on the city and the exit of our troops to the river Elbe.
The troops of the 1st Belorussian Front occupied a section of the front 172 km wide, from Nipperwiese to Gross-Gastrose. The main strike force of the front deployed on the 44-kilometer sector Gustebize, Podelzig. The right flank of the front was deployed in the Nipperwiese, Gustebize sector. The left flank of the front deployed on the 82-kilometer section Podelzig, Gross-Gastrose.
The main blow was delivered by the forces of 4 combined arms and two tank armies from the Kustrin area. The troops of the 3rd shock army under the command of Vasily Kuznetsov, the 5th shock army of Nikolai Berzarin and the 8th guards army of Vasily Chuikov, deployed in the center of the Kyustrinsky bridgehead, were supposed to break through the German defenses, ensure the introduction of tank formations into the breakthrough and attack the German capital. On the sixth day of the operation, they were supposed to be on east coast lakes Havel (Havel) on the site Hennigsdorf, Gatow. The 47th army of Franz Perkhorovich received the task of bypassing Berlin from the northwest, advancing in the general direction on Nauen, Rathenov and on the 11th day of the operation to reach the Elbe. In addition, the 3rd Army of Alexander Gorbatov was located in the second echelon of the front in the main direction.
The tank armies were in the second echelon of the strike force and were supposed to develop an offensive around Berlin from the north and south. The 1st Guards Tank Army under the command of Mikhail Katukov was to advance not from the north, together with the 2nd Guards Tank Army, as previously planned by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, but from the south to take the southern part of Berlin. The offensive of Katukov's army was also supported by Ivan Yushchuk's 11th Panzer Corps. This change in the task of Katukov's army was proposed by Zhukov, and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin approved. The northern part of the bypass grouping was already very powerful, it included: the 61st Army of Pavel Belov, the 1st Army of the Polish Army S. G. Poplavsky, the 47th Army of Perkhorovich, the 2nd Guards Tank Army of Semyon Bogdanov, 9- th Tank Corps of Ivan Kirichenko and 7th Guards Cavalry Corps of Mikhail Konstantinov.
In order to ensure the offensive of the main strike force of the front in the center on the flanks, two auxiliary strikes were delivered from the north and south. In the north, the 61st Army of Belov and the 1st Army of the Polish Poplavsky Army were advancing. They struck in the general direction of Liebenwalde, Wulkau, and on the 11th day of the offensive were to reach the Elbe in the areas of Vilsnack and Zandau.
In the south, the second blow, ensuring the offensive of the main strike force, was delivered by the 69th army of Vladimir Kolpakchi, the 33rd army of Vyacheslav Tsvetaev and the 2nd guards cavalry corps. The Soviet armies advanced on the Podelzig, Briskov sector in the general direction of Fürstenwalde, Potsdam and Brandenburg. The armies of Kolpakchi and Tsvetaev were supposed to break through the German defenses in the Frankfurt direction and, advancing to the west, with access to the southern and southwestern parts of Berlin, cut off the main forces of the 9th German army from the capital.
In total, the 1st Belorussian Front had 9 combined-arms and 2 tank armies, one air army (16th air army of Sergei Rudenko), two tank corps (9th tank corps of Ivan Kirichenko, 11th tank corps of Ivan Yushchuk ), two Guards Cavalry Corps (7th Guards Cavalry Corps of Mikhail Konstantinov, 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps of Vladimir Kryukov). The 1st Belorussian Front was also supported by the 18th Air Army of Chief Air Marshal Alexander Golovanov (long-range aviation) and the Dnieper military flotilla of V. Grigoriev. The 1st Belorussian Front had at its disposal more than 3 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 18.9 thousand guns and mortars.
Three brigades of the Dnieper flotilla were armed with 34 armored boats, 20 minesweepers, 20 air defense boats, 32 semi-gliders and 8 gunboats. The boats were armed with 37-, 40-, 76- and 100-mm cannons, 8-M-8 launchers for firing 82-mm rockets, and heavy machine guns. The flotilla received tasks to support the advancing troops, to assist in forcing water barriers, to protect water communications and crossings; destroy enemy mines placed on rivers; to carry out breakthroughs into the depths of enemy defenses, to disorganize the German rear, to land troops. The 3rd brigade was supposed to capture the hydraulic structures in the Furstenberg area, preventing their destruction.
Battery of Soviet 152-mm ML-20 howitzer guns near Berlin. 1st Belorussian Front
Operation preparation
An artillery grouping with a density of about 270 barrels per 1 km of the front was formed on the main direction of the offensive (excluding 45-mm and 57-mm guns). To ensure the tactical surprise of the offensive, it was decided to carry out artillery preparation at night, 1.5-2 hours before dawn. To illuminate the area and blind the enemy, 143 searchlight installations were concentrated, which were supposed to work with the start of the infantry attack.
30 minutes before the start of artillery preparation, night bomber aviation was supposed to strike at the headquarters of enemy communication centers. Simultaneously with the artillery preparation, the assault and bomber aviation of the 16th Air Army delivered massive strikes against enemy strongholds and firing positions to a depth of 15 km. After the introduction of mobile formations into battle, the main task of aviation was to suppress the anti-tank defense of the German troops. Most of the attack and fighter aviation switched to direct escort of combined arms and tank armies.
On April 14-15, our troops conducted reconnaissance in force in order to identify strong and weak sides German defense, its firing positions and force the enemy to pull up reserves to the front line. The main events took place in the zone of 4 combined arms armies of the front's main shock grouping. In the center, the offensive was carried out by reinforced rifle battalions of first-echelon divisions, and on the flanks by reinforced companies. The advanced units were supported by strong artillery fire. In different directions, our troops managed to penetrate the enemy's battle formations for 2-5 km.
As a result, our troops overcame the strongest lines of minefields and violated the integrity of the enemy's first line of defense, which facilitated the offensive of the main forces of the front. In addition, the German command was misled. Based on the experience of previous operations, the Germans thought that behind the reconnaissance battalions the main forces of the front would go on the offensive. However, neither on April 14 nor April 15 did our troops launch a general offensive. The German command made the erroneous conclusion that the offensive of the main forces of the 1st Belorussian Front was postponed for several days.
Soviet bombers are heading for Berlin
Soviet soldiers cross the Oder river
Breakthrough of enemy defense
At 5 am on April 16, 1945, artillery preparation began in total darkness. At the front of the main strike force, artillery suppressed enemy targets for 20 minutes to a depth of 6-8 km and in some places up to 10 km. In such a short period, about 500 thousand shells and mines of all calibers were fired. The effectiveness of the artillery strike was great. In the first two trenches, from 30 to 70% of the personnel of the German units were disabled. When Soviet infantry and the tanks went on the attack in some directions, they advanced 1.5-2 km without encountering enemy resistance. However, soon the German troops, relying on a strong and well-prepared second line of defense, began to offer fierce resistance. Fierce fighting broke out along the entire front.
At the same time, bombers of the 16th Air Army attacked headquarters, communication centers, and 3-4 trenches in the enemy's main line of defense. The 18th Air Army (heavy aviation) also took part in the attack. For 40 minutes, 745 vehicles bombed the assigned targets. In just a day, despite the unfavorable meteorological situation, our pilots made 6,550 sorties, including 877 night ones. More than 1500 tons of bombs were dropped on the enemy. German aviation tried to resist. During the day there were 140 air battles. Our falcons shot down 165 German vehicles.
Defending in the offensive zone of the 47th Army of Perkhorovich, the 606th Special Purpose Division suffered heavy losses. German soldiers were overtaken by artillery preparation in the trenches and many died. However, the Germans offered stubborn resistance, our troops had to advance, repulsing numerous counterattacks. By the end of the day, our troops advanced 4-6 km, capturing a number of important strongholds in the depths of the enemy defenses. Over 300 prisoners were taken.
The 3rd strike army of Kuznetsov successfully advanced. The troops began their offensive by the light of searchlights. The greatest success was achieved in the offensive zone of the right-flank 79th Rifle Corps of General S. N. Perevertkin. Our troops repulsed several enemy counterattacks and captured the important strongholds of Gross Barnim and Klein Barnim. In order to increase the pressure of the 79th corps in its offensive zone at 10 o'clock. introduced the 9th tank corps of Kirichenko. As a result, our infantry and tanks advanced 8 km and reached the enemy's intermediate defensive zone. On the left flank, the 12th Guards Rifle Corps of General A.F. Kazankin advanced 6 km in a day. Especially stubborn battles here went for the Lechin stronghold. German troops repulsed the frontal attack of the 33rd division of General V. I. Smirnov with strong fire. Then the 33rd division and the 52nd division of General N. D. Kozin bypassed Lechin from the north and south. So they took the stronghold. Thus, during the day of a heavy battle, the troops of the 3rd Shock Army broke through the enemy's main line of defense and reached the intermediate line with their right wing. About 900 prisoners were taken.
By the light of searchlights, the 5th shock army of Berzarin went on the offensive. The greatest success was achieved by the central 32nd rifle corps of General D.S. Zherebin. Our troops advanced 8 km and by the end of the day reached the right bank of the Alt Oder River, to the second enemy defense line in the Platkov-Guzov sector. On the right flank of the army, the 26th Guards Rifle Corps, overcoming fierce enemy resistance, advanced 6 km. The troops of the left-flank 9th Rifle Corps also advanced 6 km. At the same time, units of the 301st Infantry Division of Colonel V.S. Antonov took an important enemy stronghold - Verbig.
In the battle for the Verbig station, the Komsomol organizer of the 1st battalion of the 1054th rifle regiment, Lieutenant Grant Arsenovich Avakyan, distinguished himself. Finding an enemy detachment preparing for a counterattack, Avakyan, taking the fighters with him, headed towards the house. Covertly sneaking up on the enemy, Avakyan threw three grenades through the window. The Germans, seized with panic, jumped out of the house, and came under concentrated fire from machine gunners. During this battle, Lieutenant Avakyan, together with his fighters, destroyed 56 German soldiers and captured 14 people, captured 2 armored personnel carriers. On April 24, Avakyan once again distinguished himself by capturing and holding a bridgehead across the Spree River on the streets of Berlin. Was badly wounded. For his courage and heroism, Lieutenant Avakyan was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
Thus, by the end of the day, the troops of the 5th shock army, breaking the resistance of the enemy, advanced 6-8 km. Our troops broke through all three positions of the main line of German defense, and went out in the offensive zone of the 32nd and 9th rifle corps to its second line of defense.
The troops of Chuikov's 8th Guards Army went on the attack in the light of 51 searchlights. It should be noted that their light stunned the Germans and at the same time lit the way for our advancing troops. In addition, the powerful illumination of the searchlights disabled the German night vision systems. Almost simultaneously with the infantry, the advanced brigades of the 1st Guards Tank Army of Katukov moved. The reconnaissance units of the advanced brigades entered the battles in the ranks of the infantry. Having broken through the enemy defenses and repulsed several counterattacks of the 20th motorized and 169th infantry divisions, our troops advanced 3-6 km. The enemy's main line of defense was broken through. By 12 o'clock, Chuikov's guards and the advanced units of the tank army reached the Seelow Heights, where the second powerful line of enemy defense passed. The battles for the Seelow Heights began.
The beginning of the assault on the Seelow Heights. Zhukov's decision to send tank armies into battle
The German command managed to withdraw part of the forces of the 20th motorized division to this line of defense, and also transferred the Müncheberg tank division from the reserve. The anti-tank defense of the Seelow direction was reinforced by a significant part of the artillery of the Berlin air defense zone. The second lane of the German defense had a large number of wood-and-earth firing points, machine-gun sites, firing positions for artillery and anti-tank weapons, anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers. There was an anti-tank ditch in front of the heights, the steepness of the slopes reached 30-40 degrees and the tanks could not overcome them. The roads on which armored vehicles could pass were mined and shot through. The buildings were turned into strongholds.
The rifle corps of the 8th Guards Army did not reach the heights at the same time, so the 15-minute fire raid provided for by the offensive plan was carried out as they approached. As a result, there was no simultaneous and powerful artillery strike. The German fire system was not suppressed and our troops were met by strong artillery-mortar and machine-gun fire. Repeated attempts by the guards infantry and advanced tank units to penetrate the enemy's defenses were unsuccessful. At the same time, the Germans themselves repeatedly launched counterattacks with forces from a battalion to an infantry regiment, supported by 10-25 tanks and self-propelled guns, and strong artillery fire. The most fierce battles took place along the Seelow-Müncheberg highway, where the Germans installed about 200 anti-aircraft guns (up to half of the 88-mm anti-aircraft guns).
Marshal Zhukov, taking into account the complexity of the upcoming battle, decided to move the mobile formations closer to the first echelon. By 12 o'clock. On April 16, the tank armies were already completely on the Kustra bridgehead, in full readiness to join the battle. Assessing the situation in the first half of the day, the front commander came to the conclusion that, despite the powerful artillery and aviation preparation, the enemy defenses in the second lane were not suppressed and the offensive of the four combined arms armies slowed down. The armies clearly did not have time to complete the task of the day. At 16 o'clock. 30 min. Zhukov gave the order to bring the guards tank armies into battle, although according to the original plan they were planned to be brought into battle after breaking through the second line of enemy defenses. Mobile formations in cooperation with the infantry were supposed to break through the second line of enemy defenses. The 1st Guards Tank Army was deployed in the offensive zone of the 8th Guards Army. The 2nd Guards Tank Army of Bogdanov, with its 9th and 12th Guards Tank Corps, began to move in order to advance in the general direction of Neuhardenberg and Bernau. However, leaving at 19 o'clock. to the line of advanced units of the 3rd and 5th shock armies, the tank army could not go further.
A battery of Soviet 122mm M-30 howitzers fires at Berlin
Combat operations on auxiliary directions
On April 16, the 61st Army regrouped its forces in a new direction and prepared for the offensive the next day. The troops of the 1st Polish Army went on the offensive with three divisions. The Poles crossed the Oder and advanced 5 km. As a result, the Polish troops broke through the first line of enemy defenses by the end of the day. In the evening, the Oder began to force the troops of the second echelon of the Polish army.
Left-flank strike force - the 69th and 33rd armies went on the offensive in different time. The 69th army of Kolpakchi went on the offensive in the early morning in the light of searchlights. Our troops advanced 2-4 km, breaking fierce resistance and repulsing fierce enemy counterattacks. Our troops were able to break through in the strip of the Lebus-Schoenflis highway. By the end of the day, the army broke through the main line of defense and reached the Podelzig, Shenfis, Wüste-Kunersdorf line. In the area of the Shenfis station, our troops reached the enemy's second line of defense.
Tsvetaev's 33rd Army launched an offensive somewhat later. Our troops in the wooded and marshy terrain advanced 4-6 km, breaking through two positions of the enemy's main line of defense. On the right flank, by the end of the day, the 38th Rifle Corps reached the defensive perimeter of the Frankfurt fortress.
Thus, on the first day of the offensive, with the powerful support of artillery and aviation, our troops broke through only the main enemy line, advancing 3-8 kilometers in different directions. It was not possible to fully complete the task on the first day - to break through the second enemy defense line, which passed along the Seelow Heights. The underestimation of the enemy's defense played its role. The powerful enemy defense and the remaining unsuppressed fire system required a regrouping of artillery and new artillery and aviation training.
Zhukov, in order to speed up the offensive, brought into battle both main mobile formations - the tank armies of Katukov and Bogdanov. However, they began to enter positions in the evening and could not change the situation. The Soviet command on the evening of April 16 ordered to continue the offensive at night and on the morning of April 17 to break through the second line of defense of the German army. To do this, they decided to conduct a second 30-40-minute artillery preparation, concentrating up to 250-270 artillery pieces per 1 kilometer of the front. In addition, the army commanders were ordered not to get involved in protracted battles for enemy strongholds, to bypass them, transferring the task of eliminating the encircled German garrisons to the last units of the second and third echelons of the armies. Guards tank armies were instructed to organize interaction with the infantry.
The German command hastily took measures to strengthen the defense of the Berlin direction from the east. From April 18 to April 25, 2 command and corps and 9 divisions were transferred from the 3rd and 4th tank armies and the remnants of the East Prussia army to the 9th army. So on April 18-19, the 11th SS motorized rifle division "Nordland" and the 23rd SS motorized rifle division "Netherlands" arrived from the 3rd Panzer Army; On April 19, from the 4th Panzer Army, the command of the 56th Panzer Corps and the 214th Infantry Division arrived. Then came the administration of the 5th Army Corps and other units. The Germans did their best to stop the advance of the 1st Belorussian Front.
strategic height In a decisive offensive against enemy positions, Headquarters Supreme High Command it was decided to concentrate the most combat-ready armies - in total, according to various estimates, a strike force of at least 2.5 million people, over six thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, about 40 thousand artillery barrels. Aerial photography, which Soviet reconnaissance aircraft carried out several times a day, made it possible to assess the scope of individual fortifications, however, over the four years of hostilities, the command of the Red Army had already formed a perfect clear idea of the measures and means of destruction enemy fortified areas. Already as part of the advance of troops during the Vistula-Oder operation, the armies and brigades in practice applied data on the structure of German fortification and supply of advanced positions. In addition, the assault on Königsberg allowed the Soviet Ground Forces not only to learn the tactics of clearing city blocks, but also to make adjustments to the actions of ground units and formations right in the course of the battle. However, the Seelow Heights, from which Berlin was a little more than 70 kilometers, differed significantly from most of the fortified objects that the Soviet troops had to deal with before - a continuous twenty-kilometer strip strewn with steep hills 30-50 meters high, on which the Wehrmacht placed not only heavy weapons, but also reinforced the cannon artillery with elite motorized rifle units and formations, including special tank battalions. On April 16, 1945, after reconnaissance in force, the active phase of the offensive operation began on the deeply echeloned fortifications of the Wehrmacht near the town of Seelow. The concentration of Soviet heavy weapons reached incredible proportions - up to 300 guns for every kilometer of the front.
“If we count on the basis of the average consumption of ammunition per hour of operation of an artillery battery and multiply all this by the number of guns, as well as the duration of artillery preparation, then the approximate figures for a day of work of artillerymen are something around 900,000 shells,” said in an interview with the Zvezda TV channel. » military historian Konstantin Chursin.In addition to the active resistance of the German tank divisions, the destruction of which was carried out by the crews of Soviet heavy tanks IS-2 and anti-tank crews, the terrain created additional difficulties for the attackers - a vast plain on which the advancing Soviet troops were in full view. Aware of the importance of a breakthrough, by the evening of April 16 by order of Marshal Zhukov, the ground units were reinforced with a tank army - almost 500 units of tanks and self-propelled artillery began a large-scale cleansing of Wehrmacht positions, plowing every inch of land occupied by the enemy with huge shells. In part, Zhukov's plan to pin down and destroy formations of the 9th Army of the Wehrmacht, commanded by an experienced General Theodor Busse, who had a reputation as a professional in strategic defense, was a success already on the first day: enemy armored vehicles on the front line were destroyed by heavy artillery fire, and those occupying advanced positions German soldiers under its onslaught, they began to retreat to the fortified area. Defense Breakthrough On April 17, units of the Wehrmacht began to commit reserves into battle, which, in a few hours of active fire contact with the troops advancing along the entire width of the defense line, were almost completely destroyed. A day after the start of the assault, the German military who occupied the Brandenburg fortified area began to surrender. At the forefront of those advancing on Berlin Soviet troops The 1st Belorussian Front had one of the most combat-ready formations - the 1st Guards Tank Brigade under the command of Guards Colonel Abram Temnik. It was in the 1st Guards that the soldiers most prepared for the assault on fortified areas served, whose training process Colonel Temnik personally followed. engineering troops were able to breach the enemy's defenses. Having made his way through minefields, anti-tank pillars and gouges, the first soviet soldiers"crashed" into the first line of the area occupied by the enemy.
“It would be worth noting that the units of the 9th Wehrmacht Army on the Seelow Heights were in the most advantageous position by the beginning of the assault. Two hundred thousand personnel, supported by more than 500 of the most modern German tanks and heavy artillery pieces. The logistics were also well-established: in the rear of the defending along the railway line, the Wehrmacht troops had the opportunity to quickly move to the most dangerous sectors of the front, ”said historian Boris Makeev in an interview with the Zvezda TV channel.A huge and well-armed garrison was able to significantly slow down the advance of Soviet troops towards Berlin: only by the evening of April 18, tank units were able to "squeeze" through the first line of defense, occupy the city of Marksdorf and partially cut off the retreat of motorized rifle units, which fled to the rear, leaving heavy armament.
The beast in the cauldron It took another two days to prepare a breakthrough through the last lines of defense and repulse counterattacks, the purpose of which, according to historians, was not so much a real desire to recapture the abandoned positions, but to exert a psychological impact on the enemy. Despite the fact that Marshal Zhukov and the commander of the 1st Guards Tank Army, Katukov, were preparing for protracted battles for a defensive area near Seelov, the rapid retreat of units and formations of the 9th Wehrmacht Army allowed the Red Army to take a breath and prepare for a decisive assault. Two days later, to late in the evening of April 20, 1945, the Soviet troops finished with the last echelon of defense of the Wehrmacht on the Seelow Heights, and already on April 22-24, after the main forces approached, they proceeded to the final mopping up of the positions of the 9th Army. It is worth noting that they were surrounded by only a few dozen kilometers Adolf Hitler tried to save from Berlin: the 4th Panzer Army was thrown to their rescue. However, the troops of the 4th Panzer Army failed to achieve serious success: Hitler repeated the mistake, the consequence of which earlier, near Stalingrad, was the destruction of a group of troops under the command of Erich Manstein, sent to rescue Friedrich Paulus from the cauldron of the 6th Army. “Hitler didn’t have much choice. The encircled garrison was too large and could provide significant support to the troops defending the city, so it was decided to risk the 4th tank army, ”said military historian Yuri Pasholok in an interview with the Zvezda TV channel.By the evening of April 24, Soviet troops “covered” one of the largest boilers at the final stage of the Great Patriotic War: tens of kilometers from Berlin, almost 200 thousand people turned out to be completely surrounded with a small amount of ammunition and provisions, most of which, thanks to competent planning of the operation and timely the introduction of tank brigades managed to bury a few kilometers from the capital of the Reich. The 502nd heavy tank battalion and the Müncheberg tank division were almost completely destroyed, the personnel of which was reduced from five thousand to 224 people by the forces of Soviet artillerymen, tankers and infantry in a couple of days , as well as the 1st SS Panzergrenadier Division "Nordland", crushed by the advancing troops and reduced from 11 to 3.8 thousand people. Least of all, the personnel of the 9th Airborne Division were lucky: out of nine thousand German paratroopers who took up defense on the Seelow Heights, only 500 people escaped from a hail of bullets and shells back to Berlin, who were subsequently destroyed in full strength during the storming of Berlin.
The strategic combat mission assigned by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to Marshal Zhukov was completed: the most combat-ready and numerous grouping of enemy troops was destroyed. The Red Army was able to move forward to Berlin. My interest in the assault of the Seelow Heights by the Red Army is due to the fact that it brightly highlighted the all-Soviet slogan “we will not stand up for the price”, showing how Stalin and “Marshal of Victory” Zhukov valued their soldiers, with what generosity they threw hundreds of thousands of victorious lives into the muzzle of the war for several days to victory.
In April 1945, the Seelow Heights became the last obstacle on the way of the Red Army to Berlin - the passage through the Oder through the Seelow Heights was the shortest route to the eastern border of Berlin. Zhukov had the opportunity to bypass the Seelow Heights, encircling the 9th German army defending them, but, having a huge military advantage, he wanted to be the first to break into Berlin, and the marshal never stood behind the price of victory. Later zealous Soviet historians they will find excuses for the terrible massacre that claimed countless lives of Russian soldiers shortly before the surrender: they say that it was impossible to allow the 9th German army into Berlin and thereby complicate its assault - an explanation that does not stand up to criticism, since the defeat of the Germans during a frontal assault on the heights required an order of magnitude more casualties than taking them into the cauldron.
However, the task of hitting the forehead was given to all three fronts storming Berlin - to go ahead, and not bypass Berlin in a wide arc. All Western military historians are unanimous that the enormous loss of life on the Soviet side during the storming of Berlin is not due to military reasons, but solely to Stalin's political pressure and Zhukov's ambitions.
It was clear to everyone that victory did not depend on overcoming the German fortifications on the Seelow Heights. The operation to encircle the enemy promised much greater success. But neither the Moscow dictator nor Marshal Zhukov thought so. For their goal was - to take Berlin before the onset of the second most important Soviet holiday - May 1st. To achieve this goal, Stalin and Zhukov were ready to sacrifice their soldiers without any restrictions. According to historian Sven Kellerhof, egomania led to the battle for the Seelow Heights. And in order to protect his reputation as a winner, Zhukov easily sacrificed entire divisions.
The ratio of forces. From the German side, the Seelow Heights were defended by the 9th Army, which included 14 rifle units (about 112 thousand people), 587 tanks (512 on the move, 55 under repair, 20 on the way), 2625 artillery barrels, including 695 anti-aircraft guns. German troops began fortifying the heights two years before the battle, "charging" the hills with thousands of mines, traps, and various military installations.
From the side of the Red Army, which concentrated on the Kustrinsky bridgehead along the Oder, there were 11 armies (about 1 million people), 3059 tanks and self-propelled guns, 18934 artillery pieces and mortars, that is, the superiority of the attackers in manpower and equipment ranged from 5: 1 to 9: 1. 83 rifle divisions, 1155 tanks and self-propelled guns, 14628 guns and mortars and 1531 rocket artillery installations directly stormed the Seelow Heights. In the area of the main attack of the troops, the artillery density reached 270 guns with a caliber of 76 mm and more per kilometer of the breakthrough front, and the density of the advancing infantry formations reached 1,300 people per kilometer of the front. Never in world history has there been a greater concentration of artillery than during the assault on the Seelow Heights: one gun of medium and large caliber for every three meters of the front line. The assault on the German fortifications on the Seelow Heights lasted 4 days from 16 to 19 April 1945.
Since about 50 km remained from the heights to Berlin, the ridge of high hills, passing along the left bank of the old channel of the Oder River, was turned by the Germans into the most powerful resistance center in the 2nd defense line of Berlin: the swampy bank of the Oder, rows of trenches, a large number of Wehrmacht Pillboxes, bunkers, machine-gun platforms, trenches for artillery and anti-tank weapons, anti-tank and anti-personnel barriers. In front of the heights, the Germans dug an anti-tank ditch up to 3 m deep and 3.5 m wide, all approaches to which were mined, and the open space in front of the heights was shot through by cross artillery and machine-gun fire.
Due to the steepness of the stormed slopes, tank columns and vehicles of the Red Army could overcome them exclusively along the highways laid here, which were mined and completely shot through by the Germans.
Despite the huge superiority of forces, the first day of the assault on the heights turned into a real disaster: it was possible to break through the first line of defense at the cost of incredible losses, which led to the fact that Zhukov was forced to additionally bring into battle the 1st and 2nd Guards Tank Armies, which, according to the original plan it was supposed to enter the battle later, after breaking through the enemy’s battle formations, and according to the original plan, the tanks were supposed to bypass the heights and advance on Berlin from the north and northeast.
The steep slopes during a frontal assault did not allow the tanks to turn into battle formations. They had to keep to the roads, while becoming convenient targets for enemy artillery. Troop control was completely disrupted, in the heat of battle and with the huge density of advancing regiments, tanks crushed their own infantry. Under enemy fire, all the troops were mixed up, and there was a complete confusion in their management.
Russian journalist Alexander Peresvet wrote in Livejournal that Zhukov squandered two tank armies for taking the heights: “They ran into the German defenses and practically fought in the ranks of the infantry. HOW did you waste it? - Goose. If a tank was knocked out, they pushed it into the swamp and drove on - another two dozen meters, until the next one was knocked out ... My hair was moving in horror for what ours had to experience. Needless to say, all the heights are now covered with graves with the inscriptions "Unknown" ... "
My reader Emma Zharikova, who studied the documentation of the Military Museum and Archives in Kustrin, near the Seelow Heights, wrote: “All the Soviet tanks arriving (attacking on Berlin), which could not overcome the mountain slope of 33 degrees, fell into a fiery dead end, unable to turn around and leave the strip of swampy land near the Oder, already clogged with other tanks, between the Seelow rock and the bridge. Zhukov did not carry out any reconnaissance of the area, nor artillery preparation, because the guns of General Kazakov were not placed close enough, and Russian shells did not reach the three belts of fascist defense. The Polish army also perished in the same fire. When I first visited the monument in 1977, there was a death toll: 75,000 fighters. I was shaking with bitter weeping. However, later it turned out that there were at least four times more dead, but Zhukov hid the truth from Stalin. And at the site of the death of tanks, German volunteer search engines have been cleaning the earth from burnt scrap metal for 20 years and have already collected many tons of it ... In his memoirs, Zhukov mentioned this in five lines, but in such an abstract and veiled manner that an ignorant reader will not even guess what speech".
Aviation - own and enemy - only added to the chaos. Having no connection with the advancing troops and poorly oriented in the location of the troops due to the clouds of smoke and dust that enveloped the battlefield, she struck indiscriminately, so that both strangers and her own were hit. When their bombs began to fall near the NP of Zhukov himself, the anti-aircraft gunners were ordered ... to open fire on their aircraft.
Losses on the first day of the assault were gigantic - one Red Army soldier died on every meter of the front that day. But, nevertheless, the breakthrough of Stalin's troops failed. Despite the huge losses, Zhukov, who received the nickname "butcher" for this operation, continued to drive the troops forward, demanding from commanders at all levels that they be at the forefront. In order to stun the enemy, a night attack was made using anti-aircraft searchlights, but it did not work, because their rays could not penetrate thick clouds of smoke, dust and burning, which, moreover, were blown away by the wind on the Soviet side.
Even in undefended areas, the offensive was difficult due to the abundance of obstacles and booby traps. The Germans fought not out of courage and patriotism, but out of fear of being shot: the German command resorted to the tried and tested Soviet practice of detachments, the role of which was performed by special teams of the SS troops, who had orders to shoot all those who retreated without an order. The offensive pressure of the Soviet troops weakened both because of the huge losses, and as a result of the completely natural desire of the soldiers to live to see such a close Victory ...
Zhukov was whipped up by two circumstances: fear of the wrath of the Commander-in-Chief and the successes of others Soviet armies rushing to Berlin. He needed to take the Seelow Heights, regardless of any losses. More and more divisions had to be thrown into the furnace of a senseless battle. Zhukov knew that in case of failure, even the halo of the winner of the Battle of Stalingrad would not save him. Three days later, the breakthrough of the third and last defensive line. It cost the lives of at least 100 thousand people, and 727 wrecked tanks ... Truly, this was a victory that we suffered ... All in all, last days of the war in the battle for Berlin, the Soviet military command laid down more than 361 thousand soldiers and officers ... The average daily losses during the storming of Berlin (15712 people) are the highest among all offensive operations Second World War. For comparison: near Moscow they were equal to 10910 people. per day; near Stalingrad - 6392; on the Kursk Bulge - 11313; in Belarus - 11262.
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An absurd question is often asked: so who took Berlin if almost all the Zhukovites died? Here, too, a reader asks Igor Garin about this. Since I studied this issue, I will tell you: Konev took Berlin from the south, and Rokossovsky took it from the northeast. A little to the left of the Seelow Heights, through the suburb of Marzan, Berlin was liberated by the unforgettable General Berzarin, who received the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union for his Victory. And only Zhukov had a "meat grinder". Mr. Garin did not mention that the Polish army also perished there, in Seelow.
It was not just a "meat grinder". The language does not turn to call it another, more cruel word - a brazier. But it was. "The ashes of Klaas beat in my heart."
Let us bow our heads before the memory of our fathers and grandfathers who died in the fire with a terrible, slow, painful death...
When the first tanks crossed the bridge across the Oder branch, from the surface of the Seelow Height they began to suddenly pour mortars with fire. It was not possible to leave this place of execution, to turn around ... because the tanks coming from behind propped up those stuck in front, not knowing that everyone was burning like hell there, and there was no way out.
Tankers and infantry died a terrible death. The dying could not give any signal to those following them. And the tanks kept coming and coming under mortar fire and immediately ignited. At the distant command post of Zhukov, they thought that the tanks were moving forward, to Berlin, so more and more tanks were sent after them. Beyond the fumes, smoke, flames, and explosions of sand, they saw nothing.
Studying the documents of the Seelow Memorial, for the first time in my life I learned about how the numbers of those killed and seriously wounded were manipulated. When it was possible to take away the seriously wounded from the right flank of this battle (there is a direct road to Kustrin), they were immediately counted among the survivors, although they burned alive and died in a few hours or minutes ...
Circumstances:
Shortly before the start of the battle for Berlin, Stalin changed Rokossovsky to Zhukov in this place. Reason: Stalin was sure that it was along this direct road from Kustrin to Berlin that he would enter Berlin
his first liberator, and his surname must be Russian! Therefore - Zhukov.
Sleepy Zhukov, in the bunker with Lydia Zakharova, being too far from Zeelovo (100 km), did not even think about preliminary reconnaissance.
Nobody knew about the slope of the Seelow Heights at 33 degrees. For tanks, this was unbearable.
Artillery General Kazakov did not know that his shells would not reach the three belts of German defense on the very surface of the Seelow Heights, because he did not familiarize himself with the area ... The guns should have been closer ... The shells lay on their own, not reaching Seelow height.
An article about such tragic events cannot be marked with the word "liked"
so I will write: everything is correct.
Date of: 22.04.2012
67 years ago, on April 16, 1945, the famous assault on the Seelow Heights began - natural hills about 90 km east of Berlin. And this great battle, which showed massive examples of heroism and self-sacrifice of our soldiers and officers (and this at a time when, as everyone already felt, only a few days remained before the Victory), at the same time became one of the most slandered pages of the Great Patriotic War.
In our post-perestroika literature and in modern liberal journalism, it is customary to assert that the frontal assault on the Seelow Heights was a bloody massacre, unnecessary from a military point of view, arranged by the “butcher” - Marshal Zhukov. He, they say, started it only in order to get ahead of his other “butcher” colleague, Marshal Konev, who was advancing on the capital of the Third Reich to the south, in mastering the laurels of the winner of Berlin.
“The beams of the searchlights rest on the smoke, nothing is visible, in front are the Seelow Heights furiously snarling with fire, and the generals fighting for the right to be the first to be in Berlin are chasing behind. When the defense was nevertheless broken through with great bloodshed, a bloodbath followed on the streets of the city, in which the tanks burned one after another from the well-aimed shots of the Faustniks. Such an unattractive image of the last assault has developed over the post-war decades in mass consciousness”, - writes the well-known Russian historian Alexei Isaev and, using archival materials, refutes this Russophobic nonsense.
So why didn't our troops just try to encircle Berlin? Why did tank armies enter the streets of the city? Let's try to figure out why Zhukov did not send tank armies around Berlin, writes Alexei Isaev.
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On Nuremberg Trials General Alfred Jodl, the permanent head of the Operations Headquarters of the Wehrmacht High Command, admitted: “It was clear to the General Staff that the battle for Berlin would be decided on the Oder, so the bulk of the troops of the 9th Army, defending Berlin, was brought to the forefront. The urgently formed reserves were supposed to be concentrated north of Berlin, in order to subsequently launch a counterattack on the flank of the troops of Marshal Zhukov.
During the battle for the Seelow Heights, the German 9th Army was crushed along with the remnants of the 4th Panzer Army in the so-called. Halbinsky (Frankfurt) boiler. There the Germans lost over 200,000 killed alone. Of the entire 9th Army, only separate units of the 56th Panzer Corps of General Weidling managed to break through to Berlin. By the beginning of the battle, there were about 50,000 people in the corps. From 13,000 to 15,000 fighters broke into Berlin. A few thousand more Germans scattered over the surrounding fields and forests, and only a few, who retained discipline, like the 11th SS Panzer Corps, made their way to the West to surrender to the Anglo-Americans.
Supporters of the theory of the expediency of encircling Berlin, the historian immediately notes, lose sight of the obvious question of the qualitative and quantitative composition of the city's garrison. The 9th stationed on the Oder german army numbered 200,000 people. They could not be given the opportunity to withdraw to Berlin. Zhukov already had a chain of assaults on the encircled cities announced by the Germans as "festungs" (fortresses), both in his front line and among his neighbors. Isolated Budapest was defended from the end of December 1944 to February 10, 1945.
Therefore, Zhukov came up with a simple and, without exaggeration, ingenious plan, the authoritative historian believes. If the tank armies manage to break into the operational space, then they should go to the outskirts of Berlin and form a kind of cocoon around the German capital, which would prevent the reinforcement of the garrison at the expense of the 200,000-strong 9th Army or reserves from the west. It was not planned to enter the city at this stage. With the approach of the Soviet combined arms armies, the “cocoon” opened up, and Berlin could already be stormed in accordance with all the rules.
In many ways, the unexpected turn of Konev’s troops to Berlin, the historian notes, led to the modernization of the “cocoon” to the classical encirclement of two neighboring fronts by adjacent flanks. The main forces of the German 9th Army stationed on the Oder were surrounded in the forests southeast of Berlin. This was one of the major defeats of the Germans, undeservedly left in the shadow of the actual assault on the city. As a result, the capital of the "thousand-year Reich" was defended by Volkssturmists, members of the Hitler Youth, policemen and the remnants of the units defeated on the Oder front. They numbered about 100,000 people, which for the defense of such big city was clearly not enough. Berlin was divided into nine defense sectors. According to the plan, the number of the garrison of each sector was to be 25,000 people. In reality, there were no more than 10,000 - 12,000 people. There was no question of any occupation of each house, only the key buildings of the quarters were defended. The entrance to the city of the 400,000th grouping of two fronts did not leave the defenders any chance. This led to a relatively quick assault on Berlin - about 10 days.
What made Zhukov delay his advance to Berlin, so much so that Stalin began sending orders to neighboring fronts to turn towards Berlin? Many will give an answer on the move: Seelow Heights. However, if you look at the map, then the Seelow Heights “obscure” only the left flank of the Kustrinsky bridgehead, Isaev notes. If some armies got stuck on the heights, then what prevented the rest from breaking through to Berlin?
The legend appeared due to the memoirs of V.I. Chuikov and M.E. Katukov, the scientist explains. Advancing on Berlin outside the Seelow Heights N.E. Berzarin (commander of the 5th shock army) and S.I. Bogdanov (commander of the 2nd Guards Tank Army) left no memoirs. The first died in a car accident immediately after the war, the second died in 1960, before the period of active writing of memoirs by our military leaders. Bogdanov and Berzarin, at best, could tell about how they viewed the Seelow Heights through binoculars.
Maybe the problem was in Zhukov's idea to attack under the spotlights? Backlit attacks were not his invention. The Germans have been attacking in the dark under searchlights since 1941. So, for example, the bridgehead on the Dnieper near Kremenchug was captured, from which Kyiv was later surrounded. At the end of the war, the German offensive in the Ardennes began with floodlights. This case is closest to the attack in the light of searchlights from the Kyustrinsky bridgehead. The main objective of this technique was to lengthen the first, most important day of the operation. Yes, the raised dust and smoke from explosions interfered with the searchlight beams; it was unrealistic to blind the Germans with several searchlights per kilometer. But the main task was solved: the offensive on April 16 was launched earlier than the season allowed. The positions illuminated by searchlights, by the way, were overcome rather quickly. Problems arose already at the end of the first day of the operation, when the searchlights had long been turned off. The left-flank armies of Chuikov and Katukov rested on the Seelow Heights, the right-flank armies of Berzarin and Bogdanov advanced with difficulty in the network of irrigation canals on the left bank of the Oder. Near Berlin, the Soviet offensive was expected. Zhukov initially had a harder time than Konev, who broke through the weak German defenses far south of the German capital. This hitch made Stalin nervous, especially in view of the fact that Zhukov's plan was revealed with the introduction of tank armies in the direction of Berlin, and not around it.
But the crisis soon passed, the historian writes, and this happened precisely thanks to the tank armies. One of the mechanized brigades of Bogdanov's army managed to find a weak spot among the Germans and break through far into the German defenses. Behind her, the mechanized corps was first drawn into the breach, and the main forces of the two tank armies followed. The defense on the Oder front collapsed already on the third day of fighting. The introduction of reserves by the Germans could not turn the tide: our tank armies simply bypassed them on both sides and rushed to Berlin. After that, it was enough for Zhukov to just turn one of the corps slightly towards the German capital and win the race that he did not start.
Losses on the Seelow Heights, Isaev notes, are often confused with losses in the entire Berlin operation. And he recalls that the irretrievable losses of the Soviet troops in it amounted to 80,000 people, and the total - 360,000 people. These are the losses of three fronts advancing in a strip 300 km wide - that is, the 1st Belorussian (commander - Zhukov), the 1st Ukrainian (commander - Konev) and the 2nd Belorussian (commander - Rokossovsky). Narrowing these losses to a patch of Seelow Heights is simply stupid. It's only stupider to turn 300,000 total losses into 300,000 killed. In reality, the total losses of the 8th Guards and 69th armies during the offensive in the area of the Seelow Heights amounted to about 20,000 people, and the irretrievable losses were about 5,000 people. Here you have Zhukov, the "butcher".
The breakthrough of the German defense by the 1st Belorussian Front in April 1945, Isaev believes, is worthy of study in textbooks of tactics and operational art. Unfortunately, due to Zhukov's disgrace, neither the brilliant plan with the "cocoon" nor the daring breakthrough of the tank armies to Berlin "through the eye of a needle" were included in the textbooks.
Summarizing all of the above, we can draw the following conclusions, the historian writes. Zhukov's plan was comprehensively thought out and corresponded to the situation. The resistance of the Germans turned out to be stronger than expected, but was quickly broken. Throwing Konev to Berlin was not necessary, but improved the balance of power during the assault on the city. Also, the turn of Konev's tank armies accelerated the defeat of the German 9th Army. But if the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front had simply followed the directive of the Headquarters, then the 12th Army of Wenck would have been defeated much faster, and the Fuhrer would not even have the technical ability to rush around the bunker with the question “Where is Wenck ?!”, sums up Alexei Isaev.
V. DYMARSKY: Hello. I greet the audience of the Ekho Moskvy radio station, the RTVi TV channel, this is the Price of Victory program, and I am its presenter Vitaly Dymarsky. Today we are approaching Berlin with fighting, and the theme of our today's program is the Seelow Heights. Well, in fact, this phrase itself already says everything, a fairly well-known thing. And the guest is a historian well known to you, to those who watch our program quite regularly, Alexei Isaev, whom I am pleased to introduce to you and greet him as well. Hello Alexey.
A. Isaev: Hello.
V.DYMARSKY: +7 985 970-45-45 – SMS number, also familiar to you, yet another announcement, although familiar to you, but I will repeat it anyway – this is what the webcast is going to website of the Echo of Moscow radio station, everything is connected, so you can see Alexei Isaev on the website, well, in addition, of course, to the television broadcast. Now, after all these introductions, we can begin our conversation. I would start with this more general question. Despite the fact that, as I have already said, the phrase “Zeelow Heights”, by the way, originating simply from the town of Seelow, where, in fact, these battles took place, is quite well-known, but I would not say, even looking through and preparing for this program, looking through some literature, on the Internet, that ... I’ll even say it differently: it seems that very little has been written about this or not enough written, that, here, something that prevents writing about it in more detail, as about many other battles of World War II. Is this a misconception or do you agree with it?
A. Isaev: Well, I would say that 1945, in general, is less known than many other battles. Because there is a birth trauma, 1941, and it attracts the greatest public interest. And the year 1945, in general, is less known, and I would even say that the Seelow Heights, which are just one of the episodes of 1945, are much more known. Strictly speaking, in German geography the concept of "Seel Heights" was absent at that time. That is, the heights could be called, rather, Lebusovsky. This is a piece of terrain, somewhat elevated in the Oder valley, not very high, about 50 meters above the level of the Oder. This is not very much, but, nevertheless, the heights with steep slopes and, in fact, the fighting for them began long before April 1945. Here, for parts of these heights, the so-called (INAUDIBLE), they fought for it in March and successfully took it. And, perhaps, this pushed the Soviet command to the fact that we will take this one more site. Moreover, it should be emphasized that the Seelow Heights did not converge on them like a wedge - they blocked only part of the bridgehead on which the 1st Belorussian Front stood. Moreover, they blocked even a smaller part. Of the 5 armies that stood on this bridgehead, only 2 were directly aimed at the Seelow Heights. The rest could advance on smoother terrain.
V. DYMARSKY: Looking ahead a little, can we say that these battles on the Seelow Heights, in fact, were decisive for the capture of Berlin?
A. Isaev: Well, I would say that the outcome on the Oder front, in general, that is, on the entire front in front of the bridgehead. And the Seelow Heights became known to the public precisely because those who fought on these heights, Katukov and Chuikov, left memoirs. And those who fought to the north are the commander-in-chief of the 5th shock army, Berzarin, and the commander of the 2nd guards tank army, Bogdanov - they alone died, literally shortly after the war (this is Berzarin), and the other did not leave memoirs. Therefore, if it had happened, God forbid, on the contrary, that is, Chuikov would have died and would not have written memoirs, again, God forbid, Katukov, then we would have talked, for example, not about the Seelow Heights, but about the Altengrabow Canal. And he would be known much more. Therefore, it is such, one might say, the irony of fate that the Seelow Heights became known to a very wide circle of people who are even often far from military history.
V. DYMARSKY: These 2 armies are also the 1st Belorussian Front, right?
A. Isaev: Yes, the 1st Belorussian Front - there were 5 armies on the bridgehead itself, and in addition to this there was, for example, Kuznetsov, the future conqueror of the Reichstag, Perkhorovich, who went around Berlin. Therefore, in fact, the fame of the Seelow Heights is such a reflection of that April 1945 in the eyes of historians and history. Because, here, as Konev wrote after they removed Zhukov in 1957, he wrote that, now, Zhukov made a mistake with the Zeelovsky heights, so they went to repeat it. And, in fact, those people who actually hacked into the Oder front (they hacked it north of the heights), they ended up, as it were, in the shadows.
V. DYMARSKY: I must say that Zhukov himself, if we believe his memoirs, he also confesses there. Well, of course, much softer than Konev did in 1957. I repeat once again, much softer, but, nevertheless, he writes that everything could have been done differently. Now I do not guarantee the accuracy of the quote, but the meaning is.
A. Isaev: Yes, that is absolutely true. Zhukov had 2 plans. He is at the end of March with two plans - one offensive from the Kustrinsky bridgehead through the heights, including through the heights, the other with a freshly formed bridgehead near Frankfurt an der Oder. Here are those who go to Germany by train, they pass Frankfurt an der Oder, and, behold, along this railway could go to Berlin. It was Zhukov's second plan. He comes to Moscow with these two plans, and Stalin stuns him that the allies have achieved tremendous success, let's attack Berlin as quickly as possible.
V. DYMARSKY: When is that? Is it March?
A. Isaev: This is the very end of March. On March 28, if I am not mistaken, Zhukov went to Moscow, Konev was summoned after him, and hasty preparations began for an attack on Berlin.
V. DYMARSKY: They forced the way.
A. Isaev: Therefore, this is the plan of a breakthrough from the Frankfurt bridgehead - the terrain there is more wooded, but there are no such heights that are difficult to overcome by tanks. Therefore, if Zhukov had been given a few more days, maybe a week, maybe a week and a half, he would have made this bridgehead the second, and from it would have rushed to Berlin and, perhaps, would have ended up in it faster.
V. DYMARSKY: But on the other hand, again, my impression, in any case, is that the fame, on the one hand, the fame of the Seelow Heights, on the other hand, some understatement is connected with the fact that this battle was not very successful for Soviet troops.
A. Isaev: Indeed, the Seelow Heights were not taken head-on, they were bypassed. In principle, it was such a bastion on which the Germans remained, practically they were moved a little to the West, and they were bypassed, then caught in a cauldron in the forests southeast of Berlin. So it was such a partially resistant bastion and, indeed, we can say that it was not very successful in combat. But, unfortunately, the losses in the entire Berlin operation are now very often projected onto these unfortunate heights. Here, as a person who watched the reports on the losses of the 1st Belorussian Front, I can say that the 1st Belorussian Front did not lose 300 thousand people for the Seelow Heights, it lost 20 thousand people, including 5-6 thousand people of irretrievable losses, that is, the dead and the missing. In essence, this is a smaller part, like the Berlin operation as a whole, and the losses of the 1st Belorussian Front in this operation. They were just one of the episodes. And one should not think that they, as they say, were saturated with blood and were covered with corpses - this was not at all the case.
V. DYMARSKY: Well, anyway, one of the articles that I saw before our broadcast about the Seelow Heights is called "The Victory We Suffered." Well, the meaning is clear, right? And here, too, this figure is given, that in the battle for Berlin, the Soviet command put 361,367 soldiers and officers.
A.ISAEV: Yes. Only at the same time they forget that these are losses on the front 300 kilometers from the Baltic Sea, where Rokossovsky, the 2nd Belorussian Front advanced to Bautzen and Dresden. It's in a huge area.
V. DYMARSKY: This entire group is Soviet.
A. Isaev: Yes, 360,000 people lost their lives on 3 fronts.
V.DYMARSKY: How many people? 2 million?
A. Isaev: 2 million - only the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts. Still approximately, in my opinion, 600 or 800 thousand - the 2nd Belorussian Rokossovsky, who began later. Therefore, these 360 thousand - they were lost in the vast space between the Oder and the Elbe.
V.DYMARSKY: But it's still a huge loss - it happens every 6th or every 8th.
A. Isaev: Again, these are general losses, that is, these losses are not irretrievable. Irretrievable losses are 80 thousand people on all 3 fronts. Therefore, they, again, were scattered over a large area, and significant losses, for example, the 1st Belorussian Front, suffered when crushing the Germans surrounded near Halbe. This is a cauldron into which about 200 thousand German troops who were stationed on the Oder front fell into, and they were crushed in the forests, partly, as they say, remotely, that is, by artillery and aircraft, and partly in battle. And these losses are also included in total figure despite the fact that they have nothing to do with the Seelow Heights.
In the same way, for example, it is the crossing of the Oder, when the Oder was crossed with great difficulty at the northern tip of the Kustrinsky bridgehead. For example, the 1st Polish Army was advancing there, which lost somewhere in the initial period of the battle ...
V. DYMARSKY: And the Polish army was still there, right?
A. Isaev: Yes, the 1st army of the Polish troops. That is, on the flanks of Konev and Zhukov there were 2 Polish armies. One of them was badly beaten near Bautzen, and the second, behold, it was easier.
V. DYMARSKY: Well, now I would like to ask you to come back a little for more early term, more early period. And I would even say, at the end of 1944, and here's why. One version of the fact that there were a lot of victims on the Seelow Heights on our part is that Zhukov, in spite of everything, no matter what losses, was eager to be the first to enter Berlin and that, in fact, in 1944, when he headed the 1st Belorussian Front instead of Rokossovsky, this replacement was, in fact, made precisely because it was to give Zhukov the opportunity to be the first to enter Berlin.
A. Isaev: Yes, this is a turning point. How, now, Zhukov was appointed commander of the 1st Belorussian ...
V. DYMARSKY: This is November, if I'm not mistaken, 1944.
A. Isaev: Yes, November 1944. This, one might say, automatically meant that it was he who would enter Berlin, I would even say, regardless of what would happen. Just a front line - if you continue it, with the Vistula bridgehead, it ends in Berlin. And so he had to screw up very badly and badly in order not to get to Berlin. As for this replacement, he was a very experienced person and very clever and cunning. And I believe that if Rokossovsky had been placed on the 1st Belorussian Front, then Danzig would have been repeated on an enlarged scale when Rokossovsky was given the 1st Panzer Army and said: “Come on, go ahead, crush the Germans, die.” And instead of cutting off the troops retreating to Danzig with this tank army, he threw it directly on Danzig, one might say, take it right away. And the result of this was butting over time near Danzig and Gdynia, because of which, in fact, Rokossovsky was late for the start of the Berlin operation. That is, his front launched an offensive not on April 16, along with everyone else, but on the 18th. And, in general, things didn’t go very quickly for him, and in fact I don’t even consider him in my book on Berlin, because he was ...
V.DYMARSKY: She is next to you, right?
A.ISAEV: Yes. This is a book from 2007, I had great pleasure in studying 1945, because it turned out to be very interesting. And so it turns out that the 2nd Belorussian Front - he was such an outsider, that is, in fact, he took such a very indirect part in the battle for Berlin.
V. DYMARSKY: Did he have any role to play? Or was it the impression that everything was given to Zhukov?
A. Isaev: Zhukov was, yes. He was given a task, Berlin was in his front line, but, nevertheless, on the one hand there was Rokossovsky, who, if Zhukov was completely stuck on the Oder front, he had hypothetical chances to bypass Berlin from the north. And Konev, who used, well, I would say, he had a chance, Konev, but he did not use it to break through to Berlin from the south. It cannot be said that these were competitors, but both of them had such hypothetical chances that were not included in any directives of the rate before the start of the operation.
V. DYMARSKY: I don’t know, I didn’t see it, I’ll honestly say what Rokossovsky wrote about this and whether he wrote it. But Konev, in those of his texts, if I may say so, which we mentioned today, in 1957, when Zhukov fell into disgrace, he just wrote about competition and that the Seelow Heights are the result of competition. The fact that Zhukov went ahead, not paying attention to anything, and everything in order to get ahead of him, Konev, and, apparently, Rokossovsky was implied. In general, others, let's say, during the capture of Berlin.
A. Isaev: The directives of the headquarters did not provide for Konev's participation in the battle for Berlin. Tasks were set for him, he says in his memoirs, “Yes, I found a break in the dividing line near Lyubin.” But in the directive of the headquarters, the tasks were set up to the Elbe, and in these directives it is in no way visible that Konev is even entrusted with the possibility of throwing on Berlin. Konev, in fact, secretly from the headquarters, from Stalin, was preparing a plan to throw at Berlin and capture it with a cavalry charge, if suddenly something happened. This plan was not implemented, but nevertheless, it was de facto prepared very carefully and, I would say, by verbal orders without much publicity. And when Zhukov slowed down, I emphasize, not only on the Seelow Heights, but on the Oder Front as a whole, yes, Stalin gave Konev a chance to implement this plan and gradually, I would say, it expanded: first one tank army went to Berlin, then another part of another tank army. In general, not paying attention to anything, including the serious problems that Konev had at Bautzen, where the 2nd Polish Army was being beaten, Konev tried to rush to Berlin. He did not manage to get ahead of Zhukov, but, nevertheless, this competition, Konev was its initiator, and Zhukov - he simply hacked the Oder front, and not only the Seelow Heights, but also the chain of all these canals and rivers. And, in general, broke ...
V. DYMARSKY: In general, I have a question, perhaps a naive one. But is this kind of competition on the part of Konev or Zhukov - is this generally normal? What, there was no coordination? Still, there is a stake, there are some solutions, right?
A.ISAEV: No, that’s exactly what the decisions were…
V. DYMARSKY: This is some kind of partisanship, right? "I'll go in first. If I'm the first to come, I'll be the first to enter."
A. Isaev: Well, of course, in the directives, I emphasize, there was nothing of the kind in the rates. Then, on the move, they began to change the plan of the operation, and Konev was turned around. They told him: “Yes, turn around, try to get to Berlin from the south.” But this is already a change of plan on the go - this was no longer partisanism, he was given very clear instructions "Turn around and go to Berlin from the south." The distance there was great, he got stuck in the woods, then stuck on the bypass of Berlin, but, nevertheless, an attempt to change the plan on the go. Stalin was nervous. He understood that the Allies could reach Berlin, they already have bridgeheads on the Elbe, well, as they say, Berlin is within easy reach. If Zhukov gets stuck, Rokossovsky and so things were not going well with this forcing of two channels of the Oder at once - the Alt-Oder and, in fact, the Oder - then you never know what will happen. Therefore, he was nervous, although there were reasons for concern at the moment when all these orders “Turn, Konev, towards Berlin” were given ...
Already a real person, I think, the hero of the battle for Berlin, the one who remained in the shadows is the commander of the 1st mechanized corps Krivoshein. This is the man who met with Guderian. And this corps - at the moment when Stalin was nervous, gave all these orders “Let's take Berlin from the north, and let's take it from the south”, this corps, like a knitting needle, pierced the Oder front almost to the entire depth. The result of this breakthrough was used in the following days. Approximately on the third or fourth day of the operation, the dam collapsed, and that was it, the front crumbled.
V.DYMARSKY: What was Stalin afraid of, in fact? The fact that the Allies will be the first to enter Berlin? But the agreement with the allies was already about the division?
A.ISAEV: She was. Well, this is the same section - they could go to Berlin and come back, and, so to speak, forever.
V. DYMARSKY: So it's purely a symbolic moral thing?
A.ISAEV: This is not symbolically moral. Churchill wanted to run to Berlin with might and main, but Eisenhower preferred a bird in his hand. We have a Russian cauldron, God forbid the Germans run out of the Russian cauldron and sit in an Alpine fortress, from where we will pick them out for another year. Why do we need it? And Churchill turned a deaf ear to all these requests. And despite all attempts to influence Eisenhower through the president, it all failed - he stood like a wall. He understood that he would be president, and if he got involved in some kind of adventure at the end of the war, he would be reminded of this during the presidential campaign. So he proceeded with caution.
Stalin did not know this. He's all these promises ... Eisenhower was completely frank with him when he wrote "I won't go to Berlin, I don't need it." He was absolutely sincere. But Stalin underestimated the sincerity of the allies, who were from a different, one might say, political camp. And he understood that they can say one thing in person, but make plans completely different. Therefore, it seemed like such a game, very intricate, when it led to an acceleration of planning, and this nervousness, twitching with tank armies in the process ... But, nevertheless, Zhukov, although he lagged behind the plan, was very confident ... Here, the breakthrough of the Oder Front Zhukov should be studied in textbooks. Now, if the Germans had acted in the same way near Kursk, as Zhukov had acted on the Seelow Heights (on the Oder Front, in fact), they might have broken through the defenses of the Voronezh Front, I mean the Germans. Because Zhukov is very clear: a breakthrough has formed, narrow, thin. We are in this breakthrough, first one tank army, then the second tank army, and behind them the infantry - and that's it, and the enemy's front falls.
V. DYMARSKY: Well, we will talk about this topic later, about the battles on the Seelow Heights and not only on them. I have one more question. Is it true that Stalin, well, in addition to those plans that you spoke about that Berlin-Berlin, set the task of taking Berlin by May 1?
A. Isaev: The task was to take Berlin much earlier. And on May 1, this is just the fact that the Berlin garrison capitulated on May 2, this is a failure of all deadlines. It should have been taken much earlier, I would even say before Lenin's birthday. The fact that May 1 turned out to be close to the surrender point of the Berlin garrison is a lag and a violation, and not what they said in advance, "Let's take it by May 1." By May 1, they were not going to take it.
A. Isaev: Well, there were flags over the Reichstag, but the Germans still had large groups that still continued to resist. Flakturms were all standing - these are air defense towers - not a single one of the flakturms was taken on April 30. And there was a huge region of Gumbolthein and Friedrichshain, which remained completely under the control of the Germans. One should not think that they were squeezed from all sides, and, behold, the Reichstag was the last center of resistance. On April 30, when the flags were already fluttering in the windows of the Reichstag, the Fuhrer was still thinking whether to commit suicide, not to finish. And, in general, it happened quickly. And despite the short distance from the Reichstag to the Reich Chancellery, resistance continued there.
V.DYMARSKY: Well, the official dates for the Battle of Berlin and, in particular, the start of the battle for the Seelow Heights are April 16 - May 8, right?
A.ISAEV: Yes.
V. DYMARSKY: But since you said about Hitler, Hitler, after his success at the Seelow Heights, he, in general, there, like, according to testimonies, almost shouted “Hurrah, we won! It starts like a fracture. So, he hoped that it would be the same as near Moscow?
A. Isaev: No, he hoped when Roosevelt died shortly before the start.
V.DYMARSKY: Well, yes, I agree.
A. Isaev: Then there was a storm of delight.
V. DYMARSKY: But the Seelow Heights also inspired him with some such optimism.
A. Isaev: If you look at the documents of the Vistula Army Group, then there was very cautious optimism that the Russians launched an offensive and we are still holding out. That we are still holding on, despite the disastrous balance of power for us. So there was no reason to be happy.
V.DYMARSKY: I will interrupt you, Alexey. As a matter of fact, we will now pause for a few minutes, after which we will continue the “Price of Victory” program.
NEWS
V. DYMARSKY: Once again, we welcome our radio and television audience, the program "The Price of Victory". I remind you that I am leading it today, Vitaly Dymarsky, and Alexei Isaev is our guest and we are talking about the battles on the Seelow Heights. I will immediately respond here to several of our listeners who keep asking me about my colleague, Dmitry Zakharov. His vacation is coming to an end, I talked to him, so I think that either next week or in a week he will appear, we will restore our duet after such a long vacation that Dima was on.
Well, back, after all, to the Seelow Heights. Alexey, before this short break, you said that this operation is worthy of textbooks. But how would you say? This is the first time I hear such an assessment. There is someone praising. Well, how do you praise? Someone doesn't scold so much, someone scolds a lot. But so that right in the textbook, in fact, we talked about this - Zhukov himself was quite critical in relation to himself and to this operation. Still, there, as I understand it, from what I read and saw, there was enough ... And, by the way, according to the recollections of veterans, they are not a strategy, they, of course, did not see the entire front and the whole picture, but, nevertheless, some personal testimonies, sensations too. Both military leaders and privates ... Yes, everyone says that the news, in general, does not pull on a textbook, that there were a lot of mistakes, starting with what was there, like, when tanks were launched, that they were almost on infantry, in general , ours went.
A.ISAEV: Well, again, there are many exaggerations.
V. DYMARSKY: Maybe these are myths.
A. Isaev: Yes, there are many exaggerations regarding the Seelow Heights and the Berlin operation as a whole. When I talked about the textbook, I said that a maneuver by forces and a change of plan on the move were very competently carried out, when, indeed, they found a weak point among the Germans, knocked out a cork in their defense and not much rushed into this cork like a stormy river, not a few, but 6 tank mechanized corps of two tank armies. And this buildup of forces, which was then, again, competently used, when the Germans brought in their reserves, these reserves were carefully bypassed from the north and from the south. This maneuver, despite the fact that the battle could turn into a second Verdun, there, in the second Rzhev, this did not happen, this transformation. Precisely because they competently maneuvered the forces that were, and really changed a lot on the go and flexibly enough approached how to move forward. And so, the Germans strengthened this front for several months. And they had considerable forces there, if we take in human terms, and very good engineering preparation of the area, which in itself is not sugar. These canals, again, spring, the overflow of rivers, streams, which sometimes turned those canals that can be easily overcome in the summer on a tank, in April 1945 it was not an easy task, it was necessary to build a bridge.
And, in fact, the slowdown at the Seelow Heights is the need to overcome all these engineering obstacles, when the Germans are successively driven away from the banks of the next canal, a bridge is built, one tank corps is launched somewhere along it, then, if events develop successfully here, another . That is, we had a very clear system in 1945, which, by the way, is very rare among the Germans: someone has achieved success, they immediately turn their neighbor in the back of the head. A neighbor is stuck somewhere, no need to suffer there, no need to lose people, tanks there - turn around in the back of your head to your successfully advancing comrade and develop success through him. By the way, this system worked for both Konev and Zhukov. With Zhukov, this is simply, as it were, more clearly manifested, just this, what I said, as in a textbook. But Rybalko, for example, attacked in exactly the same way: when they got stuck, they turned around, broke through further into the depths on a successful site.
Therefore, despite the severe exhaustion of the troops, when our divisions with a staff of 10 thousand people began the Berlin operation in the amount of 4-5 thousand people, when the companies were there not 150 people, but 100.
V. DYMARSKY: Understaffed?
A. Isaev: This was a terrible understaffing of the troops, and, I would even say, it has no precedent before. That is, in 1945 they fought, on average, half the number, and in some places there were divisions of 2 thousand people each, but this, as it were, on the periphery, somewhere in Courland. And Berlin - yes, there was a small margin of safety for the troops. If they had not shown any cunning, some use of combat experience, then with these divisions of 4-5 thousand people, they simply would not have reached Berlin. They had too few people to put them on the heights, and then everything - there was no one to attack further.
V.DYMARSKY: Alexey, one more question. This German grouping, which was defeated somewhere there, bypassed somewhere, was it, as it were, the last redoubt, the last frontier in front of Berlin? How much, 60 kilometers, if I'm not mistaken, approximately?
A. Isaev: Yes, there were 60. If you take, as they say, from the top of the bridgehead, then 60 kilometers to the outskirts of Berlin. And the German 9th Army of Busse, General Busse, stood on the way to Berlin.
V. DYMARSKY: Later?
A. Isaev: No, she was on the Oder front. And if you break it, surround it, then the Berlin garrison remained, in which there were Volkssturmists, policemen, firefighters.
V. DYMARSKY: Well, these are already urban battles, right?
A. Isaev: These are urban battles in which... Again, why do I consider Zhukov a very literate person? He thought out the operation well so that the bulk of these qualified military men from the Busse army were cut off from Berlin. Several defeated divisions were driven into Berlin with a part of the Seelow Heights from the Oder Front, and the rest were unskilled people, they were Volkssturmists, that is, either young people or old people, policemen, air defense, in general, all those who were poorly trained in infantry battle. Therefore, Berlin was taken in 10 days. This is somewhat of a record. And the Germans did not have the strength to defend such a large city, to defend every building. Here, if we take Poznan, there, even Kustrin, which are smaller cities, they were taken with great difficulty, again, in proportion to their size than to Berlin. Because in Berlin how? The Germans could only control individual buildings. And these buildings were demolished, went further forward. And, in fact, this was the result of success on the Seelow Heights, again, conditionally on the Seelow Heights, it would be more correct, nevertheless, to call it “On the Oder Front”.
When this Oder front was broken, the Germans were surrounded in the forests southeast of Berlin, there some remnants from Berlin were dispersed in different directions and took the city, which was defended by non-professionals. Naturally, non-professionals against professionals had very little chance. This handful of beaten divisions under the command of Weidling, they could not become the cement of the city's defense. And the fate of Berlin will be decided on the Oder front - so the Germans, and Busse, and the commander of the army group Wisla Heinrici said that if the front collapses on the Seelow Heights, again, then the fate of Berlin will be decided. And the front collapsed. Literally in 4 days it really broke.
V. DYMARSKY: Could they have broken it earlier? Could it be more efficient? Well, it's always possible, I understand.
A. Isaev: If you look back, then perhaps it was worth, for example, to delay the introduction of tank armies. Although, in reality, it turned out that it was the tank armies who found and knocked out that cork.
V. DYMARSKY: And there, indeed, there was this collision, if you like, in literally tanks for infantry?
A. Isaev: Well, you can say that the collision is conditional and in quotation marks, it consisted in the fact that the artillery was moving. On the morning of April 16, the Seelow Heights were visible only through binoculars. Really walked for some time on the terrain as smooth as a table. So, I was there, and it is very clearly visible that the terrain is smooth, and then these low, but, nevertheless, heights abruptly go up. Here, they were approached by the end of the first day of the operation.
It was necessary to move artillery, and at that moment 2 tank armies enter the field with their mass of tanks, trucks and other equipment. And the roads were clogged. Artillery moving forward with agricultural tractors, Chuikov and these tank armies. Naturally, there was confusion, confusion and, despite the draconian regulations, there was a certain level of chaos. And this is sometimes considered a mistake. Chuikov rightly says: “Yes, I had tanks!” He really had 50 ISs for a narrow front, IS-2 heavy tanks, with which he, in fact, broke the defense. He lost 25 on the first day, he still had 50 left, and he was, in principle, ready to break forward on his own. But, nevertheless, they decided to introduce tank armies, but they were not introduced in the same way as they would have been introduced somewhere near Rzhev, they were not worn off on the first day, as near Prokhorovka - when an army is introduced, 50% of its armored vehicles are knocked out of it on the first same day. Then they carefully entered the bridgehead, got involved in the battle, felt that the resistance was too strong and very carefully probed the German defenses, found a weak spot, broke through and then rushed forward. Because the losses that could have been avoided. There are indeed Soviet tank forces fought without losing their heads. And we must pay tribute to Katukov and Bogdanov that, despite the fact that they ran into such a tough positional defense, they did not turn this battle into Prokhorovka or Rzhev.
V. DYMARSKY: Still, so to speak, among the mistakes Soviet command they call it ... Well, firstly, in the fact that the fortified positions of the Germans themselves on the Seelow Heights turned out to be a surprise - for some reason they were not expected there, they were expected below, right?
A. Isaev: Not quite so. Unexpected were the resistance forces of the opponents. What positions in the valley will overcome - they were overcome with difficulty, we will leave ...
V. DYMARSKY: Yes. And then there was the second echelon.
A.ISAEV: Yes. That we, as it were, will be able to bring him down. But, here, they could not bring him down immediately. That is, they could not shoot down on the Seelow Heights - these are 2 armies of the left flank, on all sorts of channels Haupt Graben could not be shot down by those who were north of the Seelow Heights, which, again, these Seelow Heights were only seen with binoculars. But they got stuck too.
V. DYMARSKY: Another mistake from what I saw was that there was a very short artillery preparation, there, half an hour instead of the usual couple of hours.
A.ISAEV: Well, here the situation is as follows. Zhukov had a very powerful artillery fist. And it was enough, in fact, due to the enormous power ... Heavy artillery up to 305 millimeters inclusive was used there. And so it took, in fact, half an hour. And then moved on at the request of the troops.
Here, again, there is such a stereotype: here, the artillery strikes, strikes, strikes, then the infantry comes and occupies. And here it turned out that first the artillery preparation, and then the work - just like it is written in the documents - work at the request of the troops. That is, we ran into resistance, not just, here, in the abstract, we shot several wagons, hundreds and thousands of wagons of ammunition in 2 hours, but we ran into resistance, we are wrapping up this knot of resistance. At the request of the troops. Therefore, the Germans just the same, when they wrote in the daytime report of the Vistula Army Group, the duration of the Soviet artillery preparation was indicated as 2.5 hours. They had an illusion, firstly, because of the power of the artillery preparation itself, and secondly, that it continued to accompany the infantry, work on its requests.
V. DYMARSKY: And, by the way, here, in my opinion, even the question was like this, if I'm not mistaken. Well, I will not look, I just remember this question. What is the German assessment of these battles, well, which, of course, have already appeared after the war?
A. Isaev: Well, after the war they considered it to some extent a success, but, again, they considered their defense of the Seelow Heights a success. And the Oder Front itself - yes, it collapsed. It was such a tactical success. Well, one might say, a kind of fortress that stood in the middle of a stormy sea.
V.DYMARSKY: Also, please clarify this situation, which is often mentioned, with these spotlights.
A. Isaev: The situation with searchlights is as follows. Yet it's spring, it's not June 22, when we have the longest day, it's dark. And extended the first day. The first day is very important. So we decided to start as early as possible. Firstly, it was a surprise for the Germans, this attack under the spotlights, they did not expect the offensive to start so early. And, in principle, Zhukov squeezed everything he could out of his situation, which was not the best.
He started unexpectedly with the spotlights, he actually advanced for the first hour or two under the spotlights, lengthening the day. That is, he received more light time to continue the offensive and to exit, in fact, to the 2nd defense line.
V. DYMARSKY: This probably also indicates a rush, after all.
A.ISAEV: Well, it's not so much a rush. This is a person, everything that could be invented, and, as they say now, a creative person - he squeezed the maximum of creativity out of an initially rather rotten situation. Now, if someone else had been in his place, more people would have been lost on these Seelow Heights. And so, for the Germans, this blow was unexpected, despite the fact that the searchlights did not live up to expectations, and partly, one might say, because of the jambs below, when they entrusted the placement of the searchlights to the sergeants, as a result they were not very well placed. But nevertheless, in general, this was assessed as not the worst element of the operation. Moreover, the Germans attacked with searchlights in 1941. And the Ardennes operation also began with searchlights. This is one of the tricks. And, for example, the Vistula-Oder began in the light of lighting projectiles. This is just a technique that allows you to fight longer in a short day.
V. DYMARSKY: Well, here I am, once again, just referring to Zhukov, right? Here, his order is dated April 18, that is, this is the third day of fighting. “The main reason for the poor offensive lies in the lack of organization, the lack of interaction between troops and the lack of requirements for persons and so on. I order "... It's clear, right? "The attack on Berlin is developing unacceptably slowly." That is, these are estimates of Zhukov himself.
A. Isaev: Yes, lagged behind.
V. DYMARSKY: Permanent orders, disorganization, everything is bad.
A.ISAEV: Well, of course. Boss, when he comes, if he says, "It's all right," people will naturally relax. He comes and says that everything is bad, you are bunglers, loafers and so on. This is, I would say, a typical managerial technique, and there, in the same order, there is a very interesting point- he forces to bring the command posts closer to the front line. It was, in fact, the German strategy, even the tactics and style of command, when commanding from the front. Guderian commanded from the front, Romel commanded from the front. It was considered the rule good manners when the commander, the commander of the formation sees the battlefield. And Zhukov, so to speak, drove some of his subordinates to command in this style with a stick. And, for me, it was a very funny correlation of command styles. That Zhukov - he really wanted to command the front line. And him command post was on the Reinthwein, an offshoot of the Seelow Heights, which had already been captured (more precisely, the Lebus Heights). And he saw the battlefield and he could make decisions. He made decisions about the introduction of tank armies, seeing exactly what was happening.
V. DYMARSKY: Aleksey, let's answer some questions - we don't have much time. Dmitry asks: “Tell me, was it possible to bypass the Seelow Heights from the north and block Berlin?”
A. Isaev: They were bypassed from the north. It was possible to get around from the south of Frankfurt - that's what the second plan of the Oder is. So, in reality, the Seelow Heights, I emphasize again, bypassed and bypassed them from the north.
V. DYMARSKY: Vadim asks: “Did Hitler have a chance to stop the offensive and recapture the territory?” What is "reclaim territory"? Well, stop the offensive, I guess.
A. Isaev: There was a chance to stop the offensive if he had more troops, if some other person opposed him. Now, if someone else turned out to be, we will not even name specific names.
V. DYMARSKY: Well, what is there. (laughs)
A. Isaev: Well, I, nevertheless, will honestly tell my personal opinion - I think that I have the right to it. If Rokossovsky had been in Zhukov's place, there would have been good chances of getting stuck on the Seelow Heights.
V. DYMARSKY: By the way, I want to tell our audience in general that all our guests, and we, of course, do not express some official points of view, but our personal ones, and, in general, we always speak in in our programs, that they (programs) exist not to dot the “i”, but in order to somehow stimulate you, or something, and deal with this issue yourself, draw your own conclusions, nothing more.
“And they say,” Vlad writes to us, “that Antonov clashed with Stalin. Stalin wanted to take Berlin on two fronts, while Antonov proposed three. This is true?"
A. Isaev: As a result, when the throwing began, there were attempts to deploy 2 fronts adjacent to Zhukov to Berlin. Yes, it was, but in reality, those directives that Stalin and Antonov signed on April 2, 1945, they set the task of taking Berlin to Zhukov, and, accordingly, Konev and Rokossovsky to reach the line of contact with the allies without setting them the task of taking Berlin.
V. DYMARSKY: Ah, I just found a question that I could not find, how our allies assessed the assault on the Seelow Heights. Teacher from Kazan Triad. Well, in the sense of not the Germans, but the allies, right? Well, the British, the Americans.
A. Isaev: Well, in fact, they knew too little and they had distorted information from the Germans. The Germans, of course, puffed out their cheeks and said: "Yes, we retreated from the first position and deceived the Russians." In fact, shortly before the Busse operation, the commander of the 9th Army on the Oder Front said, “I cannot give my troops this order to jump back and get away from the Russian artillery attack, because my troops are too weak morally. If they start to withdraw, it will end up running in the streets of Berlin.”
V.DYMARSKY: Well, here is the question, Dmitry, a specialist from Moscow: “Was it worth it to take care of the flanks for 2 months, wouldn’t it be more rational to send troops to Berlin in February 1945? After all, the Pomeranian, East Prussian and similar groups could be forged by mobile defense.
A. Isaev: We had a program on this topic, I think, about 2 months ago. But now I will answer briefly that thanks to the fact that they defeated the Germans in Pomerania, those armies lined up shoulder to shoulder on the Kustrinsky bridgehead, some of which would otherwise have had to be placed front to the north. For example, the 3rd shock army, which eventually took the Reichstag, it would have stood at the front to the north against the Pomeranian group.
V.DYMARSKY: Well, by the way, when Zhukov became commander of the 1st Belorussian Front in November 1944, he also promised to take Berlin by February 20th. At first, right?
A. Isaev: Well, here the allies promised that they would go home by Christmas in the summer of 1944. It is a person who assumes, and the enemy always interferes in his plans.
V.DYMARSKY: Well, we will probably complete our program little by little. We also have, as usual, a portrait at the end of the program. Well, and the program itself "The Price of Victory"... Thank you, firstly, to Alexei Isaev, and we say goodbye for a week. See you.
A. Isaev: Goodbye.
T. DZYADKO: People like him are said to lack stars from the sky. And it is true. Leonid Govorov did not take Berlin, did not head the General Staff, a kind of eternal, almost Tolstoy artilleryman. In a combat description for him in 1942, when he was commander of the 5th Army, it was stated that, further citation, “in operational tactical terms, it is well prepared, the main drawback of Comrade Govorov is some dispersion along the entire front and the lack of skills in gathering a fist for shock actions. Comrade Govorov is a strong-willed, demanding, energetic, brave and organized commander of the troops. At the request of Zhukov, Govorov was appointed commander of the 5th Army - then, in 1941, these were heavy battles near Mozhaisk, and then Govorov's luck was to convince the command of the inexpediency of fighting for the city. But the central point, of course, is not this, but the Leningrad Front, of which Govorov became commander in the summer of 1942, and the breakthrough of the blockade, which was far from successful immediately.
Stalin could not doubt Govorov's complete loyalty. Like some other marshals, he had something to fear in his biography: he was a former White Guard, served with Kolchak, and at the beginning of the war he was a non-partisan. Strange, but true: the white past did not backfire on him Soviet power. He had something to fear, because Stalin could not doubt his devotion. Although, unlike, for example, Budyonny, Govorov seems not to have been noticed in an overly vivid demonstration of his feelings. In any case, he did not try to administer justice in the same way as Budyonny. On the contrary, after the war, without much pleasure and enthusiasm, he met the case of Leningraders and the case of doctors, with whom he was allegedly connected not as an accused, but as a victim.
Everything that happened after the war is not so important compared to what happened at the front. 10 years of various positions in the Leningrad Military District of the Ministry of Defense. In the end, he already became the commander-in-chief of the air defense forces. He died in 1955 as a Marshal, Hero of the Soviet Union, holder of the Order of Victory.
