In Belarus, the memory of one of the major tank battles of the Great Patriotic War
In the area of the village of Zaozerye, Sennensky district, the VI international bike festival “Motto-strike-2016. Counterattack”, dedicated to the 75th anniversary of the tank battle, also known in the history of the Great Patriotic War as the Battle of Senno (Lepelsky counterattack). Here, about 50 kilometers southwest of Vitebsk, from July 6 to July 10, 1941, a major tank battle. Some researchers believe that in terms of the number of combat vehicles participating in it on both sides, it can be comparable to the battle of Prokhorovka on the Kursk Bulge in 1943.
Tank strikes inflicted serious losses on the Germans, especially in manpower. And although the battle was lost, nevertheless, it was a feat. The people never forgot about him, but at the state level they started talking about the battle of Senno only a few years ago. What happened on this piece of Belarusian land in 1941?
After the fall of Minsk, on the outskirts of Vitebsk, the Nazis met fierce resistance and were stopped.
And early in the morning of July 6, two mechanized corps of the 20th Army of the Western Front launched an attack on the enemy. German tanks moved towards.
By the end of the day, the Red Army had returned the city of Senno under its control, and Soviet and German tanks were left smoking on the battlefield. On July 7, the regional center changed hands three times, but by the evening it was again captured by Soviet tankers. The next day, the Nazis threw new combat units into battle, a large number of aviation, artillery, including anti-tank. Our soldiers, after a hard battle, were forced to leave Senno and retreat to the Vitebsk-Smolensk highway. But another Soviet tank wedge continued its advance on Lepel.
Unfortunately, the Germans managed to outflank the counterstrike Soviet tank corps from the north and occupied Vitebsk on July 9, reaching the Vitebsk-Smolensk-Moscow road. In connection with the threat of encirclement, the commander of the 20th Army, Lieutenant General P.A. Kurochkin ordered the attack on Lepel to be suspended and a retreat to the east to begin. It was during these dramatic battles that the most famous participant in the battle of Senno, the son of Stalin, the commander of the howitzer battery, Senior Lieutenant Yakov Dzhugashvili, was captured. But - this is a separate issue.
Few of the tankers managed to break through to the east - they had to blow up the tanks, as they ran out of fuel and ammunition. The losses of our tanks significantly exceeded the German ones.
... This has happened more than once in the history of our country, when it was enthusiasts, ascetics who, after years, and sometimes even decades, restored the half-forgotten pages of the history of the Great Patriotic War, and then, thanks to these initial efforts of caring people, the battles and exploits of the military period took their rightful place in national historiography. Over time, it even began to seem like it had always been like this. So, for example, it was with the feat of the submariner A.I. Marinesko or the heroic epic of the defenders of the Brest Fortress.
The truth about the feat of the Soviet tank crews comes back from the past through the efforts of caring people - motorcyclists of the motorcycle club "Night Wolves Belarus" and, above all, the commander of the Sennen branch of the "Night Wolves" Oleg Evgenievich Ustinovich, known in biker circles under the nickname Leshy.
His father, Yevgeny Ustinovich, chairman of the Senno District Council of Veterans, devoted his whole life to restoring the memory of this tank battle. In 2011, thanks to his selfless activity, a monument was erected in Senno, on the pedestal of which the Soviet IS-3 tank, transferred to the city by the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Belarus, froze.
“By opening the monument to Soviet tankers, we are restoring historical justice, paying tribute to the heroism of the Red Army soldiers, and the monument serves as a reminder to posterity of those tragic events,” said Belarusian Defense Minister Yuri Zhadobin. At the same time, the chairman of the regional veterans' organization, Gennady Gerasimovich, handed over name cards to the residents of the city with information about 58 tank soldiers who died in those battles, as well as information about 10 pilots who did not return from missions and died on Senno land.
Very little time has passed since that event, and both heads of veterans' councils have already passed away - both Yevgeny Ustinovich and Gennady Gerasimovich. Before the death of his father, Oleg Ustinovich promised to continue his work and kept his word. This year, thanks to the efforts of the "Night Wolves" on the Senno-Bogushevsk highway, on July 8, 2016, a memorial sign-monument to the heroes of the tank battle near Senno was solemnly opened, and just at the epicenter of the past battles.
A lot of motorcyclists came here. Their cars, in addition to biker paraphernalia, were decorated with symbols of the Great Patriotic War. But the clothes of the bikers were St. George ribbons.
Many participants of the event dressed in Soviet military uniform, had dummies of weapons of that time. Many young people and even children came. In a single motor industry there were representatives of all regions of Belarus, as well as Moscow, St. Petersburg, Smolensk and other regions of Russia, the CIS countries and the Baltic states. A special decoration of the biker rally was a three-wheeled motorcycle driven by a driver dressed in a Soviet military uniform. The red flag proudly fluttered on the car, and songs from the war years sounded from the installed speakers.
The rally was opened by Pavel Golovach, a member of the council of the All-Russian Public Organization "Russian House", one of O. Ustinovich's associates in organizing events. M. Novodvorskaya, Counselor of the Russian Embassy in Belarus, addressed the audience with a welcoming speech. The audience was also addressed by Deputy Chairman of the Senno District Executive Committee Z. Fomina, Chairman of the Coordinating Council of Russian Compatriots at the Russian Embassy in Belarus, author of these lines, producer of the film "Steel" about the battle of Senno from St. Petersburg D. Murashev, his colleagues in the film project and in conclusion - O. Ustinovich (Leshy).
He thanked the Russian Embassy in Belarus, the representative office of Rossotrudnichestvo in Belarus, the local authorities, the bikers and festival participants, the film crew of the film “Steel”, the Vitebsk public association “Russian House” and in general all those present for their help and support. Then the cover was removed from the monument, and a wreath and an armful of carnations were laid on a memorial boulder with memorial plaques and an attached tank track (a true artifact of the battle).
Quite young people approached a huge stone, knelt down, and were baptized. Many had tears in their eyes.
After the rally, bikers with unfurled flags in a friendly column headed for their camp near the village of Zaozerye "Motor Reservations". More than 1,500 people gathered in a clearing near a beautiful lake - a whole tent city. Special thanks to the participants of the festival were deserved by the representatives of the Senno catering, who organized the exit trade. Badges with festival paraphernalia and embroidered shirts with Moto-strike symbols were also sold.
Motorcycles and quad bikes scurried around here and there. But, despite the large number of festival participants, there was complete order and discipline everywhere. Special attention was paid to security issues.
And in the evening there were traditional fire shows, fireworks and a rock concert. The film crew of the film "Steel" held a premiere screening documentary film about the veteran of the battle of Senno V.P. Silin. To date, he is the last tanker who participated in that battle. He is 98 years old. V.P. Silin, a BT-7 driver, was awarded the medal "For Courage" in August 1941 for withdrawing his tank from the encirclement. Lives in the Crimea, in Kerch. The film is called “Silin”. In 2018, the film crew plans to present to the public the film "Steel", which will be filmed as a story of several tank crews that participated in the Lepel battle.
The festival ended, but many of its participants and guests were in no hurry to go home. Although, we hope that in a year they will definitely return here. It cannot be otherwise - the people's memory turned out to be stronger than the oblivion of history!
Special for the Centenary
This spring, journalistic paths led me to the Russian Belgorod region. Among other addresses on the itinerary of that trip was the famous Prokhorovka Field - the place where in July 1943, during the battles on the Kursk Bulge, the largest tank battle of the Great Patriotic War took place, which, as we remember, we were told in history lessons at school. Getting acquainted then with the grandiose memorial complex created at the site of the battles, which includes a belfry monument, a battle museum and a museum of military equipment, as well as the majestic Orthodox Church of the Holy Apostles Peter and Paul, erected in honor of the Soviet soldiers who died on the field of military glory, I could not even imagine that in just six months I will visit places where, according to some historians, a much larger battle of Soviet and Nazi tank armadas took place than near Prokhorovka. And it was at the very beginning of the Great Patriotic War near the Belarusian city of Senno.
Unfortunately, there are not so many testimonies about the heroic events of July 1941 in Senno and its district. There is no such memorial as in Prokhorovka. Everything is much simpler here: the memory of the feat of the Soviet soldiers of the 5th and 7th mechanized corps of the 20th Army of the Western Front, who took part in the tank battle near Senno on July 6-10, 1941, is immortalized only by the monument-tank IS-3 (abbreviation stands for "Joseph Stalin"). It was installed three years ago. Indeed, anyone who understands military equipment during the Second World War, it will not fail to note that given type the tank could not participate in the battles on initial stage war, as it began to be released much later. But that, as they say, is beside the point.
You can learn about the ups and downs and the course of the battle that took place near Senno from the modestly decorated, but in fact very rich museum exposition of the local history and local history museum. His researcher Vasily Bondarevich has been studying the July battles of 1941 near his city for decades and, together with his colleagues, has collected a lot of materials about a little-known tank battle.
- By the beginning of July 1941, the situation at the front for the Red Army was critical. Having defeated the main forces of the Western Front in the Bialystok and Minsk “cauldrons” during the first military week and capturing the Belarusian capital, German troops rushed further to the east, to the border of the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers, - says Vasily Viktorovich. - This region was strategically important for the enemy, since it was from there that the Nazis planned to deliver a decisive blow to Smolensk, and then to Moscow. In order to reach the Dvina-Dnieper bridgehead as soon as possible, the Wehrmacht strike formations operating in the northwestern and central directions were ordered to conduct an offensive along two main routes - to Vitebsk, where the 39th Motorized Corps from the 3rd Panzer Group of General Colonel Herman Goth, and Orsha, where the 47th motorized corps of the 2nd Panzer Group, Colonel General Heinz Guderian rushed ...
Inspired by the successes of the first days of their eastern blitzkrieg, the German commanders hoped that they would be able to conquer this line without any problems. But they miscalculated. Already on July 5, the 7th Panzer Division of Major General Hans von Funk, advancing in the Vitebsk direction in the vanguard of the 39th Motorized Corps, east of Byalynichy, stumbled upon the defensive formations of the 153rd Infantry Division, which was part of the 20th Army, and was stopped by it. The Germans could not believe that they had failed to break through the Soviet barrier on the move. Therefore, after a while they gathered their strength and attacked the positions of our troops again. But this time they were not successful either. The soldiers of the 153rd Infantry Division under the command of Colonel Nikolai Hagen in that fierce battle not only survived, but also knocked out about 50 German tanks, while destroying more than half a thousand Nazis.
As it turned out later, this battle near Beshenkovichi was only a harbinger of larger-scale hostilities by the Soviet troops. Marshal Semyon Timoshenko, who had just been appointed the new commander of the Western Front, decided to attack the enemy on the distant approaches to the Dvina-Dnieper defensive line and ordered the 7th and 5th mechanized corps of the 20th Army to launch a counterattack with a depth of more than 100 kilometers in the direction of Senno-Lepel .
- IN historical literature since the days of the USSR, the offensive of Soviet troops in early July 1941 on Lepel and Senno has been considered as part of the Vitebsk battle called the Lepel counterattack. But in last years they began to call it the battle of Senno, - V. Bondarevich continues to bring up to date.
Both strike units of the 20th Army - the 5th and 7th mechanized corps, which were ordered to go on the offensive, had not previously been involved in battles on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War. They were urgently redeployed to Belarus - the 5th corps from near Kyiv to the Orsha region, and the 7th from the Moscow region - to Liozno. Already in new places, both corps became part of the 20th Army and, according to the order of the commander of the Western Front, Marshal S. Timoshenko, received specific tasks to participate in the offensive operation, which was scheduled to begin on the morning of July 6. Thus, units of the 7th mechanized corps were to attack the enemy in the Beshenkovichi and Senno directions, and the 5th mechanized corps - in Lepel. They were opposed by significant enemy forces - parts of the 47th and 39th motorized corps and rifle formations. Unlike the Soviet units, these were well-armed and highly experienced troops.
At the appointed time on July 6, the 14th Panzer Division of the 7th Mechanized Corps under the command of Colonel Ivan Vasiliev went on the offensive in the direction of Beshenkovichi. Its advanced regiments, advancing in columns along country and forest roads, at first met with little resistance from the enemy.
However, problems began as soon as the first tanks reached the small creek of Chernogostica. It was not possible to force it on the move - steep banks and swampy terrain did not allow it. In addition, on the opposite bank, the Nazis managed to build an impressive defensive line.
Repeated attempts to seize the opposite bank of the river were unsuccessful. The division suffered heavy losses: according to the report of division commander Colonel I. Vasiliev, 126 tanks participated in the battle on the Chernogostitsa River and half of them were lost, more than 200 people were also killed and wounded. Therefore, on the evening of July 7, an order was given to change the direction of the strike - to bypass the line occupied by the enemy from the south and, on the morning of July 8, resume the offensive in a new direction in cooperation with the 18th Panzer Division.
At first, things were little better for units of the 5th mechanized corps, which was ordered to move out of the Orsha region and conduct an offensive on Lepel south of Senno. But even here the first day of the offensive operation did not work out: only about 15 kilometers were overcome.
As Colonel General later recalled tank troops Vasily Butkov, who in 1941 was the chief of staff of the 5th mechanized corps, “On July 6 at 5 o’clock the 17th, 13th tank divisions, a detachment of the 109th motorized rifle division set out in columns along the designated routes. At first, the Nazis did not offer active resistance, but the troops advanced too slowly. It was pouring rain, and traffic jams were created on muddy roads. In addition, due to the lack of air cover, they often had to take cover in the forests from enemy air strikes.
As they approached the line of Masyuki and Oboltsy, the tank divisions met organized resistance from the forward units of the enemy's 47th motorized corps. With a swift attack, our troops shot down enemy detachments and by 2000, having advanced to a depth of 14-16 km, they reached the line of Serkuty, Budno (17th Panzer Division); Zamoshye, Oboltsy (13th Panzer Division); 7 km west of Vyazmichi (detachment of the 109th motorized division).
By the end of July 6, the tanks had used up almost the entire supply of fuel. Therefore, it was decided to suspend the further offensive in order to refuel the combat vehicles during the night of July 7, and resume the offensive at dawn. However, by the morning of July 7, the vehicles providing the supply of fuel did not arrive at the units, and the commanders of the tank divisions resumed the offensive with the forces of the forward detachments, supplying their tanks with fuel drained from the tanks of other combat vehicles. And this was a justified step: they attacked the extended marching columns of the German 17th Panzer Division, advancing from the Lepel area to Senno, and broke through to the area of the villages of Tsotovo and Tolpino. As a result, the orders of the German division were broken.
But the next day, July 8, the situation of the Soviet shock tank divisions, which by that time had already provided a 40-kilometer breakthrough into the depths of the enemy defenses, deteriorated sharply. Parts of the German 7th and 17th tank divisions attacked the 5th mechanized corps in the flank and rear, and some of its units were surrounded. The next day, reinforcements came to our units that fell into the ring, and on the night of July 10, during the oncoming attack of the 17th motorized rifle regiment and the tank battalion of the 33rd tank regiment, the remnants of the advanced units of the 5th mechanized corps were able to get out of the encirclement. After that, with other units, they retreated to the Orsha region, where, on the orders of the commander of the 20th Army, Lieutenant General P. Kurochkin, they occupied a new line of defense.
The fighting continued by the 14th Panzer Division of the 7th Mechanized Corps on the Chernogostitsa River near Beshenkovichi and the 17th, 13th Panzer Divisions and a detachment of the 109th Motorized Rifle Division, which were part of the 5th Mechanized Corps, near the villages of Masyuki and Oboltsy. The eighteenth division of the 7th mechanized corps, led by Major General Fedor Remizov, came to the aid of the fighters of scattered units of the Soviet troops, who were holding back the onslaught of the enemy on the eastern outskirts of the city of Senno.
Thanks to the fresh forces that arrived in time, on July 7 the city was recaptured from the Germans. The Nazis, of course, did not want to put up with the loss of their positions and launched counterattacks one after another in order to regain control over the strategically important for them locality. However, the fighters of the 18th Panzer Division steadfastly repulsed the enemy’s attempts to capture Senno: during the day the city changed hands three times, but by the end of it, it still remained under the control of Soviet troops ...
The fierce fighting that broke out in the Senno area is also evidenced by a memorandum from Major General Walter Nering, the commander of the German 18th Panzer Division, which fought against units of the Soviet 18th (what a coincidence!) Panzer Division: “Losses of equipment, weapons and vehicles unusually large and significantly exceed the captured trophies. This situation is intolerable, otherwise we will be defeated until our own death.
- On July 8, the Nazis threw all the reserves they had in this area against the defenders of the city, - continues V. Bondarevich. - Heavy fighting ensued again. Fire from tanks, guns and mortars fell upon our positions. And what is most inconvenient for the defenders of the city is that the Germans had powerful aviation support ...
It was impossible to keep such an enemy pressure, and the units of the 18th Panzer Division had to leave the city. They withdrew to the east, to the Vitebsk-Orsha highway, where they occupied the next line of defense.
However, it was not necessary to accept the battle in new defensive positions. On July 10, in connection with the capture of Vitebsk by the enemy, the commander of the 20th Army decided to abandon the further development of the counterattack on Lepel and ordered the remaining corps of the 14th and 18th Panzer Divisions to be withdrawn and concentrated in the areas occupied by them before the start of hostilities . Thus, significantly battered, having lost more than 50 percent of tanks and other weapons in the battles near Senno and on the Chernogostitsa River, the 14th and 18th tank divisions of the 7th mechanized corps were returned to the Liozno region.
Military strategists and historians in Lately among the reasons for the failure of the Lepel counterattack are the following: poor preparation of the operation and lack of time to obtain the necessary intelligence information. Communication was very poorly established, as a result of which the participants in the counterattack often had to act blindly. A significant part of the Soviet tankers had to engage in battle literally from the wheels; the supply of fuel and ammunition was extremely unimportant. The lack of combat experience also played its detrimental role: after all, for most soldiers and junior commanders battles in the Senno area became the first baptism of fire. But they had to confront the already fairly "fired" enemy in European battles. Moreover, in many respects Soviet technology inferior to enemy combat vehicles. Our troops also suffered significant losses from the active actions of fascist aviation, and Soviet tanks did not have any air support. And even the weather was against the Soviet tankers: heavy rains made dirt roads difficult to pass, and this greatly hampered the offensive ...
However, despite the fact that the counterattack did not reach its ultimate goal, the Soviet troops managed to temporarily push the enemy back 40 kilometers towards Lepel and defend the occupied lines for several days, pulling over a significant enemy reserve. As a result, the Nazis lost a whole week, and their offensive pace slowed down greatly.
An indirect result of the battles near Senno was the gradual restructuring of the Red Army. In the Directive letter of the Headquarters to the commanders of the fronts of July 15, 1941, the question was already raised of the need to switch to a system of small armies of five, maximum six divisions without corps directorates. This made tank units mobile, capable of solving the combat missions assigned to them more successfully. Which was not slow to affect the subsequent battles of the Great Patriotic War, including such turning points as the Battle of Prokhorov.
How it was?
From the memoirs of Major General of the Tank Troops Vasily Gulyaev about the battle near the Chernogostitsa River:
“Artillery fire increased. Tanks went ahead... Sultans of explosions are bouncing on the western coast of Chernogostitsa. The enemy positions were shrouded in thick dark brown dust and smoke. In the roar of artillery preparation, a roar of unusual strength suddenly thundered. The earth trembled and splashed a giant pillar of fire into the sky. Not otherwise, our gunners covered the ammunition depot.
Roaring engines, clanging caterpillars, a tank armada, numbering up to a hundred vehicles, rushed to the river. But the enemy was silent.
My BT-7 has already gone to the crossing. Through the periscope, I see our two lead vehicles on the opposite bank.
And then there were enemy planes. The bombing started. One of the fragments of an air bomb that exploded nearby broke our right caterpillar. BT-7 spun in place. He had to leave. By the way, the KV (tank "Kliment Voroshilov" - S.G.) of Lieutenant Yakovlev turned out to be nearby.
I clung to the periscope again. It is clearly seen that the two cars that crossed over are firing at the Nazis almost point-blank. Here the caterpillars caught on the shore of the third. But a direct hit either by an enemy shell or a bomb overturned it from a steep bank into a river. This caused some confusion among those who followed behind. And the enemy aircraft went on a rampage.
A disturbing thought flashed: “Everything is lost!”. And at the same moment I saw someone jump out of one of the tanks. A small figure in black darted between the cars. It was the political instructor of the Khristoforov company. He waved his arms and shouted something. It only remained to wonder how, in this hell, fragments do not touch him ...
Khristoforov managed to eliminate the blockage. But at the very last moment, death overtook him. The cars took off again. And they started to topple over again. I aimed the periscope at the left ferry. There is the same picture. Our tank got stuck almost at the very shore. Two other steel giants blocked his way, stuck in a muddy river ... "
Sergei GOLOVKO
In connection with the difficult situation that developed at the beginning of July 1941, the command of the Western Front took measures aimed at creating a stable defense along the banks of the Western Dvina in the area of the Polotsk fortified area and at preventing a breakthrough of enemy troops near Senno, Orsha, in the interfluve of the Berezina and the Dnieper.
Parts of the 39th and 47th enemy motorized corps, which were part of the 3rd and 2nd tank groups, operated at this turn. They did not have a continuous offensive front, which is typical for the initial period of the war.
To rectify the situation, the troops of the 19th Army were transferred to the line, under the command of I.S. Konev. But the railway transport was overloaded, and the concentration of the formations of this army was delayed. It was necessary to prevent the breakthrough of the enemy's motorized corps into the Vitebsk region. In connection with the threat of such a breakthrough, the Military Council of the Western Front, with the consent of the headquarters, decided - the troops of the 20th Army, commanded by Lieutenant General P.A. Kurochkin, launch a counterattack in the direction of Senno - Lepel. The total impact depth was planned to be more than 100 kilometers.
To defeat the Lepel grouping, which was assessed as the main one, the commander of the 21st army was tasked with launching a counterattack in the direction of Senno with the forces of the 5th and 7th mechanized corps, with the further development of the success of the 7th mechanized corps on Kubliki, and the 5th - on Lepel .
On July 6, at 0500 hours, the 17th, 13th Panzer and a detachment of the 109th Motorized Rifle Divisions set out in columns along designated routes.
At first, the Nazis offered no resistance, but the troops advanced too slowly. It was pouring rain, and traffic jams were created on muddy roads. With the approach to the line of Masyuki, Oboltsy, tank divisions met organized resistance from the advanced units of the 47th motorized corps. With a swift attack, our troops shot down enemy detachments and by 2000, having advanced to a depth of 14-16 km, they reached the line: 17th Panzer Division - Serkuti, Budino; 13th - Zamoshye, Oboltsy; detachment of the 109th motorized rifle division - 7 km west of Vyazmichi.
On the morning of July 7, the commanders of tank divisions sent forward one forward detachment, destroying individual pockets of resistance, they advanced to the line of Uzdorniki, Antopol, where they met an organized defense.
On July 8, the corps troops resumed the offensive. The 17th Panzer Division, despite the strong impact of aviation, broke through the enemy defenses and successfully moved forward during the day. By 6 p.m., the 34th Tank Regiment was fighting at the Spekki-Dubnyaki line, covering the open flank of the corps from the north. The 33rd tank and 17th motorized rifle regiments, closely interacting, fought at the turn of Art. Grazino, Topino.
At 4 p.m. on July 8, the German 17th Panzer Division, with aviation support, launched a powerful counterattack from the Senno direction on the right flank of the 17th Panzer Division of our mechanized corps. The main blow fell on the 34th Tank Regiment, the auxiliary - on the right flank of the 33rd Tank Regiment. Within three hours in the area of Dubnyaki, Art. Grazino, Mal. Belitsa was a fierce tank battle. Having suffered losses in tanks, the Nazis were forced to abandon the attack on Mal. Belitsa.
stepping along railway, the Germans by the end of the day in the Budno Ryasno area cut off the rear echelons with fuel and ammunition.
Thus, as a result of the attack undertaken by the enemy, the troops of the corps were endangered by encirclement. During July 9 and 10, they fought defensive battles.
On July 10, the 5th mechanized corps, by order of the headquarters of the 20th army, was withdrawn from the battle and concentrated north of Orsha.
As a result of the fighting on July 8-10 in the Tsotovo area, the 5th mechanized corps had losses: 13th Panzer Division - 82 tanks, 11 vehicles, 3 tractors, 1 armored vehicle; 17th tank division - 44 tanks, 8 tractors, 20 vehicles; hull parts - 111 armored vehicles, of which 20% of vehicles were stuck in swamps.
In total, losses in people and equipment amounted to 60%.
Difficult and difficult battles were fought by units of the 7th mechanized corps.
On July 5, 1941, units of the 7th mechanized corps marched in two echelons in the direction of the river. Chernostinki. The columns were constantly bombed and bombarded by aircraft.
In addition to bombs and machine guns, the Germans from aircraft dropped barrels of phosphorus liquid and fuel onto our equipment. Our aviation was not in the air. Therefore, heavy losses on our part largely explain the actions of enemy aircraft.
During the night from 07/05/41 to 07/06/41, all units took up their starting position for the offensive in the forests and groves east of the river. Chernostinka.
On the morning of 07/06/41, the commander of the 27th TP, Major Romanovsky, with a group of heavy and light tanks, together with infantry and artillery, conducted combat reconnaissance of the enemy located along the western bank of the river. Chernostinka. After an unsuccessful attack, the tanks retreated to their original position, the infantry remained on the eastern bank of the river. In this reconnaissance, the Hero of the Soviet Union Captain Kharaborkin died.
On July 7, 1941, the 14th motorized rifle regiment launched an attack on the front line of the enemy in the morning and captured the opposite bank of the river, slowly moving west. At 0630, the 27th and 28th tank regiments went on the attack from their original positions.
At the same time, at the artillery position, artillery NP, on the deployed reserve of the corps commander, who was on the eastern bank of the river. Chernostinka, and the tanks of the 27th TP that broke into the depths of the defense, dive bombers and enemy fighters attacked the howitzer artillery regiment of the division and units in the Ostrovno area, which successively bombarded tanks and infantry in waves, inflicting significant losses on them. Nevertheless, tanks 27 and 28 TP, which crossed the Chernogostinka River, penetrated 3-5 km deep, but were met by strong anti-tank fire from the groves and were forced to retreat to their original positions.
By 17:00 on 07/07/41, the surviving tanks and subunits concentrated on the eastern bank of the river. Chernostinka. The enemy continuously bombed crossings and KV tanks. A group of tanks of the 27th TP, led by the regiment commander, Major Romanovsky, broke through the enemy's anti-tank defenses and went into the depths of defense. 27 TP brought 51 tanks into battle. And in total, 126 tanks participated in the battle on July 7, 1941: of them KV -1, T-34 - 24. Over 50% of the tanks were lost in the battle and more than 200 people were killed and wounded.
On July 8, the command of the 7th Corps became aware that the enemy, having concentrated large forces north of Senno, went on the offensive. The 17th Panzer Division of the Germans and an airborne assault force (numbering up to an infantry regiment) landed on July 5, armed with Oerlikon heavy machine guns, operated there.
It was necessary to hold back, pin down the tank divisions in the Senno area. The 14th and 18th Panzer Divisions went on the offensive from north to south.
Introducing new mechanized units into battle, the enemy built up forces in the Senno area every hour. The command of the 7th corps made a decision: parts of the corps with fighting retreat to the area of the crossing over the Obolyanka River near the village of Strigi.
The battles near Senno on July 8 took on the character of the so-called "layer cake" - several lines of attack and defense of the enemy unit were formed, which were surrounded, rushed to break through.
Fierce fighting in the Senno area revealed the superiority of forces on the side of the enemy. Our 14th Panzer Division was in danger of being surrounded. On forest roads, units of the 14th Panzer Division made their way to the east through Kordans, Koroli and took up defensive positions in the Liozno area.
As in the counterattack, in defensive battles, units of the 7th and 5th mechanized corps showed high combat skills, stamina, and the indomitable desire of the soldiers to defeat the enemy. General results battles testified that the 5th and 7th mechanized corps basically completed the task assigned to them: for four days, waging offensive and defensive battles, they exhausted the enemy (causing him great damage), significantly reduced the strike force of the 47th and 39th th motorized corps of the enemy, slowed down his advance to the line of defense along the Western Dvina and the Dnieper.
In tank battles, the advantage was on the side of the enemy. This is explained by the fact that its aircraft dominated the air and our units suffered losses in tanks from bombing attacks.
I would also like to note that it was one of the largest tank battles in the history of the Great Patriotic War. On July 6, 1941, 613 tanks (5MK) were put into battle by 13 and 17 tank divisions, and 801 tanks (7 MK) by 14 and 18 tank divisions.
For the battles on the Chernogostinka River on July 7, 1941, they were presented to government awards 25 people, including the battery commander, Senior Lieutenant Dzhugashvili Yakov Iosifovich (Stalin's son).
The main shortcomings in the organization of a counterattack in the Lepel and Senno direction are:
Due to the fact that little time was allotted for the preparation of the battle, the headquarters of the 5th mechanized corps was not able to organize close cooperation with the 7th mechanized corps. In addition, the counterattack of the 5th and 7th mechanized corps was not supported by the active actions of the rifle formations of the armies, as well as aviation;
The logistics of the offensive of the corps were not organized clearly enough, with large interruptions, since the rear units and subunits at that time had not yet arrived at their destination;
The commanders and staffs of divisions and regiments of the 5th and 7th MKs had no practical experience in organizing and conducting combat;
The corps involved in the counterattack did not act outside of tactical communication, independently in different directions;
The fighting testifies to the high activity of our troops in the first month of the war. The combat experience of the initial period of the war in the use of mechanized corps was used by the Soviet command in the further struggle, made it possible to determine their role and place in the defensive and offensive operations fronts and armies.
Twice as many tanks participated in the battle near Senno than near Prokhorovka
About 15 years ago, as a staff correspondent for a republican newspaper, I often had to travel to the capital, sometimes in a company car, which was given to several correspondents at once, who used it in turn. On the way to Minsk, the driver usually turned into a parking lot near memorial complex"Khatyn", and we had a quick snack in a roadside cafe. There was also a large restaurant, which, I think, was called Partizansky Bor, but we did not go there: it was intended for distinguished guests and wealthy tourists, and the menu there was exquisite and expensive. In addition, eating delicacies near the village that was burned with the inhabitants seemed sacrilege to me.
During one of these stops, I quietly wormed my way into a group of tourists to listen to the guide with them. Moreover, this time it turned out to be the director of the museum "Khatyn and the Mound of Glory" Anatoly Bely, whom I knew from Minsk when he worked in the Museum of the Great Patriotic War, where my classmate in philology, later a candidate historical sciences Tatyana Grosheva.
After the tour, A. Bely and I stepped aside and started talking. And I told him that I had recently learned from one of the central Russian newspaper that the village of Khatyn was burned, in fact, not by the Germans, but by policemen, immigrants from Ukraine.
I have known about this for a long time, - the director of the museum agreed, - but I must repeat the official version.
And then, having probably heard what the conversation was about, one of the tourists intervened in the dialogue, a stocky, very thin old man with characteristic traces of skin burns on his face and hands.
“The whole truth about the war will never be told,” he entered into the conversation. - Did you know, learned people where and when was the biggest tank battle?
He puzzled us with this question.
- On the Kursk Bulge, - I answered without hesitation.
- Near Prokhorovka, in the Belgorod direction, - the certified historian Anatoly Bely specified.
- Mob your yat with this Prokhorovka, - the old man was intricately indignant. The scorched skin on his forehead turned white, he reached into his jacket for cigarettes, the medals on his chest clinked, and I mentally noted the ribbons of the “Red Star” and “Red Banner” on his order bars.
This Prokhorovka was given to you,” he continued. - Yes, there were at most eight hundred tanks on both sides, although they lie that more than a thousand. And near Senno, where I was in the forty-first, more than two thousand tanks and self-propelled guns converged. Only we were gouged there and driven east, so they write about the Kursk Bulge and Prokhorovka. And about Senno were silent and will be silent.
I had a pocket recorder with me, I turned it on and recorded the veteran's nervous speech. He claimed that at the beginning of the war, in early July 1941, he was a tank commander and was part of the 5th Corps of the 20th Army of General Kurochkin in a battle with the German tank army, where there were at least 2 thousand combat vehicles on both sides . And it was July 6, 1941, 2 years before the battle of Prokhorovka, which is described in all history textbooks and military memoirs of Soviet commanders. But from what the former tanker said then on my tape recorder, it followed that the tank battle near Senno was really unique in terms of the number of opposing vehicles. And one of the largest in terms of the number of victims from the Soviet troops.
“Our tanks were weaker than the German ones in every respect,” said a participant in the Battle of Senno. - And the engines were inferior to the German ones in terms of power, and the armor was thinner, and the gun was worse. And most importantly, the Germans already had enough experience. They confidently fired at us, hit us with shells on the move, and our tanks burned like candles. My car was hit ten minutes after the start of the battle, the old man said. - The driver died immediately, and I got burned, but managed to get out of the tank. All of ours, who survived then, were surrounded, and after they left it, only six tanks and about twenty people were wounded in our regiment. We retreated somehow, first to Dubrovno, then to Smolensk, and from there we were sent to Moscow, where our corps was reorganized.
Returning to Vitebsk, I transferred the recording from the cassette to paper and the next day, as I promised, I sent the text to Anatoly Bely by mail. Soon I received a reply from him.
“Apparently, the old man spoke the pure truth,” the historian wrote. - I found confirmation of the correctness of his words. In the six-volume "History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945. (Vol. 2, 1961, p. 40) it is reported that on July 6, 1941, the troops of the 20th Army, then commanded by Lieutenant General P.A. Kurochkin, launched a counterattack from the Orsha region against the troops of the 3rd Panzer Group (according to our classification - the army) of the Germans. The 7th and 5th tank corps, which had about 1,000 tanks, took part in the counterattack. The 3rd tank group of the enemy had about the same number of vehicles. So it turns out, - wrote A. Bely, - that about 2 thousand tanks participated in the battle on both sides - twice as many as near Prokhorovka. The same book says that “in fierce battles, our mechanized corps inflicted heavy losses on the enemy and threw him back 30-40 km towards Lepel. But near Senno, the Germans threw the 47th motorized corps into the counteroffensive. It is here, presumably, - wrote Anatoly Bely, - that the battle took place, about which its participant told us about in Khatyn. And, judging by what is reported about her in official history, it was really the largest tank battle of the Great Patriotic War, and consequently, of the Second World War, and of all wars of the twentieth century. Another thing is that its results were unenviable for the Soviet side. As reported in the mentioned publication, "our troops withstood up to 15 attacks a day, and then they had to break out of the encirclement and retreat."
Further in the letter of A. Bely was the following: “Soviet sources did not report our losses in that battle, but if all our tanks really died (and there is no doubt about this), then we can safely talk about at least 5 thousand dead - soldiers and officers. In other major works on the history of the war, - wrote A. Bely, - there is nothing about the tank battle near Senno. True, in the 12-volume "History of the Second World War 1939-1945", published under L. Brezhnev, on page 46 of volume 4 of the battle of Senno is regarded as the usual "counterattack of our troops by the forces of the 5th and 7th mechanized corps of the 20th army of General P.A. Kurochkin in the division of the 3rd tank group of the Germans in the Lepel direction in the Senno area. About the number of tanks and the brutality of the fighting - not a word. Everything is veiled in military terminology and so intricately stated that even a historian finds it difficult to understand.
Then, 15 years ago, the historian Anatoly Bely found it difficult to understand this vague presentation of facts. But from the standpoint of our current experience, everything is very clear. The time was different, the ideological attitudes were different. Every word about the war was censored by Glavpur, the Main Political Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense.
Nothing can be changed in those books sifted by censors. But it is a sin for us, modern Belarusians, to hush up the undoubted fact that the largest and most brutal tank battle of the twentieth century took place not just anywhere, but in the Vitebsk region, near Senno ... And the head of our independent state should not arrange Grand opening museum complex of the fictional “Stalin Line” for no reason, but to please about perpetuating the heroes who fell near Senno in an unequal battle with the Nazi armored hordes. It is right that the President of Belarus lays flowers near Prokhorovka in Russia. But why not lay flowers near Senno, where Soviet tanks burned like candles and where there is still no at least a modest sign in memory of that terrible, great battle motors and people?
It is high time to pay tribute to the feat of the tankers who laid down their lives for their native land, for the freedom of their descendants. Respect for their memory would not be an extra contribution of Belarus to the perpetuation of the tragic and glorious pages common history Europe and the world.
Long before the famous tank battle near Prokhorovka, from July 6 to 9, 1941, near the town of Senno, in the Vitebsk region of the Republic of Belarus, one of the largest tank battles of World War II took place, in which about 1200 tanks and self-propelled guns took part from both sides. This battle went down in history as the "Lepel counterattack", part of the Vitebsk battle.
Circumstances of the operation
High Command german army from the very beginning chose the central site Eastern Front as the main direction of attack on the Soviet Union. Army Group Center was deployed here - in some respects it surpassed the other two Groups South and North combined. The mechanized units of the Germans consisted of the 2nd and 3rd Tank Groups - in total, they had 7 motorized and 9 tank divisions at their disposal.
Such a scale of the offensive made it possible to carry out a deep coverage and encirclement of the Soviet troops. Parts of the Western Front were indeed quickly defeated. By July 3, the Germans had crushed the last pockets of coordinated resistance. Soviet losses were huge - about two-thirds of all formations of the front. In the divisions leaving the "cauldrons" there were 1 - 2 thousand people each. All heavy weapons (aircraft, tanks, artillery) were lost. Equipment was thrown right on the roads. For this failure, the front command was arrested and shot (including General Dmitry Pavlov). In such circumstances, the battle of Senno began.
The battle of Senno was the last attempt by the Red Army to launch a counterattack with tank units. After the battle, the mechanized corps ended, and further efforts to seize the initiative from the enemy in 1941 were reduced to attacks by infantry formations. The second week of the war is over, and the Germans have already traveled 500 kilometers - half the way from the border to Moscow. When the battle of Senno began, the stunning offensive of the Wehrmacht had already shifted the front line to Vitebsk and Orsha.
Counterattack plan
The idea of the Lepel counterattack was to attack the tank units of the Wehrmacht before they were to be joined by infantry formations stretching from Minsk. This plan was consistent with one of the key military principles - to smash the enemy piece by piece. In addition, the experience of the first two weeks of confrontation with the Germans showed that a chain of rifle divisions was fighting tank attacks extremely inefficiently. Therefore, it seemed more logical to take a preemptive strike against the sprawling forces of the Wehrmacht. This is what the battle of Senno should have been from the point of view of strategy.
July 1941 was not the worst time for a counter-offensive in this region. Most of the German forces were moving not to the east, but to the northeast - the leadership of the Wehrmacht sought to force the Western Dvina as quickly as possible. Only two enemy divisions (the 17th and 7th tank divisions) remained in the Soviet strike zone, although they also represented a formidable force.
On the eve of the battle
On the evening of July 4, Semyon Timoshenko (who became commander of the Western Front that day), German Malandin and Lev Mekhlis approved a directive in which the task was to prepare a counterattack in the direction of Ostrovno and Senno. The end point of the offensive was set by Lepel, who gave the name to the entire operation. However, already at the stage of planning a counterattack, the leadership of the Western Front made a serious mistake. The capabilities of the enemy were incorrectly assessed. The command of the Western Front was in a hurry to organize a counterattack also because time worked for the enemy. A week later, the German infantry divisions, having completed the encirclement of the Minsk and Bialystok "boilers", were to approach the front line. In this case, the balance of power changed dramatically. Every day the Red Army found itself in an increasingly difficult position, and delaying even a few hours was extremely costly. Prepared for the counterattack, the 7th mechanized corps under the command of Vinogradov moved west from the Moscow Military District on June 24th. Cars on wheels set off on their own, and tracked vehicles were loaded onto railway platforms. On the way, the mechanized corps received new tasks several times, since the situation in Belarus was changing too quickly.
The beginning of the counterattack
On July 5, 1941, preparations began for the battle of Senno. The 14th Panzer Division and the 7th Mechanized Corps made a 40-kilometer forced march and took up their original positions for the proposed counterattack. It was the region of Ostrovno - Gnezdilovichi - Svetogory, 10 kilometers east of the Chernogostnitsa River. The other 18th Panzer Division was somewhat delayed. By noon the next day, she concentrated on both sides of the Obolyanka River. The 5th mechanized corps took up positions in the Orsha area. On July 6, the battle of Senno entered an active phase. Two detachments were formed in the 14th Panzer Division (each included a tank company and a motorized infantry battalion). These formations tried to force Chernogostnitsa and hold on to the western bank of the river. One detachment did manage to retain a small foothold near Lake Sarro. At this time, the forces of the 18th Panzer Division approached the eastern outskirts of Senno and there entered into a stubborn battle with the Germans. In the evening, the enemy was driven out of the city. On this front Soviet troops went on the defensive. This was their only success during the operation.
Disruption of plans
On July 7, the tank battle near Senno continued. All previous night soviet soldiers prepared crossings on Chernogostnitsa. In the morning, units of the 14th Panzer Division moved along them to the western bank of the key river. Promotion bogged down after 4 kilometers of travel. The tanks collided with the main forces of the 7th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht. Soviet formations suffered heavy losses and rolled back to their original east coast. Then they returned to Ostrovno and began to evacuate their materiel. Meanwhile, the Germans from the north launched an attack on Senno, where the 18th Panzer Division was defending. The Red Army left the city by noon on 8 July. At this time, the 5th mechanized corps was engaged in a fierce battle with enemy tanks 20 kilometers south of Senno. He managed to break the German column, but the ensuing counterattack restored the status quo. On July 9, the 14th and 18th Panzer Divisions retreated to the eastern bank of the Obolyanka. The Germans from the captured Senno began advancing to the highway to Smolensk. On the 10th, the forward detachments entered Oboltsy. By noon, the Germans had covered 40 kilometers and reached the motorway 30 kilometers west of Orsha. The Soviet 5th mechanized corps faced the threat of complete encirclement. His command decided to retreat, the remnants of the tank divisions did the same.
Results and causes of failure
Tank battle near Senno for Soviet army ended up with nothing. The troops did not fulfill any of the tasks assigned to them. It was not possible to go even half the way to Lepel. According to the plan, the main blow was delivered on the flank of the Polotsk group of Germans, but it did not suffer any losses - they simply did not get to it. In less than a week of fighting, about 70% of the equipment was lost. The remnants of the tank divisions lost their combat effectiveness and continued to roll back to the east, until they finally disappeared in the “cauldron” near Smolensk.
The main reason why the battle of Senno was lost was considered the all-destroying and ubiquitous German aviation, which dived and dropped bombs on the Red Army soldiers from morning to night.
However, in reality, everything was much more complicated. The inability of the command to maneuver and establish communication between various formations affected. In addition, the Red Army simply did not have the experience of conducting such large-scale operations, while the Wehrmacht came to the USSR with many victories in Europe behind it. All this made useless the numerical and qualitative superiority of the Soviet troops.
The state of the commanding staff was undermined after the recent repressions. Most of the experienced military, including civil war, was shot or sat in the camps. This could not affect how the battle of Senno ended. The consequences of haste and wrong decisions at the first stage of the war were reflected in many failures on the Western Front. This trend spread not only to the Lepel counterattack, but to the entire 1941 campaign of the year.
Losses
According to the study "Year 1941 - Lessons and Conclusions" (1992), in total, during the Lepel counterattack, Soviet troops lost 832 tanks. The losses of only one 5th mechanized corps amounted to 646 people.
Enemy losses are unknown. One of the sources gives figures of up to 4 infantry regiments, several artillery batteries and up to 300 tanks. However, these data are clearly overestimated, since “4 infantry regiments and 300 tanks” is almost everything that the enemy had in the zone of the Soviet counterattack and with which, after the listed losses, he continued the offensive in the Smolensk direction.
