The victory of the Russian army over the Nazi troops in the Battle of Kursk. Battle of Kursk The course of the battle. the day before

If the Battle of Moscow was an example of heroism and selflessness, when there really was nowhere to retreat, and the Battle of Stalingrad forced Berlin to plunge into mourning tones for the first time, then Battle of Kursk finally announced to the world that now the German soldier will only retreat. Not a single piece of native land will be given to the enemy! It is not for nothing that all historians, both civilian and military, agree in one opinion - the Battle of Kursk finally predetermined the outcome of the Great Patriotic War, and with it, the outcome of the Second World War. There is no doubt that the significance of the Battle of Kursk was correctly understood by the entire world community.

Before approaching this heroic page of our Motherland, we will make a small footnote. Today, and not only today, Western historians attribute the victory in World War II to the Americans, Montgomery, Eisenhower, but not to the heroes of the Soviet army. We must remember and know our history, and we must be proud that we belong to the peoples who saved the world from a terrible disease - fascism!

1943 year. The war is entering a new phase, the strategic initiative is already in the hands of the Soviet army. Everyone understands this, including the German staff officers, who, nevertheless, are developing a new offensive. The last offensive of the German army. In Germany itself, things are no longer as rosy as at the beginning of the war. The allies land in Italy, the Greek and Yugoslav forces are gaining strength, all positions have been lost in North Africa. And the vaunted German army itself has already undergone changes. Now everyone is under arms. The notorious Aryan type German soldier diluted with all nationalities. The Eastern Front is a nightmare for any German. And only the possessed Goebbels continues to broadcast about the invincibility of German weapons. But does anyone believe in this, except for himself, yes, the Fuhrer?

The victory of the Red Army at Stalingrad and its subsequent general offensive in the winter of 1942/43 over the vast expanse from the Baltic to the Black Sea undermined Germany's military power. In order to prevent the decline in the morale of the army and the population and the growth of centrifugal tendencies within the bloc of aggressors, Hitler and his generals decided to prepare and conduct a major offensive operation on the Soviet-German front. With its success, they linked their hopes for the return of the lost strategic initiative and a turn in the course of the war in their favor.

It was assumed that Soviet troops go on the offensive first. However, in mid-April, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command revised the method of the planned actions. The reason for this was the data of Soviet intelligence that the German command was planning to conduct a strategic offensive on the Kursk salient. The headquarters decided to wear down the enemy with a powerful defense, then go on the counteroffensive and defeat his striking forces. There was a rare case in the history of wars when the strongest side, owning the strategic initiative, deliberately chose to start fighting not offensive, but defensive. The development of events showed that this bold plan was absolutely justified.

(...) Soviet military intelligence managed to timely reveal the preparation of the Nazi army for a major offensive in the Kursk salient area using the latest tank technology on a massive scale, and then set the time for the enemy to go on the offensive.

Naturally, under the prevailing conditions, when the expected strike by the enemy with large forces was quite obvious, it was necessary to make the most expedient decision. The Soviet command faced a difficult dilemma: to attack or defend, and if defended, then how? (...)

Analyzing numerous intelligence data on the nature of the upcoming actions of the enemy and on his preparation for the offensive, the fronts, the General Staff and the Headquarters were more and more inclined towards the idea of transition to deliberate defense. On this issue, in particular, there was a repeated exchange of views between me and Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief GK Zhukov in late March - early April. The most concrete conversation about planning military operations for the near future took place over the phone on April 7, when I was in Moscow, at the General Staff, and G.K. Zhukov was on the Kursk ledge, in the troops of the Voronezh Front. And already on April 8, signed by G.K. Zhukov, a report was sent to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief with an assessment of the situation and considerations on the plan of action in the area of the Kursk salient, in which it was noted: it will be if we wear down the enemy on our defenses, knock out his tanks, and then, introducing fresh reserves, by going over to a general offensive, we will finally finish off the main enemy grouping.

I had to be at I.V. Stalin, when he received the report of G.K. Zhukov. I remember well how the Supreme Commander, without expressing his opinion, said: "We must consult with the front commanders." Having given the order to the General Staff to request the opinion of the fronts and obliging him to prepare a special meeting at Headquarters to discuss the plan for the summer campaign, in particular the actions of the fronts on the Kursk Bulge, he himself called N.F. Vatutin and K.K. Rokossovsky and asked him to submit his views by April 12 according to the actions of the fronts (...)

At the meeting held on the evening of April 12 at Headquarters, which was attended by I.V. Stalin, who arrived from the Voronezh Front G.K. Zhukov, head General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky and his deputy A.I. Antonov, a preliminary decision was made on deliberate defense (...)

After a preliminary decision was made on a deliberate defense and on the subsequent transition to a counteroffensive, comprehensive and thorough preparations were launched for the upcoming actions. At the same time, reconnaissance of enemy actions continued. The Soviet command became precisely aware of the dates for the start of the enemy offensive, which were postponed three times by Hitler. At the end of May - beginning of June 1943, when the enemy’s plan to inflict a strong tank attack on the Voronezh and Central Fronts using large groups equipped with new military equipment for this purpose, the final decision was made on a deliberate defense.

Speaking about the plan for the Battle of Kursk, I would like to emphasize two points. Firstly, that this plan is the central part of the strategic plan for the entire summer-autumn campaign of 1943 and, secondly, that the decisive role in the development of this plan was played by the highest bodies of strategic leadership, and not other command instances (...)

By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Central and Voronezh Fronts had 1336 thousand people, more than 19 thousand guns and mortars, 3444 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2172 aircraft. In the rear of the Kursk ledge, the Steppe Military District (from July 9 - the Steppe Front), which was the reserve of the Headquarters, was deployed. He was supposed to prevent a deep breakthrough from both Orel and Belgorod, and when going on the counteroffensive, increase the force of the strike from the depths.

The German side introduced 50 divisions, including 16 tank and motorized divisions, into the two strike groups intended for the offensive on the northern and southern faces of the Kursk ledge, which amounted to about 70% of the Wehrmacht tank divisions on the Soviet-German front. In total - 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, up to 2700 tanks and assault guns, about 2050 aircraft. An important place in the plans of the enemy was given to the massive use of new military equipment: the Tiger and Panther tanks, the Ferdinand assault guns, as well as the new Foke-Wulf-190A and Henschel-129 aircraft.

APPEAL OF THE Führer TO THE GERMAN SOLDIERS ON THE EVE OF OPERATION "CITADEL", no later than July 4, 1943

Today you are launching a great offensive battle that may have a decisive influence on the outcome of the war as a whole.

With your victory, the conviction of the futility of any resistance to the German armed forces will be strengthened stronger than before. In addition, a new cruel defeat of the Russians will further shake the faith in the possibility of the success of Bolshevism, which has already been shaken in many formations of the Soviet Armed Forces. Just like in the last big war, their faith in victory will disappear no matter what.

The Russians achieved this or that success primarily with the help of their tanks.

My soldiers! Now you finally have better tanks than the Russians.

Their seemingly inexhaustible human masses have thinned out so much in a two-year struggle that they are forced to call on the youngest and oldest. Our infantry, as always, is superior to the Russians to the same extent as our artillery, our tank destroyers, our tankers, our sappers and, of course, our aviation.

A mighty blow that will overtake this morning Soviet armies, must shake them to the ground.

And you should know that everything can depend on the outcome of this battle.

As a soldier, I clearly understand what I demand from you. In the end, we will achieve victory, no matter how cruel and difficult this or that individual battle may be.

German homeland - your wives, daughters and sons, selflessly rallying, meet enemy air strikes and at the same time work tirelessly for the sake of victory; they look with fervent hope at you, my soldiers.

ADOLF GITLER

Klink E. Das Gesetz des Handelns: Die Operation "Zitadelle". Stuttgart, 1966.

PROGRESS OF THE BATTLE. THE EVE

From the end of March 1943, the Headquarters of the Soviet Supreme High Command worked on a plan for a strategic offensive, the task of which was to defeat the main forces of the Army Group "South" and "Center" and crush the enemy defenses on the front from Smolensk to the Black Sea. However, in mid-April, on the basis of army intelligence to the leadership of the Red Army, it became clear that the command of the Wehrmacht itself plans to carry out a strike under the bases of the Kursk ledge, in order to surround our troops stationed there.

Intention offensive operation near Kursk arose at Hitler's headquarters immediately after the end of the fighting near Kharkov in 1943. The very configuration of the front in this area pushed the Fuhrer to strike in converging directions. In the circles of the German command there were also opponents of such a decision, in particular Guderian, who, being responsible for the production of new tanks for the German army, was of the opinion that they should not be used as the main striking force in a big battle - this could lead to a waste of forces . The strategy of the Wehrmacht for the summer of 1943, according to such generals as Guderian, Manstein, and a number of others, was to be exclusively defensive, as economical as possible in terms of expenditure of forces and means.

However, the bulk of the German military leaders actively supported the offensive plans. The date of the operation, which received the code name "Citadel", was set for July 5, and the German troops received at their disposal a large number of new tanks (T-VI "Tiger", T-V "Panther"). These armored vehicles were superior in terms of firepower and armor resistance to the main Soviet T-34 tank. By the beginning of Operation Citadel, the German forces of the Army Groups Center and South had at their disposal up to 130 Tigers and more than 200 Panthers. In addition, the Germans significantly improved the fighting qualities of their old T-III and T-IV tanks, equipping them with additional armored screens and putting an 88-mm cannon on many vehicles. In total, in the Wehrmacht strike groupings in the area of the Kursk ledge, by the beginning of the offensive, there were about 900 thousand people, 2.7 thousand tanks and assault guns, up to 10 thousand guns and mortars. On the southern wing of the ledge, the strike forces of Army Group South were concentrated under the command of Manstein, which included the 4th tank army General Goth and the Kempf group. The troops of Army Group Center von Kluge operated on the northern wing; the core of the strike group here was the forces of the 9th Army of General Model. The southern German group was stronger than the northern one. Generals Goth and Kemp had about twice as many tanks as Model.

The headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided not to be the first to go on the offensive, but to take up a tough defense. The idea of the Soviet command was to first bleed the enemy's forces, knock out his new tanks, and only then, having brought fresh reserves into action, go on the counteroffensive. Needless to say, it was a rather risky plan. Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin, his deputy Marshal Zhukov, and other representatives of the Soviet high command remembered well that not once since the beginning of the war had the Red Army been able to organize defense in such a way that a pre-prepared German offensive would fizzle out at the stage of breaking through Soviet positions (at the beginning of the war near Bialystok and Minsk, then in October 1941 near Vyazma, in the summer of 1942 in the Stalingrad direction).

However, Stalin agreed with the opinion of the generals, who advised not to hurry with the start of the offensive. A defense in depth was built near Kursk, which had several lines. It was specially created as anti-tank. In addition, in the rear of the Central and Voronezh fronts, which occupied positions, respectively, on the northern and southern sections of the Kursk salient, another one was created - the Steppe Front, designed to become a reserve formation and join the battle at the moment the Red Army went on the counteroffensive.

The military factories of the country worked uninterruptedly on the production of tanks and self-propelled guns. The troops received both traditional "thirty-fours" and powerful self-propelled guns SU-152. The latter could already with great success fight the "Tigers" and "Panthers".

The organization of the Soviet defense near Kursk was based on the idea of a deep echeloning of combat formations of troops and defensive positions. 5-6 defensive lines were erected on the Central and Voronezh fronts. Along with this, a defensive line was created for the troops of the Steppe Military District, and along the left bank of the river. Don prepared the state line of defense. The total depth of the engineering equipment of the area reached 250-300 km.

In total, by the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, Soviet troops significantly outnumbered the enemy both in people and in equipment. The Central and Voronezh fronts included about 1.3 million people, and the Steppe Front standing behind them had an additional 500 thousand people. All three fronts had up to 5,000 tanks and self-propelled guns, 28,000 guns and mortars at their disposal. The advantage in aviation was also on the Soviet side - 2.6 thousand for us against about 2 thousand for the Germans.

PROGRESS OF THE BATTLE. DEFENSE

The closer the launch date of Operation Citadel drew nearer, the more difficult it was to conceal its preparations. Already a few days before the start of the offensive Soviet command received a signal that it will begin on July 5th. From intelligence reports it became known that the enemy offensive was scheduled for 3 hours. The headquarters of the Central (commander K. Rokossovsky) and Voronezh (commander N. Vatutin) fronts decided to carry out artillery counter-preparation on the night of July 5. It started at 1 o'clock. 10 min. After the roar of the cannonade subsided, the Germans could not recover for a long time. As a result of the artillery counter-preparation carried out in advance in the areas of concentration of enemy strike groups German troops suffered losses and launched an offensive 2.5-3 hours later than planned. Only after some time, the German troops were able to start their own artillery and aviation training. The attack of German tanks and infantry formations began at about half past six in the morning.

The German command pursued the goal of ramming through the defenses of the Soviet troops and reaching Kursk. In the zone of the Central Front, the main blow of the enemy was taken by the troops of the 13th Army. On the very first day, the Germans brought up to 500 tanks into battle here. On the second day, the command of the troops of the Central Front launched a counterattack against the advancing grouping by part of the forces of the 13th and 2nd tank armies and the 19th tank corps. The German offensive here was delayed, and on July 10 it was finally thwarted. In six days of fighting, the enemy penetrated the defenses of the Central Front only 10-12 km.

The first surprise for the German command both on the southern and northern wings of the Kursk ledge was that the Soviet soldiers were not afraid of the appearance on the battlefield of new German tanks "Tiger" and "Panther". Moreover, Soviet anti-tank artillery and guns from tanks buried in the ground opened effective fire on German armored vehicles. And yet, the thick armor of the German tanks allowed them to break through the Soviet defenses in some areas and penetrate into the battle formations of the Red Army units. However, there was no quick breakthrough. Having overcome the first defensive line, the German tank units were forced to turn to sappers for help: the entire space between the positions was heavily mined, and the passages in the minefields were well covered by artillery. While the German tankers were waiting for the sappers, their combat vehicles were subjected to massive fire. Soviet aviation managed to retain air supremacy. Increasingly, Soviet attack aircraft appeared over the battlefield - the famous Il-2.

Only on the first day of fighting, the Model group operating on the northern wing of the Kursk ledge lost up to 2/3 of the 300 tanks that participated in the first strike. Soviet losses were also large: only two companies of the German "Tigers", advancing against the forces of the Central Front, destroyed 111 T-34 tanks during the period of July 5 - 6. By July 7, the Germans, having advanced several kilometers forward, approached the large settlement of Ponyri, where a powerful battle ensued between the strike units of the 20th, 2nd and 9th German tank divisions with formations of the Soviet 2nd tank and 13th armies. The result of this battle was extremely unexpected for the German command. Having lost up to 50 thousand people and about 400 tanks, the northern strike force was forced to stop. Having advanced only 10 - 15 km, Model eventually lost the striking power of his tank units and lost the opportunity to continue the offensive.

Meanwhile, on the southern flank of the Kursk salient, events developed according to a different scenario. By July 8, the strike units of the German motorized formations "Grossdeutschland", "Reich", "Dead Head", the Leibstandarte "Adolf Hitler", several tank divisions of the 4th Panzer Army of Goth and the Kempf group managed to penetrate the Soviet defenses up to 20 and over km. The offensive initially went in the direction of the Oboyan settlement, but then, due to the strong opposition of the Soviet 1st Tank Army, 6th Guards Army and other formations in this sector, the commander of Army Group South von Manstein decided to strike east - in the direction of Prokhorovka . It was at this settlement that the largest tank battle of the Second World War began, in which up to TWO TWO Hundred TANKS and self-propelled guns took part on both sides.

The Battle of Prokhorovka is a largely collective concept. The fate of the opposing sides was not decided in one day and not on the same field. The theater of operations for the Soviet and German tank formations represented an area of more than 100 square meters. km. Nevertheless, it was this battle that largely determined the entire subsequent course not only of the Battle of Kursk, but of the entire summer campaign on the Eastern Front.

On June 9, the Soviet command decided to transfer the 5th Guards Tank Army of General P. Rotmistrov from the Steppe Front to help the troops of the Voronezh Front, who was tasked with launching a counterattack on the enemy’s wedged tank units and forcing them to retreat to their original positions. It was emphasized that the need to try to join with German tanks into close combat to limit their advantages in armor resistance and turret gun firepower.

Having concentrated in the Prokhorovka area, on the morning of July 10, Soviet tanks moved to the attack. In quantitative terms, they outnumbered the enemy in a ratio of approximately 3:2, but the fighting qualities of the German tanks allowed them to destroy many "thirty-four" even on the way to their positions. The fighting continued here from morning until evening. The Soviet tanks that broke through met the German ones almost armor to armor. But this is exactly what the command of the 5th Guards Army wanted. Moreover, soon the battle formations of the opponents were so mixed up that the "tigers" and "panthers" began to expose their side armor, which was not as strong as the frontal, to the fire of Soviet guns. When the battle finally began to subside towards the end of July 13, it was time to count the losses. And they were truly gigantic. The 5th Guards Tank Army has practically lost its combat power. But German losses also did not allow them to further develop the offensive in the Prokhorovka direction: the Germans had only up to 250 serviceable combat vehicles left in service.

The Soviet command hastily transferred new forces to Prokhorovka. The battles that continued in this area on July 13 and 14 did not lead to a decisive victory for one side or the other. However, the enemy began to gradually run out of steam. The Germans had the 24th Panzer Corps in reserve, but sending it into battle meant losing the last reserve. The potential of the Soviet side was immeasurably great. On July 15, the Stavka decided to deploy the forces of the Steppe Front of General I. Konev on the southern wing of the Kursk ledge - the 27th and 53rd armies, with the support of the 4th Guards Tank and 1st Mechanized Corps. Soviet tanks were hastily concentrated northeast of Prokhorovka and received an order on July 17 to go on the offensive. But the Soviet tankers no longer had to participate in a new oncoming battle. The German units began to gradually move away from Prokhorovka to their original positions. What's the matter?

As early as July 13, Hitler invited Field Marshals von Manstein and von Kluge to his headquarters for a meeting. On that day, he ordered the continuation of Operation Citadel and not to reduce the intensity of the fighting. Success near Kursk seemed to be just around the corner. However, just two days later, Hitler suffered a new disappointment. His plans were falling apart. On July 12, the troops of the Bryansk Front went on the offensive, and then, from July 15, the Central and Left Wings of the Western Fronts in the general direction of Orel (Operation Kutuzov). The German defense here could not stand it and cracked at the seams. Moreover, some territorial gains on the southern wing of the Kursk salient were nullified after the battle of Prokhorovka.

At a meeting at the Fuhrer's headquarters on July 13, Manstein tried to convince Hitler not to interrupt Operation Citadel. The Fuhrer did not object to the continuation of the attacks on the southern wing of the Kursk salient (although it was no longer possible to do this on the northern wing of the salient). But the new efforts of the Manstein group did not lead to decisive success. As a result, on July 17, 1943, the command of the German ground forces ordered the withdrawal of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps from the Army Group South. Manstein had no choice but to retreat.

PROGRESS OF THE BATTLE. OFFENSIVE

In mid-July 1943, the second phase of the gigantic battle of Kursk began. On July 12-15, the Bryansk, Central and Western fronts went on the offensive, and on August 3, after the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts pushed the enemy back to their original positions on the southern wing of the Kursk salient, they launched the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation (Operation Rumyantsev "). Fighting in all areas continued to be extremely complex and fierce. The situation was further complicated by the fact that in the offensive zone of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts (in the south), as well as in the zone of the Central Front (in the north), the main blows of our troops were inflicted not on a weak, but on a strong sector of the enemy defense. This decision was made in order to shorten the time for preparing for offensive operations as much as possible, to catch the enemy by surprise, that is, precisely at the moment when he was already exhausted, but had not yet taken up a solid defense. The breakthrough was carried out by powerful strike groups in narrow sections of the front using a large number tanks, artillery and aviation.

The courage of Soviet soldiers, the increased skill of their commanders, the competent use of military equipment in battles could not but lead to positive results. Already on August 5, Soviet troops liberated Orel and Belgorod. On this day, for the first time since the beginning of the war, an artillery salute was fired in Moscow in honor of the valiant formations of the Red Army that won such a brilliant victory. By August 23, units of the Red Army had pushed the enemy back to the west by 140-150 km and liberated Kharkov for the second time.

The Wehrmacht lost 30 selected divisions in the Battle of Kursk, including 7 tank divisions; about 500 thousand soldiers killed, wounded and missing; 1.5 thousand tanks; more than 3 thousand aircraft; 3 thousand guns. Even greater were the losses of the Soviet troops: 860 thousand people; over 6 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns; 5 thousand guns and mortars, 1.5 thousand aircraft. Nevertheless, the balance of forces at the front changed in favor of the Red Army. She had at her disposal an incomparable large quantity fresh reserves than the Wehrmacht.

The offensive of the Red Army, after the introduction of new formations into battle, continued to increase its pace. On the central sector of the front, the troops of the Western and Kalinin fronts began to advance towards Smolensk. This ancient Russian city, considered since the 17th century. gate to Moscow, was released on September 25. On the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, units of the Red Army in October 1943 reached the Dnieper in the Kyiv region. Capturing several bridgeheads on the right bank of the river on the move, Soviet troops carried out an operation to liberate the Soviet capital. On November 6, a red flag was raised over Kiev.

It would be wrong to say that after the victory of the Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk, the further offensive of the Red Army developed unhindered. Everything was much more difficult. So, after the liberation of Kyiv, the enemy managed to launch a powerful counterattack in the area of Fastov and Zhitomir against the forward formations of the 1st Ukrainian front and inflict considerable damage on us by stopping the offensive of the Red Army on the territory of the right-bank Ukraine. The situation in Eastern Belarus was even more tense. After the liberation of the Smolensk and Bryansk regions, by November 1943, Soviet troops reached the areas east of Vitebsk, Orsha and Mogilev. However, the subsequent attacks of the Western and Bryansk fronts against the German Army Group Center, which had taken up a tough defense, did not lead to any significant results. Time was needed to concentrate additional forces in the Minsk direction, to give rest to formations exhausted in previous battles and, most importantly, to develop a detailed plan for a new operation to liberate Belarus. All this happened in the summer of 1944.

And in 1943, the victories near Kursk and then in the battle for the Dnieper completed a radical turning point in the Great Patriotic War. The offensive strategy of the Wehrmacht suffered a final collapse. By the end of 1943, 37 countries were at war with the Axis powers. The collapse of the fascist bloc began. Among the notable acts of that time was the establishment in 1943 of soldiers' and commanders' awards - the Orders of Glory I, II, and III degrees and the Order of Victory, as well as the Order of Bohdan Khmelnitsky 1, 2 and 3 degrees as a sign of the liberation of Ukraine. A long and bloody struggle still lay ahead, but a radical change had already taken place.

treacherous ATTACK OF GERMANY on the USSR

Preparation for war - from the end of the 20s.

BUT by 1941 the USSR was not ready for war.

The Nazis have the military potential of all of Europe;

Repression commanders in USSR.

The element of surprise is also connected with Stalin's gullibility to Hitler's promises after 08/23/1939

Germany occupied: France, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, Greece, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland.

Pro-German regimes: Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania.

Allies of Germany: Italy, Japan. Turkey.

Plan "Barbarossa"

Lightning war and the defeat of the USSR army in the summer campaign of 1941

Directions: "North" - to Leningrad (commanded by General von Leeba), "Center" - to Moscow (von Brauchitsch) and "South" - to Odessa and Kiev, in addition - the Norway Group was supposed to control the situation in the North Sea . The main direction - "Center" - to Moscow

By the summer of 1941, on the border of the USSR from the Barents to the Black Seas -
5.5 million soldiers (Germany + allies + satellites).

USSR: 4 military districts. 2.9 million people

Far East, South - 1.5 million people. (an invasion by Turkey and Japan is expected).

WWII periods

RETREATS OF THE SOVIET TROOPS (June-September 1941)

First days of the war

On the eve of the war, Stalin repeatedly received intelligence about the impending attack, but refused to believe it. Only at midnight on June 21, a number of orders were issued to put the troops on combat readiness - and this is not enough to deploy a multi-layered defense.

June 22, 1941- powerful strikes of the air and mechanized armies of Germany. “June 22, at exactly 4 o’clock, Kyiv was bombed, they announced to us that the war had begun ...” (from a song of those years)

66 airfields were bombed. 1200 aircraft destroyed Þ German air supremacy until the summer of 1943

June 23, 1941- Headquarters of the High Command (Stavka of the Supreme High Command). Head - Stalin.

June 30, 1941- State Defense Committee (GKO). Chairman - Stalin. All the fullness of state, party, military power.

Retreats of the Red Army in the first month of the war

In the first month of the war left: the Baltic States, Belarus, Moldova, most of Ukraine. Losses - 1,000,000 soldiers, 724 thousand prisoners.

3 main failures of the first months of the war:

1) Smolensk defeat

The Nazis: to take possession of the "gates of Moscow" - Smolensk.

Þ Almost all the armies of the Western Front have been defeated.

USSR command: accused a large group of generals of treason, the head - the commander of the Western Front, Colonel General D.G. Pavlov. Judgment, execution.

Plan "Barbarossa" gave a crack: the capital is not captured in mid-July.

2) Southwest Russia and Kyiv

Þ 5 armies surrounded.

500,000 dead, along with the commander of the Southwestern Front, Lieutenant General M.D. Kipronos.

Kyiv is taken Þ strengthening the positions of the Nazis Þ breaking through the defense in the Moscow direction.

August 1941- the beginning of the blockade of Leningrad.

August 16, 1941- Order No. 270. All those who are in captivity are traitors and traitors. The families of captured commanders and political workers are repressed, the families of soldiers are deprived of benefits.

3) in the Moscow direction in October-November 1941, 5 armies were surrounded and thereby opened the way for the Nazis to Moscow

BATTLE FOR MOSCOW

The plan for the capture of Moscow from Hitler - "Typhoon". On September 30, he spoke on the radio (“Not a single Moscow resident, be it a woman, an old man or a child, should leave the city ...”) According to the plan:

Army Group Center sweeps away the Soviet defenses and captures the capital before the onset of winter. In the convoy there is pink granite for the monument to the victorious German soldier on the site of the destroyed Moscow (later it was used on Gorky Street - now Tverskaya - for facing buildings, including the Post Office).

Early October - approach of the Nazis to Moscow. Stalin urgently summoned Zhukov from Leningrad

October 16 - day of general panic in Moscow, they take out valuables, including the State Tretyakov Gallery (paintings)

November 6 - meeting of the Moscow City Council at the Mayakovskaya metro station. Stalin spoke. "Victory will be ours!" It was decided - to parade on November 8 - to be!

November 8 - parade, from Red Square, soldiers and militias (25 divisions) - went straight to the front along the street. Gorky and to Voykovskaya, there is a front line

By the end of November 1941.- Germans at a distance of 25-30 km. from Moscow.

Passage "Dubosekovo" - 28 Panfilov heroes (commanded by Panfilov), political instructor Klochkov: "Velmka is Russia, but there is nowhere to retreat, Moscow is behind!"

3 fronts:

United Western - the direct defense of Moscow (G.M. Zhukov);

Kalininsky (I.S. Konev);

Southwestern (S.K. Timoshenko).

5 armies of the Western and Reserve fronts - in the "boiler".

600.000 people – surrounded (every 2nd).

Moscow, Tula, a significant part of the Kalinin region were liberated.

Losses during the counteroffensive:

USSR - 600.000 people.

Germany: 100.000-150.000 people

Near Moscow - the first major defeat since 1939.

The Blitzkrieg plan failed.

With the victory in the Battle of Moscow - a radical turn (but not yet a turning point!) In the course of the war in favor of the USSR.

The enemy - to the strategy of a protracted war.

By the winter of 1941: losses - 5,000,000 people.

2 million - killed, 3 million - in captivity.

Counteroffensive - until April 1942

Successes are fragile, soon - major losses.

Unsuccessful attempt to break through the blockade of Leningrad (established in August 1941)

The 2nd shock army of the Volkhov Front was defeated, the command and head - A.A. Vlasov - were captured.

Fascists: defeat in the Battle of Moscow Þ it is impossible to launch an offensive along the entire Eastern Front Þ strikes in the south.

Stalin: waiting for a second attack on Moscow, despite intelligence reports. Near Moscow - the main forces.

Decree to inflict a number of distracting blows in the south (Crimea, Kharkov). Against - the head of the General Staff BM Shaposhnikov Þ a complete failure.

Dispersion of forces Þ failure.

May 1942- in the Kharkov direction, the Germans surrounded 3 armies of the Southwestern Front. 240 thousand prisoners.

May 1942- the defeat of the Kerch operation. »150 thousand prisoners in the Crimea. After 250 days of siege, Sevastopol was surrendered.

June 1942 - Nazi advance towards Stalingrad

July 28, 1942 - "Order No. 227" - Stalin - “Not a step back, Under no circumstances should the city be surrendered” - therefore, ours died immeasurably ...

Retreat without an order from the command is a betrayal of the Motherland.

Penal battalions (for commanders and political workers)

Penalties (for sergeants and privates).

Barrage detachments behind the combatants. They have the right to shoot those retreating on the spot.

end of August– occupied Abgonerovo (the last settlement near Stalingrad)

Simultaneously: August 1942- a group of fascists in the Caucasus.

beginning of September- occupied the embankment, the square in front of the department store ... Fighting for every street, for every house

end of September- battles for height 102 ("Mamaev Kurgan" - now there is a monument to the motherland)

Autumn 1942 - 80 million people in the occupied territory.

Þ the country has lost

human resources;

The largest industrial areas;

Giant agricultural territories.

The main burden of the siege was on the 62nd Army under the command of General Chuikov. The capture of Stalngrad = cutting the Volga transport artery, through which bread and oil are delivered.

The Great Patriotic War.
period of radical change.
(November 19, 1942 - late 1943)

Radical change = transition from defense to strategic offensive.

Battle of Stalingrad

Frontier - Battle of Stalingrad.

November 19, 1942- Southwestern Front (N.F. Vatutin), Don Front (K.K. Rokossovsky), Stalingrad Front (A.I. Eremenko).

Surrounded by 22 enemy divisions, 330 thousand people.

December 1942 - an attempt to break through the encirclement from the Middle Don (Italian-German troops). Failure.

The final stage of the counteroffensive:

troops of the Don Front carried out an operation to eliminate the encircled enemy grouping.

The command of the 6th German Army surrendered. F. Paulus (came over to our side and later began to live in the GDR, was Chairman of the German Peace Committee).

During the period Battle of Stalingrad:

The losses of the Nazis - 1.5 million people, ¼ of all forces.

Losses of the Red Army - 2 million people.

The final stage of the Battle of Stalingrad ® general offensive of the Soviet troops.

January 1943- a successful breakthrough of the blockade of Leningrad south of Lake Ladoga. Corridor 8-11 km. "Road of Life" on the ice of Lake Ladoga. Communication with the whole country.

The Battle of Kursk (Orel-Belgorod) is the final stage of the turning point.

Germany: planned to conduct a major offensive operation ("Citadel") in the summer of 1943 in the Kursk region. In our Headquarters, the operation was called “Suvorov \ Kutuzov”, since its goal was the liberation of 2 cities (Orel and Kursk) “The war brought us to Kursk and Orel, to the very enemy gates, such, brother, things ...”

They wanted to destroy the entire southern wing.

50 divisions, 16 armored and motorized. "Tiger", "Panther".

THE USSR: 40% of combined arms formations. Slight superiority in troops.

Central Front (K.K. Rokossovsky);

Voronezh Front (N.F. Vatutin);

Steppe Front (I.S. Konev) and other fronts.

First stage

The Germans are on the offensive. Up to 35 km inland.

The largest oncoming tank battle of the 2nd World War.

1200 tanks on both sides. Russian victory

Second phase

The main groupings of the enemy were broken.

August 5, 1943- Belgorod and Oryol were liberated - the first artillery salute in Moscow.

Liberation of Kharkov = completion of the Battle of Kursk.

Defeated 30 enemy divisions, the loss of 500,000 people.

Þ Hitler was unable to transfer a single division from the Eastern Front to Italy, where a political upheaval took place;

Þ activation of the resistance movement in Europe.

Þ the collapse of the theory of "General Frost" - that is, weather conditions(winter, terrible frosts, which were characteristic for 1941-1942), which allegedly contributed to the hardy Russians. Battle of Kursk - the first summer battle

Counteroffensive near Kursk ® strategic offensive of the spacecraft along the entire front.

Soviet troops - to the West, 300-600 km.

Left-bank Ukraine, Donbass were liberated, bridgeheads in the Crimea were captured.

Forcing the Dnieper.

Þ the end of the battle for the Dnieper.

Nazi Germany to strategic defense.

The Great Patriotic War
The period of liberation of the USSR
and the defeat of Nazi Germany

The successful actions of the Soviet army in 1944 in the "Stalinist" historiography were associated with the "commander's genius" of this "father of nations". Hence the term - "10 Stalinist strikes in 1944." Indeed, the SA offensive in 1944 is characterized by 10 major operations, and the overall strategy is a constant change in the direction of the main attack (which did not allow the Germans to concentrate forces in any one direction)

Leningrad (L.A. Govorov) and Volkhov (K.A. Meretskov) fronts. Liberation of the Leningrad and Novgorod regions.

The 1st Ukrainian (N.F. Vatutin) and 2nd Ukrainian (I.S. Konev) Fronts surrounded the Korsun-Shevchenko group. The central event of this "strike" was the restoration of the Soviet border: March 26, 1944- troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front - on the border with Romania.

3. Early May 1944– liberation of Crimea = completion of the autumn-winter offensive.

4. June-August 1944- liberation of Karelia. Finland withdrew from the war and broke off relations with Germany

5. Operation "Bagration" = liberation of Belarus., general direction - Minsk-Warsaw-Berlin. June 23 - August 17, 1944 Three Ukrainian Fronts (Rokossovsky, G.F. Zakharov, I.D. Chernyakhovsky), 1st Baltic Front (I.Kh. Bagramyan).

6. July-August 1944- liberation of Western Ukraine. Lvov-Sandomierz operation End of August 1944- offensive Stopped in the foothills of the Carpathians by the reinforced and fierce resistance of the Nazis.

7. August 1944- Iasi-Chisinau operation. 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts. Moldova and Romania were liberated, 22 divisions of the Southern Ukraine Army Group were destroyed. Romania, Bulgaria - the overthrow of the pro-fascist governments. These countries declared war on Germany.

8. September 1944- from Moldova and Romania - to help the Yugoslav partisans. Josip Broz Tito

10. October 1944- Northern Fleet + Northern Front: liberation of the Soviet Arctic, expulsion of the enemy from the Murmansk region. The northeastern regions of Norway have been cleared of the enemy.

The battle on the Kursk Bulge lasted 50 days. As a result of this operation, the strategic initiative finally went over to the side of the Red Army and, until the end of the war, was carried out mainly in the form of offensive actions on its part. On the day of the 75th anniversary of the start of the legendary battle, the website of the Zvezda TV channel collected ten little-known facts about the Battle of Kursk. 1. Initially, the battle was not planned as an offensive When planning the spring-summer military campaign of 1943, the Soviet command faced a difficult choice: which method of action to prefer - to attack or defend. In their reports on the situation in the area of the Kursk Bulge, Zhukov and Vasilevsky proposed to bleed the enemy in a defensive battle, and then go on the counteroffensive. A number of military leaders opposed - Vatutin, Malinovsky, Timoshenko, Voroshilov - but Stalin supported the decision to defend, fearing that as a result of our offensive, the Nazis would be able to break through the front line. The final decision was made in late May - early June, when.

“The actual course of events showed that the decision on deliberate defense was the most rational type of strategic action,” emphasizes the military historian, candidate historical sciences Yuri Popov.

2. In terms of the number of troops, the battle exceeded the scale of the Battle of Stalingrad The Battle of Kursk is still considered one of the largest battles of World War II. On both sides, more than four million people were involved in it (for comparison: during the Battle of Stalingrad on different stages fighting involved just over 2.1 million people). According to the General Staff of the Red Army, only during the offensive from July 12 to August 23, 35 German divisions were defeated, including 22 infantry, 11 tank and two motorized. The remaining 42 divisions suffered heavy losses and largely lost their combat capability. In the Battle of Kursk, the German command used 20 tank and motorized divisions out of a total of 26 divisions that were available at that time on the Soviet-German front. After Kursk, 13 of them were completely defeated. 3. Information about the plans of the enemy was promptly received from scouts from abroad Soviet military intelligence was able to timely reveal the preparation of the German army for a major offensive on the Kursk salient. Foreign residencies obtained information in advance about Germany's preparations for the spring-summer campaign of 1943. So, on March 22, the GRU resident in Switzerland, Sandor Rado, reported that for “... an attack on Kursk, the SS tank corps will probably be used (the organization is banned in the Russian Federation - approx. ed.), which is currently receiving replenishment.” And intelligence officers in England (GRU resident, Major General I. A. Sklyarov) obtained an analytical report prepared for Churchill "Assessment of possible German intentions and actions in the Russian campaign of 1943."

"The Germans will concentrate their forces to eliminate the Kursk salient," the document said.

Thus, the information obtained by the scouts in early April revealed in advance the plan of the enemy's summer campaign and made it possible to forestall the enemy's strike. 4. The Kursk Bulge became a large-scale baptism of fire for Smersh The Smersh counterintelligence agencies were formed in April 1943 - three months before the start of the historic battle. "Death to Spies!" - so succinctly and at the same time succinctly defined the main task of this special service, Stalin. But the Smershevites not only reliably protected units and formations of the Red Army from enemy agents and saboteurs, but also, which was used by the Soviet command, conducted radio games with the enemy, carried out combinations to bring German agents to our side. In the book "The Fiery Arc": The Battle of Kursk through the Eyes of the Lubyanka, published based on materials Central Archive The FSB of Russia tells about a whole series of Chekist operations in that period.

So, in order to misinform the German command, the Smersh Directorate of the Central Front and the Smersh Department of the Oryol Military District conducted a successful radio game "Experience". It lasted from May 1943 to August 1944. The work of the radio station was legendary on behalf of the reconnaissance group of Abwehr agents and misled the German command about the plans of the Red Army, including in the Kursk region. In total, 92 radiograms were transmitted to the enemy, 51 were received. Several German agents were called to our side and neutralized, cargo dropped from the aircraft was received (weapons, money, fictitious documents, uniforms). . 5. On the Prokhorovsky field, the number of tanks fought against their quality This settlement began what is believed to be the largest battle of armored vehicles for the entire time of the Second World War. On both sides, up to 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns took part in it. The Wehrmacht had superiority over the Red Army due to the greater efficiency of its equipment. For example, the T-34 had only a 76-mm cannon, and the T-70 had a 45-mm gun. The Churchill III tanks, received by the USSR from England, had a 57 mm gun, but this vehicle was notable for its low speed and poor maneuverability. In turn, the German heavy tank T-VIH "Tiger" had an 88-mm cannon, with a shot from which it pierced the armor of the thirty-four at a distance of up to two kilometers.

Our tank, on the other hand, could penetrate 61 mm thick armor at a distance of a kilometer. By the way, the frontal armor of the same T-IVH reached a thickness of 80 millimeters. It was possible to fight with the hope of success in such conditions only in close combat, which was applied, however, at the cost of heavy losses. Nevertheless, near Prokhorovka, the Wehrmacht lost 75% of its tank resources. For Germany, such losses were catastrophic and proved difficult to replace almost until the very end of the war. 6. Cognac of General Katukov did not reach the Reichstag During the Battle of Kursk, for the first time in the years of the war, the Soviet command used large tank formations in echelon to hold a defensive zone on a broad front. One of the armies was commanded by Lieutenant General Mikhail Katukov, the future twice Hero Soviet Union, marshal of the armored forces. Subsequently, in his book "On the Edge of the Main Strike", in addition to the difficult moments of his front-line epic, he recalled one funny incident related to the events of the Battle of Kursk.

“In June 1941, after leaving the hospital, on the way to the front, I popped into a store and bought a bottle of cognac, deciding that I would drink it with my comrades as soon as I won the first victory over the Nazis,” the front-line soldier wrote. - Since then, this cherished bottle has traveled with me on all fronts. And finally, the long-awaited day has come. We arrived at the CP. The waitress quickly fried the eggs, I took a bottle out of my suitcase. They sat down with their comrades at a simple wooden table. Cognac was poured, which brought back pleasant memories of a peaceful pre-war life. And the main toast - "To victory! To Berlin!"

7. In the sky over Kursk, the enemy was smashed by Kozhedub and Maresyev During the Battle of Kursk, many Soviet soldiers showed heroism.

“Every day of fighting gave many examples of courage, bravery, stamina of our soldiers, sergeants and officers,” notes retired Colonel-General Alexei Kirillovich Mironov, participant in the Great Patriotic War. “They deliberately sacrificed themselves, trying to prevent the enemy from passing through their defense sector.”

Over 100 thousand participants in those battles were awarded orders and medals, 231 became Heroes of the Soviet Union. 132 formations and units received the title of guards, and 26 were awarded the honorary titles of Oryol, Belgorod, Kharkov and Karachev. Future three times Hero of the Soviet Union. Alexei Maresyev also took part in the battles. On July 20, 1943, during an air battle with superior enemy forces, he saved the lives of two Soviet pilots by destroying two enemy FW-190 fighters at once. On August 24, 1943, the deputy squadron commander of the 63rd Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment, Senior Lieutenant A.P. Maresyev, was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. 8. The defeat in the Battle of Kursk was a shock to Hitler After the failure at the Kursk Bulge, the Fuhrer was furious: he lost the best connections, not yet knowing that in the fall he would have to leave the entire Left-Bank Ukraine. Without changing his character, Hitler immediately laid the blame for the Kursk failure on the field marshals and generals who were in direct command of the troops. Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, who developed and conducted Operation Citadel, later wrote:

“This was the last attempt to keep our initiative in the East. With its failure, the initiative finally passed to the Soviet side. Therefore, Operation Citadel is a decisive turning point in the war on the Eastern Front.

The German historian from the military history department of the Bundeswehr Manfred Pay wrote:

“The irony of history is that Soviet generals began to learn and develop the art of operational leadership of troops, which was highly appreciated by the German side, and the Germans themselves, under pressure from Hitler, switched to Soviet positions of tough defense - according to the principle "by all means".

By the way, the fate of the elite SS tank divisions that took part in the battles on the Kursk Bulge - the Leibstandarte, the Totenkopf and the Reich - developed even more sadly in the future. All three formations participated in the battles with the Red Army in Hungary, were defeated, and the remnants made their way into the American zone of occupation. However, the SS tankers were handed over to the Soviet side, and they were punished as war criminals. 9. The victory at the Kursk Bulge brought the opening of the Second Front closer As a result of the defeat of significant Wehrmacht forces on the Soviet-German front, more favorable conditions were created for the deployment of American-British troops in Italy, the beginning of the disintegration of the fascist bloc was laid - the Mussolini regime collapsed, Italy withdrew from the war on the side of Germany. Under the influence of the victories of the Red Army, the scale of the resistance movement in the countries occupied by German troops increased, and the authority of the USSR as the leading force was strengthened. anti-Hitler coalition. In August 1943, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared an analytical document in which they assessed the role of the USSR in the war.

"Russia occupies a dominant position," the report noted, "and is a decisive factor in the forthcoming defeat of the Axis in Europe."

It is no coincidence that President Roosevelt was aware of the danger of further delaying the opening of the Second Front. On the eve of the Tehran Conference, he told his son:

“If things in Russia continue as they are now, then perhaps next spring there will be no need for a Second Front.”

Interestingly, a month after the end of the Battle of Kursk, Roosevelt already had his own plan for the dismemberment of Germany. He presented it just at a conference in Tehran. 10. For the salute in honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod, they used up the entire supply of blank shells in Moscow During the Battle of Kursk, two key cities of the country, Orel and Belgorod, were liberated. Joseph Stalin ordered an artillery salute to be arranged in Moscow on this occasion - the first in the entire war. It was estimated that in order for the salute to be heard throughout the city, about 100 anti-aircraft guns would have to be deployed. There were such weapons, but only 1,200 blank shells were at the disposal of the organizers of the solemn action (during the war, they were not kept in reserve in the Moscow air defense garrison). Therefore, out of 100 guns, only 12 volleys could be fired. True, the Kremlin division of mountain guns (24 guns) was also involved in the salute, blank shells for which were available. However, the effect of the action could not turn out as expected. The solution was to increase the interval between volleys: at midnight on August 5, firing from all 124 guns was carried out every 30 seconds. And in order for the salute to be heard everywhere in Moscow, groups of guns were placed in stadiums and wastelands in different parts of the capital.

After the defeat of the 6th Army of Army Group B near Stalingrad, the German military leadership tried to work out a campaign plan for the summer of 1943, which would again seize the military initiative.
At the same time, there was no consensus among the leadership of the Wehrmacht: some believed that it was in the summer of 1943 that a decisive blow could be delivered, after which it would be possible to make another attempt to attack Moscow, others suggested either launching an offensive not in the summer, but in the spring, or completely abandon offensive.

Meanwhile, even despite certain local successes of its armed forces, the situation for Germany was far from being the best: a crushing defeat near Stalingrad, where Romanian, Croatian and Italian units were defeated, and an unsuccessful small blitzkrieg in the Caucasus, led to that relations among the Axis were no longer the same as at the very beginning of the war.
That is why Germany needed an unconditional victory, which would allow it to restore its reputation.

At the same time, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command expected to strike, after which the military initiative would finally pass to the USSR.

Already in the spring of 1943, both sides knew that the decisive battle would unfold in the very center of the Soviet-German front: even during the winter offensive of the Red Army and the counter-offensive of the Wehrmacht that followed, a ledge stretching for 200 kilometers up to 150 kilometers deep was formed, facing west - the Kursk Bulge.

Both sides were well aware of the operational and strategic significance of the Kursk salient. And each of the parties tried to use the operational lull that had come in the spring of 1943 with the maximum benefit for itself.

Back in March 1943, the Supreme High Command of the German Ground Forces issued Order No. 5, signed by Hitler: "to preempt the Soviet troops after the end of the thaw in the offensive (....) to impose their will on the Red Army."
It was planned that the shock and tank groups created near Kharkov and Orel would be able to destroy the Soviet troops on the Kursk salient with converging strikes, and then continue to advance towards Moscow and Leningrad.

Almost at the same time, he sent his vision of the spring-summer campaign to the Headquarters of the Supreme Command and G.K. Zhukov. In his report, Zhukov spoke about the inexpediency of the Red Army offensive, the purpose of which was to preempt the enemy: "... it would be better if we exhausted the enemy on our defenses (...) and then, introducing fresh reserves (...) we finally finished off the main enemy grouping.

Categorically against Zhukov, and A.M., who supported him. Vasilevsky, N.F. Vatutin, R.Ya. Malinovsky and K.E. Voroshilov: they proposed to launch a preemptive strike in the Donbas region.

Soon, Soviet intelligence will provide irrefutable evidence of the imminent start of Operation Citadel: in order to achieve the success of their offensive, the Wehrmacht leadership planned the massive use of armored vehicles in the first operational echelon, which was supposed to be supported by aviation, including new aircraft, the Focke-Wulf fighters "and Henkel attack aircraft. Therefore, Zhukov's point of view was no longer questioned. As a result, a rather unique decision was made: the Soviet side, which by the summer of 1943 had everything necessary forces for a successful offensive operation, chose defense.

In the summer of 1943, Soviet military leaders recalled the bitter experience of the first two years of the war, when the defense did not always withstand the enemy's blow: in the areas of operation of the Central and Voronezh fronts - namely, they were supposed to carry out a defensive operation - a deep line of defense was urgently created. In the shortest possible time, anti-tank lines were built, tens of thousands of kilometers of trenches were dug, and minefields were equipped. By the beginning of the operation, the defense line of the Soviet troops consisted of eight defensive lines and lines up to 300 kilometers deep.

At the end of June, the Soviet-German front froze in heavy expectation - everyone was well aware that the battle, on the outcome of which the further course of the war depended, would begin in the near future.

On July 5, 1943, the Soviet troops, having received intelligence about the imminent start of the enemy offensive, conducted a powerful artillery counter-training. And after it, the weakened shock groups of the Nazis launched an offensive on the Kursk Bulge.

The advancing 900,000-strong grouping of the Nazis on the Kursk Bulge was opposed by almost 1,400 thousand soldiers and officers of the Red Army. The headquarters of the Supreme Command, aware that the transition to the defense, even if carefully planned, is a certain risk, managed to create a Reserve Front, which was supposed to prevent any sudden threat to the troops of the Central and Southern Fronts.

The offensive of the Wehrmacht began to choke from the first hours. The minefields, which were part of the system of defensive lines, noticeably slowed down the advance of the newest armored vehicles of the Nazis: the Tiger and Panther tanks.

However, by the end of the first day of the battle, German troops were able to break through the first lines of Soviet defense by the end of the day on the northern and southern faces of the Kursk salient.
At the same time, the short duration of the offensive of the 9th Army of the Model on the northern front led to the fact that the exhausted troops were deeply bogged down in the Soviet defense by the end of the second day. At the same time, the situation remained unchanged until July 12 - the Nazis fought endless battles near Olkhovatka and near the Ponyri station. At the same time, the Soviet command was transferring tank reserves to the southern front to defeat the enemy grouping that had broken through to the Prokhorovka area. On July 10, fierce battles began in the Prokhorovka direction.

On July 12, 1943, Soviet troops begin the offensive phase of the Battle of Kursk - Operation Kutuzov. Just a day later, the Red Army breaks through the enemy defenses, and by the end of July 15, it restores all positions lost during the previous days on the northern front. On the southern front, the situation was more complicated: the 2nd SS Panzer Corps and the 3rd Panzer Corps were liquidating a small ledge in the Rzhavets-Gostishchevo area.

Literally a week later, a turning point in the battle occurs: on July 19, the troops of the Central Front go on the offensive in the Kursk-Kromsky direction, and on the southern front, the Wehrmacht units that have exhausted their capabilities go on the defensive. Realizing that there would be no more suitable time for a counteroffensive, the command orders the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts to push the Nazis back to their original lines.

By July 26, the Nazis leave the Oryol bridgehead and hastily transfer the surviving units to the east - to the Hagen defensive line. On the southern front, the Red Army led offensive battles until August 1st.

And then the situation developed much more rapidly. On August 3, the operation "Commander Rumyantsev" begins, two days later, units of the Red Army liberate Orel and Belgorod. On August 11, the Nazis attempted to launch a counterattack in the Bogodukhov area, which ended in failure. On August 13, the troops of the Steppe Front break through the Kharkov defensive bypass and four days later begin battles to liberate Kharkov, which will end on August 23, 1943 ....

On August 23, Soviet troops will liberate not only Kharkov. They will complete the Battle of Kursk - one of the largest battles in the history of mankind.

50 days of the most difficult, exhausting battles led to the fact that the initiative completely passed to the Red Army. Now Soviet troops along the entire front line were moving from defense to offensive - it is generally accepted that the fighting of the Red Army during the winter of 1942 - summer of 1943 marked a radical turning point in the course of the Great Patriotic War.

The main forces of the Panzerwaffe, the armored forces of the Wehrmacht, were put out of action. All the Nazi commanders were unanimous in their opinion: the Battle of Kursk was a complete failure of the Nazi army.

It was no longer a question of whether the German troops would be able to reach Moscow.

The question was already different: how long would the German troops be able to hold off the growing offensive of the Red Army ...

BATTLE OF KURSK 1943, defensive (July 5 - 23) and offensive (July 12 - August 23) operations carried out by the Red Army in the area of the Kursk ledge to disrupt the offensive and defeat the strategic grouping of German troops.

It was assumed that the Soviet troops would be the first to go on the offensive. However, in mid-April, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command revised the method of the planned actions. The reason for this was the data of Soviet intelligence that the German command was planning to conduct a strategic offensive on the Kursk salient. The headquarters decided to wear down the enemy with a powerful defense, then go on the counteroffensive and defeat his striking forces. The rarest case in the history of warfare occurred when the strongest side, having the strategic initiative, deliberately chose to start hostilities not on the offensive, but on the defensive. The development of events showed that this bold plan was absolutely justified.

FROM THE MEMORIES OF A. VASILEVSKY ON STRATEGIC PLANNING BY THE SOVIET COMMAND OF THE BATTLE OF KURSK, April-June 1943

I had to be at when he received G.K. Zhukov's report. I remember well how the Supreme Commander, without expressing his opinion, said: "We must consult with the front commanders." Having given the order to the General Staff to request the opinion of the fronts and obliging him to prepare a special meeting at Headquarters to discuss the plan for the summer campaign, in particular the actions of the fronts on the Kursk Bulge, he himself called N.F. Vatutin and K.K. Rokossovsky and asked him to submit his views by April 12 according to the actions of the fronts (...)

At the meeting held in the evening of April 12 at Headquarters, which was attended by I.V. Stalin, G.K. Zhukov, who arrived from the Voronezh Front, Chief of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky and his deputy A.I. Antonov, a preliminary decision was made on deliberate defense (...)

Vasilevsky A.M. Strategic planning of the Battle of Kursk. Battle of Kursk M.: Nauka, 1970. S.66-83.

APPEAL OF THE Führer TO THE GERMAN SOLDIERS ON THE EVE OF OPERATION "CITADEL", no later than July 4, 1943

Today you are launching a great offensive battle that may have a decisive influence on the outcome of the war as a whole.

The Russians achieved this or that success primarily with the help of their tanks.

My soldiers! Now you finally have better tanks than the Russians.

The mighty blow that will overtake the Soviet armies this morning must shake them to their foundations.

And you should know that everything can depend on the outcome of this battle.

As a soldier, I clearly understand what I demand from you. In the end, we will achieve victory, no matter how cruel and difficult this or that individual battle may be.

ADOLF GITLER

This order is to be destroyed at divisional headquarters.

Klink E. Das Gesetz des Handelns: Die Operation "Zitadelle". Stuttgart, 1966.

PROGRESS OF THE BATTLE. THE EVE

From the end of March 1943, the Headquarters of the Soviet Supreme High Command worked on a plan for a strategic offensive, the task of which was to defeat the main forces of Army Group South and Center and crush the enemy defenses on the front from Smolensk to the Black Sea. However, in mid-April, on the basis of army intelligence to the leadership of the Red Army, it became clear that the command of the Wehrmacht itself plans to carry out a strike under the bases of the Kursk ledge, in order to surround our troops stationed there.

The idea of an offensive operation near Kursk arose at Hitler's headquarters immediately after the end of the fighting near Kharkov in 1943. The very configuration of the front in this area pushed the Fuhrer to strike in converging directions. In the circles of the German command there were also opponents of such a decision, in particular Guderian, who, being responsible for the production of new tanks for the German army, was of the opinion that they should not be used as the main striking force in a big battle - this could lead to a waste of forces . The strategy of the Wehrmacht for the summer of 1943, according to such generals as Guderian, Manstein, and a number of others, was to be exclusively defensive, as economical as possible in terms of expenditure of forces and means.

However, the bulk of the German military leaders actively supported the offensive plans. The date of the operation, which received the code name "Citadel", was set for July 5, and the German troops received at their disposal a large number of new tanks (T-VI "Tiger", T-V "Panther"). These armored vehicles were superior in terms of firepower and armor resistance to the main Soviet T-34 tank. By the beginning of Operation Citadel, the German forces of the Army Groups Center and South had at their disposal up to 130 Tigers and more than 200 Panthers. In addition, the Germans significantly improved the fighting qualities of their old T-III and T-IV tanks, equipping them with additional armored screens and putting an 88-mm cannon on many vehicles. In total, in the Wehrmacht strike groupings in the area of the Kursk ledge, by the beginning of the offensive, there were about 900 thousand people, 2.7 thousand tanks and assault guns, up to 10 thousand guns and mortars. On the southern wing of the ledge, the strike forces of Army Group South under the command of Manstein were concentrated, which included the 4th Panzer Army of General Hoth and the Kempf group. The troops of Army Group Center von Kluge operated on the northern wing; the core of the strike group here was the forces of the 9th Army of General Model. The southern German group was stronger than the northern one. Generals Goth and Kemp had about twice as many tanks as Model.

PROGRESS OF THE BATTLE. DEFENSE

The closer the launch date of Operation Citadel drew nearer, the more difficult it was to conceal its preparations. Already a few days before the start of the offensive, the Soviet command received a signal that it would begin on July 5th. From intelligence reports it became known that the enemy offensive was scheduled for 3 hours. The headquarters of the Central (commander K. Rokossovsky) and Voronezh (commander N. Vatutin) fronts decided to carry out artillery counter-preparation on the night of July 5. It started at 1 o'clock. 10 min. After the roar of the cannonade subsided, the Germans could not recover for a long time. As a result of artillery counter-preparation carried out in advance in the areas of concentration of enemy strike groups, German troops suffered losses and launched an offensive 2.5-3 hours later than planned. Only after some time, the German troops were able to start their own artillery and aviation training. The attack of German tanks and infantry formations began at about half past six in the morning.

Only on the first day of fighting, the Model group operating on the northern wing of the Kursk ledge lost up to 2/3 of the 300 tanks that participated in the first strike. Soviet losses were also high: only two companies of the German "Tigers", advancing against the forces of the Central Front, destroyed 111 T-34 tanks during the period of July 5 - 6. By July 7, the Germans, having advanced several kilometers forward, approached the large settlement of Ponyri, where a powerful battle ensued between the strike units of the 20th, 2nd and 9th German tank divisions with formations of the Soviet 2nd tank and 13th armies. The result of this battle was extremely unexpected for the German command. Having lost up to 50 thousand people and about 400 tanks, the northern strike force was forced to stop. Having advanced only 10 - 15 km, Model eventually lost the striking power of his tank units and lost the opportunity to continue the offensive.

On June 9, the Soviet command decided to transfer the 5th Guards Tank Army of General P. Rotmistrov from the Steppe Front to help the troops of the Voronezh Front, who was tasked with launching a counterattack on the enemy’s wedged tank units and forcing them to retreat to their original positions. It was emphasized that it was necessary to try to engage German tanks in close combat in order to limit their advantages in armor resistance and firepower of turret guns.

As early as July 13, Hitler invited Field Marshals von Manstein and von Kluge to his headquarters for a meeting. On that day, he ordered the continuation of Operation Citadel and not to reduce the intensity of the fighting. Success near Kursk seemed to be just around the corner. However, just two days later, Hitler suffered a new disappointment. His plans were falling apart. On July 12, the troops of the Bryansk Front went on the offensive, and then, from July 15, the Central and Left Wings of the Western Fronts in the general direction of Orel (Operation ""). The German defense here could not stand it and cracked at the seams. Moreover, some territorial gains on the southern wing of the Kursk salient were nullified after the battle of Prokhorovka.

PROGRESS OF THE BATTLE. OFFENSIVE

The Wehrmacht lost 30 selected divisions in the Battle of Kursk, including 7 tank divisions; about 500 thousand soldiers killed, wounded and missing; 1.5 thousand tanks; more than 3 thousand aircraft; 3 thousand guns. Even greater were the losses of the Soviet troops: 860 thousand people; over 6 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns; 5 thousand guns and mortars, 1.5 thousand aircraft. Nevertheless, the balance of forces at the front changed in favor of the Red Army. It had at its disposal an incomparably greater number of fresh reserves than the Wehrmacht.

The offensive of the Red Army, after the introduction of new formations into battle, continued to increase its pace. On the central sector of the front, the troops of the Western and Kalinin fronts began to advance towards Smolensk. This ancient Russian city, considered since the 17th century. gate to Moscow, was released on September 25. On the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, units of the Red Army in October 1943 reached the Dnieper in the Kyiv region. Capturing several bridgeheads on the right bank of the river on the move, Soviet troops carried out an operation to liberate the capital of Soviet Ukraine. On November 6, a red flag was raised over Kiev.

It would be wrong to say that after the victory of the Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk, the further offensive of the Red Army developed unhindered. Everything was much more difficult. So, after the liberation of Kyiv, the enemy managed to launch a powerful counterattack in the region of Fastov and Zhytomyr against the forward formations of the 1st Ukrainian Front and inflict considerable damage on us, stopping the offensive of the Red Army on the territory of the right-bank Ukraine. The situation in Eastern Belarus was even more tense. After the liberation of the Smolensk and Bryansk regions, by November 1943, Soviet troops reached the areas east of Vitebsk, Orsha and Mogilev. However, the subsequent attacks of the Western and Bryansk fronts against the German Army Group Center, which had taken up a tough defense, did not lead to any significant results. Time was needed to concentrate additional forces in the Minsk direction, to give rest to formations exhausted in previous battles and, most importantly, to develop a detailed plan for a new operation to liberate Belarus. All this happened in the summer of 1944.