First Berlin Crisis. Political Science: The Berlin Crisis, Coursework Causes of the Berlin Crisis 1948 in Brief

• Introduction 2
• 6
• 11
• 27
• Conclusion 31
• 34

Introduction

On May 9, 1945, the war ended, but the tragedy of the German people continued. With each passing day, the terrible cost of the inability of the German people to prevent the fascists from coming to power in due time became clearer: more than 13 million dead, captured and maimed, a destroyed economy, the threat of starvation. Every day of the work of the International Tribunal for Nazi Criminals, which opened in Nuremberg in September 1945, brought more and more new facts of the monstrous crimes of the Nazis against the peoples of other countries. The majority of the population in Germany felt depressed, many were waiting for revenge from the victors. In such an environment, it was necessary to begin post-war life - to restore the economy, to create a new one instead of a fascist state, to build relations with neighboring peoples.

At the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, the victorious powers assumed responsibility for the fate of post-war Germany. Each of them had to ensure the implementation of denazification, democratization and demilitarization in their zone of occupation. However, it soon became clear that each of the powers understood these tasks in its own way. The Soviet government was convinced that these tasks could be solved by relying on the left forces of Germany, capable of carrying out anti-capitalist reforms. To this end, it provided every possible assistance in the restoration of the KKE. Back in the spring, initiative groups of the Central Committee of the KKE arrived from Moscow, which in different regions of the Soviet zone of occupation began work to restore the party. In April 1946, the restored Communist Party of the Soviet zone merged with the Social Democratic organization of that part of Germany to form the Socialist Unity Party of Germany. The platform for unification was the struggle to build socialism. The KPD, and then the SED, tried to extend their activities to the western zones of occupation. The activity of the communists alarmed the governments of Western countries. They saw the Communist Party as a conductor of Soviet policy and did not want to allow its influence to spread throughout Germany. The deepening distrust and rivalry between the four powers in the course of implementing their policy in Germany led to a split in the country.

Throughout 1946, local self-government bodies were formed in all zones of occupation. In all the vital issues that confronted them, they were dependent on the occupation administration. Therefore, it is not surprising that parties oriented towards the states that held power prevailed here. In East Germany, the SED received between 47.5% and 58.5% of the vote. In the British and American zones, the influence of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) increased, and in Bavaria, the influence of the Christian Social Union (CSU). These were new parties. Their education reflected the natural increase in the interest of the broad masses of the population in religion in the conditions of the deep catastrophe that befell the German people. In addition, the founders of these parties (K. Adenauer and others) hoped that the revival of Christian principles in the political life of Germany would help her reconcile with the West. In the ranks of these parties there were many workers, peasants, intellectuals, representatives of various sections of the bourgeoisie. Both parties put forward the ideas of Christian socialism, the moral self-improvement of people. At first, they advocated the socialization of the mining and metallurgical industries, the establishment of state control over large-scale production, and the participation of workers in the management of enterprises.

The issues of economic recovery, supplying the population with the most necessary things were vital in the first post-war years. But it was difficult to solve them in the conditions of the division of the country into four zones. Referring to the need to restore a single economic organism, the British and American authorities in December 1946 united their zones. "Bizonia" arose, and in 1948, after the French zone was annexed to it, "Trizonia". In the first half of 1948, the Marshall Plan was extended to her. In the summer of the same year, a monetary reform was carried out in the western zones, aimed at replacing depreciated marks with new ones. At the same time, price controls were abolished. These measures signified a resolute course by the administration of the western zones and local German bodies towards the development of a market economy in Germany. The Soviet administration in its zone could not allow this. The import of banknotes, both old and new, into the Soviet zone was prohibited, and the import of any other goods was difficult. For Berlin, these measures meant its economic blockade. To save the population from starvation, the administration of the western zones established the supply of the western sectors of Berlin via an air bridge.

These events led to a sharp aggravation of relations between the USSR and the Western powers. After them, the actual split of Germany had only to be legally formalized. This happened in 1949: in May, a constitution was adopted that created the Federal Republic of Germany on the territory of the three western zones. In the same month, in contrast to it, a draft constitution for a unified German Democratic Republic was adopted in East Berlin. But since there was no chance of extending this constitution to the whole country, in October the GDR was proclaimed only on the territory of the Soviet zone of occupation.

The constitution of 1949 proclaimed the Federal Republic of Germany a federation of separate states with their own governments. The bicameral parliament, the president and the government headed by the chancellor became national (federal) authorities. One of the chambers of parliament - the Bundestag - is elected, the second - the Bundesrat - is appointed by the governments of the lands. The President is elected by the Federal Assembly, which consists of members of the Bundestag and the state parliaments. The chancellor is elected by the Bundestag and has great powers under the constitution. They, as a rule, become the leader of the leading party of the Bundestag. Like any democratic constitution, the German Constitution proclaimed the personal and political rights of citizens. Article 23 of the constitution provided for the possibility of its extension to other German lands that were not part of the FRG. In the same 1949 elections to the Bundestag were held. The formed government settled in Bonn.

1. The post-war structure of the world

The Berlin crisis cannot be viewed in isolation from the events that preceded it, only as the blockade of Berlin in 1948. It was the result of a whole chain of events that led to this deployment of actions by the Soviet side. The beginning of the confrontation between the West and the USSR was laid by the Paris Peace Conference, which continued in the Marshall Plan.

In 1946, a peace conference was held in Paris, as after the First World War. It was held without the participation of heads of state and government and was less representative than in 1919. It developed peace treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy, Romania and Finland. Bulgaria and Hungary remained within the borders approved in 1919. Romania transferred Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the USSR. Italy was losing all her colonies. She gave Greece the Dodecanese Islands, and Yugoslavia - the Istrian peninsula. The transfer of the region of Pechenga (Petsamo) by Finland to the USSR was confirmed. All former members of the Tripartite Pact had to pay reparations.

If after the First World War the great powers showed unfortunate disregard for the economic problems of the post-war order of the world, then after the Second World War considerable attention was paid to these problems. Taking into account the existing experience of collecting reparations from Germany, their less painful form was chosen. To achieve financial stability in the post-war world and prevent currency wars, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) were created under the auspices of the UN.

The idea of ​​collective security developed. Thus, an impressive foundation was created for the successful continuation of cooperation between the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition after the war. The new world order was based on the old idea of ​​collective security. The United Nations became its personification, and the implementation was carried out through the empowerment of the five leading powers, acting as "world policemen". The functioning of such a system could only be ensured on the basis of the sincere desire of all the great powers to make decisions on the basis of unanimity.

However, further developments showed that the Soviet leadership, after the unsuccessful experience of the 1930s, did not believe in the possibility of collective security. From 1939, Stalin firmly embarked on the traditional path of security - the path of power politics, territorial expansion and the creation of spheres of influence - and steadily followed this path.

The USSR achieved a significant increase in its territory under an agreement with Germany in 1939, then the recognition of these increments by the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition. After the war, he carried out additional territorial increments. The USSR included South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. The USSR, in addition, received possessions on the territory of China, turning Northeast China into its sphere of influence. The USSR included the Pechenga (Petsamo) region, which belonged to Finland, Transcarpathian Ukraine, which until 1938 was part of Czechoslovakia, and part East Prussia, which became the Kaliningrad region of the RSFSR, the Soviet leadership did everything possible to ensure that pro-Soviet forces, primarily communist parties, came to power in the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe. Already after these increments of its territory, in 1945 - 1946, the USSR presented territorial claims to Turkey and demanded a change in the status of the Black Sea straits, including the USSR's right to create a naval base in the Dardanelles. In early 1946, the United States and Great Britain were forced to put pressure on the USSR with a demand to withdraw troops from Northern Iran.

In 1941, the USSR and Great Britain jointly occupied Iran in order to ensure reliable transit of goods from the Persian Gulf to the USSR under Lend-Lease. The troops were to be withdrawn 6 months after the end of the war. Great Britain did it, but the USSR was in no hurry, an autonomous government was created in Northern Iran. At the same time, the partisan movement in Greece was activated, led by the communists and fueled by supplies from the border Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, where the communists were already in power. At the London meeting of Foreign Ministers of the permanent members of the Security Council, the USSR demanded that it be granted the right to protectorate over Tripolitania (Libya) in order to ensure a presence in the Mediterranean.

All this could not go unnoticed, the USSR clearly sought to use the collective security system only to expand its power. And being noticed, this could not but cause alarm, given the situation in Europe. In France and Italy, the Communist parties became the largest political parties in their respective countries. Here and in several other countries of Western Europe, the Communists were part of the governments. In addition, after the withdrawal of the bulk of American troops from Europe, the USSR became the dominant military force in continental Europe. Everything favored the plans of the Soviet leadership.

The reaction in Western countries to the actions of the USSR was twofold. Some politicians began to advocate the appeasement of the USSR. US Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace expressed this position most clearly. He considered the claims of the USSR justified and proposed to go to a kind of division of the world, recognizing the USSR's right to dominate in a number of regions of Europe and Asia,

Churchill adhered to another "point of view. Speaking on March 5, 1946 in the home state of President Truman Missouri, in the city of Fulton, he, in the presence of the president, described the emerging situation in Europe as dangerous for the fate of Western democracies. Paying tribute to the courage of the Soviet people and recognizing USSR the right to secure borders after such terrible war he nonetheless uneasily singled out all the symptoms of growing Soviet expansionism. In order to protect the Western democracies, in his opinion, it was necessary to rebuff the USSR, acting "with all the might of the Anglo-Saxon world", i.e. by joining the efforts of the US and the UK.

The US State Department was also looking for ways to respond to the Soviet challenge. An important role in this was played by the American diplomat, expert on Russia, George Kennan. In February 1946, while working at the US embassy in Moscow, he set out in a telegram to Washington the basic principles of the "containment" policy. In his opinion, the US government should have responded harshly and consistently to every attempt by the USSR to expand its sphere of influence. Further, in order to successfully resist the penetration of communism, the countries of the West should strive to create a healthy, prosperous, self-confident society. The policy of "containment" was seen by him as a way to prevent war and was not aimed at inflicting a military defeat on the USSR.

Truman Doctrine. Truman, Churchill and Kennan agreed that it was the United States that should assume the main role in containing the USSR. This put President Truman in a difficult position. The attitude towards the USSR that changed during the war years, together with the natural weariness from the hardships of the war, created in the USA a mass base for politicians like Wallace, who considered it possible, in spite of everything, to continue cooperation with the USSR. Supporters of this course referred to the experience of the war, when Roosevelt managed to find compromises with Stalin, and Roosevelt's authority was too high to be neglected. In addition, it was obvious that the transition to a policy of "containment" would fundamentally change US policy; now America would have to have a permanent presence in Europe. It seemed to Truman that he did not have sufficient influence and authority to carry out such a turn in politics, because in 1944 the Americans voted for President Roosevelt. The results of the 1946 midterm elections did not inspire optimism about Truman's chances in 1948: the Republicans took control of Congress for the first time since 1930. The situation was the same as during the Paris Conference of 1919: the president is a democrat, and the congress is a republican, capable of blocking any foreign policy steps of the head of state. One can understand Truman's hesitation: to continue the old policy or to switch to a new one. But events did not give Truman much time to think.

In February 1947, the British informed the US government that they were no longer able to provide military and economic assistance to Turkey and Greece. The termination of this assistance and the withdrawal of British troops from Greece made the establishment of Soviet control over these countries a matter of time, which radically changed the strategic situation in the Mediterranean. Conditions were created for the communists to come to power in Italy and there was a threat of establishing control over the Suez Canal. This forced Truman to make the final choice. On March 12, he announced his intention to provide Greece and Turkey with military and economic assistance in the amount of $400 million. At the same time, he framed a broader US policy as one aimed at helping "free peoples resisting attempts at enslavement by an armed minority and outside pressure." Truman in this statement, in addition, defined the content of the beginning rivalry between the US and the USSR as a conflict between democracy and totalitarianism. Thus was born the Truman Doctrine, which began the transition from post-war cooperation to rivalry. Further events developed with extraordinary rapidity.

2. The Marshall Plan and the Berlin Crisis

By the spring of 1947, the situation in Europe was unstable and unsettling. IN Eastern Europe a system of people's democracies was taking shape, and the Soviet Union was establishing ever tighter control over this part of the continent. In Western Europe, there were signs of a possible economic crisis, and social tensions were growing. Millions of people were out of work, starving and freezing in the harsh winter of 1946/47. The deteriorating economic situation gave rise to a sense of hopelessness and despair.

In the spring of 1947, US government departments began to explore the possibilities of American assistance to Europe. In May, Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson publicly called for urgent American assistance to the unification of European states, which, he said, would take all steps to restore themselves. “This is essential if we are to preserve our own freedoms and our own democratic institutions. Our national security requires it,” Acheson said.

On June 5, 1947, US Secretary of State George Marshall delivered a keynote speech at Harvard University, which became the starting point for the implementation of a set of economic and political measures known as the Marshall Plan.

The main goals of the Marshall Plan included the stabilization of the socio-political situation in Western Europe, the inclusion of Western Germany in the Western bloc and the reduction of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe. At a meeting with the US Secretary of State on May 28, it was decided that the countries of Eastern Europe would be able to participate in the European Reconstruction Program only if they abandoned their near-exclusive orientation of their economies towards the Soviet Union in favor of broader European integration. At the same time, it was supposed to use the raw materials of Eastern Europe to restore the western part of the continent. In fact, the plan was prepared in such a way that the participation of the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe in it looked very problematic.

On June 5, 1947, US Secretary of State George Marshall declared that European democracies needed urgent help to strengthen them. The USSR regarded this plan as aimed at the economic enslavement of Europe by America and put pressure on the Eastern European countries so that they refused to participate in the implementation of the Marshall Plan. At the same time, the process of the transfer of power into the hands of the communists in these countries was accelerated; by 1948, it was basically completed. In April 1948, 16 Western countries signed the Marshall Plan, according to which they were to receive $ 17 billion in assistance from the United States over 4 years. At the same time, the Americans, as a precondition for the provision of assistance, demanded the removal of the Communists from the government. By 1948, there were no communists in any government in Western Europe. The split of Europe has become a fact.

The main role in the discussion of Marshall's proposal with the Soviet Union was played by the British Foreign Ministers E. Bevin and France J. Bidault. They suggested that on June 27, 1947, a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, France and the USSR be convened in Paris for consultations on Marshall's proposal. Now there is reason to believe that Bevin and Bidault were playing a double game: in public statements they expressed interest in involving the USSR in the implementation of the Marshall Plan, and at the same time, each of them assured the American ambassador in Paris, J. Caffery, that he hoped for "the Soviets' refusal to cooperate » .

Moscow initially received Marshall's proposal with interest. They saw in it the possibility of obtaining American loans for the post-war reconstruction of Europe, Minister of Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov instructed to seriously prepare for the discussion of the Marshall Plan, on June 21, 1947, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks approved the positive response of the Soviet government to the notes of the British and French governments about the meeting of the foreign ministers of the three powers in Paris.

The seriousness of Soviet intentions is confirmed by the telegram transmitted on June 22, 1947 to the Soviet ambassadors in Warsaw, Prague and Belgrade. The ambassadors were to convey the following to the leadership of these countries: “We consider it desirable that the friendly allied countries, for their part, show an appropriate initiative to ensure their participation in the development of these economic measures and state their claims, bearing in mind that some European countries (Holland , Belgium) have already made such wishes.

At the same time, voices of distrust and warnings were invariably heard in Soviet official circles. So, Academician E.S. Varga, in a memorandum to Molotov dated June 24, stated: “The economic situation in the United States was of decisive importance in the promotion of the Marshall Plan. The Marshall Plan was, first of all, to be a weapon to mitigate the next economic crisis, the approach of which no one in the United States would deny ... Thus, the United States, in its own interests, must give much more loans than they have given so far in order to get rid of excess goods inside the country, even if it is known in advance that some of these loans will never be paid ... The meaning of the Marshall plan against this background is as follows. If it is in the interests of the United States itself to send many billions of dollars worth of American goods abroad on credit to unreliable debtors, then we must try to extract the maximum political benefits from this.

The Marshall Plan was also sharply negatively assessed by the Soviet Ambassador to the United States, N. Novikov, who emphasized the political aspect of the American initiative. In a telegram to Molotov dated June 24, Novikov stated: “At the same time, the main goals of US foreign policy, which are the essence of the “Truman Doctrine”, - the suspension of the democratization of European countries, the stimulation of forces opposing the Soviet Union and the creation of conditions for consolidating the positions of American capital in Europe and Asia - remain without significant changes. A careful analysis of the "Marshall plan" shows that in the end it comes down to the creation of a Western European bloc as an instrument of American policy ... Thus, the "Marshall plan" instead of the previous disparate actions aimed at the economic and political subordination of European countries to American capital and the creation of anti-Soviet groups provides for a wider action, meaning to solve the problem in a more effective way.

In this situation, the Soviet leadership sought to prevent the United States from receiving any economic and political advantages in the process of implementing the Marshall Plan. The Soviet Union resolutely rejected any form of US control over the economy of the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe. At the same time, the Soviet Union was interested in American loans for post-war reconstruction. Former member of the Molotov secretariat, Ambassador V.I. Erofeev defined the position of the Soviet leadership as follows: “We had to agree to this proposal and try, if not completely eliminate, then minimize all negative features, to ensure that they did not impose any conditions on us. In short, something like Lend-Lease. Molotov was just a supporter of this approach.

However, for the American side, this option was completely unacceptable. US Deputy Secretary of State W. Clayton, during negotiations with British leaders on June 25, 1947, objected to any mention of the very term "Lend-Lease" in the prepared memorandum.

The point of view of the Soviet leadership was the basis for the directives of the Soviet delegation at the meeting of foreign ministers in Paris. At the forefront was the task of obtaining information “on the nature and conditions of the proposed economic assistance to Europe. In particular, the Soviet delegation must clarify the following questions: what are the forms, possible amounts and conditions under which this assistance will be provided. The Soviet delegation was instructed to proceed from the fact that “the question of American economic assistance to European countries should be considered not from the point of view of drawing up an economic program for European countries, but from the point of view of identifying their economic needs for American assistance (credits, supplies of goods) by drawing up applications themselves European countries. At the same time, the delegation should not allow the ministerial meeting to stray into the path of identifying and verifying the resources of European countries, relegating such a formulation of the issue to the fact that the task of the meeting is to identify applications from European countries and the possibilities of satisfying them from the United States, and not to draw up economic plans for European countries ". The directives specifically emphasized: “When discussing any specific proposals regarding American assistance to Europe, the Soviet delegation must object to such conditions of assistance that could entail infringement of the sovereignty of European countries or violation of their economic independence.”

During this meeting, the French delegation, headed by Bidault, showed the greatest efforts in the search for some kind of mutually acceptable compromise. However, Molotov, in a cipher telegram sent from Paris to Moscow after the second meeting, emphasized the existence of a fundamental difference between the Soviet and French projects. “I answered this,” Molotov reported, “that there is such a difference and that it lies in the fact that the Soviet project limits the tasks of the meeting and committees that can be created to only discuss issues directly related to American economic assistance to Europe, while the French the project also provides for the preparation of economic programs covering both issues related to the domestic economy of European countries, and issues related to economic relations between them.

During the meeting, Molotov was given important information, according to which the position of the Western partners in the negotiations appeared in an extremely unfavorable light. Early in the morning of June 30, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR A.Ya. Vyshinsky, in a coded telegram, reported to Molotov information received through Soviet intelligence. Referring to sources of information in London, the minister was telegraphed that as a result of the meetings of the US Deputy Secretary of State W. Clayton with the British ministers, an agreement was reached on the following points:

a) Britain and the USA agreed that the Marshall Plan should be seen as a plan for the reconstruction of Europe, and not aid to Europe, that it should not be a continuation of the UNRRA. UNRRA - United Nations Relief and Reconstruction Administration, established on November 9, 1943 to assist countries affected by the Second World War in rebuilding their economies.

b) Britain and the USA agreed that the reconstruction of Europe could be carried out through the creation of a series of functional committees on coal, steel, transport, agriculture and food, headed by one main committee ...

c) Any organization created to implement the Marshall Plan must be outside the UN. This is because Germany is not a member of the United Nations.

d) England and the USA believe that Germany is still the key to the European economy. Therefore, it is in fact one of the foundations of any plan for the restoration of the continent.

e). England and America "will resist the payment of reparations to the Soviet Union from current production."

It must be admitted that the Soviet leadership had good sources of information. In any case, the main results of Clayton's conversations with British leaders were presented correctly. During the first meeting with members of the British Cabinet, Clayton said: "The US administration wants to receive information from all interested European countries as to why the recovery of Europe has been so slow, what Europe can do to help itself, how long it will take, what is the minimum assistance with The United States will need Europe to get back on its feet.” In fact, during Clayton's visit to London, an agreement was reached on the implementation of the Marshall Plan in relation to Western Europe only, without the Soviet Union. The British memorandum, summarizing the Anglo-American agreements, stated the desire of the parties to include all of Europe in the Marshall Plan. However, "the US administration would be satisfied if the implementation of the plan began with the countries of Western Europe as a kind of core." True, at the same time, American and British leaders expressed the hope that the countries of Eastern Europe would take part in the implementation of the Marshall Plan, even if the Soviet Union refused.

In the light of information received from Moscow, Molotov's talks in Paris looked unpromising and ambiguous. It turned out that the American and British leaders had already decided everything, and the Paris meeting was only covering up their double game. It should also be taken into account how painfully Moscow treated any attempts to push the Soviet Union aside in resolving the German question, to infringe on its rights as a victorious power, especially with regard to reparations. It is no coincidence that the directives of the Soviet delegation directly prescribed "to object to the consideration at the ministerial meeting of the issue of using economic resources Germany for the needs of European countries and against the discussion of the issue of economic assistance to Germany from the United States.

The message from Moscow prompted the USSR Foreign Minister to more resolutely oppose the "behind-the-scenes collusion between the US and Great Britain" against the USSR. Therefore, speaking at a meeting on June 30, Molotov emphasized that the task of the meeting "does not include drawing up a comprehensive program for European countries" and "the question of Germany is subject to consideration by four powers: Great Britain, France, the USSR, the USA."

This meeting revealed the impossibility of achieving agreed positive solutions. Assessing the progress of the meeting, Molotov telegraphed I.V. Stalin: "In view of the fact that our position is fundamentally different from the Anglo-French position, we do not count on the possibility of any joint decision on the merits of this issue."

On July 2, the Paris Conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the three powers ended with the refusal of the USSR delegation to participate in the implementation of the Marshall Plan. Thus, Soviet foreign policy eased the position of the organizers of the Marshall Plan. It seems that this was a losing diplomatic move. In September 1947, Bidault, in a conversation with J. Byrnes, assessed Molotov's actions as follows: “I confess that I could never understand the reasons for his behavior. Either he would get a part of the benefit, or if the whole enterprise failed, he would still benefit from the fact that no one got anything. Staying with us, he unanimously implement their plan, and then leave the meeting and take with him as many delegations from other countries as possible. In a more diplomatic, softer form, this position of the PC of the CPSU (b) was reported to B. Bierut (Poland), K. Gottwald (Czechoslovakia), G. Georgiou-Dejo (Romania), G. Dimitrov (Bulgaria), M. Rakosi (Hungary ), E. Hodge (Albania) and the leader of the Communists of Finland X. Kuusinen.

The head of the Bulgarian government, G. Dimitrov, also spoke out precisely for the decision that was made in Moscow - the countries of Eastern Europe to participate in the Paris Conference and defend the Soviet concept of the reconstruction of Europe at it. During a reception with the American political representative in Sofia on July 4, Dimitrov, in a conversation with the Soviet ambassador S. Kirsanov, noted that "refusal to participate in the conference of such countries as Bulgaria would give grounds for accusation of their lack of independence in politics."

On the evening of July 6, Molotov telegraphed instructions to the Soviet ambassadors in Warsaw to Belgrade to inform Bierut and Tito about the desirability of an unofficial visit to Moscow of responsible persons they had selected, "in order to agree on the issue of the Paris meeting in advance and to avoid unnecessary unrest during this meeting."

However, after a few hours, in Moscow they gave up. On the night of July 6-7, to the Soviet ambassadors in Belgrade, Budapest, Bucharest, Warsaw. Prague, Sofia, Tirana, Helsinki were sent an order to hand over to Bierut - Gottwald, Georgiu-Dezhu, Dimitrov, Rakosi, Tito, Hodge and Kuusinen; advises giving an answer to the British and French before July 10, since in some countries friends (i.e., leaders of the Communist Parties) are in favor of refusing to participate in the conference on July 12, since the USSR will not participate in the conferences.

The Stalinist leadership hesitated. On the one hand, I wanted not to refuse to participate in the Paris meeting, but also to ruin the whole thing for the organizers, to leave with a scandal, to “slam the door”. On the other hand, the temptation to receive American economic assistance could be too attractive for the governments of some Eastern European countries, the coalition nature of the governments of Czechoslovakia and Poland, the lack of absolute control of the Communists over diplomatic services of these countries, it would be difficult for Moscow to dictate specific steps to their representatives at the Paris meeting. Thus, it was assumed that Czechoslovakia would be represented at the meeting by its ambassador to France, I. Nosek. In this regard, the Soviet ambassador in Paris A.B. Bogomolov drew the attention of the Soviet leadership "to the fact that Ambassador Nosek is known as a conservative politician in domestic politics and Western oriented foreign policy. Moreover, the participation of the people's democracies in the Paris Conference would have made it very difficult for the Western European communist parties to campaign against the Marshall Plan, it would not have lost anything in any case, but it chose the only course of action in which it was definitely losing.

Nevertheless, the actions of the Soviet leadership had their own logic. The rigid, unconstructive position of the Soviet delegation in Paris was explained mainly by the desire not to allow the West to get the opportunity to influence the state of affairs in the countries of Eastern Europe - the Soviet sphere of influence.

The approach to interstate relations as a zero-sum game required every effort to prevent the United States from realizing their plans and increasing influence in Europe. Molotov, in a telegram to Stalin on the night of June 30 to July 1, summarized his impressions of the Paris Conference as follows: “Both England and France are in a very difficult situation and do not have serious means in their hands to overcome their economic difficulties. Their only hope is in the United States, which demand from Britain and France the creation of some pan-European body to facilitate the intervention of the United States in both the economic and political affairs of European countries. Great Britain and, in part, France are also counting on the use of this body in their own interests.

Already on the day of the end of the Paris meeting, Bevin and Bidault published a joint statement: on behalf of the governments of Great Britain and France, they invited all European states, temporarily, excluding Francoist Spain, to take part in the European Economic Conference. It was supposed to create a non-permanent organization to draw up in the shortest possible time a program for European reconstruction, in which the resources and needs of each state would be coordinated. On July 4, official invitations were sent to the governments of 22 countries in Europe. It was proposed to open the conference on July 12, 1947 in Paris.

The USSR refused to participate in the conference and took the line to disrupt it. On the morning of July 5, Soviet ambassadors in the capitals of a number of European states received instructions from Moscow to visit the foreign ministers of the respective countries and make a statement to them, in which a negative assessment of Marshall's proposals was given. The text of the statement, in particular, emphasized: “The USSR delegation saw in these claims a desire to interfere in the internal affairs of European states, imposing their program on them, making it difficult for them to sell their products where they want, and, thus, put the economies of these countries in dependence on US interests.

A special role was assigned to the Eastern European allies of the USSR. The Kremlin's intentions were most clearly and clearly stated in a telegram dated July 5 to the Soviet ambassador in Belgrade. The ambassador was obliged, on behalf of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, to convey to Tito the following: “We received a message about the intention of the Yugoslav government to refuse to participate in the Paris meeting on July 12, convened by the British and French. We are glad that you are being firm on the issue of American extortionate credits. However, we think that it would still be better for you to take part in the conference, send your delegation there and give battle there to America and its satellites - England and France in order to prevent the Americans.

In the end, those concerns were outweighed. On the night of July 7-8, the Soviet ambassadors in Belgrade, Budapest, Bucharest, Warsaw, Prague, Sofia, Tirana, Helsinki were instructed to immediately transmit the following telegram to Bierut, Gottwald, Georgiu-Dezh, Dimitrov / Rakosi, Tito, Hoxha and Kuusinen

Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks:

“The latest information received by the Soviet Government on the nature of the Paris meeting of July 12 revealed two new circumstances. First, the initiators of the meeting, the British and French, do not intend to make any changes to their plans for the economic recovery of Europe without taking into account the interests of the sovereignty and economic independence of small countries. Secondly, under the guise of working out a plan for the restoration of Europe, the initiators of the conference want to actually create a Western bloc with the inclusion of West Germany in it.

In view of these circumstances, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks cancels its telegram of July 5 and proposes to refuse to participate in the conference, that is, not to send delegations to the conference.

Each country can present reasons for refusal at its own discretion. However, the Kremlin's hesitation on July 4-7 complicated the situation. While the governments of Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia and Finland obediently complied with Moscow's directive, difficulties arose in Prague. When the Charge d'Affaires of the USSR in Czechoslovakia M.F. Bodrov appeared on July 8 to the head of the government, Gottwald, and handed him a telegram from the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the latter declared that it was no longer possible to change the decision of the Czechoslovak government to participate in the Paris Conference - "the government will not support us (communists)." Gottwald was joined by the Communist Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs V. Clementis, who told Bodrov “that they can’t change anything now, because everything has already been done, the answer has been given to the British and French, it has been published in the press, Nosek has been instructed in Paris that he is instructed to participate in the meeting.

An enraged Stalin demanded the immediate arrival of the government delegation of Czechoslovakia in Moscow. On the morning of July 9, a delegation headed by Gottwald flew to Moscow. At first, Stalin invited one Gottwald to his place. According to Gottwald, Stalin was extremely angry. He demanded in an ultimatum to immediately cancel the decision of the government of Czechoslovakia to participate in the Paris meeting on the Marshall plan. Gottwald returned to his colleagues about five hours later, having already agreed to comply with Stalin's demand. At 11 p.m., when Stalin met with the entire delegation of Czechoslovakia, he was already in a more complacent mood. He argued that, according to information received by the Soviet government, the Paris Conference was intended to be part of the implementation of a wider Western plan to isolate the USSR. At the same time, Stalin emphasized the stake of the West on the restoration of the German economy and, in particular, the Ruhr Basin, which was designed to become the industrial base of the Western bloc. Sweeping away all the timid objections of the Czechoslovak ministers, Stalin declared: “Participation in the conference will put you in a false light. This "breakthrough of the front" would mean the success of the Western powers. Switzerland and Sweden are still hesitant, and your participation would definitely influence their decision. We know that you are our friends, we have no doubts about it. But by your participation in Paris, you would have been used as a tool against the USSR. Neither the Soviet Union nor its government would have allowed this.

Upon the return of the delegation from Moscow on July 11, an emergency meeting of the Czechoslovak government was held in Prague, which lasted almost the entire day. Closing the meeting, Deputy Prime Minister V. Shiroky read out a new decision: the government had unanimously rescinded its previous directive on Czechoslovakia's participation in the Paris Conference on the Marshall Plan. The opinion of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia, Jan Masaryk, which he shared with his friends, is interesting: “I went to Moscow as a free minister, and returned as a Stalinist farm laborer! »

The Soviet leadership saw the United States as its main rival in the international arena and tried in every possible way to prevent the expansion of American influence in Europe. In Moscow, any attempts to create a Western bloc under American hegemony in this coalition were very painfully perceived.

Paradoxically, the implementation of the Marshall Plan without the participation and even with opposition from the USSR to some extent suited both sides: the USSR retained and established its influence on the countries of Eastern Europe; The United States and its partners in the Marshall Plan got the opportunity to carry out a set of measures to stabilize the socio-political situation in Western Europe, and then to create a military-political Western alliance.

In fact, the implementation of the Marshall Plan and the sharply negative reaction of the Soviet leadership meant the most important milestone on the path to the split of Europe. The concept of dividing Europe into spheres of influence, which the US leadership did not want to accept before, triumphed.

He immediately affected the fate of Germany. For Western countries, their zones of occupation have become the front line of the policy of "containment". It became obvious that the success of this policy largely depended on the Germans. The US therefore insisted on including West Germany within the scope of the Marshall Plan. The collection of reparations and the shipment of equipment on account of these payments to the USSR were stopped. Western countries began to seek the economic stabilization of Germany and the creation of a strong state based on the three western zones of occupation. On June 20, 1948, a monetary reform was carried out there. The replacement of the depreciated Reichsmark by the new Deutschemark gave impetus to the start of an economic recovery. But it was a clear violation of the agreements on the joint solution of German problems. Taking advantage of the fact that the agreement on the status of Berlin did not provide for specific obligations of the USSR to ensure transport links between the western sectors of Berlin and the western zones of occupation, the USSR in response blocked the roads leading from Berlin to the west. The blockade of Berlin began - the first open confrontation between the USSR and its former allies. Starting on June 24, it lasted 324 days. The blockade greatly complicated the supply of food and medicine to Berlin and the Allied army, and caused growing tension in the city. Food rations were limited. The city was not ready for such a turn of events and there were no food supplies. The question arose of saving the population of the city from the oncoming famine. It was decided to create an air bridge between Berlin and the zone of occupation of the allies. For these purposes, US military transport aviation was allocated, which was supposed to drop food directly onto the streets of the city. The situation was complicated by the fact that all the main airfields were in the zone of Soviet occupation and their use was not possible. The airfields that were in the zone of occupation of the United States and England were destroyed during the storming of Berlin by Soviet troops and by that time had not yet been restored. In order to make the consequences of the blockade less painful, it was necessary to create new airfields for receiving cargo. It was impossible to do this in the shortest possible time.

During this time, the supply of the Allied troops in Berlin and the two million population of West Berlin was taken over by the Allied aviation, which organized an air bridge. Soviet troops did not interfere with aircraft flights over the territory of East Germany. In addition, part of the cargo destined for the western part of Berlin fell into the Soviet zone of occupation, which was facilitated by wind or pilot errors. However, despite all the costs, the blockade of Berlin was broken from the air by organizing a rhythmic supply of the city.

The Soviet government had to allocate 100 thousand tons of grain, more than 10 thousand tons of fat to supply the inhabitants of Berlin.

Berlin began a new history of division into two sectors. The western part of Berlin remained an administrative entity for a long time - West Berlin.

The blockade of Berlin, in turn, led to new developments in the political arena. Against the background of this blockade, Truman won the presidential election in November 1948. Simultaneously, the Democrats regained control of both houses of Congress. The elections testified to the turning point in the mood of the Americans: they established themselves in the idea that America's line of defense was in Europe and Asia, and gave preference to the line of military confrontation with the USSR, begun by Truman. Isolationism was over.

3. The split of the world as a consequence of the Berlin crisis

The blockade of Berlin, showing the unreliability of post-war agreements, in addition, made obvious the need to strengthen the military power of Western countries. On April 4, 1949, 10 European countries, the United States and Canada signed North Atlantic Treaty. In it, the parties declared their determination, acting within the framework of the UN Charter, to jointly defend against enemy attacks and created the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to achieve these goals. Based on this treaty, a unified armed force was created, headed by Dwight Eisenhower.

The countries of Eastern Europe, for their part, also continued to strengthen their cohesion. On January 25, 1949, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the USSR and Czechoslovakia proclaimed the creation of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) to jointly solve economic problems in connection with the split of Europe. Albania joined the CMEA in February.

1949 was the year of the split of Germany. Soon after the currency reform in the western zones, work began on the constitution of the state, which was to be created on the basis of these three zones. In May 1949, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was formed. In October, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was created in the eastern zone of occupation.

Almost simultaneously with the formation of the GDR, the People's Republic of China (PRC) was proclaimed - the war with the Kuomintang ended in victory for the communists. The transfer of the most populous country in the world to the Communists caused a state close to panic in the United States.

The US nuclear monopoly was abolished. On the eve of the Americans learned about the successful testing of the atomic bomb in the USSR. And although atomic weapons entered service only in 1953, it was obvious that the military-political rivalry had acquired a new character - the US monopoly in this area had been eliminated. In the United States, in this regard, a decision is made to improve nuclear weapons and means of delivery. In 1952, the United States tested the first hydrogen bomb, in which the atomic bomb, based on the use of the fission energy of heavy uranium and plutonium nuclei, was only a fuse, a fuse to start the fusion reaction of light hydrogen nuclei, in which a large amount of energy is released. At the same time, the manufacture of hydrogen bombs was not difficult, and their power was limited only by the capabilities of the carrier. The first hydrogen bomb tested by the Americans had a power equal to the explosion of 10 million tons of TNT. But already 10 months later, similar weapons were tested in the USSR. In the 1950s, new carriers of nuclear weapons were being rapidly created in both countries. Based on the achievements of German rocket science during the war, powerful intercontinental ballistic missiles were created. The first nuclear-powered missile-carrying submarines appeared. The rivalry between the USSR and the USA took the form of a nuclear-missile arms race.

In 1950, the United States was forced to use its military forces for the first time, intervening in the conflict on the Korean Peninsula. After the war, Korea was occupied from the north by the Soviet Union, from the south by the United States. As in Germany, two governments were created, the rivalry between which intensified as tensions in Soviet-American relations grew. By 1949, the troops of the two countries were withdrawn from Korea, elections were held in both parts of it. On June 25, 1950, the troops North Korea crossed the demarcation line along the 38th parallel and began to rapidly move south. The United States achieved the recognition of North Korea's actions as aggressive and the adoption of UN decisions to provide assistance to South Korea. Under the flag of the UN, troops of several states landed on the Korean Peninsula, but most of them were Americans. The Korean War began, which went on with varying success until 1953.

This is how the global rivalry between the USSR and the USA arose. If we consider it the beginning of the Truman Doctrine on March 12, 1947, and the end - the collapse of the USSR on December 8, 1991, it lasted almost 45 years. During all this time, the rivalry between the USSR and the USA never turned into a war. This is what gave reason to call this period the “cold war”: both sides were preparing for a “hot war”, viewed each other as an enemy, competed in all regions of the world and in all types of weapons, accumulated them in quantities sufficient to repeatedly destroy all life on earth. Earth, but this power has never been used against each other. However, initially neither side wanted such a war. When the confrontation became a fact, neither side was sure of its victory in the event of a new war. This unpredictability of the outcome of the war pushed both sides to improve their weapons systems in an attempt to achieve some unilateral advantage, but the emergence of ever new weapons made the outcome of the conflict even more unpredictable.

The Cold War swept the entire planet into itself. It split the world into two parts, two military-political and economic groups, two socio-political systems. The world has become bipolar, bipolar. A peculiar political logic of this global rivalry has arisen - whoever is not with us is against us. All events in the world began to be viewed as if through this "black and white" prism of rivalry. In everything and everywhere, each side saw the insidious hand of the enemy, at the same time trying to annoy him by any means.

The Cold War, although it did not, fortunately, become "hot", brought militarism in politics and thinking to unprecedented proportions. Everything in world politics began to be evaluated in terms of the ratio of military power, the balance of tanks, aircraft, warheads, and so on. The threat of the use of force, "nuclear deterrence", contrary to the UN Charter, became the main instrument of politics. The arms race led to the formation of a military-industrial complex unprecedented in peacetime in the USSR and the USA, including the armed forces, industries that manufacture weapons, research institutions that develop more and more new types of them, and, finally, bodies that planned and coordinated all this. large-scale work. The political role and prestige of the ministries and departments in charge of these issues has sharply increased. There was a militarization and mass consciousness. Heroized military service. The image of the enemy was formed, either in the form of a ruthless, insidious communist, or in the form of an equally ruthless, greedy imperialist. The mass culture of both countries was saturated with this. "Spy" novels began to seriously push the traditional detective story.

Conclusion

Thus, the Berlin Crisis of 1948 was the result of confrontation between the USSR and Western countries. Its foundations were laid during the Paris Peace Conference, the adoption of the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine.

The Soviet delegation at the Paris Conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the three powers was consistently guided by these directives. Their nature made it impossible for the Soviet side to accept Western proposals to coordinate the efforts of European countries to restore the European economy. The fact that the Soviet leadership ruled out in advance the identification and verification of the resources of European countries, in essence, did not allow reaching mutually acceptable agreements. The Soviet proposals to confine ourselves to identifying the needs of European countries for American assistance and to send these requests in the form of some kind of US request were unacceptable to the West. The Paris meeting confirmed that it was impossible to agree on these mutually exclusive positions.

The rigid, unconstructive position of the Soviet delegation in Paris was explained mainly by the desire not to allow the West to get the opportunity to influence the state of affairs in the countries of Eastern Europe - the Soviet sphere of influence.

An analysis of the Soviet position on the Marshall Plan leads to the conclusion that priority in the foreign policy strategy of Moscow was the establishment and strengthening of Soviet control over the countries of Eastern Europe. Stalin considered the Soviet zone of influence the most important result of the hardest war. He was not going to make any concessions to the West in this part of Europe: for the then Soviet leadership, control over the sphere of influence was important for imperial, geopolitical, and ideological reasons.

The Soviet leadership saw the United States as its main rival in the international arena and tried in every possible way to prevent the expansion of American influence in Europe. In Moscow, any attempts to create a Western bloc under American hegemony in this coalition were very painfully perceived.

It became obvious that the success of this policy largely depended on the Germans. The US therefore insisted on including West Germany within the scope of the Marshall Plan. The collection of reparations and the shipment of equipment on account of these payments to the USSR were stopped. Western countries began to seek the economic stabilization of Germany and the creation of a strong state based on the three Western zones of occupation.

Taking advantage of the fact that the agreement on the status of Berlin did not provide for specific obligations of the USSR to ensure transport links between the western sectors of Berlin and the western zones of occupation, the USSR in response blocked the roads leading from Berlin to the west. The blockade of Berlin began - the first open confrontation between the USSR and its former allies. Starting on June 24, it lasted 324 days.

The blockade of Berlin, having shown the unreliability of the post-war agreements, also made obvious the need to strengthen the military power of the Western countries. On April 4, 1949, 10 European countries, the USA and Canada signed the North Atlantic Treaty. In it, the parties declared their determination, acting within the framework of the UN Charter, to jointly defend against enemy attacks and created the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to achieve these goals. The countries of Eastern Europe, for their part, also continued to strengthen their cohesion. On January 25, 1949, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the USSR and Czechoslovakia proclaimed the creation of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) to jointly solve economic problems in connection with the split of Europe. 1949 was the year of the split of Germany. Soon after the currency reform in the western zones, work began on the constitution of the state, which was to be created on the basis of these three zones. In May 1949, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was formed. In October, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was established in the eastern zone of occupation.

List of sources used

1. World history of modern times. Ed. Kosmach G.A. etc. Mn. Interpressservice. 1993. - 320s.

2. History of the fatherland. Comp. Kozlov V.A.M. Politizdat. 1991. - 366s.

3. History of the Great Patriotic War. In 6 volumes. T.2.M. Politizdat. 1987. - 928s.

4. World War II. In 3 volumes. T.2.M. Politizdat. 1990. - 800s.

5. World War II.M. Politizdat. 1990. - 780s.

6. The Great Patriotic War in the memoirs of contemporaries.M. Knowledge. 1987. - 611s.

7. Reader on the history of the USSR.M. Education. 1977.-701c.

8. History of the state and law of the Slavic peoples. Author-compiler Kuznetsov I.N.M. New knowledge. 2004. -587p.

9. General history of state and law.M. Legal Literature. 1978. - 711s.

10. Galkin I.S. Creation of the German Empire (1815 - 1871) M. International relations. 1966. - 390s.

11. Zhidkov O.A. History of bourgeois law.M. Higher School, 1971. - 569s.

12. History of bourgeois constitutionalism. T.1 - 2.M. Education. 1983. -531s.

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The strategy of the USSR and the West in European countries and the emergence of the policy of "containment". Monetary reform in the western zone of occupation. Blockade of West Berlin (June 21, 1948 - May 11, 1949). The end of the crisis and its consequences. Berlin Crisis 1948-1949

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POLICY OF THE USSR IN EUROPE After the end of the war, the leadership of the USSR did everything possible for the communist parties to come to power in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The USSR sought to use the Yalta agreements to expand its influence in Europe. This was noticed by Western countries and caused them concern.

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Support for the communist guerrilla movement in Greece. Demands to change the status of the Black Sea straits, including the rights of the USSR to establish a naval base in the Dardanelles. The demand to grant the right to a protectorate over Libya, to ensure the presence of the USSR in the Mediterranean Sea. POLICY OF THE USSR IN EUROPE

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USSR POLICY IN EUROPE In France and Italy, the communist parties became the largest political parties in their countries. Here and in several other countries of Western Europe, the Communists were part of the governments. In addition, after the withdrawal of the bulk of American troops from Europe, the USSR became the dominant military force in continental Europe.

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The US was looking for a way to counter the USSR. An important role in this was played by the American diplomat, expert on Russia, George Kennan. In 1946, he outlined the basic principles of the policy of "containment" of the USSR. THE POLICY OF "DETERRINT" OF THE USSR The US should strongly oppose the attempts of the USSR to expand its sphere of influence. For this it is necessary: ​​The ideas of communism are popular where society is in need and oppression, therefore, it is necessary to counter the poverty of the population of the East with the wealth and success of the population of the West. Weaken and harm the USSR by any means and wherever possible. Introduce a ban on the supply of goods and technologies to the USSR for its development.

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Rice. US Congress building on Capitol Hill in Washington DC. On March 12, 1947, Truman delivered a speech to Congress that the United States should intervene in the lives of other peoples in order to help the majority against the minority. Truman made it clear that the US would only accept such changes in the world as they saw fit. The US Congress authorized American intervention in the internal affairs of other countries. POLICY OF "CONTAINMENT" OF THE USSR

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USSR "CONTAINER" POLICY This is the program announced in a speech on March 12, 1947: The so-called Truman Doctrine was the real embodiment of the "containment" policy of the USSR. “…totalitarian regimes have recently been imposed on the peoples of many countries against their will. The US government protests against the violation of the Yalta agreements by the Soviet Union, expressed in coercion and intimidation of the authorities in Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria ... The US invested 341 billion in winning the war. It is an investment in freedom and world peace. I ask Congress to help Turkey and Greece in their struggle against totalitarianism. We must save our investments and make sure that the spending is not in vain. The seeds of totalitarian regimes spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their peak when people's hope for a better life has died. We must support this hope. The free peoples of the world ask us to maintain their freedom. If we waver in our leadership, we may jeopardize the peace of the world..."

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THE POLICY OF CONTAINMENT OF THE USSR The Truman Doctrine was aimed at fighting for the assertion of American exceptionalism. George Kennan Allen Dulles Dean Acheson

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THE POLICY OF CONTAINMENT OF THE USSR The Truman Doctrine was aimed at limiting the growth of socialism and putting pressure on the USSR. The doctrine marked the beginning of the provision of extensive military assistance to other countries and was used to justify US interference in the internal affairs of other countries. US Vice President Henry Wallace described the doctrine as "an insane step towards war that caused a crisis in international relations." To assist Greece and Turkey, it was planned to allocate $ 400 million to fight against the USSR.

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Rice. US Secretary of State George Marshall July 24, 1947 began to implement the US plan, named after the Secretary of State - "Marshall Plan". The US government provided financial assistance to European states in the amount of about 13 billion dollars. At the same time, the Americans, as a condition for providing assistance, demanded the removal of the Communists from the governments of these countries. THE POLICY OF "CONTAINING" THE USSR By 1948, there were no communists in any government of Western Europe

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POLICY OF "CONTAINMENT" OF THE USSR European countries that received US aid under the "Marshall Plan" (billion dollars) The confrontation between the USSR and the West intensified. The USSR, weakened by the war, could not answer the United States in the same way and provide the countries of Europe with their finances.

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PREREQUISITES FOR THE CRISIS On January 1, 1947, the American and British authorities, without agreement with the Soviet side, decide to create the so-called Bizonia. Customs barriers between both zones were abolished, which contributed to economic development. In the spring of 1948, the French zone of occupation joined them, Bizonia becomes Trizonia and is included in the economic organization of Western Europe.

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The United States was the first to set up border posts between the Soviet and American zones of occupation of Germany BACKGROUND OF THE CRISIS The answer to this was Stalin's irritated reaction in January 1948: "The West will make its own from West Germany, and we from East Germany will make our own state!"

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BACKGROUND OF THE CRISIS Berlin, located in the center of the Soviet zone of occupation, was also divided into zones of occupation. In turn, the United States, Great Britain and France begin to form a German pro-Western government in their zones of occupation. Contrary to the agreement not to influence the will of the German people for self-determination, the USSR begins to form a German pro-Soviet government in its zone of occupation.

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According to the plan of the Soviet leadership, all of Berlin was to enter the Soviet zone of occupation. BACKGROUND OF THE CRISIS In protest against the unilateral agreements of the Western countries on the creation of Trizonia, the USSR on March 20, 1948 leaves the Control Council, created by the decision of the Yalta Conference.

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June 20, 1948 Western countries begin monetary reform. The Western Deutsche Mark is introduced. Monetary Reform of the West The purpose of the reform is to economically separate Western Germany from Eastern Germany and discredit the Soviet economy. Stalin opposes this reform, because he considers it a violation of the Potsdam agreement. After the refusal of the USSR, the allies decide unilaterally from June 24 to reform the monetary system in West Berlin. At the same time, only 60 marks were changed to each German at the rate of 1: 1, and 40 marks were changed immediately, and 20 only after two months. The rest of the savings changed already at the rate of 1:20.

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Monetary reform of the West The Germans, who were offered to change their old savings at the rate of 1:20, tried to spend them where the money is still circulating. That is - in the Soviet zone of occupation. Pensions, salaries, payments and taxes were recalculated 1:1. As a result, two completely different currencies come into circulation in Berlin.

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Monetary reform of the West In the Soviet zone, everything was swept off the shelves, the main thing was to spend money.

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Monetary Reform of the West The massive buying up of goods led to their shortage and supply problems in the Soviet zone of occupation. In addition, more and more East Germans wanted to move to the western sector, since the economic conditions of life there were much more profitable. This led to a constant outflow of labor.

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On March 25, 1948, the movement of passenger trains in East Germany was reduced. On April 15, the US was asked to evacuate signal troops stationed in the Soviet zone of occupation. On June 12, road communication was stopped. On June 21, river communication was stopped. On June 24, railway communication was stopped. On June 24, 1948, the blockade becomes absolute, which is a complete violation of the quadripartite agreement, according to which the supply of Berlin is carried out by joint efforts. Air supply remains the only possible way to bring food to West Berlin. Blockade of Berlin The blockade of West Berlin becomes the USSR's response to the actions of the West.

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Blockade of Berlin Fig. Germany, divided into occupation zones, and the "air bridge" scheme to supply the blockaded West Berlin in 1948 June 24, 1948, the USSR blocks all communications between Berlin and the Western zones. The West organized an "air bridge" through which American and British transport aircraft supplied the blockaded population.

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Blockade of Berlin A loud propaganda campaign was organized in the West. Berlin was portrayed as a "free West" that must be defended at all costs. Properly planned and carried out, the action gave its tangible results: . The USSR was discredited, and the Germans began to see their true defenders in the Americans and the British

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A one-sided point of view was established in mass opinion: the blockade of West Berlin doomed 2.5 million Germans to starvation, saved only thanks to the "air bridge". blockade of berlin

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In fact, the picture was completely different. There were 2,800 stores in the Soviet sector. Residents of the western sectors could receive food on cards. Blockade of Berlin On August 17, 1948, it was announced that coal would be provided to the population of all four sectors of Berlin. From September 1, the distribution of milk to all children under 14 years old from the western sectors began. However, the Western Powers forbade residents to obtain food in the eastern sector of the city.

The international crisis at the initial stage of the Cold War.

It began on June 23, 1948 with the extension to the western sectors of Berlin of a separate monetary reform, which the occupation authorities of the United States, Great Britain and France had previously carried out in their zones of occupation. There, the economic unity of Berlin was thereby violated, and a threat was created to the economy of the entire Soviet zone. As a response, the Soviet military administration on the night of June 23-24 blocked ground communications between Berlin and the western zones.

The supply of goods to West Berlin was also stopped, and the supply of electricity there was limited. In this regard, the Western powers launched a propaganda campaign about the "blockade of Berlin" and the "air bridge" that had broken through it. In fact, the goods that US and British military transport aircraft delivered to the western sectors of Berlin did not meet the most minimal needs of its inhabitants, who had an unlimited opportunity to buy everything they needed in East Berlin and in the adjacent territory of the Soviet zone.

During the negotiations that began on August 2 in Moscow, in which J. V. Stalin and V. M. Molotov took part on the Soviet side, the Western representatives agreed to withdraw the separate Western mark from their sectors and accept the new East German mark as the only means of payment in Berlin . For his part, Stalin declared that he was not opposed to the Western military presence in Berlin. In addition, instead of his original demand for the annulment of the decision to create a separate state in West Germany, he was ready to accept a formula for its suspension.

On this basis, a directive was developed and adopted on August 30, 1948, by the four commanders-in-chief of the occupation forces in Germany, which provided for the simultaneous introduction of the eastern mark throughout Berlin and the removal of transport restrictions on access routes from the western zones. However, negotiations on concrete measures to implement this directive ended in failure. The crisis has not ended; on the contrary, it has deepened.

Only on July 14 did the Soviet side declare its readiness to take over the supply of the population of all of Berlin and thereby compensate for deliveries from the western zones interrupted due to "transport restrictions" introduced on June 24. On the "black market" in Berlin, the Western mark rose in price, while the Eastern mark fell in price, and under these conditions, the introduction of the monopoly of the latter became unattractive for the Germans.

On September 9, 1948, on the square in front of the Reichstag, Burgomaster E. Reiter, who was not recognized by the Soviet commandant, delivered a speech against the "blockade"; riots arose, the Soviet flag was torn off the Brandenburg Gate and the sentry at the monument to Soviet soldiers was fired upon. These events can be considered the apogee of the Berlin crisis.

In the diplomatic arena, the crisis manifested itself in the exchange of sharp notes between the USSR and the Western powers and in sharp polemics in the UN. The Western powers imposed a "counter-blockade" - a virtual embargo on trade between east and west. On January 31, 1949, Stalin's answers to the questions of the American correspondent J. Kingsbury Smith were published, from which it followed that the solution of the currency issue in Berlin was no longer considered a prerequisite for the lifting of transport restrictions on access routes to Berlin. On this basis, on March 15, informal negotiations began between the Permanent Representative of the USSR to the UN, Ya. A. Malik, and the American diplomat F. Jessep. The crisis began to de-escalate.

On May 5, 1949, a joint communiqué of the four powers was agreed, which provided for the abolition of "transport restrictions" between Berlin and the western lands of Germany, between the eastern and western zones of Berlin, and also between the western and eastern zones of occupation of Germany, as well as the convening of a new meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers (CMFA), which was perceived by the world community as the last attempt to resolve the German issue on the basis of preserving the unity of the country. The attempt was unsuccessful.

The start of the Ministerial Council on May 23, 1949, coincided with the entry into force in the western zones of the Basic Law, which formalized the creation of a West German state - the Federal Republic of Germany. On October 7, 1949, the creation of another German state, the German Democratic Republic, was proclaimed in the eastern zone. The split of Germany was finalized. This can be considered one of the immediate consequences of the first B. to.

Russian Historical Encyclopedia

Berlin Crisis 1948-1949 international crisis in its early stages "cold war". It began on June 23, 1948, with the extension to the western sectors of Berlin of a separate monetary reform, which the occupation authorities of the United States, Great Britain and France had previously carried out in their zones of occupation. There, the economic unity of Berlin was thereby violated, and a threat was created to the economy of the entire Soviet zone. As a response, the Soviet military administration on the night of June 23-24 blocked ground communications between Berlin and the western zones. The supply of goods to West Berlin was also stopped, and the supply of electricity there was limited. In this regard, the Western powers launched a propaganda campaign about the "blockade of Berlin" and the "air bridge" that had broken through it. In fact, the goods that US and British military transport aircraft delivered to the western sectors of Berlin did not meet the most minimal needs of its inhabitants, who had an unlimited opportunity to buy everything they needed in East Berlin and in the adjacent territory of the Soviet zone.
During the negotiations that began on August 2 in Moscow, in which the Soviet side took part I. V. Stalin and V. M. Molotov, the Western representatives agreed to remove the separate Western mark from their sectors and accept the new East German mark as the only means of payment in Berlin. For his part, Stalin declared that he was not opposed to the Western military presence in Berlin. In addition, instead of his original demand for the annulment of the decision to create a separate state in West Germany, he was ready to accept a formula for its suspension. On this basis, a directive was developed and adopted on August 30, 1948, by the four commanders-in-chief of the occupation forces in Germany, which provided for the simultaneous introduction of the eastern mark throughout Berlin and the removal of transport restrictions on access routes from the western zones. However, negotiations on concrete measures to implement this directive ended in failure. The crisis has not ended; on the contrary, it has deepened.
Only on July 14 did the Soviet side declare its readiness to take over the supply of the population of all of Berlin and thereby compensate for deliveries from the western zones interrupted due to "transport restrictions" introduced on June 24. On the "black market" in Berlin, the Western mark rose in price, while the Eastern mark fell in price, and under these conditions, the introduction of a monopoly of the latter became unattractive for the Germans. On September 9, 1948, on the square in front of the Reichstag, Burgomaster E. Reiter, who was not recognized by the Soviet commandant, delivered a speech against the "blockade"; riots arose, the Soviet flag was torn off the Brandenburg Gate and the sentry at the monument to Soviet soldiers was fired upon. These events can be considered the apogee of the Berlin crisis.
In the diplomatic arena, the crisis manifested itself in the exchange of sharp notes between the USSR and the Western powers and in sharp polemics in the UN. The Western powers imposed a "counter-blockade" - a virtual embargo on trade between east and west. On January 31, 1949, Stalin's answers to the questions of the American correspondent J. Kingsbury Smith were published, from which it followed that the solution of the currency issue in Berlin was no longer considered a prerequisite for the lifting of transport restrictions on access routes to Berlin. On this basis, on March 15, informal negotiations began between the Permanent Representative of the USSR to the UN, Ya. A. Malik, and the American diplomat F. Jessep. The crisis began to de-escalate.
On May 5, 1949, a joint communiqué of the four powers was agreed, which provided for the abolition of "transport restrictions" between Berlin and the western lands of Germany, between the eastern and western zones of Berlin, as well as between the western and eastern zones of occupation of Germany, as of May 12, as well as the convening of a new meeting of the Council Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the four powers (FMD), which was perceived by the world community as the last attempt to resolve the German issue on the basis of maintaining the unity of the country. The attempt was unsuccessful. The start of the Ministerial Council on May 23, 1949, coincided with the entry into force in the western zones of the Basic Law, which formalized the creation of a West German state - the Federal Republic of Germany. On October 7, 1949, the creation of another German state was proclaimed in the eastern zone - German Democratic Republic. The split of Germany was finalized. This can be considered one of the immediate consequences of the first B. to.

Lit.: The USSR and the German Question. 1941-1949: Documents from Russian archives. T. 1V: June 18, 1948 - November 5, 1949 M., 2012; 1948 in German history. / Ed. B. Bonvecha, A. Yu. Vatlina, L. P. Schmidt. M., 2009; Narinsky M. M. The Berlin Crisis of 1948-1949. // Bulletin of MGIMO-University. 2011. No. 1 (16). A. M. Filitov.

DISPUTES ABOUT THE FUTURE OF POST-WAR GERMANY

By the middle of 1948, the offensive nature of American policy continued to grow. The United States was not afraid of Moscow's reactions, believing that it was constrained by the understanding of Washington's nuclear superiority and focused on consolidating its positions in Eastern Europe. The USSR showed no signs of aggressiveness outside this zone. American experts believed that the Soviet Union would be able to create its own atomic bomb only by the mid-1950s. In addition, it was known that the USSR did not have strategic bombers, the range of which would allow them to reach US territory and return back. Military analysts of the US National Security Service also pointed to the lack of airfields in the Soviet Union capable of receiving heavy combat vehicles of the required class, and the lack of high-octane gasoline for refueling them. In general, the military readiness of the USSR for a conflict with the West was rated low.

The monetary reform of June 18, 1948 in the western zones involved the introduction of new banknotes into them and their subsequent distribution in West Berlin, although legally the latter, being in the center of the Soviet zone of occupation, was part of it in the financial and economic sense, that is, it had common with its sources of supply, transport communications, etc. The measures of the Western powers caused an influx into the Soviet zone of depreciated old banknotes, which continued to circulate in East Germany. This raised the threat of economic chaos in the east, and Moscow reacted sharply to the situation. On June 24, 1948, the Soviet Union introduced a ban on the movement and transportation of goods from the western zones to the eastern. At the same time, deliveries from the Soviet occupation zone to the western sectors of Berlin were also cut off. The western part of the city was cut off from supply sources in the Soviet occupation zone and was deprived of the opportunity to receive goods by land from the western ones. This situation has been referred to in the literature as the "blockade of West Berlin".

Maintaining this position meant economic strangulation and civilian population city, and the US, British and French armed forces stationed there. In response to Soviet measures, the United States and Great Britain, using the airfield available in West Berlin, organized an air bridge between the Western occupation zones and West Berlin, through which military transport aviation began to deliver everything necessary to ensure its life. Western warplanes violated the airspace over the Soviet occupation zone and flew over the location of Soviet units in East German territory. Everything was accompanied by harsh rhetoric and mutual threats exchanged between Moscow and Washington. Neither the USSR nor the USA were ready to fight. But the war could start by accident, if one of the planes was shot down, fell on some of the Soviet military facilities, etc. The likelihood of a collision was high, both powers were teetering on the brink of war.

The situation described in the literature is called the Berlin crisis, which refers to a sharp aggravation of the international political situation due to the situation around the city, in which the likelihood of a military clash between the Soviet Union and the Western powers began to grow. The Berlin crisis fortunately did not escalate into a war. The Western powers were able to carry out deliveries by air without hindrance, the USSR did not try to shoot down aircraft or otherwise interfere with their navigation. The peak of the crisis lasted from June 24 to August 30, 1948. After negotiations between the ambassadors of the four powers in Moscow, a partial agreement was reached on measures to resolve the situation. It was not implemented and the situation remained tense. But it was already clear that it was stable in its own way and that the opposing sides did not seek to escalate. The downward confrontation around Berlin continued until May 23, 1949 (VI session of the Ministerial Council in Paris), after which the USSR lifted restrictions on the transportation of goods from the west and the situation returned to normal.

In Western capitals, the events around Berlin were assessed as a defeat for Stalinist diplomacy and a sign of the weakness of the Soviet Union. In Washington, the victory seemed complete. H. Truman finally became convinced of the correctness of the offensive line and began to speed up the solution of the question of ending the occupation regime in West Germany and the creation of a separate West German state. In November 1948, H. Truman had to go through presidential elections. The Berlin situation gave him a serious trump card.

In Moscow, what happened caused great irritation to I.V. Stalin, who preferred to find the guilty. In 1949 V.M. Molotov was removed from the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs. His place was taken by A.Ya. Vyshinsky.

Story international relations(1918-2003) / ed. HELL. Bogaturova.

http://www.diphis.ru/obostrenie_germanskogo_voprosa_i_perviy_berli-a866.html

"AIR BRIDGE"

According to the calculations of the military governor of the American zone of occupation, General Lucius Clay, in order to somehow survive in conditions of complete isolation from the outside world, West Berlin residents needed 4.5 thousand tons of food daily, as well as several thousand tons of fuel, because electricity and water supply were also was terminated. When giving the order to begin regular air supply of West Berlin, General Clay probably did not have much confidence in the long-term success of this action. After all, even with the mobilization of all possible means for a large-scale transport operation, he considered it realistic to transfer no more than 700 tons of food and essentials to the blocked city every day.

In desperation, the military governor was even going to clear the land supply routes of the city with the help of tanks. But Washington did not give the green light to this risky operation. President Harry Truman did not want to risk starting a third world war. But the White House went with a light heart to the operation "Wittles" ("Provision"), which provided for the opening of an air bridge to West Berlin from the territory of the FRG. "I cannot guarantee that we will succeed," General Clay wrote to the West Berlin burgomaster Ernst Reuther at the time. "I am convinced that, at best, people will starve and freeze." The Soviet organizers of the blockade did not believe in the success of the western air bridge either.

In a matter of weeks, the Americans gathered in West Germany the military transport aircraft of their allies and partners literally from all over the world. Very soon, more modern and cargo-lifting four-engine American C-54 "Skymaster" transporters began to ply the air bridge - it was they who acquired the name "raisin bombers" among the Germans. Soon, the pilots of the Royal Air Force of Great Britain, as well as crews from Canada who arrived specially in Germany, joined the operation "Whittles", South Africa, Australia and New Zealand. The British even used the Short Sunderland flying boats, which could land on the West Berlin Lake Wannsee. Conventional planes used airfields in Berlin's Tempelhof district and in the suburb of Gatow, which, according to calculations, would soon be unable to cope with an endless series of take-offs and landings of "raisin bombers". But simultaneously with the beginning of the blockade and the air bridge in West Berlin, the construction of a new Tegel airport began. Construction under the blockade was completed in 85 days.

From West Germany, cargo was airlifted from the American Rhine-Main bases in Frankfurt am Main and from the airfield near Wiesbaden. Both of these cities will host major events in the coming days. commemorative events. The Berlin authorities decided to abandon the "celebration" of the anniversary of the beginning of the blockade of the city, in the German capital, celebrations are scheduled for the spring of next year - May 11, 1949 at 24:00, the Soviet blockade of West Berlin in accordance with agreements between Western allies and the USSR was officially completed.

The statistics of the air bridge sixty years ago still stagger the imagination today. So, on April 16, 1949, it turned out to be a record day when 12,940 tons of cargo were delivered (in terms of 22 freight trains of 50 wagons each). In total, 57 thousand people participated in the operation. A total of 279,962 flights to West Berlin received almost two and a half million tons of cargo. The total time spent by the aircraft of the air bridge in the air exceeds 35 years, and the total distance is 175 million kilometers.

Y. Shpakov. "Raisin bombers" over Berlin

THE FAILURE OF SOVIET PROPAGANDA

According to a CIA report based on a reliable source, the Soviet occupying authorities experienced a kind of shock after the East German leadership was informed of all the likely consequences of a western counter-blockade of the eastern zone. On June 28, four days after the imposition of the blockade, the Soviet and East German authorities held a thorough discussion of the economic consequences of curtailing transport and trade ties with the West. The Soviet military commandant was struck by the conclusions of the analytical report about the horrifying prospect of a blockade for East German industry. Prior to this, the whole calculation was made on the fact that the economy of the eastern zone would be able to survive even under blockade conditions.

Nevertheless, rather for propaganda reasons, the Soviet Poem Administration announced an increase in the norms for the distribution of food in its zone of occupation. This led, however, to a completely opposite result - to an increase in negative sentiments, which, for example, spread widely among the population of Brandenburg and were recorded by the Information Bureau of the SVAG. So, the factory worker Skomed from Eberswalde said: "... You have to be an artist to live the whole day with an increase of 50 grams of bread and 50 grams of potatoes and be full." Chairman of the production council of the shipyard named after E. Thalmann in Brandenburg, member of the SED (last name not specified), "he could only calm down the indignant workers when they were announced the size of the increase in rations."

The situation was aggravated by the serious events that took place in the Soviet zone of occupation. On September 9, 1948, a demonstration of East Germans took place at the Brandenburg Gate. First, the protesters put forward economic demands, then more and more often political slogans of an anti-Soviet orientation began to be heard from the crowd. Some of the protesters tore down the Soviet flag. From the side of the Soviet soldiers, single shots were fired at the crowd.

The events of September 9 were not an unfortunate accident. They became an outbreak of dissatisfaction with politics Soviet authorities accumulated by a significant part of the German population in the eastern part of Berlin. Characteristic in this respect open letter Dr. Friedensburg, one of the leaders of the Christian Democratic Union of East Berlin, addressed to Colonel Tyulpanov, Deputy Soviet Military Commandant of Berlin, General Kotikov:

“Even the most well-meaning people feel growing disillusionment and despair at the position that the Soviet Union has taken towards our primitive and natural democratic views. Soviet policy in relation to Germany, relying only on the Communist Party, is doomed to failure in advance.

The continuous efforts of our Communists, despite their small numbers, to impose their will on the vast majority of the population with the help of the occupying power are continuously causing the growth of anti-Communist sentiments and in the future elections in Berlin, just as in any other place, will lead to a crushing defeat of the Communist parties.

The Germans believe that our reproaches against the other occupying powers are a feather in comparison with the oppression to which the Soviet occupying power daily subjects our hearts and our own and private lives.

The armed suppression of the demonstration only led to the growth of anti-Soviet sentiment in East Berlin. This was facilitated by the numerous arrests carried out by the East German authorities among violators of public order. The Bureau of Information recorded a number of statements in which one thought was expressed: the arrests carried out are only evidence of weakness, "extreme nervousness of Russians who see treason everywhere."

S.Ya. Lavrenov, I.M. Popov. The Soviet Union in local wars and conflicts

EDUCATION GDR

On October 1, the Soviet government sent a note to the governments of the United States, Great Britain and France, outlining the position of the Soviet Union with regard to the situation in Germany that has now arisen in connection with the formation on September 20 of this year. city ​​of a separate government in the city of Bonn (western part of Germany). At the same time, the Soviet government declared that the creation of a separate Bonn government was gross violation The Potsdam Decisions, according to which the governments of the USSR, the USA, Great Britain and France assumed the obligation to consider Germany as a whole and to promote its transformation into a democratic and peace-loving state, as well as the obligation to conclude a peace treaty with Germany.

A number of obstacles have now been created in the way of restoring the unity of Germany. Who, for example, is not clear that the puppet "government" created in Bonn cannot serve the cause of restoring a united, democratic, peace-loving Germany? The formation of the Bonn government, on the contrary, is aimed at deepening the division of Germany.

Under these conditions, it is impossible not to recognize as legitimate the desire of the German democratic circles to take into their own hands the restoration of the unity of Germany and its revival on democratic and peace-loving principles. It is precisely in this that the Soviet Government sees the meaning of the decisions of the German People's Council on the implementation of the constitution of the German Democratic Republic and on the formation in Berlin of the Provisional Government of the German Democratic Republic.

In connection with the aforementioned decisions of the German People's Council, the Soviet government decided to transfer to the Provisional Government of the German Democratic Republic the administrative functions that hitherto belonged to the Soviet Military Administration.

Instead of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany, a Soviet Control Commission will be created, which will have as its task control over the implementation of the Potsdam and other joint decisions of the four powers in relation to Germany.

Statement by General of the Army Chuikov V. I., Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Military Administration of Germany, in connection with the decisions of the German People's Council on the enactment of the Constitution of the German Democratic Republic and on the formation of the Provisional Government of the German Democratic Republic in Berlin, October 11, 1949