Heroes of the Great War
Samsonov Alexander Vasilievich
Alexander Vasilyevich Samsonov was born on November 2, 1859 in the village of Andreevka, Elisavetgrad district, Kherson province. He came from a middle-class family. Military education he received at the Kyiv military gymnasium and in Nikolaevsky cavalry school, from which he graduated in 1877 as an 18-year-old cornet.
He was sent to the 12th Akhtyrsky Hussars and participated with him in the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. Having received combat training, by honest and zealous service he won the right to enter the Academy of the General Staff and in 1884 he successfully graduated from it. Upon graduation, he served in various military headquarters. As a cavalry chief, Major General Samsonov participated in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, first leading the Ussuri Cavalry Brigade, then the 1st Siberian Cossack Division. Under Wafangou and Liaoyang, near the Shahe River and near Mukden, he led his horsemen into heated battles, experienced both the joy of victories and the bitterness of heavy defeats.
Memorial plaque at the site of the death of General Samsonov
In the summer of 1914, on the eve of the First World War, Samsonov takes command of the 2nd Army. Samsonov met with the commander of the North-Western Front, Y. Zhilinsky, who initiated him into the plan for future actions. The 2nd Army was entrusted with the task, in cooperation with the 1st Army of General P. Rennenkampf, to carry out the offensive East Prussian operation. There was practically no time for her preparation: her urgency was dictated by a request for help from France, which was subjected to a powerful blow from the German army. The French ambassador to Russia, M. Paleologus, four days after the start of the war, appealed to Nicholas II: “I beg Your Majesty to order your troops an immediate offensive, otherwise french army risk being crushed." Realizing the complexity and danger of the planned operation in East Prussia, Samsonov nevertheless considered it his duty to try to carry it out. On July 23, he assumed the post of commander of the 2nd Army.
According to the plan of the operation, developed at Headquarters under the leadership of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich, the 1st and 2nd Armies were to defeat the German 8th Army concentrated in East Prussia. Samsonov was ordered to move from the Narew River (on the territory of Poland) bypassing the Masurian Lakes to the north, Rennenkampf - from the Neman to the west.
The Rennenkampf army was the first to come into contact with the enemy; on August 4, it defeated the advanced German corps at Stallupenen; german army. On the same day, after an accelerated march, Samsonov's army, having overcome more than 80 kilometers along sandy roads in three days, crossed the border of East Prussia. Samsonov informed the front commander Zhilinsky: “It is necessary to organize the rear, which has not yet received organization. The country is devastated, the horses have long been without oats. There is no bread, delivery from Ostrolenka is impossible.” But the front commander, despite the lagging rear and meager information about the plans of the enemy, every day demanded that Samsonov speed up the movement. Encountering no serious enemy resistance, the 2nd Army occupied intermediate settlements, and Samsonov, anticipating a trap, asked the higher command for permission to deploy the army in a ledge to the northwest.
After three days of negotiations with the headquarters of the front, he finally received such permission, but was obliged, on the instructions of Zhilinsky, to send the right-flank 6 Corps to the north. This led to the detachment of the corps from the main forces of the army. In addition, by order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the left-flank 1st Corps was stopped at Soldau and also broke away from the 13th, 15th and 23rd Corps operating in the center. The situation was aggravated by the weak reconnaissance of the enemy and the disruption of communications in the army, since the Germans, retreating, disabled the telephone and telegraph network. The transmission of radio messages was regularly tapped by the enemy, who thus knew about the Russian action plans.
Memorial plaque at the site of the death of General Samsonov in the municipality of Wielbark in Poland.
Leaving a barrier of two divisions against the 1st Army, the command of the German 8th Army, using the railways, transferred its main forces and the incoming reserves against Samsonov's army. On August 13, the 2nd Army ran into unexpectedly strong German opposition. On this day, the right-flank 6th Corps was defeated near Bischofsburg and began to retreat. The next day, the left-flank 1st Corps retreated south of Soldau almost without a fight; learning about this, Samsonov was beside himself with indignation and removed the corps commander Artamonov from his post. The position of the 13th, 15th and 23rd corps, which fought the Germans in the center and experienced strong enemy pressure, became threatening.
Worried about their fate, on August 15, Alexander Vasilyevich arrived at the front line - at the headquarters of the 15th Corps of General Martos. He still had hopes for a successful breakthrough of the corps to the north, towards Rennenkampf, and that the 1st Army had already begun active operations in the rear of the pressing Germans, but they were not destined to come true. Arriving at the front line and making sure that the enemy’s offensive could no longer be stopped, Samsonov had the opportunity to go back, but did not. A sense of duty and the old traditions of the Russian army did not allow him to abandon the fighters.
The retreat of the flank corps of the 2nd Army allowed the Germans to cut the way back for three Russian corps, and they were soon surrounded. The army headquarters, led by Samsonov, breaking out of the encirclement, moved in the direction of Yanov. Alexander Vasilyevich was in the hardest morale. According to the chief of staff, General Postovsky, on the 15th and 16th Samsonov said more than once that his life as a military leader was over. After a short night's halt in the forest on August 17, 1914, when the staff officers moved on on foot, Alexander Vasilievich imperceptibly went deep into the forest, and his shot sounded there ...
Despite the search, his body was never found, and besides, it was necessary to evade persecution. However, there is another version of Samsonov's death. According to one of the officers leaving the encirclement, he last saw his commander at the edge of the forest, leaning over the map. “Suddenly a huge column of smoke enveloped our headquarters. One of the shells hit the tree trunk, exploded and killed the general on the spot ... ".
The fate of Samsonov's army was tragic, a few units and groups managed to escape from the encirclement, the losses amounted to tens of thousands of killed, wounded and captured.
Awards:Order of St. Anne IV degree
Order of Saint Stanislaus III degree
Order of St. Anne III degree
Order of St. Stanislaus II degree
Order of St. Anne II degree
Order of St. Vladimir IV degree
Order of St. Vladimir III degree
Order of St. Stanislaus 1st class with swords
Order of St. Anne, 1st class with swords
golden weapon
Order of St. Vladimir II degree
Order of St. George IV degree
Order of the White Eagle
Order of Saint Alexander Nevsky
General Alexander Samsonov
The Russian command, entering the war against Germany and Austria-Hungary, pinned great hopes on the armies of the North-Western Front, which, having preempted the German troops in deployment, immediately transferred military operations to enemy territory and defeated the enemy. A significant part of this difficult task was assigned to the 2nd Army, commanded by General of the Cavalry Alexander Vasilievich Samsonov, who was considered one of the best commanders of the Russian army.
Alexander Vasilyevich Samsonov was born in the Yekaterinoslav province on November 2, 1859 in a poor noble family.
After completing the course of the Vladimir Gymnasium in Kyiv, he, sixteen years old, having taken the oath on August 19, 1875 in the capital's Nikolaev Cavalry School, entered the military service. After graduating from college in the first category, the young cornet immediately got into the Russian-Turkish war in Bulgaria. Vetovo, Yeserdum, Khan-Gyul, Chesmi, Bessarabovo, Kadikioy, Trestenik, Mechki are milestones of his military path.
Acting as part of a flying detachment under the command of Count I. I. Vorontsov-Dashkov, independently commanding a squadron, Alexander Vasilyevich showed initiative, courage, fortitude and the ability to competent tactical calculation. Thus, he favorably differed from other officers, including those who had richer combat experience behind them. At the end of 1877, cornet Samsonov was awarded the first award for military merit - the Order of St. Anna, IV degree, on a nominal weapon with the inscription "For Courage".
For 39 years of military service, he was also awarded the orders of St. George 4th degree, St. Alexander Nevsky, White Eagle, St. Vladimir 2, 3 and 4 degrees, St. Stanislav 1st degree with swords, 2 and 3 degrees, as well as foreign ones - the Serbian Order of Takov of the 3rd degree and the Grand Officer's Cross of the French Order of the Legion of Honor.
After the victorious end of the Russo-Turkish War, Alexander Vasilyevich did not immediately return to Russia, but only after 16 months, having visited many cities and villages of Bulgaria during this time. Liberators from Turkish yoke everywhere he was warmly welcomed by grateful Slavs, which he often recalled in conversations with subordinates and in the family circle.
In 1884, after graduating from the Nikolaev Academy General Staff in the first category, Alexander Vasilyevich was sent to serve in the Caucasus. Before the 25-year-old captain, brilliant opportunities for career advancement opened up. Soon, having received the rank of colonel, he headed the Elisavetgrad Cavalry School. Here in a provincial Ukrainian city he married Ekaterina Alexandrovna, nee Pisareva. It is hard to believe now that the colonel of the General Staff at that moment did not have, as they say, "neither a stake nor a yard." But the facts support this. In his track record, against the question: “Does he, for his parents, or, when married, for his wife, real estate, patrimonial or acquired?” it said "doesn't have". The family estate of his wife in Akimovka, Kherson province, did not become his family. However, the graveyard of the church with simple oak crosses and gray limestone slabs once seemed to Samsonov to be the place where he was destined to rest when the Lord called his soul. He once told Ekaterina Alexandrovna about this ...
At his own request, Alexander Vasilyevich asked for the Russo-Japanese War. First, he was appointed commander of the Ussuri Cavalry Brigade, and a week later - the 1st Siberian Cossack division. On August 18, 1904, separate Japanese units began crossing to the right bank of the Taijihe River. Intelligence reported that the enemy was advancing to the Yantai mines, where there was a small garrison of four companies with six guns under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Shestakov. The commander of the Manchurian army, General A.N. Kuropatkin, ordered Samsonov to immediately go there and, holding the position, secure the left flank of the army.
Having traveled 28 versts at night along little-known roads and in the absence good cards, the entire division (19 hundreds and 6 horse guns) concentrated in the indicated area. By the end of the day, the consolidated detachment of the 3rd Infantry Division under the command of General N. A. Orlov was located to the right. At 8 o'clock in the morning he went on the offensive. A hard fight ensued. By noon, having lost more than one and a half thousand people killed and wounded, the Russians retreated.
At dawn on August 21, General Kuropatkin decided to leave Liaoyang and retreat to Mukden. Samsonov is again in the rearguard. By nightfall, the last detachment of Russians passed through the position of the division. But for another two days, her regiments steadfastly repelled the attacks of a superior enemy. “The position at Tumyntzy,” noted Lieutenant General K. A. Kondratovich, “was of great importance for the entire Liaoyang operation: our entire Manchurian army, with all its huge convoys, artillery, parks, hospitals and other things, after an unsuccessful offensive at the Yantai spears , pressed from the south by the Japanese, began to retreat north along the tracks almost directly adjacent to the railway line, which was only 5-7 versts from this position, and the main rear dirt track - the Mandarin road - passed only four versts from Tumyntzy. One of the rear routes passed only two versts west of Tumyntzy's position. The occupation of this long position, which stretched almost parallel to our rear routes, by the Japanese before the withdrawal of all our troops would inevitably lead to a catastrophe, the results of which could bring innumerable disasters to our retreating army, since the rear routes would inevitably be fired not only by artillery, but also by rifles. fire."
Thanks to the heroic actions of the 1st Siberian Cossack Division, as well as the approaching 9th East Siberian Rifle Division, three Russian corps managed to get out of the attack of the Japanese in an organized manner and retreat to new lines. Subsequently, Alexander Vasilyevich successfully commanded a division in battles on the Shahe River, near Mukden and at Sandepu. May 17, 1905 he was given another military rank lieutenant general.
From the Far East, Alexander Vasilievich was sent by the chief of staff of the Warsaw Military District. Since March 1907, for two years he was the chief ataman of the Don Cossack army, in the next five years he was the Governor-General of Turkestan, commander of the Turkestan military district and the chief ataman of the Semirechensk Cossack army. Since 1910 - General of the cavalry.
In 1914, the Samsonov family spent their holidays in the Caucasus. On July 17, on the first day of mobilization, Alexander Vasilyevich received an order to receive the 2nd (Narevsky) Army, which was being formed in the Warsaw Military District.
“That means war again,” the 55-year-old general said sadly to his beloved children and wife. He said goodbye to his relatives as if he was taking the last step towards fate.
A. V. Samsonov was appointed commander of the 2nd Army of the North-Western Front, commanded by General Ya. G. Zhilinsky. According to the plan of the Headquarters and the headquarters of the front, his army was to attack the enemy south of the Masurian Lakes, preventing the withdrawal of German divisions beyond the Vistula.
Operations in this region have been lost at least twice in the previous ten years. The first time was in 1903 at a military game held by the Great German General Staff. Then, according to the "legend" of this game, the Russian army, breaking through to the Neman, was surrounded south of Easterburg and surrendered. True, its commander, General Francois, did not agree with this outcome and, objecting to the chief of the general staff, argued that the army could never lay down its arms. But Schlieffen, after listening to him, acted like a teacher in relation to an obstinate student:
- The commander of the Neman army recognized the position of his army as hopeless. He was looking for death in the front line and found it,” he stated sternly.
Communion before the attack.
But it was not only the decisiveness of the actions of the German troops, but also the excellent protection of East Prussia by the line of the Masurian Lakes. Deep, frequent, with swampy wooded shores, these lakes stretched from north to south for almost 80 km and were separated from each other only by narrow isthmuses. If you bypass the lakes from the north and south, they would break the connection between the advancing flanks. Behind the natural shield, the defenders could successfully maneuver through the dense network of railways and attack the attackers one by one, before they had time to connect.
Field Marshal Schlieffen always put the enemy in the best conditions. This time, too, he admitted that the Russian troops bypassed the Masurian Lakes and connected on the Alla River near the city of Allenstein, although the possibility of such a maneuver was practically absent. Even under these conditions, Schlieffen managed to pull all his forces to the south, leaving the Königsberg fortress with secondary units on the left flank. And, having gathered a strong fist in the area of Deutsch-Eylau, he coped with the Russian army advancing from the Narew.
The second war game took place in Kyiv in April 1914. On it, the commander of the Warsaw Military District, cavalry general Ya. G. Zhilinsky, Samsonov's mentor at the military school, served as commander of the North-Western Front, as it was supposed to according to the mobilization schedule. By his decision, the entire front simultaneously went on the offensive against the enemy, which was superior in strength and means. After bypassing the Masurian Lakes from the north and south, the main blow was delivered to Ortelsburg, and the other blow to Gumbinnen. Russian troops, by decision of Zhilinsky, attacked the enemy, not waiting for the final deployment of the front on the Middle Neman.
In terms of East Prussian offensive operation the commander of the Northwestern Front, General Zhilinsky of the 2nd Army, assigned an important role. According to his plan, the troops of this army, brought into battle two days later by the 1st Army, bypassing the Masurian Lakes from the southwest, were to break the formations of the 8th German Army concentrated there and thereby prevent their withdrawal beyond the Vistula. According to this plan, General Samsonov received a directive late in the evening of July 31, according to which the 2nd Army, consisting of five corps (11 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions - a total of 347 thousand people and 720 guns) was ordered to attack "... from the line of Augustov, Myshinets, Khorzhele in the strip of Rudzhany, Ortelsburg, directing efforts from the line of Myshinets, Khorzhele to Rudzhany, Passenheim and further Rastenburg, Seeburg to the flank and rear of the line of lakes. The border was determined to be crossed on August 5 by cavalry, and on August 6 by the main forces of the corps.
The task of the offensive was assigned to the army actually at the stage of formation. Its corps were still only concentrated in the starting areas: partly according to railway, partly marching. The haste was explained by the desire of the Russian High Command to disrupt the German offensive against allied France. In addition, the army commander rightly feared that when advancing west of the Masurian Lakes, the enemy would be able to attack the left flank from Allenstein, and decided to provide him with intensive reconnaissance.
But to solve all these problems in practice was very difficult. The army headquarters, as they say, was not put together. People who had not previously worked together were appointed to leadership positions. Thus, the post of chief of staff was assigned to Major General Postovsky, who during last year was a cavalry brigade commander. The duties of the quartermaster general were to be performed by Major General Filimonov, who had previously acted as chief of staff of the Novogeorgievskaya Fortress for almost two years. Major General Bobrovsky, the former head of military communications of the Vilna military district, was appointed head of supply. The operational department was headed by Colonel Vyalov, who in the last two years before the war was seconded to the Vladimir Military School, where he taught military sciences. Colonel Lebedev, a teacher at the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff, became the head of army intelligence from a regular position as a teacher.
When the corps of the 1st Army were already fighting at Stalyupenen, the 2nd Army began to advance from its initial position 30-80 km from the border, aiming significantly to the west of the intended zone. This did not go unnoticed by General Zhilinsky: “The offensive front for the 2nd Army west of the Masurian Lakes is indicated from the Myshinets, Horzhele line to Rudzhany, Passenheim,” he recalled. “You have stretched your left flank to Zhaboklik, thanks to which the front of the three army corps will be stretched by 60 versts when approaching the border, which I consider excessive.” Only on the fourth day of the march, two days late, did the 2nd Army reach state border.
The regrouping seemed to General Zhilinsky rather sluggish. In a telegram sent by him to the headquarters of the 2nd Army, he wrote: “The delay in the offensive of the 2nd Army puts the 1st Army in a difficult position, which has been fighting for two days at Stalyupenen. Develop the operation more vigorously." To this, Samsonov replied that his “... units are moving with full effort, making daily transitions of more than 20 miles across the sands. Therefore, I can’t speed up the movement.”
The roads were really hard and the weather was hot. There were no days. Orders for advance were sent out late, as a result of which many regiments expected to march until the next noon. Column paths were not always chosen successfully, they often crossed.
On August 9, General Zhilinsky again demanded decisive action from General Samsonov. He informed Alexander Vasilievich about the beginning of the pursuit by the 1st Army of the defeated enemy near Gumbinnen, which was not true. In the response telegram of the headquarters of the 2nd Army, and this time the main reasons for the apparent indecision were named: “Severe fatigue of the troops, the need to pull up the lagging 2nd Infantry Division, the disorder of the rear and the understaffing of the units, especially the 23rd Corps.” Nevertheless, by evening, the formations of the army reached the line of Ortelsburg (6th Corps), Willenberg (13th Corps), Neidenburg (15th Corps), Koslau (2nd Infantry Division), Zelyun (15th Cavalry Division) . The 2nd Corps was transferred to the 1st Army.
On August 10, in Marienburg, the German command decided to oppose the Russians in this sector "... a thin, but not weak center" at a time when two heavy masses were to make a decisive attack on both flanks: from the northwest by the 1st Army Corps, and from northeast - 17th and 1st reserve buildings. “It was necessary,” recalled the commander of the 8th German Army, General P. Hindenburg, “to win over Samsonov not a simple victory, but to destroy him in order to have free hands against Rennenkampf. Only in this way could we cleanse East Prussia and get freedom for further action to assist the Austrians in decisive battles in Galicia and Poland.
Preparation of a mass grave for the burial of fallen soldiers.
At the same time, General Samsonov asked for permission from the front commander to make adjustments to the directive given to them. That is, continuing to advance in the Rastenburg, Seeburg zone, push the corps to the Allenstein, Osterode line. Firstly, for the reasons of Alexander Vasilyevich, in this way the army could better perform the main task. Secondly, she could receive material resources from Mlava by rail. Thirdly, from the Allenstein line, it was easier for Osterode to subsequently advance in a westerly direction.
To this, General Zhilinsky verbally reprimanded General Samsonov for his lack of performance. However, the army corps had already begun to carry out the plan of the army commander: the 6th corps aimed at Bischofsburg, the 13th at Wartenburg, the 15th at Allenstein, the 23rd at Hohenstein. The 1st Corps remained at Soldau to cover the left flank of the army. The offensive of the army developed, consequently, with a major disagreement between the commanders of the front and the army. General Zhilinsky "pulled" the army to the right, and General Samsonov led it to the left.
Skirmishes between the 2nd Army units and the Germans took place on the same day. On its way to Kurken, the 15th Corps met resistance from three divisions of the German 20th Corps at the fortified position of Orlau-Frenkenau, equipped with "wolf" pits and barbed wire. The battle, which began at about 3 p.m., in which the enemy used hand grenades and bayonet attacks, lasted almost a day. Only with the approach of the 13th corps, success was outlined in the direction of Osterode. Trophies were two heavy guns, two machine guns, charging boxes. There were also many prisoners. The corps lost about 2.5 thousand people.
The result of combat work was highly appreciated by the front commander. General Zhilinsky immediately sent a telegram to the 2nd Army: “I congratulate you and the troops of the army entrusted to you on the first success, which forced the enemy corps to hastily retreat. May the trophies you have captured instill in the hearts of your army an ardent, united desire to move forward with the aim of inflicting a decisive defeat on the units that are against you, in order to prevent them from escaping from the just retribution of the Russian soldier.
At the end of August 11, General Samsonov ventured to ask permission to pursue the retreating enemy. To this, the chief of staff of the front, Lieutenant-General V. A. Oranovsky, replied: “If it is confirmed that the enemy is retreating to Osterode, and in view of the fact that the enemy’s retreat to Koenigsberg cannot be intercepted, the commander agrees to change the offensive of the 2 Army on Allenstein, Osterode, but so that the direction between the lakes and Allenstein was covered by one corps with cavalry, which is most convenient to advance to Seeburg. As a result, the 6th Corps was cut off from the rest of the group of troops at a distance of up to two daily crossings. The army was artificially reduced by one corps.
On the morning of August 12, Alexander Vasilyevich became aware of the concentration of the 41st German Infantry Division on the left flank of the army. In the afternoon, on the right flank, large German forces went on the offensive from the side of Lautenburg and Lake Damerau. It was General Hindenburg who began to put his plan into action. It became obvious to him that the unimpeded advance of the 2nd Russian Army to the rear nullified the benefits of operations in the north.
The troops were exhausted. Subordinate commanders asked Samsonov to give them rest. He, in turn, turned to the front commander, but Zhilinsky was adamant. He was generally dissatisfied with the fact that the offensive of the army was slower than he expected. Therefore, Zhilinsky replied that he did not consider it possible to allow a day earlier than the Allenstein, Osterode line, explaining that only upon reaching this line would it be possible to threaten the enemy's retreat to the Vistula.
On the evening of August 13, not yet aware of the withdrawal of the right-flank 6th Corps to the Teervishvoliai, Grodzisken, Shchepanken line, General Samsonov insisted on continuing the offensive. Stubborn, but quite successful battles were waged by the 15th Corps. Parts of the 13th Corps occupied Allenstein. The 1st Army Corps held positions on the left flank. The corps commander, Infantry General Artamonov, went to battle formations to deal with the situation and raise the morale of the units. As a result, control was lost, parts of the corps independently retreated to Soldau, and then to Mlava. For this, the army commander removed General Artamonov from his post and instead appointed the commander of the 22nd Infantry Division, Lieutenant General Dushkevich. The 6th Corps, as on the previous day, was withdrawing.
The situation became threatening, and the front commander insistently demanded that the enemy be thrown back. To ensure the implementation of this order, on the morning of August 15, General Samsonov with the operational group of the headquarters moved from Neidenburg to the headquarters of the 15th Corps.
By evening, the position of the 2nd Army became extremely difficult. The transition to the offensive, scheduled for that day, failed. Infantry General Martos reported to the army commander that parts of his 15th corps, exhausted by previous marches and having lost their best officers and many lower ranks in battle, were not capable of active operations.
From the situation that had arisen, there could be only two ways out - either to continue the battle in the positions occupied or to immediately begin to retreat. In the first case, the chances of success were zero. Therefore, General Samsonov settled on the second option and ordered a general withdrawal under the cover of side rearguards. At the same time, following the will of General Zhilinsky, he tried to attack the enemy with units of the 1st Army Corps. But to no avail.
In this difficult time for the troops, Samsonov sought to be in the combat area and personally lead the battle. The result turned out to be deplorable. Due to the departure of the commander and for other reasons, control of the flank corps was lost and communication with the front headquarters was interrupted. The hastily withdrawn 23rd Corps exposed the rear of the neighboring 15th Corps. The enemy, using the highway from Soldau to Neidenburg, began to concentrate in the rear of the army. Parts of the 17th German Corps blocked all roads east of Passenheim and Ortelsburg. The 2nd Army was actually surrounded.
Some regiments panicked. At Nadrau, the army commander saw the remnants of the 4th Koporsky Infantry Regiment randomly retreating. With great effort, he stopped them. Replacing the commander, Alexander Vasilyevich, with simple but passionately spoken words, raised the fallen spirit of the Koporians. After that, he accepted their oath before the regimental banner about the faithful future service. But this was only one combat episode, which, although it took a lot of time, did not play a significant role against the backdrop of the operation of the entire army.
On the morning of August 16, General Samsonov traveled around the units gathered in the Orlau area, clarified the losses. Rumors about the death of General Martos forced Alexander Vasilyevich to order Lieutenant General N. A. Klyuev to join his 13th Corps and the orphaned divisions of the 15th Corps. But, perhaps, it was one of the last orders of the commander of the 2nd Army.
Camp for Russian prisoners of war in Bavaria.
On this day, cavalry general A.V. Samsonov, accompanied by staff officers and Cossacks, hurriedly walked away from the nearby explosions of shrapnel shells and machine-gun bursts to Yanov, a small town on the border Russian Empire.
Alexander Vasilievich, mentally tormented, tried to find an excuse for what had happened. What is his fault? After all, he, following the order of the commander of the North-Western Front, General Ya. G. Zhilinsky, led the army on the offensive. True, without waiting for the deployment of the rear. About this and about the danger that arose on the left flank, he reported to Zhilinsky ... But what does Yakov Grigorievich have to do with it? He led the army, General Samsonov. It seems that the fate of General A.N. Kuropatkin is now destined for him, to whom the hacks from the "New Time" blamed Russia's defeat in the Russo-Japanese War as personal guilt.
On short halts, the commander peered into the faces of the Cossacks for a long time. They, who had risked their lives more than once in battle, looked terrified to death.
Who needs their sacrifice now? thought Samsonov and let the Cossacks go. They quickly disappeared into the forest. Only a few officers of the army headquarters and a batman remained with the general.
It was getting dark quickly. The group got up and continued on their way. Each step of Alexander Vasilyevich, even with the help of those who accompanied him, was given with great difficulty. He was breathing heavily, asthma choking.
Finally, stop for the night. Samsonov lay down on the carefully bedded blanket. Closed my eyes. However, he could not sleep. He could hear the even breathing of the sleepers. Somewhere in the distance, as before, although rarely, they were still shooting.
– What to expect? Why torture people? – struggled looking for a way out thought. They will come without me.
Alexander Vasilyevich got up quietly. I walked for several minutes until my legs hurt. Finding a dry spot, he sat down. He pulled out a revolver. He cocked the trigger. The drum turned with a click.
- Forgive me, a sinner, Lord! - whispered Alexander Vasilyevich and shot in the heart. The debt of military honor did not allow him to survive the defeat ...
“But was Samsonov worse than those generals who were at the head of the Russian armies? Of course not! Both as a boss and as a person, Alexander Vasilievich was a charming personality, ”wrote B. M. Shaposhnikov, who, even before the World War, had repeatedly met with General Samsonov in his service in the Turkestan military district. - Strict to himself, friendly with subordinates, he was a highly honest person. But life is cruel, very often people like Samsonov become victims of its blows, and the villains triumph, because they know how to lie, dodge and sell themselves in time for lentil stew to please others. Samsonov was not like that and acted even better than many "strong-willed" army commanders.
This was a frank allusion to the behavior of the commander of the 1st Army, General Rennenkampf, who at one time was condemned from the position of "knight's honor", and later, including Shaposhnikov, from the position of the Bolsheviks. General Samsonov, who committed suicide and abandoned his subordinate troops to the mercy of fate, was closer to the Bolsheviks than another, who was involved in suppressing "revolutionary" unrest on the railway. So history made its choice for many years.
After the commander committed suicide, by the evening of August 16, when the remnants of the 13th and 15th corps were drawn into the Grunflies (Kaltenborn) forest, everything was completely mixed up. All direction of their actions was lost. Attempts to break through the ring of German troops failed. General Klyuev was completely at a loss, and on his instructions, Sergeant Major Chernyavsky threw out a white flag.
From German sources it is known that about 125 thousand people were captured, of which 30 thousand were wounded. More than 40 thousand soldiers and officers fell on the battlefield. About 500 guns were captured. 171 officers and 10,300 soldiers broke out of the encirclement. Most of these people were selected secretly, singly or in groups. Some came out fighting. The most numerous were the detachment of Lieutenant Colonel of the 31st Alekseevsky Infantry Regiment Sukhachevsky (about 1250 people with 14 machine guns), as well as the detachment of the staff captain of the 142nd Zvenigorodsky Infantry Regiment Semechkin in the amount of 165 people.
The investigation into the activities of the senior military commanders of the 2nd Army was entrusted to the adjutant general Panteleev, who enjoyed special confidence in the sovereign. The government commission paid special attention to two circumstances that had a disastrous effect on the outcome of the offensive operation. The act indicated, firstly, “the untimely arrival of the corps and divisional cavalry and their complete unpreparedness for the performance of their tasks. As a result of this, not only was the immediate reconnaissance of the enemy extremely unsatisfactory, but even the space traversed by the Russian troops remained completely unexamined, especially the forest, cities and villages. The enemy partisans had every opportunity to take cover and, using the telephone network widely developed in East Prussia, deliver to their troops the most detailed information about our troops.
Secondly, “the extreme negligence of our headquarters in using the spark telegraph. During the period from August 10 to 15, the spark telegraph station of the Brest-Litovsk fortress intercepted 15 unencrypted radio telegrams from the headquarters of the corps of the 2nd Army and even the headquarters of the army, containing the most secret, essential orders of a combat nature. Especially in this regard, the following telegrams attract attention: General Postovsky to the commander of the 13th Corps dated August 10, No. 6318, outlining the task of the corps on the 1st; his own telegram to the head of the 2nd Infantry Division dated August 11, No. 648, outlining the task assigned to the division and indicating the location of the 6th and 15th corps, the 6th and 15th cavalry divisions and, finally, the telegram of General Samsonov to the commanders of the 1st th, 13th and 23rd corps dated August 12, No. 6346, outlining the directive of the 2nd Army for August 12.
The conclusion noted: “From the foregoing, it follows that by the time of the battles of the 2nd Army, the German command was well aware of the grouping of forces, movements and intentions of the commanding officers of the 2nd Army from our own spark telegrams, which also transmitted information available at the headquarters about the German troops, as well as some data on the materiel and, in general, on the state of the 2nd Army.
Other reasons were also noted. Among them were named such as General Samsonov's failure to comply with the main directive of the commander of the North-Western Front, General Zhilinsky, as a result of which the offensive sector was unreasonably stretched and torn apart; severe fatigue of the troops caused by the unsatisfactory organization of the offensive. The groundlessness of General Samsonov's order to continue the offensive on August 14, when it was already known that the 1st and 6th corps, which provided the flanks of the army, retreated, was emphasized, as well as his order to remove the telegraph at the army headquarters (Neidenburg), which caused on August 15 the final loss of control of the army.
Punishment in a German camp of a captured Russian soldier.
The Minister of War, General A. A. Polivanov, subsequently reviewed the report and made his own conclusion. On this occasion, he left a rather lengthy reasoning, in which, in particular, he wrote:
“The very idea of the operation, which originated in the quartermaster general of the headquarters of the Supreme Commander, was not sufficiently compared with those views on possible operations in East Prussia that existed in the German General Staff. These views were known to us from the report at our disposal of the enemy's war game in 1905. In the said report there is the following phrase, which, it would seem, should have made the initiators of the unfortunate operation think about it.
Almost everyone who up to now had to lead the Russian side advanced with the Neman army in the direction between Insterburg and Angeburg, while the Narew army, bypassing the Masurian lakes from the south and further in a northern or northwestern direction, with the joyful confidence that they would be able to destroy this concentric advance of the Germans, who were supposed to be concentrated behind the line of the Masurian lakes or across the river Alle. But they were constantly wrong. The Germans, not expecting this maneuver, retreated, but took advantage of the opportunity provided to them to attack the left flank of the Narew army in the most dangerous direction for it. Apparently, both the headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the lower headquarters did not take into account the plans of the enemy.
Then I cannot but express surprise that our staffs did not take into account the enormous capacity of the German railways, which made it possible for the German army to quickly and widely maneuver, which we were also well aware of even in peacetime. Also noteworthy is the fragmentation of the actions of the 1st and 2nd armies and the absence of any connection between them, which could not but affect the success of the entire operation. While the 1st Army is fighting, the 2nd Army is slowly advancing and comes into contact with the enemy only when the 1st Army completely loses contact with him ...
This failure clearly showed that in Russia there was no attention to such an important matter as the training of military leaders to control large masses of troops in war. General Samsonov was an intelligent, honest and calm person. During the Russo-Japanese War, he commanded a Siberian cavalry division and had several successes with it. During the years 1905-1907 he was chief of staff of the Warsaw district and in this period, of course, he could enter into a course of operational considerations that should have embraced our probable actions in East Prussia, but from 1907 he held military administrative posts. They diverted his attention, mainly, towards issues of a civil nature, connected primarily with the improvement of the Asian outskirts.
After the declaration of war, he, seven years behind the operational nature in the event of a war with Germany, who had no practice in managing even a corps, was summoned from Turkestan, given an army of five corps unknown to him, with a headquarters unknown to him, and hurried with an offensive to East Prussia , the defense of which was long and methodically studied by German generals both in deliberately conducted maneuvers and in a military game, and gradually improved by strengthening it technical ways. As a result, if the idea of the offensive given by the commander-in-chief already corresponded to the combination for which the German command had thoroughly prepared and which they found especially desirable for themselves, then its execution in the form in which it was undertaken by General Samsonov probably surpassed all of them. calculations on the unpreparedness of the Russian command.
The historian A. Kersnovsky identified Alexander Vasilyevich as the main culprit in the shame of Russian weapons: “Contemporaries tried to portray him as a “victim”. The researcher of a later era will not be able to agree with this, he concluded. - General Samsonov is not only a victim of Zhilinsky's bureaucracy and the worthlessness of his commanders. He, moreover, is himself a criminal before the Russian army. Never before have Russian troops fought so badly as the unfortunate 2nd Army in August 1914! She was left to the mercy of fate at the most tragic moment of her struggle. The command of the army was not up to the hussar cornet. On August 14, having removed General Artamonov from the infantry, who was prancing in the front lines and disorganized the management of the corps, Samsonov himself repeated the same mistake the next morning - unforgivable for the corps commander and criminal for the army commander. And then, seeing that everything was lost - and, moreover, through his fault - he failed to find the only honorable way out of this situation, failed to die the death of the brave at the head of the first battalion he met, but preferred to die a miserable death of the cowardly ... "
After the start of the war, Samsonov's wife, Ekaterina Alexandrovna, moved from Tashkent with her children to Elisavetgrad, where she entered the hospital of the local Red Cross community as a nurse. She also worked in the county zemstvo, collecting voluntary donations for the hospital. At the end of November 1914, a letter was sent to her by Colonel Krymov. In it, he wrote: “Alexander Vasilievich was a noble man, of which there are few. A purely Russian, father-loving officer, about which you must tell your son Vladimir. Alexander Vasilievich, with a fatal shot, took upon himself the courage to answer for everyone. The fatherland and the top leadership remained untarnished.”
Thanks to this letter, the doubts that tormented the soul of this poor woman were dispelled, on whose shoulders the responsibility for raising her twelve-year-old daughter Verochka and fifteen-year-old son Vladimir fell from now on. On December 15, Ekaterina Alexandrovna wrote to the emperor with a letter: “It is inexpressibly hard for me to ask for a pension, but caring for two minor children, in a difficult financial situation, makes me worry you, Sovereign, with the most humble request to ensure my existence and my children, a son up to twenty-five years old, with a pension age, daughter before marriage.
On January 2, 1915, the Council of Ministers considered the request and, taking into account the military merits of the general from the cavalry Samsonov, recognized "to throw on the Highest Imperial Majesty a report on providing his family with pensions in the amount of 10,645 rubles a year." On January 17, Nicholas II approved the petition.
In the autumn of 1915, Ekaterina Alexandrovna, as part of an international delegation, visited the camps of Russian prisoners of war in Aeba, Byutov, Hammerstein, Chersk, Tukhala, Aris, Gailbert. On the trip, she managed to establish the burial place of Alexander Vasilyevich. The grave was located two versts from the Karolinenhof estate. In Vilenberg, Ekaterina Alexandrovna was given back her husband's locket. With tears in her eyes, she remembered him as he was before leaving for Warsaw: big, cut like a short crew cut, with gray hair at the temples, slightly snub-nosed, with shaggy black eyebrows with gray hair, a beard and big eyes.
She managed to obtain permission for reburial. The grave was opened, the body was placed in an iron-lined box, and Ekaterina Alexandrovna took him to Russia. At the end of November 1915, Alexander Vasilievich Samsonov was buried in his native land, where he wanted - on the graveyard of the Akimovskaya church.
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The battle for Paris in ... East Prussia
August 30 (O.S. 17), 1914 cavalry general Alexander Samsonov, commander of the 2nd Army of the North-Western Front, shot himself, along with his army, was surrounded in East Prussia. The Germans then counted 92 thousand prisoners. The death of the general (and his army) is described in many novels and historical opuses. Still, such a grandiose catastrophe, the death of such a high military rank ... However, the Germans captured a lot of generals, even one full general - infantry general Nikolai Martos, commander of the XV Army Corps. In total, according to the estimates of historians Fyodor Gushchin and Sergey Zhebrovsky, 18 generals of Samsonov's army were captured, including two corps commanders.
The earlier Battle of Gumbinnen brought success to the Russian 1st Army, Cavalry General Pavel von Rennenkampf. His army entered East Prussia not fully mobilized, but on the 15th day of mobilization (which was scheduled to be completed in 36 days). He was met by the enemy, who had already completed the mobilization and fought on his territory, studied in detail and mastered, relying on the local population. In addition, the Germans could use the well-developed railway network, quickly transferring their units to any place along it, but the soldiers of the Rennenkampf army moved mainly on their own two feet, breaking away from the rear, stretching their supply lines.
As the military historian Sergei Andolenko (Brigadier General of the French Army) wrote, “one can ask oneself the question why, having assumed the obligation to France to attack the Germans on the 15th day, measures were not taken in advance to complete the mobilization before this date. It came out of the competence of the general. Mobilization was an all-Russian affair. He was instructed to attack "with what God sent."
This is the answer to the question why such a rush to bring the Russian armies into battle is an allied obligation. From the very first day of the war, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich, incessantly urged his generals to attack: as soon as possible and regardless of real readiness, because France and Paris had to be saved at any cost! And so the Rennenkampf army won the first victory for Russia, because “France was given the opportunity to win the battle on the Marne, because the German headquarters, under the impression of the defeat at Gumbinnen, weakened its western front by three corps, two of which were hastily transferred against the Russians, on the eve of a decisive battles on the Marne,” stated the historian Andolenko.
In euphoria, the Headquarters demanded that Rennenkampf and Samsonov build on their success, continuing to perform feats in order to save glorious France. The high command suddenly became convinced that the operation in East Prussia had already been victoriously completed and the Germans were draping towards the Vistula. So, we must hurry forward to Berlin! Where they planned to move the 9th Army concentrated in Warsaw, and to strengthen it, they decided to take some “unnecessary” corps from the 1st and 2nd armies. Rennenkampf himself was ordered to advance on Koenigsberg.
Subsequently, this is precisely what Rennenkampf will be blamed for: he advanced to the west, when it would be better for him to move to join Samsonov's army. But Rennenkampf had an order, where exactly the direction of the strike was prescribed, and not a single military leader has the right to arbitrarily change the instructions of the high command. And the real state of affairs with his neighbor became known only by August 28 (15 according to Art. Art.). Meanwhile, the Germans, having transferred units from the West to East Prussia, skillfully took advantage of the wide gap between the 1st and 2nd armies. The German 8th Army, led by Paul von Hindenburg, who replaced General Maximilian von Prittwitz, who lost the Battle of Gumbinnen, struck at this junction. The Germans struck on 26 (13 O.S.) August, and on 29 (16 O.S.) August the Russian XIII and XV Corps ceased to exist.
The main blame for the defeat of the 2nd Army lies with General Samsonov himself: at a critical moment, he completely let go of the leadership of the army. As Rear Admiral Alexander Bubnov, who served in the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander, assured, having almost no information about the enemy, “and disagreeing about the conduct of operations not only with the commander-in-chief of the front, but also with his own chief of staff, he [Samsonov], when his presence at the army headquarters was especially necessary, went to the front, providing the chief of staff with operational leadership of the army. And this is when "at any moment such critical situations could suddenly arise from which the army could be withdrawn without a catastrophe only by a fast-acting and firm operational leadership." For which it is necessary "the constant, every minute presence of the army commander in his headquarters." But General Samsonov, breaking away from his headquarters, lost all the opportunity to influence the course of operations and turned out to be "a helpless spectator of the defeat of the army entrusted to him, which led him to the tragic decision to commit suicide." The corps of his army lost contact with both the army headquarters and its neighbors. “Not leading a long-range reconnaissance in front of them,” writes Bubnov, “they walked blindly, as if doomed, right into the mouth of the enemy.” When Rennenkampf figured out the real state of affairs with his neighbor, he immediately began to deploy the corps of his 1st Army to the southwest - to strike in aid of Samsonov, and threw cavalry behind enemy lines, but it was too late ...
Public opinion, fueled by intentional leaks through the newspapers, demanded blood, being sure that Rennenkampf had shown criminal inaction, even treason was seen in his behavior - "he's a German!" Fuel was generously added to the fire by the entourage of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, with whom Rennenkampf had extremely strained relations. In addition, the Headquarters was in dire need of a scapegoat, on whom it was possible to blame the defeat ... By order of the emperor, a special Government Commission was created to investigate the causes of the catastrophe of the 2nd Army. But in her conclusions - not a single reproach against Rennenkampf. Nevertheless, he was soon removed from command, and then dismissed. Under the Provisional Government, they arrested and wanted to judge. Already after the death of the general (in April 1918 he was killed by the Bolsheviks), they slandered again: at the suggestion of the German General Max Hoffmann, the myth was launched about the alleged quarrel between Samsonov and Rennenkampf dating back to the Russo-Japanese War. What Hoffmann wrote in his memoirs: “Aha, that’s why he didn’t help Samsonov!” - the "public" soared joyfully. Only this is a lie: at the indicated time, Rennenkampf was in the hospital with a serious wound and could not quarrel with any Samsonov.
Returning to that crazy race in East Prussia, let's ask ourselves: was it really needed, even for the sake of saving France? After all, what did Russia get in return? "France allows Russia to bear the entire burden of the war on its shoulders" - this is an entry in the diary of the French ambassador in St. Petersburg, Maurice Palaiologos. There are also other interesting entries. For example, that “in terms of cultural development, the French and Russians are not on the same level. Russia is one of the most backward countries in the world ... Compare our army with this ignorant and unconscious mass: all our soldiers are educated; young forces fight in the forefront, who have shown themselves in art, in science, talented and refined people - this is the cream and color of humanity. Therefore, "from this point of view, our losses are more sensitive than Russian losses." That's it: the elite and-Russian cattle? Who fought and died for France?
Alexander Vasilievich Samsonov. Born on November 2 (14), 1859 in the village of Andreevka, Yakimovskaya volost, Elisavetgrad district, Kherson province - died on August 17 (30), 1914 in Willenberg (East Prussia, German Empire). Russian statesman and military leader, cavalry general (1910), commander of the 2nd Army during the East Prussian operation.
Alexander Samsonov was born on 2 (14 New Style) November 1859 in the village of Andreevka, Yakimovskaya volost, Elisavetgrad district, Kherson province, in the family of retired lieutenant Vasily Vasilyevich Samsonov and his wife Nadezhda Yegorovna. Parents owned lands in the Elisavetgrad district.
In 1875 he graduated from the Vladimir Military Gymnasium in Kyiv. In 1977 he graduated from the Nikolaev Cavalry School, released as a cornet in the 12th Akhtyrsky Hussar Regiment.
Member of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878.
In 1884 he graduated from the Academy of the General Staff. From November 8, 1884, senior adjutant of the headquarters of the 20th Infantry Division, from July 10, 1885 to February 4, 1889 - senior adjutant of the headquarters of the Caucasian Grenadier Division.
In 1887-88 he was a squadron commander of the 24th Lubensky Dragoon Regiment.
From February 4, 1889 - the head of the Main Directorate of the Cossack troops, from March 11, 1890 - a staff officer for assignments at the headquarters of the Warsaw Military District.
Since February 1, 1893 - a staff officer for special assignments under the commander of the Warsaw Military District.
From July 25, 1896 - head of the Elisavetgrad cavalry cadet school. He served as his chief for about 8 years. At the same time, he was a member of the Elisavetgrad district zemstvo and a member of the Elisavetgrad City Committee of the Red Cross Society. In 1902, the level of accreditation was increased to the school, and it became the second most important (after the capital Nikolaev) cavalry school of the Russian Empire. Samsonov was remembered by the cadets as an educated military man, an exemplary commander and a fair administrator, who was uncompromisingly against hazing and other violations of military and Christian ethics.
During the Russo-Japanese War, Major General Samsonov commanded the Ussuri Cavalry Brigade.(since March 15, 1904). From his first battle - on May 17 near Yudzyatun - he gained a reputation as an ideal cavalry commander. The Yudzyatun clash went down in history as one of the two victorious cavalry battles of the Russian-Japanese war, in which the Cossacks almost completely destroyed the Japanese squadron in a matter of minutes. The lightning success of the Cossacks in this battle was facilitated by their peaks, against which the Japanese armed with sabers were helpless.
At Vafangou, General Samsonov's cavalry bypassed the 4th Japanese division, which decided the fate of the battle. Then Samsonov participated in the battles near Senyuchen, near Gaizhou and Tashichao (raid on Yingkou), in the Liaoyang battle. Commanding a flank detachment, he repulsed the attack of the Japanese guards brigade, and during the retreat he occupied the Yantai position with four Siberian Cossack regiments with a horse battery and held it while the Russian corps organizedly retreated to the north.
September 2, 1904 Samsonov led the Siberian Cossack division. With her, he participated in bloody battles on the river. Shahe, near the village of Sandepu, near Mukden.
For merits in the battles, Samsonov was awarded golden weapons, orders of St. George 4th degree, St. Anna 1st class with swords, St. Stanislav 1st degree with swords and received the rank of lieutenant general.
From March 17, 1909 - Turkestan Governor-General and commander of the troops of the Turkestan military district and military ataman of the Semirechensky Cossack army. The talented administrator Samsonov established peaceful relations between the Russians and the local population, activated educational activities, contributed to the development of cotton growing, water supply and irrigation in the region.
In 1910 he was promoted to general of the cavalry.
General Samsonov
General Samsonov in World War I
In the summer of 1914, straight from the Caucasus, where Samsonov and his family were on vacation, he went to Warsaw to take command of the 2nd Army. On July 19 (August 1), 1914, the First World War.
In Warsaw, Samsonov met with the commander of the North-Western Front, Ya. G. Zhilinsky, who initiated him into a plan for future actions. The task was entrusted to the 2nd Army, in cooperation with the General's 1st Army, to carry out the offensive East Prussian operation. There was practically no time for her preparation: her urgency was dictated by a request for help from France, which was subjected to a powerful blow from the German army. Four days after the start of the war, the French ambassador to Russia, M. Paleologus, appealed to: "I beg Your Majesty to order an immediate offensive from your troops, otherwise the French army risks being crushed."
It is known that Samsonov received the order to attack in a decadent mood - he understood that, together with his army, he was intended to be a victim.
On July 23, he assumed the position of commander of the 2nd Army, with which he was surrounded during the East Prussian operation as a result of erroneous decisions by the commander of the North-Western Front Zhilinsky and his own miscalculations. According to the plan of the operation, developed at Headquarters under the leadership of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich, the 1st and 2nd Armies were to defeat the German 8th Army concentrated in East Prussia. Samsonov was ordered to move from the Narew River (on the territory of Poland) bypassing the Masurian Lakes to the north, Rennenkampf - from the Neman to the west.
The death of the 2nd army of Samsonov
The Rannenkampf army was the first to come into contact with the enemy, on August 4 it defeated the advanced German corps at Stallupenen, on the 7th in the oncoming battle at Gumbinnen-Goldap, it forced the main forces of the 8th German army to retreat. On the same day, after an accelerated march, Samsonov's army, having overcome more than 80 kilometers along sandy roads in three days, crossed the border of East Prussia. Samsonov informed the front commander Zhilinsky: “It is necessary to organize the rear, which has not yet received organization. The country is devastated. Horses have been without oats for a long time. There is no bread. Delivery from Ostroleka is not possible.”
But the front commander, despite the lagging rear and meager information about the plans of the enemy, every day demanded that Samsonov speed up the movement. Encountering no serious enemy resistance, the 2nd Army occupied intermediate settlements, and Samsonov, anticipating a trap, asked the higher command for permission to deploy the army in a ledge to the northwest. After three days of negotiations with the headquarters of the front, he finally received such permission, but was obliged, at the direction of Zhilinsky, to send the right-flank 6 Corps to the north. This led to the detachment of the corps from the main forces of the army. In addition, by order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the left-flank 1st Corps was stopped at Soldau. The situation was aggravated by the weak reconnaissance of the enemy and the disruption of communications in the army, since the Germans, retreating, disabled the telephone and telegraph network. The transmission of radio messages was regularly tapped by the enemy, who thus knew about the Russian action plans.
The command of the German 8th Army, using the railways, transferred its main forces and incoming reserves against Samsonov's army. On August 13, the 2nd Army ran into unexpectedly strong German opposition. On this day, the right-flank 6th Corps was defeated near Bischofsburg and began to retreat. The next day, the left-flank 1st Corps retreated south of Soldau almost without a fight; learning about this, Samsonov was beside himself with indignation and removed the corps commander Artamonov from his post. The position of the 13th, 15th and 23rd corps, which fought the Germans in the center and experienced strong enemy pressure, became threatening.
Worried about their fate, on August 15, Alexander Vasilyevich arrived at the front line - at the headquarters of the 15th Corps of General Martos. He still had hopes for a successful breakthrough of the corps to the north, towards Rennenkampf, and that the 1st Army had already begun active operations in the rear of the pressing Germans, but they were not destined to come true (then Rennenkampf would be haunted by rumors about his criminal slowness for a long time ). Arriving at the front line and making sure that the enemy’s offensive could no longer be stopped, Samsonov had the opportunity to go back, but did not. To abandon the fighting subordinates, he was not allowed by a sense of duty and the old traditions of the Russian army.
At 7 o'clock. 15 minutes. on the morning of August 15 (28), 1914, General Samsonov sent a telegram to the Commander-in-Chief of the Front: “The 1st Corps, very upset, last night, on the orders of General. Artamonov, retreated to Illov, leaving the rearguard ahead of Soldau. Now I am moving to the headquarters of the XV Nadrau Corps to lead the advancing corps. I'm removing Yuz's apparatus. I will be temporarily without contact with you.
This decision led to the complete disorganization of command and control of the troops of the 2nd Army. So, General N. Golovin wrote in his study: “This is the decision of the gene. Samsonov can be compared to the decision of the commander of a cavalry regiment, who becomes the head of a group of squadrons for the personal conduct of a fleeting cavalry attack. As far as this does not meet the requirements for modern command and control of the army, it seems to us that there is no need to expand. We repeat that the explanation for such an act of the gene. Samsonov can only be found in the area of his spiritual experiences. But what is difficult to explain is that the departure of the army commander forward was associated with a break in communication (“I’m filming Yuz’s apparatus, I will temporarily be without communication with you”). Apparently, the headquarters of the 2nd Army - for the issue of maintaining communications is entirely within the functions of the headquarters - was not aware of an elementary rule: an already operating communication station ceases to operate only after opening new station, more in line with the new location of the chief. The ignorance of the army headquarters led to the aggravation of the consequences of the decision of General. Samsonov to go to the XV Corps. With his departure to Nadrau, the management of the army ended. The catastrophe of the army began from that moment.”
Even once in a bag, 100 thousand people could gather for a powerful blow, which, alas, did not happen. Some parts were demoralized by the general confusion even before direct contact with the enemy. They had not received food for a long time, they were exhausted by a long transition over rough terrain, they were pissed off by an invisible, retreating, but clearly in control of the situation enemy, showing the initiative.
The retreat of the flanks of the 2nd Army allowed the Germans to cut the way back for the three Russian corps, and they were soon surrounded. The army headquarters, led by Samsonov, breaking out of the encirclement, moved in the direction of Yanov. Alexander Vasilyevich was in a difficult moral state. According to the chief of staff, General Postovsky, on the 15th and 16th Samsonov said more than once that his life as a military leader was over. His colleague Colonel M.N. Gryaznov recalled: “At the end of August 1914, I saw not a gallant general sitting like a devil on a war horse, but a human ruin.”
At the same time, Chief of the General Staff Ya.G. Zhilinsky noted: “If the behavior and orders of General Samsonov, as a commander, deserve severe condemnation, then his behavior, as a warrior, was worthy; he personally led the battle under fire and, not wanting to survive the defeat, committed suicide.
Death of General Samsonov
When leaving the encirclement near the city of Willenberg (Willenberg - now Velbark, Warmian-Masurian Voivodeship, Poland), Alexander Vasilyevich Samsonov died.
There are several versions of how the days of General Samsonov ended. The most common version is that he shot himself near the Karolinenhof dairy farm in the vicinity of Wilenberg.
His chief of staff, General Postovsky, describes in detail the last hours of Samsonov’s life: “At about 12 noon on August 16 (29), 1914, General Samsonov left the 2nd division and went to Vilenberg, where he expected to find the 6th corps. On the way, at all crossings of swampy rivers, German units with machine guns met. In one of the swampy fashion shows, the Army Commander ordered his Cossack convoy to attack the machine guns. Kazakov was led on the attack by the brave Colonel of the General Staff Vyalov. Unfortunately, the attack failed. Having approached Wilenberg, Gen. Samsonov found the city occupied by the Germans. The Cossacks of the convoy gradually left the Army Commander, who by evening remained in the forest near Wilenberg with 7 officers of the General Staff and one orderly private. It was necessary to get out of the enemy's sphere of disposition at night. On horseback it was impossible. With the onset of complete darkness, a group of officers with the army commander moved on foot through swamps and forests, often meeting enemy patrols and his riflemen. While approaching Wilenberg, Gen. Samsonov demanded of me not to interfere with his suicide and abandoned his intention only after a heated protest from the officers accompanying him. At about one in the morning, the group, after a short rest in the forest, moved to continue the journey, but the gene. Samsonov hid from his companions. Soon a shot rang out in the forest. Everyone understood that the noble Commander of the Army, who did not want to survive the misfortune that befell his army, committed suicide with this shot. The whole group of officers decided to stay in place until the morning in order to find the body of the chief in the light of day and take him out of the enemy location. Unfortunately, it didn't work out. With the first ray of the rising sun, German riflemen approached and opened fire on the officers. The search for the body of Gen. Samsonov had to stop.
There is another version of Samsonov's death. According to one of the officers leaving the encirclement, he last saw his commander at the edge of the forest, bending over the map: “Suddenly a huge column of smoke enveloped our headquarters. One of the shells hit the trunk of a tree, exploded and killed the general on the spot.
Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich in the book "My memories" wrote: "What the world community called "Joffre's victory on the Marne" was in fact the victim of the 150,000-strong Russian army of General Samsonov, deliberately thrown into the trap set by Ludendorff".
General Samsonov's awards:
Order of St. Anna IV degree (1877)
Order of St. Stanislaus III degree (1880)
Order of St. Anne III degree (1885)
Order of St. Stanislaus II degree (1889)
Order of St. Anne II class (1892)
Order of St. Vladimir IV degree (1896)
Order of St. Vladimir III degree (1900)
Order of St. Stanislaus, 1st class with swords (11/18/1904)
Order of Saint Anna, 1st class with swords (1905)
Order of the Legion of Honor (1905)
Golden Weapon (1906)
Order of St. Vladimir II degree (1906)
Order of St. George IV degree (1907)
Order of the White Eagle (06.12.1909)
Order of Saint Alexander Nevsky (December 6, 1913)
Personal life Alexander Vasilievich Samsonov:
Wife - Ekaterina Alexandrovna Samsonova. After the death of the general, he left a 15-year-old son and a 12-year-old daughter. They were allotted a pension in the amount of 10,645 rubles a year.
Ekaterina Alexandrovna Samsonova was a sister of mercy during the First World War. She worked in the hospital of the Elisavetgrad community of the Red Cross.
In order to search for her husband's grave, she, in due course, asked permission to travel to Germany. In August 1915, she received a mission to Germany to inspect POW camps as a representative of the International Red Cross Society. Ekaterina Samsonova for two months carefully carried out the mission of verifying the observance by the Germans of international agreements in relation to prisoners of war, which aroused the respect and even fear of the Germans. She reported on her work.
After fulfilling the official order of E.A. Samsonova, with the permission of the German authorities, went from Berlin to the town of Gross-Pivnitz, in East Prussia, in the vicinity of which, according to Guchkov's assumptions, it was necessary to look for the body of the general. Ekaterina Alexandrovna, accompanied by a German officer, questioned local peasants for several days until she learned that at the end of last summer, the corpse of a Russian officer was accidentally found in the forest. The peasants could not describe the signs of the murdered man, but they remembered that the lining of his greatcoat was red, that is, the general’s, and they advised him to contact the local miller, who participated in the burial of the found and even removed some things from him.
Ekaterina Alexandrovna found the miller, and he gave her a gold medallion taken from the body of the general buried by him, on which the inscription “Remember us” was engraved, and inside there was a group portrait - Ekaterina Alexandrovna with children Vladimir and Vera. There were no more doubts, the general's widow immediately hired people and, together with the miller, went to the forest, where, after a short search, the grave was found, the remains were exhumed and placed in a sealed coffin.
On November 3, the coffin with the body of General Samsonov, accompanied by Ekaterina Alexandrovna, was sent from Berlin to Stockholm, and from there to Petrograd. On November 21, at 15:00, a funeral train with a special carriage arrived in Yelisavetgrad. He was met by the 54th Kherson foot squad in full combat gear with their brass band, cadets and teachers of the cavalry school, headed by the head, Major General V.G. Lishin, chairman of the zemstvo council I.A. Kovalev, mayor G.I. Volokhin and many others. Exactly at 19 o'clock, at the command "on guard", under the performance of the anthem "Kol Slaven" by the orchestra, a massive oak coffin covered with a silver eye was carried out of the car. At 20 o'clock after the memorial service, the coffin, to the sounds of the anthem, was brought into the car, near which a guard of honor was placed.
On November 22, at 6:20 a.m., the mourning car was hitched to a train free of passengers, which followed through Elisavetgrad to the Wicker Tashlyk station. From there, on horseback, the coffin with the body of A.V. Samsonov was transferred to the family estate. The burial took place in the Samsonov family crypt near the church of Saints Joachim and Anna in the village of Yakimovka, which is located across the river from the village of Yegorovka.
Over time, the crypt was looted, and the coffins of A.V. Samsonov and his family are defeated. Later, the tomb, decorated on the outside with a marble allegorical sculpture, was completely destroyed and razed to the ground.
On February 13, 2002, at the place of his burial, which now turned out to be in the courtyard of Yakimovskaya secondary school, a modest memorial sign was opened in the form of a Cossack cross made of red granite. The sign was initiated and implemented by the Yakimovskaya rural community and the Kirovograd Regional Historical and Cultural Society "Oikumena".
« ABOUT He was a noble man, of which there are few. A purely Russian, fatherland-loving officer, ”his associate Colonel A. Krymov wrote about General Samsonov. For 39 years of military service, Alexander Vasilyevich Samsonov was awarded the orders of St. George 4th degree, St. Anna 4th degree, St. Alexander Nevsky, St. Vladimir 2nd, 3rd and 4th degrees, St. Stanislav of the 1st degree with swords, 2nd and 3rd degrees, foreign orders - the White Eagle, the Serbian Takov of the 3rd degree and the Grand Officer's Cross of the French Legion of Honor, as well as the Golden Weapon.
A Alexander Vasilievich Samsonov was born in the Yekaterinoslav province on November 2, 1859, into a middle-class noble family. He received his military education at the Vladimir Gymnasium in Kyiv, and then continued his studies at the Nikolaev Cavalry School. At the end of the school, Samsonov, with the rank of cornet, was assigned to the 12th Akhtyrsky Hussar Regiment. It happened in 1877 - the year of the beginning Russian-Turkish war. Together with the regiment, he went to war at the age of eighteen.
IN he fought in Bulgaria, acting as part of a flying detachment under the command of Count I.I. Vorontsov-Dashkov. Independently commanding a squadron, Alexander Vasilyevich, as a commander, practically did not differ from other officers who had combat experience behind him, showed initiative, courage, fortitude and the ability to competent tactical calculation. For the courage and diligence shown in 1877, the cornet Samsonov was awarded the first award - the Order of St. Anna, 4th degree. By honest and zealous service, he won the right to enter the Academy of the General Staff.
IN In 1884, he successfully graduated from the academy and was sent to serve in the Caucasus with the rank of captain. For him, a twenty-five-year-old officer, brilliant opportunities for career advancement opened up. Soon, having received the rank of colonel, he headed the Elisavetgrad Cavalry School.
WITH the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, being in the rank of major general, Samsonov, of his own free will, goes to Far East. Having first headed the Ussuri Cavalry Brigade, a week later he was appointed commander of the 1st Siberian Cossack Division. In August 1904, by order of the commander of the Manchurian army, A.N. Kuropatkin, Samsonov's division was sent to the Yantai mines, where there was a small garrison under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Shestakov. The task of the division was to hold the position and secure the left flank of the army.
P having traveled 28 miles at night along little-known roads and in the absence of good maps, the entire division (19 hundred and 6 horse guns) concentrated in the indicated area. By the end of the day, the consolidated detachment of the 3rd Infantry Division under the command of General N.A. was located to the right. Orlov. In the morning the detachment went on the offensive. A heavy battle ensued, and soon the Russians had to retreat, having suffered heavy losses - more than one and a half thousand people were killed and wounded.
P After the decision was made to leave Liaoyang and withdraw to Mukden, Samsonov's division covered this retreat of the Russian units, being in the rearguard. By the night of August 21, the last detachment passed through the position of the division. But for another two days, her regiments steadfastly repelled the attacks of a superior enemy. Thanks to the heroic actions of the 1st Siberian Cossack Division, as well as the approaching 9th East Siberian Rifle Division, three Russian corps managed to get out of the attack of the Japanese in an organized manner and retreat to new lines.
IN further, at the head of the Samsonov division, he participates in battles on the Shahe River, near Mukden and at Sandepu. During the war, he experienced both the joy of victories and the bitterness of heavy defeats. He was awarded many orders and a golden saber. And in May 1905, Alexander Vasilyevich was awarded the rank of lieutenant general.
IN The war ended, and Samsonov was sent to the Warsaw military district to the post of chief of staff. Two years later (in 1907) he became the chief ataman of the Don Cossack army. He stayed in this post for about two years, Samsonov was transferred to Turkestan as the governor-general and military ataman of the Semirechensk Cossack army. The management of such a vast territory with a population of about three million people required great efforts and administrative skill from Samsonov. Despite the settlement by diverse Turkic peoples, during the years of Samsonov's rule, life on the territory entrusted to him proceeded mostly calmly. In 1910 he was promoted to the rank of General of the Cavalry.
H The beginning of the First World War found Alexander Vasilyevich in the Caucasus, where he spent his holidays with his wife and children. On the first day of mobilization, he receives an order to take command of the 2nd Army, which was being formed in the Warsaw Military District.
IN In Warsaw, Samsonov was met by the commander of the North-Western Front, Y. Zhilinsky, who knew Samsonov from the academy, being his mentor, and initiated Alexander Vasilyevich into the plan for the upcoming East Prussian operation. Samsonov's army consisted of five corps (11 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions - a total of 347 thousand people with 720 guns). Its task was to carry out offensive operations in close cooperation with the commander of the 1st Army, General P. Rennekampf. According to the directive of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the 2nd Army moved from the territory of Poland from the Narew River, bypassing the Masurian Lakes to the north. The directive was given without taking into account the fact that the 2nd Army was still in the process of formation. Part of the corps had not yet been advanced to their original positions, and the army headquarters had not yet been formed. Special mention should be made of the headquarters. People who had never worked together before were appointed to leadership positions. The post of chief of staff was assigned to Major General Postovsky, who for the past year had been commander of a cavalry brigade. The duties of the quartermaster general were to be performed by Major General Filimonov, who had previously acted as chief of staff of the Novogeorgievskaya Fortress for almost two years. Major General Bobrovsky, previously the head of military communications of the Vilna military district, was appointed head of supply. The operational department was headed by Colonel Vyalov, who taught military sciences at the Vladimir Military School for the past two years. Colonel Lebedev was transferred from the regular post of teacher of the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff as the head of intelligence.
P the haste of offensive actions was explained by the request of the French ambassador M. Paleologus to provide assistance to France, which was subjected to a powerful German offensive. Introduction to fighting Russian armies could help the ally to thwart the victorious offensive of Germany.
P Having read the plan in detail, the commander of the 2nd Army, General Samsonov, rightly feared that when advancing to the west of the Masurian Lakes, the enemy would be able to attack the left flank of the army from the side of Allenstein. Therefore, as he said, especially intensive reconnaissance was to be carried out here. Realizing the complexity and danger of the planned operation, Alexander Vasilyevich considered it his duty to try to carry it out.
H This clear coordination of actions led to the fact that the 2nd Army began advancing to the borders at a time when the 1st Army was already fighting with the German units. Hurrying to help Rennenkampf, Samsonov overcame 80 km in an accelerated march for three days. Only on the fourth day of the march, two days late, did the 2nd Army reach the state border. Samsonov reported to the front commander Zhilinsky that “... the units are moving with full effort, making daily transitions of more than 20 miles across the sands. Therefore, I can’t speed up the movement.” But General Zhilinsky seemed to be rather sluggish, and he hurried Samsonov. He, in turn, asked the commander to organize the rear of the army, since, passing by an accelerated march, the 2nd Army had significantly broken away from its bases.
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August General Zhilinsky again demanded decisive action from General Samsonov. He informed Alexander Vasilievich about the beginning of the pursuit by the 1st Army of the defeated enemy near Gumbinnen-Goldap. In a reply telegram, Samsonov again drew the attention of the front commander to the reasons for his "indecision." Among them, he named: severe fatigue of the troops, the need to pull up the lagging behind 2nd Infantry Division, the disorder of the rear and the lack of staffing. By the time the 2nd Army approached the 1st, the German command had ceased active operations against Rennenkampf and stepped up its activities against Samsonov.
2
th army easily managed to occupy intermediate settlements. Encountering practically no resistance from the enemy, she moved on, and Samsonov felt a trap. The German troops began active hostilities against the 2nd Russian Army under the new command - the generals of Hindenburg and the chief of his staff, Ludendorff, who replaced Prittwitz, who had been removed from command. Samsonov did not know that the German command decided - as Hindenburg writes in his memoirs - to oppose "... a thin, but not weak center at a time when two heavy masses were to make a decisive attack on both flanks: from the northwest - 1 th army corps, and from the northeast - the 17th and 1st reserve corps. It was necessary to win over Samsonov not a simple victory, but to destroy him in order to have free hands against Rennenkampf.
IN In his memoirs, Ludendorff wrote: “The powerful army of General Rennenkampf stood like a threatening thundercloud in the northeast. She should have attacked us, and we would have been defeated. But this did not happen, the 1st Army was inactive. Leaving a barrier of two divisions against the 1st Russian Army, the German command transferred all its main forces and the arrived reserves against Samsonov's army. While the regrouping of troops was going on in the German units, the 2nd Army was increasingly drawn into the depths of East Prussia. 
IN
At the same time, General Samsonov applied for permission from the front commander to deploy the army in a northwestern direction. After three days of negotiations, he received such permission. According to Alexander Vasilievich, such a change, firstly, would allow the 2nd Army to better fulfill the task. Secondly, by rail from Mlawa, the army could receive material and technical means. And, besides, it was easier to advance to the West from this direction. Having given permission, Zhilinsky demanded that Samsonov nevertheless send the 6th corps, which was on the right flank, to the north, and stop the 1st corps of the left flank at Soldau. The orders were carried out, and this led to the fact that two corps on both flanks were cut off from the main forces, and the center of the Russian army remained uncovered. Such inconsistency between the commanders of the front and the army could not but affect the tragic outcome of the operation.
B The battle with the German units began before Samsonov could get in touch with Rennenkampf. Initially, the 2nd Army managed to achieve little success and even organize the pursuit of the retreating enemy. On its way to Kurken, the 15th Corps met resistance from three divisions of the German 20th Corps at the fortified position of Orlau-Frenkenau, equipped with "wolf" pits and barbed wire. The battle, in which the enemy used hand grenades and bayonet attacks, lasted almost a day. Only with the approach of the 13th corps, success was outlined in the direction of Osterode. The trophies of the Russians were two heavy guns, two machine guns, and charging boxes. There were also many prisoners. The corps lost about 2.5 thousand people.
R The result of combat work was highly appreciated by the front commander. General Zhilinsky immediately sent a telegram to Samsonov: “I congratulate you and the troops of the army entrusted to you on the first success, which forced the enemy corps to hastily retreat. May the trophies you have captured instill in the hearts of your army an ardent, united desire to move forward with the aim of inflicting a decisive defeat on the units that are against you, in order to prevent them from escaping from the just retribution of the Russian soldier.
H o luck accompanied the 2nd army for a short time. Already on August 13, the right-flank 6th Corps, left in the northern direction near Bischofsburg, was attacked. Under strong pressure from the enemy, he was forced to retreat. The next day, the left-flank 1st Corps, cut off from the army, was also attacked, which withdrew south of Soldau almost without a fight. So General Hindenburg began to put his plan into action.
H Not knowing yet about the withdrawal of the 6th Corps, General Samsonov continued the offensive in the center.
IN On the evening of August 13, not yet aware of the withdrawal of the 6th Corps, General Samsonov insisted on continuing the offensive. Stubborn but rather successful battles were waged by the 15th Corps, and parts of the 13th Corps were occupied by Allenstein.
At knowing about the retreat of the corps on the flanks, Samsonov realized that the situation had become threatening. Immediately, units of the 2nd Army, which up to this point had been successfully fighting the enemy, faced unexpected strong opposition from the Germans. By evening, the position of the 2nd Army became extremely difficult. The transition to the offensive, scheduled for that day, failed. Infantry General Martos reported to the army commander that parts of his 15th corps, exhausted by previous marches and having lost their best officers and many lower ranks in battle, were not capable of active operations.
ABOUT appreciating the situation, General Samsonov decided to withdraw the army from its positions under the cover of side rearguards. At the same time, following the will of General Zhilinsky, he tried to attack with units of the 1st Army Corps. But to no avail.
H The German command continued to develop the offensive, and the Russian troops, exhausted by the march and the first battles, could no longer give the enemy a worthy rebuff. In order to understand the situation, many generals went to battle formations, at the headquarters military units confusion reigned. Radiograms were sent unencrypted, which made it easier for the enemy to determine the location of the units.
IN during this difficult time for the troops, Samsonov sought to be in the combat area. Worrying about the fate of the 13th, 15th and 23rd corps, fighting in the center with superior enemy forces, he arrived at the front line - at the headquarters of the 15th corps. The result turned out to be deplorable. Control of the flank corps was lost, communication with the front headquarters was interrupted. The army was doomed. The hastily withdrawn 23rd Corps exposed the rear of the neighboring 15th Corps. The enemy began to concentrate in the rear of the army, which was actually surrounded.
H but Alexander Vasilyevich still had hope for a successful breakthrough of the corps to the north, towards the 1st Army. He hoped that Rennenkampf had already begun active operations in the rear of the Germans pressing on the 2nd Army. But they were not destined to come true.
P Having arrived at the front line, the commander was convinced that the enemy’s offensive could no longer be stopped. There was only one way out - captivity, and some units had already raised the white flag. On the morning of August 16, General Samsonov traveled around the units gathered in the Orlau area, clarified the losses. Samsonov had the opportunity to go back, but he did not. Having united the remnants of the 13th and 15th corps under the command of Lieutenant General N.A. Klyuev, the troops retreated to the forest. All direction of their actions was lost. Attempts to break through the ring of German troops failed. General Klyuev was completely taken aback. On his instructions, the sergeant-major Chernyavsky threw out a white flag.
ABOUT the circled army almost completely perished, the same units that managed to get out of the encirclement made their way to the Russian border. The capital was not yet aware of the crushing defeat of the 2nd Army. General Samsonov himself, together with the army headquarters and the remnants of the troops, made his way to Yanov - to a place located on the border of the Russian Empire.
IN these days, Alexander Vasilyevich more than once told the officers around him that his life, as a military leader, was over. He was in the most difficult moral condition. He probably thought in those days that, despite any objective reasons for the defeat, he led the 2nd Army into battle - he was responsible for the outcome of the operation. Alexander Vasilievich could not find an excuse for what had happened. Fulfilling the order of the commander of the North-Western Front, General Ya.G. Zhilinsky, Samsonov led the army on the offensive, without waiting for the deployment of the rear. About this and about the danger that arose on the left flank, he reported to Zhilinsky. But he led the army, General Samsonov. The debt of military honor did not allow him to survive the defeat.
P After a short halt in the forest on August 17, Samsonov released the soldiers guarding him. They quickly disappeared into the forest, and only a few officers of the army headquarters and a batman remained with the general. It was difficult for Alexander Vasilyevich, who suffered from asthma, to walk, but he continued on his way. Soon everyone stopped for the night. Unnoticed by others, the general went into the forest, and after that a shot was fired. Colonel Krymov wrote to the wife of the commander: “Alexander Vasilyevich took upon himself the courage to answer for everyone. The fatherland and the top leadership remained untarnished.”
P Later, the front commander Zhilinsky, when reporting to the leadership, noted: “If the behavior and orders of General Samsonov, as a commander, deserve severe condemnation, then his behavior, as a warrior, was worthy; he personally led the battle under fire and, not wanting to survive the defeat, committed suicide.
IN The East Prussian operation ended in the defeat of the Russian army, but despite this, the goal for which the operation was carried out was achieved. The German command transferred part of its forces to East Prussia, weakening its onslaught on France
Samsonov's suicide is a well-known fact in military history. But there is another version of his death. This was told by one of the officers who left the encirclement together with the general. “Suddenly a huge column of smoke enveloped our headquarters. One of the shells hit the tree trunk, exploded and killed the general on the spot ... ".
IN During the East Prussian operation, the 2nd Army lost 125 thousand soldiers and officers as prisoners. About 40 thousand died in the battles, and 30 thousand were wounded. The enemy got 500 guns. 171 officers and 10,300 soldiers left the encirclement. Most of these people were selected secretly - one by one or in groups. Often had to engage in battle with the pursuing enemy. The most numerous of those who went to the Russian border were the detachment of Lieutenant Colonel of the 31st Alekseevsky Infantry Regiment Sukhachevsky (about 1250 people with 14 machine guns), as well as the detachment of the staff captain of the 142nd Zvenigorodsky Infantry Regiment Semechkin in the amount of 165 people.
ABOUT in the fall of 1915, Ekaterina Aleksandrovna, the wife of General Samsonov, as part of an international delegation, as a sister of mercy, examined the camps of Russian prisoners of war. On the trip, she managed to establish the burial place of Alexander Vasilyevich and achieve the transfer of the body to Russia.
G General Alexander Vasilievich Samsonov was buried on Russian soil, in native village Akimovka. His widow, left with two children, was given a pension by the emperor.
