The brigade, reorganized into a division in 1916, existed until 1920. During this time, the unit has changed more than 10 commanders - but invariably all of them were Russian officers and each of them brought something new to the unit.
So, under Colonel Petr Charkovsky, who replaced Domontovich, an artillery semi-battery was created as part of the formation. And at the initiative of the third commander - Colonel Alexander Kuzmin-Karavaev - a Russian paramedic appeared in the brigade, who became the first military doctor of the Persian army.
Later, the unit also had an infantry training team, a machine gun team, and even cadet corps. However, before that, the brigade had to endure a decline. After the change of Kuzmin-Karavaev in 1890, the quality of training of the Cossacks decreased, the unit was simply not given due attention and, most importantly, funding. As a result, with a nominal strength of a thousand people, there were actually only a few hundred fighters in the state. It even got to the point that the Shah was seriously considering transferring command of the brigade to the British - he was stopped only by his unwillingness to spoil relations with the Russian Empire.
Only Colonel Vladimir Kosogovsky, who took command in 1894, could help the Persian Cossacks to get out of the crisis. He managed to achieve an increase in the brigade budget, return the Russian instructors to the location of the Shah and stop the practice of transferring officer ranks by inheritance. The commander also received permission to rebuild the third regiment and form a full battery.
But most importantly, it was Kosogovsky who put forward the idea to form a new Persian army on the basis of the Cossack brigade. It will be brought to life by his followers.
“Very quickly, the corps again turned into the best and most prestigious Persian unit. With his help, many military formations that were in the service of local authorities were disbanded,” writes Oleg Pauller.
To control order from 1910 to 1914, a dozen territorial detachments appeared in the unit, responsible for certain regions of the country. The authorities pushed for their creation, including the events that unfolded in Persia in the second half of the first decade of the 20th century. For six years, the country will be engulfed in revolutions and unrest, with which the sheikh will have to fight, including by force. At the same time, the Cossack brigade will also be used - for example, it will be noted by the shelling of the Majlis in 1908.
The history of the unit will come to an end exactly along with the history of the Russian Empire. After the revolutions of 1917, the affairs of the Middle East faded into the background for the new leadership, and the presence of "their" connection in Persia would lose its significance. Already in 1918, the British began to finance the division, and the Russian officers in it were replaced by local, Persian ones. The unit will be finally disbanded in 1920. Nevertheless, even in a short 40-year history, the brigade left its indelible mark, laying the foundation for the formation of the modern Iranian army.
The beginning of the 20th century was a time when the world was collapsing and reshaping before our eyes - sometimes quite bizarrely.
For example, in July 1934, a Russian émigré officer Boris Skosyrev came to the tiny European principality of Andorra and, following the example of Ostap Bender, so fooled the members of the local General Council that they unanimously recognized him as king BorisI. The reign of this sovereign did not last long - just enough to become an international incident. A week later, he quarreled with the spiritual shepherd of Andorra Bishop of Urgell and declared war on him. An outfit of the Italian gendarmerie arrived in the capital of the newly-minted kingdom, which radically strangled the brilliant reign of the unlucky monarch.
However, history also knows more successful cases of ascension to the throne of people of completely non-royal origin. The phrase "Persian Cossack brigade" sounds ridiculous, but such military unit really existed, and the brave Cossack Reza Khan fought in it.
Learn from the enemy
For more than a century, the Persians kept fighting with the Russian Cossacks in the Caucasus, suffering huge losses and not having success. Finally, in 1878 the Persian Shah Nasser al-Din Shah from the Qajar dynasty, impressed by the prowess of the Terek Cossacks, turned to the governor of the Caucasus, the Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich with a request to detach officers for the device in his possessions of a similar military unit. In St. Petersburg, they did not resist for a long time - it was a chance to seriously strengthen Russia's position in Persia and begin to squeeze out the British from there, with whom the Russian Empire had a protracted undeclared war.
Officers and conscripts were sent to Tehran. Officially, the brigade was subordinate to the Persian Minister of War (and then to the Shah himself), but in reality it was led by a Russian envoy, especially since the payment for this military unit came from the Russian treasury. The direct commander of the brigade was modestly listed as the "head of training for the Persian cavalry" (I recall the Soviet "military experts" in Korea, Vietnam and African countries). The brigade was mainly recruited from Caucasians, who at one time fled to Persia from Russian troops. Now they or their descendants themselves had to serve under the command of Russian officers. The task before the Cossack brigade was set responsible - the protection of the sovereign himself, his family members, the first persons of the state and members of the diplomatic corps. By the beginning of the 20th century, the brigade was rightly revered as the most organized and combat-ready part of the Persian army.
Capable boy
It was at this time that a fourteen-year-old "Cossack" joined the ranks of the brigade. Reza Khan Savadkuhi. The origin of the recruit was quite ordinary for this military unit. He was born and raised in the small village of Alasht in northern Persia. He had undoubted talents, knew several languages, but had practically no education and wrote with difficulty. His militant ancestors once lived in the Caucasus, his grandfather was already a major in the Persian army, his father a colonel. However, Reza Khan barely remembered him - he died when the future Cossack was still a child. The son of a younger wife, he had fadingly small chances for a poor inheritance, but he was distinguished by excellent physical development and a representative appearance. Service in a privileged part gave him a relatively good position and the opportunity to advance to the officer rank. At that time, this was the height of Reza's dreams.
The service was easy for him, a natural rider and grunt quickly attracted the attention of commanders. In 1900, he finally received his first officer rank. Three years later, he was entrusted with a responsible mission - the protection of the Dutch consul. General Fritz Knebel, whose bodyguard was the handsome young Reza Khan, appreciated the smart and inquisitive officer. Thanks to the Dutchman, he mastered the basics of diplomacy with political literacy, and received a thorough knowledge of European military science. By 1910, Reza had already become the captain of the Persian Cossack brigade - not only a dashing horseman, but also a very knowledgeable officer. I must say that such an elevation in this brigade was the exception rather than the norm, command staff here was predominantly Russian. But then Captain Reza Khan was lucky: in 1916, at the height of World War I, it was decided to deploy the brigade into a division.
Between two fires
In contrast to the Persian Cossacks, Great Britain, as if Russia's ally in the Entente, formed South Persian rifle units on the model of Indian sepoys to protect its interests in Persia. Russia could not put up with this and increased its presence in a strategically important region (Baku was nearby, which at that time provided the lion's share of oil to the world market). Officers needed much more than before, and Russian military experts were needed on the fronts of the war with Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey. This is where Reza Khan becomes a colonel and commander of a separate Kazvin detachment. As a child, looking at the brave Cossacks in Circassian coats - with gazyrs, in shaggy hats, with decorated checkers and daggers on their belts - he could only dream of such a career. In reality, however, his rise was just beginning.
The revolution in Russia set in motion hitherto unknown mechanisms of world politics. Most of the officers of the Cossack division sided with the Whites, but the Bolsheviks also looked at the Persian lands with considerable interest: the revolution must be world! In 1920, a detachment of sailors under the command of a former midshipman of the imperial fleet Fyodor Ilyin (Raskolnikov), commander of the Astrakhan-Caspian flotilla, landed in the Persian port of Anzeli, allegedly to return the ships stolen by the White Guards. But soon the landing force was surrounded by Cossacks patrolling the Caspian coast and thrown into the sea. The heroes of this battle were Russian Cossack officers who remained in the service of the Shah. They were led by Reza Khan. However, such a vivid manifestation of combat readiness and loyalty did not so much please the weak Ahmad Shah how much it frightened the British military mission, which planned to seize the Baku oil fields. The British began to actively put pressure on the Shah and his Prime Minister, demanding the dissolution of the Cossack division. Since, after the collapse of the Russian Empire, the financing of the “allied” military unit now lay on their shoulders, it was not difficult to “cut off the oxygen”.
Sardar Sepah
This is where the lessons learned from the Dutch consul came in handy for Colonel Reza Khan. On the night of February 20-21, 1921, his Cossacks supported the coup in the capital. The new prime minister approved the military leader of the uprising as the commander of the revived Cossack division and granted him the rank of general (with the assignment high title"Sardar Sepah"). Soon Reza Khan became the military governor of the capital, the commander in chief and the military minister of Persia. One of the first actions of the new government on February 26, 1921 was the signing of a treaty of friendship with Soviet power. The British could bite their elbows, but access to Baku oil was blocked for them.
A couple of years later, Reza Khan himself became the prime minister of Persia, and two years later the incredible happened: on October 31, 1925, the Majlis (parliament) announced the deposition of Ahmad Shah and the entire Qajar dynasty, and on December 12, the dashing Cossack Reza was declared Shah of Persia Khan, who became known as Reza Pahlavi. The new Shahinshah had nothing to do with the ancient Parthian Karen-Pahlavid dynasty, but his name sounded much more magnificent than before.
It was here that a number of details were revealed that had not previously been focused on. Thought to be a Shia Muslim, the new Shah turned out to be a Zoroastrian and introduced a number of innovations that turned old-fashioned Persia into a rapidly developing secular power. Laws unprecedented for these places were adopted, including the civil code, the law against the violent seizure of land, an autonomous customs tax was introduced ... The Shah actively laid highways and railways, built factories, distributed land plots to four million poor peasants, practically eliminated illiteracy in the country, gave women the right to vote. It was under him, in 1935, that a decree was issued on the removal of the veil! In the same year, the old name of the country - Persia - was changed to Iran, i.e. Aryan country.
Not for that horse
The Aryan theme was generally popular in the 30s of the last century, and most of all in Germany, which had the same attitude to this. ancient people, as Shah Reza to the Parthians (translated by Pahlavi means "Parthian"). This has led to interest true Aryans"to the true Iranians and probably determined the fate of the most progressive of the eastern rulers of that era. He saw in the Nazi Reich a counterbalance to the USSR and Great Britain, from which Iran took a sip of dashing, and maintained active diplomatic contacts with the Germans.
In 1941 Soviet Union and Britain, fearing the placement German bases on the Caspian coast, they demanded that the Shah allow allied troops into their territory. Reza Pahlavi declared his neutrality and refused. Then, on August 25, Soviet and British troops from the north and south began to move inland towards each other. Not wanting senseless bloodshed, Reza Pahlavi abdicated in favor of his son and left the country. He died in Johannesburg (South Africa) in 1944. After the end of the war, his remains were returned to their homeland, and in 1949 the Mejlis awarded the late sovereign the title of "Great". Thus ended the long and glorious epic of the Russian-Persian Cossack - the father of Iran.
The Cossacks were one of the most important levers of political and military influence tsarist Russia in iran, official name which until 1935 was Persia. The Persian Cossack brigade under the leadership of Russian officers appeared in the country in 1879 during the reign of Nasreddin Shah Qajar. Until the end of the military-political domination of the Russian Empire in Iran, this unit was considered the most important organized combat force of the Shah's army. Throughout the existence of the brigade, its top leadership was carried out by Russian officers.
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Der Spiegel 12/17/2014 The members of the command of the Persian Cossack brigade, who were appointed directly from St. Petersburg, were guided in their actions not so much by the orders of the Iranian government, but by the decrees of the Russian authorities. Despite this, all expenses for the maintenance of the unit were compensated by the shah's treasury, although the members of the Iranian government themselves could not determine its size and determine what needs the allocated funds were spent on.Thus, as he writes in his book, Brief essay Constitutional Revolution in Iran" historian Rahim Namvar, "the Persian Cossack brigade was an armed force modeled on Russian army, and were actually under her command, obeying the orders of the Cossack command located in Russia. The budget of this military unit directly went to its command through the Russian Accounting and Loan Bank at the expense of the Iranian government, but it itself did not control the Cossacks.
In his memoirs, the well-known Iranian traveler and participant in the Constitutional Revolution, Mohammad Ali Sayah Mahalati, reports that back in 1905, the number of the Cossack Corps in Persia was about one thousand people, and it was the most effective military unit countries.
However, despite the fact that the Cossacks were provided at the expense of the Shah's government, they were under the influence of the Russian embassy. Salaries, maintenance and other expenses were paid at the expense of customs duties on the northern borders of Persia, received by the Accounting and Loan Bank. Its leadership, in accordance with the orders of the Russian ambassador in Tehran, made all the necessary payments, without even informing the Persian authorities about it. As he writes in his monograph "Persia in the struggle for independence" Soviet historian Mikhail Pavlovich, “the salaries and provisions of the officers and privates of the Persian Cossack brigade depended on the Russian government. In political matters, its commander, who was appointed and sent from St. Petersburg, acted taking into account the position of the Russian ambassador in Tehran. The commander received his salary from the Accounting and Loan Bank, and all the necessary orders from the Russian diplomatic mission. In a word, he was a direct agent of the tsarist government.
During the period of the Constitutional Revolution in Iran, it was the forces of the Persian Cossack Brigade that in 1908 bombarded the national parliament of the first convocation. By the way, the Accounting and Loan Bank itself, which financially supported the Cossacks, mainly attracted them to ensure the safety of its funds and the safety of personnel.
In addition to the fact that under the protection of the Persian Cossack brigade there were branches of this bank in Tehran and other regions of the country, its duties included escorting representatives of the bank's management traveling around the country and controlling the transportation of its cash and other goods. The main part of the researchers of that period is inclined to believe that this formation played a negative role in the political life of Iran in those years. In particular, information is provided that it was the Accounting and Loan Bank, which pays funds for the maintenance of the Persian Cossack brigade, that determined its goals, while defending the military and political interests of the Russian Empire.
In his memoirs, German Consul General in Tabriz, Wilhelm Liten, who worked in Iran even before the outbreak of World War I, described the Persian Cossack Brigade in detail, noting the role played by the Accounting and Loan Bank in strengthening this military formation. According to him, the Persian Cossack Brigade was founded in 1879, when it was headed by Colonel Alexei Domontovich. In 1882, the command passed to Colonel Pyotr Charkovsky, in 1885 he was replaced by Colonel Alexander Kuzmin-Karavaev, and in 1890 Colonel Konstantin Shneur was appointed to this position. Then, in 1896, the leadership of the brigade was entrusted to Colonel Vladimir Kosogovsky, already in 1903 Colonel Vladimir Lyakhov took his place, and in 1907 Colonel Prince Nikolai Vadbolsky was appointed the new commander.
According to Liten, the Cossack Brigade was a Persian military unit commanded by Russian officers and subordinate to the high command of the Russian army. Annually, 342 thousand fogs were spent on its maintenance (which was almost 1.2 million marks at the then exchange rate), but in 1913 this amount was increased to 900 thousand fogs (3.5 million marks). These funds were paid directly by the Accounting and Loan Bank of Iran at the expense of proceeds from customs duties in the north of the shah.
The budget of this formation was made by its commander, who at the same time did not provide any accounts to either the Shah's government or the treasury. The number of the brigade was 1,600 people, but in 1913 its units were also founded in other Iranian cities - Tabriz, Resht and Hamadan, so the number of personnel was increased. Initially, efforts were made to use the Cossacks as gendarmes on the roads in the northern part of Persia, but due to the disagreement of Colonel Vadbolsky, this plan could not be implemented.
In fact, the Persian Cossack brigade was a court military formation, which was used for parades and as a guard guarding the Shah personally and Russian envoys. However, from the very beginning of its existence in 1879, not a single Russian officer died in the line of duty and was not even injured. Let's take a look at this fact for comparison. The Swedish officers, who in 1911 organized the gendarmerie service in Iran, only in 1914 lost those killed in the line of duty. official duties six persons. The post of commander of the Persian Cossack brigade was very profitable for its owner, but subordinate officers treated him without much respect.
After the defeat of tsarism in Russia, the Persian Cossack Brigade, along with other Russian units, swore allegiance to Great Britain.
Coming to the end, it should be said that the Cossacks played a crucial role in the 1921 coup d'état. As in 1908, when, under the command of Colonel Lyakhov, members of the Persian Cossack Brigade shot down the Iranian parliament, 13 years later, having taken part in another political coup, they dealt an even more crushing blow to the gains of the Constitutional Revolution.
In the second half of the 19th century, two regional powers in the Middle East, Ottoman Empire and Persia, sought to seriously modernize their armed forces. It was clear that the traditional system of organization and training of both the Sultan's and the Shah's armies had become obsolete. Instructors from various European countries were invited to train new units. However, one of the most interesting examples use of European experience in the East became the Persian Cossacks.
In 1848, the seventeen-year-old Nasser al-Din Shah Qajar ascended the Shah's throne of Persia. He was a representative of the Qajar dynasty that had ruled the country since 1795 - immigrants from the Azerbaijani Qajar tribe, who settled in the Transcaucasus after the Mongol conquest of the territory of modern Iran. In 1795, the son of one of the leaders of the Koyunlu clan of the Qajar tribe Agha Mohammed Qajar seized power in the country and established the power of his family. By the time of the events described - the creation of the Persian Cossack brigade - Nasser ad-Din Qajar had been in power for thirty years. In 1878, he undertook his next trip to European countries, visiting the territory of the Russian Empire. The shah returned from Europe as a convinced supporter of the reorganization of his army along the European lines. He brought military instructors from France, decided to establish in Tehran military school. During a trip through the Russian Transcaucasus, the Shah was greatly impressed by the Cossacks guarding him. Nasser al-Din Qajar set about creating a similar military unit in Persia, for which he turned to Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich Romanov, who at that time was the governor in the Caucasus, with a request to send Russian Cossack officers as instructors - to form the Persian Cossack army. Despite the fact that before Russian empire fought with Persia more than once, and indeed the relations between the two neighboring states were far from ideal, the Russian leadership decided to meet the Shah halfway. Moreover, the appearance in Persia of military units led by Russian officers inevitably meant the growth of Russian influence on the policy of the Persian state. Therefore, the "go-ahead" for sending military advisers to Persia was received. Thus began the history of the Persian Cossacks of the Qajar Shahs.
Thirty-two-year-old Lieutenant Colonel Alexei Ivanovich Domontovich was already an experienced officer by the time of the events described. He served in the headquarters of the Caucasian Military District - as a staff officer for special assignments. Behind the lieutenant colonel, a Kuban Cossack by origin, were studies in the 2nd Moscow Cadet Corps, the Alexander Military School and the Mikhailovsky Artillery School and fourteen years of military service. In 1864, Domontovich began serving as cornets of the 11th horse artillery battery of the Kuban Cossack army, in 1872-1875. studied at the Nikolaev Academy General Staff, after which he was assigned as a senior adjutant of the headquarters of the 38th Infantry Division and promoted to captain. In 1876, Captain Domontovich took part in the occupation of Bayazet, Surp-Oganez, Bolshaya Karakilisa, Diadin and a number of other battles. For military exploits, the officer received the Order of St. Vladimir of the 4th degree with swords and a bow and was promoted to lieutenant colonel - for participating in the battles at Dayar. Therefore, there was nothing surprising in the fact that when discussing the candidacy of a military adviser sent to Persia, the choice fell on Lieutenant Colonel Domontovich. On February 7, 1879, Domontovich signed a contract with the Persian leadership on the arrival of the Russian military mission in Persia and the formation of the Persian Cossack brigade. Domontovich himself was appointed the first brigade commander, and in 1880 he was promoted to colonel. In 1879, the first regiment of the brigade was formed.
The organization of the brigade service was very interesting. Formally, the Persian Cossack Brigade was subordinate to the Minister of War of Persia, but in fact the brigade was controlled by the Russian envoy in Persia. The commander of the Persian Cossack brigade was a Russian officer with the rank of colonel of the General Staff, who officially had the position of head of training for the Persian cavalry. Russian officers and sergeants, who were considered his assistants, were subordinate to him. Each regiment of the brigade was commanded by a Persian general, but the actual commander of each regiment was again a Russian instructor officer. In each regiment of the brigade, subordinate to the officer - instructor was a constable who assisted in the training of personnel. The cavalry regiments of the brigade each consisted of four squadrons, which in turn included four platoons.
It was initially decided to staff the personnel of the Persian Cossack Brigade with Muhajirs - the descendants of settlers from the Caucasus who left for Persia after Russia's victory in the Caucasian War. Highlanders were considered warlike, brave people, familiar with military affairs from childhood, so they were best suited for the role of the Cossacks of the brigade. Over time, more than half of the Cossacks of the brigade were from the mountain Kurdish tribes of Iranian Kurdistan, and the rest was recruited from among the representatives of the Turkic tribes of Iran, Turkmens and Afghans. The soldiers of the brigade wore the uniform of the Terek Cossack army, were armed with rifles of the Berdan system and cold - sabers and daggers.
In 1882, Colonel Domontovich was recalled to Russia and after some time was appointed chief of staff of the Caucasian Cavalry Division. Subsequently, he rose to the rank of cavalry general, commanded the 2nd consolidated Cossack division and retired in 1906. Colonel of the General Staff Pyotr Vladimirovich Charkovsky was appointed the new commander of the brigade. He formed the third Cossack regiment and a squadron of veterans "Kadama" as part of the brigade - from representatives of older ages. Also, the Persian Cossack Brigade included a mounted artillery battery, a squadron of the Shah's guards and a musical detachment. In 1885, Colonel Charkovsky, who served for further service as chief of staff of the 21st Infantry Division of the 3rd Caucasian Army Corps, was replaced as brigade commander by Colonel Kuzmin-Karavaev. He led the brigade until 1891, when he was replaced by Colonel Alexander Konstantinovich Shneur (he commanded the brigade in 1891-1894).
However, already in the second half of the 1880s. the Russian leadership lost interest in the brigade, which immediately affected its financial support. The reduction of the personnel of the brigade began - up to 200-300 people by the mid-1890s. Lost interest in the brigade and Nasser ad-Din Shah Qajar. The Minister of War of Persia, Naib os-Saltane, on whom strong influence provided by British agents, generally insisted on the dissolution of the Persian Cossack Brigade. According to the minister, it was enough to keep only the Cossack convoy to accompany the Shah. However, Nasser al-Din Qajar still abandoned the idea of disbanding the brigade - largely because he did not want to quarrel with his powerful northern neighbor. But the possibility of replacing Russian officers with German instructors was already beginning to be discussed by the Persian command. 
Clouds gathered over the brigade, and who knows, maybe during 1894-1896. it would have ceased to exist if in 1894 a new brigade commander had not been appointed - Colonel of the General Staff Vladimir Andreevich Kosogovsky. Graduate of Nikolaev cavalry school, Kosogovsky previously served in the 12th Akhtyrsky Hussar Regiment, then as a senior adjutant of the headquarters of the 2nd Caucasian Cossack division, commanded a squadron of the 22nd Astrakhan Dragoon Regiment, served as a chief officer for assignments at the headquarters of the Caucasian Military District and as a staff officer for special assignments under the commander of the troops of the Semirechensk region. In 1890, Lieutenant Colonel Kosogovsky became a staff officer for assignments at the headquarters of the Caucasian Military District, and in 1894 he was promoted to colonel and sent to Persia to command a Cossack brigade.
Colonel Kosogovsky was far from being an ordinary serviceman. He was fluent in Farsi and other Iranian dialects, studied the life and traditions of the peoples of Persia. It was Kosogovsky who proposed to the Shah the idea of creating a new Persian army of the modern type on the basis of the Persian Cossack brigade. He resumed the recruitment of personnel to the brigade, and by September 1894, 500 Cossacks were under the command of the colonel. However, it was not without controversy. When Kosogovsky abolished the privileges of the Muhajirs, some of them rebelled. On May 5, 1895, the Muhajirs left the location of the brigade, taking their hereditary pensions. Minister of War Naib os-Saltane, known for his hostile attitude towards the brigade, invited those who left part of the Muhajirs under his command and already on May 9, 1895, announced the creation of the Persian brigade. Her instructors were supposed to be English officers, but intervened Russian embassy and on May 24, 1895, Shah Nasser ad-Din ordered the disbandment of the os-Saltane brigade. At the same time, the shah signed an agreement that only Russian military instructors would serve in the brigade. Interference in the internal affairs of the brigade was prohibited even for the leaders of the Persian Ministry of War.
For nine years of commanding the brigade, Kosogovsky managed to turn it into the most combat-ready formation of the Persian army. Accordingly, the influence of Kosogovsky himself on political life Persia. He became one of the Shah's chief military advisers. In March 1899, Shah Mozafereddin Shah Qajar, who succeeded Nasser al-Din Qajar, who was killed in 1896, on the throne, ordered to increase the size of the brigade by a thousand people. So the Persian Cossack brigade turned into a powerful unit of 1600 trained and well-armed Cossacks. Colonel Kosogovsky himself in 1900, while in the position of commander of the Persian Cossack brigade, received the rank of major general, and continued to command the brigade in this rank until 1903, when he was replaced by Colonel Fyodor Grigoryevich Chernozubov. In 1906, Colonel Vladimir Platonovich Lyakhov became the brigade commander. It was he who commanded the brigade in 1908, when on June 22, by order of the new Shah Muhammad Ali, who replaced Mozafereddin Shah Qajar, who died in 1907, the Persian Majlis was shot from artillery pieces. For this, the Shah appointed Lyakhov Governor General of Tehran. Seeing the reliability of the brigade, the shah thought about further increasing its numbers. In 1913, units of the brigade, previously stationed exclusively in Tehran, were deployed to Tabriz, Rasht and Hamadan.
In 1909, Colonel Lyakhov (pictured) was transferred to Russia - to the post of commander of the 50th Bialystok Infantry Regiment, and in 1912 he became the head of the military headquarters of the Kuban Cossack army. He rose to the rank of lieutenant general and commanded the 1st Caucasian Army Corps, and after the revolution and the beginning civil war- troops of the Tersko-Dagestan region Volunteer army, was killed in 1919. The new commander of the brigade was Colonel Prince Nikolai Petrovich Vadbolsky, a participant in the Russo-Japanese War, who served as the chief of staff of the Caucasian Cavalry Division. Vadbolsky deserves the merit of delivering the brigade from performing unusual functions of police service in the northern provinces of Persia.
In the summer of 1916, the Persian Cossack Brigade was reorganized into the Persian Cossack Division. He commanded her in 1916-1917. Major General Baron Vladimir Nikolaevich von Meidel - a participant in the First World War, and in 1917-1918. - Colonel Georgy Iosifovich Klerzhe, future chief of staff of Ataman Semenov's troops. After the change of power in Russia, the division was taken over by the British, who gained enormous influence in Persia. In 1918-1920. The Persian Cossack division was commanded by the last Russian commander - Colonel Vsevolod Dmitrievich Staroselsky, the former commander of the Guards Cavalry Regiment, who left for Persia after October revolution. At the same time, units of the division patrolled the coast of the Caspian Sea in order to prevent the landing Soviet troops. It was they who forced the detachment of the Red Army commanded by Fedor Raskolnikov to leave Persia. The famous adventure to "Sovietize" Persia failed largely thanks to the Persian Cossack division. However, in 1920, under pressure from British military advisers, all Russian officers who served in the division were fired, and command was transferred to Persian officers.
At the end of 1920, the division was disbanded, and five years later, General Reza Khan was proclaimed Shah of Persia (in the photo of 1910 - on the left), which gave rise to the new Shah Pahlavi dynasty. Ironically, Reza Khan came from the Persian Cossack Brigade. It was there that a young man named Reza Savadkuhi, a Mazenderan by his father and an Azerbaijani by his mother, began serving as a private, and in 1898, at the age of twenty, he was promoted to officer and served in the Persian Cossack brigade (and then division) for more than twenty years, rising to the rank of 1919 to the rank of general. In 1921, at the height of the turmoil, General Reza Khan, with the help of his friends - officers, former colleagues in the Persian Cossack Brigade, captured Tehran. Ahmed Shah Qajar was forced to appoint him military governor of the capital, then minister of war. In 1923, Reza Khan headed the Persian government, and in 1925 he announced the deposition of Ahmed Shah Qajar and became the new ruler of the country.
The Persian Cossack brigade (hereinafter referred to as the PKB; the official name is His Majesty Shah's Cossack brigade) is a unique military unit of the Persian army that existed under the leadership of Russian instructors from the moment the first regiment was formed in 1879 until 1920 (in 1916 it was reorganized into division). Its creation was initiated by the Russian envoy in Tehran I.A. Zinoviev. It was in close connection with the conquest of Akhal-Teke by the Russians and the struggle with Great Britain on this occasion, as well as for influence at the Shah's court [Khidoyatov G.A., 1969, p. 348-423]. Despite the existing publications [Gokov O.A., 2003; Gokov O.A., 2008; Krasnyak O.A.; Krasnyak O.A., 2007; Ter-Oganov N.K., 2010; Ter-Oganov N.K., 2012; Rabi U., Ter-Oganov N., 2009], some fragments of its history require more detailed study. One of them is the period from 1882 to 1885, when Pyotr Vladimirovich Charkovsky was the commander of the PKB, or the Head of Training of the Persian Cavalry (hereinafter referred to as the Head), as his position was officially called. So far, his activities in Iran have been described most holistically in the study by N.K. Ter-Oganov [Ter-Oganov N.K., 2012, p. 62–67]. But the internal problems and the real state of the PKB are poorly covered by him. In our article, we will try to give complete analysis activities of P.V. Charkovsky and the position of the brigade in the period under review.
The first Head was Lieutenant Colonel (later - Colonel) of the General Staff (hereinafter - General Staff) Alexei Ivanovich Domontovich, who had been in Persia from 1879 to 1882. and liked by Shah Nasreddin [Krasnyak O.A., 2007, p. 72–78; Ter-Oganov N.K., 2012, p. 52–62]. In 1882, at the end of the contract, A.I. Domontovich, despite the requests of the Shah, was not left in his position. The reason for this was the conflict with the envoy [Kosogovsky V.A., 1923, p. 392]. By order of the Minister of War, since March 1882, the Caucasian authorities were preoccupied with the search for a new candidate for the post of Head. At the initiative of the Chief of Staff of the Caucasian Military District, Lieutenant General of the General Staff P.P. Pavlov, approved by General of Cavalry A.M. Dondukov-Korsakov, instead of A.I. Domontovich, it was decided to send Colonel P.V. Charkovsky.
The new Head came from St. Petersburg nobles. He was born on April 15, 1845, graduated from the Pavlovsky Cadet Corps, the Mikhailovsky Artillery School and the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff. He entered the service on September 29, 1861. He served in the Life Guards Horse Artillery Brigade. Participated in the rank of captain Russian-Turkish war 1877–1878 During the first year of the war, he was awarded the Orders of Vladimir 4th class with swords and a bow, St. Stanislaus 2nd class and St. Anna 2nd class with swords. After graduating from the accelerated course of the Academy of the General Staff, he was released into the General Staff. In March 1878 he was renamed lieutenant colonel of the General Staff, and in August he was promoted to colonel for distinction. In 1879 he was awarded a golden weapon for the campaign. From March 1878 to January 1879 P.V. Charkovsky was the commander of a cavalry artillery brigade division and served as chief of staff of the 1st Caucasian Cossack division. From January 1879 to October 1882, he was listed only as chief of staff [Glinoetsky N.P., 1882, p. 174; List of generals by seniority, 1891, p. 840; List of generals by seniority, 1896, p. 659]. At the same time, he was an active participant in military intelligence in the Caucasus. Being in this position, P.V. Charkovsky was appointed to the post of secretary of the Trebizond consulate [RGVIA, f. 446, d. 44, l. 19] . In the Ministry of War, neither the chief of the General Staff nor the head of the department raised objections to the candidacy, which was reported to the envoy in Tehran [RGVIA, f. 446, d. 44, l. 8–9].
On June 5, 1882, Emperor Alexander III allowed the appointment of Colonel of the General Staff P.V. Charkovsky to the post of Head of Training of the Persian Cavalry [RGVIA, f. 446, d. 44, l. 19–20] . The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was informed about this. Since the shah insisted on the speedy arrival of the new Head [RGVIA, f. 446, d. 44, l. 16], appointed on March 28, 1882 by the Minister of Foreign Affairs N.K. Girs telegraphed charge d'affaires in Tehran (I.A. Zinoviev was on vacation in Russia) to urgently begin negotiations on the renewal "on the previous basis of the contract for our instructor" [RGVIA, f. 446, d. 44, l. 27]. On July 16, Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Tehran K.M. Argiropulo signed a new three-year contract with the Shah's government [RGVIA, f. 446, d. 44, l. 52–53] .
The terms of the contract basically repeated the text of the agreement of 1879 [Krasnyak O.A. , 2007, p. 79; RGVIA, f. 446, d. 44, l. 52, 57–59; Ter-Oganov N.K., 2012, p. 63–64; Browne E.G., 1910, p. 228–232]. It was written in French and Persian and consisted of eleven articles. The first of them indicated that P.V. Charkovsky, is appointed by the Caucasian authorities to replace A.I. Domontovich for three years as a military instructor of the Persian "Cossacks". His duty was to prepare and drill cavalry units, determined by the Persian Ministry of War, according to the Russian model. The second article stipulated that 3 officers and 5 officers were appointed to help the colonel by the Caucasian administration. It was pointed out that the names of the members of the military mission, the colonel should inform the envoy in Tehran, and he - to the Iranian government. The third article was devoted to the issues of material and financial support. The manager was to receive 2,400 fogs (24,000 French francs) a year, paid quarterly, and daily fodder for five horses. The chief officers were left with a salary, as in the case of A.I. Domontovich, i.e., each about 5,000 fogs (12,000 French francs). The maintenance of officers was 20 fogs per month or 240 fogs per person per year. The fifth article stated that this money should be paid starting from the date of signing this agreement. The sixth article stated that 400 fogs (4,006 francs) - an advance payment for two months - should be issued to the colonel on the day the contract was signed. According to the fourth article, the instructors were to receive from the Persian government 100, 75 and 24 semi-imperials, respectively, to pay for their journey. According to Article Ten, at the end of the contract, the Persian government undertook to pay the officers the same amount of travel expenses for returning to Russia. At the same time, the members of the military mission retained the right to them if "the agreement is canceled at the request of the Persian government before the end of the specified period." The seventh article stated that in all matters related to the service, the colonel must act in accordance with the instructions of the Persian Ministry of War, to which he is subordinate. The same ministry was obliged to pay him a salary. In the eighth paragraph, the Iranian government undertook to compensate P.V. Charkovsky all travel expenses made by the colonel on his orders. The ninth article fixed that the colonel could not cancel or change the provisions of the contract, could not leave the service of the Persian government before the end of the three-year term. The exception was the disease, due to which P.V. Charkovsky would not have been able to fulfill his duties. The colonel was allowed leave for a period not exceeding three months, "if his health or private affairs need it." But in this case, the General Staff officer did not have the right to receive any payments (including salaries) from the Tehran government. Similar conditions were recorded for other members of the military mission. According to the last eleventh article, the instructors had to arrive in Tehran within two and a half months from the moment they received the amount for travel expenses through the Russian diplomatic mission.
At the same time, the process of enrolling the colonel in a new position took place. As noted, since 1879 he was the secretary of the Trebizond consulate, being an unofficial military agent. By tradition, before being appointed to this post, P.V. Charkovsky was fired from military service with the preservation of a full-time position, but without maintenance, the right to promotion to the next rank, etc., and was assigned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a renaming to the rank of collegiate adviser. Therefore, when sending him to Persia, the reverse procedure was necessary. This required agreements between the War Department and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They were completed in early July. By the highest order of July 16, P.V. Charkovsky was returned to military service and renamed the colonel of the General Staff [RGVIA, f. 446, d. 44, l. 43]. And on July 18, P.P. Pavlov was given an order signed by the Chief of the General Staff N.N. Obruchev call P.V. Charkovsky from Trebizond to Tiflis. Upon arrival, the colonel received an eight-day leave [RGVIA, f. 446, d. 44, l. 45–46]. His trip to Iran was delayed, because one of the new instructors was expected in Tiflis - cornet Denisov, seconded by the General Staff [RGVIA, f. 446, d. 44, l. 46–47]. Finally, in August, members of the mission left for Tehran. Along with the change of the Head, there was also a change of Russian instructors. Esaul E.A. Makovkin was left by the Caucasian authorities for a second term. In addition to him, Yesaul Menyaev and cornet Denisov were appointed officers of the Kuban Cossack army [RGVIA, f. 446, d. 44, l. 53]. As for the officers, some of them were replaced, and some remained for a second term [RGVIA, f. 446, d. 44, l. 27].
The new commander obviously did not have the initiative in political affairs that his predecessor, but he knew his job well and tried to do it the same way. During his command of the PKB P.V. Charkovsky brought the number of people in the brigade to 900 by including 300 Muhajirs in it. Muhajirs were people from Transcaucasia (Erivan and Baku regions), who left it after the signing of the Turkmanchay Peace Treaty of 1828 and settled in Persia [Kolyubakin, 1883, p. 61–62; Mamontov N.P., 1909, p. 91]. A.I. Domontovich was allocated 400 people from the irregular cavalry of the Muhajir, who were distinguished by extremely weak discipline [Kosogovsky V.A., 1923, p. 391]. V.A. Kosogovsky wrote that “under Charkovsky, they managed to convince the remaining 300 Tehran muhajirs, who, during the initial formation of the brigade, did not want to become Cossacks and sat in the best, to join the brigade on the same conditions on which the first four hundred were accepted, that is, with the preservation of their tribal or hereditary content” [Kosogovsky V.A., 1923, p. 392]. Following V.A. Kosogovsky, modern researchers also argue that that part of the Muhajirs who did not agree to serve in the brigade, through the efforts of P.V. Charkovsky was enlisted in the brigade under the same conditions as their compatriots [Krasnyak O.A., 2007, p. 79; Ter-Oganov N.K., 2012, p. 64].
However, it seems to us that this enrollment occurred not only at the insistence of the colonel, but at the request of the Muhajirs themselves and the Shah. Initially, the Muhajirs reacted negatively to attempts to enroll them in the PCB during its formation. Their boss frankly harmed A.I. Domontovich, not wanting to lose his position. However, over time, the situation has changed. Central to this change was the financial support and status achieved for the brigade by its first commander. In conditions when the financial allowance of the Muhajirs worsened from year to year, the stable position of their fellow tribesmen who were in the PKB could not but attract. At the same time, the inclusion of the remaining Muhajirs in the ranks of the Design Bureau was temporarily solved by the task set by Colonel of the General Staff A.I. Domontovich. In 1880 he wrote to I.A. Zinoviev that the position of the Muhajirs, who were not included in the brigade, acts corruptingly on their fellow tribesmen - "Cossacks" [Krasnyak O.A., 2007, p. 132-133]. In particular, the first Head paid attention to the fact that, without carrying out any service, they live in Tehran and use their content. “This kind of facts,” he wrote, “have a very unfavorable effect on the“ Cossacks ”, who carry out a rather difficult service, forcing them to evade it with all their might” [Krasnyak O.A., 2007, p. 132-133].
In 1883 P.V. Charkovsky formed the third regiment and squadron "Kadam" from Muhajirs of different sex and age, i.e. veterans (in this case, the elderly), and women and children were enlisted as pensioners, who continued to receive the Muhajirs' hereditary salary in the form of pensions. In addition, the colonel transformed the Guards semi-squadron into a squadron and formed a choir of musicians [Kosogovsky V.A., 1923, p. 393]. In October of the same year, 4 guns of the 1877 model and 532 charges for them were delivered as a gift from the Russian Emperor Alexander III to the Design Bureau [Kublitsky, 1884]. On the basis of these guns in 1884, P.V. Charkovsky formed a horse battery at the Design Bureau [Ter-Oganov N.K., 2012, p. 65]. It seems that these changes were also connected with Russia's foreign policy plans in the Middle East. In 1881–1885 there was a conquest of the Turkmen lands by the empire, to which Persia partly claimed. The advance of Russia caused a response from the British, who sought to create an anti-Russian bloc in the Middle East [Davletov J., Ilyasov A., 1972; Accession of Turkmenistan to Russia, 1960, p. 549-797]. Therefore, maintaining peaceful relations with Iran, attracting the favor of the Shah to Russia, were among the most important tasks of Russian diplomacy. A P.V. Charkovsky and the PKB acted as elements of foreign policy influence.
The structure of the brigade began to look as follows. It was headed by a colonel of the Russian General Staff - the head of the training of the Persian cavalry; Russian officers and sergeants were considered his assistants - naibs. The PCB consisted of three regiments: two of the Muhajirs, one of the volunteers. “When formed, according to the state, each regiment was supposed to have four squadrons, and in the third - only personnel for four squadrons” [RGVIA, f. 401, op. 5, d. 481, l. 5]. According to the lists, the number of regiments of the brigade was 800 people. “There are 300 men in the 1st and 2nd regiments, about 150 in the third, and about 50 in the battery,” wrote Misl-Rustem [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 146]. In addition to them, there was a squadron of guards, a squadron "Kadam" and a musical choir. At the head of each regiment was an Iranian general with the rank of sarkhang (colonel) or sartip (general). He, however, was usually subordinate to a junior Russian officer-instructor. These Russian officers were the actual commanders of the regiments. In each regiment, a Russian officer had one sergeant at his disposal, with whose help he trained the regiment [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 148]. “They are held in high esteem by the Persian officers,” wrote the author, hiding under the pseudonym Misl-Rustem, “who shake hands with them and obey them in everything. This comes from the fact that the Russian officers are much more educated and know how to behave more importantly with the lower ranks” [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 148]. The regiment or foudzh was divided into 4 squadrons (hundreds), commanded by Iranian staff officers. According to Misl-Rustem, who observed the PKB, the latter “are trying to recruit as many people from their “nukers” as possible into their squadrons, i.e. servants, or peasants of their villages and related villages. With such nukers, they are better off, they get more profit, and it’s easier to deal with them” [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 148]. Each squadron was divided into 4 deste (platoons). Each regiment had a banner with the Persian coat of arms. They were kept either in the colonel's apartment or in the duty room.
The brigade had at its disposal barracks, stables, pantries for fodder. There were also small workshops (in which the "Cossacks" themselves repaired weapons and equipment), arsenals, a smithy and an infirmary. All this was located in the central part of Tehran. The officers of the PKB, including the Head, lived in houses located opposite the barracks [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 142-146]. As for the "Cossacks", those who were not on vacation lived partly in the barracks, partly in various parts of Tehran in apartments [RGVIA, f. 401, op., 5, file 515, fol. 204]. P.V. Charkovsky sought to equip the unit entrusted to him on the model of European armies. Through his efforts, the appearance of the premises (especially the infirmary, kitchen and barracks) was kept clean and tidy. In 1883, on the orders of the colonel, a duty room was made [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 143].
The appearance of the "Cossacks" was as close as possible to that of the Russian ones. They wore the uniform of the Caucasian Cossacks. The first regiment was dressed in the uniform of the Kuban Cossack army with red beshmets and papa tops. The second regiment wore the uniform of the Terek Cossack army with blue beshmets and papa tops. The third was distinguished by green beshmets and papa tops. On the shoulder straps of the "Cossacks" were embroidered the "initials" of the regiment to which they belonged. The uniforms of the batterymen copied those of the Russian "Kubans". The Guards squadron was equipped in the uniform of the Russian Life Guards Cossack Regiment. On solemn occasions, his soldiers and officers wore red uniforms, and in everyday life - blue, trimmed with galloons, and Circassians. The armament consisted of a Caucasian dagger and checker, as well as a rifle of the Berdan No. 2 system. The latter, however, were handed out only for the duration of the exercises [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 141]. It should be noted that Russian instructors followed the appearance of the "Cossacks", starting from the creation of the unit. This was explained by the psychological impact that well-equipped cavalrymen had on not only the Shah, his entourage, but also the inhabitants of Iran in general (thus raising the status of Russia in their eyes), but also on outside observers-foreigners [Medvedik I.S. ., 2009, p. 120].
Initially, the PKB was formed exclusively from cavalrymen. “Those who wanted to join the brigade brought a horse with a saddle,” wrote Misl-Rustem [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 141]. D. N. Curzon reported that “the lower ranks should have their own horses, but to keep them in order and to replace them with new ones in case of loss or damage, each person is given annually 100 cranes in excess of the prescribed” [Kurzon G., 1893, p. 134]. In reality, the treasury saved on these "vacations". The horse composition consisted of stallions. Only in the guards squadron they were of a certain color - gray. The PKB had state-owned horses. They were used for the internal needs of the brigade, a detachment of musicians rode them, a battery was transported [RGVIA, f. 401, op. 5, d. 481, l. 6].
The PKB was trained according to abbreviated Russian military regulations, which were translated into Persian. Classes took place on the training ground Meydan-e Meshk, located near the barracks of the brigade. First, each "Cossack" was trained separately, then squadron, regimental and brigade exercises were carried out. In addition, they practiced riding and horse riding.
A certain idea of the preparation of the brigade is given by the testimony of the Russian officer A.M. Alikhanov-Avarsky. He traveled to Persia in the middle of 1883 and observed the Guards squadron of the PKB, which constituted the personal guard of Nasreddin Shah. “A few minutes later, a platoon-by-platoon, with music at the head, excellently dressed in red Circassian coats, the shah’s escort squadron passed by us,” A.M. Alikhanov-Avarsky impressions of the review of the troops that accompanied Nasreddin Shah on his trip to Budzhnurt. - It was an exact copy from our St. Petersburg convoy to the last detail (we are talking about the Life Guards Cossack Regiment of His Majesty, whose Cossacks made up the convoy of the Russian Emperor - O.G.); even the officers were wearing Russian epaulettes” [Alikhanov-Avarsky M., 1898, p. 157]. “As far as one can judge from one passage,” the Russian observer noted, “the imitation seems to have succeeded this time not only in appearance ... the squadron made such an impression on us (the officers who watched the review - O.G.) that it seemed , he can, without any exaggeration, with dignity enter the environment of any European army" [Alikhanov-Avarsky M., 1898, p. 157–158].
Under P.V. The Charkovsky Design Bureau also received its first baptism of fire. In 1882, 100 "Cossacks" were "among other troops" sent by the Persian government to the Astrabad region "to curb the Turkmens." Then, in 1884, 300 people were sent, and in 1885, 100 people [RGVIA, F. 401, op. 5, d. 61, L. 20]. Unfortunately, the only thing known about the details of the expeditions is that among the "Cossacks" 28 rifles were killed and lost [RGVIA, F. 401, op. 5, d. 61, L. 20]. The following was reported in the collection of the Russian Military Ministry about the last expedition against the Yomud Turkmens: “In 1885, an expeditionary detachment was equipped to the Atrek River to pacify the Yomud Turkmens. During the speech, it consisted of 1,600 infantry, 200 Cossacks and 200 irregular cavalry, a total of 2,000 people. 600 people arrived at Atrek, the rest deserted along the way” [Collection of the latest information about the armed forces of European and Asian states, 1894, p.804].
However, the external gloss could not cover up the internal decay. The system of relations characteristic of the Persian armed forces and society as a whole more and more penetrated into the PCB. The main problem remained financial. P.V. Charkovsky was forced to resort to extensive austerity measures, since a large amount of money was spent on the maintenance of pensioners. In addition, the brigade's financing system required the Head to be able to solve economic issues in such a way as to avoid riots in the Design Bureau and at the same time maintain its appearance. The latter for Nasreddin Shah was more important than the actual combat capability.
As before, the remark of A.I. Domontovich about "inaccurate issuance of money for the maintenance of the brigade", which "prevents the proper conduct of business" [Krasnyak O.A., 2007, p. 133]. In the Persian army, there was a complex system of issuing amounts for the maintenance of individual military units [Vrevsky A.B., 1868, p.29; Frankini, 1883, p. 27–28]. Since the PKB was part of the Iranian armed forces, it was also subject to generally accepted norms. The entire funding system was "tied" to the Minister of War, who distributed the country's military budget. And in the case of the Design Bureau, it was he who was the most important obstacle, since he withheld part of the brigade's funds in his favor. It should also be noted that a significant reason for the financial turmoil of the Design Bureau was the fact that initially no long-term documents were agreed and signed that determined budget allocations, their spending and reporting. In fact, everything was carried out on the basis of agreements between the Russian Mission and the Shah and the Minister of War each time a new Head was appointed. As a result, P.V. Charkovsky was constantly faced with the untimely issuance of money to him for the maintenance of the Design Bureau [RGVIA, f. 401, op. 4, d. 57, l. 4]. In addition, the money was paid to the brigade only starting a few months after the beginning of the year [RGVIA, f. 446, d. 46, l. 90]. The budget for 1882–1883 was 66,536 fogs [Ter-Oganov N.K., 2010, p. 77] and had no tendency to increase. Misl-Rustem described the financial side of the life of the brigade in this way. “The colonel is given a certain amount for the brigade, according to the budget approved by the shah ... but they will not give him all the money: having kept a lot in favor of the military ministry, and even the “saraf” - the tax collector - will charge interest, since checks are issued to receive money ahead of schedule. Then the colonels must sometimes bring, like real Persians, gifts to the Minister of War and even to the Shah ... After all, these gifts also cost a lot, which should cause savings, in view of which there is, especially in summer, half of the people on vacation in the brigade, meanwhile, everyone is listed. [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 150]. In addition, "the salary of the third regiment was issued in addition to the Russian colonel and was paid extremely inaccurately" [RGVIA, f. 446, d. 46, l. 90].
The result of cost savings was a decrease in the quality of training of the people of the brigade. I had to save on almost everything. Thus, the indicated author, who observed the PCB for about 6 years, reported that P.V. Charkovsky “dressed people in shirts for the summer, and hid Circassian coats in the arsenal, on the one hand, on the occasion of the heat, and on the other, to save Circassian coats” [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 151]. There is a gradual departure from the principles of management laid down by A.I. Domontovich. An indicator of this was the case when P.V. Charkovsky decided not to give portioned money to his hands, so that they would not be spent for other purposes. “But he did not succeed for a long time,” Misl-Rustem reported. - there was a murmur, and the food was no longer cooked. “The fact is,” he explained, “that the Persian “Cossack” manages to feed his entire family on the portions received, and it is unthinkable to do this from the boiler” [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 145]. Thus, the idea of the first Head that the contentment of people with food should not be given into the hands of each horseman receded before the realities of Persian life. The result of financial problems was that by the time the contract ended, the colonel failed to provide a "reporting on the expenditure of amounts" on time. The Russian envoy described this as a "misunderstanding" [RGVIA, f. 401, op. 4, d. 57, l. 5]. And it consisted in the fact that the Minister of War Kamran Mirza withheld part of the payments in the amount of 6,000 fogs in his favor [Kosogovsky V.A., 1923, p.393]. Nevertheless, with each new Head, the “misunderstanding” grew and eventually almost led to the liquidation of the Design Bureau.
Under P.V. Charkovsky, such a pan-Persian phenomenon as the transfer of part of the personnel of the brigade "on leave" is spreading. Continuing to be listed in the Design Bureau, the soldiers were sent home to earn money. This made it possible to save their salaries (on vacation it was supposed to allocate half the content for a soldier), but also caused criticism of the colonel in an effort to enrich himself at the expense of the “Cossacks” [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 151-152]. However, it seems to us that these complaints were caused by the activities of the next Head. Financial difficulties led to the fact that when leaving Persia in 1885, P.V. Charkovsky was unable to provide timely reports on the expenditure of amounts [RGVIA, f. 401, op. 4, d. 57, l. 5]. However, the history of the Design Bureau shows that this fact cannot be used as unconditional evidence of the financial unscrupulousness of the Head. Each of the brigade commanders in the 19th century had problems with submitting a financial report to the envoy. In the case of P.V. Charkovsky, unfortunately, lacks facts and information to clarify all the causes of financial troubles.
Outwardly, the structure and activities of the PCB looked quite respectable. However, it is difficult to fully agree with the opinion of A. Rzhevussky (made, by the way, at the beginning of the 20th century), which the researchers cite, that “The Persian Cossack brigade ... occupied a special position in the Iranian armed forces and by that time was already a good organized military unit” [Krasnyak O.A., 2007, p. 80; Ter-Oganov N.K., 2012, p. 65]. Indeed, by Persian standards, the PKB was elite unit well organized and funded. At the same time, external indicators should not obscure internal processes. As stated in the “Report on Issues Concerning the Current Situation of the Persian Cossack Brigade”, compiled in October 1907, at the beginning of its existence, the PCB was an “ordinary, only better trained” part of the Iranian army [Rybachyonok I.S., 2012, p. . 452]. So, despite the relatively regular training of the Cossacks (three times a week, each no more than two hours [Kublitsky, 1884, p. 71]), the main thing that the PKB was taught was horse riding and defile, or a ceremonial march [Alikhanov-Avarsky M., 1898, p. 223]. “All the people at the head of the army,” explained one of the officers who observed the PKB in 1883, “including here the Minister of War Naib os-Soltane, have no idea about military affairs and consider it the height of perfection if the part approximately exactly goes through the ceremonial march” [Kublitsky, 1884, p. 71]. “The brigade walks wonderfully in ceremonial,” noted Misl-Rustem [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 149]. An extremely negative characterization of the PKB was given by the Russian officer A.M., who visited Khorasan in 1883. Alikhanov-Avarsky. Its number does not always reach even 750 people, he reported. “This essentially militia cavalry regiment (So in the text - O.G.) is quite arbitrarily called a brigade, and even more so - a Cossack brigade, because, in addition to the costume of the Caucasian mountaineers, this unit has nothing to do with the Cossacks” [Alikhanov-Avarsky M. , 1898, p. 222]. The training of the brigade, from the point of view of the European military, was far from being in the best condition. The internal reason for this, most likely, was not the reluctance of the colonel, but the lack of funds. P.V. Charkovsky took care of the Design Bureau, but was forced to adapt to existing conditions. So, “during the 6 years that I spent in Persia,” an anonymous correspondent wrote, “the brigade did not have a single live ammunition firing exercise” [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 149]. “Why waste expensive ammo?! - cited the statement of the Minister of War, the third son of Nasreddin Shah, Kamran Mirza Naib os-Saltane A.M. Alikhanov-Avarsky. - ... After all, in wartime you will have to shoot not at birds, not even at single people, but at the masses, on which our boys will not miss! [Alikhanov-Avarsky M., 1898, p. 212–213]. It was necessary to save cartridges, since there was nothing to replenish their loss. “I know for certain,” Kublitsky reported, “that at present, in the Cossack brigade, the entire combat set of cartridges for 600 Berdan rifles is limited to two and a half thousand, i.e. that is, only four cartridges per gun ”[Kublitsky, 1884, p. 69]. At the same time, they were not always spent rationally, and not through the fault of the Head. So, due to the poor quality of local gunpowder, cartridges from Russian guns were used for blank firing on the orders of the Minister of War at the Shah's maneuvers of the Tehran garrison [Kublitsky, 1884, p. 68]. The same was true for artillery. “For 1883 to 1898,” the new PKB commander V.A. Kosogovsky, - The Persian Cossack battery, due to the impossibility of replenishing the produced shells, did not fire almost any live shells at all, only from time to time releasing a few grenades for the shah's amusement. The consequence of this is that, being well trained in combat and action with guns, officers and servants in essence have no idea about firing live projectiles ”[RGVIA, f. 401, op. 5, d. 61, l. 38].
The position of the PKB was also only partly privileged. It consisted in the fact that Russian instructors trained the "Cossacks", the brigade was under the patronage of the Russian diplomatic mission and the salary was paid regularly in it in comparison with other parts of the Persian army. Otherwise, the PKB was an integral part of the Iranian armed forces, which was subject to most of their rules and shortcomings. The brigade was also part of the Tehran garrison. Contrary to popular belief [Kalugin S., 2003, p. 364; Rybachenok I.S., 2012, p. 451; Sergeev E.Yu., 2012, p. 175; Strelianov (Kalabukhov) P.N., 2007, p. 215; Shishov A.V., 2012, p. 20], the brigade was neither a personal escort nor the Shah's guard. Convoy functions were performed only by "Cossacks" from the Guards squadron, who accompanied the Shah on trips around the country. Under Nasreddin Shah, the “guards” and personal units guarding the Persian ruler were ghouls [Krasnyak O.A., 2007, p. 57; Frankini, 1883, p. 20–21].
As already noted, the brigade had at its disposal barracks, stables, pantries for fodder and other utility and residential premises. However, Misl-Rustem, who observed them from the inside, reported that part of the existing one was finished to be shown to visitors senior officials, and the main buildings were not updated and gradually fell into decay [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 142–146].
Another negative phenomenon that "overwhelmed" the PKB was an overabundance of officers. The fact is that in the production of ranks the brigade commander was not independent and could not regulate it. Being part of the Persian armed forces, the PKB also fell under their practice of forming a command corps. “The quality of officers is also not paid attention here,” wrote M.A. Alikhanov-Avarsky. - they are produced not only by the Minister of War for a fee, but also by the brigade commander himself indiscriminately" [Alikhanov-Avarsky M., 1898, p. 233]. In addition, the Shah himself also made officers for offerings. There was an unwritten rule in the Persian army, according to which all ranks from the naib (second lieutenant) to the sultan (captain) complained to the commander of the fouja, from the sultan to the sartip (general) - to the minister of war, and in the sartip they became only at the behest of the shah [Collection of the latest information about the armed forces of European and Asian states, 1894, p. 797]. The colonel could promote himself to the ranks up to the sultan, without bringing to the attention of the Persian ruler. All that was required was the approval of the Minister of War. However, M.A. Alikhanov-Avarsky was not quite right in criticizing the brigade commander. In Russia, the heads of individual units had the right to be promoted to headquarters officers and awarded [RGVIA, f. 401, op. 5, d. 61, l. 121]. The same was sought by the first Heads - control over the production of ranks. The PKB commanders were put in such a position that they were forced to put up with appointments "from outside". From the side, an ignorant person, especially accustomed to a strict system of promotion to officer ranks in European armies, it seemed that the Superintendent was illegible in his choice. But, on the other hand, under the orders that prevailed in the armed forces and the administration of Persia, chinoproizvodstvo became a profitable item for the producer. It is difficult to say how much the first two colonels used their position to improve their own financial affairs. Regarding P.V. Charkovsky has no direct information of this kind. It is possible that he adopted the practice of his predecessor regarding the production of noble "Cossacks" as officers, since he also had to fight the privileged position of the former residents of the South Caucasus. On the other hand, it can be assumed that the colonel also promoted muhajirs to officers in order to enlist their loyalty. Those who considered themselves descendants of noble muhajirs, “found service in the lower ranks of the brigade for themselves humiliating” [Kosogovsky V.A., 1923, p. 393]. The same situation developed if unborn Muhajirs were appointed commanders of well-born Muhajirs. Therefore, the Head was forced to maneuver in order to avoid intra-brigade conflicts. As for the sale of ranks, Misl-Rustem extended his thoughts about the financial unscrupulousness of the brigade commanders to the first three colonels in general [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 150], and they were based largely on rumors and misunderstood actions.
From indirect information it can be seen that P.V. Charkovsky enjoyed great authority among his subordinates [Misl-Rustem, 1897, p. 145–146]. There is no doubt about his competence: he did a lot to equip the Design Bureau, developed the "Guide to the training of Cossack horse artillery", translated into Farsi and published in Tehran in 1885 [Ter-Oganov N.K., 2012, p. 65]. Foreign observers have noted that "the influence of seconded Russian officers continues to be noticeable" [Armed Forces of Persia by Löbel Jahresbericht, 1888, p. 129]. From the side, the brigade really made an impression. The English doctor Wils wrote: “Three years ago (the Russian translation was published in 1887 - O.G.) the Shah had three Cossack regiments that received the correct salary, with Europeans as instructors. I have never seen a more beautiful composition of soldiers and horses" [Wils, 1887, p. 179]. The activity of Russian instructors had an external effect. Wils' opinion was shared by many observers, and in their words, by the inhabitants in these countries. These fears were clearly manifested in the political circles of Great Britain [Medvedik I.S., 2009, p. 117; Rotstein F.A., 1960, p. 221]. Nevertheless, Russian government during the period under review was not interested in creating an organized armed forces[The Most Submissive Report of Lieutenant-General Kuropatkin..., 1902, p. 60]. In this context, an interesting question that still remains open is the attitude of the colonel to the Mission.
N.K. Ter-Oganov claims that between P.V. Charkovsky and A.A. Melnikov in 1885 there was a conflict. The reason for it, as in the case of A.I. Domontovich, was the desire of the PKB commander to achieve the status of a military agent and greater independence from the Russian diplomatic representative [Ter-Oganov N.K., 2012, p. 109]. Unfortunately, the author does not provide any links to documents or details of the conflict. The sources known to us do not allow us to state with certainty that there are sharp contradictions between the representatives of the Romanov Empire in Tehran. Therefore, if there were any, then they are waiting for their researcher. Nevertheless, this question is important for a better understanding of the history of the PKB and requires a little explanation.
A.I. Domontovich put forward, according to the envoy, the same demands as P.V. Charkovsky, according to N.K. Ter-Oganov. And it should be noted that from the point of view of the position of the Head and personally of his own, the first commander of the Design Bureau had reason to do this. The fact is that until the early 1890s. only the obligations of the Head were defined in writing, but not his rights. “Having left Russia by order of the Caucasian authorities with the officers, I found myself here in the position of an entrepreneur,” wrote A.I. Domontovich. - The officers depend on the solution of the money issue, the officers receive the agreed content from the Persian government, and I don’t even have any instructions from the authorities in what respect they should stand towards me. The power of a regimental commander, with all his valid rights, is hardly sufficient under such circumstances. Here, in the midst of a Muslim, fanatical people who do not value their lives in anything, we are placed with the demand of various shy and not always understood by them rules. The slightest oversight, the slowdown of officers in the execution of my instructions, can bring evil” [Krasnyak O.A., 2007, p. 130]. December 5, 1892 next Head - Colonel of the General Staff N.Ya. Shneur - received the Shah's destikhat (handwritten command), which established new rules for managing the brigade. On this occasion, he wrote to his superiors: “this is the first attempt to establish some kind of order in the brigade and to determine in writing the rights of the Head of Training for the Persian cavalry, since until now everything has been done according to the established custom” [RGVIA, f. 446, d. 46, l. 89]. A.I. Domontovich, heading the PKB, was formally listed as a staff officer for assignments from the headquarters of the Caucasian Military District, who was on a business trip. In the case of P.V. Charkovsky, apparently, took into account this shortcoming - he received an official appointment as commander of the Design Bureau. However, it was a palliative solution. Formally, he remained only one of the many commanders of military units, albeit in a somewhat privileged position. In Iran, where the position and status had great importance, this interfered, reducing the authority of the Head both among the highest dignitaries and among the Muhajirs of the brigade, especially the noble ones. A military agent (attaché) was the official representative of the Russian Military Ministry abroad. He was included in the diplomatic corps, enjoyed the appropriate privileges, and in political matters was subordinate to the envoy [RGVIA, f. 401, op. 4, d. "On military agents and persons occupying their positions"]. None of this, with the exception of dependence on the head of the diplomatic corps, neither the first nor the second Heads had. The brigade commanders were at the same time secret military agents, that is, they had to deliver intelligence information to the headquarters of the Caucasian Military District. The status of a military attache would have contributed to greater activity of the colonels in this direction. And so the workload of brigade affairs did not allow them to fully perform the functions of military intelligence.
In addition, the colonels were in a delicate position. Formally, according to the contract, they had to obey the Minister of War (and informally - the Shah). As representatives of Russia, they were obliged to coordinate all their actions with the head of the Mission. And, as secret military agents, the PKB commanders depended on the command of the Caucasian Military District (although this dependence was less than the first two). As a result, the Heads turned out to be, as it were, a triple overlapping subordination. The main problem in this situation was how to behave in the event of a conflict of interests of the Shah's Russian side. Failure to comply with the wishes of the Persian ruler or the Minister of War entailed a deterioration in their attitude towards the head and the design bureau. In turn, ignoring or incompletely following the instructions of the Russian Mission could provoke a conflict with it and a recall from Tehran. Based on the foregoing, there is nothing surprising if P.V. Charkovsky really turned to the envoy and the Caucasian authorities with requests to strengthen their position. However, the facts proving this are not yet known. Judging by external signs, P.V. Charkovsky, apparently, did not seek to play an independent role, like A.I. Domontovich, and tried to follow the instructions of the Russian mission.
In June, due to the end of the contract, V.P. Charkovsky went to Russia [Kosogovsky V.A., 1923, p. 393]. Before the arrival of the new Head, Yesaul E.A. Makovkin. Together with the colonel from Persia, 2 officers and 1 officer from the mission left. The rest decided to continue serving in the PKB.
Thus, during the command of P.V. Charkovsky Design Bureau acquired a classic look, which formally did not change until the end of the 19th century. . Outwardly, it was a well-organized, uniformed and trained military unit. However, the internal problems that have manifested themselves in the brigade since its inception acquire more pronounced features in the period under review. They remained outside the attention of outside observers, but gradually began to exert an ever greater influence on the internal climate of the PKB and its position. After the change of A.I. Domontovich and the transition of I.A. Zinoviev to the post of director of the Asian Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the point of view on the Design Bureau as a political (sometimes even advertising) project prevailed. Its main goals were to prevent English instructors from entering the Iranian army and to satisfy the needs of the Shah to have a well-trained military unit by Russian hands. The result of this was the emphasis in the training of the brigade on external training, when combat effectiveness and internal integrity were sacrificed for ostentatious effect. In the future, this played a negative role, putting in the first half of the 1890s. PCB is on the brink of liquidation. ">
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