Exactly seventy years ago, the Soviet Union launched a seven-year program of "large naval shipbuilding" - one of the most expensive and ambitious projects in the history of domestic, and not only domestic, military equipment.
The main leaders of the program were considered heavy artillery ships - battleships and cruisers, which were to become the largest and most powerful in the world. Although it was not possible to complete the super-battleships, interest in them is still great, especially in light of the emerging Lately fashion on alternate history. So what were the projects of the "Stalinist giants" and what preceded their appearance?
Lords of the Seas
The fact that battleships are the main force of the fleet was considered an axiom for almost three centuries. From the time of the Anglo-Dutch wars of the 17th century until the Battle of Jutland in 1916, the outcome of the war at sea was decided by an artillery duel of two fleets lined up in wake lines (hence the origin of the term “ship of the line”, abbreviated as battleship). Faith in the omnipotence of the battleship was not undermined by either the emerging aircraft or submarines. And after the First World War, most admirals and naval theorists still measured the strength of the fleets by the number of heavy guns, the total weight of the broadside and the thickness of the armor. But it is this exceptional role battleships, who were considered the undisputed rulers of the seas, and played a cruel joke with them ...The evolution of battleships in the first decades of the twentieth century was truly rapid. If by the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 the largest representatives of this class, then called squadron battleships, had a displacement of about 15 thousand tons, then the famous Dreadnought built in England two years later (this name became a household name for his many followers) had a full the displacement was already 20,730 tons. "Dreadnought" seemed to contemporaries a giant and the height of perfection. However, by 1912, against the backdrop of the latest superdreadnoughts, it looked like a completely ordinary ship of the second line ... And four years later, the British laid the famous "Hood" with a displacement of 45 thousand tons! Incredibly, powerful and expensive ships in the conditions of an unbridled arms race became obsolete in just three to four years, and their serial construction became extremely burdensome even for the richest countries.
Why did it happen so? The fact is that any warship is a compromise of many factors, the main of which are three: weapons, protection and speed. Each of these components "ate" a significant part of the ship's displacement, since artillery, armor, and bulky power plants with numerous boilers, fuel, steam engines or turbines were very heavy. And the designers, as a rule, had to sacrifice one of the fighting qualities in favor of the other. So, the Italian shipbuilding school was characterized by high-speed and heavily armed, but poorly protected battleships. The Germans, on the contrary, prioritized survivability and built ships with very powerful armor, but moderate speed and light artillery. The desire to ensure a harmonious combination of all characteristics, taking into account the trend of a constant increase in the main caliber, led to a monstrous increase in the size of the ship.
Paradoxically, the appearance of the long-awaited "ideal" battleships - fast, heavily armed and protected by powerful armor - brought the very idea of \u200b\u200bsuch ships to complete absurdity. Still: floating monsters, because of their high cost, undermined the economy of their own countries more significantly than the invasion of enemy armies! At the same time, they almost never went to sea: the admirals did not want to risk such valuable combat units, since the loss of even one of them was equated almost to a national disaster. Battleships from a means of waging war at sea have become an instrument of big politics. And the continuation of their construction was no longer determined by tactical expediency, but by completely different motives. To have such ships for the prestige of the country in the first half of the 20th century meant about the same as now to have nuclear weapons.
The need to stop the untwisted flywheel of the naval arms race was realized by the governments of all countries, and in 1922 at a meeting convened in Washington international conference drastic measures were taken. The delegations of the most influential states agreed to significantly reduce their naval forces and fix the total tonnage of their own fleets in a certain proportion over the next 15 years. For the same period, the construction of new battleships was almost everywhere stopped. The only exception was made for Great Britain - the country forced to scrap the largest number of brand new dreadnoughts. But those two battleships that the British could build would hardly have had an ideal combination of fighting qualities, since their displacement was to be measured in the amount of 35 thousand tons.
The Washington Conference was the first real step in history to limit offensive arms on a global scale. It has given the global economy some breathing room. But no more. Since the apotheosis of the "battleship race" was yet to come...
The dream of a "large fleet"
By 1914, the Russian Imperial Fleet ranked first in the world in terms of growth. On the stocks of the shipyards in St. Petersburg and Nikolaev, powerful dreadnoughts were laid down one after another. Russia quickly recovered from the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War and again claimed the role of a leading maritime power.However, the revolution, the Civil War and general devastation did not leave a trace of the former sea power of the empire. The Red Fleet inherited from the "tsarist regime" only three battleships - "Petropavlovsk", "Gangut" and "Sevastopol", renamed respectively "Marata", " October Revolution and the Paris Commune. By the standards of the 1920s, these ships already looked hopelessly outdated. It is not surprising that Soviet Russia was not invited to the Washington Conference: its fleet was not taken seriously at that time.
At first, the Red Fleet did not really have any special prospects. The Bolshevik government had far more urgent tasks than restoring its former sea power. In addition, the first persons of the state, Lenin and Trotsky, looked at the navy as an expensive toy and an instrument of world imperialism. Therefore, during the first one and a half decades of existence Soviet Union The ship structure of the RKKF was replenished slowly and mainly only by boats and submarines. But in the mid-1930s, the naval doctrine of the USSR changed dramatically. By that time, the "Washington battleship vacation" was over and all the world powers began to feverishly catch up. Two international treaties signed in London tried to somehow restrain the size of future battleships, but everything turned out to be futile: practically none of the countries participating in the agreements from the very beginning was going to honestly fulfill the signed conditions. France, Germany, Italy, Great Britain, the USA and Japan have begun to create a new generation of leviathan ships. Stalin, inspired by the successes of industrialization, also did not want to stand aside. And the Soviet Union became another participant in a new round of the naval arms race.
In July 1936, the Council of Labor and Defense of the USSR, with the blessing of the Secretary General, approved a seven-year program of "large naval shipbuilding" for 1937-1943 (due to dissonance official name in the literature it is usually referred to as the "Big Fleet" program). In accordance with it, it was supposed to build 533 ships, including 24 battleships! For the then Soviet economy, the figures are absolutely unrealistic. Everyone understood this, but no one dared to object to Stalin.
In fact, Soviet designers began to develop a project for a new battleship back in 1934. The case progressed with difficulty: the experience of creating big ships they were completely absent. I had to attract foreign specialists - first Italian, then American. In August 1936, after analyzing various options, the terms of reference for the design of battleships of type "A" (project 23) and "B" (project 25) were approved. The latter was soon abandoned in favor of the Project 69 heavy cruiser, but Type A gradually turned into an armored monster, leaving all its foreign counterparts far behind. Stalin, who had a weakness for giant ships, could be pleased.
First of all, we decided not to limit the displacement. The USSR was not bound by any international agreements, and therefore, already at the stage of the technical project, the standard displacement of the battleship reached 58,500 tons. The thickness of the armor belt was 375 millimeters, and in the area of the bow towers - 420! There were three armored decks: 25 mm upper, 155 mm main and 50 mm lower anti-fragmentation. The hull was equipped with solid anti-torpedo protection: in the central part of the Italian type, and in the extremities - of the American type.
The artillery armament of the Project 23 battleship included nine 406-mm B-37 guns with a barrel length of 50 calibers, developed by the Stalingrad plant "Barrikada". The Soviet gun could fire 1,105 kg projectiles at a range of 45.6 kilometers. In terms of its characteristics, it surpassed all foreign guns of this class - with the exception of the 18-inch Japanese super battleship Yamato. However, the latter, having larger shells, were inferior to the B-37 in terms of firing range and rate of fire. In addition, the Japanese kept their ships so secret that until 1945 no one knew anything about them at all. In particular, the Europeans and Americans were sure that the caliber of the Yamato artillery did not exceed 16 inches, that is, 406 millimeters.
Japanese battleship "Yamato" - the largest warship of World War II. Laid down in 1937, commissioned in 1941. Total displacement - 72,810 tons. Length - 263 m, width - 36.9 m, draft - 10.4 m. Armament: 9 - 460 mm and 12 - 155 -mm guns, 12 - 127mm anti-aircraft guns, 24 - 25mm machine guns, 7 seaplanes
The main power plant of the Soviet battleship is three turbo-gear units with a capacity of 67 thousand liters each. With. For the lead ship, the mechanisms were bought from the Swiss branch of the English company Brown Boveri, for the rest the power plant was to be manufactured under license by the Kharkov Turbine Plant. It was assumed that the speed of the battleship would be 28 knots and the cruising range of a 14-knot course - over 5,500 miles.
In the meantime, the "large offshore shipbuilding" program was revised. In the new "Large Shipbuilding Program", approved by Stalin in February 1938, "small" type "B" battleships were no longer listed, but the number of "large" project 23 increased from 8 to 15 units. True, none of the experts doubted that this number, as well as the previous plan, belonged to the realm of pure fantasy. After all, even the “mistress of the seas” Great Britain and the ambitious Nazi Germany expected to build only 6 to 9 new battleships. Having realistically assessed the possibilities of industry, the top leadership of our country had to limit itself to four ships. Yes, and it turned out to be beyond the power: the construction of one of the ships was stopped almost immediately after the laying.
The lead battleship ("Soviet Union") was laid down at the Leningrad Baltic Shipyard on July 15, 1938. It was followed by "Soviet Ukraine" (Nikolaev), " Soviet Russia"and" Soviet Belarus "(Molotovsk, now Severodvinsk). Despite the mobilization of all forces, construction lagged behind schedule. By June 22, 1941, the first two ships had the highest degree of readiness, respectively 21% and 17.5%. At the new plant in Molotovsk, things were going much worse. Although in 1940, instead of two battleships, they decided to build one there, anyway, by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War its readiness reached only 5%.
The timing of the manufacture of artillery and armor was not kept. Although tests of an experimental 406-mm gun were successfully completed in October 1940, and before the start of the war, the Barrikady plant managed to hand over 12 barrels of naval superguns, not a single turret was assembled. Even more problems were with the release of the armor. Due to the loss of experience in the manufacture of thick armor plates, up to 40% of them went to waste. And negotiations on ordering armor from Krupp ended in nothing.
Attack Nazi Germany crossed out plans for the creation of the "Big Fleet". By a government decree of July 10, 1941, the construction of battleships was stopped. Later, the armor plates of the "Soviet Union" were used in the construction of pillboxes near Leningrad, and the B-37 experimental gun also fired at the enemy there. "Soviet Ukraine" was captured by the Germans, but they did not find any use for the giant corps. After the war, the issue of completing the construction of battleships according to one of the improved projects was discussed, but in the end they were dismantled for metal, and the section of the hull of the lead "Soviet Union" was even launched in 1949 - it was planned to be used for full-scale tests of the anti-torpedo protection system. The turbines received from Switzerland were at first wanted to be installed on one of the new light cruisers of Project 68 bis, then they abandoned this: too many alterations were required.
Good cruisers or bad battleships?
Project 69 heavy cruisers appeared in the “Large Shipbuilding Program”, which, like the “A” type battleships, were planned to be built 15 units. But these were not just heavy cruisers. Since the Soviet Union was not bound by any international treaties, the restrictions of the Washington and London conferences for ships of this class (standard displacement up to 10 thousand tons, artillery caliber no more than 203 millimeters) were immediately discarded by Soviet designers. Project 69 was conceived as a fighter for any foreign cruisers, including the formidable German "pocket battleships" (with a displacement of 12,100 tons). Therefore, at first its main armament was to include nine 254-mm guns, but then the caliber was increased to 305 mm. At the same time, it was necessary to strengthen armor protection, increase the power of the power plant ... As a result, the total displacement of the ship exceeded 41 thousand tons, and the heavy cruiser turned into a typical battleship, even larger than the planned project 25. Of course, the number of such ships had to be reduced. In reality, in 1939, only two “super cruisers” were laid down in Leningrad and Nikolaev - Kronstadt and Sevastopol.
The heavy cruiser Kronstadt was laid down in 1939 but not completed. The total displacement is 41,540 tons. The maximum length is 250.5 m, the width is 31.6 m, the draft is 9.5 m. The power of the turbines is 201,000 l. s., speed - 33 knots (61 km / h). The thickness of the side armor - up to 230 mm, towers - up to 330 mm. Armament: 9 305 mm and 8 - 152 mm guns, 8 - 100 mm anti-aircraft guns, 28 - 37 mm machine guns, 2 seaplanes
There were many interesting innovations in the design of the Project 69 ships, but in general, according to the cost-effectiveness criterion, they did not stand up to criticism. Conceived as good cruisers, Kronstadt and Sevastopol, in the process of "improving" the project, turned into bad battleships, too expensive and too difficult to build. In addition, the industry clearly did not have time to manufacture the main artillery for them. Out of desperation, the idea arose to arm the ships instead of nine 305-mm guns with six German 380-mm guns, similar to those installed on the battleships Bismarck and Tirpitz. This gave an increase in displacement by more than a thousand tons. However, the Germans were in no hurry to fulfill the order, of course, and by the beginning of the war, not a single gun had arrived from Germany in the USSR.
The fate of "Kronstadt" and "Sevastopol" developed similarly to their counterparts of the "Soviet Union" type. By June 22, 1941, their technical readiness was estimated at 12-13%. In September of the same year, the construction of Kronstadt was stopped, and Sevastopol, located in Nikolaev, was captured by the Germans even earlier. After the war, the hulls of both "super cruisers" were dismantled for metal.
Battleship "Bismarck" - the strongest ship of the Nazi fleet. Laid down in 1936, commissioned in 1940. Total displacement - 50,900 tons. Length - 250.5 m, width - 36 m, draft - 10.6 m. Side armor thickness - up to 320 mm, towers - up to 360 mm. Armament: 8 - 380 mm and 12 - 150 mm guns, 16 - 105 mm anti-aircraft guns, 16 - 37 mm and 12 - 20 mm machine guns, 4 seaplanes
Last attempts
In total, 27 battleships of the latest generation were built in the world in 1936-1945: 10 in the USA, 5 in Great Britain, 4 in Germany, 3 each in France and Italy, 2 in Japan. And in none of the fleets did they justify the hopes placed on them. The experience of the Second World War clearly showed that the time of battleships is gone. Aircraft carriers became the new masters of the oceans: carrier-based aircraft, of course, surpassed naval artillery both in range and in ability to hit targets in the most vulnerabilities. So it is safe to say that the Stalinist battleships, even if they were built by June 1941, would not have played any significant role in the war.But here's the paradox: the Soviet Union, which, compared to other states, spent somewhat less money on unnecessary ships, decided to make up for lost time and became the only country in the world that continued to design battleships after the Second World War! Contrary to common sense, designers have been working tirelessly for several years on the drawings of the floating fortresses of yesterday. The successor of the "Soviet Union" was the battleship of project 24 with a total displacement of 81,150 tons (!), The successor of "Kronstadt" was the 42,000-ton heavy cruiser of project 82. mm artillery of the main caliber. Note that the latter, although it was called medium, but in terms of displacement (30,750 tons) left all foreign heavy cruisers far behind and approached battleships.
Battleship "Soviet Union", project 23 (USSR, laid down in 1938). Standard displacement - 59,150 tons, full - 65,150 tons. Maximum length - 269.4 m, width - 38.9 m, draft - 10.4 m. Turbine power - 201,000 l. s., speed - 28 knots (when boosting, respectively, 231,000 hp and 29 knots). Armament: 9 - 406 mm and 12 - 152 mm guns, 12 - 100 mm anti-aircraft guns, 40 - 37 mm machine guns, 4 seaplanes
The reasons that domestic shipbuilding in post-war years went clearly against the current, mostly subjective. And in the first place here are the personal preferences of the "leader of the peoples." Stalin was very impressed with large artillery ships, especially fast ones, and at the same time he clearly underestimated aircraft carriers. During a discussion of the Project 82 heavy cruiser in March 1950, the Secretary General demanded that the designers increase the speed of the ship to 35 knots, “so that he would panic the enemy’s light cruisers, disperse them and smash them. This cruiser should fly like a swallow, be a pirate, a real bandit.” Alas, on the threshold of the nuclear missile era, the views of the Soviet leader on issues of naval tactics lagged behind their time by one and a half to two decades.
If projects 24 and 66 remained on paper, then under project 82 in 1951-1952, three “bandit cruisers” were laid down - “Stalingrad”, “Moscow” and the third, which remained unnamed. But they did not have to enter service: on April 18, 1953, a month after Stalin's death, the construction of ships was stopped due to their high cost and the complete ambiguity of tactical use. A section of the hull of the head "Stalingrad" was launched and for several years was used for testing different types naval weapons, including torpedoes and cruise missiles. It is very symbolic: the world's last heavy artillery ship turned out to be in demand only as a target for new weapons ...
Heavy cruiser Stalingrad. Laid down in 1951, but not completed. Full displacement - 42,300 tons. Maximum length - 273.6 m, width - 32 m, draft - 9.2 m. Turbine power - 280,000 l. s., speed - 35.2 knots (65 km / h). The thickness of the side armor - up to 180 mm, towers - up to 240 mm. Armament: 9 - 305 mm and 12 - 130 mm guns, 24 - 45 mm and 40 - 25 mm machine guns
The obsession of the "supership"
In conclusion, it should be noted that the desire to create a "supership", stronger than any potential opponent of its class, in different time puzzled designers and shipbuilders of different countries. And here there is a pattern: the weaker the economy and industry of the state, the more active this desire; for developed countries, on the contrary, it is less typical. So, in the interwar period, the British Admiralty preferred to build ships that were very modest in terms of combat capabilities, but in large numbers, which ultimately made it possible to have a well-balanced fleet. Japan, on the contrary, strove to create ships stronger than the British and American ones - in this way she expected to compensate for the difference in economic development with their future rivals.In this regard, the shipbuilding policy of the then USSR occupies a special place. Here, after the decision of the party and the government to build the "Big Fleet", the obsession with "superships" was actually brought to the point of absurdity. On the one hand, Stalin, inspired by the successes in the aviation industry and tank building, considered too hastily that all problems in the shipbuilding industries could be solved just as quickly. On the other hand, the atmosphere in society was such that the project of any ship proposed by industry and not superior in its capabilities to foreign counterparts could easily be considered "wrecking" with all the ensuing consequences. The designers and shipbuilders simply had no choice: they were forced to design the “most powerful” and “fastest” ships armed with the “world’s longest-range” artillery ... In practice, this resulted in the following: ships with the size and armament of battleships began to be called heavy cruisers (but the most powerful in the world!), heavy cruisers - light, and the latter - "destroyer leaders". Such a substitution of some classes for others would still make sense if domestic factories could build battleships in the quantities in which other countries built heavy cruisers. But since this was, to put it mildly, not at all the case, the reports about the outstanding successes of the designers that went up often looked like banal eyewash.
It is characteristic that almost all the "superships" ever embodied in metal did not justify themselves. Suffice it to cite the Japanese battleships Yamato and Musashi as an example. They died under the bombs of American aircraft, without firing a single salvo with their main caliber at their American "classmates". But even if they happened to meet with the US fleet in a linear battle, they could hardly count on success. After all, Japan was able to build only two battleships of the latest generation, and the United States - ten. With such a balance of power, the individual superiority of the Yamato over the individual "American" no longer plays any role.
World experience shows that several well-balanced ships are much better than one giant with hypertrophied combat characteristics. And yet, in the USSR, the idea of a "supership" did not die. A quarter of a century later, Stalin's leviathans had distant relatives - nuclear missile cruisers of the Kirov type, followers of Kronstadt and Stalingrad. However, that's a completely different story...
Battleship
Battleship(abbreviated from "ship of the line") - a class of armored artillery warships with a displacement of 20 to 70 thousand tons, a length of 150 to 280 m, armed with main caliber guns from 280 to 460 mm, with a crew of 1500-2800 people. Battleships were used in the 20th century to destroy enemy ships as part of a combat formation and artillery support for land operations. It was an evolutionary development of armadillos of the second half of XIX V.
origin of name
Battleship - short for "battleship". So in Russia in 1907 they named a new type of ships in memory of the old wooden sailing ships of the line. Initially, the new ships were supposed to revive linear tactics, but this was soon abandoned.
The English analogue of this term - battleship (literally: warship) - also came from sailing ships of the line. In 1794, the term "line-of-battle ship" (ship of the battle line) was abbreviated as "battle ship". In the future, it was used in relation to any warship. From the late 1880s, unofficially, it was most often applied to squadron ironclads. In 1892, the reclassification of the British Navy called the word "battleship" a class of super-heavy ships, which included several especially heavy squadron ironclads.
But the real revolution in shipbuilding, which marked a truly new class of ships, was made by the construction of the Dreadnought, completed in 1906.
Dreadnoughts. "Only Big Guns"
The authorship of a new leap in the development of large artillery ships is attributed to the English Admiral Fisher. Back in 1899, commanding the Mediterranean squadron, he noted that firing with the main caliber can be carried out at a much greater distance if guided by splashes from falling shells. However, at the same time, it was necessary to unify all artillery in order to avoid confusion in determining the bursts of shells of the main caliber and medium-caliber artillery. Thus was born the concept of all-big-guns (only big guns), which formed the basis of a new type of ship. The effective firing range increased from 10-15 to 90-120 cables.
Other innovations that formed the basis of the new type of ships were centralized fire control from a single general ship post and the spread of electric drives, which accelerated the guidance of heavy guns. The guns themselves have also changed significantly, due to the transition to smokeless powder and new high-strength steels. Now only the lead ship could carry out sighting, and those following in the wake were guided by bursts of its shells. Thus, building in wake columns again allowed in Russia in 1907 to return the term battleship. In the USA, England and France, the term "battleship" was not revived, and new ships continued to be called "battleship" or "cuirassé". In Russia, the "battleship" remained the official term, but in practice the abbreviation was established battleship.
Battlecruiser Hood.
The naval community adopted the new class capital ships ambiguously, weak and incomplete armor protection caused particular criticism. Nevertheless, british navy continued the development of this type, first building 3 Indifatigeble-class cruisers (eng. Indefatigable) - an improved version of the Invincible, and then moved on to the construction of battlecruisers with 343 mm artillery. They were 3 Lion-class cruisers (Eng. Leon), as well as built in a single copy of the "Tiger" (Eng. Tiger) . These ships had already surpassed their contemporary battleships in size, were very fast, but their armor, although increased in comparison with the Invincible, still did not meet the requirements of a battle with a similarly armed enemy.
Already during the First World War, the British continued to build battlecruisers in accordance with the concept of Fisher, who returned to leadership - the highest possible speed combined with the strongest weapons, but with weak armor. As a result, the Royal Navy received 2 Rinaun-class battlecruisers, as well as 2 Koreages-class light battlecruisers and 1 Furies-class, the latter being rebuilt into a semi-aircraft carrier even before commissioning. The last British battlecruiser commissioned was the Hood, and its design was significantly changed after the battle of Jutland, which was unsuccessful for the British battlecruisers. The ship's armor was sharply increased, and it actually became a cruiser battleship.
Battlecruiser Goeben.
A noticeably different approach to the design of battlecruisers was demonstrated by German shipbuilders. To a certain extent, sacrificing seaworthiness, cruising range and even firepower, they paid great attention to the armor protection of their battlecruisers and ensuring their unsinkability. Already the first German battlecruiser "Von der Tann" (German. Von der Tann), yielding to the Invincible in the weight of an airborne salvo, it noticeably surpassed its British counterparts in security.
In the future, developing a successful project, the Germans introduced into their fleet battlecruisers of the Moltke type (German. Moltke) (2 units) and their improved version - "Seidlitz" (it. Seydlitz). Then the German fleet was replenished with battlecruisers with 305-mm artillery, against 280-mm on early ships. They became "Derflinger" (German. Derfflinger), "Lützow" (German. Lutzow) and "Hindenburg" (German. Hindenburg) - according to experts, the most successful battlecruisers of the First World War.
Battlecruiser Kongo.
Already during the war, the Germans laid down 4 Mackensen-class battlecruisers (German. Mackensen) and 3 types "Ersatz-York" (it. Ersatz Yorck). The former carried 350 mm artillery, while the latter were planned to mount 380 mm guns. Both types were distinguished by powerful armor protection at a moderate speed, but by the end of the war, none of the ships under construction entered service.
Battlecruisers also wished to have Japan and Russia. The Japanese fleet received in 1913-1915 4 units of the Kongo type (jap. 金剛) - powerfully armed, fast, but poorly protected. The Russian Imperial Navy built 4 units of the Izmail type, which were distinguished by very powerful weapons, decent speed and good protection, surpassing the battleships of the Gangut type in all respects. The first 3 ships were launched in 1915, but later, due to the difficulties of the war years, their construction slowed down sharply and was eventually stopped.
World War I
During World War I, the German Hochseeflotte - High Seas Fleet and the English Grand Fleet spent most of their time at their bases, as the strategic importance of the ships seemed too great to risk in battle. The only clash of battleship fleets in this war (Battle of Jutland) took place on May 31, 1916. The German fleet intended to lure the English fleet out of the bases and break it up in parts, but the British, having guessed the plan, put their entire fleet into the sea. Faced with superior forces, the Germans were forced to retreat, avoiding being trapped several times and losing several of their ships (11 to 14 of the British). However, after that, until the very end of the war, the High Seas Fleet was forced to remain off the coast of Germany.
In total, during the war, not a single battleship went to the bottom only from artillery fire, only three English battlecruisers died due to weak defenses during the battle of Jutland. The main damage (22 dead ships) to the battleships was caused by minefields and submarine torpedoes, anticipating the future importance of the submarine fleet.
Russian battleships did not participate in naval battles - in the Baltic they stood in the harbors, connected by a mine and torpedo threat, and on the Black Sea they had no worthy rivals, and their role was reduced to artillery bombardments. The exception is the battle of the battleship "Empress Catherine the Great" with the battlecruiser "Goeben", during which the "Goeben", having received damage from the fire of the Russian battleship, managed to maintain an advantage in speed and went to the Bosphorus. The battleship "Empress Maria" died in 1916 from an explosion of ammunition in the harbor of Sevastopol for an unspecified reason.
Washington Maritime Agreement
First World War did not put an end to the naval arms race, for the place of the European powers as owners of the largest fleets was taken by America and Japan, who practically did not participate in the war. After the construction of the newest superdreadnoughts of the Ise type, the Japanese finally believed in the possibilities of their shipbuilding industry and began to prepare their fleet to establish dominance in the region. These aspirations were reflected in the ambitious 8 + 8 program, which provided for the construction of 8 newest battleships and 8 equally powerful battlecruisers, with 410 mm and 460 mm guns. The first pair of Nagato-class ships had already launched, two battlecruisers (with 5 × 2 × 410 mm) were on the stocks, when the Americans, concerned about this, adopted a response program for the construction of 10 new battleships and 6 battlecruisers, not counting smaller ships. War-ravaged England also did not want to lag behind and planned the construction of ships of the G-3 and N-3 type, although it could no longer maintain the "double standard". However, such a burden on the budgets of the world powers was extremely undesirable in the post-war situation, and everyone was ready to make concessions in order to maintain the existing position.
To counter the ever-increasing underwater threat, the size of anti-torpedo protection zones on ships increased more and more. To protect against projectiles coming from afar, therefore, at a large angle, as well as from aerial bombs, the thickness of the armored decks (up to 160-200mm), which received a spaced structure, was increasingly increased. The widespread use of electric welding made it possible to make the structure not only more durable, but also gave significant savings in weight. Anti-mine caliber artillery moved from the side sponsons to the towers, where it had large angles of fire. The number of anti-aircraft artillery was constantly increasing, divided into large-caliber and small-caliber, to repel attacks, respectively, at large and small distances. Large-caliber, and then small-caliber artillery received separate guidance posts. The idea of a universal caliber was tested, which was a rapid-fire large-caliber guns with large pointing angles, suitable for repelling attacks by destroyers and high-altitude bombers.
All ships were equipped with airborne reconnaissance seaplanes with catapults, and in the second half of the 30s, the British began to install the first radars on their ships.
The military also had at its disposal a lot of ships from the end of the “superdreadnought” era, which were being upgraded to meet the new requirements. They received new machine installations to replace the old ones, more powerful and compact. However, their speed did not increase at the same time, and often even fell, due to the fact that the ships received large side fittings in the underwater part - boules - designed to improve resistance to underwater explosions. The main caliber towers received new, enlarged embrasures, which made it possible to increase the firing range, for example, the firing range of the 15-inch guns of the Queen Elizabeth ships increased from 116 to 160 cable guns.
In Japan, under the influence of Admiral Yamamoto, in the fight against their main intended enemy - the United States - they relied on a general battle of all naval forces, due to the impossibility of a long confrontation with the United States. The main role in this was assigned to new battleships (although Yamamoto himself was against such ships), which were supposed to replace the unbuilt ships of the 8 + 8 program. Moreover, back in the late 1920s, it was decided that within the framework of the Washington Agreement it would not be possible to create sufficiently powerful ships that would have superiority over the American ones. Therefore, the Japanese decided to ignore the restrictions by building ships of the greatest possible power, dubbed the "Yamato type". The largest ships in the world (64,000 tons) were equipped with record-breaking 460 mm caliber guns that fired 1,460 kg shells. The thickness of the side belt reached 410 mm, however, the value of the armor was reduced by its lower quality compared to European and American. The huge size and cost of the ships led to the fact that only two were completed - the Yamato and Musashi.
Richelieu
In Europe, over the next few years, ships such as Bismarck" (Germany, 2 units), "King George V"" (Great Britain, 5 units), "Littorio" (Italy, 3 units), "Richelieu" (France, 2 pieces). Formally, they were bound by the limitations of the Washington Agreement, but in reality all the ships exceeded the contractual limit (38-42 thousand tons), especially the German ones. The French ships were actually enlarged versions of the small Dunkirk-class battleships and were of interest because they had only two turrets, both in the bow of the ship, thus losing the ability to shoot directly at the stern. But the towers were 4-gun, and the dead angle in the stern was rather small. The ships were also interested in strong anti-torpedo protection (up to 7 meters wide). Only Yamato (up to 5 m, but the thick anti-torpedo bulkhead and large displacement of the battleship somewhat compensated for the relatively small width) and Littorio (up to 7.57 m, however, the original Pugliese system) could compete with this indicator. Booking of these ships was considered one of the best among the "35-thousand-ton".
USS Massachusetts
In the United States, when building new ships, a requirement was made for a maximum width of 32.8 m so that the ships could pass through the Panama Canal, which was owned by the United States. If for the first ships of the North Caroline and South Dakota type this did not yet play a big role, then for the last ships of the Iowa type, which had an increased displacement, it was necessary to use elongated pear-shaped hull shapes. Also, American ships were distinguished by powerful 406 mm caliber guns with shells weighing 1225 kg, which is why all ten ships of the three new series had to sacrifice side armor (305 mm at an angle of 17 degrees on the North Caroline, 310 mm at an angle of 19 degrees - on the South Dakota and 307 mm at the same angle on the Iowa), and on the six ships of the first two series, also the speed (27 knots). On four ships of the third series (“Iowa type”, due to the larger displacement, this drawback was partially corrected: the speed was increased (officially) to 33 knots, but the thickness of the belt even decreased to 307 mm (although officially, for the purposes of the propaganda campaign, it was announced 457 mm), however, the thickness of the outer skin increased from 32 to 38 mm, but this did not play a significant role.The armament increased somewhat, the main caliber guns became 5 calibers longer (from 45 to 50 cal.).
Operating with the Tirpitz Scharnhorst in 1943 met with the English battleship Duke of York, heavy cruiser Norfolk, light cruiser Jamaica and destroyers and was sunk. The Gneisenau of the same type during the breakthrough from Brest to Norway across the English Channel (Operation Cerberus) was heavily damaged by British aircraft (partial explosion of ammunition) and did not go out of repair until the end of the war.
The last battle in naval history directly between battleships took place on the night of October 25, 1944 in the Surigao Strait, when 6 American battleships attacked and sank the Japanese Fuso and Yamashiro. The American battleships anchored across the strait and fired broadside salvos with all their main battery guns along the radar bearing. The Japanese, who did not have shipborne radars, could only fire from the bow guns almost at random, focusing on the muzzle flashes of the American guns.
In the changed circumstances, projects to build even larger battleships (the American "Montana" and the Japanese "Super Yamato") were canceled. The last battleship to enter service was the British Vanguard (1946), laid down before the war, but completed only after it ended.
The impasse in the development of battleships was shown by the German projects H42 and H44, according to which a ship with a displacement of 120-140 thousand tons was supposed to have 508 mm artillery and 330 mm deck armor. The deck, which had a much larger area than the armored belt, could not be protected against aerial bombs without excessive weighting, while the decks of the available battleships were pierced by 500 and 1000 kg bombs.
After World War II
After the war, most of the battleships were scrapped by 1960 - they were too expensive for war-weary economies and no longer had their former military value. For the role of the main carrier nuclear weapons aircraft carriers and, a little later, nuclear submarines came out.
Only the United States used its last battleships (of the New Jersey type) for artillery support of ground operations several more times, due to the relative cheapness of shelling the coast with heavy shells in areas, as well as the extraordinary firepower of ships (after upgrading the system loading, for an hour of firing, Iowa could fire about a thousand tons of shells, which is still not available to any of the aircraft carriers). Although it must be admitted that having a very small (70 kg for 862 kg high-explosive and only 18 kg for 1225 kg armor-piercing) explosive shells of American battleships were not the best suited for shelling the coast, and they did not gather to develop a powerful high-explosive projectile. Before the Korean War, all four Iowa-class battleships were recommissioned. In Vietnam, "New Jersey" was used.
Under President Reagan, these ships were decommissioned and recommissioned. They were called upon to become the core of new strike ship groups, for which they were re-equipped and became capable of carrying Tomahawk cruise missiles (8 4-charge containers) and Harpoon-type anti-ship missiles (32 missiles). "New Jersey" participated in the shelling of Lebanon in -1984, and "Missouri" and "Wisconsin" fired the main caliber at ground targets during the first Gulf War g. The shelling of Iraqi positions and stationary objects with the main caliber of battleships with the same effectiveness turned out to be much cheaper than a rocket. The well-protected and spacious battleships also proved to be effective as headquarters ships. However, the high costs of re-equipping old battleships (300-500 million dollars each) and the high cost of maintaining them led to the fact that all four ships were re-withdrawn from service in the nineties of the XX century. The New Jersey was sent to the Naval Museum in Camden, the Missouri became a museum ship at Pearl Harbor, the Iowa is mothballed at the Reserve Fleet in Susan Bay, California, and the Wisconsin maintained in conservation class "B" in maritime museum Norfolk. Nevertheless, military service battleships can be resumed, because during conservation, legislators specifically insisted on maintaining the combat readiness of at least two of the four battleships.
Although now battleships are not in the combat composition of the fleets of the world, their ideological successor is called “arsenal ships”, carriers of a large number of cruise missiles, which should become a kind of floating missile depots located near the coast for launching missile strikes on it if necessary. There are talks about the creation of such ships in American maritime circles, but to date, not a single such ship has been built.
unique photo of four Iowa-class battleships together in one campaign, June 1954
Battleships type " Iowa” are considered the most advanced ships in the history of shipbuilding. It was during their creation that designers and engineers managed to achieve the maximum combination of all the main combat characteristics: weapons, speed and protection. Battleships of the Iowa type put an end to the development of the evolution of battleships. They can be considered an ideal project.
Here are the names of the legendary battleships: Iowa"(BB-61)," New Jersey "(BB-62)," Missouri" (BB-63) and " Wisconsin» (BB-64). Two more battleships , « Illinois" (BB-65) and " Kentucky» (BB-66) were not completed. Since by September 1939 the Americans had a clear advantage over the Japanese fleet in terms of the number of warships built, it was decided to experiment and build a high-speed battleship. But in the meantime, US intelligence suggested that construction of the third and fourth Yamato-class battleships had begun in Japan. According to them, the displacement of these warships is 46,000 tons, and the caliber of artillery is 406 mm (in fact, the data was different: 62,315 tons and 460 mm, respectively). The coming strengthening of the fleet of a potential enemy caused concern. Therefore, the General Council instructed the design department, in parallel with the development of a high-speed battleship, to consider its low-speed version.
battleship Iowa, August 1962
In April, three draft designs of a low-speed battleship were submitted to Admiral Hart for consideration. As a result, one of them is approved. Immediately after that, the production of working documentation - drawings - began. The decision to build the first two battleships of the new type was approved by Congress on May 17, 1939. Europe was already at war. Immediately after the surrender of France, the US Congress adopted a shipbuilding program that provided for the creation of a powerful fleet. She even had a name Two Ocean Navy Act", which means "Fleet of two oceans." Far from the last place in the program was occupied. Therefore, on September 9 of the same year, an order for two more ships of the type " Iowa': under the names ' Illinois" And " Kentucky". Production of battleships of the class " Iowa” was a rather difficult task, but the American industry coped with it quite easily. The laying of the lead ship took place on June 27, 1940, and on February 22, 1943, it already became part of the US Navy. The last pair of battleships, unfortunately, were not lucky, due to a change in priorities in the military-industrial complex, the construction of battleships was stopped.
see a good selection of historical photos and videos of the legendary battleship Iowa
On the ship " Iowa"At the end of 1943, US President Roosevelt went to Casablanca to escort the US Pacific Fleet's aircraft carrier formation.
After the war " Iowa"was placed in reserve, August 24, 1951 re-commissioned and was transferred to the US Atlantic Fleet.
In the spring of 1980, the US Congress decided to reopen battleships type " Iowa» (4 units). By that time " cold war"between the USSR and the "conditional enemy" reached its climax. The United States took a course on a sharp increase in its fleet. "Rebirth", so you can call the return to life of the famous battleships. They retained sets of heavy artillery and armored belts with decks, in addition, they were equipped with strategic weapons - cruise missiles of the " Tomahawk» as well as anti-ship missiles and automated anti-aircraft artillery systems.
battleship "Iowa" photo
battleship Iowa fired a salvo
salvo of the battleship "Iowa"
battleship Iowa, 1988
battleship "Iowa" stern
On April 28, 1984, after a thorough modernization in New Orleans, the Iowa battleship re-enters service. However, in mid-April 1989, after the explosion of the powder compartment, which caused enormous damage to the central gun of the ship, it was put into reserve.
Battleship "Wisconsin” became on January 12, 1995 for permanent mooring in the port of Newport.
Battleships of this type participated in the Vietnam War, took part in Operation Desert Storm, as well as in the localization of the conflict in the Falkland Islands. They were repaired, modernized and put back into operation.
Battleship"Missouri" on May 4, 1998 was transferred to the US Navy Museum, which is located at the Pearl Harbor military base. Despite the age of 40, the battleships are quite well preserved, because they were operated for only about 13 years, and the rest of the time they were in reserve.
battleship Wisconsin, 1952
battleship
SHIP OF THE LINE (battleship)
in the sailing navy 17 - 1st floor. 19th centuries a large three-masted warship with 2-3 decks (decks); had from 60 to 130 guns and up to 800 crew members. It was intended for combat in the battle line (hence the name).
In the steam armored fleet, 1st floor. 20th century one of the main classes of large surface ships. It had 70-150 guns of various calibers (including 8-12 280-457 mm) and 1500-2800 crew members. After the 2nd World War, battleships lost their importance.
Battleship
in the sailing navy of the 17th-1st half of the 19th centuries. a large three-masted warship with 2≈3 artillery decks (decks); had from 60 to 135 guns, installed along the sides in a line and up to 800 crew members. He fought while in the wake column (battle line), which is why he got his name, which traditionally passed to the ships of the steam fleet.
In the steam armored fleet, one of the main classes of the largest artillery surface ships in size, designed to destroy ships of all classes in a sea battle, as well as to deliver powerful artillery strikes against coastal targets. Battleships appeared in many navies of the world after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05 to replace battleships. At first they were called dreadnoughts. In Russia, the name of the class L. k. was established in 1907. L. k. were used in the First World War of 1914–18. By the beginning of World War II (1939-45), L.K. had a standard displacement of 20,000 to 64,000 tons, armament of up to 12 main-caliber turret guns (from 280 to 460 mm), and up to 20 anti-mine, anti-aircraft, or universal artillery guns. caliber 100≈127 mm, up to 80≈140 anti-aircraft small-caliber automatic guns and heavy machine guns. The speed of the L. k. ≈ 20≈35 knots (37≈64.8 km / h), the wartime crew is ≈ 1500≈2800 people. Side armor reached 440 mm, the weight of all armor was up to 40% of the total weight of the ship. On board the LK there were 1-3 aircraft and a catapult to take them off. In the course of the war, in connection with the growing role of naval, especially aircraft carrier aviation, as well as the submarine forces of the fleet and the death of many L. to. from air strikes and submarines, they lost their significance; after the war, in all fleets, almost all L. to. were scrapped.
B.F. Balev.
Wikipedia
Ship of the line (disambiguation)
Battleship- the name of heavy artillery warships intended for combat in wake columns:
- A ship of the line is a sailing wooden military ship with a displacement of 500 to 5500 tons, which had 2-3 rows of cannons in the sides. Sailing battleships were not called battleships.
- Battleship is an armored artillery ship of the 20th century with a displacement of 20,000 to 64,000 tons.
Battleship
Battleship:
- in a broad sense, a ship intended for combat operations as part of a squadron;
- in the traditional sense (also abbreviated battleship), - a class of heavy armored artillery warships with a displacement of 20 to 70 thousand tons, a length of 150 to 280 m, with a main battery caliber of 280-460 mm, with a crew of 1500-2800 people.
Battleships were used in the 20th century to destroy enemy ships as part of a combat formation and artillery support for land operations. They were the evolutionary development of battleships of the second half of the nineteenth century.
Ship of the line (sailing)
Battleship- a class of sailing warships. Sailing ships of the line were characterized by the following features: full displacement from 500 to 5500 tons, armament, including from 30-50 to 135 guns in side ports (in 2-4 decks), the crew size ranged from 300 to 800 people with full staffing. Sailing ships of the line were built and used from the 17th century until the early 1860s for naval battles using linear tactics.
In 1907, a new class of armored artillery ships with a displacement of 20,000 to 64,000 tons was named battleships (abbreviated as battleships). Sailing battleships were not called battleships.
type "Soviet Union"
The combat charter of the Naval Forces of the Red Army - 1930 (BU-30) recognized battleships as the main striking force of the fleet, and the course towards industrialization opened up real prospects for their creation. However, it was not only handicapped, but also dogmatism, extremes in the development of naval theory. Leading theorists B.B. Zhreve and M.A. Petrov, who advocated a proportional ratio of different classes of ships in the combat composition of the fleet, at the turn of the 20-30s. labeled apologists for the "bourgeois old school"; while M.A. Petrov, who brilliantly defended the fleet from its radical reduction in a sharp polemic with M.N. Tukhachevsky at a meeting of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, ended up in prison, where he later died.
Under the influence of a tempting idea to solve the problems of the naval defense of the USSR through the mass construction of relatively cheap submarines, torpedo boats and seaplanes, not always competent specialists of the so-called young school won the theoretical dispute; some of its representatives, out of opportunistic considerations of undermining the authority of the "old specialists", distorted the picture of the struggle at sea during the First World War, idealizing the combat capabilities of "new means", for example, submarines. Sometimes such one-sided concepts were shared by the leaders of the Naval Forces of the Red Army; so, in October 1933, the head of the USSR Navy (Namorsi) V.M. Orlov, at the suggestion of the most aggressive "theoretician" A.P. Aleksandrova demanded "exposing in the press" and "withdrawal from circulation" of the book "Anglo-American Maritime Rivalry", published by the Institute of World Economy and Politics; one of its authors - P.I. Smirnov, who held the position of Deputy Inspector of the Navy of the Red Army, dared to objectively show the place of battleships in the fleet that A.P. Aleksandrov regarded it as "a shameless attack on the party line in naval construction, undermining the confidence of personnel in their weapons."
It is noteworthy that even during the period of enthusiasm for mosquito forces (October 1931), a group of engineers from the design bureau of the Baltic Shipyard in Leningrad seemed to foresee the imminent need for these ships; they submitted a memorandum to the industry leadership, which contained proposals to start preparatory work, choosing types, drafting projects, strengthening the material base, design and workforce. Many of the signatories of this document participated in the design of Soviet battleships. The importance of building large ships in the mid-30s. became obvious to Namorsi V.M. Orlov, his deputy I.M. Ludri and the head of the Glavmorprom of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry R.A. Muklevich.
The greatest success in 1935 was achieved by the Central Design Bureau of Special Shipbuilding of the Glavmorprom (TsKBS-1), headed by V.L. Brzezinski. Among a number of promising projects, six variants of battleships with a standard displacement from 43,000 to 75,000 tons were worked out. According to the results of the work Chief Engineer TsKBS-1 V.P. Rimsky-Kor-sakov (in the recent past - deputy head of the Naval Training and Construction Department) compiled a generalized code of TTE, which V.L. On December 24, 1935, Brzezinski reported to the leadership of the Naval Forces and Glavmorprom. The first order for the preliminary design of the "project No. 23 of the battleship for Pacific Fleet» Glavmorprom issued the Baltic Shipyard on February 21, 1936, but the task for this project was not approved and was subjected to adjustments according to the TsKBS-1 options. V.M. Orlov recognized projects of battleships with a standard displacement of 55,000-57,000 and 35,000 tons (instead of the option of 43,000 tons) as “interesting and relevant” for the Navy; On May 13, 1936, he gave instructions to I.M. Loudry on the issuance of "clear tasks" to the Naval Research Institute of Military Shipbuilding (NIVK) and industry for the "final sketch design of large ships" in the development of selected options. Preliminary tactical and technical specifications for sketches developed under the guidance of the head of the Shipbuilding Department of the UVMS flagship engineer 2nd rank B.E. Alyakritsky, approved on May 15, 1936 by I.M. Ludry.
The concept of building two types of battleships (larger and smaller displacement) was based on the differences in the theaters of military operations - the open Pacific, limited Baltic and Black Sea. The compilers of the TTZ proceeded from the optimal characteristics of the ships, determined by the level of technology and experience of the past war, combat training. However, at the initial stage, the design experienced strong influence foreign experience and contractual displacement limits provided by the Washington (1922) and London (1930 and 1936) agreements, in which the USSR did not officially participate. V.M. Orlov was inclined to reduce the displacement and caliber of weapons of the first battleship of the Pacific Fleet, and for the second he chose the option of a relatively small but fast ship, embodied in the projects of the French Dunkirk and the German Scharnhorst. When discussing the sketches, the proposed placement of all three turrets of the main caliber of the “large” battleship in the bow of the hull (following the example of the English battleship Nelson) did not pass the proposed design bureau of the Baltic Shipyard. The TsKBS-1 sketch was taken as the basis, in which two three-gun turrets were placed in the bow, and one in the stern. August 3, 1936 V.M. Orlov approved the TTZ for the preliminary design of battleships of types "A" (project 23) and "B" (project 25), proposed on a competitive basis by TsKBS-1 and the design bureau of the Baltic Shipyard.
In accordance with the special regulation approved by V.M. Orlov and R.A. Muklevich on August 21, 1936, work on projects was carried out in close cooperation with the heads of the Design Bureau and TsKBS-1 S.F. Stepanova and V.L. Brzezinski with representatives of the Navy, who observed the design. The examination was entrusted to the heads of naval institutes under the general supervision of the head of the NIVK, flag officer of the 2nd rank E.P. Liebel.
In November 1936, the materials of the draft designs of the battleships "A" and "B", together with the reviews of the observers and the NIVK, were considered in the Shipbuilding Department of the UVMS (head - engineer-flag officer 2nd rank B.E. Alyakrinsky). To draw up the general technical design of the first of the battleships, the most thoughtful version of the design bureau of the Baltic Shipyard (standard displacement 45,900 tons) was chosen with changes approved by V.M. Namorsi. Orlov November 26, 1936; displacement, for example, was allowed in the range of 46-47 thousand tons with an increase in draft in full load up to 10 m, it was envisaged to strengthen the booking of decks and the bow end. The development of the general technical design of the battleship type "B" was entrusted to TsKBS in the development of the sketch presented by him with a standard displacement of 30,900 tons (total 37,800).
Fulfilling the government decree of July 16, 1936, the Shipbuilding Department of the UVMS issued on December 3 an order to Glavmorprom for the construction of eight battleships with delivery to the fleet in 1941. In Leningrad, it was planned to build two battleships of project 23 (Baltic Plant) and the same number of project 25, in Nikolaev - four projects 25 . This decision actually meant another correction of the shipbuilding program of the second five-year plan (1933-1937), supplementing it with previously unforeseen battleships. However, the implementation of new plans to strengthen the fleet encountered serious difficulties, some of which were determined by the huge amount of experimental work that could ensure the success of design and construction; this meant the manufacture of steam boilers, mine protection compartments, armor plates, life-size models of turbine and boiler rooms, testing the effects of bombs and shells on deck armor, irrigation systems, remote control, air conditioning, etc. The problems of creating artillery installations and turbine mechanisms of high power turned out to be especially difficult.
All these difficulties were overcome in an atmosphere of disorganization in the management of the fleet and industry caused by the repressions of 1937-1938, when almost everyone who led the choice of types and the creation of future battleships became victims. The already dire situation worsened with the availability of qualified command and engineering personnel, as a result of which the laying of ships in 1937 did not take place, and the design tasks themselves underwent serious changes. Project 25 was abandoned, later it was transformed into a heavy cruiser (Project 69, Kronstadt). In August-September of the same year, the new leadership of the Navy of the Red Army (Namorsi - the flagship of the fleet of the 2nd rank L.M. Galler) reworked the previously drawn up ten-year plan for building ships. This option provided for the prospective construction of 6 battleships of type “A” and 14 of type “B” instead of 8 and 16. However, such a truncated plan, submitted to the Defense Committee by Marshal of the Soviet Union K.E. Voroshilov in September 1937, was never officially approved.
Despite the problematic implementation of the ten-year program, the government, by a decision of August 13/15, 1937, determined the revision of the technical project 23 with an increase in the standard displacement to 55-57 thousand tons while optimizing the armor and constructive underwater protection and abandoning two stern 100-mm towers. The increase in displacement, reflecting the objective need to combine powerful weapons, reliable protection and high speed, proved the validity of the initial tasks of 1936. At the same time, TsKB-17 received the flagship of the 2nd rank S.P. developed by the commission. Stavitsky tactical and technical
a request for the design of a battleship type "B" (project 64) with 356-mm artillery of the main caliber. For projects 23 and 64, the unification of the main turbo-gear units with a capacity of 67,000 hp was assumed. every ( technical assistance Swiss company "Brown-Boveri"), 152-, 100-mm turrets and quad 37-mm machine guns of domestic design.
The materials of technical project 23 (head of the design bureau of the Baltic Shipyard Grauerman, chief engineer B.G. Chilikin) were considered in the Shipbuilding Department (UK) of the Red Army Navy in November 1937. In December, the head of TsKB-17 N.P. Dubinin and chief engineer V.A. Nikitin submitted to the Criminal Code draft design 64, but both of them were recognized as unsatisfactory. In project 23 (standard displacement 57,825, total displacement 63,900 tons), there were many unresolved issues related to the development of the main power plant, anti-mine and anti-aircraft artillery towers, bottom protection and a reservation system that did not correspond to the results of experimental bombing. The shortcomings of Project 64 were largely explained by the task itself, which involved the creation of a deliberately weak ship, designed to solve problems "in cooperation with other means of connection." Armament (nine 356-, twelve 152-, eight 100-, thirty-two 37-mm guns) and its characteristics (for 356-mm it was planned 750-kg shells with an initial speed of 860-910 m / s) at a speed of 29 knots could not provide a battleship of type "B" with tactical advantages in single combat with the same foreigners. The desire of the designers to meet the stringent requirements of the TTZ for the protection of the ship led to an increase in the standard displacement to almost 50,000 tons. The wishes of the Naval Shipbuilding Administration to reduce the displacement to 45,000 tons did not come true at the beginning of 1938, the battleship "B" was abandoned.
