LECTURE 20
RATIONALITY(from lat. ratio - mind) - reasonableness, a characteristic of knowledge in terms of its compliance with the most general principles thinking, mind.
The concept of rationality has a long history, but only from the second half of XIX century, it began to acquire a stable content and became the subject of heated debate. This was largely due to the consideration of theoretical knowledge in its development, the understanding of the complexity and ambiguity of the justification procedure.
Any human activity has an expedient character, and this implies a clear understanding of the goal, its setting and the choice of ways to achieve it. In everyday and practical life such a choice is made on the basis of everyday experience, in which a choice based on common sense and intuition will be considered rational or reasonable. However, common sense and intuition are only enough to solve relatively simple tasks. In more difficult cases solutions scientific problems and complex problems, one has to turn to the construction of rational choice models. When building such a model, the scheme of activity includes: 1) the exact formulation and justification of the goal, or, as they say, the target function; 2) a complete listing of all possible alternatives or ways to achieve the goal; 3) an assessment of each alternative in terms of its value or utility, as well as the likelihood of its implementation in reality. Ultimately, from all available alternatives, the one that best suits the goal, both in terms of its usefulness and the likelihood of implementation, is selected.
Such a choice should not be arbitrary, but justified, reasonable or rational. The validity of such a choice is connected, first of all, with its purpose, and reasonableness or rationality depends on the methods and means used to achieve the ultimate goal. Therefore, the contradictions that arise in the selection process are primarily associated with the identification of rational and irrational approaches, both to the selection process itself and to the assessment of possible alternatives for its implementation.
The solution to the problem of the relationship between individual calculation and adherence to norms is offered by an alternative theory of social exchange - rational choice theory . This theory is a scientific approach that is based on the consideration social interaction as a process of coordinating the actions of people striving to achieve individual goals. The rationality of the choice is determined by the optimality of the behavior strategy. The individual chooses from alternatives – fixed dialing options actions - the option that will give the best result. However, the desire of all to maximize individual benefit can lead to a social dilemma - a situation in which there is a conflict between individual rationality and social rationality.
Despite the influence of rational choice theory on the development of exchange theory, it has remained aloof from the mainstream of sociological theory. Thanks in large part to the efforts of one man, James S. Coleman, this theory has become one of the "topical" in modern sociology. First, Coleman founded the journal Rationality and Society in 1989 to promote rational choice theory. Secondly, Coleman published the extremely influential book The Foundations of Social Theory. Finally, in 1992, he became president of the American Sociological Association. Taking advantage of the opportunity to promote the theory of rational choice, he spoke at the meeting of the association with the appeal "The rational reorganization of society."
Thus, the journal "Rationality and Society" is closed to many sociological studies. At the same time, macro-level approaches and their relationship with rational action remain in the area of interest of the publication. In addition to these academic considerations, Coleman insists that rational choice research should be connected in a practical way to our changing world.
The problem of optimizing the strategy of behavior in a situation where individually rational actions lead to socially irrational consequences is revealed on models mathematical theory games. The most famous of these is called the Prisoner's Dilemma.
For each of the two arrested (for participation in the same crime), there are two options: confess or deny. The matrix of possible outcomes for the first participant (see Fig. 4) includes four cases, depending on the actions of the second participant:
1) both confess and, sharing responsibility, receive the same punishment;
2) the first confesses while the second is unlocked, and the blame is shifted to the second;
3) the first is unlocked, the second confesses, and the blame is shifted to the first;
4) both are unlocked and receive the same minimum penalty.
Rice. 4 Prisoner's Dilemma
The application of models like the prisoner's dilemma to the analysis of a wide variety of social phenomena forms the basis of the research strategy of rational choice theorists. They have traditionally been modeled by the work of economists who have long developed this approach, and in recent years also by the work of the American sociologist James Coleman (1926–1995) The Foundations of Social Theory (1990).
Coleman analyzed from the point of view of rational choice interactions traditionally associated with the manifestation of feelings rather than with calculation. In particular, he showed that in the process of courtship and marriage, an individual seeks a partner as attractive as possible in terms of physical beauty, intelligence, kindness, job prestige, income level, or other qualities. Therefore, marriage behavior, according to Coleman, is reduced to a rational choice from a fixed set of alternatives. But the desire of each participant in the "marriage market" to optimize the choice leads to a social dilemma that can be described using the "prisoner's dilemma" model. If both partners marry for love, then each "acquires" attention and care from the other and at the same time "spends" energy and time on attention to the partner and care for him, that is, there is a situation of general gain (4). If one of the partners enters into a marriage of convenience, and the other for love, then one "wins" because it "acquires" without "spending", that is, there is a situation of either one-sided gain (2) or one-sided loss (3). The strategy of marriage of convenience is individually rational, but if both partners choose such a strategy, then neither of them “acquires” what he expects (1). The strategy of marriage of convenience is socially irrational.
Social norms limit the choice, reducing alternatives to socially approved actions, and orient the participants in the interaction to maintain their reputation, that is, to maintain confidence in them from the interaction partners. Thus, the rational choice can be considered not in favor of individual interest, but in favor of the positive opinion of other people. However, rational choice theory underestimates the problem of opinion formation, that is, the perception, interpretation and evaluation of the actions of individuals by other participants in the interaction.
Coleman's commitment to the concept of rational choice is reflected in his central idea that "people strive to achieve their goal, and the goal (and therefore actions) is shaped by values or preferences." But at the same time, Coleman clarifies that in theoretical terms, he needs a conceptually more definite idea of a rationally acting subject, which can really be borrowed from political economy. According to this concept, actors choose those actions that contribute to the extraction of maximum benefit, satisfy needs and desires.
Key concepts in Coleman's theory are actors and resources. Resources- this is what is controlled by the actors and what they are interested in one way or another. Given these two elements, Coleman describes how their interaction is brought to the system level:
The minimum basis of a social system of action is two actors, each of which controls the resources in which the other is interested. It is the interest in resources controlled by the other that makes the subjects be purposeful and participate in actions that include both sides in the system of actions. It is this structure, along with the purposefulness of actors striving to realize their interests to the maximum, that determines the interdependence of their actions, giving them a systemic character.
Based on rational choice theory, Coleman is far from thinking that this approach will provide answers to all emerging questions. However, he is convinced of its ability to develop in this direction, since he argues that "the success of social theory based on rationality lies in the consistent reduction of that area social activities which cannot be explained by this theory.
Coleman's focus on the rational action of an individual suggests that his approach involves the linking of micro and macro phenomena, or an explanation of how a combination of individual actions affects the behavior of a system. Giving this issue highest value, Coleman is interested in the transition from the macro to the micro level, or how the system limits actors' attitudes. Finally, he focuses on relationships within the micro level - the impact of individual actions on other individual actions.
Still, Coleman's approach fails to avoid several shortcomings, three of which are major. First, he pays predominant attention to the issue of the transition from the micro to the macro level, without concentrating on consideration of relations of a different kind. Second, he neglects relationships within the macro level. Finally, it sets causality purely unidirectional; in other words, it does not take into account the dialectical relations connecting micro and macro phenomena.
Sociology of rational choice is based on the theory of social exchange and economic theories of rational choice. The concept of rational action of individuals is transferred to the behavior of the whole system, consisting of the same individuals. The idea to transfer the principles of methodological individualism to the level of corporate actors was born in response to the inability of economists to explain such economic phenomena as stock market panics or trust relationships in mutual lending societies.
The sociology of rational choice revives the ideas of utilitarianism in sociology, which views a person as a utility utilizer.
New models of rationality. The prerequisites for the theory of rational choice arose as early as the middle of the 18th and early 19th centuries. in the doctrines of morality of the Scottish school of morality, whose representatives were the first to propose an individualistic concept of rational behavior of people and drew attention to its fruitfulness for explaining other social phenomena.
None other than the future founder of classical political economy, Adam Smith, who belonged to this school, applied this concept to explain market relations. Another source of its origin is the ideas of the supporters of the school of utilitarianism, who refused to consider the behavior of people on the basis of various a priori ideas and preconceived opinions. In contrast, they began to explain their actions and behavior solely by the results to which they lead. Therefore, they stopped considering people's actions in advance as good or bad until their results are known. The founder of the school of utilitarianism, I. Bentham, put forward the basic principle that ethics should be focused on achieving happiness for the greatest number of people. In his opinion, this happiness can even be mathematically calculated as a balance of pleasures and pains in a certain behavior.
Representatives of the later neoclassical theory in economics replaced the principle of evaluating behavior through a balance of pleasure and pain with the principle of the mutual exchange of goods, if this exchange takes place honestly. In this way, the ideas of individualism, rational or intelligent choice in decision-making were used to analyze economic activity and, above all, to study market relations. Therefore, in the future, the theory of rational choice (TRV) began to be developed mainly in economic research and began to be considered as a purely economic theory.
In recent decades, this theory under the name of public choice theory (TOT) has been applied and developed in political science, sociology, history and other social sciences. At present, there is even a tendency to consider RCT as a universal theory or even a research paradigm for all social sciences and humanities. Without denying the importance and important merits of this theory, primarily in economic research, as evidenced by the award Nobel Prizes behind Last year according to this profile, we will nevertheless try to show that this theory has certain limits of application.
Therefore, without a meaningful analysis of the principles and methods of a particular social science, it cannot be automatically applied to all social sciences without exception. humanities.
Questions for self-control:
1. Explain the essence of rational choice theory;
2. Who is the most significant developer of rational choice theory;
3. What is the sociology of rational choice based on.
The main peak of the crisis of behaviorism, structural-functional analysis and other main methodological trends occurred in the 60-70s. These years were full of attempts to find a new methodological basis for further research. Scientists have tried to do this in different ways:
update the "classical" methodological approaches (the emergence of post-behavioural methodological trends, neo-institutionalism, etc.);
create a system of "middle level" theories and try to use these theories as methodological framework;
try to create an equivalent general theory by referring to classical political theories;
turn to Marxism and create on the basis of this various kinds of technocratic theories.
These years are characterized by the emergence of a number of methodological theories that claim to be " big theory". One of such theories, one of such methodological directions was the theory of rational choice.
Rational choice theory was designed to overcome the shortcomings of behaviorism, structural-functional analysis and institutionalism, creating a theory of political behavior in which a person would act as an independent, active political actor, a theory that would allow looking at a person’s behavior “from the inside”, taking into account the nature of his attitudes, choice of optimal behavior, etc.
The theory of rational choice came to political science from economic science. The “founding fathers” of the theory of rational choice are considered to be E. Downes (he formulated the main provisions of the theory in his work “The Economic Theory of Democracy”), D. Black (introduced the concept of preferences into political science, described the mechanism for their translation into performance results), G. Simon (substantiated the concept of bounded rationality and demonstrated the possibilities of applying the rational choice paradigm), as well as L. Chapley, M. Shubik, V. Riker, M. Olson, J. Buchanan, G. Tulloch (developed "game theory"). It took about ten years before rational choice theory became widespread in political science.
Proponents of rational choice theory proceed from the following methodological assumptions:
First, methodological individualism, that is, the recognition that social and political structures, politics, and society as a whole are secondary to the individual. It is the individual who produces institutions and relationships through his activity. Therefore, the interests of the individual are determined by him, as well as the order of preferences.
Secondly, the selfishness of the individual, that is, his desire to maximize his own benefit. This does not mean that a person will necessarily behave like an egoist, but even if he behaves like an altruist, then this method is most likely more beneficial for him than others. This applies not only to the behavior of an individual, but also to his behavior in a group when he is not bound by special personal attachments.
Proponents of the theory of rational choice believe that the voter decides whether to come to the polls or not, depending on how he evaluates the benefits of his vote, and also votes based on rational considerations of utility. He can manipulate his political settings if he sees that he may not get a win. Political parties in elections also try to maximize their benefits by enlisting the support of as many voters as possible. Deputies form committees, guided by the need to pass this or that bill, their people to the government, and so on. The bureaucracy in its activities is guided by the desire to increase its organization and its budget, and so on.
Thirdly, the rationality of individuals, that is, their ability to arrange their preferences in accordance with their maximum benefit. As E. Downs wrote, "every time we talk about rational behavior, we mean rational behavior, initially directed towards selfish goals" 12 . In this case, the individual correlates the expected results and costs and, trying to maximize the result, tries to minimize costs at the same time. Since the rationalization of behavior and the assessment of the ratio of benefits and costs require the possession of significant information, and its receipt is associated with an increase in overall costs, one speaks of "limited rationality" of the individual. This bounded rationality has more to do with the decision-making procedure itself than with the essence of the decision itself.
Fourth, the exchange of activities. Individuals in society do not act alone, there is an interdependence of people's choices. The behavior of each individual is carried out in certain institutional conditions, that is, under the influence of institutions. These institutional conditions themselves are created by people, but the initial one is people's consent to the exchange of activities. In the process of activity, individuals rather do not adapt to institutions, but try to change them in accordance with their interests. Institutions, in turn, can change the order of preferences, but this only means that the changed order turned out to be beneficial for political actors under given conditions.
Most often, the political process within the framework of the rational choice paradigm is described in the form of public choice theory, or in the form of game theory.
Proponents of the theory of public choice proceed from the fact that in the group the individual behaves selfishly and rationally. He will not voluntarily make special efforts to achieve common goals, but will try to use public goods for free (the “hare” phenomenon in public transport). This is because the nature of a collective good includes such characteristics as non-excludability (that is, no one can be excluded from the use of a public good) and non-rivalry (the consumption of this good by a large number of people does not lead to a decrease in its utility).
Game theorists assume that the political struggle to win, as well as the assumptions of rational choice theory about the universality of such qualities of political actors as selfishness and rationality, make the political process similar to a game with zero or non-zero sum. As is known from the course of general political science, game theory describes the interaction of actors through a certain set of game scenarios. The purpose of such an analysis is to search for such game conditions under which the participants choose certain strategies of behavior, for example, those that are beneficial to all participants at once 13 .
This methodological approach is not free from some shortcomings. One of these shortcomings is the insufficient consideration of social and cultural-historical factors influencing the individual's behavior. The authors of this study guide are far from agreeing with researchers who believe that the political behavior of an individual is largely a function of social structure or with those who argue that the political behavior of actors is in principle incomparable, because it takes place within unique national conditions, and so on. However, it is obvious that the rational choice model does not take into account the influence of the socio-cultural environment on the preferences, motivation and behavioral strategy of political actors, and does not take into account the influence of the specifics of political discourse.
Another shortcoming has to do with the assumption of rational choice theorists about the rationality of behavior. The point is not only that individuals can behave like altruists, and not only that they can have limited information, imperfect qualities. These nuances, as shown above, are explained by the rational choice theory itself. First of all, we are talking about the fact that often people act irrationally under the influence of short-term factors, under the influence of affect, guided, for example, by momentary impulses.
As D. Easton rightly points out, the broad interpretation of rationality proposed by the supporters of the theory under consideration leads to the blurring of this concept. More fruitful for solving the problems posed by the representatives of rational choice theory would be to single out types of political behavior depending on its motivation. In particular, “social-oriented” behavior in the interests of “social solidarity” 14 differs significantly from rational and selfish behavior.
In addition, rational choice theory is often criticized for some technical inconsistencies arising from the main provisions, as well as for the limited explanatory possibilities (for example, the applicability of the model of party competition proposed by its supporters only to countries with a two-party system). However, a significant part of such criticism either stems from a misinterpretation of the work of the representatives of this theory, or is refuted by the representatives of rational choice theory themselves (for example, with the help of the concept of "bounded" rationality).
Despite these shortcomings, rational choice theory has a number of virtues which are the reason for its great popularity. The first undoubted advantage is that standard methods of scientific research are used here. The analyst formulates hypotheses or theorems based on a general theory. The method of analysis used by supporters of rational choice theory proposes the construction of theorems that include alternative hypotheses about the intentions of political actors. The researcher then subjects these hypotheses or theorems to empirical testing. If reality does not disprove theorems, that theorem or hypothesis is considered relevant. If the test results are unsuccessful, the researcher draws the appropriate conclusions and repeats the procedure again. The use of this technique allows the researcher to draw a conclusion about what actions of people, institutional structures and the results of the exchange of activities will be most likely under certain conditions. Thus, rational choice theory solves the problem of verifying theoretical propositions by testing scientists' assumptions about the intentions of political subjects.
As the well-known political scientist K. von Boime rightly notes, the success of rational choice theory in political science can be generally explained by the following reasons:
“Neopositivist requirements for the use of deductive methods in political science are most easily satisfied with the help of formal models, on which this methodological approach is based.
The rational choice approach can be used to analyze any type of behavior, from the actions of the most selfish rationalist to the infinitely altruistic activity of Mother Teresa, who maximized the strategy of helping the disadvantaged.
areas of political science, which are on the middle level between micro- and macrotheories, are forced to recognize the possibility of an approach based on the analysis of activity ( political actors– E.M., O.T.) actors. The actor in the concept of rational choice is a construction that allows you to avoid the question of the real unity of the individual
rational choice theory promotes the use of qualitative and cumulative ( mixed - E.M., O.T.) approaches in political science
the rational choice approach acted as a kind of counterbalance to the dominance of behavioral research in previous decades. It is easy to combine it with multi-level analysis (especially when studying the realities of the countries of the European Union) and with ... neo-institutionalism, which became widespread in the 80s” 15 .
Rational choice theory has a fairly wide scope. It is used to analyze the behavior of voters, parliamentary activity and coalition formation, international relations, etc., and is widely used in modeling political processes.
The general provisions of numerous varieties of rational choice theory are:
- - the assumption of intentionality;
- - assumption of rationality;
- - distinction between "complete" and "incomplete" information and, in the latter case, between "risk" and "uncertainty";
- - distinction between "strategic" and "interdependent" actions.
Rational choice theory presupposes intentionality. Rational choice explanations are really a subset of "intentional explanations." Intentional explanations do not simply assume that the individual is acting intentionally; rather, they explain social practices by referring to the respective beliefs and desires of individuals. Often intentional explanations are accompanied by a search for unexpected (or so-called "aggregated") consequences of people's intentional actions. In contrast to functionalist ways of explaining, the unexpected effects of social practices are not used to explain the sustainability of these same practices. Rational choice theorists pay special attention to two types of negative unintended consequences or "social contradictions": counter-finality and sub-optimality.
Counterfinality is associated with the "failure of composition" that occurs whenever people act on the erroneous assumption that what is optimal for any individual in a particular situation is simultaneously necessarily optimal for all individuals in that situation ( , 106; , 95).
Suboptimality refers to individuals who, under conditions of interdependent choices, choose a particular strategy, knowing that other individuals do the same, and also realizing that everyone can gain at least the same amount if a different strategy is adopted ( , 122). A striking example of suboptimality for two is the so-called prisoner's dilemma, about which will be discussed later.
Second, in addition to intentionality, rational choice theories presuppose rationality. Rational choice explanations are in fact a subset of intentional explanations; they attribute, as the name suggests, rationality in social action. By rationality is meant, roughly speaking, that acting and interacting, the individual has an appropriate plan and seeks to maximize the totality of satisfactions of his preferences, while minimizing the corresponding costs. Thus, rationality implies a "connectedness assumption" that states that the individual involved has a complete "order of preference" with respect to various options. Based on these preference orders, social scientists can speak of a utility function that assigns a number to each option according to its rank within the preference order. For a person to be rational, his order of preference must satisfy certain requirements. The principle of transitivity is an obvious example of such a prerequisite: preference for X over Y and Y over Z must imply a preference for X over Z. In the case where connectedness and transitivity are involved at the same time, rational choice theorists are on fire about "weak order of preference."
Rational choice explanations relate individual behavior to that individual's subjective beliefs and preferences, rather than to the objective conditions and opportunities facing him. Thus, it is possible for someone to act rationally based on false beliefs, which is opposed to better ways achieving someone's goals or desires. However, to call someone rational, he/she must gather enough information, within the bounds of what is possible, to make his/her beliefs valid. The endless collection of information can also be a sign of irrationality, especially if the situation is an emergency. For example, under conditions of direct military attack, a long study of possible strategies will have devastating consequences.
Third, there is a difference between uncertainty and risk. It is assumed that people know with some certainty the consequences of their actions. But in reality, people often have only partial information about the relationship between specific actions and consequences. Some theorists even take the position that there are no real life situations in which people are able to rely on complete information, because, as Burke wrote two centuries ago, "you can never plan the future based on the past." There is a difference within the framework of "incomplete information" between "uncertainty" and "risk" - this distinction was first made by M. Keynes, and rational choice theory seeks to study choice under uncertainty as choice under risk.
When faced with risk, people are able to attribute the likelihood of different outcomes, while when faced with uncertainty, they are unable to do so. Rational choice theorists tend to focus on risk for two reasons: either because they believe that situations of uncertainty do not exist, or because they believe that when such situations exist, rational choice theory cannot help people in their actions. Under conditions of risk, rational risk theory assumes that people are able to calculate the "expected utility" or "expected value" of each action.
Fourth, there is a difference between strategic and parametric choices. Excluding the above two types social contradiction(indicative of "strategic" or "interdependent" choices), let's turn to parametric choices. They refer to the choices faced by individuals in environments independent of their choices. Sub-optimality and counter-finality are examples of strategic choices in which individuals must take into account choices made by others before determining their own course of action. Another example is that people who buy and sell stocks on the stock exchange tend to consider the choices of others before making their own decisions. As part of rational action theory, game theory deals with the formalization of interdependent or strategic choices. It constructs ideal-type models that provide for the rational decision of each player in a game where other players also make choices, and where each player must take into account the choices of others.
The Norwegian sociologist Ottar Broks (born 1932) set out to show what rational bases have local adaptations ("customs") that society considers traditional or traditionalist . As an example, he analyzes the fish bowl institution. On the north coast of Norway, once traditional on many, there was a fjord outlet to catch fish for dinner, as they said, "catch on the cauldron." Often the fishermen could catch more fresh fish than they could use, then the surplus had to be given to neighbors, friends or acquaintances. However, such "generosity" was not a manifestation of altruistic values, but an exchange within the framework of a barter economy. Later, the donor himself will receive the fish and other goods, or he will be helped in some other way when he needs it. This system of exchange relations was supported by customs and social norms. However, with the advent of the refrigerator, it has become more profitable to store fish than to “give away” it. Such new latent forms of action were used by people who were ready to break the rules and were not sensitive to sanctions. Thus, they can function as entrepreneurs, changing the existing system of interdependence.
Another prominent Scandinavian theorist of this trend is Gudmund Hernes (born 1941), a student of Coleman who studied education and inequality and applied rational choice theory to the study of power and anarchy. On his initiative and under his leadership, a large-scale study of power relations in modern Norwegian society was carried out, commissioned and paid for by the Norwegian government. Hernes and his colleagues created a model for analyzing the processes taking place in the negotiation economy and in mixed administration .
The central concepts of the Hernes model are power, interest And exchange. Actor A has power over B because A controls something that interests B, and vice versa. This interdependence forms the basis of exchange, as actors can make decisions while facing each other. Actors can give up control over something of lesser interest to them in order to gain control over something more significant. Hernes sums up the mutual dependency, power and bargaining power of the parties with the following formula:
A's direct power over B = A's control over item X + B's interest in item X = direct dependence of B on A ( , 14,).
A and B are not necessarily individuals, but rational actors cooperating in groups for their own benefit. Parliamentarians legislate and can therefore create relationships of exchange with those who value parliamentary votes. Farmers control food production and thus have leverage over the authorities and the consumer. Trade unions can exercise power through strike action. Henry Milner dealt with the problems of studying the relationship between social democratic politics and rational choice theory.
From the point of view of J. Elster, it is necessary to reject the functional explanation and replace them with combinations of intentional and causal explanations. Instead of postulating classes as collective actors, one should analyze the ways in which rational individuals combine in actions to achieve common purpose. Game theory, according to Elster, is acceptable for giving the macrotheories of Marxism a microfoundation.
The main peak of the crisis of behaviorism, structural-functional analysis and other main methodological trends occurred in the 60-70s. These years were full of attempts to find a new methodological basis for further research. Scientists have tried to do this in different ways:
1. update the "classical" methodological approaches (the emergence of post-behavioral methodological trends, neo-institutionalism, etc.);
2. create a system of "middle level" theories and try to use these theories as a methodological basis;
3. try to create an equivalent of a general theory by referring to classical political theories;
4. turn to Marxism and create on the basis of this various kinds of technocratic theories.
These years are characterized by the emergence of a number of methodological theories that claim to be the "grand theory". One of such theories, one of such methodological directions was the theory of rational choice.
Rational choice theory was designed to overcome the shortcomings of behaviorism, structural-functional analysis and institutionalism, creating a theory of political behavior in which a person would act as an independent, active political actor, a theory that would allow looking at a person’s behavior “from the inside”, taking into account the nature of his attitudes, choice of optimal behavior, etc.
The theory of rational choice came to political science from economic science. The “founding fathers” of the theory of rational choice are considered to be E. Downes (he formulated the main provisions of the theory in his work “The Economic Theory of Democracy”), D. Black (introduced the concept of preferences into political science, described the mechanism for their translation into performance results), G. Simon (substantiated the concept of bounded rationality and demonstrated the possibilities of applying the rational choice paradigm), as well as L. Chapley, M. Shubik, V. Riker, M. Olson, J. Buchanan, G. Tulloch (developed "game theory"). It took about ten years before rational choice theory became widespread in political science.
Proponents of rational choice theory proceed from the following methodological assumptions:
First, methodological individualism, that is, the recognition that social and political structures, politics, and society as a whole are secondary to the individual. It is the individual who produces institutions and relationships through his activity. Therefore, the interests of the individual are determined by him, as well as the order of preferences.
Secondly, the selfishness of the individual, that is, his desire to maximize his own benefit. This does not mean that a person will necessarily behave like an egoist, but even if he behaves like an altruist, then this method is most likely more beneficial for him than others. This applies not only to the behavior of an individual, but also to his behavior in a group when he is not bound by special personal attachments.
Proponents of the theory of rational choice believe that the voter decides whether to come to the polls or not, depending on how he evaluates the benefits of his vote, and also votes based on rational considerations of utility. He can manipulate his political settings if he sees that he may not get a win. Political parties in elections also try to maximize their benefits by enlisting the support of as many voters as possible. Deputies form committees, guided by the need to pass this or that bill, their people to the government, and so on. The bureaucracy in its activities is guided by the desire to increase its organization and its budget, and so on.
Thirdly, the rationality of individuals, that is, their ability to arrange their preferences in accordance with their maximum benefit. As E. Downes wrote, "every time we talk about rational behavior, we mean rational behavior, initially directed towards selfish goals." In this case, the individual correlates the expected results and costs and, trying to maximize the result, tries to minimize costs at the same time. Since the rationalization of behavior and the assessment of the ratio of benefits and costs require the possession of significant information, and its receipt is associated with an increase in overall costs, one speaks of "limited rationality" of the individual. This bounded rationality has more to do with the decision-making procedure itself than with the essence of the decision itself.
Fourth, the exchange of activities. Individuals in society do not act alone, there is an interdependence of people's choices. The behavior of each individual is carried out in certain institutional conditions, that is, under the influence of institutions. These institutional conditions themselves are created by people, but the initial one is people's consent to the exchange of activities. In the process of activity, individuals rather do not adapt to institutions, but try to change them in accordance with their interests. Institutions, in turn, can change the order of preferences, but this only means that the changed order turned out to be beneficial for political actors under given conditions.
Most often, the political process within the framework of the rational choice paradigm is described in the form of public choice theory, or in the form of game theory.
Proponents of the theory of public choice proceed from the fact that in the group the individual behaves selfishly and rationally. He will not voluntarily make special efforts to achieve common goals, but will try to use public goods for free (the “hare” phenomenon in public transport). This is because the nature of a collective good includes characteristics such as non-excludability (that is, no one can be excluded from the use of a public good) and non-rivalry (the consumption of that good big amount people does not reduce its utility).
Game theorists believe that political struggle for winning, as well as the assumptions of rational choice theory about the universality of such qualities of political actors as selfishness and rationality, make the political process similar to a zero-sum or non-zero-sum game. As is known from the course of general political science, game theory describes the interaction of actors through a certain set of game scenarios. The purpose of such an analysis is to search for such game conditions under which participants choose certain behavior strategies, for example, that are beneficial to all participants at once.
This methodological approach is not free from some shortcomings. One of these shortcomings is the insufficient consideration of social and cultural-historical factors influencing the individual's behavior. The authors of this manual are far from agreeing with researchers who believe that the political behavior of an individual is largely a function of the social structure or with those who argue that the political behavior of actors is in principle incomparable, because it occurs within the framework of unique national conditions and etc. However, it is obvious that the rational choice model does not take into account the influence of the socio-cultural environment on the preferences, motivation and behavioral strategy of political actors, and does not take into account the influence of the specifics of political discourse.
Another shortcoming has to do with the assumption of rational choice theorists about the rationality of behavior. The point is not only that individuals can behave like altruists, and not only that they can have limited information, imperfect qualities. These nuances, as shown above, are explained by the rational choice theory itself. First of all, we are talking about the fact that often people act irrationally under the influence of short-term factors, under the influence of affect, guided, for example, by momentary impulses.
As D. Easton rightly points out, the broad interpretation of rationality proposed by the supporters of the theory under consideration leads to the blurring of this concept. More fruitful for solving the problems posed by the representatives of rational choice theory would be to single out types of political behavior depending on its motivation. In particular, “social-oriented” behavior in the interests of “social solidarity” differs significantly from rational and selfish behavior.
In addition, rational choice theory is often criticized for some technical inconsistencies arising from the main provisions, as well as for the limited explanatory possibilities (for example, the applicability of the model of party competition proposed by its supporters only to countries with a two-party system). However, a significant part of such criticism either stems from a misinterpretation of the work of the representatives of this theory, or is refuted by the representatives of rational choice theory themselves (for example, with the help of the concept of "bounded" rationality).
Despite these shortcomings, rational choice theory has a number of virtues which are the reason for its great popularity. The first undoubted advantage is that standard methods are used here. scientific research. The analyst formulates hypotheses or theorems based on a general theory. The method of analysis used by supporters of rational choice theory proposes the construction of theorems that include alternative hypotheses about the intentions of political actors. The researcher then subjects these hypotheses or theorems to empirical testing. If reality does not disprove theorems, that theorem or hypothesis is considered relevant. If the test results are unsuccessful, the researcher draws the appropriate conclusions and repeats the procedure again. The use of this technique allows the researcher to draw a conclusion about what actions of people, institutional structures and the results of the exchange of activities will be most likely under certain conditions. Thus, rational choice theory solves the problem of verifying theoretical propositions by testing scientists' assumptions about the intentions of political subjects.
As the well-known political scientist K. von Boime rightly notes, the success of rational choice theory in political science can be generally explained by the following reasons:
1. “neopositivist requirements for the use of deductive methods in political science are most easily satisfied with the help of formal models, on which this methodological approach is based
2. The rational choice approach can be applied to the analysis of any type of behavior - from the actions of the most selfish rationalist to the infinitely altruistic activity of Mother Teresa, who maximized the strategy of helping the disadvantaged
3. directions of political science, which are on the middle level between micro- and macrotheories, are forced to recognize the possibility of an approach based on the analysis of activity ( political actors– E.M., O.T.) actors. The actor in the concept of rational choice is a construction that allows you to avoid the question of the real unity of the individual
4. rational choice theory promotes the use of qualitative and cumulative ( mixed - E.M., O.T.) approaches in political science
5. The rational choice approach acted as a kind of counterbalance to the dominance of behavioral research in previous decades. It is easy to combine it with multi-level analysis (especially when studying the realities of the countries of the European Union) and with ... neo-institutionalism, which became widespread in the 80s.
Rational choice theory has a fairly wide scope. It is used to analyze the behavior of voters, parliamentary activity and coalition formation, international relations, etc., and is widely used in modeling political processes.
discursive approach.
The concept of discourse is very ambiguous (from the Latin - discursus- reasoning, argument, argument), it is often used as a synonym for the word "text". Moreover, the text was sometimes understood not only as a specific product of speech activity, but also the widest range of phenomena of reality, structured in a special way and carrying a semantic load.
In science, there are many definitions of concepts discourse, political discourse. With their diversity, one can distinguish two main approaches .
The first approach is broader, and here under discourse understood fragments of reality that have a temporal length, logic and represent a complete composition formed on the basis of the organization of meanings (a completed “work”, for example, in the form of a text) using a semantic code (dictionary, etc.).
Representatives of another, narrower approach interpret discourse as a special kind of communication: "Discourseis a communicative event that occurs between the speaker, listener (observer, etc.) in the process of communicative action in a certain temporal, spatial, etc. context. This communicative action can be verbal, written, have verbal and non-verbal components.» .
If we apply this approach to the analysis of social and political phenomena, then the discourse will not define interpersonal dialogue as a “speech event”, but “social dialogue that takes place through and through social institutions between individuals, groups and also between the social institutions themselves involved in this dialogue."
In general, representatives of the theory of discourse distinguish two aspects of this phenomenon:
1. discourse is a frame, a "generating system" (J. Poccock, K. Skinner). The terms "language", "ideology" are often used to refer to this phenomenon; it is in this sense that one speaks of the discourse of liberalism, conservatism, and so on.
2. specific discourse - a discourse-work that has a specific plot, for example, the discourse of the 2000 presidential elections in the Russian Federation.
In the applied, “technical” sense, discourse means a written, speech or figurative manifestation of an object (broad interpretation of discourse), or communication (narrow interpretation). In this case, speeches, texts, interviews, conversations, debates, etc. are analyzed.
Discourse theory is a relatively new approach in political science, although it has deep roots in the philosophical tradition. In the twentieth century, the concept of discourse began to be widely used in the linguistic sciences. Since the mid 50s. the intensive use of the term begins in philosophy, and later in other social sciences, including political sciences. This process was facilitated deepening interest in linguistics and language problems at all.
This interest is due to two groups factors: external for science (objective social needs) and internal (the logic of the development of science itself).
External factors were associated with the expansion of the scope of language in the public, incl. political life. Through the development of funds mass media language permeates all areas of social life, becomes a real social force, a powerful tool of influence and manipulation. In addition, the nature of social processes influenced the growing interest in the language: the rethinking of language problems, as a rule, is characteristic of periods of social upheaval, which were the 60-70s. Socio-political transformations, as a rule, are accompanied by a change in the attitude of various social groups word, language, culture. The changes that have taken place require reflection. Traditional ideas cannot explain the new reality, and therefore there is a need for a new worldview, new concepts and terminology.
internal a factor was the accumulation of new empirical data, which contributed to a change in attitudes towards language in the humanities. Traditionally, language has been viewed as a product of culture that emerges in the course of mastering reality; as a coordinator of activities, translator of experience and knowledge between generations (language - an object culture). Gradually, a different idea arises, in which the language acts not only as a product, but also condition culture, its means, which is not only subject to external influence, but also has the opposite effect, forms and structures environment(language becomes subject culture).
The foundations of the theory of political discourse were laid by representatives of the Cambridge and Oxford philosophical schools in the 50s. 20th century, who analyzed the linguistic context of social thought. One of the first studies of political discourse was the serial publication of P. Lasle "Philosophy, Politics and Society", launched in 1956. In the 70s. the term "discourses" is beginning to be widely used in the analysis of political processes. In the 80s. there is a center of semiotic research associated with the analysis of discourses. It concentrates around T. Van Dyck. The researchers of the center are beginning to pay attention not only to the content aspects, but also to the technique of analyzing political discourse. From this point on, we can talk about the formation of an independent methodological approach to the analysis of political processes.
To study political discourse, representatives of this methodological direction widely use the methods of semiotic analysis (study of the discourse-frame), as well as rhetoric and literary criticism (analysis of a specific discourse-work).
Exploring the discourse-frame (languages), scientists identify different levels of organization of the political discourse-frame. In particular, dictionaries are considered such levels, a simple language that allows the existence of one point of view on the phenomenon and a generally accepted meaning, Difficult language, allowing the existence of many points of view and subjective meanings, as well as a myth.
One of the most developed areas of analysis within the framework of this approach is the contextual analysis of political discourse, or rather its individual components. As a result of this contextual analysis, the features of the meanings of individual components of political discourse are revealed, which are formed under the influence of factors external to it (socio-economic, cultural and political conditions). At the same time, it is recognized that discourse is not a simple reflection of processes taking place in other areas of the social world, for example, in the economy. It combines the semantic elements and practices of all areas public life. The concept of articulation is used to explain the process of its construction. Combining, heterogeneous elements form a new construction, new meanings, a new series of meanings or discourse. For example, the Labor government that came to power in England in the 1950s built its program using various ideological components: the welfare state, the promise of universal employment, the Keynesian model of government, the nationalization of certain industries, support for entrepreneurship, cold war. This strategy was not just an expression of the interests of certain social strata of society, a response to changes in the economy; it was the result of the combination of various political, ideological and economic models, as a result of which a new discourse was constructed.
Appeal in the analysis of the discourse-work to the achievements of rhetoric and literary criticism involves, first of all, the use of methods related to the analysis of the plot. There are well-established schemes and models here that allow one to present individual political events and processes (a rally, an election process, etc.) as a discourse with its own plot, meanings and other parameters and to predict its development. Much attention is paid to the study of alternative plots based on one original model, as well as to the study of plots with open ends. This technique and technology makes it possible to obtain good results in the analysis of the political process as a dynamic characteristic of politics.
Practical use the theory of discourse can be demonstrated on the example of the analysis of Thatcherism (S. Hall). The project of Thatcherism consisted of two, in many respects, mutually exclusive spheres of ideas and theories: these are elements of neoliberal ideology (the concepts of “personal interests”, “monetarism”, “competition” were articulated), and elements of conservative ideology (“nation”, “family” , "duty", "authority", "power", "traditions"). It was based on a combination of free market politics and a strong state. Around the term "collectivism", which did not fit into the framework of this project, the ideologists of Thatcherism built a whole chain of associations, which led to the emergence of social rejection of this concept. Collectivism in mass consciousness began to be associated with socialism, stagnation, inefficient management, the power not of the state, but of trade unions to the detriment of state interests. The result of this policy was the introduction of ideas that social institutions, built in accordance with the ideology of "collectivism", are responsible for the crisis state of the economy and the protracted stagnation in society. Thatcherism became associated with individual freedoms and personal enterprise, the moral and political rejuvenation of British society, the restoration of law and order.
One of the directions of the analysis of political discourse is the postmodern approach. It is impossible not to mention postmodernism in discursive analysis due to the fact that this direction is becoming more widespread in the social sciences, including political science, and is considered one of the “fashionable” areas of social and political analysis. Let us dwell briefly on its characteristics.
When analyzing political discourse, postmodernists proceed from the following parcels. They deny the possibility of the existence of a single and shared image of reality that can be accurately studied and explained. The world created by the beliefs and behavior of people. As ideas spread, people begin to believe in them and act on them. Being enshrined in certain rules, norms, institutions and mechanisms social control, these ideas thereby create reality.
Most representatives of this trend believe that meanings must be sought not in the surrounding external world, but only in language, which is a mechanism for creating and broadcasting individual ideas. Therefore, the study of language is declared the main task of science. The need to understand how the formation and construction of objects of reality takes place is proclaimed; the only way to achieve this goal is considered to be the interpretation of the language through the text. At the same time, language is often regarded as an exceptional subject that forms people's ideas about the world around them.
According to representatives of the postmodern direction, to understand the discourse, it is enough to analyze only the text itself. At the same time, the conditions of its writing, its history, personality, knowledge of the author's abilities, etc. are ignored. That is, the meanings and meanings contained in the text belong neither to the context, nor to the author, nor to the reader, nor to history, but only to the text. Most postmodernists believe that any reader of the text is able to offer a reliable interpretation of it, the reliability of the interpretation depends solely on subjective perception. As D. Easton rightly notes, “this perspective destroys both objectivity and subjectivity; the text speaks for itself, the dialogue is not between people, not between the author and the reader.
Some postmodernists, believing that all meanings and meanings are in the text, argue that there is no reality outside the language. Thus, the existence of a basis external to the researcher, on which scientific knowledge can be based, is rejected.
Although this position seems to apply only to language, many postmodernists use it to analyze behavior. They believe that human behavior is "constructed" like text; we "read" the behavior as well as the sentence. Behavior contains meaning in and about itself. At the same time, the intentions of the actor do not affect the meaning of his behavior, just as the intentions of the author do not apply to the text. The circumstances under the influence of which the action is carried out are also not taken into account. There is no analysis of the socio-economic context, motivation, cultural orientations, social structure and other variables that explain behavior. Thus, the possibilities for an authentic "reading" of action within the framework of postmodernism also turn out to be at a low level, as well as the possibilities for "reading" texts.
Thus, within the framework of postmodernism, there is no full-fledged analysis of political discourse, since only its subjective meanings received by researchers are subjected to analysis. In this regard, it is significant that within the framework of postmodernism, the concept of discourse is not even defined, although the term itself is used quite widely. In general, the postmodern approach to the analysis of political discourse cannot be considered particularly fruitful, although there is no doubt that a lot of factual material is analyzed within the framework of this direction, the appeal to which is of undoubted interest for further studies of political discourse.
Similar information.
The main peak of the crisis of behaviorism, structural-functional analysis and other main methodological trends occurred in the 60-70s. These years were full of attempts to find a new methodological basis for further research. Scientists have tried to do this in different ways:
1. update the "classical" methodological approaches (the emergence of post-behavioral methodological trends, neo-institutionalism, etc.);
2. create a system of "middle level" theories and try to use these theories as a methodological basis;
3. try to create an equivalent of a general theory by referring to classical political theories;
4. turn to Marxism and create on the basis of this various kinds of technocratic theories.
These years are characterized by the emergence of a number of methodological theories that claim to be the "grand theory". One of such theories, one of such methodological directions was the theory of rational choice.
Rational choice theory was designed to overcome the shortcomings of behaviorism, structural-functional analysis and institutionalism, creating a theory of political behavior in which a person would act as an independent, active political actor, a theory that would allow looking at a person’s behavior “from the inside”, taking into account the nature of his attitudes, choice of optimal behavior, etc.
The theory of rational choice came to political science from economic science. The “founding fathers” of the theory of rational choice are considered to be E. Downes (he formulated the main provisions of the theory in his work “The Economic Theory of Democracy”), D. Black (introduced the concept of preferences into political science, described the mechanism for their translation into performance results), G. Simon (substantiated the concept of bounded rationality and demonstrated the possibilities of applying the rational choice paradigm), as well as L. Chapley, M. Shubik, V. Riker, M. Olson, J. Buchanan, G. Tulloch (developed "game theory"). It took about ten years before rational choice theory became widespread in political science.
Proponents of rational choice theory proceed from the following methodological assumptions:
First, methodological individualism, that is, the recognition that social and political structures, politics, and society as a whole are secondary to the individual. It is the individual who produces institutions and relationships through his activity. Therefore, the interests of the individual are determined by him, as well as the order of preferences.
Secondly, the selfishness of the individual, that is, his desire to maximize his own benefit. This does not mean that a person will necessarily behave like an egoist, but even if he behaves like an altruist, then this method is most likely more beneficial for him than others. This applies not only to the behavior of an individual, but also to his behavior in a group when he is not bound by special personal attachments.
Proponents of the theory of rational choice believe that the voter decides whether to come to the polls or not, depending on how he evaluates the benefits of his vote, and also votes based on rational considerations of utility. He can manipulate his political settings if he sees that he may not get a win. Political parties in elections also try to maximize their benefits by enlisting the support of as many voters as possible. Deputies form committees, guided by the need to pass this or that bill, their people to the government, and so on. The bureaucracy in its activities is guided by the desire to increase its organization and its budget, and so on.
Thirdly, the rationality of individuals, that is, their ability to arrange their preferences in accordance with their maximum benefit. As E. Downes wrote, "every time we talk about rational behavior, we mean rational behavior, initially directed towards selfish goals." In this case, the individual correlates the expected results and costs and, trying to maximize the result, tries to minimize costs at the same time. Since the rationalization of behavior and the assessment of the ratio of benefits and costs require the possession of significant information, and its receipt is associated with an increase in overall costs, one speaks of "limited rationality" of the individual. This bounded rationality has more to do with the decision-making procedure itself than with the essence of the decision itself.
Fourth, the exchange of activities. Individuals in society do not act alone, there is an interdependence of people's choices. The behavior of each individual is carried out in certain institutional conditions, that is, under the influence of institutions. These institutional conditions themselves are created by people, but the initial one is people's consent to the exchange of activities. In the process of activity, individuals rather do not adapt to institutions, but try to change them in accordance with their interests. Institutions, in turn, can change the order of preferences, but this only means that the changed order turned out to be beneficial for political actors under given conditions.
Most often, the political process within the framework of the rational choice paradigm is described in the form of public choice theory, or in the form of game theory.
Proponents of the theory of public choice proceed from the fact that in the group the individual behaves selfishly and rationally. He will not voluntarily make special efforts to achieve common goals, but will try to use public goods for free (the “hare” phenomenon in public transport). This is because the nature of a collective good includes such characteristics as non-excludability (that is, no one can be excluded from the use of a public good) and non-rivalry (the consumption of this good by a large number of people does not lead to a decrease in its utility).
Game theorists assume that the political struggle to win, as well as the assumptions of rational choice theory about the universality of such qualities of political actors as selfishness and rationality, make the political process similar to a game with zero or non-zero sum. As is known from the course of general political science, game theory describes the interaction of actors through a certain set of game scenarios. The purpose of such an analysis is to search for such game conditions under which participants choose certain behavior strategies, for example, that are beneficial to all participants at once.
This methodological approach is not free from some shortcomings. One of these shortcomings is the insufficient consideration of social and cultural-historical factors influencing the individual's behavior. The authors of this manual are far from agreeing with researchers who believe that the political behavior of an individual is largely a function of the social structure or with those who argue that the political behavior of actors is in principle incomparable, because it occurs within the framework of unique national conditions and etc. However, it is obvious that the rational choice model does not take into account the influence of the socio-cultural environment on the preferences, motivation and behavioral strategy of political actors, and does not take into account the influence of the specifics of political discourse.
Another shortcoming has to do with the assumption of rational choice theorists about the rationality of behavior. The point is not only that individuals can behave like altruists, and not only that they can have limited information, imperfect qualities. These nuances, as shown above, are explained by the rational choice theory itself. First of all, we are talking about the fact that often people act irrationally under the influence of short-term factors, under the influence of affect, guided, for example, by momentary impulses.
As D. Easton rightly points out, the broad interpretation of rationality proposed by the supporters of the theory under consideration leads to the blurring of this concept. More fruitful for solving the problems posed by the representatives of rational choice theory would be to single out types of political behavior depending on its motivation. In particular, “social-oriented” behavior in the interests of “social solidarity” differs significantly from rational and selfish behavior.
In addition, rational choice theory is often criticized for some technical inconsistencies arising from the main provisions, as well as for the limited explanatory possibilities (for example, the applicability of the model of party competition proposed by its supporters only to countries with a two-party system). However, a significant part of such criticism either stems from a misinterpretation of the work of the representatives of this theory, or is refuted by the representatives of rational choice theory themselves (for example, with the help of the concept of "bounded" rationality).
Despite these shortcomings, rational choice theory has a number of virtues which are the reason for its great popularity. The first undoubted advantage is that standard methods of scientific research are used here. The analyst formulates hypotheses or theorems based on a general theory. The method of analysis used by supporters of rational choice theory proposes the construction of theorems that include alternative hypotheses about the intentions of political actors. The researcher then subjects these hypotheses or theorems to empirical testing. If reality does not disprove theorems, that theorem or hypothesis is considered relevant. If the test results are unsuccessful, the researcher draws the appropriate conclusions and repeats the procedure again. The use of this technique allows the researcher to draw a conclusion about what actions of people, institutional structures and the results of the exchange of activities will be most likely under certain conditions. Thus, rational choice theory solves the problem of verifying theoretical propositions by testing scientists' assumptions about the intentions of political subjects.
As the well-known political scientist K. von Boime rightly notes, the success of rational choice theory in political science can be generally explained by the following reasons:
1. “neopositivist requirements for the use of deductive methods in political science are most easily satisfied with the help of formal models, on which this methodological approach is based
2. The rational choice approach can be applied to the analysis of any type of behavior - from the actions of the most selfish rationalist to the infinitely altruistic activity of Mother Teresa, who maximized the strategy of helping the disadvantaged
3. directions of political science, which are on the middle level between micro- and macrotheories, are forced to recognize the possibility of an approach based on the analysis of activity ( political actors– E.M., O.T.) actors. The actor in the concept of rational choice is a construction that allows you to avoid the question of the real unity of the individual
4. rational choice theory promotes the use of qualitative and cumulative ( mixed - E.M., O.T.) approaches in political science
5. The rational choice approach acted as a kind of counterbalance to the dominance of behavioral research in previous decades. It is easy to combine it with multi-level analysis (especially when studying the realities of the countries of the European Union) and with ... neo-institutionalism, which became widespread in the 80s.
Rational choice theory has a fairly wide scope. It is used to analyze the behavior of voters, parliamentary activity and coalition formation, international relations, etc., and is widely used in modeling political processes.
