Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation
federal state budgetary educational institution higher professional education
Fraternal State University
Department of History and Political Science
Prague Spring
student gr. MTS-13
Checked by: Ph.D., Associate Professor
Kunzharov E.M.
Bratsk 2014
Introduction
Prague Spring. Causes
Prague Spring. Main stages and results
Was Czechoslovakia lagging behind the West?
Who started what?
Who drove Novotny
Again students
The purpose of the Soviet leadership
. "Prague Spring"
Conclusion
List of sources and literature
INTRODUCTION
More than 45 years have passed since the famous "Prague Spring". For relatively a short time assessments of this historical event changed quite abruptly - from "creeping counter-revolution" to peaceful democratic revolution. Now the overwhelming majority is of the opinion that an outstanding experiment in building socialism with a human face was ruined in Czechoslovakia. What, they say, if it were not for the intervention of the USSR, then on the basis of this experiment it would be possible to build real socialism and prevent the mistakes of Perestroika.
Now only a small number of authors consider the events of 1968 in Czechoslovakia as an attack by the enemies of Russia. In particular, this approach is most fully substantiated in our book on the Orange Revolutions. Indeed, the hand of provocateurs who tried in Czechoslovakia in 1968 to undermine the socialist community is well felt. But such an approach does not expose the main manipulative assertion of the lovers of "socialisms with a human face" - but are such socialisms even possible? In addition, it remains unclear why Dubcek came to power and why exactly he.
An ordinary ordinary citizen of our country knew the following about the events of the Prague Spring: On the night of August 20-21, 1968, about seven thousand tanks and more than three hundred thousand soldiers and officers from five countries Warsaw Pact(USSR, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria) crossed the borders of Czechoslovakia.
What did the troops of the countries bound by a cooperation agreement forget on the streets of Prague? Why did the Soviet Union take the unprecedented step of openly intimidating Czechoslovakia? Despite the fact that more than 45 years have passed since the suppression of the Prague Spring, the world is still arguing about the causes and consequences of these events. What is it - "Prague Spring"? Revolution or counter-revolution, a conspiracy of internal and external forces who tried to "tear" Czechoslovakia from the socialist camp, a cosmetic attempt at pro-socialist reforms, a real path to building socialism without its inherent shortcomings, or an uncontrolled process of the collapse of socialism with unpredictable consequences?
1. Prague Spring. Causes
In addition to the main myth about the attempt to build socialism with a human face in 1968, there are currently several other less important myths associated with the Prague Spring, or rather, the events during the spring-summer of 1968 in Czechoslovakia.
So first these 10 major myths.
Socialism slowed down the growth rate of Czechoslovakia.
Reforms in Czechoslovakia began Dubcek.
Novotny was replaced by the communists of Czechoslovakia themselves, and they themselves chose Dubcek, regardless of the reaction of the leaders of the USSR.
The ultimate goal of the Prague Spring was to build socialism with a human face. Dubcek wanted to establish democracy in Czechoslovakia.
Dubcek carried out economic reforms.
The USSR was the first to formulate the doctrine of limited sovereignty.
The Soviet Union used force where caution and patience were needed.
The USSR, by its actions, sharply aggravated the international situation and brought the world to the brink of nuclear war.
After the introduction of Soviet troops, he removed the leaders of the Prague Spring. The military intervention of the USSR ended the democratic leadership of Czechoslovakia, headed by Dubcek.
After the introduction of troops, the Soviet Union stopped economic reforms in Czechoslovakia.
We will deal with a detailed analysis and debunking of myths.
2. Prague Spring. Main stages and results
Before refuting the myths, a few words about the historical outline of those events. The encyclopedia says that in March 1953, immediately after Stalin, the president of Czechoslovakia, K. Gottwald, died. Antonin Zapototsky was elected President of Czechoslovakia, and V. Shiroky received the post of Prime Minister. In June 1953, unrest broke out in Pilsen and other industrial areas, the reason for which was a significant increase in prices, the result of the monetary reform and the lifting of restrictions on the purchase of food and consumer goods. The unrest was a reaction to similar events in the GDR. In an effort to reassure the population, the government took a series of measures to increase the production of consumer goods. In July, the public demanded that the government end harsh penalties for leaving work. To reassure the peasants, the forced collectivization was suspended, and the peasants were allowed to leave the collective farms.
In May 1956, students held a demonstration in Prague demanding the abolition of control over cultural and intellectual life. Who organized their performances, now it is difficult to say. But it was clearly not an independent action. It should be remembered that in 1956, after Khrushchev's report, the West began total subversion in all socialist countries. Anti-government demonstrations were noted not only in Czechoslovakia, Poland, the GDR, but also in Hungary, where they ended with the Orange Revolution.
In November 1957 Zapototsky died. A. Novotny took the post of General Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and at the same time the President of the country. And already in 1960, the first steps towards de-Stalinization began. Gottwald has been criticized for having a "cult of personality". In 1961 his body was removed from the mausoleum. Several high-ranking individuals who carried out repressions during the Stalinist period were removed from the governing bodies others were imprisoned. The monument to Stalin in Prague was dismantled. Novotny did not support the removal of Khrushchev in 1964.
In 1967, the situation in Poland sharply worsened. The USSR provided her with economic assistance and allowed her to take Western loans. This permission was a fundamental mistake. Such circumstances preceded the beginning of the Prague Spring.
3. Was Czechoslovakia lagging behind the West?
Let's start with the first myth, that socialism slowed down the growth of Czechoslovakia. Say, Czechoslovakia lagged behind the West. This is a typical manipulation that all the detractors of socialism use. Suffice it to recall Czechoslovakia in the 80s of the XX century. Czechoslovakians then lived very well, there was no shortage at all. Such social benefits, stimulating the rearing of children and family relations, were not in any country in the world. Postpartum parental leave with full pay for 5 years. Benefits for children, for whom almost everything is free... Czechoslovakia was one of the most developed countries in the world and once even ranked among the 10 most developed countries in the world. Here are just a few numbers. The population of Czechoslovakia in 1989 participated in the world community of 0.4%, while the engineering production of tiny Czechoslovakia exceeded 4% (!) of world engineering! Until the end of the 80s, the whole world knew the Czechoslovak companies Skoda, CKD, Tatra, Sigma, Zetor or Czech breweries, glassmaking, Czech porcelain, etc. The Czechs under the communists produced more electric locomotives than the United States! The Czechs under socialism occupied the first place in the world in the production of trams, the second place in the world in the production of motorcycles. Czechoslovakia produced color televisions, like Japan in the same 1953, the Czechs used television. In terms of arms supplies, Czechoslovakia ranked fifth in the world! East of Berlin (of course, except for the USSR), Czechoslovakia was the only country able to supply nuclear power plants. The line between the standard of living of the rural population and the urban population was erased word for word under the communists. In general, agriculture carried out the homeland's plan for food for the whole country so successfully that even 10 years after the coup, the French appreciated the Czechoslovak socialist Agriculture as the most developed in all of Europe! 4. Who started what?
The second widespread myth about the Prague Spring is the myth that reforms in Czechoslovakia were started by Dubček. No, it was Novotny who started the reforms and precisely in order to stop the reforms, as well as to achieve agreement on the deployment of the Soviet nuclear weapons in Czechoslovakia (more on that below), he was removed from the post of First Secretary, and then President of Czechoslovakia. A similar situation developed later in Poland. In 1981, Gierek, who failed to cope, was dismissed, and S. Kanya was supposed to stabilize the situation, but he quietly ruined it. Yes! The liberalization of the regime in Czechoslovakia began precisely at the time of Novotny. And if in the USSR after Khrushchev it was curtailed, then in Czechoslovakia it continued. In those years, in Czechoslovakia, the “sluggish” planned economy was criticized more and more fiercely, whose weaknesses showed up more and more clearly: they say that production was falling, and with it wages, there was a shortage of goods. Member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, head of the Institute of Economics of the Prague Academy of Sciences, Ota Zhik, spoke about a serious economic crisis. This crisis, as Ota Zik explained, could only be overcome with the help of energetic reforms - the planned economy should be replaced by "socialist market management." This would mean the release of enterprises from government controlled and at the same time it would remove the huge bureaucratic superstructure that is becoming unnecessary and absolutely unproductive. It is now that we know that the market superstructure is much larger and slower. But then Zhik's words seemed like a revelation. His other ideas were no less heretical: trade union independence, workers' self-management, cooperation with Western enterprises, import of Western know-how, free pricing, allowing small private firms - isn't this a rejection of socialism? Nevertheless, the voice of Ota Zhik was heeded - market reforms in the economy began. The economic reform itself, developed under his influence, had the most market orientation. It was the foolish economic reforms of the early 1960s that caused the economic difficulties that Novotny spoke of when he refused to increase the military spending of Czechoslovakia. At the same time, Novotny significantly loosened his control over ideology. Franz Kafka, who was previously outlawed, was officially "rehabilitated", one of Jerzy Menzel's films received an Oscar, Western books that were previously banned suddenly appeared on store shelves, and the Literary News magazine turned into a mouthpiece of the intelligentsia attacking socialism. So, the reforms of socialism were started not by Dubcek, but by Novotny, which later led to the emergence of economic difficulties. 5. Who chased Novotny away?
The myth that Novotny was ousted by the Czechoslovak communists themselves and that they themselves elected Dubcek, regardless of the reaction of the leaders of the USSR, requires special attention. Now, there are two versions of those events. According to the first, everything was decided by the Czechoslovaks themselves They say that all groups in the Central Committee united against Novotny and a conspiracy of some more progressive forces formed. Moscow, they say, knew about the situation, but decided to remain neutral, which, of course, meant a free hand for Novotny's critics. At the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on January 3-5, 1968, all this led to the resignation of the president of the republic, A. Novotny, from the post of first secretary of the Central Committee. In Moscow, this choice was treated calmly. A. Dubcek was a well-known person who spent many years of his life in the USSR, a graduate of the Higher School of Education under the Central Committee of the CPSU. Apparently, they hoped that he would be a manageable figure because of his gentle nature and complaisance. Meanwhile, there was a man equal in authority to Novotny in Czechoslovakia. But it was the once disgraced G. Husak, who back in 1944 led the Slovak National Uprising, and after the war headed the government of Slovakia. According to the activist of the Prague Spring, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Zdenek Mlynarzh, Husak "was a personality in his own right, surpassing most of the then communist leaders in his abilities." Husak was the author of the idea of Slovakia joining the USSR (without the Czech Republic). In addition, he considered "unreliable" Jews in the communist movement in Czechoslovakia. In 1951, Husak was arrested on the basis of a denunciation by the Slovak party leader Shiroky. He was released only in 1963. According to the activist of the Prague Spring, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Zdenek Mlynarzh, Husak "was a personality in his own right, surpassing most of the then communist leaders in his abilities." But that is precisely why he was feared like fire by both "conservatives" and "progressives" in the leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. The former simply “clamped” him, and the latter came up with the idea that until Gusak stood firmly on his feet and took the place of Novotny, he himself should put his man in this place. Therefore, the nomenklatura decided to put a weak person in this place. It was as if Novotny appealed to the USSR in the struggle for the seat of General Secretary, but did not receive Brezhnev's support. According to the second version, it was Moscow who decided who to make the leader of Czechoslovakia. The latest version seems somewhat unusual. But now we know that at that time not a single change in the leader of the socialist countries, perhaps, except for China and Vietnam, was uncontrolled and was carefully analyzed and regulated in the Kremlin. There is every reason to think that it was the leaders of the USSR who removed Novotny precisely for his market reforms and for refusing to agree to the deployment of Soviet nuclear weapons on the border with NATO (more on this below). It should also be remembered that L. Brezhnev did not like A. Novotny. Their relationship did not work out immediately after October 14, 1964, after the removal of Khrushchev, and Brezhnev informed all the leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries about this by telephone. In addition, Brezhnev could not forgive Novotny for some objections in 1964 regarding the form of N. Khrushchev's release from top posts. In addition, Brezhnev considered Novotny's policy to be the cause of the growing difficulties in Czechoslovakia, 6. Students again?
How, after all, was Novotny's removal carried out in practice? Usually, such decisions require some kind of event that shows everyone that the leader has lost confidence. And there is such an event in the history of Czechoslovakia. On October 30-31, 1967, student demonstrations took place against the backdrop of discussions in the Politburo. Here is how it was. On October 30, 1967, students of the Prague Technical College were talking in the Strakhov hostel with representatives of the youth magazine Mlada Fronta, complaining about interruptions in light and heating, and during the meeting the light suddenly went out. Who and why cut off the light, why weren't they apologized to the students? One way or another, but it aroused the students. October 1967, students took to the streets of Prague, protesting against the allegedly unbearable living conditions in their hostels. Students, numbering about 1500, marched on Hradcany, shouting “we want to study! we want light! The police first invited the students to put forward their wishes in an organized manner. Why did the students suddenly refuse? Do you remember the scene from Sholokhov's Virgin Soil Upturned, when the collective farmers are incited by the kulak underdogs, while themselves remaining in the shadows? After the students refused to disperse, the police used water cannons and tear gas, which only led to further bitterness and radicalization of the student environment. It is unlikely that the performance of the students was organized by the United States. Then they would have acted in favor of the USSR, since as a result of the Prague Spring, it was the USSR that achieved its goal - to deploy nuclear weapons in Czechoslovakia. Moreover, after the performance, they would have had to sacrifice part of their agents. Here the KGB was involved. He was then repeatedly exposed in 1989, participating in the organization of "perestroika", or rather, coup d'état, in the countries of Eastern Europe. The dispersal of students caused massive criticism in the Central Committee itself, and Novotny turned to his "elder brother" in Moscow in search of help. He did not understand that such a demonstration could not be organized so easily. If this is not the state security of Czechoslovakia or the KGB, then the United States. If the United States, then the state security did not work well or deliberately missed this event. However, the Czechoslovak state security could well have done this only on command from the USSR, on which it was completely dependent. At the end of December 1967, a meeting was held at which it was discussed who should be put in Novotny's place, and which lasted 18 hours without a break. Brezhnev, more than other applicants (Husak, however, was not among them), liked the first secretary of the Communist Party of Slovakia, Alexander Dubcek, or simply "our Sasha", as he called him. Sasha was relatively young, during the war he lived in Kazakhstan, studied in Moscow, and, moreover, touched Brezhnev when, in a frank conversation, he shed a tear and said that Novotny, a longtime friend of the USSR, "tyrant" Novotny did not take with him to Moscow for celebration of the 60th anniversary of October. To Brezhnev, such experiences were close and understandable from the time of Khrushchev. According to the official version, Brezhnev himself left it to the Czechs to decide who to lead them ("it's your business"), and according to the unofficial version, he made it clear that he was not against Dubcek's candidacy - "Our Sasha is still a good comrade." Who is Dubcek? Dubcek graduated with honors from the Higher Party School in Moscow and then became the head of the Slovak Communist Party. As the Czechs themselves recalled, the rustic Dubcek was a political blockhead, however, his frequent and truly notorious words were: "I believe, I believe." Even the children then said that it was not the Secretary General who was speaking, but "I believe, I believe." Dubcek began to play the role of his chair. Dubcek would never have been chosen if not for the chilly relationship between Brezhnev and then-Czech party leader Antonin Novotny. Soon, on January 4, 1968, President Novotny was removed from the leadership of the party - he resigned from the post of First Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, and Dubcek was elected First Secretary. For the first time, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was headed by a Slovak. Four new members were introduced to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. It was a kind of sensation, but in essence it was a compromise of various forces within the Central Committee. Then, at the end of March, Novotny was removed from the post of president of the country. He seemed to have resigned himself. Instead, Ludwik Svoboda, a World War II hero, was elected president. Oldrich Czernik replaced Josef Lenart as prime minister. Thus Alexander Dubcek, the first secretary of the Communist Party of Slovakia, who criticized the Novotny government and advocated a renewal of the party's policy, became the new party leader and the main political figure in the country. It is believed that, as de facto head of state, Dubcek wished to take a course towards political liberalization and to emphasize the production of consumer goods in industry. In the future, the federalization of Czechoslovakia and the creation of a multi-party system were supposed. But is it? A number of facts show that this is not the case. At the end of January, A. Dubcek had a long meeting with L. Brezhnev. Gradually he got acquainted with other leaders, the most friendly contacts he had with J. Kadar. Upon coming to power, Dubcek immediately tried to calm the reformers' ardor and assuage the fears of the rest of the Eastern Bloc, who already saw Czechoslovakia marching into the Western camp. Ota Zhik, whose reformist intentions were precisely the cause of the growing free-thinking among the workers, was not included either in the Presidium of the party, or admitted to the leadership of the commission working on economic reform. Thus, the problems that the reformers worked on in such a hurry were of less concern to Dubcek; the main thing he wanted was a new federal constitution, which was supposed to give the Slovaks more self-government. Note. It turns out that Dubcek cooled the ardor of the reformers. This means that the reforms began under Novotny. And the task of Dubcek was precisely the curtailment of reforms. political social Prague liberalization 7. The purpose of the Soviet leadership
If the USSR contributed to the removal of Novotny, then the question arises, why did he need it? A simple rejection of Novotny by Brezhnev cannot explain this. Few people dislike anyone. To remove the first secretary of the ruling party of a country like Czechoslovakia, a lot of preparatory work is needed, it just won’t work. Any such event has a double bottom and it is not known how society will behave in response to external influences. What were the historical precedents? In 1948-1949, despite Stalin's threats, Yugoslavia, at the cost of a break with the USSR, defended its independent course, which sharply weakened the position of the USSR in the Balkans. In 1956, a compromise was hardly reached in Poland with the new leadership headed by W. Gomulka, but before that there was also the suppression of the protests of workers in Poznan, and a massive Soviet military demonstration before N. Khrushchev's arrival in Warsaw. In 1956 - a putsch in Hungary, suppressed by Soviet troops, who were invited by the hastily formed government of J. Kadar. The government of I. Nagy was removed from power. So, with a tip, decisions to remove the leader of a country, even dependent on the USSR, are not made. Therefore, there had to be not only a public, but also a hidden, not visible from the surface and more deeply lying, real and very important geopolitical reason. It turns out that there is such a reason, and the student riot was just a public reason. The geopolitical reason was that the USSR needed to deploy nuclear weapons on the border with NATO. It is known that in 1960 the United States began to place nuclear missiles in Europe and Asia, 60 Thor missiles in the UK, 30 Jupiter missiles in Italy, and 15 Jupiter missiles in Turkey. In response, the USSR decided to deploy its nuclear missiles (40 launchers for SS-4 and SS-5 missiles plus 162 atomic bombs for Il-28 bombers) in Cuba. President Kennedy announced a naval blockade around the coast of Cuba, which brought the USSR and the United States to the brink of nuclear war. The confrontation lasted 38 days, then the missiles were withdrawn from both Cuba and Turkey. In Europe, the missiles continued to be deployed. This forced the USSR to take symmetrical actions. By 1968, the USSR was deploying up to 200 new missiles annually. But they were far away, on the territory of the USSR. Simultaneously with the deployment of the missiles, intensive negotiations were going on to sign a non-proliferation treaty. The treaty was approved by the UN General Assembly on June 12, 1968, and opened for signature on July 1, 1968 in Moscow, Washington, and London. In order to compensate for the geopolitical losses from the signing of the treaty, the USSR had to be able to place missiles and nuclear charges on the border with NATO. Here is a quote from the work of Y. Shimov: “In the 60s of the last century, Czechoslovakia was the only state of the Eastern bloc that directly bordered on Western countries, without having Soviet troops on its territory. Therefore, a curious international legal conflict arose. After Caribbean Crisis In 1962, the leading nuclear powers began negotiations on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, culminating in the development of an appropriate treaty, which was opened for signature in July 1968. Already during the preparation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, an unspoken agreement was reached that the US and the USSR would not transfer nuclear weapons to their allies. Thus, if in Hungary, Poland and the GDR, the Soviet Union could ... deploy tactical nuclear weapons (since these countries had Soviet troops, in whose hands these weapons remained), then problems arose with Czechoslovakia. Soviet troops were not there, at numerous meetings and conferences at the top in the 60s, Prague politely but stubbornly refused to accept them, while transferring nuclear warheads to the CSNA meant jeopardizing important negotiations on the nuclear issue with the West. In addition, Washington's response in this case could be the nuclearization of the German armed forces, and the Kremlin really did not want this for a number of not only military-strategic, but also political-ideological considerations. Leaving the situation as it was meant, in the event of a possible conflict with NATO in Europe, jeopardizing the speed of deployment of tactical nuclear weapons on one of the most important sectors of the front. An additional factor that aroused Moscow's concern was the complaints of the Czechoslovak leadership that high spending on defense and rearmament of the army placed too heavy a burden on the country's economy, which entered a period of crisis in the first half of the 60s. According to the estimates of the Czech historian I. Fidler, in terms of military spending among the Warsaw Pact countries in terms of per capita, Czechoslovakia at that time was second only to the USSR, noticeably ahead of the rest of the Eastern European countries. In 1963, at the talks in Moscow, the President of Czechoslovakia A. Novotny stated that maintaining the strength and combat readiness of the Czechoslovak army at the level at which the Soviet leadership insisted and which provided for the possibility of a quick transition from a peacetime situation to conducting a front-line offensive operation, “represents the limit our capabilities and negatively affects the state of the national economy of the republic. So, the leaders of the USSR had good reasons to want Novotny's removal. This is his refusal to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of Czechoslovakia and his economic reforms and the weakening of ideological control over the opposition. In January, Novotny's replacement seemed to be a success. 8. Prague Spring
In the end, Czechoslovakia confirmed its loyalty to the socialist course and loyalty to the allies. In response, the Soviet side said that Czechoslovakia had every right to choose its own path. When an agreement was reached, the negotiators traveled to Bratislava and prepared a joint communiqué. It was signed on 3 August. The document officially recognized the right of Czechoslovakia to carry out reforms, subject to its obligations towards its allies in the Warsaw Pact Organization (WTO). The concessions that the Soviet Union made with regard to Czechoslovakia did not meet with a proper response in it. On the contrary: mass demonstrations began in the country. Newspapers vying with each other urged the country's leadership not to stop there, but to dissociate themselves from the "big brother", take a course towards the neutralization of the country and establish closer ties with the West. The tone of the articles became more and more tense, more and more openly anti-communist notes appeared in them. On August 9, Tito visited Prague, and Ceausescu arrived the next day. Both leaders openly declared their support for the leadership of Czechoslovakia and approved of the reforms they were carrying out. Along with those who were delighted with the wind of change, there were also supporters of the former course in Czechoslovakia. Shortly after the signing of the communiqué, 19 high-ranking party leaders wrote to Brezhnev asking for military assistance. They wanted to remove Dubcek. But Brezhnev did not immediately respond to this request. Some authors believe that the decision to attack Czechoslovakia was announced as early as the spring of 1968. The rest was nothing more than decoration. However, most researchers are sure of the opposite: Brezhnev to the last delayed the use of force in resolving the Czechoslovak issue. And only when the danger of regime change arose did he begin negotiations with the allied countries. On the night of August 20-21, the Vltava-666 signal sounded on the air, marking the beginning of Operation Danube. The operation was led by General of the Army Ivan Grigoryevich Pavlovsky. A well-known specialist in military history, Igor Drogovoz, called the Danube the most grandiose strategic military action in terms of its scale. The scale of it really looked impressive: about 30 tank and motorized rifle divisions of the USSR and its allies in the Warsaw Pact Organization occupied the country in the center of Europe in 36 hours. The attack was swift. The troops crossed the border of Czechoslovakia at 20 points. Early in the morning tanks with white stripes were already roaring through the streets of Prague. At 4 o'clock in the morning the building of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was surrounded by paratroopers, at 6 o'clock in the morning the tank column took control of the General Staff, at about 7 o'clock in the morning the government building was blocked, and two hours later - post office, telegraph, as well as radio and television centers. At 0900, Dubcek, Chernik, Smrkovsky and Kriegel were arrested by agents of the Czechoslovakian security service, and later handed over to the Soviet side. The population of Czechoslovakia, which was already hostile towards the USSR after publications in newspapers, after the introduction of troops perceived the Soviet troops as occupiers. An excerpt from the report of the instructor of the political department of the 38th Army, Colonel Kosenkov, perfectly describes the atmosphere that prevailed in the country during the introduction of Soviet troops: “The population of the cities of Olomouc, Psherov, Prosteev, Krimarzhizh and others met the Soviet troops, incited by counter-revolutionary forces, with hostility and anger. Slogans were shouted out: “Invaders, go home! Shame on you!" - and others". Local authorities gave unspoken orders: not to make contact with Soviet soldiers, not to go into the city, not to give water to the invaders. Leaflets were posted everywhere calling for the condemnation of the Warsaw Pact troops. The government forbade the army to leave the barracks to avoid bloodshed. However, there were losses. Moreover, judging by the surviving documents, both sides. In August 1968, more than seventy people died in Czechoslovakia. About two hundred and fifty were wounded. Here are the official numbers Soviet losses: 11 servicemen were killed, including one officer, 87 servicemen, including 19 officers, were injured and injured in accidents, careless handling of weapons, etc. 85 people died (and also died of disease). Despite the fact that the troops that arrived in Czechoslovakia were given strict orders to shoot only in response, not everyone could withstand the nerves. Reading the memoirs of eyewitnesses and participants in the events, it is difficult to understand in whose words there are more exaggerations. Some say that the inhabitants of Prague and other cities behaved exclusively peacefully and protests were conducted only on the "cultural front". For example, the owner of the Moskva restaurant changed two letters on the sign, and his establishment became known as Morava. The accidentally collapsed bridge was renamed the "Bridge of Soviet-Czechoslovak Friendship". Numerous graffiti appeared on the walls. Military reports contain completely different information, indicating that the Czechs and Slovaks were not at all so peaceful and law-abiding. Set on fire tanks, and shots from roofs, and weapons found in several places are mentioned ... Here are just a few facts from the many set forth in the “Information on the facts of hostile manifestations and provocative actions in Prague and its environs”: “On the night of August 25 to 26 August in the building of the Ministry of Energy of Czechoslovakia seized 61 machine guns, 2 light machine guns, a grenade launcher, 10 pistols, 11,468 rounds of ammunition. 29 assault rifles, 3 machine guns, 20 pistols, a large number of ammunition. On the Old Town Square, in house No. 22, 4 pistols, an ammunition box and a radio transmitter were confiscated. Under the House of the Government of Czechoslovakia, at a depth of 130 meters, a room was found where there were pistols and ammunition ... "Of course, this amount of weapons would not be enough to arm the people's militia. However, it was found. And if the presence of pistols can be easily explained (you never know who decided to acquire personal weapons), then the grenade launcher and machine guns were definitely not bought for hunting or self-defense. In the same note (by the way, it was compiled in a single copy and until recently kept under the heading "Secret"), the feverish activity of representatives of the capitalist countries is also mentioned: the driver of a car with a West German license plate in Prague photographed the positions of units of the 1st Guards Tank Division. When trying to detain him, he threw out the Kodak camera with a prefix and disappeared. Another message: “On August 27 of this year, patrols of the 81st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 6th Guards Motorized Rifle Division detained car number 583904, whose three passengers, West German tourists, were photographing our equipment.” Under similar circumstances, many foreign citizens People: French tourist Litalmer Philippe, born in 1936; Swedish tourist Iona Berne; Hirigan Paul Georgi, resident of West Berlin, born in 1938, student-architect. Among the detainees were both US citizens and local residents. Of course, both journalists and just patriots who collected evidence of the perfidy of former comrades in the socialist camp could take pictures of Soviet tanks on the streets of Prague. However, not all episodes fit into these versions. Some foreign tourists found plans and maps, which marked the location of the Soviet units. On the eve of the entry of troops into Czechoslovakia, on August 18, Marshal Grechko gathered the leadership of the USSR Armed Forces and said: “A decision has been made to send troops of the Warsaw Pact countries into Czechoslovakia. This decision will be carried out even if it leads to a third world war.” This phrase is evidence that the Danube operation was taken more than seriously in the Soviet Union. And they understood its possible consequences. In the event of the intervention of Western countries on the territory of Czechoslovakia, fighting would begin. If the guide Soviet Union took such a step, and the Warsaw Pact countries supported it, which means that the point is not in the turn to a market economy and not in the freethinking of Czechoslovak means mass media. At that time, there was a real threat to the USSR - otherwise such an expensive operation, fraught with a major international scandal, would not have been carried out. By the way, the appearance of tanks on the streets of Prague was not completely unexpected: on August 20, Dubcek received a call from Moscow and warned him about the impending entry of troops. The government members arrested during the operation were taken to Moscow. Ludwig Svoboda insisted that they be released and take part in the negotiations. The result of these negotiations was the signing of an agreement in which the introduction of troops was approved. Meanwhile, in Czechoslovakia itself, an extraordinary XIV Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was held. He condemned the intervention, demanded the withdrawal of troops and turned to the world communist movement for help. However, the troops remained on the territory of the country. The main forces - 25 divisions - returned to the USSR on November 4, but the 15th Guards and 31st Tank Divisions, the 18th and 30th Guards and 48th Motorized Rifle Divisions remained in Czechoslovakia until 1991. In the event of major riots in the cities, the Gray Hawk Plan was developed. He assumed the introduction of 20 battalions and the use of force. After the existence of this plan became known to the leadership of Czechoslovakia, the general political strike scheduled for December 31, 1968 was canceled. Active resistance gradually faded away. The Soviet Union, meanwhile, began to actively restore its shattered reputation. By order of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Novosti press agency is preparing for publication in record time a White Book on the activities of the counter-revolutionary forces in Czechoslovakia. This collection of documents and materials has been published in Russian, Czech, Slovak, German, Polish, Hungarian, Bulgarian, English, French, Spanish and Arabic. Some authors speak of it as an unsuccessful attempt to justify themselves to the world community. But if you look at the statements of politicians of that time, it becomes clear that the possibility of bringing Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia seemed quite real to Western politicians. Moreover, this was expected from the USSR. Judge for yourself: statements that anti-Soviet speeches would soon appear in the Czechoslovak press appeared almost immediately after Dubcek came to power, that is, long before they actually appeared. Many public figures Western countries said that they support the Czechs and Slovaks in their endeavors. They assured that they were ready to help Czechoslovakia financial assistance. Prague intellectuals took these statements as a good sign: if it suddenly comes to a conflict, the West will definitely take the side of Czechoslovakia. Interestingly, long before the decision to send troops was made in the Soviet Union, Western politicians began to make statements that they would not interfere in the conflict. And those who counted on the help of the NATO countries could not but know about it. CONCLUSIONS
Until now, disputes about what the Prague Spring really was, which lasted only eight months, have not subsided. Some believe that it was organized by Western intelligence agencies, who set themselves the goal of destroying the Warsaw Pact. According to this version, Czechoslovakia was supposed to be the first, but not the last, country to leave the Warsaw Pact. The actions of the Soviet leadership made it possible to postpone the collapse of this union until 1991. But the countries of the West received an excellent trump card in the ideological struggle: after the introduction of troops into the territory of Czechoslovakia, they openly declared the imperial claims of the Soviet Union. Another version, which also has many supporters, is that the Prague Spring was caused by the desire of the citizens of Czechoslovakia to restore democratic traditions. The communist ideology left too little freedom. It suppressed the development of the personality - this led to the accumulation of discontent and the demand for change. The Soviet Union was destined to go through a similar period. True, his name was much less poetic - perestroika. As in Czechoslovakia, it all started with publicity and discussion of "uncomfortable" issues... LIST OF SOURCES AND LITERATURE 1. Short story Czechoslovakia from ancient times to the present day / (Under the editorship of A.Kh. Klevanskikh, V.V. Maryina and others) - M.: Nauka.1988.-552p. Maryina V.V. Prague Spring 1968 to the issue of international resonance (according to published in Czech Republic documents and materials of the Czech magazine "Soudobe dejiny") / V.V. Maryina // Slavic Studies.-2008.-№3.-p. 22-393. Novikova A., Shinkarev L. Based on documents from the archives of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Who was afraid of the old square // Izvestia. gas.-1992. -August 17. - p.7
). With his kind permission, I am publishing an article about the so-called. "Prague Spring" in the "Military History Journal" No. 8 for 2010.
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The events of 1968 in Czechoslovakia and the position of the United States
H.N.Platoshkin
Abstract: The article deals with US reaction towards so called “Prague spring 1968”. The author argues that the Americans didn’t really support the “liberals” in Czechoslovakia and were considering a NATO military intervention which could have provoked a world war.The so-called "Prague Spring" of 1968 is still surrounded by myths that are politically beneficial to the West, however, like other major crises of the Cold War. Today's interpretation of these events is approximately as follows: the process of economic and political reforms in Czechoslovakia, which began with the election of Alexander Dubcek to the post of first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KPC) in January 1968, was stopped by the invasion of the troops of five countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (OVD) on August 20-21, 1968. At the same time, the sympathies of the "free world" and, above all, the United States, of course, were on the side of the Czechoslovak reformers.
In fact, everything was different. The process of real political and economic reforms in Czechoslovakia was started under the influence of developments in the USSR in the first half of the 60s. Under the leadership of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (since 1953) and the President of Czechoslovakia Antonin Novotny, the process of rehabilitation of the victims of the repressions of the early 50s began in Czechoslovakia, censorship was significantly weakened, the "new wave" of Czechoslovak cinema was recognized throughout Europe (one of the young representatives which became the now world-famous director Milos Forman with the film "Black Peter"). As the main event of that time, we can single out the adoption in Czechoslovakia under the direct influence of the "Kosygin reform" in the USSR in 1965 new concept economic policy. This concept set the task of weakening central planning and giving enterprises greater economic independence within the framework of cost accounting.
That is, it was the USSR that became the catalyst for real reforms in Czechoslovakia, and the coming to power in Moscow in October 1964 of a new leadership headed by L.I. Brezhnev only stepped up the transformations both in Moscow and in Prague.
However, at the end of 1967, the internal struggle in the Czechoslovak party leadership seriously escalated. Novotny was not a supporter of the federalization of Czechoslovakia and criticized the "nationalism" of the Slovak communists led by Alexander Dubcek (who, by the way, in the position of secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in the late 50s oversaw the country's industry). Novotny’s struggle against the leadership of the Slovak Communist Party was taken advantage of by opposition-minded members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, who decided to remove him from the highest party post (moreover, both the “Stalinist” Bilyak and the “reformer” Smrkovsky were against Novotny). Novotny invited Brezhnev to Moscow in December 1967, but he refused to support him. One of the reasons for this position was the fact that Brezhnev considered Novotny a supporter of his main rival in the Soviet leadership - A.N. Kosygin.
As a result of heated and lengthy debates in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (which began in October 1967), Novotny himself proposed Alexander Dubcek as a compromise candidate for the post of first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, with which Brezhnev agreed. Dubcek lived in the USSR from 1925 to 1938 and was considered a reliable friend and ally in Moscow (Brezhnev called him "Sasha" or "Alexander Stepanovich"). However, he did not have his own political face and was considered a weak figure, so Dubcek was approved by both "liberals" and "conservatives" in the Czechoslovak party leadership. On January 5, 1968, Dubcek was elected First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia by a majority of just one vote. It should be noted that Novotny's opponents spread rumors that the former Secretary General was preparing a military coup (both the CIA and the US State Department regarded these rumors as "wildly exaggerated").
As early as December 2, 1967, the US Embassy in Prague reported to Washington about rumors about Novotny's possible resignation. Members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Kolder (“conservative”) and Chernik (“liberal”) were named as possible successors. Dubcek was not mentioned. Moreover, as one of the reasons for Novotny's resignation, the Americans noted the fact that the economic reform has not yet yielded the expected results, although the economic indicators of Czechoslovakia are "favourable." Brezhnev's "unexpected" visit to Prague on December 8, 1967, the US Embassy assessed in the sense that the Kremlin, against its will, is forced to intervene in internal party struggle in the Czechoslovak leadership, since there was no independent alternative to Novotny.
US State Department Intelligence IntelligenceandResearchBureau) gave an assessment of Dubcek as a “apparatchik” of the “Novotny type”, as opposed to the “reformer” Josef Lenart. Lenart headed the government of Czechoslovakia and actively implemented the "Kosygin type" reform. Interestingly, on April 8, 1968, the “reformer” Dubcek removed Lenart from his post and replaced him with Oldrich Chernik. The latter was an opportunist who supported both the Prague Spring and its suppression (characteristically, Chernik was the head of government until 1970). When Lenart became prime minister of Czechoslovakia in 1963, he was hailed by the entire Western press as an "anti-Stalinist". Lenart supported the entry of the ATS troops in August 1968 and re-entered the top leadership of Czechoslovakia. Thus, according to the State Department, it turns out that after August 1968, Moscow returned to the highest posts in Czechoslovakia the "reformer" Lenart, who was removed from work by the "apparatchik" Dubcek.
In February 1968, the US State Department agreed with the recommendations of the US Embassy in Prague not to show "openness" and goodwill towards the "Dubcek regime" for the time being, since this regime itself is an unstable coalition of right and left forces. Meanwhile, the US had all the leverage to support the "reformist leadership." During the liberation of the western part of Czechoslovakia in 1945, the US Army seized the gold reserves of the Czechoslovak bank, which, after the occupation of Czechoslovakia by Hitler in 1939, fell into the hands of the Germans. Despite the repeated demands of the government of Czechoslovakia to return the gold, the Americans, under various pretexts, avoided a substantive discussion of the issue. In 1961, they nevertheless agreed to return the monetary gold looted by the Nazis in exchange for paying off the claims of American citizens who allegedly suffered from the nationalization in Czechoslovakia after 1948. The amount of claims was agreed upon by both parties at 10-11 million dollars. However, then the United States unexpectedly increased this amount by 4 times without explaining the reasons (allegedly, some new estimates of damage from nationalization appeared). In fact, Washington was simply dissatisfied with the supply of weapons from Czechoslovakia to Vietnam, which was fighting against American aggression, but the Americans did not officially voice this version, since they themselves considered the retention of Czechoslovak gold stolen by the Nazis a “cynical” step.
The United States also delayed granting Czechoslovakia the status of the most favored nation in trade, linking this issue with .... the issue of the return of gold. Since the beginning of the Prague Spring, the US position has not changed one iota.
The US State Department believed that Dubcek and Company should first strengthen their positions in the state apparatus and themselves ask the West for economic assistance. On March 22, 1968, Novotny resigned as president of Czechoslovakia and was succeeded by the former commander of the Czechoslovak units on the Soviet-German front, General Ludwik Svoboda. The day before, on March 21, Czechoslovakia's ambassador to Washington, Karel Duda, in a conversation with US Assistant Undersecretary of State for European Affairs Stessel, expressed the opinion that the new leadership of Czechoslovakia would like to improve relations with the United States. The ambassador completely ruled out foreign interference in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia (the Americans understood this as a hint at Moscow), but admitted that the situation could change dramatically if internal strife in Czechoslovakia led to bloodshed.
Meanwhile, the "Prague Spring" caused an unexpected aggravation of relations between Czechoslovakia and the United States. On February 25, 1968, Major General Jan Sheina, a supporter of Novotny, who headed the party organization of the Ministry of Defense, defected to the Americans (with a 22-year-old mistress). Czechoslovakia demanded the extradition of the general (he was accused of corruption and preparing a military mutiny in support of Novotny). Ambassador of Czechoslovakia Duda, in the already mentioned conversation with Stessel, noted the "irony" of the fact that the United States gave asylum to the "Stalinist". The ambiguity of the situation was also recognized by Stessel. But the Americans did not extradite Shane to the Prague “reformers”, since the general became the CIA’s main expert source on Czechoslovakia. In 1970, Sheina was sentenced in absentia in Czechoslovakia to 10 years in prison with confiscation of property, but the Americans granted this "Stalinist" political asylum.
Novotny's resignation from the post of president of Czechoslovakia was not unambiguously assessed by the US embassy in Prague. In a telegram to Washington dated March 25, 1968, US Ambassador to Prague Beam wrote that the process of democratization could get out of control of the party leadership and lead to "dangerous demands" such as the neutrality of Czechoslovakia. However, Beam believed that “the Czechs are not Poles or Hungarians” and “they won’t lose their heads,” and the bulk of the population would react passively to political liberalization. Beam believed that Moscow would intervene in events in Czechoslovakia only when Czechoslovakia itself forced the Russians to do so. The ambassador hoped "that the lessons of 1956 have been learned by all parties and that Prague can be expected to do everything possible to avoid risky foreign policy steps." The reformers themselves (the Dubcek-Chernik group) were not highly regarded by Bim: they wanted to cause democratization for tactical purposes only in order to remove Novotny, and now they are unsuccessfully trying to put the genie back into the bottle. On the whole, events in Czechoslovakia are developing in line with the "interests of the United States."
That is why, on April 26, Beam submitted a memorandum to the US Under Secretary of State for European Affairs, Bohlen, proposing to soften the position on gold in order to send a positive signal to the new Prague leadership. It will also help "strengthen our influence ... in the communist world." Beam offered to give the Czechs "Nazi gold" in exchange for the first payment from Prague in compensation for damages from nationalization, with the proviso that further payments should follow. Most favored nation status in trade was proposed to be used as a "carrot" for the future. However, this very modest proposal of Beam did not find support in Washington either. They clearly considered the "Dubcek regime" fragile and transitional and waited for further developments. The State Department only agreed that "the Czechs should be informed informally and discreetly that we welcome their steps towards liberalization." However, while Czechoslovakia is the third largest supplier of weapons to North Vietnam, direct financial and economic assistance to Prague is impossible.
Secretary Rusk only did not object to the fact that the FRG provided financial assistance to Czechoslovakia. But West Germany limited itself only to the fact that, in the spring of 1968, several agents were sent to Prague through the BND intelligence line with the task of gaining access to information from the highest echelon of the political leadership (Operation Nepomuk).
All this time in Washington there was a struggle between "hawks" and "doves" among the top political leadership of the country. US President Johnson (who had already decided not to run for a second term in October 1968) and Secretary Rusk believed that the beginning of detente in relations with the USSR was of paramount importance. Including because with the help of Moscow it is possible to stop the almost lost war in Vietnam without losing face. Johnson was even going to visit Moscow in October 1968 as the first President of the United States. Against this background, the US president believed that excessive liberalization in Czechoslovakia could jeopardize the thaw that had begun in Soviet-American relations.
The hawk faction was led by Deputy Secretary of State for Political Affairs Rostow. For him, the global weakening of the positions of the USSR in the world with the help of Czechoslovakia's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact was a paramount task. Including because it could distract the Russians from Vietnam and give the United States a chance to end the war victoriously.
On May 10, 1968, Rostow sent a memorandum to Rusk entitled " Soviet threats to Czechoslovakia". Rostow considered these threats to be the maneuvers of the ATS troops that began in Poland: “The Russians are hesitating. So now is the time to give them a signal…” Rostow suggested that Johnson immediately summon the USSR ambassador to the United States, Dobrynin, and demand an explanation from him regarding the maneuvers of the ATS. Rostow further proposed the creation of a special high-level NATO group to monitor the situation in Czechoslovakia. This group was supposed to prepare a plan for the response of the North Atlantic bloc to a possible aggravation of the situation in Czechoslovakia.
However, neither Rusk nor Johnson supported Rostow's alarmist sentiments.
The same cautious opinion, although for a different reason, was shared by the US Embassy in Germany. In its telegram dated 05/10/1968, it noted that, unlike the 1956 crisis in Hungary, the movement of American troops in the FRG "closer to the Czech border, or even crossing the Czech border to help the Czechs repel a Soviet attack" is possible, given the common border of Czechoslovakia and Germany. However, the government of the FRG (which then included the Social Democrats) warned that Bonn was opposed to any American military action from the territory of the FRG. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the FRG Zam even demanded from the US Ambassador to the FRG McGee that the Americans moderate the tone of propaganda against Czechoslovakia from radio stations "Free Europe" in Munich and RIAS in West Berlin. In this regard, McGee considered any joint actions with the FRG against Czechoslovakia from the territory of West Germany "unrealistic."
On May 11, 1968, Rusk, in a telegram from the US mission to NATO, initiated a constant exchange of views between the bloc countries on the situation in Czechoslovakia, but for the time being recommended to refrain from steps that could be regarded in the world as NATO's "unusual concern" about the state of affairs in Czechoslovakia.
Meanwhile, the United States still did not want to solve the real, urgent issues of bilateral US-Czechoslovak relations. The new Minister of Foreign Affairs, the "reformer" Jiří Hajek, in a conversation with the American Ambassador on May 28, 1968, stated that since 1962 bilateral relations have not only not improved, but in a sense even rolled back. Gaek again demanded the return of the country's gold reserves, noting that the occupation of Czechoslovakia by Nazi Germany took place with the connivance of the Western powers, including the United States. Beam again could not say anything concrete in response (as in the Sheina case), but told the State Department that, in his opinion, Prague was using the gold issue to strengthen its authority in the "communist world" and "prevent natural pro-American sympathies within the country" .
Meanwhile, the development of the situation in Czechoslovakia was also closely monitored by the CIA. On June 13, 1968, American intelligence submitted a memorandum to the country's top leadership under the characteristic title " Czechoslovakia: Dubcek's pause". The CIA believed that both the internal and external crisis in Czechoslovakia had lost its urgency (hence the term "pause"). Moscow calmed down as Dubcek and Chernik firmly promised that the reform process would be led by the Communist Party. In exchange, the "Czechs" received from the USSR relative freedom of hands in domestic politics. It was noted that the "Soviets" themselves want to avoid military intervention in Czechoslovakia. The CIA emphasized that the main concern of the Kremlin is the possible withdrawal of Czechoslovakia from the Warsaw Pact, since the Czechoslovak army is the largest in the Warsaw Pact (230,000 people) per capita.
The CIA noted that despite Moscow's protests against the anti-Soviet campaign in the Czechoslovak media, this campaign has "reached astonishing proportions" in recent weeks. Moreover, the media of Czechoslovakia accused Moscow not only of the repressions of the early 50s, but also that it was the USSR that was to blame for the current economic problems of the country. Yet the CIA concluded that, as a result of the compromise reached between Prague and Moscow, "Moscow has decided not to use force, at least for the time being." Moreover, according to the CIA, Dubcek personally won because of the position of Moscow, since in the eyes of the population his own indecision in implementing reforms was explained by the pressure of the Soviet side.
American intelligence (with reference to Czech sources) reported disagreements in the Soviet leadership regarding Czechoslovakia. Brezhnev is forced to put pressure on Dubcek, since his (Brezhnev's) authority has seriously suffered: after all, it was Brezhnev who "put" Dubcek at the helm, and the latter is actually pursuing an anti-Soviet policy. Against this background, the Czechoslovak crisis could be used by Brezhnev's opponents in the Soviet leadership, including Kosygin.
In general, the Americans (quite rightly) believed that Dubcek was only buying time by formally agreeing with Brezhnev and promising that the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia would preserve socialism in the country. In fact, at the upcoming Congress of the Communist Party in September 1968, the reformist views will receive the status of the official program of the KRC and the "Soviets" will realize that they have been misled. The CIA also believed that Dubcek did not have clear views of his own and was under the influence of Chernik and Z. Mlynarzh, who would play a decisive role after the congress. The CIA concluded: “Thus, there is a high probability that relations between Prague and Moscow will again become very tense. The Soviet leaders, or at least most of them, want to avoid drastic and costly military action. However, if Dubček's control is in danger of collapsing, or if Czech policy becomes "counter-revolutionary" from Moscow's point of view, then the Soviets may again use their troops to threaten the Czech borders.
On July 11, 1968, the US Embassy in Moscow noted the intensification of controversy in the media of the Soviet Union against anti-Soviet publications in the Czechoslovak media, in particular against the well-known manifesto "2000 words".
By that time, the CIA had clearly fallen under the influence of its chief "expert" on Czechoslovakia, the "Stalinist" Sheina, who played his own game, trying to discredit Dubcek in the eyes of the Americans. On July 24, 1968, the CIA stated that the crisis in Czechoslovakia was over, because "according to the source" (i.e. Sheina) "the Czechoslovaks will probably capitulate to the Soviets" and curtail the reforms. Moreover, this will not cause protests among the population, since "neither workers nor Slovaks actively participate in liberalization." This opinion of Sheina was correct: the "Prague Spring" was the work of the intelligentsia and part of the party apparatus, but did not bring any improvement in the material situation of the population. And the anti-Sovietism of the Czech central press did not arouse sympathy in Slovakia. A note on the CIA report opined that "Shayna seems to underestimate the national factor." The military and police, according to Sheina, can quickly suppress possible demonstrations against the curtailment of reforms, as the officers are "conservative and pro-Soviet."
The CIA memo also noted that the "Soviets" were under intense pressure from "conservative forces in Czechoslovakia" as well as the leaders of Poland and the GDR, who demand that Moscow better control the situation in Czechoslovakia. It appears that this moment it should be emphasized that indeed not the entire population of Czechoslovakia welcomed the "Prague Spring". In addition to the well-known manifesto "2000 words" in the media appeared and open letter people's militia of Czechoslovakia with directly opposite demands in defense of socialism. Czechoslovakia was clearly sliding into a civil war.
Scheina (according to the CIA memo) believed that the "Soviets" preferred political leverage, but if military intervention was required, it would be in the form of a "lightning advance of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia." The CIA correctly identified the reasons for the possible intervention: Moscow began to understand that Dubcek and the “liberals” were “lying” when they promised not to withdraw Czechoslovakia from the Soviet sphere of influence (ie, the Warsaw Pact).
In the meantime, already in July 1968, the State Department was discussing the question of bringing the Czechoslovak problem to the UN for discussion. The reason could be a protest against the presence of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia, which, according to the Americans, left the country too slowly after the Šumava ATS maneuvers that ended on June 30, 1968. However, the Americans themselves did not want to apply to the UN, hoping that Czechoslovakia itself or Romania and Yugoslavia would initiate a discussion.
On July 20, 1968, Rostow again turned to the Secretary of State with a memorandum, demanding active influence on the USSR in order to keep Moscow from any action against Czechoslovakia.
"Prague Spring" - a period of political and cultural liberalization in Czechoslovakia. The period began on January 5, 1968, when the reformer Alexander Dubcek was elected First Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, and continued until August 21, when the USSR and the rest of the Warsaw Pact, except Romania, invaded the country to suppress reforms.
In January 1968, Alexander Dubcek took over the post of First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. This choice was treated with restraint in Moscow, he was a well-known person who spent long years of his life in the USSR, was a graduate of the Higher Party School under the Central Committee of the CPSU. In Moscow, apparently, they hoped that he would be a manageable figure because of the gentleness of his character. For almost eight months, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (Czechoslovakia) experienced a period of profound change, unprecedented in the history of the communist movement:
Censorship was significantly weakened, free discussions were held everywhere, and the creation of a multi-party system began. A desire was declared to ensure complete freedom of speech, assembly and movement, to establish strict control over the activities of security agencies, to facilitate the possibility of organizing private enterprises and to reduce state control over production.
It was planned to federalize the state and expand the powers of the authorities of the subjects of Czechoslovakia - the Czech Republic and Slovakia.
Dubcek allowed the creation of a number of new political clubs
In the field of foreign policy, it was decided to pursue a more independent course that would meet the interests of the Warsaw Pact in general and the policy of the USSR in particular.
Simultaneously with liberalization, anti-Soviet sentiments grew in society. When on February 15 at the Olympic Games in Grenoble the hockey team of Czechoslovakia beat the Soviet team with a score of 5: 4, for many in the republic this event turned into a national holiday.
End of "spring"
On March 23, 1968, at the Congress of Communist Parties in Dresden, criticism of the reforms in Czechoslovakia was voiced; on May 4, Brezhnev received a delegation led by Dubcek in Moscow, where he sharply criticized the situation in Czechoslovakia. On June 27, 1968, a manifesto was published in a Prague newspaper demanding further reforms. He was especially negatively perceived by the leadership of the USSR. In addition, the leadership of a number of countries participating in the Warsaw Pact thought about the increased, in their opinion, the vulnerability of the borders and territory of Czechoslovakia, the prospect of its withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, which would inevitably undermine the Eastern European military security system. Potentially, the situation in Czechoslovakia could affect neighboring Eastern European countries, and even the Soviet Union itself. The Czechoslovak slogan "socialism with a human face" called into question the humanity of Soviet socialism. "Opportunity " chain reaction” in neighboring socialist countries, where the social upheavals of the recent past were still fresh in memory (GDR in 1953, Hungary in 1956), led to hostility to the Czechoslovak “experiment” not only of the Soviet, but also of East German (W. Ulbricht), Polish ( V. Gomulka) and Bulgarian (T. Zhivkov) leadership. A more reserved position was taken by J. Kadar (Hungary).
Despite the fact that the Kremlin was unanimous in its negative attitude towards Czechoslovak reformism, they did not incline for a military invasion for a long time. Some members of the Soviet leadership engaged in an intensive search for a peaceful solution to the problem. This became apparent after March 1968, when the Soviet government began to use a number of political and psychological pressures to persuade Dubcek and his colleagues to slow down the imminent change.
The aggravation of the situation was also facilitated at first by a restrained reaction, and then by the categorical refusal of the Czechoslovak leadership to accept repeated proposals to deploy a Soviet military contingent on the territory of Czechoslovakia.
Political pressure was accompanied by psychological pressure: near the borders of Czechoslovakia, large-scale exercises of the ATS troops were held with the participation of the USSR, the GDR and Poland. Later, such a type of psychological influence was used as the presence of troops of the Warsaw Pact countries on the territory of Czechoslovakia during and after military exercises in June and July 1968.
In addition, the Soviet leadership did not rule out the possibility of applying economic sanctions against Czechoslovakia as a form of pressure. However, despite the reports that appeared at the end of April 1968 that Soviet grain supplies had been cut off, there was no real evidence of the use of economic levers.
Preparing for an invasion
The use of force was considered by the Soviet leadership as the last alternative. The option of military intervention was discussed in the military leadership throughout this period.
Back in the spring of 1968, the Soviet leadership decided that it was necessary to take measures to prepare their armed forces for operations on the territory of Czechoslovakia. There were also peculiarities in the mechanism for creating a grouping of troops. Along with the Soviet formations, it included formations of the Warsaw Pact countries - the GDR, Poland (Poland), Hungary (Hungary) and the NRB (Bulgaria). Formations and units from the end of May 1968 concentrated on the border with Czechoslovakia, primarily in Poland, East Germany and the USSR. The concentration of troops on the borders of Czechoslovakia was carried out covertly. In general, the exercises of the troops of the Warsaw Pact countries, held from May to mid-August on the territory of Czechoslovakia and along its borders, were used as a political and psychological influence on the leaders of Czechoslovakia. In addition, they made it possible to hide the signs of the impending entry into the territory of Czechoslovakia.
The Soviet command reported to the government that the indefinitely long deployment of a half-million army around the Czechoslovak borders, from the point of view of strategic, psychological and logistical, is extremely difficult. There were two options here: either disband the huge and costly troop concentration, or enter Czechoslovakia.
The final decision on the introduction of troops was made at an expanded meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee on August 16 and approved at a meeting of the leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries in Moscow on August 18. One of the decisive factors in the choice of the time of the invasion was the date set for September 9, 1968, for the congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, where, according to forecasts, the reformers were to win in the Czechoslovak leadership.
The official reason for the intensification of actions was a letter of appeal from a group of party and state leaders of Czechoslovakia to the governments of the USSR and other countries of the Warsaw Pact with a request for international assistance. It was supposed to change the political leadership of the country.
The invasion of the ATS troops in Czechoslovakia
On the morning of August 20, 1968, a secret order was read to the officers on the formation of the Danube High Command. The combat alert was announced at 23.00. Through closed communication channels, all fronts, armies, divisions, brigades, regiments and battalions were given a signal to advance. On the night of August 21, the troops of the USSR, Poland, the GDR, Hungary and Bulgaria crossed the Czechoslovak border from four directions at twenty points. The largest contingent of troops was allocated from the Soviet Union.
Four hours after the landing of the first groups of paratroopers, the most important objects of Prague and Brno were under the control of the allied forces. The main efforts of the paratroopers were aimed at seizing the buildings of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the government, the Ministry of Defense and general staff, as well as the buildings of the radio station and television. According to a predetermined plan, columns of troops were sent to the main administrative and industrial centers of Czechoslovakia. Formations and units of the allied forces were deployed in all major cities. Particular attention was paid to the protection western borders Czechoslovakia.
The 200,000-strong Czechoslovak army (about ten divisions) offered practically no resistance. She remained in the barracks, following the orders of her Minister of Defense, and remained neutral until the end of the events in the country. Among the population, mainly in Prague, Bratislava and other large cities, there was dissatisfaction with what was happening. The protest of the public was expressed in the construction of barricades on the path of advancement of tank columns, the actions of underground radio stations, the distribution of leaflets and appeals to the Czechoslovak population and military personnel of the allied countries. In some cases, there were armed attacks on the military personnel of the contingent of troops introduced into Czechoslovakia, throwing tanks and other armored vehicles with bottles of combustible mixture, attempts to disable communications and transport, destruction of monuments to Soviet soldiers in cities and villages of Czechoslovakia.
The rapid and coordinated entry of troops into Czechoslovakia led to the fact that within 36 hours the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries established complete control over Czechoslovak territory. However, despite the obvious military success, it was not possible to achieve political goals. The leaders of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, and after them the XIV Extraordinary Congress of the Party, already on August 21, condemned the introduction of allied troops. Representatives of the conservative-minded group of delegates at the congress were not elected to any of the leadership positions in the HRC.
On August 21, a group of countries (USA, England, France, Canada, Denmark and Paraguay) spoke at the UN Security Council demanding that the “Czechoslovak question” be brought to the UN General Assembly meeting, seeking a decision on the immediate withdrawal of troops from the Warsaw Pact countries. The representatives of Hungary and the USSR voted against. Later, the representative of Czechoslovakia also demanded that this issue be removed from consideration by the UN. The situation in Czechoslovakia was also discussed in the NATO Permanent Council. The governments of the countries of socialist orientation - Yugoslavia, Albania, Romania, and China - condemned the military intervention of the five states. Under these conditions, the USSR and its allies were forced to look for a way out of the situation. Negotiations began in Moscow (August 23-26) between the Soviet and Czechoslovak leadership. Their result was a joint communique, in which the timing of the withdrawal of Soviet troops was made dependent on the normalization of the situation in Czechoslovakia.
At the beginning of September, the first signs of stabilization of the situation appeared. The result was the withdrawal of the troops of the participating countries from many cities and towns of Czechoslovakia to specially designated locations. Aviation was concentrated on dedicated airfields.
The reason for extending the stay of the contingent of troops on the territory of Czechoslovakia was not only the continued internal political instability, but also the increased activity of NATO near the Czechoslovak borders, which was expressed in the regrouping of the bloc's troops stationed on the territory of the FRG in close proximity to the borders of the GDR and Czechoslovakia, in conducting various kinds of exercises .
On October 16, 1968, an agreement was signed between the governments of the USSR and Czechoslovakia on the conditions for the temporary stay of Soviet troops on the territory of Czechoslovakia, according to which part of the Soviet troops remained on the territory of Czechoslovakia "in order to ensure the security of the socialist community." The treaty contained provisions on respect for the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia and non-interference in its internal affairs. The signing of the treaty was one of the main military-political results of the introduction of troops of five states, which satisfied the leadership of the USSR and the Department of Internal Affairs. On October 17, 1968, a phased withdrawal of allied troops from the territory of Czechoslovakia began, which was completed by mid-November.
Despite the fact that during the introduction of troops of the Warsaw Pact countries fighting were not conducted, there were losses. Thus, during the redeployment and deployment of Soviet troops (from August 20 to November 12), as a result of the actions of hostile persons, 11 military personnel, including one officer, were killed; 87 Soviet servicemen were wounded and injured, including 19 officers. In addition, 87 people died in catastrophes, accidents, careless handling of weapons and military equipment, as a result of other incidents, and also died of diseases.
As a result of the introduction of troops into Czechoslovakia, a radical change in the course of the Czechoslovak leadership took place. The process of political and economic reforms in the country was interrupted. At the April (1969) plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, G. Husak was elected the first secretary. In December 1970, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia adopted the document “Lessons of Crisis Development in the Party and Society after the XIII Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia”, which generally condemned the political course of A. Dubcek and his entourage.
public discontent
In Czechoslovakia, the events taking place were negatively perceived, many Czechoslovaks expressed their disagreement by acts of self-immolation. The most famous of them is the act of self-immolation by Jan Palach, a student of the Faculty of Philosophy at Charles University. January 16, 1969 Jan Palach committed self-immolation on Wenceslas Square in Prague in protest against the occupation of Czechoslovakia. Letters were found in Palach's briefcase explaining his act, as well as indicating the existence of an organization of young people who were going to protest against foreign military intervention in the affairs of Czechoslovakia in this form of self-sacrifice. died 3 days later.
The authorities of Czechoslovakia tried to hide the reasons for the self-immolation of Jan Palach. As early as January 20, the Czechoslovak press and information administration ordered that only official reports about the incident be printed. At the same time, many foreign journalists were expelled from the country. The Czechoslovak authorities also tried to distort the reasons for the self-immolation of Jan Palach. Thus, the deputy from the Communist Party, Wilem Novy, stated that Palach was not going to commit suicide. Allegedly, it was planned to use some kind of "cold fire", the liquid of which was replaced with gasoline without the knowledge of Palach. Five people (including the mother of Jan Palach) filed a lawsuit against Wilem Novy for insulting honor and dignity. In 1970, the court found Wilem Novy innocent, calling the plaintiffs "enemies of socialism." The same version is used young man without his knowledge for the purpose of provocation - adhered to by the official Soviet authorities.
After Palach's death, until April 1969, 26 more people attempted self-immolation, thus protesting against Soviet intervention and the suppression of the Prague Spring of 1968, including 7 who died. One of them - Jan Zajic - also committed suicide on Wenceslas Square
Questions and tasks:
Why did the population of East Germany flee to the territory of West Germany?
Why did the Soviet leadership need to block West Berlin?
What caused the emergence of Berlin Wall", when did it happen?
Why did the presence of the Berlin Wall demonstrate the weakness of the USSR?f
On January 3-5, 1968, a plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KPC) was held in Prague, at which the former leader Antonin Novotny, who also held the post of president of the country, was removed from the post of first secretary of the Communist Party. Alexander Dubcek, the head of the Communist Party of Slovakia, a well-known party leader who was in opposition to Novotny, was elected the new leader of the party.
Formally, Novotny left the post after a months-long discussion about the possibility of combining the post of head of the Communist Party and the president of the country. However, in fact, by that time, a strong opposition to the current leader had developed in the party, uniting both supporters of the liberalization of the regime, who resurrected after 1956, and the Slovak wing of the Communist Party, dissatisfied with the leader’s dismissive attitude towards Slovakia.
“Novotny was very unpopular in Slovakia, and lost the remnants of confidence, speaking in August 1967 in Matica Slovak (Slovak National Cultural and Educational Society. — RT) when he publicly insulted the Slovaks, Jan Rychlik from the Institute of Czech History at the Faculty of Philosophy of Charles University notes in an interview with Radio Czech Republic. - Dubcek spoke out against him, first in the presidium, and then in the Central Committee in the fall of 1967. So he got into the mainstream.”
According to the historian, the fact that Dubcek was a Slovak played an important role in his appointment - someone was needed who could calm this part of the country. Dubcek's candidacy as a compromise candidate for conservatives and reformists was also supported by Novotny himself. They say that in a narrow circle, the president described the new head of the Communist Party as follows: "Don't be afraid, everything is in order, Dubcek is a weakling, he will not cope with the position."
Another possible contender for the post of head of the party from Slovakia was Gustav Husak, one of the leaders of the anti-fascist Slovak National Uprising in 1944, who was accused of bourgeois nationalism in 1950 and later sentenced to life imprisonment. He was rehabilitated in 1963. The gander was considered strong leader and that is why he was suitable for the role of a compromise figure.
- Russian Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin, general secretary Communist Party Leonid Brezhnev and Czechoslovak leader Alexander Dubcek
- Gettyimages.ru
- PhotoQuest
Nor did they oppose Alexander Dubcek in the USSR. “Moscow knew about the situation, but decided to remain neutral, which meant, of course, a free hand for Novotny's critics. Leonid Brezhnev did not like Novotny, considered his policies to be the cause of the growing difficulties in Czechoslovakia, and besides, he could not forgive him for some objections in 1964 regarding the form of Khrushchev's release from senior posts, ”the well-known Soviet and Russian diplomat, extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador Leonid Musatov.
Dubcek lived in the USSR for a long time, was a graduate of the Higher Party School under the Central Committee of the CPSU. As noted in a now-declassified CIA cable dated March 27, 1968, the Soviet leadership "did not consider Dubcek to be willing to pursue an anti-Soviet line."
"Manifestations of an anti-socialist character"
After Dubcek took over the leadership of the CPC, the reformist wing of the party set its sights on the final removal of Novotny from the presidency. This was done at the end of March 1968. The highest state post was headed by the popular general Ludovic Svoboda. Until that time, however, Dubcek did not undertake any fundamental reforms, despite loud statements about democratization.
Real changes towards a market economy began to be carried out even under Novotny and did not cause much opposition among the comrades in the socialist camp, since this was a general trend. Just then, Kosygin's reforms were carried out in the USSR, and in Hungary, Janos Kadar was building the famous "goulash socialism."
However, the implementation of the reforms did not lead to the desired result, and in 1968 the industrial and developed Czechoslovakia was forced to turn to the USSR for economic assistance. The backlog and economic problems shook faith in socialism.
“Economic problems pose a direct threat only to Czechoslovakia,” noted a CIA memorandum dated March 27, 1968, addressed to Walt Rostow, special assistant to the President of the United States. “People, especially the elite and the youth, think it's the party's fault.<…>When the communists came to power in 1948, Czechoslovakia fared better than West Germany. Now per capita production is two-thirds and consumption three-fifths of the West German level.”
The leadership of the party after Dubcek came to power was not up to the economy: there was, as one of his associates, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Zdenek Mlynarzh recalled, a struggle for the distribution of portfolios.
In the meantime, fermentation began in the country, semi-official organizations of supporters of liberal reforms began to be created. In April 1968, the reformists pushed their people into the leadership of the party and the state, and even proclaimed new program actions, the theses of which were mainly reduced to promises of political changes: more freedom of the press, more freedom of assembly, a multi-party system.
- Anti-communist protest in Czechoslovakia, 1968
- Gettyimages.ru
- Bettmann
“The atmosphere in the country was becoming different, the initiative gradually passed into the hands of non-traditional political forces, which put pressure on the party-state leadership through the media and, in general, outside the framework of official structures,” Leonid Musatov noted in his work.
“Along with democratization, the unfinished Nazis who returned from places of deprivation of liberty began to crawl out,” the deputy said in an interview with RT State Duma Russia of the 6th convocation, Yuri Sinelshchikov, who was in the group of Soviet troops that entered Czechoslovakia in 1968.
In January 1968, Dubcek met with the Soviet leadership, and at the end of March, the Central Committee of the CPSU sent information to the party activists about the state of affairs in Czechoslovakia. In particular, it noted "anxiety about many manifestations of an anti-socialist nature." "Tov. A. Dubcek in all cases firmly assures that the new leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia controls the situation and will not allow its undesirable development, ”the document emphasized.
From the point of view of the leadership of the USSR, the manifestations of an anti-socialist nature consisted, first of all, in the desire to bring Czechoslovakia out of the ranks of the allies of the USSR into the midst.
“Attempts are being made to cast a shadow on the foreign policy of Czechoslovakia, the need for an “independent foreign policy” is emphasized. There are calls for the creation of private enterprises, the abandonment of the planned system, and the expansion of ties with the West. Moreover, in a number of newspapers, on radio and television, calls are being propagated "for the complete separation of the party from the state", for the return of Czechoslovakia to a bourgeois republic, ”the document of the Central Committee of the CPSU noted.
Orientation to the West
“Still, Czechoslovak society was oriented towards Europe and the West,” said a professor at the Institute of International actual problems Alexander Zadokhin. - Both the elite, and the intelligentsia, and the townsfolk believed that their place was in Europe. They were not satisfied with the authoritarian position of the leadership of the Soviet Union, the fact that the Soviet Union was imposing a line of conduct on them.
“The West was aimed at Czechoslovakia, it was clear that it pays a lot of attention to it, not like Poland and Hungary,” notes Yuri Sinelshchikov.
According to a former Soviet soldier, Western propaganda radio stations were freely caught in Czechoslovakia, pro-Western literature was distributed, and warehouses with weapons for the anti-communist underground were prepared. “We confiscated a lot of weapons from them from all sorts of underground warehouses,” notes a participant in the events.
“According to the KGB of the USSR, in 1962, an operational plan for covert operations was developed in the United States to undermine the domestic political situation in European countries that were part of the socialist camp,” Yevsey Vasilyev, deputy general director of the Strategic Communications bureau, said in an interview with RT. “The Americans carried out systematic work to support “anti-socialist elements,” including from the territory of third countries.”
- Vladislav Gomulka
However, on March 23, 1968, at a meeting of communist parties in Dresden, Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev was soft on Dubcek. If the Polish leader Vladislav Gomulka and the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany Walter Ulbricht announced a creeping counter-revolution in Czechoslovakia, Brezhnev only expressed concern about what was happening. The Soviet side tried to influence the events in Czechoslovakia by peaceful means.
At the same time, the concern of the neighboring GDR and Poland grew, fearing that destabilization processes would spread to their territories. The KGB, in turn, reported on the formation of an anti-state group in the leadership of Czechoslovakia, headed by Prime Minister Oldrich Chernik, associated with dissident circles in the intelligentsia (Milan Kundera, Vaclav Havel, etc.) and even allegedly with "bourgeois" emigration.
“There were attempts to peacefully resolve the crisis, but the Czechoslovak side did not agree to this either,” notes Alexander Zadokhin. “They did not want to make concessions - the West supported them, they were guided by the West and believed that they were not on the road with the Soviet Union,” the expert emphasized.
military solution
For the first time, a military solution to the problem was announced on May 8, 1968 in Moscow at a meeting of the leaders of the USSR, Poland, East Germany, Bulgaria and Hungary. The following month (June 20-30), the troops of the ATS countries entered Czechoslovakia for the first time - the Shumavo exercises took place.
Meanwhile, the situation in Czechoslovakia was heating up. Despite pressure from Moscow, the local leadership did not want to curtail liberal reforms, former bourgeois parties became more active, and new non-communist political organizations were created. And although in the summer of 1968 the party leadership of the USSR and Czechoslovakia, during meetings in Cierna nad Tisou and Bratislava, managed to agree on a common course of action with the preservation of control of the CPC over society, Moscow believed Dubcek less and less.
Already on August 8, 1968, the Soviet ambassador to Czechoslovakia telegraphed to the Kremlin about a meeting with Alexander Dubcek, noting that although he had pledged to fight against right-wing and bourgeois forces, he was not sincere and was generally unable to fulfill his promises.
Meanwhile, in the Czechoslovak press there was a sharp criticism of the USSR, the issues of the political reorientation of the country were actively discussed, which undoubtedly irritated the Soviet leadership.
On August 18, 1968, at a meeting of the leaders of the USSR, Poland, Hungary, the GDR and Bulgaria, the Hungarian leader Janos Kadar, who had previously supported Dubcek and opposed military intervention, stated with regret that Prague was not fulfilling the agreements reached in Bratislava. The final decision was made to send troops.
“This was already the third case of the introduction of troops into the countries of Eastern Europe,” reminds Alexander Zadokhin. “In the GDR (the suppression of protests in 1953 in East Berlin), then in Hungary (the suppression of the anti-communist uprising in 1956), so there was already such a stereotype of solving these problems.”
Another reason that nevertheless led to the introduction of troops, according to the expert, was the crisis of socialist construction in the USSR itself.
“Socialism somehow didn’t work out, and when it doesn’t work out inside, they very often rely on foreign policy,” the political scientist noted.
“The opinion that the USSR decided to severely suppress democratic transformations in the Czech Republic by military means is untrue and is one of the many myths of the Prague Spring,” says Yevsey Vasiliev. - In fact, the decision to bring in the ATS contingent was preceded by several months of lengthy negotiations. At some point, the parties even came to a compromise, considering the situation around the Prague Spring settled.”
However, according to the expert, the HRC, headed by Alexander Dubcek, which, in fact, initiated the reforms, "by August 1968, partially lost control over the situation and was unable to fulfill the agreements reached as a result of negotiations in Cierne nad Tisou and Bratislava" .
- Soviet T-55 tanks with "invasion stripes" during Operation Danube, 1968
- Wikimedia Commons
On August 21, 1968, the troops of the USSR, Poland, Bulgaria and Hungary launched Operation Danube and entered the territory of Czechoslovakia. The military of the GDR, although they were mobilized, remained on the border of the country, playing the role of a reserve. The Prague Spring was crushed.
Alexander Dubcek and President Svoboda eventually agreed to legalize the presence of troops from the Warsaw Pact countries on the territory of their states until the situation normalizes. Most of the military countries of the ATS were withdrawn before the end of 1968. In Czechoslovakia, a separate group of Soviet troops was created, which was on the territory of the country until the "velvet revolution" of 1989. Dubcek himself remained in power until April 1969, when he was replaced by Gustav Husak.
“The United States was well aware of the forthcoming entry of ATS troops into Czechoslovakia,” notes Yevsey Vasiliev. - The calculation was to provoke the USSR to take drastic steps, which, in turn, should have caused a wide public outcry and lead to even greater consequences. And so it happened. The theme of the Prague Spring became the leitmotif of the “Velvet Revolution” of 1989, and later one of the key arguments for the need for the Czech Republic to join the EU and NATO. Of course, the events of the Prague Spring were used by the United States to organize large-scale anti-Soviet propaganda, which was supposed to split between the countries of the socialist camp and at the same time push the attention of the world community away from US war crimes in Vietnam.
The entry of troops into Czechoslovakia in 1968 did not allow the West to carry out a coup d'état in Czechoslovakia using the technology of making "velvet" revolutions and kept life in peace and harmony for more than 20 years for all the peoples of the countries of the Warsaw Pact.
A political crisis in Czechoslovakia, as in other countries of the socialist bloc, was bound to arise sooner or later after N. S. Khrushchev came to power in the USSR in 1953.
Khrushchev accused I. V. Stalin, and in fact the socialist socio-political system, of organizing mass repressions, as a result of which millions of innocent people allegedly suffered. In my opinion, Khrushchev's report at the 20th Congress in 1956 took place thanks to the grandiose victory of the Western intelligence services and their 5th column inside the USSR.
It doesn't matter what motivated Khrushchev when he launched a policy of de-Stalinization in the country. It is important that the accusation of the socialist socio-political system of organizing mass repressions deprived the legitimacy of Soviet power. The geopolitical opponents of Russia, the USSR, received weapons with which they could crush the impregnable fortress - the USSR and other countries of the socialist camp.
By 1968, for 12 years, schools and institutes had been studying works that delegitimized Soviet power. All these 12 years, the West has been preparing the Czechoslovak society for the rejection of socialism and friendship with the USSR.
The political crisis in Czechoslovakia was connected not only with the policy of N. S. Khrushchev, which reduced the number of citizens who were ready to defend the socialist system and friendly relations with the Soviet Union, but also with the national hatred between Czechs and Slovaks fomented by anti-Soviet forces. The factor that Czechoslovakia did not fight against the Soviet Union and did not feel guilty before our country also played a significant role.
But for the sake of truth, it must be said that no less Russian blood was shed during the war through the fault of Czechoslovakia than through the fault of Hungary and Romania, whose armies, together with Germany, attacked the USSR in 1941. Czechoslovakia from 1938 and throughout the war supplied the German troops with a huge amount of weapons from which they killed Soviet soldiers and civilians in our country.
Gottwald, who built a prosperous socialist Czechoslovakia after the war, died the same year as Stalin in 1953. The new presidents of Czechoslovakia - A. Zapototsky, and since 1957 A. Novotny have become like N. S. Khrushchev. They essentially destroyed the country. A. Novotny was a copy of N. S. Khrushchev and caused significant damage with his ill-conceived reforms national economy which also led to a decline in the standard of living of the people. All these factors contributed to the emergence of anti-socialist and anti-Russian sentiments in society.
On January 5, 1968, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia elected the Slovak A. Dubcek instead of Novotny to the post of First Secretary of the Central Committee, but did not remove Novotny from the post of president of the country. Over time, order was restored, and L. Svoboda became the president of Czechoslovakia.
Liberals call the reign of A. Dubcek "Prague Spring". A. Dubcek immediately fell under the influence of people who, under the guise of democratization, began to prepare the country for surrender to the West. Under the guise of building "socialism with a human face", the destruction of the Czechoslovak socialist state began. By the way, socialism has always been with a human face, but capitalism, liberalism has always been with the face of the Nazis and US liberals like them, who killed the children of Korea, Vietnam, Grenada, Yugoslavia, Iraq, Libya, Lebanon, Syria and other countries that the US considered insufficient democratic. The United States and its citizens did not spare.
After the January 1968 Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, a frantic criticism of the situation in the country began. Using the criticism of the leadership voiced at the Plenum, the opposition political forces, calling for the "expansion" of democracy, began to discredit the Communist Party, power structures, bodies state security and socialism in general. Covert preparations for a change in the state system began.
In the media, on behalf of the people, they demanded to abolish the management of the party's economic and political life, to declare the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia a criminal organization, to ban its activities, to dissolve the state security agencies and the People's Militia. Various "clubs" ("Club 231", "Club of Active Non-Party People") and other organizations arose throughout the country, the main goal and task of which was to denigrate the history of the country after 1945, rally the opposition, and conduct anti-constitutional propaganda.
By mid-1968, the Ministry of Internal Affairs received about 70 applications for the registration of new organizations and associations. So, "Club 231" was established in Prague on March 31, 1968, although it did not have permission from the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The club united over 40 thousand people, among whom were former criminals and state criminals. As the newspaper Rude Pravo noted, among the members of the club were former Nazis, SS men, Henlein, ministers of the puppet "Slovak state", representatives of the reactionary clergy.
The general secretary of the club, Yaroslav Brodsky, said at one of the meetings: "The best communist is a dead communist, and if he is still alive, then he should pull out his legs." At enterprises and in various organizations, branches of the club were created, which were called "Societies for the Protection of the Word and the Press." The organization "Revolutionary Committee of the Democratic Party of Slovakia" called for elections under the control of England, the USA, Italy and France, an end to criticism in the press Western states and its focus on the USSR.
A group of employees of the Prague Military-Political Academy proposed the withdrawal of Czechoslovakia from the Warsaw Pact and called on other socialist countries to eliminate the Warsaw Pact. In this regard, the French newspaper Le Figaro wrote: Geographical position Czechoslovakia can turn it both into the bar of the Warsaw Pact and into a gap that opens the entire military system of the Eastern bloc. All these mass media, clubs and individuals speaking on behalf of the people also opposed the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.
On June 14, the Czechoslovak opposition invited the well-known American "Sovietologist" Zbigniew Brzezinski to give lectures in Prague, in which he outlined his strategy of "liberalization", called for the destruction of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, as well as the elimination of the police and state security. According to him, he fully "supported the interesting Czechoslovak experiment."
It should be noted that Z. Brzezinski and many oppositionists were not interested in fate, national interests Czechoslovakia. In particular, they were ready to give up lands to Czechoslovakia for the sake of "rapprochement" with the FRG.
The western borders of Czechoslovakia were opened, border barriers and fortifications began to be liquidated. At the direction of the Minister of State Security Pavel, spies identified by counterintelligence Western countries did not detain, but gave them the opportunity to leave.
The population of Czechoslovakia was persistently instilled with the idea that there was no danger of revanchism from the FRG, that one could think about the return of the Sudeten Germans to the country. The newspaper "General Anzeiger" (FRG) wrote: "The Sudeten Germans will expect from Czechoslovakia, liberated from communism, a return to the Munich Agreement, according to which the Sudetenland was ceded to Germany in the autumn of 1938." Jiricek, editor of the Czech trade union newspaper Prace, told German television: “About 150,000 Germans live in our country. One can hope that the remaining 100-200 thousand could return to their homeland a little later.” Probably, Western money helped him forget about how the Sudeten Germans persecuted the Czechs. And the FRG was ready to seize these lands of Czechoslovakia again.
In 1968, consultative meetings were held between representatives of NATO countries, at which possible measures were studied to bring Czechoslovakia out of the socialist camp. The Vatican stepped up its activities in Czechoslovakia. Its leadership recommended directing the activities of the Catholic Church towards merging with the movement for "independence" and "liberalization", as well as taking on the role of "support and freedom in the countries of Eastern Europe", concentrating on Czechoslovakia, Poland and the GDR. In order to create a situation in Czechoslovakia that would facilitate the withdrawal of Czechoslovakia from the Warsaw Pact, the NATO Council developed the Zephyr program. In July, a special Observation and Control Center began to operate, which American officers called the "Strike Group Headquarters." It consisted of more than 300 employees, including intelligence officers and political advisers.
The center reported information about the situation in Czechoslovakia to NATO headquarters three times a day. The remark of the representative of the NATO headquarters is interesting: “Although due to the entry of the Warsaw Pact troops into Czechoslovakia and the conclusion of the Moscow Agreement, the special center did not solve the tasks assigned to it, its activities still were and continue to be valuable experience for the future.” This experience was used during the destruction of the USSR.
The military-political leadership of the USSR and other countries of the Warsaw Pact closely followed the events in Czechoslovakia and tried to bring their assessment to the authorities of Czechoslovakia. Meetings of the top leadership of the Warsaw Pact countries were held in Prague, Dresden, Warsaw, Cierna nad Tisou. In the last days of July, at a meeting in Cierna nad Tisou, A. Dubcek was told that in case of refusal to carry out the recommended measures, the troops of the socialist countries would enter Czechoslovakia. Dubcek not only did not take any measures, but also did not bring this warning to the members of the Central Committee and the government of the country, which, when the troops were brought in, initially caused indignation of the Czechoslovak communists because they were not informed of the decision to send troops.
From a military point of view, there could be no other solution. The rejection of the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia, and even more so the entire country from the Warsaw Pact and the alliance of Czechoslovakia with NATO, put the groupings of the Commonwealth troops in the GDR, Poland and Hungary under flank attack. The potential enemy received a direct exit to the border of the Soviet Union. The leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries were well aware that the events in Czechoslovakia were NATO's advance to the East. On the night of August 21, 1968, the troops of the USSR, Bulgaria, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and Poland entered the territory of Czechoslovakia. Neither the troops of Czechoslovakia, nor the troops of NATO, nor units of Western intelligence services openly dared to oppose such a force.
Troopers landed at the Prague airfield. The troops were ordered not to open fire until they were under fire. The columns were moving at high speeds, stopped cars were pushed off the roadway so as not to interfere with traffic. By morning, all the advanced military units of the Commonwealth countries had reached the assigned areas. Czechoslovak troops remained in the barracks, their military camps were blocked, batteries were removed from armored vehicles, fuel was drained from tractors.
On April 17, 1969, instead of Dubcek, G. Husak was elected head of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, who at one time was the head of the Communist Party of Slovakia. The actions of our troops in Czechoslovakia actually showed NATO the highest level combat training and technical equipment of the Soviet Army.
The paratroopers captured the Czechoslovak airfields in a few minutes and began to receive weapons and equipment, which then began to move towards Prague. On the move, the guards were disarmed and the building of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was seized, and the entire leadership of Czechoslovakia was taken to the airfield in armored personnel carriers and sent first to the headquarters of the Northern Group of Forces, and then to Moscow.
The tankers clearly fulfilled the task, which in an extremely short time took up positions according to the operation plan. Several thousand T-54 and T-55 tanks entered Czechoslovakia, and each crew knew their place on the territory of the tank unit.
In Czechoslovakia, our soldiers showed that there is no kinder people on earth than the Russians. The most impressive and tragic was the feat performed on the mountain road by a tank crew from the 1st Guards Tank Army, who deliberately sent their tank into the abyss in order to avoid running into the children set there by the picketers. Those who prepared this heinous provocation were sure of the death of children and then they would shout to the whole world about the crime of Soviet tankers. But the provocation failed. At the cost of their lives, Soviet tankers saved the lives of Czechoslovak children and the honor of the Soviet Army. This vivid example shows the difference between the people of the liberal West, who prepared the death of children, and the people of the socialist Soviet Union, who saved the children.
Distinguished in Czechoslovakia and our aviation, including aviation special purpose. Tu-16 jamming aircraft of the 226th electronic warfare regiment, which took off from the Stryi airfield in Ukraine, successfully suppressed radio and radar stations in Czechoslovakia, demonstrating the great importance of electronic warfare in modern warfare.
The West initially understood that it would not be allowed to carry out a coup in Czechoslovakia by a Warsaw Pact country, but cold war against the USSR, he carried out with "hot spots". In practice, Soviet troops did not conduct combat operations on the territory of Czechoslovakia. The Americans at that time waged a war in Vietnam, burning thousands of Vietnamese villages with napalm and destroying dozens of cities to the ground. They poured blood over the long-suffering land of Vietnam. But this did not prevent them from broadcasting on all radio and television channels to the USSR, the countries of Eastern Europe and the whole world that the USSR was an aggressor country.
The topic of Czechoslovakia was discussed by the Western media even several years after 1968. To give this topic an ominous color, they prepared a suicide bomber, as terrorists prepare suicide bombers today, did not spare the Czechoslovak student Jan Palach and set fire to him, doused with gasoline, in the center of Prague, exposing this as an act of self-immolation in protest against the entry of troops of the Warsaw Pact countries. Russia will always lose the ideological struggle with the West because in this struggle it will never sink to the level of the United States and its satellites.
The entry of troops into Czechoslovakia was made in order to protect the security of the Warsaw Pact countries from NATO troops. But the security of the United States was not threatened by either Korea or Vietnam, located thousands of kilometers from the US border. But America waged large-scale military operations against them, killing hundreds of thousands of people of these sovereign states. But the world community prefers to remain silent about this.
Czechs should be grateful Soviet army for the fact that the Sudetes remained part of Czechoslovakia, their state exists within modern borders, and the nation has avoided the huge number of human casualties that always happen during a coup d'état.
The liberals of the USSR, the 5th column of the West in our country, did their best to kindle "passions" around the events in Czechoslovakia. In 1968, the Soviet intelligentsia went into open conflict with the authorities. S. G. Kara-Murza with co-authors wrote the following on this occasion: “To her (parts Soviet intelligentsia- L. M.) it was disgusting that Russia was fighting for its vital interests as a power - by the same means that the West used and is using without a twinge of conscience. The United States does not have any moral problems at all, but our democratic intellectuals respect them even more for this. The United States openly declares large parts of the world a zone of its interests and easily sends troops there, having previously destroyed many people from the air - Russian democratic intellectuals even like this.
In 1968, going for the sake of saving the entire bloc and the Warsaw Pact to invade Czechoslovakia, the Soviet leadership, of course, foresaw what heavy damage this would inflict on the USSR. It was, frankly, a bad decision. But all attempts even today, after what we have seen over the past 30 years, to "lose" that situation again, do not allow us to reliably determine which solution would be the best. The best in the interests of the USSR, and not its opponents. August 1968 - Combat in the Cold War during the retreat. The generation of Gorbachevs and Shevardnadzes was already going upstairs.”
It is impossible not to pay attention to the fact that at the present time, in 2017, when more than 25 years have passed since the murder of the USSR, and Russian Federation ceased to be socialist, the West continues to wage a cold war against us, and Russophobia dominates all media in the West. This suggests that the West is waging war not against any particular social system, but against the Russian state and its peoples for their geopolitical interests.
And in this struggle, the decisive assistance to the West was provided by the Khrushchevites’ strike prepared with the help of the 5th column of the West against the Soviet Stalin era. From this blow, the alliance with China and the countries of Eastern Europe that provided us with security and prosperity for hundreds of years to come began to crumble.
