is a live album by American rock band Alice in Chains, released in 1996. The album contains a recording of Alice in Chains' performance for the television show MTV Unplugged in which musicians perform songs on acoustic instruments. The concert was the first for the Seattle band in two and a half years, during which vocalist Lane Staley was treated for drug addiction.

The program was recorded on April 10, 1996 at the Brooklyn Academy of Music Theater. Despite Lane Staley's illness and guitarist Jerry Cantrell's food poisoning, the performance was a success. Alice in Chains performed acoustic versions of previously known songs, as well as a new song "Killer is Me". Episode MTV Unplugged featuring Alice in Chains was televised on May 28, 1996. The album was released on July 17, debuting at number three on the Billboard chart. The album was supported by the singles "Would? and "Over Now", a video recording of the concert was released on DVD. As it turned out later, the concert for MTV was one of the last for Lane Staley. A few months later, the vocalist was hospitalized due to a drug overdose, after which he stopped performing and began to lead a reclusive lifestyle. In 2002, Staley was found dead in his home; death was due to an overdose of heroin and cocaine.

After receiving moderate critical reviews immediately after the release of the record, over time, the record gained the status of a cult live album, becoming one of the highlights in the history of the group.

Good article

Carmen

The opera takes place in Spain. The main characters are the gypsy Carmen, the sergeant Don Jose, the bullfighter Escamillo and the bride Jose Michaela. In addition to them, the opera features a number of minor characters: officers, soldiers, gypsies, smugglers, bullfighters, a tavern owner and ordinary people. The plot of the opera differs greatly from Mérimée's short story, in particular the appearance of Michaela, Jose's fiancee, as well as the softening of Carmen's character.

Musicologists consider "Carmen" one of the few works that have managed to stand the test of time. It is noted that the opera has become world famous because of the harmony, perfect orchestration, as well as the accurate transfer of all the actions taking place in the music. The opera has been repeatedly recorded on various media, with the first recordings dating back to the 1890s; also on the basis of "Carmen" by Georges Bizet, various kinds of adaptations were created, one of which is the ballet

Leonid Mitrofanovich ZAMYATIN shares his memories ( former leader International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU)

Activities and actions around Afghanistan, perhaps, began in April 1978. That is, when the group after Daoud came to power ... The Daoud incident is completely unclear to us when the coup was carried out. By whose hands Daoud was killed is unknown.

Officers from the PDPA of this same National Front, the Democratic Front, that is, Khalq and Parcham, came to power.

And in April 1978, in essence, a new structure of power took shape. There is no king, there is no feudal system, a socialist group has come. And now a new stage in the development of Soviet-Afghan relations has taken shape. Is it so? True. How did we perceive these events then? Well, first of all, we did not know who and how carried out this coup. We, in general, learned from the English radio that such events had taken place. The Foreign Ministry requested Puzanov, who was there as an ambassador. I'll tell you how ambassadors have been appointed to these republics since Khrushchev's time. Nowhere to put a man ...

One of Puzanov's predecessors was Antonov, Minister of the Meat and Dairy Industry of the USSR. He ruined the entire industry - he was sent there. Then he was replaced because he failed. But he was there for almost five years. They sent Puzanov, who ruined the State Radio and Television and was still somewhere in the Council of Ministers, and when the moment came when they asked what happened in Afghanistan, the answer was: I should visit the Foreign Ministry and find out what is happening there. And we learned about the April Revolution. The Center learned from English radio messages. Although we already had our people in Afghanistan, we had advisers. That is, we learned about the fact of the incident from the outside. But the assessment of what happened was not given. What has overcome our leaders? Especially Ponomarev, Suslov, who believed that they knew the East. Like it or not, it's hard to say, but they had advisers. Ulyanovsk was like that, he determined Ponomarev's eastern policy. There was such an opinion: since events took place there that will lead to a socialist system in this country, we must support this system. When they said that the country is feudal, they answered: well, Mongolia has gone through these stages, so let's support socialism. And from here, ideologically, we prepared ourselves to support the development of socialism in this purely feudal country. This showed that we did not know this country, that the British fought for 30 years in order to press it to their dominion - nothing happened, they left, but we forgot this story too. That's what's the matter. From here the development of events began, that's where it started. This is the first. The second is that we were provoked. At that time, certain forces provoked the rise of Carter, the rise of Brzezinski to power in America. They were looking for a reason to force Russia to get involved in some big conflict, because the entire image of the United States was a Vietnamese burn, and they could not wash it off. And from here, Brzezinski got the theory that the world is developing according to the distribution scheme of the “green underbelly”. That is Islamism. And indeed so. And then his theory began to be confirmed. Iranian events: Americans are being driven out of Iran. This is already the 79th year. This is already later, it is not connected with the revolution, but American intelligence worked. She worked through our intelligence, and our KGB actively argued that we should now study the situation, and our ideologists said that we could not give Afghanistan away, we were with Afghanistan: the first Country of Soviets established relations immediately after the revolution.

Even during the Nazi war, we kept Afghanistan a neutral state. How can we now give it to Islamism. Our republics to some extent resonate with today ... We did not keep Najibullah, Islamism began to creep into our Central Asian republics, to some extent the analysis was correct, but Brzezinski was not a fool. Well, we were obsessed with this idea of ​​socialization. And from here we sent a huge number of our advisors on our first visit.

I remember my dispute with Boris Nikolaevich Ponomarev after a meeting, when the Central Committee of the Komsomol was instructed to send advisers to the Komsomol and to pioneer organizations. I say: “Boris Nikolaevich, I was recently in Afghanistan. Look, the girls walk around in a veil, they also cover their faces, they have not even reached the point of opening their eyes, as in other Islamic republics, how are we going to put on pioneer ties for them, this is stupid.” He says to me: "You know, you need explanatory work and we must create socialist prerequisites in this country.” There was such a conversation. And so we gradually crawled into the fact that in March 1979, Taraki stood at the head of the state - famous poet, Afghan writer, but absolutely little known to anyone statesman, which proceeded from the fact that Moscow must be pressed and Moscow will help us stay in power.

The first coup attempt against Taraki was in March '79. After that, we strengthened the group of military advisers. We've buffed Taraki, we've basically changed his environment. Already lunch was served to him by our waitresses, security was already from our 9th department, and so on and so on.

But this has not yet taken on the scale that was later, already with Babrak.

In August, Taraki began to worry about what Falin said at the Constitutional Court that the Americans and Pakistan, in general, were working to prevent Sovietization in Afghanistan, to prevent its socialist spirit. Because for them Afghanistan was also a kingdom that was in the sphere of influence of Great Britain for many years, and then, in the time of Hitler, all the officers went through fascist training. But Zahir Shah was very loyal to us. He believed that he was a big neighbor, why should he argue with him. After the 29th year, when we pacified the situation in all the Central Asian republics, we believed that nationalism had calmed down, and he believed that the border was calm.

But whether she was calm is another question, examples can be given ... By these events, we are approaching the fact that in May after this coup there was an unofficial visit of Taraki to Moscow, where he demanded that we send troops. He had several conversations with Kosygin, and Kosygin convinced him that we could not agree to the introduction of troops, that they themselves should cope with the situation, and this was our concept until August 79.

Taraki called, according to my records, 12 times. Moreover, we really went out, Kornienko also has this, and I myself was a witness when Kosygin talked to Taraki, he spoke to him on an open phone on purpose so that Westerners could hear what we were saying. Kosygin argued that we could not send troops.

In August, suddenly Taraki decided to go to Cuba at the invitation of Castro. There was some kind of celebration there, the devil knows, we were against it. He made a stop in Moscow. Here Kornienko tells how he met with him here. But ... Brezhnev accepted him, and he produced a very great impression. Brezhnev was a very impressionable, tearful person at that time. Since 1976, Brezhnev was half paralytic, after a stroke he could barely move his legs, he quickly developed senile symptoms and so on. And Taraki impressed him with his human appearance, and when Taraki was strangled in September 79, he was strangled with a pillow, there is a record somewhere, I have to find it, Taraki's wife said, - a film, how her husband was strangled. She is, film. I had a text, they brought it to me, I gave it to Borovik, but it was not a film, Borovik says, it was necessary to find a film. They suffocated him with a pillow. Who? Amine. The man who was his half-brother in charge of the new Afghanistan. And now, after the strangulation of Taraki, H. Amin came to power, and this is where our emotions played out. What were those emotions?

Brezhnev could not understand how we allowed the strangulation of N. M. Taraki. How can a state leader be strangled, what did our people do there and how they looked.

They started throwing out different theories. Amin was also for input Soviet troops, we went along the line of intelligence, both military and ours. We already had advisers, there was a group of General I. Pavlovsky, but there were no troops yet. This is the middle of the 79th year. Pavlovsky argued, and very realistically - he was the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces - that it was impossible to send troops, that we would get bogged down. That 70 thousand of our troops will not decide anything, and Amin already asked that all these things are unrealistic. To which Ustinov said: "Our presence will sober up the Afghans - and Pakistan, and Afghanistan, and feudal circles, our presence will sober up." Well, we will stay there for three months, what is special, we will not fight, we will mobilize the troops, that's what the concept was.

On the other hand, ideologists like Ponomarev, Suslov, and others said that it was necessary to strengthen the socialist principles. Well, the moment has come. Already after Iranian events, when the Americans were expelled from Iran, their embassy in Tehran was occupied, Carter, Brzezinski began to throw information through all channels that the process of Islamization of our (Russian) "underbelly" was underway, and in general everything from Iran to Pakistan would be green soon, so the forces that we were provoked, given, including from Washington, reports of such a plan that Amin began to act and made contact with the Americans. That Amin, it seems, is now doing some work through his brother, looking for contacts with the Americans, and that these contacts may lead to the fact that there may not be such a quick socialist orientation, especially since the contradictions between Khalq and Parcham are growing, then are two parts of one pseudo-socialist party, a socialist party that has not yet grown strong under feudalism. This is not yet a party, it is essentially a military confrontation between two groups backed by certain political forces. And when there were rumors that the Americans could somehow influence Amin, then ours began to seriously discuss: how to protect the development of socialist principles in Afghanistan. Here the theory of Dmitry Fedorovich Ustinov began to operate - the possibility of the presence of our troops. (Although it must be borne in mind that this theory was forced on Ustinov by Andropov. - N.P.) Especially since Amin, I repeat, he did not deny Taraki's requests that there be Soviet troops after all. Because he believed that it would be a support. After the assassination of Taraki, we strengthened our "KGB" group, significantly strengthened it. In essence, the representative of the Chairman of the State Security Committee, Lieutenant-General B. Ivanov, went to Afghanistan.

B. Ivanov headed this entire group of the State Security Committee. His information, compared to what the Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave, of course, lost in terms of facts. Only because the service of the State Security Committee was directly in the protection of Amin, and surrounded by Amin, and at the same time, special groups were trained, which we now call the Alpha type, which were deployed in case of any emergency in Afghanistan . These groups were And when the events went so far, it was already decided somewhere, but perhaps not yet definitively, that the presence of our troops is still possible in Afghanistan, then you know that sad events happened with Amin. Assault groups, capture groups, mixed groups, mostly these were “KGB” groups, they attacked the presidential palace on armored personnel carriers, and during this operation, there were skirmishes with Amin’s guards, and our representatives, our guards, Amin, were in Amin’s guards, in short, he was killed. By whom was he killed? And we are already preparing a new person ...

I want you to highlight...

I will express my point of view on this matter.

Because, in general, when the decision was made that our troops should be brought in, I was not present there; I was engaged in the analysis of events and was not a participant in the adoption of this decision. It was not even a meeting of the Politburo, it was a meeting in the building of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, late in the evening, where the issue was discussed in a very narrow circle. I recently heard that Valentin Mikhailovich Falin, who was closer to these decisions, he worked then in this direction, he said that it was adopted by five people.

This is the tenth of December 1979. Troops, as you remember, were introduced on December 25, 1979, that is, 15 days before the introduction of troops, the decision was discussed by this group. Some believe that there were six of them, others believe that there were five. I believe that there was no doubt that there were three leaders, and no one has any doubts here. This, let's call it that, according to the degree of influence on this process, the Afghan one at that moment. Ustinov - member of the Politburo, Minister of Defense, Andropov, I put him second - Chairman of the State Security Committee, member of the Politburo. The third is Gromyko, and I put him third, and I will explain why, the fourth is Suslov, the fifth is Boris Nikolayevich Ponomarev, Secretary of the Central Committee, head of the International Department of the Central Committee, which included all socialist, communist parties. After all, the International Department, in essence, is the former Comintern. Here we are now at the Constitutional Court judging and judging what the International Department is, whom it helped, what money it had at its disposal, and so on. After all, in general, if in the distant past - this is the Comintern, and now everything remains from the Comintern - the Soviet part, Ponomarev himself came from the Comintern, Ulyanovsky, who, together with Ponomarev, dealt with the Afghan issue and other issues in the department, this is also a person from the Comintern . He is now quite a few years old. I believe that Ponomarev was present at the decision-making. If he wasn’t, he can come forward and refute me, because I can’t say for sure, but I believe that the ideological part at this meeting, not even the Politburo, but the narrow circle of the Politburo, the ideological part was represented by Suslov and Ponomarev. What gives me reason to assume about Boris Nikolaevich Ponomarev - before that he traveled to Afghanistan. He got acquainted with the situation on the spot, and it can be assumed that his report was made immediately upon his return and then he played a certain role in making a decision, he was one of the leading people who was responsible not for the military part, but for the ideological part of our relations already from socialization of Afghanistan.

Well, of course, Brezhnev was at the head of this group when making a decision. Why don't I put him first? Because at that moment the first foundations had already been formed, this political impotence of Brezhnev, it led to the fact that on acute issues, then the beginning had already been laid, the Politburo commissions began to be created. Subsequently, it has already grown something there up to fifteen commissions. But the Afghan events marked the beginning of the creation of the first commission on the merits. It took shape at the beginning of the 1980s, but before that it worked in the form of a troika, in the form of a four, because it had to prepare analytical material for a report to Brezhnev. I once saw how this whole procedure is done. The troika met in the so-called Nut Room, it is between the Politburo meeting room, the Reception Secretary General and his office. Usually, for all such, I would say, confidential, purely confidential conversations, this Walnut Room was always used. Why Walnut? Because there was a walnut round table and there was a remote control. In this room and on various occasions in various combinations, members of the Politburo gathered, and then it grew into a tradition: before each meeting of the Politburo - the Politburo, you know, consisted of members and candidates - here the Politburo members first gathered in the Walnut Room with the General Secretary, and the candidates were already entering the common room, and these were leaving as if from the front porch, from this Walnut Room into the Politburo hall. But at that time, in this Walnut Room, this trio, which I spoke about, she worked through all the Afghan issues. Whoever said, here Kornienko claims, I listened to his recording, claims that Andropov said the decisive word. I think that there was no such moment here that one of these five or six said the decisive word. Already the fact that there was no vote ... why can I assume that there was no vote on the introduction of troops? I can assume, because if there were some kind of voting in these six and if it was an official meeting of the Politburo, then there would be some kind of Politburo document. As far as I know from the military and from the Foreign Ministry, I don’t know the KGB part, a document that would reflect the meeting on December 10 in the form of a Politburo protocol (and the Politburo always keeps the protocols) there was no Politburo decision to send troops. Nikolai Vasilievich Ogarkov, he was then the chief General Staff, said that Ustinov left the meeting (the military part of the meeting was decided in this Nut Room) and said: “We will send troops, get ready.” Roughly gave the figures, which I do not remember now, of course, I thought that the military would clarify how much was planned. One airborne division, in my opinion, and three more regiments. I may be wrong here. These were the initial outlines. How they expanded later, I do not know this and do not undertake to judge the military. You ask about the role of the State Security Committee. I can say that at that time I already got acquainted with the information that came from Afghanistan, I mean the telegram code, that after all, the decisive materials of a political nature, which provided the basis for practical discussions, were, after all, the materials of the State Security Committee . They were more involved in this process of contacts at that stage already with Amin.

I think that we may find a person who was a resident of the KGB then, not a representative of the Chairman of the State Security Committee, but a resident in Afghanistan, who, as far as I know, is now working at the African Institute, you can talk to him, he should know better this situation.

Well, I think that Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov, who has always occupied, I would say, an equally key role in matters related to security and foreign policy, he was always drawn to questions foreign policy, and his word for Brezhnev at that time was as weighty as the word of Ustinov.

I once expressed the opinion that if events had developed in the future and Ustinov had not fallen seriously ill and saved his life, then Ustinov would have been Brezhnev's successor, these are my assumptions. Because, as far as I can tell, Ustinov was the most influential person for Brezhnev at that time than anyone else. But they all stuck together as a trio. And now the political part is Ustinov, Andropov, Gromyko. And usually the questions were always reported by the three of us. And jealousy was huge if someone reported questions without the other two. In this I can be absolutely sure, because I somehow felt even such things. Sometimes Brezhnev selectively invited someone to Zavidovo under the guise of hunting, and Brezhnev was fanatical even during this period, and this, perhaps, was one of his most such entertainments, this is a wild hunt. Why do I call it “wild”, because the boars were not fed, as they say, for two or three days, and in the morning they went to the point where Brezhnev was sitting and killing these boars. This, apparently, was fun, then they made good hams from it. I can judge by myself, sometimes they made sausage from this slaughter, and the field service of the Central Committee of the Party, as a gift from Brezhnev, delivered, well, according to the list, to members of the Politburo, here are some heads of departments, sometimes I also got this case. Here is the result of this hunt. But when Brezhnev invited someone to hunt in Zavidovo, then, naturally, there was a chime. Well, let's say Gromyko called, I judge by that, once I was in Gromyko's office, he was talking, in my opinion, with Andropov, they usually all spoke in the same name, and it was not difficult to guess. He asked him if he was in Zavidovo? And Dima was in Zavidovo? Don't know what was there? This jealousy, good or bad, I would say - this desire was about being aware of what these two people were deciding. What was reported by one of them, and then it passed to the next one, this troika for the time being, it was essentially a troika that replaced the collective leadership of the Politburo in military-political matters.

I can't say that she made decisions on issues of the economy, industry, and so on in the same combination. Other people connected there, at first, when Kosygin was, he, of course, played a leading role. Indeed, this was the mind of our state, I can judge, because as a press secretary I had to accompany Kosygin on a number of trips, to follow his train of thought; he was one of the most talented people in our leadership ever. This is a man who knew how to calculate. A man who already in those years, in the seventies, came to an understanding of the need for reforms. You remember, Kosygin's reform was the talk of the town. As it is, he surrounded himself with economists. And then they argued whether he was right or wrong, but he felt that he was brewing; these are not the reforms that we came to on the threshold of 1985, but these were the reforms of an economy that suffered from all ills.

Kosygin, of course, played a decisive role in matters of industry, in matters of technology; then Tikhonov appeared. There was another person, but he was early, so to speak, detached somehow from this - this is Podgorny.

I, working in the apparatus of the Central Committee, did not know that the troops were brought in, I learned from the information that I received from TASS, I called Ogarkov and said: “Listen, they say here that on December 28 we began to send troops to Afghanistan, that’s right, Nikolai, or not true? He says to me: “How do you know?” Well, we were equal with Ogarkov both in age and in relations, I simply asked: “Well, is this true, Nikolai, or is it not true, if we are bringing in, then we should know why we are bringing in troops? He said, "Well, you'll find out in four or five days."

That is, it cannot be said that at that time someone protested against the introduction of troops, well, no one knew, we learned everything from Western information that troops were being brought in, then we began to pull apart, look for our sources: why are the troops being brought in? All this was done conspiratorially, although huge masses were moving. And basically three departments were involved! This is the Ministry of Defense, of course, which carried out this order, this is the State Security Committee, which was actively involved from the very beginning. His advance group, which was in Afghanistan, as well as the Ministry of Defense, consisted of advisers led by General Pavlovsky. But Pavlovsky was just the man who argued that there was no need to send in troops, which is why he later withdrew from this operation and was generally not welcomed by the Minister of Defense for these thoughts. And the third is the foreign policy department. But everything was so curtailed, as Kornienko says, and he was Gromyko's right hand in essence, at that time, the first deputy minister, who was responsible for formulating the entire foreign policy together with the minister. Gromyko withdrew into himself, and Kornienko could not know in detail the information about what was happening in the first period with the introduction of troops. Naturally, later, when the Commission was created and formalized, Kornienko became a member of this Commission. It was the beginning of the 80th year.

The commission was headed by Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko, he seemed to be between two departments - between the Ministry of Defense and the State Security Committee. Each of them, if he headed the Commission, would have his own priority as Chairman, but there was usually no vote in this Commission. It was a study of the material, because the Politburo was then, under the leadership of Brezhnev, generally incapable of working through the materials. The Politburo - in any case, those that I visited, how did they go? They wrote the Politburo script to Brezhnev, he was already so mentally limited due to his illness - they wrote the entire Politburo script to him. Here the Politburo was opening, already in its script it was written what to open the Politburo, read out the agenda, and there was the agenda, then the script wrote the question that was being discussed, the speaker who reported. It was not necessarily a member of the Politburo. But one of the members of the Politburo, if these are technical or economic questions, who prepared this question, he briefly reports. He also prepared the Draft Decision, which was already attached and already sent to all members of the Politburo. There were discussions, but during the Brezhnev period there were very limited discussions, sometimes in these scenarios it was written by assistants like this: if this is said, then say that, that is, he had options what to say, and so he went on this. I have one such protocol left somewhere, I tried to show you, find it on the issue that I was preparing for the Party Bureau at that time. It really was. Well, the Politburo usually started, where he told how he spent the morning today, what his pulse was, the doctors said how he swam in the pool, that was a scriptless introduction. Usually he always did something introductory in this spirit, and then moved on to this text.

With the progression of his illness, the time of Politburo meetings was also reduced, the number of Commissions increased, because often, when a question arose at the Politburo, the decision was this: to form a Commission consisting of Solomentsev, someone else, someone else, and this Commission spun off , she prepared questions, sometimes for a week or two, involving ministries, departments of the Central Committee, a question was prepared, sent to the general department - Chernenko, he was then the head of the department, it was only later that he became the leader. And then he was just the head of the department, but the central department, which sent out all the documents, had an apparatus, and sent them out to the members of the Politburo. Usually, when they arrived, there were a lot of notes on the documents, some of the notes were of members of the Politburo, some of the notes were of their assistants, I sometimes jokingly asked when all these amendments had already been collected: well, whose amendments are these, such and such or his assistant? Because sometimes, at the request of Chernenko, already outside the framework of the Politburo, I had to bring these amendments together, because they sometimes excluded one another, somehow it was necessary to put the document in order.

It would probably be too bold of me - although I worked with Gromyko for almost twenty years - to give him general characteristics. Let's get closer to the Afghan events, it's easier for me too and won't express all my feelings, very positive feelings towards Gromyko, which I still feel. This is one of smartest people was... With regard to Andropov and the KGB, in this case, I can only express my point of view. Because in the state plan there are always at least three sources of information. Foreign policy, I mean. This is the information of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is often given priority in all foreign policy issues, this is intelligence information, which is reported by the State Security Committee in the field and foreign policy, and information that is reported to the military-political leadership by the Main Intelligence Directorate. This is the scheme that operated at that time, but I omit all outsiders, TASS and so on, radio and all this is already different. But there are three main sources. In my opinion, at that time the most valuable information, in terms of its content, was the information of the State Security Committee. I have already said why: because there was an advance group that had a plenipotentiary representative of the Chairman of the State Security Committee, and, naturally, this information was sent to the leadership according to certain lists that always exist, and it had a certain and great influence. I said that the embassy information was weak, poorly oriented, but then it also received the status of information influencing the course of events, because through this channel their advisers began to transmit information, who were sent through the International Department of the Central Committee. These are political advisers. And there were very respectable people who represented the Central Committee of the party, they influenced the development of political processes. The entire process was led by the Politburo through the International Department. Therefore, there was already a gradual increase in the influence of the information of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But I do not want to belittle the military information, because military information was not decisive then, because we still proceeded from the concept of not conducting military operations in Afghanistan, but the presence of Soviet troops, and military information proved this. Did the information of the State Security Committee have a decisive influence on the decision? Still, I think that this is a combination of information, although I do not want to underestimate the great influence of everything that we received from Afghanistan through the people who were already deployed at that time.

And yet, do you think Andropov was a more active person who stood for the entry of troops?

I think that, after all, when the decision was made, then, naturally, the decisive word was Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov, as the most knowledgeable person, but I do not want to belittle Ustinov's influence in this case.

Dmitry Fyodorovich Ustinov - a man, I would say, of a rather persistent character, Andropov was more flexible in terms of other issues. I am not judging by Afghanistan, I am judging by Andropov's future work, including as General Secretary. A man who thought more broadly in matters of politics, in matters of international concern, than Dmitry Fedorovich. Dmitry Fedorovich is more technical. He also came to the post of Minister of Defense, from the war years he led the military industry. It is rather the practical mind of a technician. I remember how one issue of missile placement was solved. When he says to Brezhnev: "Lenya, well, we still need to deliver 20-30 missiles in Europe." He asks: "Why?" He says: “Well, what, more - less, does it hurt? Well, we can put the question like this - let's put the problem. - "Well, Dima, you need to think it over, well, act, act." It was. Anyone who listens to me can throw a reproach at me that I am simplifying. Well, that was the nature of the relationship between these people. And when, say, I happened to be present at such conversations by chance or not by chance, I do not reveal any secrets - this is our history. We will continue to study it. As we have now conceived this film to show the roots of the Afghan war. We want to get to the bottom of them. We must tell the truth, how it was, how it happened... I think that Ustinov's concept was that our presence, I repeat this, our presence, and not participation in hostilities, it will sober up both Pakistan and the Americans. This is his characteristic trait. Including with missiles, after all, this was the case in Europe. Well, let's put more systems SO-20, well, we'll sober them up, they'll know. Such is the concept. I do not want to say that the head of our military department was guided by primitivism, no, different approaches. And now we come to Gromyko. Gromyko, of course, was the most cautious of the trio that prepared this whole concept, and we approached the fact that we should come to this decision, because all the information that was going on led us to this. Right or wrong let down - that is the question. This is a matter of analyzing everything, but what we convinced ourselves about, what I am talking about now, this is already a long period of time giving us the opportunity to comprehend. But how did we convince ourselves? The socialization of the country, the military presence, the influence and support of the government, which asks, on the basis of Article 54 of the UN, to send troops. That needed political wisdom. We had to look ahead, and this wisdom was not enough for us. Now they can say - smart in hindsight, but where were you then? Firstly, our floor did not solve this matter, the council floor, and it was not yet dedicated, but, nevertheless, the analytical study of this issue, in my opinion, was not sufficiently carried out then. Why did we think that our presence - Ustinov's concept - the presence of our troops releases Afghan troops who can join the battle, the Khalq and Parcham troops can engage in battle against the enemy coming from Pakistan - that part of Afghanistan that did not accept this revolution, and most of the population did not accept this revolution. Feudalism remained feudalism. Hence - the clans fought against the troops. And we believed that we were freeing up for the Afghans, for the part that is closer to us, their troops so that it would join with the part that is against these revolutionary transformations.

Gromyko was here, in the discussions he, as always, had two positions. In the initial period, this is typical for many political issues, that Andrei Andreevich stated everything “for” and everything “against”. "Pros and cons". That was his tone. I do not rule out that during the period of discussion Andrei Andreevich understood the consequences of the momentary entry of troops, namely the destruction of the detente, that is, this peaceful coexistence. He understood the American policy of Carter-Brzezinski better than perhaps anyone in the Politburo. And from here I can make such a presumption that at some stage Gromyko defended the line, and then it was so that we need to be more careful with the troops for the time being. But Gromyko was such a person. When a decision is already being made, I will repeat what Georgy Markovich Kornienko said, Gromyko became a more active promoter of this idea than even those who took the initiative of this idea. For him, the implementation and implementation of already agreed upon and adopted decisions was already mandatory, and he already here turned on his entire foreign policy mechanism to work out this issue. What we reaped with the introduction of troops is another part, but momentarily we gave Carter, Brzezinski the opportunity, and in 1980, when Reagan came to power, to break the SALT-2 agreement signed by Carter and Brezhnev in Vienna in 1979- m year, on the limitation of strategic arms. Broke? Broke! Although it exists, it has not been ratified. Further. Well, they broke this whole policy, which was outlined with Nixon, starting from 1972 - the policy of peaceful coexistence and the gradual removal of tension. The Americans, especially Brzezinski - Carter, after all, was a man of a limited plan, he came from peanuts, from land use, a landowner, and Brzezinski played a political role with him - a man who knew the situation well, a man who could politically judge, and he developed a concept relations with Russia. To say that from a friendly position, I absolutely do not agree with this. This was the man who worked against us. He considered, as Reagan said after, - this is the "Evil Empire". At that time, this had not yet been formulated by Brzezinski, but Carter proceeded from this. From here we exploded the whole process of détente, and we felt this for a long time and gave the Americans the opportunity to gradually move away from the Vietnam syndrome. We helped them do it.

I will ask you to tell us about Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, our General Secretary at that time...

Again, I ask those who listen to me to consider that I express my own judgment on this matter. I just do not pretend to be factual, but at the same time I am responsible for what I say as a person who could observe a lot. I don't want anyone to have the opinion that now he is so freely telling all this, but that he could not state it all then. Well, Khrushchev once answered all such people very simply. XX Party Congress. When he was then asked the question: “Nikita Sergeevich, now you are exposing Stalin, now you delivered a report on Stalinism, atrocities, and so on, but you worked at that time, where were you then, why didn’t you voice then raised?" Khrushchev read this note, it is anonymous from the Presidium. “You see, although anonymous, I will answer. Well, now someone here in the hall can stand up and say: let's, so to speak, get rid of Khrushchev, overthrow Khrushchev. Well, who is brave? Laughter in the hall. He says, "Well, here's the answer to your question." So are we. They talked to each other in various combinations. They condemned. But to go out to the square... Here you ask a question, I return to your question about Brezhnev.

Our medicine is Evgeny Ivanovich Chazov, I am convinced that he will also tell his point of view, but he has already stated it in the book. He knew, and we all saw it, that since 1976, Brezhnev was already tangibly a person who had the opportunity to fall, I would say, well, state thinking, or something. And then she already rolled down to the primitivism of thinking. And to count on the fact that over the years he could clearly manage the state ... I did not get such an impression.

The question may arise: well, what, the Politburo did not see what you are now telling? Saw. Somehow Shcherbitsky told me: “Listen, well, what about Brezhnev this and that”, - this is again a personal conversation, and I told him: “Viktor Vasilyevich, well, you are members of the Politburo, well, you You can solve all these questions. They could make him Honorary Chairman, and so on. But what was driving everyone? This is my conclusion and I do not want to impose it on anyone. Every time we approached a party congress, when we approached some new, turning point in the life of the party, suddenly both the press and ideology began to convince everyone that if there were changes in this gerontological Politburo, then this would be regarded in the West as instability in our leadership. And on this note of instability, the preservation of this stability, we also went to the Plenums of the Central Committee, not we personally, but I mean the leadership of the Central Committee, and therefore the people in the Politburo changed very belatedly. After all, we have reached a period, now we can say that in two years three leaders of the party have gone to another world, right? Here's what we've come up with. There was no succession. All were in the region of 79-80 years, and gradually this age grew. Therefore, I cannot say that Brezhnev was a leader who generated ideas. He had a very good advisory apparatus, he had talented assistants who wrote speeches for him, and much more. So he had to read it, so he read it. Of course, he delved into some things. Often, when it was necessary to push through some question, well, what did they do? Well, here lies the paper, it doesn't pass, after all, the Secretary General. Well, you're calling someone. He had a consultant, a woman - Galina Anatolyevna, to whom you say: "Galina Anatolyevna, you have paper." - "And what do you want? - "Well, I would have to decide this and that." I don't mean, of course, the Afghan issue, I'm taking routine questions. "Well, you roughly dictate the resolution you want." You dictate to her, she edits it, attaches a corner, you see, two days later the issue moved, he signed this deed. Am I the only one who resorted to this? Dozens of people have done it. I do not want to say that we led the whole country in this way. Again, I say, the word "we" is bad. Well, the leadership of the party led the country in such a way, so, of course, commissions were created on fundamental issues, where discussions took place. For example, I was later a member of the Foreign Policy Commission headed by Suslov. And much more. And these Commissions, they worked out everything in detail. But Brezhnev was on his own, he was losing his ability to lead, he was ill a lot, and there were accidents with him, when he lost consciousness, he was in the hospital for several months. I had to communicate with the foreign press, here are a dozen books in which foreign correspondents write about my stiffness of communication with the press, with the foreign press. And then there were no press secretaries, then duties were assigned to someone, you remained in your position, and there were no special press services. There was a press department, there was TASS, and now, communicating with correspondents, the most difficult thing was to answer abroad and in the Union to foreign correspondents about Brezhnev's health. Here Melor Sturua even wrote in Ogonyok later a whole ode to the fact that I spoke a lie in Vienna in 1979, when signing SALT-2, that Brezhnev was in full health and that I defended this line. You see, this is not an easy question. The health of the leader through the mouth of the press secretary cannot be expressed. It can only be expressed by leadership. And with the approval of management. And if you say that he is sick, then it means that he needs to be changed. And this is the mistake of many members of the Politburo - the body that could initiate this issue and should have initiated this issue. After all, Chernenko once found the courage to say, when he was elected General Secretary, that maybe I should still resign when he went to the hospital. And none other than Andrei Andreyevich Gromyko writes about this in his memoirs. And Grishin Viktor Vasilievich: everyone remembers this scene with a bouquet of flowers in the hospital, when he was handed a certificate of deputy of the Moscow Council No. 1, and Chernenko was taken out on a gurney, and he could hardly get up, and behind the guard was holding a bouquet, pretending that this bouquet was Grishin handed it to him and he keeps. Why? Because no one from the Politburo wanted to start the process, I would say, of the reconstruction of the leadership itself, because they were all somewhere under the same umbrella. I forgot to answer you about orders.

There was an anniversary, I don’t remember, Kosygin, perhaps he was 75 years old. I could be wrong by a year or two. And now, as always, the ceremony of awarding orders, they approximately went through one pattern, which had already been sewn and cut out many times. Everyone stood at the chairman's green table. Everyone lined up, everyone was looking for a place where to put their head closer, so that it would be closer to Brezhnev in the picture the next day - such a competition, if you look at the pictures, you will see, I don’t want to name persons who knew the place, how to get into a television camera or into a camera - this was also studied. And so, when he presented Kosygin with the Order October revolution, I heard it myself - you won’t find this material anywhere, he hung this order on him and says: “Listen, Alyosha, what about a beautiful order, huh?” And he already had half a breast of orders. And so he repeated several times: “Alyosha, a beautiful order, Kostya, but I don’t have an order.” And what do you think?! After a certain number of days, I look, a vote is sent out, and members of the Politburo vote on the Draft decision of the Politburo, it says “Not for print”, and if it’s not for print, it means that it gets to my department in order to inform TASS accordingly that this Decree will not be printed. I know from this Decree that a number of members of the Politburo have already voted: to award Brezhnev with the Order of the October Revolution. For what? For the development of virgin lands and for its role. He was already a Hero for these virgin lands, and something else was awarded, well, he needed a reason, he needed an order. The man had a special predilection, probably not only him. Once I was in Montenegro, one of the kings of Montenegro, it was not our century, he also had the same thing. They showed me a collection, he had about two hundred orders, he collected these cases. Brezhnev had the same mania. Once, somehow, I had a conversation with him, where he complained to me, as if so casually, about Khrushchev, that here is the first Order of Brezhnev, says Brezhnev, I did not receive at one time, when everyone was awarded for the Dneproges; Khrushchev struck me off the list, and I was the secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk City Party Committee. Well, again, these were speculations, that maybe some feeling arose from there that he was cheated of something, I’m saying that this can be disputed, these are my, so to speak, speculations, maybe this was laid down when - that's the beginning.

He had a passion for collecting hand watches, he had a huge number of watches, although he wore the same watches, and cars were given to him abroad. He replied that he was a tanker in the past, and now he likes foreign cars. And somewhere not far from Domodedovo, it seems that such a garage still exists, where all the cars that have ever been donated to Brezhnev are accumulated. The Ninth Department had a whole hangar of these cars.

What installations were given to Afghanistan means mass media and who gave them?

In the beginning there was one large Commission, which, as I said, was headed by Gromyko, Boris Nikolaevich gave instructions, including to the press: how to get out, what to get out with, and so on. Zimyanin, who was then Secretary of the Central Committee, he received instructions either through Suslov or through Ponomarev. And then they already received instructions from the departments.

But in the first period, you remember, in the early years we covered the whole matter so poorly that it was impossible to understand from our reports what we were doing there. Even on television, Sergey Georgievich Lapin is a militant person, and even then he could not break through anything, but he was militant, including with Ustinov. He showed the tanks that are standing, and our soldiers are pouring soup to the Afghan people, and we showed this stew all the time on television. And already at that time - this is already 80-81 years - there were coffins, people were secretly buried, not in the central cemeteries, but at the military registration and enlistment offices through the Ministry of Defense, how, I don’t know, instructions were given, you know, even names on coffins did not write. There were funerals, there were funerals. And so our press began to cover the Afghan events, more or less approaching the fact that we began to fight there, which began from the moment when Andropov came to the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee. It was only then that our press got the opportunity, after a conversation as part of one of the secretaries of the Central Committee, I was at this conversation, and also Albert Ivanovich Vlasov, who later was the Chairman of the APN. Andropov was asked how long, they say, we will cover like this, the whole world writes, all people listen to foreign radio. If we give something, Andrei Andreevich Gromyko usually accompanied us in such a way, I myself heard it from his lips. Here is a small message from which nothing is clear, but only to foreign media, and not to the Soviet press. When they told him, it would all come back, Andrey Andreyevich, through Western voices, but with their accompaniment. "Nothing - they will find out what is needed." That's what was the approach to the propaganda of the Afghan issue. And then an article signed by A. Petrov appeared in the newspaper Pravda, then there was a whole series of articles by Petrov. It was the collective pseudonym of the foreign policy department where I worked - the article was edited by Andropov himself, it gave the first fuse in covering the Afghan events from the point of view of the more or less real situation of our troops and the participation of our troops in operations. That's because until what period, and everything else was closed.

You just said that the consequences of the introduction of troops affected the prestige Soviet Union on the international plane, I confirmed this idea of ​​yours by the fact that we paid a very cruel price in many things in matters of the external position of the Soviet Union. By the way, by chance or not, the deployment of American medium-range missiles in Europe also falls on December 1979.

80th year - the year of the Olympics. And here is the new Reagan administration, it was more implacable in condemning the Soviet Union for the events in Afghanistan and for a number of other events than the Carter administration, a change has already taken place, it has taken a line, agreed within NATO, to boycott the Olympic Games in order to to show both our Soviet people and the international community that such actions do not go unnoticed. Indeed, a boycott of the Olympic Games was declared. For the Soviet Union, this was a huge slap in the face, because the Olympic Games were canceled only in Nazi Germany when the advent of Hitler was. True, they were held there somehow, but the boycott was then the first time the Olympic Games. It was the second boycott of the Soviet Union already.

And that's when everything was involved, all of our diplomatic service, our public services, in order to still save and stretch the Olympics, and, mainly, we pulled out. Again, I say “we”, I mean the country, in this case, they pulled it out due to the fact that many African countries we were supported, many movements supported us, because they saw that the boycott great country does damage.

You asked me in a private conversation how Brezhnev reacted to this. I don't think he had great emotions then. All management of the preparations for the Olympic Games was then entrusted to Moscow, to Grishin personally, and in the Politburo Kirilenko was responsible for this matter, a person who was a very, very dim personality in the leadership, I would say so. He was, in general, the person who pursued this supreme line in preparation, and mainly it was Grishin and Ignatiy Trifonovich Novikov as Chairman of the Committee. Still, we managed to pull out the games, save them, and Moscow did a lot to ensure that the games were held solemnly, so that this imprint, that Western countries wanted to do. I would say that many boycotted, but even Western athletes took part individually, so there was no complete boycott, but no full games either.

When deciding to send troops to Afghanistan, the Hungarian and Czech events did not play the role of a “successful” precedent? Many military advisers in Afghanistan, Andropov and his entourage went through these events. Wasn't this used as an argument in the discussions?

It would be very difficult for me to answer this question, because I have not been anywhere where I have heard this argument. But there is no doubt that when our military was working on the issue of bringing in troops, then the 56th year - the Hungarian events, of course, were in sight, and the Czechoslovak events were the same. I think that you are largely right when you link these events. But so that I can hear that in some conversations these questions were really and specifically linked ... Probably, the military who developed this concept for the introduction of troops, it was a little different, but, nevertheless, this is the introduction of troops. There was already a sad experience, but, unfortunately, it was ignored as a sad experience with its consequences. I have already said that during the introduction of troops into Afghanistan, Ustinov's version dominated that it was for three months. But what really happened, you saw - a big war.

On December 12 (according to other sources, December 10), a political decision was made to send troops to Afghanistan, and it was on December 12 that NATO decided to deploy medium-range missiles in Europe. Is this a coincidence? Or opponents closely watched each other and waited for the first step ...

This is very difficult - right now, without analysis, it is difficult to answer this. It was a consequence, as a consequence, of an aggravation of the situation of tension, and for the Americans it was an excuse for many actions that were subsequently committed, including the deployment of troops. Of course, this was one of the arguments to justify the introduction of troops.

What was the general geopolitical situation in the world at the time of the entry of troops into Afghanistan? The decline in the export of American weapons and the fall in prices for it, the depreciation of the dollar and our petrodollars - can we look at the Afghan events through the prism of these things?

I'll tell you so. In any case, if analysts, military and political, still analyzed what Afghanistan was, analyzed the wars that were waged in Afghanistan by Westerners, well, I take the current terminology, by the British in particular ... It was impossible to defeat Afghanistan with the presence of troops, the second : it was, in general, the rise of the Islamic movement. Iranian events against the United States of America, the rise of Islamism, militaristic Islamism, I'm not afraid of the word, in Pakistan; activation in the Middle East. It cannot be said that Islamism has created this green underbelly, because Islamism is heterogeneous, we feel this now. No more Najibullah. We did not support him at the last moment. This was our policy. But the departure of Najibullah without preparing a political decision on power in Afghanistan did not lead to peace in Afghanistan. Our troops are no more, but the war is on, fiercest war. Because like every step that is taken, from the initial stage to the final one, it still needs to be politically worked out much deeper than we have always done. The same with Afghanistan. The troops are gone, right? Left right. They could have left before. But it was necessary to prepare a coalition government. And after all, it was not a question of returning Zahir Shah, it was a question of finding some kind of opposition that opposed us - to find contact with it, we were looking for contact. Shevardnadze's department, in this case I take it, because it worked then, it had contacts with Zahir Shah, it had irreconcilable opposition, but then we began to force things. Let Najibullah leave - that was the condition of the Americans, that was the condition of the Westerners - that's no relationship with Najibullah.

Najibullah was not the same force that would work to counter the destabilization of the situation in Afghanistan. Najibullah was reasonably prepared to contain the situation after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, and after all, the Afghans were on the side of Najibullah. They held on, held on, and then after all, we, in general, gave Najibullah away and did not complete the issue of creating a government, they were forced to move away from everything.

We can say that it was difficult. That's what international politics is for, that's what negotiations were for. And, with the withdrawal of troops, this was also a subject of negotiations: why did we withdraw troops and did not resolve the issue of prisoners of war? Question. Many questions.

The fact that the withdrawal of troops saved many Afghan lives is correct, but, probably, we have not fully thought out a lot.

As for Gorbachev, he first came as Secretary for agriculture He had a huge interest in foreign policy issues. I saw that he participated, well, where sometimes I had to go on my own issues, he spoke at the Politburo on a number of issues, especially ideological issues, but I didn’t see Gorbachev’s role closely at that time. He was not a member of this Commission that I was talking about. He had his own sector at first - agriculture.

How did the old people treat him?

I don't think that the question then arises. They decided, these old men. At that period... We are now taking a limited period, and under Gorbachev the issue of the withdrawal of troops was resolved. This is his great merit. The previous leadership pulled everything. Even under Andropov, the question dragged on, although he understood that all the same, in the end, the troops had to be withdrawn. This was an axiom for Andropov in the last period of his life - a decision had to be made, but he did not accept it.

And only many innovations and, here I am not afraid to say, “new thinking” helped. Still, it had a positive effect on our foreign policy in many respects.

And in this case, of course, it is Gorbachev's merit that he understood that it is impossible to risk our lives in Afghanistan any longer, that this war must be ended, that the troops must be withdrawn.

There was an Afghan commission, it was already in a different composition. It already included Shevardnadze, Kornienko, whom we listened to here, the same Ponomarev, Kryuchkov. She discussed Afghan issues very broadly. I know that there were several meetings between Mikhail Sergeevich and Najibulla. In particular, there was a secret meeting of him in Tashkent, where the issues of the future of Afghanistan and the issues of the withdrawal of our troops, the possibility of withdrawal were discussed. And, naturally, Gorbachev showed great perseverance in this matter. Great persistence. It was not the military command that made the decision, but the Politburo made the decision to withdraw the troops. General Secretary. And here in no way should one underestimate the importance of Gorbachev's personality in resolving these issues.

It was probably even more difficult to withdraw than to enter?

Certainly. Like a change of command.

I'll tell you so. Brezhnev was in his younger years, probably during the war years, a handsome man who admired himself. He himself told a lot, loved to tell, when during the war he put on a general's uniform for the first time, he walked, he says, through Dnepropetrovsk, all the women stopped and looked. He liked to tell such things, let's say, some kind of dinner or something else, he loved this business. I think that, like any man of this appearance, he was successful with women, so it seems to me. And therefore, the side about which I heard a lot of all kinds of talk, probably, they are not without foundation. He loved the female sex, and, probably, the love was mutual.

Well, how did he treat employees who also liked to start novels?

You know, I did not consider myself among Brezhnev's direct employees, because there were many departments of the Central Committee, he had his own direct apparatus, with which not only we were in contact; Well, from conversations it was clear that he really did not like if some kind of immorality appeared in his environment. This is how it really is. There is a lot of truth here.

Where and why did the figure of Babrak Karmal surface? If there had not been such a candidate, then perhaps Amin would not have been eliminated, and the troops would not have been brought in?

When the Afghan revolution, as it is called, took place, many people who were to some extent, one might say, dissidents in Khalq, in Parcham, did not share certain opinions, which is why they were sent according to our model ambassadors.

And in the early years, a number of party leaders, when they came to power after 1978, were sent abroad. Babrak Karmal was sent as an ambassador to Czechoslovakia, and he was sitting there.

Why the choice fell on Babrak, I can’t tell you, I don’t know, but on the eve of the introduction of our troops, when somewhere in some secret services a plan was being worked out to destroy Amin, then the figure of Babrak Karmal arose.

And that's when Karmal appeared. It happened very quickly. Our troops entered, and Karmal was already in Afghanistan, but Amin was no longer there. Now tie it all into one knot, and the denouement is somewhere in special services. The whole bunch is here somewhere, if we continue to understand. This needs to be taken by special services that can reveal this knot. He was not known to me. I just take everything that happened for myself as an analyst of the event and tie it into one knot. In my opinion, M. Tabeev was immediately appointed instead of Puzanov.

He was an ambassador, and, if my memory serves me right, the second secretary of the city party committee Grekov Leonid Ivanovich was sent there as a representative of the Central Committee.

There were many people of the highest party echelon there. You can even listen to many of them.

I'm starting a war! Pikov Nikolai Ilyich

Shares his memories Leonid Mitrofanovich ZAMYATIN (former head of the international department of the Central Committee of the CPSU)

Activities and actions around Afghanistan, perhaps, began in April 1978. That is, when the group after Daoud came to power ... The Daoud incident is completely unclear to us when the coup was carried out. By whose hands Daoud was killed is unknown.

Officers from the PDPA of this same National Front, the Democratic Front, that is, Khalq and Parcham, came to power.

And in April 1978, in essence, a new structure of power took shape. There is no king, there is no feudal system, a socialist group has come. And now a new stage in the development of Soviet-Afghan relations has taken shape. Is it so? True. How did we perceive these events then? Well, first of all, we did not know who and how carried out this coup. We, in general, learned from the English radio that such events had taken place. The Foreign Ministry requested Puzanov, who was there as an ambassador. I'll tell you how ambassadors have been appointed to these republics since Khrushchev's time. Nowhere to put a man ...

One of Puzanov's predecessors was Antonov, Minister of the Meat and Dairy Industry of the USSR. He ruined the entire industry - he was sent there. Then he was replaced because he failed. But he was there for almost five years. They sent Puzanov, who ruined the State Radio and Television and was still somewhere in the Council of Ministers, and when the moment came when they asked what happened in Afghanistan, the answer was: I should visit the Foreign Ministry and find out what is happening there. And we learned about the April Revolution. The Center learned from English radio messages. Although we already had our people in Afghanistan, we had advisers. That is, we learned about the fact of the incident from the outside. But the assessment of what happened was not given. What has overcome our leaders? Especially Ponomarev, Suslov, who believed that they knew the East. Like it or not, it's hard to say, but they had advisers. Ulyanovsk was like that, he determined Ponomarev's eastern policy. There was such an opinion: since events took place there that will lead to a socialist system in this country, we must support this system. When they said that the country is feudal, they answered: well, Mongolia has gone through these stages, so let's support socialism. And from here, ideologically, we prepared ourselves to support the development of socialism in this purely feudal country. This showed that we did not know this country, that the British fought for 30 years in order to press it to their dominion - nothing happened, they left, but we forgot this story too. That's what's the matter. From here the development of events began, that's where it started. This is the first. The second is that we were provoked. At that time, certain forces provoked the rise of Carter, the rise of Brzezinski to power in America. They were looking for a reason to force Russia to get involved in some big conflict, because the entire image of the United States was a Vietnamese burn, and they could not wash it off. And from here, Brzezinski got the theory that the world is developing according to the distribution scheme of the “green underbelly”. That is Islamism. And indeed so. And then his theory began to be confirmed. Iranian events: Americans are being driven out of Iran. This is already the 79th year. This is already later, it is not connected with the revolution, but American intelligence worked. She worked through our intelligence, and our KGB actively argued that we should now study the situation, and our ideologists said that we could not give Afghanistan away, we were with Afghanistan: the first Country of Soviets established relations immediately after the revolution.

Even during the Nazi war, we kept Afghanistan a neutral state. How can we now give it to Islamism. Our republics to some extent resonate with today ... We did not keep Najibullah, Islamism began to creep into our Central Asian republics, to some extent the analysis was correct, but Brzezinski was not a fool. Well, we were obsessed with this idea of ​​socialization. And from here we sent a huge number of our advisors on our first visit.

I remember my dispute with Boris Nikolaevich Ponomarev after a meeting, when the Central Committee of the Komsomol was instructed to send advisers to the Komsomol and to pioneer organizations. I say: “Boris Nikolaevich, I was recently in Afghanistan. Look, the girls walk around in a veil, they also cover their faces, they have not even reached the point of opening their eyes, as in other Islamic republics, how are we going to put on pioneer ties for them, this is stupid.” He says to me: "You know, explanatory work is needed, and we must create socialist prerequisites in this country." There was such a conversation. And so we gradually crept into the fact that in March 1979, Taraki, a famous poet, writer of Afghanistan, but an absolutely little-known statesman who proceeded from the fact that Moscow should be pressed and Moscow would help us hold on, stood at the head of the state in power.

The first coup attempt against Taraki was in March '79. After that, we strengthened the group of military advisers. We've buffed Taraki, we've basically changed his environment. Already lunch was served to him by our waitresses, security was already from our 9th department, and so on and so on.

But this has not yet taken on the scale that was later, already with Babrak.

In August, Taraki began to worry about what Falin said at the Constitutional Court that the Americans and Pakistan, in general, were working to prevent Sovietization in Afghanistan, to prevent its socialist spirit. Because for them Afghanistan was also a kingdom that was in the sphere of influence of Great Britain for many years, and then, in the time of Hitler, all the officers went through fascist training. But Zahir Shah was very loyal to us. He believed that he was a big neighbor, why should he argue with him. After the 29th year, when we pacified the situation in all the Central Asian republics, we believed that nationalism had calmed down, and he believed that the border was calm.

But whether she was calm is another question, examples can be given ... By these events, we are approaching the fact that in May after this coup there was an unofficial visit of Taraki to Moscow, where he demanded that we send troops. He had several conversations with Kosygin, and Kosygin convinced him that we could not agree to the introduction of troops, that they themselves should cope with the situation, and this was our concept until August 79.

Taraki called, according to my records, 12 times. Moreover, we really went out, Kornienko also has this, and I myself was a witness when Kosygin talked to Taraki, he spoke to him on an open phone on purpose so that Westerners could hear what we were saying. Kosygin argued that we could not send troops.

In August, suddenly Taraki decided to go to Cuba at the invitation of Castro. There was some kind of celebration there, the devil knows, we were against it. He made a stop in Moscow. Here Kornienko tells how he met with him here. But ... Brezhnev accepted him, and he made a very big impression on Brezhnev. Brezhnev was a very impressionable, tearful person at that time. Since 1976, Brezhnev was half paralytic, after a stroke he could barely move his legs, he quickly developed senile symptoms and so on. And Taraki impressed him with his human appearance, and when Taraki was strangled in September 79, he was strangled with a pillow, there is a record somewhere, I have to find it, Taraki's wife said, - a film, how her husband was strangled. She is, film. I had a text, they brought it to me, I gave it to Borovik, but it was not a film, Borovik says, it was necessary to find a film. They suffocated him with a pillow. Who? Amine. The man who was his half-brother in charge of the new Afghanistan. And now, after the strangulation of Taraki, H. Amin came to power, and this is where our emotions played out. What were those emotions?

Brezhnev could not understand how we allowed the strangulation of N. M. Taraki. How can a state leader be strangled, what did our people do there and how they looked.

They started throwing out different theories. Amin was also for the entry of Soviet troops, we went along the line of intelligence, both military and ours. We already had advisers, there was a group of General I. Pavlovsky, but there were no troops yet. This is the middle of the 79th year. Pavlovsky argued, and very realistically - he was the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces - that it was impossible to send troops, that we would get bogged down. That 70 thousand of our troops will not decide anything, and Amin already asked that all these things are unrealistic. To which Ustinov said: "Our presence will sober up the Afghans - and Pakistan, and Afghanistan, and feudal circles, our presence will sober up." Well, we will stay there for three months, what is special, we will not fight, we will mobilize the troops, that's what the concept was.

On the other hand, ideologists like Ponomarev, Suslov, and others said that it was necessary to strengthen the socialist principles. Well, the moment has come. Already after the Iranian events, when the Americans were expelled from Iran, their embassy in Tehran was occupied, Carter, Brzezinski began to throw information through all channels that the process of Islamization of our (Russian) “underbelly” was underway, and in general everything from Iran to Pakistan will be green soon, therefore, the forces that provoked us gave, including from Washington, reports of such a plan that Amin began to act and made contact with the Americans. That Amin, it seems, is now doing some work through his brother, looking for contacts with the Americans, and that these contacts may lead to the fact that there may not be such a quick socialist orientation, especially since the contradictions between Khalq and Parcham are growing, then are two parts of one pseudo-socialist party, a socialist party that has not yet grown strong under feudalism. This is not yet a party, it is essentially a military confrontation between two groups backed by certain political forces. And when there were rumors that the Americans could somehow influence Amin, then ours began to seriously discuss: how to protect the development of socialist principles in Afghanistan. Here the theory of Dmitry Fedorovich Ustinov began to operate - the possibility of the presence of our troops. (Although it must be borne in mind that this theory was forced on Ustinov by Andropov. - N.P.) Especially since Amin, I repeat, he did not deny Taraki's requests that there be Soviet troops after all. Because he believed that it would be a support. After the assassination of Taraki, we strengthened our "KGB" group, significantly strengthened it. In essence, the representative of the Chairman of the State Security Committee, Lieutenant-General B. Ivanov, went to Afghanistan.

B. Ivanov headed this entire group of the State Security Committee. His information, compared to what the Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave, of course, lost in terms of facts. Only because the service of the State Security Committee was directly in the protection of Amin, and surrounded by Amin, and at the same time, special groups were trained, which we now call the Alpha type, which were deployed in case of any emergency in Afghanistan . These groups were And when the events went so far, it was already decided somewhere, but perhaps not yet definitively, that the presence of our troops is still possible in Afghanistan, then you know that sad events happened with Amin. Assault groups, capture groups, mixed groups, mostly these were “KGB” groups, they attacked the presidential palace on armored personnel carriers, and during this operation, there were skirmishes with Amin’s guards, and our representatives, our guards, Amin, were in Amin’s guards, in short, he was killed. By whom was he killed? And we are already preparing a new person ...

I want you to highlight...

I will express my point of view on this matter.

Because, in general, when the decision was made that our troops should be brought in, I was not present there; I was engaged in the analysis of events and was not a participant in the adoption of this decision. It was not even a meeting of the Politburo, it was a meeting in the building of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, late in the evening, where the issue was discussed in a very narrow circle. I recently heard that Valentin Mikhailovich Falin, who was closer to these decisions, he worked then in this direction, he said that it was adopted by five people.

This is the tenth of December 1979. Troops, as you remember, were introduced on December 25, 1979, that is, 15 days before the introduction of troops, the decision was discussed by this group. Some believe that there were six of them, others believe that there were five. I believe that there was no doubt that there were three leaders, and no one has any doubts here. This, let's call it that, according to the degree of influence on this process, the Afghan one at that moment. Ustinov - member of the Politburo, Minister of Defense, Andropov, I put him second - Chairman of the State Security Committee, member of the Politburo. The third is Gromyko, and I put him third, and I will explain why, the fourth is Suslov, the fifth is Boris Nikolayevich Ponomarev, Secretary of the Central Committee, head of the International Department of the Central Committee, which included all socialist, communist parties. After all, the International Department, in essence, is the former Comintern. Here we are now at the Constitutional Court judging and judging what the International Department is, whom it helped, what money it had at its disposal, and so on. After all, in general, if in the distant past - this is the Comintern, and now everything remains from the Comintern - the Soviet part, Ponomarev himself came from the Comintern, Ulyanovsky, who, together with Ponomarev, dealt with the Afghan issue and other issues in the department, this is also a person from the Comintern . He is now quite a few years old. I believe that Ponomarev was present at the decision-making. If he wasn’t, he can come forward and refute me, because I can’t say for sure, but I believe that the ideological part at this meeting, not even the Politburo, but the narrow circle of the Politburo, the ideological part was represented by Suslov and Ponomarev. What gives me reason to assume about Boris Nikolaevich Ponomarev - before that he traveled to Afghanistan. He got acquainted with the situation on the spot, and it can be assumed that his report was made immediately upon his return and then he played a certain role in making a decision, he was one of the leading people who was responsible not for the military part, but for the ideological part of our relations already from socialization of Afghanistan.

Well, of course, Brezhnev was at the head of this group when making a decision. Why don't I put him first? Because at that moment the first foundations had already been formed, this political impotence of Brezhnev, it led to the fact that on acute issues, then the beginning had already been laid, the Politburo commissions began to be created. Subsequently, it has already grown something there up to fifteen commissions. But the Afghan events marked the beginning of the creation of the first commission on the merits. It took shape at the beginning of the 1980s, but before that it worked in the form of a troika, in the form of a four, because it had to prepare analytical material for a report to Brezhnev. I once saw how this whole procedure is done. The troika met in the so-called Nut Room, between the Politburo meeting room, the General Secretary's Reception Room and his office. Usually, for all such, I would say, confidential, purely confidential conversations, this Walnut Room was always used. Why Walnut? Because there was a Walnut round table and there was a communication console. In this room and on various occasions in various combinations, members of the Politburo gathered, and then it grew into a tradition: before each meeting of the Politburo - the Politburo, you know, consisted of members and candidates - here the Politburo members first gathered in the Walnut Room with the General Secretary, and the candidates were already entering the common room, and these were leaving as if from the front porch, from this Walnut Room into the Politburo hall. But at that time, in this Walnut Room, this trio, which I spoke about, she worked through all the Afghan issues. Whoever said, here Kornienko claims, I listened to his recording, claims that Andropov said the decisive word. I think that there was no such moment here that one of these five or six said the decisive word. Already the fact that there was no vote ... why can I assume that there was no vote on the introduction of troops? I can assume, because if there were some kind of voting in these six and if it was an official meeting of the Politburo, then there would be some kind of Politburo document. As far as I know from the military and from the Foreign Ministry, I don’t know the KGB part, a document that would reflect the meeting on December 10 in the form of a Politburo protocol (and the Politburo always keeps the protocols) there was no Politburo decision to send troops. Nikolai Vasilievich Ogarkov, he was then the chief of the General Staff, said that Ustinov left the meeting (the military part of the meeting was decided in this Nut Room) and said: “We will send troops, get ready.” Roughly gave the figures, which I do not remember now, of course, I thought that the military would clarify how much was planned. One airborne division, in my opinion, and three more regiments. I may be wrong here. These were the initial outlines. How they expanded later, I do not know this and do not undertake to judge the military. You ask about the role of the State Security Committee. I can say that at that time I already got acquainted with the information that came from Afghanistan, I mean the telegram code, that after all, the decisive materials of a political nature, which provided the basis for practical discussions, were, after all, the materials of the State Security Committee . They were more involved in this process of contacts at that stage already with Amin.

I think that we may find a person who was a resident of the KGB then, not a representative of the Chairman of the State Security Committee, but a resident in Afghanistan, who, as far as I know, is now working at the African Institute, you can talk to him, he should know better this situation.

Well, I think that Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov, who always occupied, I would say, an equally key role in matters related to security and foreign policy, he was always drawn to foreign policy issues, and his word for Brezhnev at that time was as weighty as Ustinov's word.

I once expressed the opinion that if events had developed in the future and Ustinov had not fallen seriously ill and saved his life, then Ustinov would have been Brezhnev's successor, these are my assumptions. Because, as far as I can tell, Ustinov was the most influential person for Brezhnev at that time than anyone else. But they all stuck together as a trio. And now the political part is Ustinov, Andropov, Gromyko. And usually the questions were always reported by the three of us. And jealousy was huge if someone reported questions without the other two. In this I can be absolutely sure, because I somehow felt even such things. Sometimes Brezhnev selectively invited someone to Zavidovo under the guise of hunting, and Brezhnev was fanatical even during this period, and this, perhaps, was one of his most such entertainments, this is a wild hunt. Why do I call it “wild”, because the boars were not fed, as they say, for two or three days, and in the morning they went to the point where Brezhnev was sitting and killing these boars. This, apparently, was fun, then they made good hams from it. I can judge by myself, sometimes they made sausage from this slaughter, and the field service of the Central Committee of the Party, as a gift from Brezhnev, delivered, well, according to the list, to members of the Politburo, here are some heads of departments, sometimes I also got this case. Here is the result of this hunt. But when Brezhnev invited someone to hunt in Zavidovo, then, naturally, there was a chime. Well, let's say Gromyko called, I judge by that, once I was in Gromyko's office, he was talking, in my opinion, with Andropov, they usually all spoke in the same name, and it was not difficult to guess. He asked him if he was in Zavidovo? And Dima was in Zavidovo? Don't know what was there? This jealousy, good or bad, I would say - this desire was about being aware of what these two people were deciding. What was reported by one of them, and then it passed to the next one, this troika for the time being, it was essentially a troika that replaced the collective leadership of the Politburo in military-political matters.

I can't say that she made decisions on issues of the economy, industry, and so on in the same combination. Other people connected there, at first, when Kosygin was, he, of course, played a leading role. Indeed, this was the mind of our state, I can judge, because as a press secretary I had to accompany Kosygin on a number of trips, to follow his train of thought; he was one of the most talented people in our leadership ever. This is a man who knew how to calculate. A man who already in those years, in the seventies, came to an understanding of the need for reforms. You remember, Kosygin's reform was the talk of the town. As it is, he surrounded himself with economists. And then they argued whether he was right or wrong, but he felt that he was brewing; these are not the reforms that we came to on the threshold of 1985, but these were the reforms of an economy that suffered from all ills.

Kosygin, of course, played a decisive role in matters of industry, in matters of technology; then Tikhonov appeared. There was another person, but he was early, so to speak, detached somehow from this - this is Podgorny.

I, working in the apparatus of the Central Committee, did not know that the troops were brought in, I learned from the information that I received from TASS, I called Ogarkov and said: “Listen, they say here that on December 28 we began to send troops to Afghanistan, that’s right, Nikolai, or not true? He says to me: “How do you know?” Well, we were equal with Ogarkov both in age and in relations, I simply asked: “Well, is this true, Nikolai, or is it not true, if we are bringing in, then we should know why we are bringing in troops? He said, "Well, you'll find out in four or five days."

That is, it cannot be said that at that time someone protested against the introduction of troops, well, no one knew, we learned everything from Western information that troops were being brought in, then we began to pull apart, look for our sources: why are the troops being brought in? All this was done conspiratorially, although huge masses were moving. And basically three departments were involved! This is the Ministry of Defense, of course, which carried out this order, this is the State Security Committee, which was actively involved from the very beginning. His advance group, which was in Afghanistan, as well as the Ministry of Defense, consisted of advisers led by General Pavlovsky. But Pavlovsky was just the man who argued that there was no need to send in troops, which is why he later withdrew from this operation and was generally not welcomed by the Minister of Defense for these thoughts. And the third is the foreign policy department. But everything was so curtailed, as Kornienko says, and he was Gromyko's right hand in essence, at that time, the first deputy minister, who was responsible for formulating the entire foreign policy together with the minister. Gromyko withdrew into himself, and Kornienko could not know in detail the information about what was happening in the first period with the introduction of troops. Naturally, later, when the Commission was created and formalized, Kornienko became a member of this Commission. It was the beginning of the 80th year.

The commission was headed by Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko, he seemed to be between two departments - between the Ministry of Defense and the State Security Committee. Each of them, if he headed the Commission, would have his own priority as Chairman, but there was usually no vote in this Commission. It was a study of the material, because the Politburo was then, under the leadership of Brezhnev, generally incapable of working through the materials. The Politburo - in any case, those that I visited, how did they go? They wrote the Politburo script to Brezhnev, he was already so mentally limited due to his illness - they wrote the entire Politburo script to him. Here the Politburo was opening, already in its script it was written what to open the Politburo, read out the agenda, and there was the agenda, then the script wrote the question that was being discussed, the speaker who reported. It was not necessarily a member of the Politburo. But one of the members of the Politburo, if these are technical or economic questions, who prepared this question, he briefly reports. He also prepared the Draft Decision, which was already attached and already sent to all members of the Politburo. There were discussions, but during the Brezhnev period there were very limited discussions, sometimes in these scenarios it was written by assistants like this: if this is said, then say that, that is, he had options what to say, and so he went on this. I have one such protocol left somewhere, I tried to show you, find it on the issue that I was preparing for the Party Bureau at that time. It really was. Well, the Politburo usually started, where he told how he spent the morning today, what his pulse was, the doctors said how he swam in the pool, that was a scriptless introduction. Usually he always did something introductory in this spirit, and then moved on to this text.

With the progression of his illness, the time of Politburo meetings was also reduced, the number of Commissions increased, because often, when a question arose at the Politburo, the decision was this: to form a Commission consisting of Solomentsev, someone else, someone else, and this Commission spun off , she prepared questions, sometimes for a week or two, involving ministries, departments of the Central Committee, a question was prepared, sent to the general department - Chernenko, he was then the head of the department, it was only later that he became the leader. And then he was just the head of the department, but the central department, which sent out all the documents, had an apparatus, and sent them out to the members of the Politburo. Usually, when they arrived, there were a lot of notes on the documents, some of the notes were of members of the Politburo, some of the notes were of their assistants, I sometimes jokingly asked when all these amendments had already been collected: well, whose amendments are these, such and such or his assistant? Because sometimes, at the request of Chernenko, already outside the framework of the Politburo, I had to bring these amendments together, because they sometimes excluded one another, somehow it was necessary to put the document in order.

It would probably be too bold of me - although I worked with Gromyko for almost twenty years - to give him a general description. Let's get closer to the Afghan events, it's easier for me too and won't express all my feelings, very positive feelings towards Gromyko, which I still feel. He was one of the smartest people… With regard to Andropov and the KGB, in this case, I can only express my point of view. Because in the state plan there are always at least three sources of information. Foreign policy, I mean. This is the information of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is often given priority in all foreign policy issues, this is intelligence information, which is reported by the State Security Committee in the field and foreign policy, and information that is reported to the military-political leadership by the Main Intelligence Directorate. This is the scheme that operated at that time, but I omit all outsiders, TASS and so on, radio and all this is already different. But there are three main sources. In my opinion, at that time the most valuable information, in terms of its content, was the information of the State Security Committee. I have already said why: because there was an advance group that had a plenipotentiary representative of the Chairman of the State Security Committee, and, naturally, this information was sent to the leadership according to certain lists that always exist, and it had a certain and great influence. I said that the embassy information was weak, poorly oriented, but then it also received the status of information influencing the course of events, because through this channel their advisers began to transmit information, who were sent through the International Department of the Central Committee. These are political advisers. And there were very respectable people who represented the Central Committee of the party, they influenced the development of political processes. The entire process was led by the Politburo through the International Department. Therefore, there was already a gradual increase in the influence of the information of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But I do not want to belittle the military information, because military information was not decisive then, because we still proceeded from the concept of not conducting military operations in Afghanistan, but the presence of Soviet troops, and military information proved this. Did the information of the State Security Committee have a decisive influence on the decision? Still, I think that this is a combination of information, although I do not want to underestimate the great influence of everything that we received from Afghanistan through the people who were already deployed at that time.

And yet, do you think Andropov was a more active person who stood for the entry of troops?

I think that, after all, when the decision was made, then, naturally, the decisive word was Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov, as the most knowledgeable person, but I do not want to belittle Ustinov's influence in this case.

Dmitry Fyodorovich Ustinov - a man, I would say, of a rather persistent character, Andropov was more flexible in terms of other issues. I am not judging by Afghanistan, I am judging by Andropov's future work, including as General Secretary. A man who thought more broadly in matters of politics, in matters of international concern, than Dmitry Fedorovich. Dmitry Fedorovich is more technical. He also came to the post of Minister of Defense, from the war years he led the military industry. It is rather the practical mind of a technician. I remember how one issue of missile placement was solved. When he says to Brezhnev: "Lenya, well, we still need to deliver 20-30 missiles in Europe." He asks: "Why?" He says: “Well, what, more - less, does it hurt? Well, we can put the question like this - let's put the problem. - "Well, Dima, you need to think it over, well, act, act." It was. Anyone who listens to me can throw a reproach at me that I am simplifying. Well, that was the nature of the relationship between these people. And when, say, I happened to be present at such conversations by chance or not by chance, I do not reveal any secrets - this is our history. We will continue to study it. As we have now conceived this film to show the roots of the Afghan war. We want to get to the bottom of them. We must tell the truth, how it was, how it happened... I think that Ustinov's concept was that our presence, I repeat this, our presence, and not participation in hostilities, it will sober up both Pakistan and the Americans. This is his characteristic trait. Including with missiles, after all, this was the case in Europe. Well, we'll put in more CO-20 systems, well, we'll sober them up, they'll know. Such is the concept. I do not want to say that the head of our military department was guided by primitivism, no, different approaches. And now we come to Gromyko. Gromyko, of course, was the most cautious of the trio that prepared this whole concept, and we approached the fact that we should come to this decision, because all the information that was going on led us to this. Right or wrong let down - that is the question. This is a matter of analyzing everything, but what we convinced ourselves about, what I am talking about now, this is already a long period of time giving us the opportunity to comprehend. But how did we convince ourselves? The socialization of the country, the military presence, the influence and support of the government, which asks, on the basis of Article 54 of the UN, to send troops. That needed political wisdom. We had to look ahead, and this wisdom was not enough for us. Now they can say - smart in hindsight, but where were you then? Firstly, our floor did not solve this matter, the council floor, and it was not yet dedicated, but, nevertheless, the analytical study of this issue, in my opinion, was not sufficiently carried out then. Why did we think that our presence - Ustinov's concept - the presence of our troops releases Afghan troops who can join the battle, the Khalq and Parcham troops can engage in battle against the enemy coming from Pakistan - that part of Afghanistan that did not accept this revolution, and most of the population did not accept this revolution. Feudalism remained feudalism. Hence - the clans fought against the troops. And we believed that we were freeing up for the Afghans, for the part that is closer to us, their troops so that it would join with the part that is against these revolutionary transformations.

Gromyko was here, in the discussions he, as always, had two positions. In the initial period, this is typical for many political issues, that Andrei Andreevich stated everything “for” and everything “against”. "Pros and cons". That was his tone. I do not rule out that during the period of discussion Andrei Andreevich understood the consequences of the momentary entry of troops, namely the destruction of the detente, that is, this peaceful coexistence. He understood the American policy of Carter-Brzezinski better than perhaps anyone in the Politburo. And from here I can make such a presumption that at some stage Gromyko defended the line, and then it was so that we need to be more careful with the troops for the time being. But Gromyko was such a person. When a decision is already being made, I will repeat what Georgy Markovich Kornienko said, Gromyko became a more active promoter of this idea than even those who took the initiative of this idea. For him, the implementation and implementation of already agreed upon and adopted decisions was already mandatory, and he already here turned on his entire foreign policy mechanism to work out this issue. What we reaped with the introduction of troops is another part, but momentarily we gave Carter, Brzezinski the opportunity, and in 1980, when Reagan came to power, to break the SALT-2 agreement signed by Carter and Brezhnev in Vienna in 1979- m year, on the limitation of strategic arms. Broke? Broke! Although it exists, it has not been ratified. Further. Well, they broke this whole policy, which was outlined with Nixon, starting from 1972 - the policy of peaceful coexistence and the gradual removal of tension. The Americans, especially Brzezinski - Carter, after all, was a man of a limited plan, he came from peanuts, from land use, a landowner, and Brzezinski played a political role with him - a man who knew the situation well, a man who could politically judge, and he developed a concept relations with Russia. To say that from a friendly position, I absolutely do not agree with this. This was the man who worked against us. He considered, as Reagan said after, - this is the "Evil Empire". At that time, this had not yet been formulated by Brzezinski, but Carter proceeded from this. From here we exploded the whole process of détente, and we felt this for a long time and gave the Americans the opportunity to gradually move away from the Vietnam syndrome. We helped them do it.

I will ask you to tell us about Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, our General Secretary at that time...

Again, I ask those who listen to me to consider that I express my own judgment on this matter. I just do not pretend to be factual, but at the same time I am responsible for what I say as a person who could observe a lot. I don't want anyone to have the opinion that now he is so freely telling all this, but that he could not state it all then. Well, Khrushchev once answered all such people very simply. XX Party Congress. When he was then asked the question: “Nikita Sergeevich, now you are exposing Stalin, now you delivered a report on Stalinism, atrocities, and so on, but you worked at that time, where were you then, why didn’t you voice then raised?" Khrushchev read this note, it is anonymous from the Presidium. “You see, although anonymous, I will answer. Well, now someone here in the hall can stand up and say: let's, so to speak, get rid of Khrushchev, overthrow Khrushchev. Well, who is brave? Laughter in the hall. He says, "Well, here's the answer to your question." So are we. They talked to each other in various combinations. They condemned. But to go out to the square... Here you ask a question, I return to your question about Brezhnev.

Our medicine is Evgeny Ivanovich Chazov, I am convinced that he will also tell his point of view, but he has already stated it in the book. He knew, and we all saw it, that since 1976, Brezhnev was already tangibly a person who had the opportunity to fall, I would say, well, state thinking, or something. And then she already rolled down to the primitivism of thinking. And to count on the fact that over the years he could clearly manage the state ... I did not get such an impression.

The question may arise: well, what, the Politburo did not see what you are now telling? Saw. Somehow Shcherbitsky told me: “Listen, well, what about Brezhnev this and that”, - this is again a personal conversation, and I told him: “Viktor Vasilyevich, well, you are members of the Politburo, well, you You can solve all these questions. They could make him Honorary Chairman, and so on. But what was driving everyone? This is my conclusion and I do not want to impose it on anyone. Every time we approached a party congress, when we approached some new, turning point in the life of the party, suddenly both the press and ideology began to convince everyone that if there were changes in this gerontological Politburo, then this would be regarded in the West as instability in our leadership. And on this note of instability, the preservation of this stability, we also went to the Plenums of the Central Committee, not we personally, but I mean the leadership of the Central Committee, and therefore the people in the Politburo changed very belatedly. After all, we have reached a period, now we can say that in two years three leaders of the party have gone to another world, right? Here's what we've come up with. There was no succession. All were in the region of 79-80 years, and gradually this age grew. Therefore, I cannot say that Brezhnev was a leader who generated ideas. He had a very good advisory apparatus, he had talented assistants who wrote speeches for him, and much more. So he had to read it, so he read it. Of course, he delved into some things. Often, when it was necessary to push through some question, well, what did they do? Well, here lies the paper, it doesn't pass, after all, the Secretary General. Well, you're calling someone. He had a consultant, a woman - Galina Anatolyevna, to whom you say: "Galina Anatolyevna, you have paper." - "And what do you want? - "Well, I would have to decide this and that." I don't mean, of course, the Afghan issue, I'm taking routine questions. "Well, you roughly dictate the resolution you want." You dictate to her, she edits it, attaches a corner, you see, two days later the issue moved, he signed this deed. Am I the only one who resorted to this? Dozens of people have done it. I do not want to say that we led the whole country in this way. Again, I say, the word "we" is bad. Well, the leadership of the party led the country in such a way, so, of course, commissions were created on fundamental issues, where discussions took place. For example, I was later a member of the Foreign Policy Commission headed by Suslov. And much more. And these Commissions, they worked out everything in detail. But Brezhnev was on his own, he was losing his ability to lead, he was ill a lot, and there were accidents with him, when he lost consciousness, he was in the hospital for several months. I had to communicate with the foreign press, here are a dozen books in which foreign correspondents write about my stiffness of communication with the press, with the foreign press. And then there were no press secretaries, then duties were assigned to someone, you remained in your position, and there were no special press services. There was a press department, there was TASS, and now, communicating with correspondents, the most difficult thing was to answer abroad and in the Union to foreign correspondents about Brezhnev's health. Here Melor Sturua even wrote in Ogonyok later a whole ode to the fact that I spoke a lie in Vienna in 1979, when signing SALT-2, that Brezhnev was in full health and that I defended this line. You see, this is not an easy question. The health of the leader through the mouth of the press secretary cannot be expressed. It can only be expressed by leadership. And with the approval of management. And if you say that he is sick, then it means that he needs to be changed. And this is the mistake of many members of the Politburo - the body that could initiate this issue and should have initiated this issue. After all, Chernenko once found the courage to say, when he was elected General Secretary, that maybe I should still resign when he went to the hospital. And none other than Andrei Andreyevich Gromyko writes about this in his memoirs. And Grishin Viktor Vasilievich: everyone remembers this scene with a bouquet of flowers in the hospital, when he was handed a certificate of deputy of the Moscow Council No. 1, and Chernenko was taken out on a gurney, and he could hardly get up, and behind the guard was holding a bouquet, pretending that this bouquet was Grishin handed it to him and he keeps. Why? Because no one from the Politburo wanted to start the process, I would say, of the reconstruction of the leadership itself, because they were all somewhere under the same umbrella. I forgot to answer you about orders.

There was an anniversary, I don’t remember, Kosygin, perhaps he was 75 years old. I could be wrong by a year or two. And now, as always, the ceremony of awarding orders, they approximately went through one pattern, which had already been sewn and cut out many times. Everyone stood at the chairman's green table. Everyone lined up, everyone was looking for a place where to put their head closer, so that it would be closer to Brezhnev in the picture the next day - such a competition, if you look at the pictures, you will see, I don’t want to name persons who knew the place, how to get into a television camera or into a camera - this was also studied. And so, when he presented Kosygin with the Order of the October Revolution, I heard it myself - you won’t find this material anywhere, he hung this order on him and said: “Listen, Alyosha, is it a beautiful order, huh?” And he already had half a breast of orders. And so he repeated several times: “Alyosha, a beautiful order, Kostya, but I don’t have an order.” And what do you think?! After a certain number of days, I look, a vote is sent out, and members of the Politburo vote on the Draft decision of the Politburo, it says “Not for print”, and if it’s not for print, it means that it gets to my department in order to inform TASS accordingly that this Decree will not be printed. I know from this Decree that a number of members of the Politburo have already voted: to award Brezhnev with the Order of the October Revolution. For what? For the development of virgin lands and for its role. He was already a Hero for these virgin lands, and something else was awarded, well, he needed a reason, he needed an order. The man had a special predilection, probably not only him. Once I was in Montenegro, one of the kings of Montenegro, it was not our century, he also had the same thing. They showed me a collection, he had about two hundred orders, he collected these cases. Brezhnev had the same mania. Once, somehow, I had a conversation with him, where he complained to me, as if so casually, about Khrushchev, that here is the first Order of Brezhnev, says Brezhnev, I did not receive at one time, when everyone was awarded for the Dneproges; Khrushchev struck me off the list, and I was the secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk City Party Committee. Well, again, these were speculations, that maybe some feeling arose from there that he was cheated of something, I’m saying that this can be disputed, these are my, so to speak, speculations, maybe this was laid down when - that's the beginning.

He had a passion for collecting hand watches, he had a huge number of watches, although he wore the same watches, and cars were given to him abroad. He replied that he was a tanker in the past, and now he likes foreign cars. And somewhere not far from Domodedovo, it seems that such a garage still exists, where all the cars that have ever been donated to Brezhnev are accumulated. The Ninth Department had a whole hangar of these cars.

What directives were given to the mass media about Afghanistan and who gave them?

In the beginning there was one large Commission, which, as I said, was headed by Gromyko, Boris Nikolaevich gave instructions, including to the press: how to get out, what to get out with, and so on. Zimyanin, who was then Secretary of the Central Committee, he received instructions either through Suslov or through Ponomarev. And then they already received instructions from the departments.

The first commander of the 40th United Army, retired lieutenant general Yuri Vladimirovich TUKHARINOV shares his memories In 1979, I surrendered the army in Ulan-Ude and arrived at the new position of first deputy commander of the Turkestan district in October