Over the past eight years, a series of books on the bibliography of Crimean studies have been published in Simferopol. During this time, 18 volumes were published. Implementation large-scale project Andrey Nepomnyashchiy, a professor at Vernadsky Tauride University, headed it. Management of the Central Library. L.N. Tolstoy organized a meeting of Andrei Anatolyevich with representatives of the creative intelligentsia and librarians of our city. Andrei Nepomniachtchi, along with the authors of some (already published) works, did not come to Sevastopol empty-handed. In the reading room of the Central Library. L.N. Tolstoy, they launched an exhibition of books in the series. In the center of the exposition was a volume with a recognizable portrait of Arseniy Markevich on a hard cover. 125 years ago, Arseniy Ivanovich was one of the organizers of TUAK - the Taurida Scientific Archival Commission. He wrote: “Recently, the number of people who specifically study the Crimea and Taurida has begun to increase. And no wonder. This region is a vast and very rewarding field for the research scientist, as well as it is of deep interest to any educated and inquisitive person.
More than a century has passed since Arseniy Markevich entrusted these words to paper. And all this time, that “deep interest” in the past of the peninsula, about which the famous ascetic of science wrote, did not weaken. Proof of this is the idea of Professor Andrey Nepomniachtchi, which deserves approval and our admiration, and the number of his like-minded colleagues, growing every year.
Andrey Anatolyevich is not only the initiator and organizer, but also the most prolific author of the books of the project, which deserves every support. And a fairly voluminous work about his outstanding predecessor was written by Andrei Nepomniachtchi. This work was highly appreciated by the reviewers of a dozen and a half leading Simferopol and Kyiv publications. The success of the book about Arseniy Markevich was explained by the author himself. He said that by working on extensive material, he managed to get creative freedom from narrow biographical constructions. Before the reader, his hero appeared against the backdrop of the fates of dozens of other Crimean experts. Since many of them lived in Kyiv, St. Petersburg and other major cities of the Russian Empire, then, deprived, for obvious reasons, of our modern means of communication, they were forced to actively correspond. Most of their letters have survived to this day, which Andrei Nepomniachtchi took advantage of with knowledge of the matter. Of course, he highlighted the teaching activity of the hero of the book in the men's and women's gymnasiums that lasted three decades. His work as a teacher of the Russian language and literature was so successful that he was awarded the rank of real state councilor. The rarest case.
His many years of service as the leader of TUAK were also noticed. He was involved in the opening in 1918 of the Tauride University, in the creation of the Crimean Central Archive, Central Museum Tauris. In 1927, Arseniy Markevich organized and led visiting all-Union conferences of archaeologists in Kerch and Chersonese. At the same time, he was unanimously elected a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, although, oddly enough, he officially did not have a degree.
We, the people of Sevastopol, are probably close to the fact from the biography of Arseny Markevich, which, perhaps, is not reflected in the voluminous work of Andrei Nepomniachtchi. From August 20 to August 31, 1886, a study tour of one hundred pupils to Sevastopol, organized by the 31-year-old teacher of the Simferopol male gymnasium A. Markevich, lasted. Although more than thirty years had passed since the end of the defense of the city, it still kept traces of destruction. Arseniy Ivanovich and his young friends toured the sights of Sevastopol and its immediate environs.
It is noteworthy that from March 28 to April 4, 1855, the second bombardment of Sevastopol lasted. And somewhere in Brest-Litovsk on March 31, 1855, Arseniy Markevich was born.
Of the great many printed works of Arseniy Markevich, someone considers the main large-scale work “Tavrika. The experience of the index of works relating to the Crimea and the Taurida province in general. But the author of these modest notes in the first place puts the work of the same age as the most dramatic days of the defense of Sevastopol - the book "Tauride Province during the Crimean War." She is devoid of emotional outbursts. But how many feelings and awakening motives for reflection are contained in its cover! In another separate line of the book, the contents of a stack of original documents are compressed.
A lot has been written about the first defense of Sevastopol, but Areny Markevich, if not the only one, then one of the few authors showed how the events of the Crimean (Eastern) War affected not only Sevastopol, but also Yekaterinoslav, Lugansk, Belgorod, Kursk, Kazan ... If we also mention such towns as Bakhchisaray, Genichesk, then this list in our story would take up a lot of space.
Andrei Nepomnyashchy considers the professor of Taurida University to be a historian and local historian equal to Arseny Markevich in two departments at once (history and German language) Nikolai Ernst. By the way, he took over from Arseniy Markevich, assuming the post of head of the Tauride Society of History, Archeology and Ethnography, created on the basis of TUAK. Andrei Anatolyevich also wrote a book about Nikolai Ernst.
Peru Professor A.A. Nepomniachtchi also owns the books “History and Ethnography of the Peoples of the Crimea”, “Notes of Travelers and Guides in the Development of the History of Crimean Local Lore” and other publications of the series, which are distinguished by their thoroughness.
Doctor historical sciences A.A. Nepomniachtchi was twice awarded the Vernadsky Prize. Andrei Anatolyevich is a laureate of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea award, an honored worker of science and technology of the autonomy. These and others honorary titles not only for the tireless pen of a scientist. Eight years after the release of the first book in the series, the school created by the master of young scientists and graduate students, such as V. Bobkov, V. Kalinovsky, U. Musaeva, S. Volnova, and other ambitious researchers, is more and more clearly visible.
At a meeting in the reading room of the Central Library. L.N. Tolstoy from the lips of Andrei Nepomniachtchi and his companions could be heard more than once: "Introduced into scientific circulation." And how could science not be burdened with new information, if the authors, who caught courage, brought documents into the light of God, which for a century had not been touched by a human hand. These are not only letters, but also formulary lists, memorable books, including those for the Sevastopol city administration. The fund of the liquidated Center of Restoration Workshops with deposits of documents on the Crimean monuments was discovered by one of the persistent Simferopol residents in an unexpected place - in the Central State Archive of the Russian Federation in Moscow.
Professor Andrei Nepomniachtchi and his companions kindly donated to the Central Library. L.N. Tolstoy book series. As you remember, some of them - not even one copy.
Our city has developed its rich traditions in local history. But the residents of Simferopol taught the hosts an instructive lesson in teamwork within the framework of the target program.
On the pictures: Professor A.A. Nepomniachtchi; Corner of the exhibition of books of Simferopol residents.
The concept of transaction was first introduced into scientific circulation by J. Commons.
A transaction is not an exchange of goods, but an alienation and appropriation of property rights and freedoms created by society. This definition makes sense (Commons) because institutions ensure that the will of the individual is extended beyond the realm within which he can influence environment directly by their actions, that is, beyond the scope of physical control, and, therefore, turn out to be transactions, in contrast to individual behavior as such or the exchange of goods.
Commons distinguished three main types of transactions:
1. Transaction transaction - serves to carry out the actual
alienation and appropriation of property rights and freedoms and with its
implementation requires the mutual consent of the parties, based on the economic interest of each of them.
In the transaction of the transaction, the condition of symmetry of relations between counterparties is observed. The hallmark of the transaction transaction, according to Commons, is not the production, but the transfer of goods from hand to hand.
2. Transaction of control - in it the key is the attitude
management of subordination, which involves such interaction between people when the right to make decisions belongs to only one side. In a management transaction, behavior is clearly asymmetric, which is a consequence of the asymmetry of the position of the parties and, accordingly, the asymmetry of legal relations.
3. The transaction of rationing - with it, the asymmetry of the legal status of the parties is preserved, but the place of the managing party is occupied by a collective body that performs the function of specifying rights. Rationing transactions include: the preparation of the company's budget by the board of directors, the federal budget by the government and approval by a representative authority, the decision of the arbitration court on a dispute that arises between acting entities, through which wealth is distributed. There is no control in the rationing transaction. Through such a transaction, wealth is endowed to one or another economic agent.
The presence of transaction costs makes certain types of transactions more or less economical, depending on the circumstances of time and place. Therefore, the same operations can be mediated by different types of transactions, depending on the rules they order.
The reason for the emergence of firms is that the existence of a market or price coordination is associated with certain costs. The firm as an alternative form of coordination reduces these costs.
What are these costs? In contrast to production costs, which are determined by the volume and technology of production, Coase refers to these costs as follows:
1. Costs of organizing production using the price mechanism, associated with finding out what the corresponding prices are. These costs can be reduced by the emergence of specialists who will sell such information, but they cannot be completely eliminated;
2. the costs of conducting and concluding contracts for each
a separate exchange transaction. Although there are markets (commodity exchanges, for example) where techniques have been developed to reduce contracting costs to a minimum, they have not been completely eliminated there either;
3. costs of using the price mechanism: the factor of production (or its owner) should not enter into a series of contracts with
factors with which he cooperates within the firm. Long
fixed-term contracts are more economical than
short term for several reasons.
First, it is possible to avoid certain costs associated with renegotiating each contract, when instead of several short-term contracts one long-term contract is concluded.
Secondly, the participants in the transaction may prefer a long-term contract to a short-term one due to a certain attitude to risk and uncertainty, since restrictions on the scope of possible actions of the seller of services do not appear in the contract, but appear later, in the course of their execution, at the will of the buyer. The buyer does not know in advance which of the possible ways of the supplier's action will be preferable for him. Therefore, the conditions for the provision of services are determined in the most in general terms, only the boundaries of the actions of the supplier of goods and services are stipulated, the details are not specified and are determined by the buyer later. The supplier of services or goods may be completely indifferent to what course of action the buyer chooses.
Thus, a firm is more likely to emerge when short-term contracts become unsatisfactory. Obviously, this is more important in the case of the supply of labor services than in the case of the purchase of goods. In the latter case, the main issues can be agreed in advance. Within the firm, the costs of searching for information about prices are reduced, the need for constant renegotiation of contracts disappears, and economic relations become more definite and stable. To the extent that the mechanism of administration leads to savings in transaction costs, "hierarchy" crowds out the market.
Therefore, the key points underlying transaction costs are uncertainty and problems of access to information.
The emergence of firms is thus linked to the existence of market costs. Why can't administrative coordination be all-encompassing, why can't the entire economy be represented by one big firm? In other words, what are the reasons that determine the size of the firm? If the emergence of the firm eliminates certain costs and actually reduces the costs of production, why do market transactions persist at all?
First, as the size of the firm increases, the income from the entrepreneurial function may begin to decline, that is, there may be a diminishing return on managerial resource. Thus, the firm will expand until the cost of arranging one additional transaction equals the cost of arranging the same transaction through an open market exchange or the cost of arranging it through another firm. The optimal size of a firm will be determined by the point where the marginal cost of using the market equals the marginal cost of using administrative control. Up to this border, the company is profitable, after - the market.
Secondly, it may turn out that as the number of transactions increases, the entrepreneur will not be able to use the factors of production with the highest profit, that is, to place them at the points of production where they have the highest value. Again, there must be a point at which the cost of wasting resources is equal to the cost of marketing in an exchange transaction on the open market, or the loss in arranging that transaction by another entrepreneur.
Third, the supply price of one or more factors of production may increase because the small firm has more “other” advantages than the large firm.
In general, the point at which a firm's expansion stops may be determined by the combined action of several of the above factors. The first two most likely correspond to economists' statements about "diminishing returns on managerial resource."
Thus, Coase's contribution to the theory of the firm is to accept the existence of transaction costs, and this is the break with neoclassical theory. This applies not only to the analysis of the firm, but also to the analysis of the market or law, which Coase sees as institutional forms designed to facilitate the transactions of exchange. In this sense, Coase is the founder of the new institutional economics, which O. Williamson will develop further.
In subsequent years, Coase's treatment of transaction costs has undergone adjustments and modifications.
Transaction costs are the costs (explicit and implicit) of ensuring the fulfillment of external contracts. Transaction costs are the costs of doing business, including the monetary value of the time to find a business partner, to negotiate, to conclude a contract, to ensure the appropriate performance of the contract.
Control costs are the costs associated with the execution of internal contracts. Control costs include the costs of monitoring the performance of internal contracts, as well as losses due to improper performance of contracts.
The market and the firm from this point of view are alternative ways of concluding contracts. The market can be thought of as a network of external contracts, and the firm as a network of internal contracts.
The growth of transaction costs due to the inefficiency of external contracts limits the scope of the market. This, in turn, leads to the existence of relatively large firms, for which the problem of external agreement and the possibility of opportunistic behavior is in many cases removed by the development of internal contracts.
In turn, with the growth of the company, the number of employees and the dismemberment of the production process increase ( characteristic example- assembly line with separate operations), so that the total result of the company's activities turns out to be the work of not one or several employees, as in the pre-industrial era, but of many departments and many employees. As a result, the direct connection between labor and its result, which is characteristic of small-scale production, is lost.
And the problem of the free rider immediately appears: the reduction in the intensity of labor of one of the workers does not directly affect the total product of the firm and may go unnoticed, and therefore tempts workers to work not in full force. Self-control of the intensity of labor ceases to serve as a way to increase the efficiency of production; a controlling authority is forced to take its place. The costs of monitoring the degree of intensity of labor (activity) of each production link appear and grow. The larger the firm becomes, the higher these control costs become.
The firm as a separate entity of economic activity exists between two types of costs - transaction costs, which determine the lower limit of the firm, its minimum size, and control costs, which set the upper limit, its maximum size.
The concept of transaction costs was introduced by R. Coase in the 1930s in his article "The Nature of the Firm". It has been used to explain the existence of such hierarchical structures as opposed to the market, such as the firm. R. Coase associated the formation of these "islands of consciousness" with their relative advantages in terms of saving on transaction costs. He saw the specifics of the functioning of the company in the suppression of the price mechanism and its replacement by a system of internal administrative control.
Within the modern economic theory transaction costs have received many interpretations, sometimes diametrically opposed.
So K. Arrow defines transaction costs as the costs of operating the economic system. Arrow compared the effect of transaction costs in economics with the effect of friction in physics. Based on such assumptions, conclusions are drawn that the closer the economy is to the Walrasian general equilibrium model, the lower the level of transaction costs in it, and vice versa.
In the interpretation of D. North, transaction costs “consist of the costs of assessing useful properties the object of exchange and the cost of enforcing and enforcing rights”. These costs serve as a source of social, political and economic institutions.
In the theories of some economists, transaction costs exist not only in a market economy (Coase, Arrow, North), but also in alternative ways economic organization, and, in particular, in a planned economy (S. Chang, A. Alchian, Demsets). Thus, according to Chang, the maximum transaction costs are observed in the planned economy, which ultimately determines its inefficiency.
Attention should be paid to the fact that transaction costs do not replace, but only supplement traditionally considered production costs.
There are many classifications and typologies of transaction costs in the economic literature. The most common is the following typology, which includes six types of transaction costs:
1. Information search costs. Before a deal is made or a contract is concluded, it is necessary to have information about where you can find potential buyers and sellers of the relevant goods and factors of production, what are the current prices. The costs of this kind are made up of the time and resources required to conduct the search, as well as the losses associated with the incompleteness and imperfection of the acquired information.
2. Negotiation costs. The market needs distraction
significant funds for negotiating the terms of the exchange, for the conclusion and execution of contracts. Main instrument
savings of such costs - standard (standard) contracts.
We are talking only about intra-company costs of negotiating and concluding contracts. The level of costs of this type depends, first of all, on the specificity of the assets that the parties have: the less such specificity, the more opportunities for standard contracting, and the lower the negotiation costs. However, it must be noted that what large quantity people are involved in the management of the firm, the higher the costs of negotiating, obviously. Therefore, in cooperatives participation in management is direct, these costs will be somewhat higher than average.
3. Measurement costs. Any product or service is a set of characteristics. The act of exchange inevitably takes into account only
some of them, and the accuracy of their assessment (measurement) can be
extremely approximate. Sometimes interesting qualities
vara are generally immeasurable and for their evaluation one has to use
surrogates (for example, judging the taste of apples by their color). Here
includes the costs of the relevant measuring equipment,
carrying out the actual measurement, the existence of measures that have
aim to protect the parties from measurement errors and, finally, loss
from these mistakes. Measurement costs increase with increasing accuracy requirements.
Measurement is information quantification. In fact, no product offered for sale is free from the cost of measuring its properties. Quantification involves the costs of appropriate measuring equipment and the actual measurement. In addition, measures have to be taken to protect the participants in the transaction from measurement errors, which also requires costs. Finally, when making a deal, you need to know in advance the possible losses from these errors. Savings in measurement costs have led to business practices such as warranty repairs, brand labels, purchasing batches of goods from samples, etc.
Naturally, the costs of measurement grow with increasing requirements for their accuracy. In this respect, enormous savings in measurement costs have been achieved by mankind as a result of the invention of standards for weights and measures.
In the general case, cooperatives and joint-stock firms with participation of employees in management have comparative advantages in this type of costs: cooperative ideology (typical to a large extent and semi-cooperatives, which are joint-stock firms with the participation of employees) reduces incentives to shirk, and, consequently, costs control, an integral part of which are the costs of measurement.
4. Costs of specification and protection of property rights. This includes both public and private costs associated with the legislative provision of the specification of property rights, and the costs of maintaining property rights protection bodies (court, arbitration, advocacy, police, etc.). “It is assumed that economic agents act in accordance with their interests, therefore, observance of the rights of others (as a system) is possible when the structure of incentives, determined by sanctions for violating the legal regime, does not allow violating the established rules” [Shastitko A. E., 1998, With. 184].
One of the main means of saving on the costs of specification and protection of property rights is an ideology that often makes it possible to ensure the protection of property rights more effectively than formal institutions. On the other hand, the costs of introducing and maintaining such an ideology in society should also be attributed to such costs.
Despite the fact that the costs of specification and protection of property rights are typical, first of all, for the whole society as a whole, its specific institutions, including the institutions of cooperative property, are not free from these costs. The situation requiring the specification of property rights arises, for example, in the joint ownership of the means of production and the private nature of the appropriation of income from these means.
To analyze this type of transaction costs, it is necessary to separate the costs of specification from the costs of protecting property rights. If the latter are inversely related to the number of owners (i.e., the more owners, the lower the transaction costs of ensuring the security of property from external encroachments [see Shastitko A. E., 1998, p. 236]), then for the first, in general, there is a direct relationship between these costs and the number of owners. Most likely, the lowest costs of specification and protection of property rights are characteristic of communal property institutions (private property is characterized by high security costs, and state property is characterized by a high degree of dilution of property rights). As an illustration, we can provide a graphic confirmation of this thesis. On fig. 4.2 curve D (N)- specific costs of ensuring the security of property rights from external encroachments, and the curve B(N)- unit cost of specification of rights
property (the shape and angle of inclination of both curves are arbitrary: in the general case, we cannot say anything definite about either one or the other). Dot A on the curve T(N)(T= B(N)+ DI)) illustrates the case of private property, point C is the case of state property, and point E- communal property.
Rice. 4.2. Specification Costs and Property Rights Protection Costs:
ATS - average transaction costs of specification and protection of property rights per person; N is the number of people in the group.
Of the various forms of communal property, the cooperative property has the advantage in terms of this kind of costs: the cooperative ideology reduces the risk of opportunistic behavior, which, in turn, reduces the costs of specifying and protecting property rights.
5. Costs of Opportunistic Behavior. Opportunism, according to Williamson, means "providing incomplete or distorted information, especially when it comes to deliberate deceit, misrepresentation, distortion and concealment of the truth, or other methods of confusing a partner. It underlies the real or imaginary information asymmetry, which significantly complicates the problems of economic organization” [Williamson O. I., 1996. p. 98]. Williamson highlights ex ante And ah post opportunistic behaviour. The first is related to information asymmetry before the signing of the contract. A classic example ex ante opportunistic behavior is the case of the used car market, described by J. Akerlof in the classic article "The Lemon Market: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism". A used car salesman naturally knows his car, while in most cases it is extremely difficult for a buyer (i.e., the cost of obtaining information is prohibitively high) to determine the actual characteristics of a used car. As a result, the owners of the best used cars (“drain”) are forced to sell them at the same price as the worst cars are sold (“lemons”) (see [Akerlof J., 1994]).
An effective way to combat this kind of opportunistic behavior is to provide the carrier with some kind of collateral that is potentially inaccessible to other parties to the transaction. For the used car market, that collateral would be that sellers of the best cars provide guarantees to their buyers. In cases of bilateral information asymmetry, collateral exchange may occur.
ex post opportunistic behavior manifests itself, first of all, in two main forms: in the form of shirking and extortion. The first is characteristic of agency relations: “If the personal contribution of each agent to overall result measured with large errors, then the reward will be weakly related to the actual efficiency of his work. Hence, there are negative incentives pushing for "shirking". If information about the actual behavior of an agent is expensive, then within certain limits he can act uncontrollably, following his own interests, which do not tangibly coincide with the interests of the organization" [Kapelyushnikov R.I., 1994].
shirking more characteristic of large groups, where the income of each particular individual is less dependent on his own actions, and the costs of control are high (often prohibitively high). On the other hand, shirking is a problem of the relationship between agent and principal, a problem of information asymmetry. The cost of shirking is thus directly proportional to the size of the firm as well as the complexity of its management structure. For companies the same size, but with different ownership systems, the costs of shirking will reach their maximum under state ownership (we are talking, again, only about the general case: any exceptions are possible). Obviously, among joint-stock firms, the lowest costs of shirking are characteristic of those where employees participate in management.
Ways to combat shirking can be tightening control over the agent's activities, creating a system of incentives that would reduce his interest in shirking, or, again, a pledge.
Extortion occurs when both parties have specific resources that are complementary. That is, either party may demand an increase in its share of the quasi-rent due to it on the grounds that without it the other party will receive nothing at all.
Obviously, if the owners of specific assets are involved in the management of the firm (where they are co-owners of the firm), the transaction costs of extortion are reduced. Thus, joint-stock companies in which employees participate in profits and management, as well as cooperatives, have some advantage in this type of cost.
6.The costs of politicization. This term refers to transaction costs that arise in the organization and are associated with the very nature of decision-making within the organization. If the voluntary nature of the transaction concluded in the market guarantees the effectiveness of decision-making, then the lack of such voluntariness within the organization leads to additional costs. Moreover, this happens both in the case when decisions are made on a collective basis, and when decisions are made centrally. In the first case, the costs of collective decision-making arise. They consist of three elements: “Firstly... decision-making by majority vote does not provide optimal results... Secondly, the process of developing joint decisions itself can absorb a lot of time, effort and money. These costs are greater, the more numerous and heterogeneous the composition of the participants, i.e., the greater the divergence of their interests... Thirdly, resources are wasted when trying to form coalitions and in the course of their struggle among themselves” [Kapelyushnikov R. I., 1994 ].
The costs of collective decision-making are directly proportional to the number of people involved in the decision-making process. It is obvious that these costs will be minimal under private form of ownership, and maximum - under state, cooperative, and also joint stock with the participation of employees in the management of the company.
Influence costs arise from the desire of rationally acting individuals who are not directly involved in the decision-making process to benefit from the decisions made in the administrative system. They consist of the following components: “Firstly, these are losses in efficiency due to the distortion of information by agents who supply it to higher authorities and who thus try to influence their decisions ... Secondly, these are the time and efforts that are spent trying to influence the decisions made by others to their advantage. Thirdly, these are the costs necessary to prevent the politicization of the internal life, the company and reduce the costs of influence” [Kapelyushnikov R.I., 1994]. Influence costs are typical, first of all, for large groups with centralized control, where the voice of each member of the group does not have a serious impact on the decision being made.
The value of transaction costs of influence, as well as some other types of transaction costs (see earlier), depends on the size of the firm and the complexity of its management structure. Where the “principal-agent” relationship is more developed, the costs of influence will also be higher. It is clear that the costs of influence reach their maximum under the state form of ownership, and the minimum - under private ownership. Influence costs in cooperatives generally cannot be significant because cooperative firms are generally not that large. In addition, since cooperators manage their own property, cooperatives are likely to have less information asymmetry between agents and principals. Also reduces the cost of influence and cooperative ideology.
To the question Please tell me the reasons for the anomie. given by the author queen nothing the best answer is Anomia - [Greek. a - negative particle, nomos - law] - a concept introduced by E. Durkheim to explain deviant behavior (suicide, apathy and disappointment) and expressing a historically determined process of destruction of the basic elements of culture, primarily in the aspect of ethical norms
Anomie - "lack of a clear system social norms, the destruction of the unity of culture, as a result of which life experience people ceases to conform to ideal social norms"
Source:
Answer from grow up[guru]
maybe anemia? It seems that there is very little oxygen in the blood
Answer from European[guru]
Anomia - [Greek. a - negative particle, nomos - law] - a concept introduced by E. Durkheim to explain deviant behavior (suicide, apathy and disappointment) and expressing a historically determined process of destruction of the basic elements of culture, primarily in terms of ethical norms. With a rather sharp change in social ideals and morality, certain social groups they cease to feel their involvement in this society, they are alienated, new social norms and values are rejected by members of these groups (including socially declared patterns of behavior), and instead of conventional means of achieving individual or social goals, their own (in particular, illegal) ones are put forward. The phenomena of anomie, affecting all sections of the population during social upheavals, have a particularly strong effect on young people.
There is also a concept, or how it sounds:
Anomie - "the absence of a clear system of social norms, the destruction of the unity of culture, as a result of which the life experience of people ceases to correspond to ideal social norms." The term was coined by Émile Durkheim. Further development of the concept of anomie is associated with the name of Robert Merton.http://www.mirrabot.com/work/work_36189.html
Anemia (Greek αναιμία, anemia) is a group of clinical and hematological syndromes, the common point for which is a decrease in the concentration of hemoglobin in the blood, more often with a simultaneous decrease in the number of erythrocytes (or the total volume of erythrocytes). The term "anemia" without specification does not define a specific disease, i.e. anemia should be considered one of the symptoms of various pathological conditions. In itself, any anemia is not a disease, but can occur as a syndrome in a number of diseases that can either be associated with a primary lesion of the blood system or not depend on it. In this regard, a strict nosological classification of anemia is impossible. For the classification of anemia, it is customary to use the principle of practical expediency. For this, it is most convenient to divide anemia according to a single classification feature - a color indicator. In connection with the transition to automatic analysis of the composition of peripheral blood, a color indicator can be replaced with no less success by another indicator - the average corpuscular volume (RMS). It is measured in a direct way using an automated counter. The normal RSD value is 80-90 fl (normocytosis). Decreased RMS below 80 fl - microcytosis. An increase in RMS above 95 fl is macrocytosis. A decrease in the concentration of hemoglobin in the blood often occurs with a simultaneous decrease in the number of erythrocytes and a change in their qualitative composition. Any anemia leads to a decrease in the respiratory function of the blood and the development of oxygen starvation of tissues, which is most often expressed by such symptoms as pallor of the skin, increased fatigue, weakness, headaches, dizziness, palpitations, shortness of breath and others.
In a routine examination of a peripheral blood smear, the morphologist indicates a deviation in the size of erythrocytes to a smaller side (microcytosis) or to a larger side (macrocytosis), but such an assessment, if it is made without special devices - micrometers - cannot be free from subjectivity. The advantage of an automatic blood test is the standardization of the indicator - RMS. Replacing the color indicator with the RSD indicator does not violate the usual classification of anemia, built on the basis of the color indicator.
Hypochromic (microcytic):
Iron-deficiency anemia
thalassemia
Normochromic (microcytic):
hemolytic anemia (when the rate of destruction of red blood cells exceeds the rate of their production)
post-hemorrhagic (as a result of blood loss due to bleeding or hemorrhage)
neoplastic diseases of the bone marrow
aplastic anemia
extramedullary tumors
anemia due to decreased production of erythropoietin
Hyperchromic (macrocytic):
vitamin B12-deficient anemia
For the first time the word "sociology", denoting the field of scientific knowledge, was introduced into scientific circulation by the French thinker Auguste Comte in his work "Course of Positive Philosophy" (1842). Considering the problems of society and social behavior, he, firstly, raised the motto "Order and Progress" to the shield, where the order was understood by analogy with physics as the symmetry and balance of the structural elements of society (individuals and groups), and progress - as the use of knowledge about society, primarily to solve specific problems.
Secondly, O. Comte believed that sociology should consider society as a kind of organism with its own structure, each element of which should be examined from the point of view of utility for the public good. O. Comte divided all sociology into social statics and social dynamics and allowed the application of the laws of mechanics to the study of society and its basic elements.
In addition, speaking of gaining knowledge about society and the laws of its functioning and development, O. Comte assumed, first of all, the need to study individual social facts, compare and verify them, almost completely denying the role general theory in sociology. Instead of theoretical generalizations of empirical data and their reduction into something whole, the French thinker assumed only a primary generalization and built a picture of society mainly in the form of a mosaic of separate interconnected facts. Such an approach to obtaining and using scientific knowledge is usually qualified as empiricism in sociology.
The historical and scientific role of Auguste Comte lies primarily in the fact that he raised the problem of studying society and the relationships within it within the framework of a separate science, which he called sociology. Unfortunately, O. Comte could not define the subject clearly enough. new science and find scientific method, which allows a comprehensive study of the patterns of social development. His complete analogy of social phenomena with phenomena observed in physics, chemistry and medicine was questioned and criticized already during his lifetime. Even the initial study of society has shown that social life differs to a large extent from the regularities with which the natural sciences deal.
Classical period of development of sociology. Sociology received real development and recognition only when the main scientific concepts were developed and formulated and it became possible to create theoretical foundations study of social phenomena. The honor of the actual "discovery" of sociology belongs to three outstanding thinkers who lived and worked in the period from the middle of the 19th century to the beginning of the 20th century. These are the German scientists Karl Marx and Max Weber, as well as the Frenchman Emile Durkheim.
The work of Karl Marx. Karl Marx (1818-1883) made a significant contribution to the development of sociology. One of his main merits is considered to be the scientific analysis of contemporary capitalist society. As a tool for this analysis, Marx used the class structure of society: all individuals belong to certain social classes, the division into which occurs on the basis of ownership of the means of production and the amount of remuneration received from this ownership. The division into classes is based on inequality, which means that one class (the class of owners of the means of production) is in a better position than the rest, and appropriates part of the results of the work of another class (the working class).
K. Marx considered the structure of society in dynamics, assuming that classes are historically changing components of the social structure. Qualitative changes in the major components of the social structure occur as a result of a change in socio-economic formations. All changes in a society divided into classes are based on the laws of dialectics, on the constant struggle between the classes of the poor, the oppressed and the oppressors.
Marx comprehensively substantiated the mechanism of the emergence and development of social conflict, which occurs as a result of inequality, which is constantly intensifying with the dominance of some classes over others. The struggle of the working class to change the distribution of the product produced leads to the achievement of an unstable equilibrium on the basis of a temporary agreement between the exploiters and the exploited. In the future, contradictions accumulate, which leads to new clashes leading to a new agreement on conditions different from the previous ones. At the same time, there is a quantitative accumulation of discontent among the representatives of the oppressed classes and their awareness of the injustice of their position, and at the same time their strength. All this ultimately causes a global class conflict and the emergence of a new qualitative certainty - a classless society, where the product is distributed fairly and there is no exploitation.
Thus, K. Marx for the first time presented society as a product historical development as a dynamically developing structure. He substantiated the emergence of social inequality and analyzed social conflicts as a phenomenon necessary for social development and progress.
Sociology of Max Weber. The work of Max Weber (1864-1920), a German economist, historian and sociologist, is characterized primarily by deep penetration into the subject of research, the search for initial, basic elements with which one could come to an understanding of the laws of social development. Under the influence of Marx and Nietzsche, Weber nevertheless developed his own sociological theory, which still has a decisive influence on all scientific sociological theories and on the activities of sociologists in all countries of the world.
One of central points Max Weber's theory was the selection by him elementary particle the behavior of an individual in society is a social action that is the cause and effect of a system of complex relationships between people. At the same time, society, according to the teachings of Weber, is a set of acting individuals, each of which, acting, seeks to achieve its own goals. The actions of individual individuals cooperate, and associations (groups or societies) are formed on the basis of this cooperation. Despite their selfish aspirations, people act together because their actions are meaningful, rational, and they understand that individual goals are best achieved through joint action. This understanding comes to them due to the fact that in the course of social practice, unnecessary patterns of behavior are always discarded and only those that can be foreseen, calculated and that bring benefits with the least risk are left. Thus, meaningful behavior resulting in the achievement of individual goals leads to the fact that a person acts as a social being, in association with others, thus achieving significant progress in interaction with the environment.
A very important aspect of Weber's work can be considered his study of basic relations in social associations. This is primarily a relationship of power. Since the organized behavior of individuals, the creation and functioning of institutions is impossible without effective social control and management, a necessary condition for the implementation of such actions are the relations of power that permeate all social structures. Weber analyzed in detail the relations of power, as well as the nature and structure of organizations, where these relations manifest themselves most clearly. He considered bureaucracy as an ideal mechanism for embodying and maintaining relations of power in an organization - an artificially created apparatus for managing an organization, extremely rational, controlling and coordinating the activities of all its employees.
IN theoretical works Max Weber not only clearly defined the subject of sociology as a science, but also laid the foundations for its development both in theoretical and practical terms. Weber's ideas still inspire many sociologists to further theoretical developments, he has many followers, and his books are considered classic examples of scientific research.
Ideas of Emile Durkheim. Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) - founder of the French sociological school. He strove primarily for the autonomy of sociology, the separation of its subject from the subject of other social sciences, and also for the explanation of all phenomena. public life exclusively from a sociological standpoint.
Unlike M. Weber, E. Durkheim believed that society is a supra-individual being, the existence and laws of which do not depend on the actions of individual individuals. Uniting in groups, people immediately begin to obey the rules and norms, which he called "collective consciousness". Each social unit must perform a certain function necessary for the existence of society as a whole. However, the functioning of individual parts of the social whole can be disrupted, and then these parts will be a distorted, poorly functioning form. social organization. Durkheim paid much attention to the study of such forms, as well as types of behavior that deviate from generally accepted rules and norms. The term "anomie" introduced by him into scientific use serves to explain the causes of deviant behavior, defects in social norms, and makes it possible to classify in detail the types of such behavior.
The doctrine of E. Durkheim's society formed the basis of many modern sociological theories and, above all, structural-functional analysis. Numerous followers created Durkheim's sociological school, and modern sociologists rightly recognize Durkheim as a classic in the field of sociology.
Summing up, we can say that the name of the science "sociology" (literally - the science of society), so successfully applied by Auguste Comte, was subsequently saturated with scientific, theoretical content thanks to the works of K. Marx, M. Weber and E. Durkheim. It is as a result of their efforts that sociology has become a science that has its own subject, its own theory, and opportunities for empirical confirmation of various aspects of this theory.
a) electoral
b) scattered
c) distributed
d) all answers are wrong
107. Supporters of ____ believe that all phenomena of attention can be explained by the laws of structural perception:
a) associationism
b) cognitive psychology
c) gestalt psychology
d) psychology of consciousness
108. The concept of "dominant" was introduced into scientific circulation:
a) W. Neisser
b) V.M. Bekhterev
c) A.A. Ukhtomsky
d) P.Ya. Galperin
109. In attention to the line of natural and the line of cultural development, he singled out:
a) L.S. Vygotsky
b) S.Ya. Rubinstein
c) N.F. Dobrynin
d) P.Ya. Galperin
110. In the theory of attention, P.L. Galperin considers it as:
a) a product of the development of external, objective and expanded control activities into an internal, form
b) a mental phenomenon that does not have its own content
c) a phenomenal productive manifestation of the work, the leader, the level of organization of activities
d) all answers are correct
111. The basis for the classification of attention into visual and auditory is:
A ) lead parser
b) subject of reflection
d) nature of connection with practice
112. The criterion for classifying attention into sensory-perceptual, intellectual, motor is:
a) lead analyzer
b) subject of reflection
c) the form of existence of matter
d) nature of connection with practice
