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Sent to the National Library
The Republic of Belarus
ANNOUNCEMENT

To the 20th anniversary of withdrawal
Limited contingent
Soviet troops from Afghanistan

"Lessons of the War in Afghanistan 1979-1989"

Based on an article by retired lieutenant general Viktor Sergeevich Korolev,
former Deputy Commander of the 40th Army for armaments:

“Results and results of the main large-scale operations
combat operations of units and formations of the 40th Army Armed Forces Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the period 1980 - 1989 in Afghanistan"

February 15, 2009 is a memorable event in the history of the Soviet Army and its combat traditions. Twenty years ago at 15:00 - February 15, 1989 - the last soldier of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces (OKSV) in Afghanistan, represented by the Commander of the 40th Army of the Armed Forces of the USSR, Lieutenant General Boris Vsevolodovich Gromov, crossed the bridge over the State Border of the USSR along the Amu Darya River in Hairaton (Republic of Afghanistan) and Termez (USSR).
Thus, the so-called "undeclared war", which lasted a little less than 10 years, ended with the complete withdrawal of formations and units of the 40th Army of the Armed Forces of the USSR from the Republic of Afghanistan.
In total, for the period from December 25, 1979 to February 15, 1989, as part of the Limited Contingent of Soviet troops stationed in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA), later the Republic of Afghanistan (RA), participated in hostilities, their combat support: more than 620 thousand military personnel ( including 62,900 officers); in the operational-maneuverable groups of the border troops, special forces "Cascade", "Omega", units of the KGB of the USSR - more than 90 thousand military personnel; in the formations of the internal troops and the police, in the special forces "Cobalt" of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs - more than 6,000 military personnel.
in positions civilian personnel there were 21 thousand people during this period.
The annual average number of OKSV troops was 80-104 thousand military personnel and 5-7 thousand civilian personnel.

In December 1979, the Supreme Leadership of the Soviet Union decided to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan. At the same time, it was understood that formations and units would be deployed by garrisons near settlements and would take under protection the most important objects and communications in 31 provinces and 290 counties and volosts. The introduction and placement of OKSV in the DRA was carried out from December 25, 1979 to the second half of January 1980.

It included:
Directorate of the 40th Army of the USSR Armed Forces with support and maintenance units;
4 divisions (5th Guards, 108th and 201st Motorized Rifle Divisions (MSD), 103rd Guards Airborne Division (VDD));
6 separate brigades (66th separate motorized rifle brigade, 56th separate air assault brigade, 70th guards separate motorized rifle brigade, 15th and 22nd separate special forces brigades, 278th separate airborne brigade);
4 separate regiments (191st, 682nd, 860th, 373rd separate motorized rifle regiments);
4 regiments of combat front-line aviation (apib, iap, shap);
3 helicopter regiments of army aviation and the 50th mixed aviation regiment;
7 separate helicopter squadrons;
separate pipeline crew;
59th Army Brigade material support;
repair and restoration base and other parts;
institutions of the military construction department.

The term of stay of military personnel in the OKSV was set no more than 2 years - for officers and a year and a half - for soldiers and sergeants of military service.
During this period, more than 32 thousand Belarusians and representatives from the Red Banner Belarusian Military District (KBVO) served in the 40th Army, border troops, the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

During the war of 1979-1989, military units and subunits of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Troops in Afghanistan carried out large-scale peacekeeping and antiterrorist tasks: protecting the population from the threat of continuous incursions by armed opposition detachments; groups of Mujahideen with the aim of destroying the state system; destruction of administrative authorities; the forcible planting of inter-ethnic conflicts and the interception of control of various regions of the territory by centers of influence and power outside the country.

Soviet troops in Afghanistan during the war of 1979 - 1989, in the main composition, carried out tasks to protect the country's strategically important infrastructure facilities: transport and other all types (air, energy, water, highways, mountain passes and trails) communications, objects of Soviet - Afghan cooperation (gas fields, power plants, nitrogen fertilizer plant in Mazar-i-Sharif, etc.). Eight separate security battalions, in the face of incessant shelling and all possible methods of penetration and sorties with the aim of carrying out terrorist attacks, guarded and ensured the functioning of the airfields of large cities (Kabul, Kandahar, Jalalabad, Shindand, Kunduz, Bagram); and also, to cover the State border of the USSR and the border area.

The fulfillment of all the tasks assigned to the Limited Contingent of Soviet Troops in Afghanistan during the war of 1979-1989 was associated with the ultimate strain of the physical and moral forces of the human body in difficult climatic conditions of mountainous and desert areas (daily temperature difference up to 40 degrees, in particular Kandahar and others .) environmental influences. Factors such as: a sharp change in air pressure, the presence of oxygen starvation, dust pollution, daily sandstorms, dangerous infectious diseases (hepatitis, paratyphoid, malaria, dysentery), bites of poisonous insects and snakes, contributed to the acquisition of chronic forms of diseases and irreversible deterioration processes. health (over 70%) of the personnel of OKSV.

The modern armament and equipment of the Mujahideen detachments, the presence in them of trained, trained commanders, units consisting of foreign military specialists, turned the fulfillment by our units of the tasks of escorting, guarding and defending automobile convoys with military and national economic cargo for their own needs in the interests of Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) in a new kind of fighting.

The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan in December 1979 did not lead to a decline in armed confrontation in the country. On the contrary, since the spring of 1980, the activity of armed formations and opposition detachments for control over the country's provinces has intensified.
Thus, the Soviet troops introduced into Afghanistan became involved in an internal military conflict on the side of the Government and the state, headed by the General Secretary of the PDPA B. Karmal.

The stay of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and their combat activities are conditionally divided into four stages for the entire period:

Stage 1 (December 1979 - February 1980). The entry of Soviet troops into the DRA. Successful implementation of the operation "Storm-333" by the operational-combat groups of the KGB and GRU special forces detachments, airborne units: assault on the Taj-Bek Palace, blocking command posts, possible centers of resistance. Making a march by troops, capturing key infrastructure facilities, taking them under control and, in the future, placing units and individual units in garrisons. Organization of protection and defense of points of permanent deployment and strategically important facilities.
In the eastern direction from the city of Kabul to the city of Hairatan, the city of Gardez, the city of Ghazni, the city of Shahdzhoy, the city of Kalat, the city of Jelelabad, Soviet troops were deployed in 134 military camps and at 760 outposts and posts for the protection of the most important objects, airfields and communications.
In the western direction from the city of Kandahar, the city of Lashkargah, the city of Farah and the city of Shindand, the city of Herat, the settlement of Turagundi - the introduced units of the 5th Guards. The Moscow Motor Rifle Division, the 70th Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 22nd Special Forces Brigade were stationed in 45 military camps and carried out security services at 89 outposts (posts).

Stage 2 (March 1980 - April 1985). Conducting active combat operations, carrying out large-scale military operations jointly with Afghan formations and units. Work on the reorganization and strengthening of the Armed Forces of the DRA.
At this stage, 420 large-scale military operations were carried out, which include the most significant military operations carried out in the Panjshir and Andarab gorges and adjacent areas (1980 - 1985); in the green zone of Jabal - Ussaraj, Charikar (Parvan province), Mahmudraki (Kapisa province) - in January-February 1982; in Kandahar in January 1982; in Nijrai district (Kapisa province) in April 1982; in the Lurkoh mountains in December 1984; in Helmand Province, in May 1985; in the provinces of Farah, Baghlan, Kunar, Kapisa - in 1985.
Special forces units and subunits (15th and 22nd Special Forces brigades, operational-combat groups of the Special Forces detachment of the KGB "Kaskad", "Omega" - a total of 9, OBG Special Forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs "Cobalt" - a total of 23) carried out combat missions: destruction detachments, groups of armed rebel formations of the Mujahideen; suppression of the delivery of weapons and ammunition on 96 caravan routes from abroad, in some cases, the supply of drugs; assisting in the creation of state security agencies - Khad (Kaskad detachments), Tsarandoy - the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Cobalt detachment), organizing intelligence and operational work on the ground, conducting special operations; ensuring combat operations and participation in combat operations.

Stage 3 (May 1985 - December 1986). The transition from active combat operations of units and subunits of the OKSV to support of the combat operations of the Afghan troops with the participation of Soviet aviation, artillery and sapper units.
The combat use of Soviet motorized rifle, airborne and tank units, mainly as a reserve and to increase the moral, political and combat stability of the Afghan troops. Units and subunits of special forces (15th and 22nd br. Special Forces) have stepped up combat activity to prevent the delivery of weapons and ammunition from abroad, the supply of drugs. Assistance continued in the creation and equipping of the armed forces of the DRA. In 1986, six tank and anti-aircraft artillery regiments of the 5th Guards were withdrawn to their homeland. msd., 108th msd. and 201st msd., incl. 24th, 285th and 401st tank regiments.
In October 1985, a large series of large-scale military operations of the DRA armed forces was carried out with the active participation of Soviet troops in the provinces of Baghlan, Kapisa and Kunar.
In the province of Herat in 1986, a military operation was carried out, including the defeat of the base - the arsenal of Kakari-Shushari, as well as operations to defeat the base areas and large opposition bases in the provinces of Jowzjan (Darzyab), Nimroz (Rabati-Jali), Ghazni (Iskapol), Kandahar (Islamdad), Paktia (Srana), in the district of Khost (Javida, Lmafhauz), etc.

Stage 4 (January 1987 - February 1989). The participation of Soviet troops in the activities carried out by the Afghan leadership of the policy of national reconciliation (PNP). Continued full-scale support for the combat activities of the Afghan troops. Preparation of Soviet troops for the return to their homeland and the implementation of their complete withdrawal.

Thousands of Soviet soldiers during the course of hostilities in large-scale military operations, attacks and shelling of outposts and columns during the years of this war showed examples of courage and courage, performed feats, remaining known only to a small number of fellow witnesses of the events, sometimes due to the death of heroes.

For courage and personal bravery shown in carrying out the tasks assigned to the Soviet troops during the war of 1979-1989 on the soil of Afghanistan, 86 servicemen were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
Of these: soldiers of the airborne troops - 16, air force pilots - 20, soldiers of the ground forces - 30 and soldiers of the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs - 14; awarded the Order of Lenin to the servicemen of the Soviet Army - 103 and the Orders of the Red Banner - 1972.
In total, 200,153 military personnel from the OKSV were awarded state awards in Afghanistan, including 10,955 awarded posthumously. .h. 1350 - women.

State awards of the Soviet Union for the entire period of the presence of OKSV in Afghanistan were awarded to more than 9,200 servicemen from Belarus and representatives of the Red Banner Belarusian Military District.

During the periods of military operations during the war of 1979 - 1989, sabotage and shelling, the performance of other tasks by units and subunits of the OKSV, 13833 military personnel from the 40th Army, KGB officers and border guards - 589, employees of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs - 28 were killed. advisers, specialists and translators of the Soviet army in the formations and units of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Afghanistan died - 180.
The greatest losses with the death of Soviet soldiers occur in 1982, when 1948 soldiers and officers died, in 1984 - 2343 soldiers and officers, and in 1985 - 1686 soldiers and officers.
Among the dead, 771 servicemen were natives of Belarus and representatives of the Red Banner Belarusian Military District (KBVO).

23,258 soldiers and officers received combat wounds, 22,939 soldiers and officers received injuries and injuries, 404,464 military personnel acquired diseases.

6669 soldiers and officers became disabled, including 1st group - 1479 soldiers and officers, 2nd group - 4331 soldiers and officers and 3rd group - 859 soldiers and officers. 38,614 servicemen and officers were returned to service after treatment - 6,194.

Among the awarded Belarusian soldiers and graduates of the Red Banner Belarusian Military District participating in the 40th Army, 2235 military personnel were awarded military orders, 252 soldiers were awarded orders twice and 23 soldiers received awards three times and four times.
Eight servicemen - Belarusians and pupils of the Red Banner Belarusian Military District - were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, including Lieutenant General Gromov B.V., commander of the 40th Army. Among those awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union are I.P. Barchukov, V.V. Pimenov, A.A. Melnikov, N.P. Chepik, V.V. Shcherbakov, E.I. Zelnyakov, F.I. Pugachev, S.A. Filipchenko. 906 servicemen from the Republic of Belarus were awarded the medal "For Courage".

Representatives of Belarus bravely fought on the battlefields during the hostilities, sparing neither their blood nor even their lives in the name of achieving the goal and success in battle.
Posthumously, among them, the orders of Lenin and the Red Star were awarded to Lieutenant Colonel Ferko A.S. from Bobruisk, captain Tatur G.A. from Karelich (awarded 2 orders of the Red Star), Captain Sechko G.A. was posthumously awarded the Order of Lenin. from Luban.

Orders of the Red Banner were awarded posthumously to scout soldiers from Belarus - officers Tropashko Yu.K. from Grodno, Styrov V.V. (KBVO), Spelov S.Yu. (KBVO), Major Slizh V.M. from Volozhin, Skakun S.V. from Minsk, Sidorovich V.P. from Dzerzhinsk. I would like to mention such soldiers who were awarded the Order of the Red Star and medals "For Courage", "For Military Merit". These are our countrymen: Private Serafimovich from Borisov, Private Semenits from Zhlobin, Private Rizmont and others who laid down their lives on Afghan soil.

Recently, a mania has appeared among veterans to attach Soviet orders illegally, including by former Afghan soldiers, without certificates corresponding to the Law for the right to wear them.

On February 15, 1989, after the completion of the withdrawal of the 40th Army of the OKSV, 334 military personnel were wanted, of which: 316 were missing, 18 were interned in other countries, 50 were in opposition detachments, and captured by the Mujahideen - 39, returned to their homeland - 17, refused to return to their homeland - 6 people.
Among the missing are natives of Belarus - private Belitsky V.A., (from Minsk), lieutenant Babilo M.M. (from Grodno), private Buza A.A. (from Baranovichi), private Durnev N.A. (from the village of Uzda), Lieutenant Evtukhovich O.A., Captain Kulazhenko G.I. (from Minsk), Private Zverkovich A.A. (from Minsk), Private Kozlov A.D. (from the city of Glusk), private Lavidenko V.E. (from the city of Rossony), Private Lopukh A.A. (from the city of Baranovichi), Private Pikhach V.V. (Nesvizh district), private Sinyak M.V. (from Minsk), Private Talashkevich A.A. (from Pruzhany), etc.
In the course of joint large-scale military operations for the period 1980 - 1988. the total combat losses of the Afghan army amounted to 26,595 military personnel, and 28,002 people were missing.
For nine years, 285,541 servicemen have deserted from the Afghan army.
During the same period, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Afghanistan lost: tanks - 362 units, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, BRDM - 804 units, guns and mortars - 750 barrels, vehicles - 4199 units, aircraft - 120 units, helicopters - 169 units.
In the composition of the OKSV in 1988, taking into account the withdrawn tank and anti-aircraft regiments in 1986, the main types of weapons and equipment in units and formations, there were: tanks - T-62D and T-62 mr - up to 590 units; BMP-1 and BMP-2 - from 1300 units. up to 1150 units, wheeled armored personnel carriers (BTR-70 and BTR-80) - from 2650 units. up to 2345 units; cars of all types, caterpillar tractors - from 19,500 units. up to 16,450 units; D-30 guns - from 300 units. up to 320 units, self-propelled guns 122-mm 2S1 "Carnation" - from 196 units. up to 86 units; 152 mm 2S3 "Acacia" - up to 54 units, 120 mm 2S9 "Nona-S" - 70 units, 152-mm guns - 2A36 (2S5) "Hyacinth" - 60 units; MLRS "Grad-1" - 122 mm and 240 mm - 120 units; anti-aircraft weapons - 235 units; aircraft - 118 units, helicopters -332 units.
Our losses of weapons and equipment were: tanks - 147 units, armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, BRDM - 1314 units, guns and mortars - 433 units.

Thanks to the achievement of a high political and moral state of the troops, coordinated efforts in command and control of the troops by commanders, headquarters, political workers of units and subunits, taking into account the staffing of the OKSV troops, mainly with all types of weapons and equipment, uninterrupted supply of units and subunits with ammunition and stocks of material and technical means , timely restoration and return to service of previously damaged and faulty equipment with positive results, all planned military operations and other measures were carried out in order to fulfill large-scale peacekeeping tasks to protect strategically important infrastructure of the Republic of Afghanistan, prevent mass deaths of civilians in the course of confrontation with armed groups and formations opposition.

Successful organization of the participation of Soviet troops in the activities of the national reconciliation policy of the Government of the Republic of Afghanistan in relation to the situation and national characteristics of the country, the best practices of the OKSV Command in planning and directing the combat operations of entrusted units and subunits, based on the military experience of the defenders of our Fatherland, combat coordination of troops and personal example helped save a lot of people.
The following generals and officers of the 40th Army, divisions and brigades distinguished themselves: Yu.V. Tukharinov, B.M. Tkach, N.G. Ter-Grigoryants, V.M. Mironov, Yu.V. Shatalin, I.F. Ryabchenko, E.V. Vysotsky, V.F. Ermakov, A.E. Slyusar, L.E. Generalov, S.P. Seleznev, V.G. Vinokurov, M.N. Rodionov, A.I. Sergeev, G.P. Kasperovich, V.P. Dubynin, Yu.P. Grekov, V.N. Shekhovtsev, B.V. Gromov, G.G. Kondratiev, P.S. Grachev, V.I. Isaev, N.P. Pischev, A.G. Sheenkov, V.V. Ruzlyaev, V.M. Barynkin, V.A. Loginov, A.V. Uchkin, V.A. Vostrotin and others. The 40th Army was successfully commanded by the commanders - Generals Yu.V. Tukharinov, B.I. Tkach, V.F. Ermakov, L.E. Generalov, I.N. Rodionov, V.P. Dubynin, B.V. Gromov.
Most Active participation in planning and conducting joint and independent operations of the Afghan troops, the chief military advisers in the Armed Forces of Afghanistan received army generals: A.M. Mayorov; G.I. Salmanov; M.I. Sorokin, colonel generals: V.A. Vostrov; MM. Sotskov, as well as others, generals and officers of the advisory apparatus in the armed forces, the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In particular, generals T.I. Shkidchenko and N.A. Vlasov. A great deal of work to maintain weapons and military equipment in combat readiness of the OKSV troops was carried out by the deputy commanders of the 40th Army for armaments, representatives of the Red Banner Belarusian Military District, generals: G.V. Zhuravel; P.S. Creanga; S.A. Maev; V.S. Korolev (author of the article).
In providing the need for material reserves of the army troops and clear planning of logistics support, the logistics generals V.I. took an active part. Isakov, A.M. Zhukov, V.A. Vasenin, A.A. Moskovchenko, who arrived in the 40th Army from the Red Banner Belarusian Military District.
In the period 1986 - 1989. the head of the Representation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR in Afghanistan was our countryman - Belarusian General V.D. Yegorov, officers - Belarusians of the advisory apparatus of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, now generals of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Lazebnik V.M., Cherginets N.I. - enjoyed great authority of influence in the troops. and others.
Between May and September 1983, units and subunits of the 40th Army carried out 12 planned and 10 unscheduled combat operations, set up 2,800 ambushes and implemented 198 intelligence, as a result of which 17,632 rebels were destroyed and 4,334 units were captured. small arms, 98 units. DShK machine guns, 129 RPG grenade launchers, 79 mortars. During the same period, the Mujahideen carried out: 103 shelling of convoys and 116 shelling of deployment points; produced 98 explosions on mines.
Our losses amounted to: killed - 491 military personnel, wounded - 1182 military personnel, including 179 officers.
From May to September 22, 1984, 22 planned and 19 unscheduled operations were carried out, 248 intelligence data were implemented with 2084 ambushes, including 181 effective ones (8% of the total).
During the conduct of hostilities, the rebels were destroyed - 18184, 3839 barrels of small arms, 146 DShK machine guns, 101 grenade launchers, 48 ​​mortars, 46 recoilless rifles, about 2 million units were captured. ammunition.
During this period, the rebels carried out sabotage attacks on convoys - 81, attacks on deployment points - 96, and 53 mine explosions were also carried out. At the same time, the losses of our troops amounted to 886 servicemen killed, including 111 officers and 1958 servicemen wounded, including 233 officers.
The 40th Army of the USSR Armed Forces during the winter period of 1984-1985 carried out: 10 planned, 3 unscheduled and 19 private operations with combat operations, 120 combat exits for the implementation of intelligence, set up 1460 ambushes. At the same time, 7890 rebels, 198 caravans were destroyed, guns and mortars - 38, rocket launchers - 16, RPGs - 119, MANPADS - 7, DShK and ZPU machine guns - 79, small arms - 1744 barrels were captured.
About 12,000 ammunition for heavy weapons and RPGs, more than 3,000,000 rounds of ammunition, 4,130 engineering mines, and 5 tons of explosives were seized from more than 100 warehouses.
However, despite the significant damage inflicted on the Mujahideen as a result of the joint actions of the 40th Army and the Armed Forces of the DRA, their activity, numbers and influence in most provinces of the country did not decrease. If in 1981 the Mujahideen detachments were 30,000 rebels, then in 1983 - about 40,000 rebels, and in 1985 - over 50,000 rebels.
The main reason for this situation was the decrease in the effectiveness of military operations, complacency among a certain part of the OKSV Command and the RA Armed Forces, underestimation of the operational situation and serious systemic omissions in the preparation and management of units during military operations by the command staff of formations and units.
Every officer knows that political (information) work in the troops plays a leading role in the management of military units, reveals the spirit of a warrior, his face, intentions and goals of the war.
Individual commanders who do not own a comprehensive system of training and training of personnel for combat operations, based on the method of combat coordination, ignored the combat experience of our fathers and grandfathers, obtained by blood and sweat over more than a thousand-year history of the Fatherland. The requirements of the combat manuals of the USSR Armed Forces were strict real rules of war and met modern laws of warfare, made it possible to flexibly use their individual provisions in combination with the real situation to organize the training and control of units in the entire range of tasks assigned to units and subunits of the OKSV in Afghanistan.

The combat experience gained in the war in Afghanistan in 1979-1989 only supplements the Combat Manuals of the armies of the countries of the Collective Security Treaty Organization - the national treasure of our Fatherland, fills the military strategy "the science of winning" with advanced combinations of modern methods and techniques of warfare in modern conditions.
Appearance as part of the military confrontation a large number mobile assault units for special purposes, the use of the same type of old and new weapons, mine-sabotage weapons, man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), automatic grenade launchers (AGS), laser sights and guidance systems, the latest communication and command and control systems, high technologies in equipment , medical support, predetermined the merger of combat tactics of foreign armies.
During the war in Afghanistan of 1979-1989, a new practice, little known to the world community, of conducting full-scale combat operations by mobile assault detachments arose in the conditions of a military, armed confrontation of a focal nature, the enemy could suddenly appear anywhere and anytime.
In the world theory and practice of preparing and waging war, military operations, there have been qualitative changes in the operational art and tactics of combat operations of units of foreign armies due to their rearmament, which led to the rapid development of the tactics of small units of all countries of the world.
These circumstances have fully affected the equipment, training and combat capabilities of the armed opposition groups of the Republic of Afghanistan.

Unfortunately, the High Command of the USSR Armed Forces in a number of issues of equipping our units with everything necessary, including the use of the latest models of weapons, communications, medical support, equipment for their combat operations in Afghanistan, ignored the requirements of the situation of the significantly increased combat capabilities of the armed formations of the Mujahideen , the presence of trained military specialists in their composition, the conditions of a mountainous desert area, a hot climate with large daily temperature differences.

Infectious diseases departments of medical institutions were staffed with 85% of regular positions. The level of training of the vast majority of infectious disease doctors was very low. Of the 56 specialists from among the OKSV officers, only 5 people had sufficient qualifications for independent work in medical institutions and were practically not able to qualitatively conduct intensive care of patients with emergency conditions.

In 1983, there were 32,097 cases of infectious diseases among the personnel of the OKSV in conditions of overloading medical institutions with typhoid patients, weakened and emaciated, with risk factors for complications and requiring intensive care. Among them prevailed:
viral hepatitis A - 15,221 cases;
typhoid fever and paratyphoid fever - 4,349 cases;
acute dysentery - 1,119 cases;
enterocolitis - 4 362 cases.
In 1984, the number of patients with typhoid fever was three times more, acute dysentery and enterocolitis - twice as much.
Nosological forms of diseases:
typhoid fever - 1983 - 42.3%, 1984 - 47.2%;
acute dysentery - 1983 - 20.4%, 1984 - 21%;
enterocolitis - 3.3%.

Mortality, deaths from infectious diseases in 1983 amounted to 0.28% and mainly accounted for typhoid fever. Almost all cases of late hospitalization were associated with the participation of patients in hostilities, being in columns.
The main complaints of the personnel were: shortness of breath - 80%, lack of appetite - 44%, dizziness and weakness, gastrointestinal upset - 30%, stomach pain - 12%, decreased visual acuity and hearing - 12%, bleeding from the nose - 10%, resting tachycardia - up to 100 heart beats per minute, mood instability.
A decrease in physical and mental performance was observed in all personnel. With obvious signs of various pathologies, there were constantly cases of removal of personnel from participation in a combat operation and hospitalization. A big problem was the development of underweight in the vast majority of personnel (45-50% of the total number of those examined).

Medical standards were developed to overcome combat stress and fatigue against the background of inadequate nutrition and limited water consumption. Thus, the duration of military operations in the mountains was not more than 7-10 days, a series of operations should not exceed 2.5 months. The duration of rest after the operation was to be at least 1.2 times the duration of the operation. The OKSV command formed requirements for the prevention of climate impacts in mountainous desert areas. Particular attention was paid to measures to restore the functions of thermoregulation, so, in the daytime, the rate of water consumption was from 4 to 10 liters per day. This explained many cases of disorders of the gastrointestinal tract, diseases of enterocolitis, especially in units located in the districts of Kandahar province. The personnel had prolonged and persistent diarrhea for 2-3 months after their arrival in Afghanistan.
The personnel of the units and divisions of the OKSV were exposed to a complex of negative environmental factors, the main of which is high air temperature. The influence of this factor was exacerbated by constant combat stress.
At officers, constantly participating in hostilities, there was a high physical and neuropsychic overwork, a significant decrease in working capacity. The state of nutrition of various age groups was generally assessed as satisfactory, lack of body weight was detected in 15% - 20% of officers of motorized rifle units.

Special requirements for the equipment of personnel in the conditions of mountainous desert terrain had a significant discrepancy with the actual equipment of the units. The following was found:
all types of uniforms were subjected to increased wear;
the forced use in the daytime of elements of uniforms that provide ventilation to the surface of the human body, and at night the forced insulation from hypothermia rendered useless wadded jackets and blankets, constantly transported, carried with them in combat operations in the mountains.
The duffel bag used by personnel is inconvenient, made it difficult to move in the mountains, unmasked personnel in combat operations, made it difficult to move, and is subject to frequent fabric tears.
Shoes in the form of boots with elongated leggings generally satisfied the personnel, however, after overcoming ditches, boots, after getting into water and mud, greatly contributed to abrasions of the legs.
The steel helmet (helmet) had a number of significant drawbacks; among the personnel, its restrained use was noted, which led to dangerous wounds to the head. Its disadvantages:
sun glare, extreme heat and solar thermal shock;
low bullet resistance;
unreliable attachment to the head.
Bulletproof vests were used by personnel in a differentiated way. The most common was the standard bulletproof vest B 2. Characteristic disadvantages:
getting wet clothes under body armor in hot weather, provoking heat stroke;
at night - hypothermia, with the initiation of colds.
In the units and subunits of the OKSV, performing combat missions in mountainous areas, there was practically no mountain equipment.
The equipment of the personnel of the units and subunits of the OKSV did not meet the requirements of the theater of operations and the combat situation.
The inspection groups of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, which performed the tasks of tracking and monitoring the support and participation in hostilities of units and subunits of the OKSV, were repeatedly, in a harsh form, made proposals by the officers of the OKSV:
on the use of camouflage uniforms;
on the use of shoes with ventilation holes on the inside, special materials for mountain shoes, removable anti-mine insoles;
on the use of a cover for a steel helmet (helmet) of different colors;
on strengthening the protection of the steel helmet;
on the use of climatic special elements of clothing;
on the use of a removable body armor cover (bra for automatic magazines) with patch pockets for storing and carrying ammunition and food, drinking water containers, first-aid kits;
on the use of a removable cover of a bulletproof vest of a modular type, with the use of additional thermal protection of arms and legs with equipment for transportation in case of injury;
on the use of a medical officer's bag in the form of a paratrooper's knapsack;
about the use of bandages with camouflage colors to reduce the likelihood of repeated hits.
The wounded, who received bullet wounds from modern powerful small arms, are overwhelmingly heavy, have a frightening appearance on the battlefield and give the impression of hopelessness. Loss of consciousness, pain shock, closed brain injuries were observed in every third wounded. The wounded in the maxillofacial region were especially difficult to provide medical care, which accounted for 9.6% in the general structure of all gunshot wounds.
According to the nature of the injuries, the injuries of the personnel were approximately distributed:
penetrating wounds - 47%;
blind wounds - 53%;
tangents - 3.3%, of which combined - 43%.
Of great difficulty were the maxillofacial wounded with combined injuries of the skull and brain. Leading in frequency and severity were bullet wounds, the pronounced severity of gunshot and shrapnel injuries was due to the significantly increased power of small arms, the massive use of mines.

Wounded with general disorders, loss of consciousness, shock, head trauma, as a rule, are the reason for the impossibility of a quick recovery and return to duty, in about 30 cases out of 100.

The command of the Turkestan military district, studying in detail the episodes of the combat activities of the troops, established examples of negligence, dishonesty of individual officials in organizing the preparation and equipping of units for combat operations, which subsequently led to the lack of results of military operations, failures in suppressing ambush actions of Mujahideen detachments, senseless death of people.
So, the fighting in the province of Parwan, conducted by Lieutenant Colonel A.V. Zinevich in the period from December 18 to 26, 1984 were unorganized, poorly managed. The units were ambushed after escorting an Afghan convoy to Pishgor. As a result, 5 soldiers were killed and 33 wounded.
In the period from December 5 to December 14, 1984, during the hostilities, under the leadership of the commander of the 682nd OMSP, 7 soldiers were killed, 29 soldiers were injured, and a SU-25 aircraft was shot down. For four days, the units could not get out of the shelling of the rebels, but the command of the 108th Motor Rifle Division and the 40th Army organized practically no support for the units and did not provide any assistance to the commanders in directing combat operations.
There are plenty of such facts and examples of superficiality, disorganization, and sometimes negligence in the conduct of hostilities. This was revealed during the fighting in Pechdara by the 2nd Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 149th Motorized Rifle Division of the 201st Motorized Rifle Division and the 350th Infantry Regiment of the 103rd Airborne Division, where there were heavy losses in personnel.
The rebels, using mine-explosive methods in ambush actions, carried out acts of intimidation and sabotage to destroy the population and villages, personnel and equipment of Soviet units and subunits on the roads and routes of movement of OKSV troops in the gorges. As a rule, attacks and shelling were carried out at the moments of the return of units and subunits from the places of hostilities, when the fatigue of the personnel affected, vigilance was dulled.
In addition, most of the officers from regiments and battalions who arrived in Afghanistan according to the plan of the second or third replacement, who had previously served in the internal districts of the Soviet Union, arrived mainly from reduced and cropped (without personnel) units, therefore they did not have management experience regular units, sufficient skills in organizing interaction with units and subunits of the RA Armed Forces, were not able to set tasks for attached aviation and artillery units.
So, when carrying out joint operation in the Panjshir Gorge on April 30, 1984, as a result of a negligent attitude to the performance of his official duty in a combat situation, the commander of the 285th tank regiment of the 108th motorized division, Lieutenant Colonel Suman P.R. the first battalion of this regiment was ambushed, suffered heavy losses as a result of the battle - 53 servicemen were killed, including 12 officers, and 58 were wounded.
In the rear of this battalion there were units of the RA government troops, which could support the actions of this battalion and change the course of the fire confrontation, but the lack of initiative actions of the commander of the Afghan unit contributed to the execution of the personnel of the Soviet battalion by the rebels.
For negligence in the performance of their duties, Lieutenant Colonel Suman P.R. was removed from his post and sent to the troops of the KBVO, from where he had previously arrived on a planned replacement.

For personal irresponsibility in the management of their units in the performance of assigned tasks during the hostilities in Afghanistan, which led to unjustified losses of personnel, 8 officers were previously removed from command of the regiments, including the notorious commander of the 860th Omsp L.Ya. Rokhlin, who was removed from his post in April 1983 for significant losses of personnel, and then sent to the city of Ghazni as deputy commander of the 191st Omsp. L.Ya. Rokhlin held this position until January 1984, and then was reinstated as commander of this regiment, after the removal of the former commander V.I. Golunov, who was put on trial for cowardice, for having left his subordinates to perish, he alone fled in a helicopter, leaving the command post of the regiment. For unjustified losses of personnel during the hostilities, the commander of the "SpN" brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Yu.A. Sapalov, who was also seconded to the KBVO, was removed from his post.
In the tactics of the actions of our troops, elements of military cunning and measures to misinform the enemy were not sufficiently applied. Active reconnaissance and combat operations at night by some combat units and subunits during certain periods of the war were not planned and were not conducted.
In the Kunar operation, which took place in December 1984, in May - June 1985, throughout the gorge from the city of Jalalabad to the city of Barikot (at a distance of 170 kilometers), when units and subunits of the OKSV troops numbering more than 11,000 were parachuted during the operation people, there were still serious shortcomings and omissions in command and control.
The reasons for the low results of the combat operations of units and subunits were the insufficient command training of officers, the lack of real experience of combined arms commanders in managing attached and supporting forces and means, setting tasks for attached aviation and artillery to strike and fire.
Many commanders and officers who arrived as a replacement from the Union, from units of reduced and cadre personnel, absolutely did not know and did not represent the methods and methods of action of the rebellious armed formations, did not follow their development, the rapid change in the situation. Even then, many officers began to think that in our army, with the possible exception of paratroopers and special forces, there was not enough professionalism in military affairs.
The overall results of the conduct of hostilities by reconnaissance and special forces units for the entire period of the war are well known: more than 70% of positive results with a ratio of 5% in terms of strength to the entire OKSV.

The main methods of action of the rebels were: shelling the location of troops and settlements from heavy weapons (rockets); attacks on posts (outposts), small garrisons of government troops; ambush, mining, sabotage at national economic facilities and sabotage and terrorist acts against government officials and military personnel; mine-blasting actions to disrupt transportation on the main communications of the country.

In 1985, the OKSV troops lost 1868 servicemen in the Republic of Afghanistan (irretrievable losses). Of these: combat losses - 1552 military personnel (including 240 officers), 1194 died in battle (including 202 officers), 358 military personnel died from combat wounds (including 33 officers).
Among the irretrievable losses are also non-combat losses - 316 servicemen (died from diseases - 62, died in car accidents - 45, from careless handling of weapons - 65, suicides - 59, died and died for other reasons - 85). In addition, 36 servicemen were captured by the rebels, 37 were missing. 72nd paragraph of the 8th infantry division, which carried out the withdrawal of units that performed the task of defense from sections of the road, from positions - "blocks". The battalion of the regiment left the encirclement, but 60 people were captured.

The main objects of sabotage were: power lines; government agencies; industrial and agricultural facilities. On June 13, 1985, a sabotage was committed at the Shindand airbase, as a result of which 19 combat aircraft (13 MIG-21 units, 6 Su-17 units) were blown up on the ground from the Afghan Air Force and 17 aircraft were damaged. A group of traitorous soldiers and officers of the RA Armed Forces was identified and rendered harmless at the airfield of Shindanda city, 31 servicemen were arrested, incl. 13 officers.

The rebels used the following methods of terror: killing or capturing officials, arson and robbery, mining buses with magnetic mines; the use of vehicles filled with explosives; the use of children and teenagers to place mines on cars of officials; using pets to deliver explosives.
Soviet and Afghan aircraft and helicopters were constantly fired upon from MANPADS on their flight routes. MANPADS of the Stinger and Bluepipe types were used. Special groups with MANPADS were sent to the airfield areas to destroy aircraft during takeoff and landing. Characteristically, 50% of aviation losses occurred in the protected areas of airfields.
In April 1987, the rebels were armed with 341 MANPADS, including 47 Stinger MANPADS, which, compared to 1986, doubled the number of MANPADS. The number of launches of MANPADS on planes and helicopters of Soviet and Afghan aviation has sharply increased. So, if in 1984 there were 62 launches of MANPADS, in 1985 - 141 launches, then in 1986 - 847 launches (26 aircraft and helicopters were shot down). For three months in 1987, 86 launches of MANPADS were made (18 air targets were shot down).
In 1981-1983, the number of active units of the Mujahideen in Afghanistan was about 45,000 people. In 1986, the Mujahideen numbered 150,000.
By this time, the combined Afghan-Soviet grouping of troops operating in Afghanistan had reached a strength of approximately 400,000 military personnel, of which the Soviet troops were about 100,000 soldiers and officers. They reliably controlled more than 20% of the country's territory.

The cities and the main highways connecting them remained under government control. The vast majority of rural areas were under increasing control of the Islamic committees and Mujahideen.

Since the beginning of 1986, the command of the OKSV has taken a number of organizational measures with the task of strengthening the system of independent control of formations and units of the military leadership of the RA Armed Forces, solving problems on its own in confronting opposition armed formations.
Thus, in 1986, a military operation was carried out to defeat the Mujahideen transshipment base of Javara "Wolf Pit" in the Khost district, where, in accordance with the plan of the operation, 54 Afghan battalions, artillery units and the RA Air Force participated under the leadership of the commander of the 3rd Army Corps, Major General I. A. Delaware. However, the operation was in jeopardy due to the low combat readiness of the units. The command of the OKSV was forced to bring into combat operations some units and subunits of the Soviet troops (5 battalions) under the leadership of the chief of staff of the army, Major General Yu.P. Grekov. Additionally, from April 5 to April 9, 4 Soviet battalions were landed at the Khost airfield to help the units and subunits of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia. However, this did not help either.
After undermining the base structures and special mines, by the end of April 22, government troops were withdrawn from the combat area and, angry with failure, being demoralized, engaged in robbery. From the city of Javara, government troops took three tanks, four armored personnel carriers, 23 guns and mortars, 60 DShK and ZPU machine guns and 45 MANPADS to Khost.

Detachments and groups of armed formations of the opposition were armed with small arms and heavy weapons, the weight characteristics of which made it possible to transport them with pack animals and carry them disassembled.
Most of the weapons of the armed forces of the opposition were Soviet-made. The main type of small arms was the Kalashnikov assault rifle of Chinese and Egyptian production, as well as Soviet ones obtained through third countries or obtained in battle. When seizing the warehouses of the rebels, there were American M16A1 rifles, West German, Israeli, British and Swedish-made machine guns.
The Mujahideen were armed with and widely used: Chinese-made heavy machine guns DShK caliber 12.7 mm, AK-47 assault rifles and Kalashnikov machine guns caliber 7.62 mm, anti-tank grenade launchers RPG-2, RPG-7, Swiss-made RPG "Folsknet", German - "Lyantse - 2", American - "M72A", French - "Sarpak", Israeli - "Piquet"; Chinese, Pakistani and American 75 mm and 82 mm recoilless rifles.
Massive fire weapons were 60 mm and 82 mm mortars, which almost every armed group of rebels had. Since the beginning of 1984, the Mujahideen had Chinese PU RS (launchers) for firing rockets, which were used in the shelling of outposts and garrisons of Afghan administrative centers.

Large-caliber machine guns, anti-aircraft mountain installations (ZGU), Oerlikon small-caliber anti-aircraft guns were used as air defense systems, since 1981 - portable anti-aircraft missile systems (MANPADS) "Strela-2" of Soviet, Chinese and Egyptian production, "Red - Ai", "Jevelyn", later appeared the English "Blowpipe", the American "Stinger".
The rebels were armed with various types of mines, including anti-tank (PTM) and anti-personnel (PPM), as well as land mines. Most of them were in the detachments operating near communications. These were Italian mines (TS-1; TS-2.5; TS-1.6; TS-50; SH-55), American (M-19, M 18A-1, DCME-C Claymore), Swedish M-102 and English MK-7, in small quantities Czechoslovak Soviet origin.
The most widely used mines in a plastic case, which exploded (triggered) after a few clicks on the cover and are poorly detected by mine detectors, as well as land mines and land mines with remote control, radio-controlled mines.
Detachments and groups were controlled using HF, VHF, Japanese, West German, Chinese, Soviet (R-105 M, R-118 BM, R-118 BMZ) radio communications.

The main principles of managing the combat operations of the rebels were:
avoid direct clashes with superior forces of regular troops;
not to turn military operations into a positional war, to refuse to hold the occupied areas for a long time;
to attack suddenly, to widely use the tactics of the "Basmachi" movement, as well as terror and indoctrination of the personnel of the Afghan army and the population.
Armed confrontation was conditionally divided into three stages:
1. Organized with an inactive form of hostilities, holding individual points and areas, conducting extensive agitation and propaganda activities among the population and attracting it to its side.
2. Increasing the activity of hostilities due to sabotage and terrorist attacks, raids on garrisons and posts of government troops, attacks on columns; the main goal is to seize weapons, ammunition and various logistical means.
3. Complete and widespread destruction of the enemy.
In the period from January 1 to June 15, 1987, government troops completed 31 combat missions, including 17 joint missions and 14 independent missions.
Results:
rebels killed - 3096, captured - 60;
44 RS launchers, 53 mortars, AZGU-1650 units, 56 DShK machine guns, 29 RPGs, more than 1200 units were destroyed. small arms, 1149 RS, 624 mortars;
13 RS launchers, 21 mortars, 15 BOs, 10 ZGUs, 7 units were captured. MANPADS;
58 land mines, 751 anti-tank mines, 434 APMs were removed.
The tasks assigned to the troops during the military operations in the provinces of the Republic of Armenia in 1987 were achieved with the greatest result:
joint - Kandahar city (February, May, June), prov. Nangarhar (April), Kabul (May), Prov. Lagman (May);
independent - Herat city (May), prov. Bugman (May).
During the hostilities, 46 villages were liberated.
The losses of the Afghan army amounted to:
a) in terms of personnel: 370 servicemen were killed, 1232 were wounded;
b) armament and equipment: 20 tanks; 2 infantry fighting vehicles; 23 armored personnel carriers; 4 BRDM; 7 guns; 15 mortars; 14 PGI; 4 DShK; 15 machine guns; 1998 small arms; 108 cars; 9 aircraft; 15 helicopters.
Soviet troops during this period conducted 8 joint military operations:
1. "Shkval" - in the province of Kandahar (pass, Shinarai base). In the period from February 4 to March 11, by the forces of: 5th Motor Rifle Division (3 battalions); 70th Omsbr (1 battalion); 45th OISP (1 battalion) together with the 7th Infantry Division (2 battalions); 7th brigade (2 battalions), 506th brigade (2 battalions, battalion of small and medium-sized regiments).
Only 12 battalions.
Head - Major General Yu.P. Greeks.
2. "Strike" - in the province of Kunduz (Madras region), in the period from February 16 to February 23, 1987, by the forces of: 201st Motor Rifle Division (4 battalions) together with the 20th Infantry Division; a separate battalion of the MGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
Only 8 battalions.
Head - Colonel V.N. Shekhovtsov.
3. "Thunderstorm" - in the province of Ghazni (Piadada base area) from March 2 to March 21, 1987, by forces: 56th odshbr (2 battalions), 19th OMSP (2 battalions) together with 14 infantry divisions; 38th odshbr; separate battalion of the MGB, about the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
Only 10 battalions.
4. "Circle" - in the provinces of Kabul, Lagar (Jigdalai district), 64 kilometers west of Jalalabad, from March 8 to March 21, 1987, by the forces of: 108th Motor Rifle Division (2 battalions); 103rd airborne division (3 battalions); 66th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2 battalions) together with the 11th Infantry Division (2 battalions); 8th infantry division (3 battalions); orb 1 ak, 2nd about the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 2nd about the MGB.
A total of 19 battalions.
Head - Major General G.G. Kondratiev.
5. In the province of Herat (west of the outskirts of Herat) from April 11 to 21, 1987, by the forces of the 5th Motor Rifle Division (4 battalions) together with the 17th Infantry Division (4 battalions); 145th brigade (3 battalions); about the Ministry of Internal Affairs and about the MGB.
A total of 13 battalions.
Head - Major General A.V. Uchkin.
6. "Spring" - in the province of Kabul (the base area of ​​Kuhi-Sofi). 234 kilometers northwest of the settlement Surubi; Chakaray base area, 30 kilometers southeast of Kabul from April 12 to April 24, 1987, by forces: 108th Motor Rifle Division (3 battalions), 103rd Airborne Division (3 battalions) together with the 8th Infantry Division (5 battalions); orb 1 ak, 61st opp (2 battalions); about the MGB, about the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
A total of 16 battalions.

7. "Volley" - in the provinces of Lagar, Paktia, Kabul (the base area of ​​​​Hisarak, Azrats, the area of ​​\u200b\u200bMount Noray, Aliheil), from May 20, 1987 to early June 1987, by forces: 108th Motor Rifle Division (3 battalions); 103rd airborne division (3 battalions); 66th Omsb (2 battalions); 56th brigade (2 battalions); 345th OPDP (2 battalions) together with the 8th Infantry Division (5 battalions); 11th Infantry Division, 12th Infantry Division (6 battalions), 14 Infantry Division (5 battalions); about the MGB (2 battalions), about the Ministry of Internal Affairs (2 battalions).
A total of 25 battalions.
Head - Major General V.P. Dubynin.
8. "South-87" - in the province of Kandahar ("green zone" of the Arghandab River) since May 25, 1987 - by the forces of the 5th Motor Rifle Division (3 battalions); 70th Omsbr (2 battalions); 191st OMSP (2 battalions); 3rd Omsb, 22nd Special Forces Brigade, together with the 7th Infantry Division (5 battalions); 15th Infantry Division (5 battalions); 7th TD (2 battalions); 466th ODShP (2 battalions); 38th odshbr (2 battalions); 21st MPD (2 battalions); 1st regiment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 93rd regiment (1 battalion); about the MGB, about the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
A total of 31 battalions.
Head - Major General N.P. Pischev.

6 operations were carried out to support independent combat operations of the DRA Armed Forces, 11 local combat operations, 32 operations for the implementation of intelligence, of which: 24 with the results of 66% of the destruction of objects and targets, 2071 ambushes, of which: 259 with the results of the defeat of the personnel of the rebels 72%.
During this period, 11,925 rebels, 111 portable anti-aircraft missile systems (MANPADS), 279 rocket launchers (PU RS), 14,855 rocket projectiles (RS), 438 Degtyarev-Shpagin heavy-caliber machine guns (DShK) and anti-aircraft mining installations ( ZGU), 302 mortars, 180 recoilless rifles (BO), 314 hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers (RPGs), 1566 units. small arms, 230 warehouses with property of the rebels.
349 captured rebels, 102 MANPADS, 69 PU RS, 38,019 RS, 142 DShK and ZGU, 3,800,000 cartridges for DShK, 73 mortars, 64,019 mines for mortars, 58 BO, shots for them - 26,026, 169 RPGs, grenades to them - 28 283, 2155 units. small arms, 8,190,000 rounds. Warehouses with property - 686.

The rebels carried out hostilities as a retaliatory strike: 927 acts of sabotage, including 752 shelling of outposts and posts, 142 columns, 182 permanent deployment points, 104 mine explosions, and 51 other acts of sabotage.
Losses in units and subunits of the 40th Army amounted to: 68 servicemen were killed, of which 15 were officers; wounded 46.

The results of the combat operations of special forces units:

1. Combat sorties were made - 168. Of these, 20% were effective.
2. Destroyed:
caravans - 131, warehouses - 31;
rebel groups - 53;
rebels - 1416;
PU RS - 2, RS - 3002 units;
DShK machine guns - 23, ammunition for them - 74,300 pieces.
BO - 6 units, ammunition for BO - 1800 units;
mortars - 2, mines to them - 1402 units;
RPG - 52 units, shots for them - 1584 units;
MANPADS - 10 units;
small arms - 110 units, ammunition for them - 1,030,000 pieces;
cars - 80 units;
tractors - 14 units;
pack animals of the rebels - 690;
PTM - 200 pcs.;
PPM - 709 pcs.
3. Captured:
prisoners - 176 rebels;
PU-11 - 4,437 units;
DShK - 28 units, cartridges for them - 295,800 pieces;
mortars - 11 units, shots for them - 4,014 pieces;
MANPADS - 60 units;
small arms - 624 units, cartridges - 1,757,000 pieces;
cars - 26 units, tractors - 9 units;
pack animals - 22;
motorcycles - 33 units;
PTM - 481 pcs.;
PPM - 873 pcs.;
medicines - 2038 kg;
drugs - 9,000 kg;

The results of hostilities in 1987.
The head of the operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense, General of the Army V.I. Varennikov, summing up the results, noted: in 1987, 18 joint military operations of the OK NE with units and subunits of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia were carried out. The largest of them are "Shkval", "Energy", "Blockade", "Magistral". Also, 25 local (private) and 610 implementations of intelligence data were carried out. About 1,000 caravans were opened and destroyed, more than 7,000 ambush operations were carried out, 24 episodes of the participation of Soviet units and subunits in support of independent military operations of the RA Armed Forces.

The war in Afghanistan continued every day and all night, the intensity of hostilities did not tend to decrease. The blood of our soldiers and officers continued to flow. At the same time, the goals and objectives of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Troops in Afghanistan acquired a vague outline. None of the leadership of the USSR could clearly define the timing and final tasks of the peacekeeping mission of the Soviet troops during the war in Afghanistan.

The military joint operation "Magistral" with the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia was carried out in the period of November 1987 - January 1988. Units and subunits of the Soviet troops operated successfully with minimal losses.

The purpose of the military operation "Magistral" is to unblock the road between Gardez and Khost and deliver food, fuel, and other essentials to the district center using motorcades. The demonstration of the capabilities of the leadership of the Republic of Afghanistan to solve complex political problems was fully implemented.

The following were involved in the military joint operation "Magistral":
from the 103rd Airborne Division - reconnaissance companies of the 350th Airborne Regiment and the 317th Airborne Regiment (airborne regiments);
one airborne battalion of the 357th infantry regiment,
a separate reconnaissance company of the 103rd airborne division;
from the 108th Motor Rifle Division - reconnaissance companies of the 180th and 181st Motor Rifle Divisions;
from the 201st Motor Rifle Division - 2 reconnaissance companies, small and medium sized detachments from the 149th motorized infantry division, 2 motorized infantry detachments from the 395th infantry regiment;
from the 66th brigade - reconnaissance, 3 msb;
from the 56th brigade - 2 battalions (1 and 3 infantry brigade, reconnaissance);
from the 345th opdp - 2 pdb, reconnaissance;
from the 191st omsp - 2 msb;
from the 15th brigade of the Special Forces - 2 separate detachments of the Special Forces.
A total of 40 armies were involved:
personnel - 5634 military personnel;
tanks - 28 units;
BMP-2 - 190 units;
BTR-70 (80) - 102 units;
MLRS "Grad" (BM-21) - 21 units;
self-propelled artillery (2S 5 "Hyacinth" - 10 units, 2S 3 "Acacia" - 8 units, 2S 1 "Carnation" (122 mm) - 34 units, 2S 9 "Nona-S" - 14 units, 2S 4 "Tulip" - 2 units, mortars 2B 14 - 24 units, 2B 9 - 15 units);
trucks - 298 units, special vehicles - 195 units.
From the Afghan Armed Forces:
formations and units of the 1st and 3rd AK (army corps), 15th brigade, 37th brigade, 66th brigade, 230th brigade (airborne assault brigade);
separate battalions of the MGB - two and the Ministry of Internal Affairs - two.
The head of the military operation is the commander of the 40th Army, Lieutenant General B.V. Gromov, Deputy Commander for Technical Support, Major General Korolev V.S.
The decisive actions of the 103rd Airborne Division (commander P.S. Grachev), the 345th Opdp (commander V.A. Vostrotin), the 15th Special Forces Brigade (commander Yu.T. Starov) made a decisive contribution to the success of the military operation " Highway"

Soviet troops go home.

First phase of withdrawal
Limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

On April 14, 1988, with the mediation of the United Nations, in Geneva, at the UN Headquarters, the Foreign Ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan signed a package of diplomatic documents designed to stop the bloodshed in Afghanistan. The United States and the USSR acted as guarantors of the implementation of the agreement. The bilateral agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan on the voluntary return of refugees committed both sides to take the necessary security measures to deal with this complex issue.
In accordance with these agreements, the Soviet Union undertook to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan within a nine-month period, starting from May 15, 1988. At the same time, during the first 3 months, half of all Soviet troops were withdrawn.
To control the fulfillment by the parties of their obligations, a collective monitoring body was created under the auspices of the UN.
However, the leaders of the Mujahideen, not being invited to Geneva, said that these agreements, signed by the leadership of Afghanistan and Pakistan and other countries, do not concern them. One of the opposition leaders, G. Hekmatyar, said: “The agreements in no way affect and do not oblige us to anything. Even if the Soviets begin to withdraw troops, we will continue to attack the Shuravi.
April 7, 1988 Minister of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov signed the Directive, which stated: "The withdrawal of troops after the signing of the Geneva agreements between Afghanistan and Pakistan should be carried out in accordance with the approved plan from May 15, 1988 to February 15, 1989, in two stages." This Directive was accompanied by a document to the Command of the TurkVO and the 40th Army - a schedule for the withdrawal of the OKSV, approved by the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. The General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces also developed a comprehensive plan for the withdrawal of units and units of the 40th Army, which provided for measures for its implementation in Afghanistan and the Soviet Union (organizational measures, road and rail transportation, air transportation, deployment of units and subunits, disbandment storage of weapons, etc.).
Practical implementation of plan activities General Staff The USSR Armed Forces for the preparation and withdrawal of troops began the day after the signing of documents by the Heads of the guarantor states of the USA and the USSR in Geneva. During the preparatory period (April - the first half of May 1988), by the decision of the commander of the 40th Army of the USSR Armed Forces, from separate small garrisons: Asadabad, Gulbahor, Bamiyan, Baraki, Chahcharan, Shahdzhoy, Rukh, etc., the units stationed there were withdrawn in advance to the main points deployment of regiments, brigades, divisions.

At the time of the signing of the Geneva Accords, the number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan was 100,600 thousand troops.

The formations and units of the OKSV at that time included:
; armored vehicles - 4697 units. (including tanks - 636 units, infantry fighting vehicles - 1388 units, armored personnel carriers and armored personnel carriers - 2582 units);
; ground artillery of all types - 1595 barrels;
; automotive equipment - 16,676 units;
; aircraft - 517 units. (including aircraft - 168 units, helicopters - 349 units).
Based on the provisions of the plan for the withdrawal of OKSV from Afghanistan, in accordance with the approved schedule, at the first stage (May 15 - August 15, 1988), formations and units were to leave the garrisons:

; Jalalabad city (15th “SpN” brigade, 66th brigade, ground echelon of the 335th helicopter regiment, air defense units, KECH district, security battalion) - four columns;
; Lashkargah city (22nd "SpN" brigade, ground echelon of the 205th helicopter squadron) - in one column;
; Fayzabad city (860th detachment detachment in full force) - in two columns;
; the city of Ghazni (191st OMS in full strength, 2nd battalion of the 15th brigade "SpN") - in two columns;
; city ​​of Gardez (56th brigade in full force, 4th battalion of the Special Forces of the 15th brigade of the Special Forces, ORATO of the squadron of the 335th OVP) - in two columns;
; Kandahar city (70th brigade - in full force, both of the 280th helicopter regiment, battalion of the 22nd brigade "SpN", KECH, hospital, security battalion) - five columns;
; Shindand city (403rd obato, air force obmo, military hospital, KECh, SEO, 424th, 196th autobattalions) - in two columns;
; Kunduz city (149th MSP, 996th artillery detachment, orb, obs, 340th orvb, obmo, ground echelon of the 181st helicopter regiment) - six columns;
; Kabul Service and support units were withdrawn, construction units - in nine columns.

Soviet troops left Afghanistan in two directions:
1. from the cities of Jalalabad, Ghazni, Kabul, Kunduz through the settlement Hairaton on the city of Termez;
2. from the cities of Kandahar, Shindanda, Lashkargah, Herat through the settlement of Turagundi to Kushka.

At the same time, the phased and sequential execution of the schedule for the withdrawal of troops was strictly observed in accordance with the plan of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces.
The command and control of the troops was carried out from the command post in Kabul, the reserve command post in the city of Naibabad, the reserve command post in the city of Shindand by the army operational groups led by:
; an area five kilometers east of Kabul - Major General A.G. Sheenkov;
; northern outskirts of the settlement Jabal-Ussaraj - Colonel V.F. Yakubovsky;
; Salang Pass - Major General V.S. Korolev (author of these lines);
; Chaugani - Major General V.G. Profitilov;
; Puli-Khumri - Colonel V.A. Vasenin;
; area 3 kilometers south of the settlement Hairatan - Colonel V.A. Dybsky.
To exclude the impact of the rebels on the columns during the movement in the eastern direction of the route of their exit, in advance, the forces of the units and subunits blocked sections of the road on the routes: by the forces of the 103rd Airborne Division from the city of Gardez to the city of Kabul and from the city of Jalalabad to the city of Kabul , 191st OMSP from the city of Ghazni to the city of Kabul; 345th OPD and 177th MRR on Salanga, and further to Chaugani - 395th MRR, and from the city of Tashkurgan to the settlement. Hairatan - 122nd MSP, 201st MSP.
Operational and tactical cover for sections of the road on the exit route of the OKSV in the eastern direction The command of the 40th Army determined, by organizing a security and defense system, the most dangerous sections of the road by units of entrusted units in the areas of strong points:
forces of the 103rd airborne division from Kabul to the settlement of Jabal-Ussaraj,
108th Motor Rifle Division to the Salang pass,
forces of the 345th opdp on Salanga to the village of Chaugani,
395th Motorized Rifle Division 201st Motorized Rifle Division to Puli-Khumri;
At the same time, artillery groups were created at prepared firing positions located along the routes of advancement of troops.

In the western direction of the route, the movement of the columns was carried out by conducting combat operations with simultaneous blocking of the routes by units of the 70th Motorized Rifle Brigade in the section of Kandahar - Girishk, further from Girishk to the settlement of Turagundi by units of the 371st and 101st MSPs 5 th MSD.
In the regime zone, n.p. Turagundi sections of the road were guarded by units of a separate battalion of the 22nd brigade "SpN".
On the eve of the withdrawal of troops, during April - May 1988, the commission of the Command of the 40th Army, headed by the commander of the 40th Army and me, being his deputy for armaments, carried out a program of 100% verification of the technical condition of weapons and equipment, its readiness for deployment to the Soviet Union, as well as maintenance and restoration activities.
The Commission of the 40th Army carried out, in accordance with the Directive of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, the transfer of a large amount of weapons and equipment to units and subunits, the armed forces, the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Afghanistan.
Simultaneously with the restoration of standard equipment in units and subunits of the 40th Army, the conditions and tasks for the promotion and return to the Soviet Union were studied.
By the decision of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, the Command of the 40th Army carried out measures to restore faulty equipment and weapons of formations and units of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Afghanistan. In the garrisons, all buildings and objects of the residential zone were transferred to the military units of the Republic of Afghanistan in the points of permanent deployment, in the territories of outposts and outposts.
During the preparatory period (March - May 1988), the Command of the 40th Army organized the creation of three-month stocks of ammunition of all types, property, food, fuel in the amount of 85,063 tons, in the garrisons of the cities left by the Soviet troops: Jalalabad, Gardez, Shindanda, Herat, Kandahar, Kunduz, Kabul, Jabal-Ussaraj, Baghlan, Puli-Khumri, Mazar-i-Sharif.

In the preparatory stage for the withdrawal of the OKSV, officers of the technical services of the army armament control in units and separate subunits underwent a 100% check of standard equipment, the organization of repair work, and the restoration of faulty weapons of all units and subunits of the 40th Army.
The forces of the 501st evacuation battalion of the army repair and restoration base of the ARVB carried out the transportation of faulty equipment and weapons to be sent for overhaul to the army’s SPPM deployed on the USSR State Border. The ARVB carried out a partial removal of the armored hulls of tanks, armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles to the Soviet Union, which they managed to concentrate along the routes of advance and in the park zone of the units' deployment points.
To the Armed Forces of the Republic of Afghanistan by representatives of the Command of the 40th Army during events preparatory phase was transferred:
more than 50 T-62 tanks;
65 units BMP-1;
277 units armored personnel carrier and BRDM;
more than 80 units artillery pieces;
11 rocket launchers;
46 anti-aircraft installations;
12 ATGM combat vehicles;
6 850 units small arms.
The technical support of the withdrawn units and subunits of the 40th Army on the routes of movement was organized by regular repair and evacuation means, with the allocation of a technical circuit in the amount of 5 to 10 units on each section of the road. heavy-duty trailers, for the purpose of transporting non-recoverable military equipment, for subsequent concentration and storage on army SPPM.
In the eastern direction, collection points for damaged vehicles (SPPM) were deployed:
SPTA No. 1 on the eastern outskirts of Kabul from 10.05. 1988 subdivisions 4904 ARVB for complex repair;
SPPM No. 2 in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe settlement of Jabal-Ussaraj, by units of the 333rd airborne brigade of the 108th motorized rifle division and three platoons of the army of the 884th airborne assault brigade of the RAV, the 762nd airborne assault brigade of the MA and the 682nd brigade of the BT;
SPPM No. 3 in the city of Baghlan by units of the 340th Orvb, 201st Motor Rifle Division;
SPPM No. 4 in the city of Puli-Khumri by the forces of the 890th rear air brigade, the 59th ABR MO with attached army assets - a platoon of the 884th RAV brigade and the 682nd BT brigade;
SPPM No. 5 in the settlement of Hairaton - on the basis of the 501st army evacuation battalion with attached three platoons of the 762nd airborne regiment MA, 681st airborne regiment BT and 889th airborne regiment RAV.
In the western direction, SPTA No. 1 was deployed:
in Shindand - on the basis of the 177th Orvb 5th Motor Rifle Division with the attached repair company of the 762nd Orvb MA and the 682nd Orvb BT, with the 285th TM company;
SPPM No. 2 - in the settlement of Turagundi, on the basis of a repair company of the 177th Orvb of the 5th Motor Rifle Division and an attached platoon of the 762nd Orvb of the MA and a platoon of the 285th Orv of the TM.
In the eastern direction, the leadership and coordination of the work of the SPPM is Colonel (now Lieutenant General) Korolev V.S. partially instructed the head of AROB 4904, Colonel Tskhovrebov Kh.M.
In the western direction, the management of the activities of both SPPMs was entrusted to the head of the army’s auto service, Colonel L.E. Kiyashkin.
The transfer of equipment, weapons and military camps to the formations of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Afghanistan, as well as the creation of the necessary supplies for them (including ammunition and fuel and lubricants) was carried out in accordance with the approved plan of the General Staff of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the instructions of the Minister of Defense of the USSR.
At the first stage of the withdrawal, the command of the OKSV handed over to the leadership of the RA Armed Forces the housing stock, barracks, utilities and equipment, apartment property in 58 military camps of units and subdivisions.
By 15.05. In 1987, operational groups of the Command of the 40th Army arrived in the indicated areas to manage the advancement of units and subunits of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in accordance with the action plan of the General Staff of the USSR Ministry of Defense.
The military units of the Jalalabad garrison were the first to advance on May 15, 1987. On the routes of traffic in the cities of Jalalabad, Kabul, Kunduz, on the initiative of the Afghan side, mass rallies were held. 12,000 people participated in the farewell in Jalalabad, about 100,000 people took part in the streets and rallies in Kabul, and all members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the PDPA, headed by the President of the Republic of Afghanistan, Najibullah, attended the rallies here in the capital of Afghanistan.
The withdrawal of troops was covered by 212 correspondents, including 22 people from 10 countries of Europe and America, 15 Soviet correspondents, who accompanied them to the State Border of the USSR on military equipment, along with personnel, the rest were delivered to the area of ​​​​the city of Termez - n.p. Hairatan by plane.
The march along the indicated routes of formations and units of the Limited Contingent of the Ground Forces in the eastern and western directions took place without serious incidents and mass deaths of personnel, without the massive use of regular weapons of the troops and organized fire impact of the rebels. On the mountain slopes near the Salang pass, there were seven overturning of cars, armored personnel carriers, BRDM into the abyss, with the death of 14 people.
The first to advance were 4 columns from the city of Jalalabad, which included 1216 units. military equipment and vehicles. At the head of the columns were colonels Starov Yu.T. and Avlasenko V.V., lieutenant colonels Yakub V.I., Tashko A.A. Two columns from the city of Gardez were led by lieutenant colonels Evnevich V.G. and Goryachev B.I. From the city of Kunduz, 5 columns of units of divisions of the 201st Motor Rifle Division and one column of Air Force ground services advanced towards the USSR. From the city of Ghazni, the 191st OMSP advanced in two columns led by Colonel Shcherbakov V.M. and Mironenko V.P. In the western direction from the city of Kandahar, the 70th brigade was advanced in four columns with ground services of the Air Force, led by Lieutenant Colonel Nikulin V.A., Dunaev S.P., Major Salnik P.S., Medvedev V.P. The 22nd “SpN” brigade advanced from the city of Lashkargah, in two columns, led by Colonel Nekhai I.P. and Major Kovalchuk A.Z. From the city of Kunduz, the administration of the 201st Motor Rifle Division was advanced with units of combat and technical support: the 149th Motorized Rifle Regiment, 998th Ap, five columns, under the command of Colonels Ruzlyaev V.V., Kalinin A.D., Lieutenant Colonel Perepelitsa S.G. ., lieutenant colonel Berezhev S.G., lieutenant colonel Ivanov P.G.
During the period of preparation for the withdrawal of troops, the 860th detachment detachment stationed in Fayzabad in the eastern direction turned out to be in the most difficult condition, where the 2nd motorized rifle battalion in the settlement of Baharaka was in a blockaded position, where the bandit formation, having a triple superiority, mined all routes for the withdrawal of equipment and personnel. Dushmans demanded that the Soviet command transfer all weapons and military equipment to them. The command of the 40th Army decided to disarm the BMP, remove the machine guns, gun locks and blow up 16 BMP-1s. The withdrawal of the regiment was carried out in two columns along the route of Faizabad, Talukan settlement, Khanabad settlement. The first column was headed by Lieutenant Colonel Yu.P. Ryzhakov, the second - by the commander of the regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Churkin A.A.

At the first stage, the withdrawal of OKSV troops was carried out in the most favorable weather conditions and a stable military-political situation. However, an analysis of the activities of the rebels shows that the leaders of the main opposition groups, armed groups, ignoring the Geneva agreements and the peace initiatives of the Soviet Union and Afghanistan, maintained an uncompromising stance towards the existing state system and continued to increase their efforts to capture political power in the country.
In order to make up for losses and strengthen the opposition armed groups of the Mujahideen, in April-May 1988 alone, the arrival of about 10,000 militants from Iran and Pakistan was noted.
Mujahideen groups in Afghanistan by May 15, 1988 amounted to 4492 detachments and 190 groups, which included 160,580 rebels.
There were 1,776 active armed groups and detachments, which included 67,090 rebels. 134 detachments with a total number of 6010 rebels were added to them. The beginning of the withdrawal of the OKSV did not cause a decrease in the level of combat activity of the Mujahideen.
The largest concentration of Mujahideen still remained in the provinces of Takhar, Badakhshan, Parvan, Kapisa, Kabul, Wardak, Kunar, Nangarhar, Paktia, Ghazni, Kandahar, Helmand, Kunduz, Herat, Khost district, as well as the main communications.
In these provinces, 2,842 detachments and groups were concentrated, numbering over 103,000 Mujahideen, which accounted for 64% of the total grouping of armed opposition formations, of which 1,250 detachments and groups of 46,800 people showed particular activity and audacity in attacks on columns and outposts of Soviet troops.
Communications, through which the promotion of the OKSV was carried out, served as the territory of constant fire confrontation between the Soviet troops and the armed formations of the Mujahideen:
Ghazni city - Kabul city. 63 detachments and groups of 2100 rebels;
Kabul city - Gardez city. 55 detachments of 1850 rebels, which had 8 MANPADS, 8 PU RS, 15 BO, 62 mortars, 8 ZGU, 64 DShK machine guns, 147 RPGs;
Kabul city - Hairaton city. 439 detachments and groups of 12,200 rebels, who had 29 MANPADS, 18 PU RS, 6 GP, 80 BO, 100 mortars, 12 ZGU, 182 DShK machine guns, 599 RPGs.
The situation in Kandahar province remained very tense. The Mujahideen group consisted of 251 detachments and groups of 8,770 Mujahideen, of which 86 detachments of 3,165 Mujahideen showed combat activity. The situation was heating up.
In the province of Ghazni, the Mujahideen armed formations numbered 174 detachments and groups with 6,496 rebels, of which 54 detachments showed the greatest activity, in which 2,175 Mujahideen fought.
In the province of Helmand, the armed formations consisted of 155 detachments and groups of Mujahideen numbering 6,755 rebels.
At the first stage, Soviet troops were withdrawn from 12 provinces in May to August 15, 1988. 50.2 thousand military personnel (personnel 50% of the total number) returned to their homeland in accordance with the obligations stipulated in the Geneva agreements.
From the garrisons of the cities of Ghazni, Gardez, Jalalabad, Fayzabad, Kunduz, Lashkargah and Kandahar, more than 30,000 OKSV military personnel were transported by transport aircraft to Tashkent and Termez.
After August 15, 1988, Soviet troops remained only in six provinces of Afghanistan (Kabul, Herat, Parvan, Samangan, Balkh, Baghlan), having 50,1 thousand people. In parts of the Air Force of the 40th Army, 55% of the personnel were left, of which front-line aviation - 90%, army aviation - 35%.
The main efforts of the units and subunits of the OKSV were focused on fulfilling the tasks of assisting the Armed Forces of the Republic of Afghanistan, in holding the most important administrative centers, air bases, communications, as well as in supporting the combat operations of the Afghan army against the armed forces of the opposition.
For the period from March 15 to August 15, 1988, at the first stage, it was withdrawn:
110 T-62 tanks;
1026 units BMP, BTR;
346 guns and mortars;
48 units anti-aircraft weapons;
3728 units cars, 203 units. special machines;
14 aircraft, 207 helicopters;
Total 5,582 units
As the head of the operational group on Salanga, Colonel (currently retired lieutenant general) Korolev V.S. During his stay, he was forced to monitor the posted outposts and posts on a daily basis. The armed formations of the Mujahideen of the opposition leader, the late Ahmad Shah Massoud, received orders from him to stop hostilities and shelling of Soviet troops. However, some of the leaders of the Mujahideen, such as Gul Kaidar, Mirzgo, Mosandkhan, ignored the Geneva agreements and continued terror.
During this period, active hostilities on the part of the armed opposition groups in the Salang region clearly did not manifest themselves. At the same time, 36 military personnel died from mine explosions, shelling and road accidents, of which 14 people died at the Salang pass.

During the period of the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, 174 tanks, 49 infantry fighting vehicles, 262 armored personnel carriers and armored personnel carriers, 160 units were repaired for the army, units of the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Afghanistan in the units and subunits of the 40th Army. BTR-152, 41 barrels of 152 mm GD-1 guns, 46 units. 120 mm mortars, 30 units. 122 mm howitzers, 93 units. 76 mm guns ZIS-3, 23 pcs. 57 mm guns ZIS-2; 237 units mortars 82 mm.
Organizationally and operationally, the 40th Army was part of the Turkestan Military District and was subordinate to the commander of the troops, General of the Army N.I. Popov and the district headquarters, headed by Lieutenant General V.T. Denisov. Therefore, upon the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, it was necessary to carry out organizational measures to disband the withdrawn units during the second stage from November 15, 1988 to February 15, 1989.
Having received instruction personally from the commander of the district troops, Colonel (now Lieutenant General) Korolev V.S. with the operational group of the district headquarters from officers of the organizational and mobilization Directorate, officers of technical services and rear, departed for the city of Termez, where units and formations were withdrawn to the base of the 4th Motor Rifle Division along the route of the eastern direction:
The 56th brigade, which, after the withdrawal of supernumerary equipment and weapons from it, was sent to the railway. transport to the city of Iolatan, Mary region of the Turkmen SSR;
860th OMSP - was completely disbanded on the spot with the transfer of personnel and weapons to other formations;
66th Motorized Rifle Brigade - after the withdrawal, it was reorganized into the 186th Motorized Rifle Brigade and here in the city of Termez the 186th Motorized Rifle Brigade was deployed as part of the 108th Motorized Rifle Division. The administration of the 201st Motor Rifle Division and parts of support and maintenance, together with the 191st Motorized Rifle Regiment, were relocated to the duty station in Dushanbe.
The 70th Motorized Rifle Brigade, withdrawn in the western direction to the area of ​​​​the city of Kushki, was reorganized into the 373rd Motorized Rifle Brigade with its entry into the 5th Motorized Rifle Division.
The 15th “SpN” brigade, withdrawn to the city of Termez, was disbanded, except for the 154th special forces brigade left in TurkVO, and the rest of the railway units. transport sent to other military districts, after the withdrawal of freelance equipment and weapons (SAVO, BVO and KVO).
The 22nd brigade of the Special Forces, withdrawn in the city of Kushka, was disbanded, and special detachments were stationed in restricted areas until the complete withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, then sent by rail. transport (MosVO, ZakVO, LenVO, PrikVO).
Separate security battalions, withdrawn from the cities of Jalalabad, Kandahar, Kunduz, were subject to complete disbandment.
The ground echelons of the 335th and 181st separate helicopter regiments, the 254th, 239th, 205th separate helicopter squadrons departed for internal military districts.
At the meetings of the commanders, the commanders of the withdrawn units, first in the city of Termez, and then in the city of Kushka, were informed of the requirements of the directive of the Minister of Defense of the USSR No. 314/1/0520 of 04/24/1988 and the instructions of the district commander. The task force led by Colonel (now Lieutenant General) Korolev V.S. immediately began to carry out the disbandment (reformation) of units, as well as reconciliation of the availability of standard equipment and weapons in accordance with the time sheets according to the services of the district and the army.
The dispatch of personnel after their retirement to the reserve, transfers to other units and formations of the internal military districts was carried out.

Retired Lieutenant General Viktor Sergeevich Korolev, former Deputy Commander of the 40th Army for armaments, recalls:
“A lot of work has been done on compiling documentation for equipment requiring major repairs, decommissioning and sending to the repair enterprises of the Center (factories and bases of GBTU, GRAU, GlavTU), which were carried out by the technical services of the TurkVO, headed by Major General Yu.N. Burovtsev, Yu.A. Nagula and Colonel I.A. Ryzhenkov.
This work was carried out in parallel in the garrisons of Kushki and Termez by officers of operational groups, until September 15, 1988.
On the night of August 22 this year. I flew to Kabul to investigate, on the order of the commander of the district troops, the fact of undermining and mass destruction of army stocks of ammunition and materiel in the warehouses of the 59th army brigade of material support in the city of Puli-Khumri. As a result of an investigation carried out under my leadership by district officers, it was established that as a result of a sabotage act and a simultaneous massive shelling of the warehouse zone with rockets, seven army warehouses were destroyed. According to intelligence, this raid was carried out by gangs of leaders Farakhutdin and Malid.
As a result of the hit of the RS (rockets) in a pile of 122-mm rocket shells, a strong fire began, which engulfed all the buildings. After the explosion of ammunition, the spread of explosive rockets over the territory within a radius of up to 3 kilometers began.
Residential, park and warehouse areas burned during the fire. In addition to the army artillery depot, the buildings of six more army depots burned down (BTI, ATI, engineering and chemical weapons, as well as clothing and medical).
Soldiers, workers and employees of the 59th army brigade of material support, explosions and fires that broke out were taken by surprise during a lunch break. As a result of this sabotage, an ammunition depot with a capacity of 1200 wagons and six warehouses with army supplies of general allowance were completely destroyed, in particular: 200 tank engines, infantry fighting vehicles, wheeled armored personnel carriers, about 50 gearboxes and transmission units of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles.
More than 50 engines, about a hundred power transmission units, about a thousand sets of tires, more than 500 pcs. batteries, etc.
Together with warehouses (hangars), about 20 prefabricated panel buildings (modules) burned down completely, and therefore the entire personnel of the ABrMO was left homeless.
In order to dress and shoe the "burnt victims", among the army soldiers they let out a "hat in a circle" to collect voluntary donations in favor of the "burnt victims".
In addition to the sabotage and explosion of army stocks in the city of Puli-Khumri, three-month stocks of ammunition and fuel left for the army, the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Afghanistan in the cities of Jalalabad and Kandahar were blown up.

Arriving in Tashkent and reporting on the results of the investigation into the results of the explosion of army supplies to General of the Army N.I. Popov, we made a decision to partially replenish ammunition and the necessary spare parts for BT and AT equipment, directly to formations and units, bypassing the army warehouses that were destroyed, in amounts that ensure the maintenance of the combat readiness of divisions and regiments of the OKSV. At the same time, the reconciliation of documentation on the availability of weapons and equipment continued by the heads of services of the withdrawn units at the first stage and the execution of acceptance certificates and orders for sending weapons samples to the factories and bases of the Center for repair.

The main problem of reforming the army, units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Guards of the Ministry of State Security of the Republic of Afghanistan for this period was the catastrophic shortage of specialists for armored models, ground and anti-aircraft artillery, ATGM systems and such rocket technology, as "Luna-M" and the operational-tactical complex 8K14-R-300 "Skat".
In pursuance of the decision of the General Staff, on the basis of the 4th Motor Rifle Division in Termez, the 720th training center was created for the retraining of Afghan soldiers in specialties corresponding to their standard equipment and weapons. It turned out that we left samples of weapons and military equipment with a surplus, not taking into account the availability of specialists for them - soldiers of the Afghan army. The number of specialists capable of controlling weapons and driving equipment did not exceed: 50%, and even lower for certain specialties, such as tank and infantry fighting vehicle drivers, ATGM, MANPADS gunners and missile system specialists - up to 75% of the required numbers.
In connection with the above, three-month courses for the military personnel of the Republic of Afghanistan were created. Directly by the District Leadership - the leadership of departments and technical services, 24 technical classes, headmistresses, training fields and tankodromes with all elements of combat training, everyday life and life were created.
For one single period, we retrained from 1000 to 1300 Afghan servicemen with theoretical and practical mastery of the specialty. After completing their studies, they received full-time military equipment, were formed into the appropriate units and subunits, then, under the command of Afghan officers and generals, marched under their own power to their places of deployment. More than 5,000 Afghan soldiers were retrained at this training center from September 1, 1988 to July 1, 1989.
154 Soviet specialist officers from the troops of the TurkVO and officers - Dari translators were involved in conducting classes at these courses.
At that time, in the units and formations of the OKSV that remained on the territory of Afghanistan, there was an intensive training of personnel, weapons and military equipment, to make marches under their own power in both directions in the USSR.
The preparation and transfer of weapons and military equipment to the Afghan armed forces (army, guards of the Ministry of State Security and subdivisions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs), which began back in the period of the first stage of the withdrawal of Soviet troops, continued, in the following quantitative composition: tanks - 240 units, infantry fighting vehicles 1 - 212 units (incl. BMP 2 - 127 units, wheeled armored personnel carriers - 850 units, BRDM - 183 units, vehicles - 3293 units, samples of ground artillery - up to 168 barrels, anti-aircraft guns - 236 units, small arms - 15,584 units).
During the preparation of troops at the final stage of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the President of the Republic of Afghanistan, Najibullah, did not want to involve the armed forces of his country to fight the implacable opposition (apparently, they saved it for the future).

Facts and documents testify: The leadership of the Republic of Armenia tried to use mainly units of the 40th Army for these purposes, hoping to involve the Shuravi in ​​large-scale military operations, especially against the armed detachments of Ahmad Shah Massoud and thereby detain them in Afghanistan.
The Afghan leadership repeatedly followed up with appeals to the Soviet Government: "Stop the withdrawal of troops due to the fact that Pakistan and the United States do not comply with the Geneva agreements."
Immediately, as soon as the President of the Republic of Armenia Najibullah began to appear defeatist moods and the idea began to emerge to appeal to the Soviet leadership with a request to leave troops in Afghanistan, after the deadline for their final withdrawal stipulated by the Geneva agreements (15.02.1989), reports from the military OKSV command with proposals not to do this.
At the beginning of 1989, the Minister of Defense of the USSR D.T. Yazov demanded to prepare and conduct an operation in the Panjshir Gorge and in the southern regions of the Takhar province in February-March. However, according to the Command of the 40th Army, in winter conditions this was unrealistic.
And yet, common sense prevailed: at a meeting of the Politburo Commission of the CPSU Central Committee for Afghanistan, it was decided not to detain part of the troops in the RA, but to fully and accurately fulfill the obligations assumed in Geneva and withdraw them on time.
This decision was greeted with enthusiasm by all servicemen who were in Afghanistan.
On January 27, 1989, the withdrawal of OKSV was resumed. The highway began to work in one direction - from south to north.
The opposition, with some exceptions, did not prevent the withdrawal of Soviet troops, as well as the occupation of regime zones, outposts and security posts by the RA armed forces.
Columns of caterpillar and automotive vehicles went to the State Border of the Soviet Union in exceptionally difficult weather conditions (low temperatures, fog, icy roads).
In the highlands, especially at the Salang pass, snow avalanches hampered the movement of vehicles. They often descended from the mountains, forming many kilometers of snow and stone blockages on the road. A huge amount of work was done on engineering, road, technical and logistics support.
The last unit of the Soviet Army left Kabul on February 4, 1989.
Only a small force remained to guard the Kabul airfield, as food and flour were still transported to the capital by air.

After the withdrawal of Soviet troops at the first stage, and then government troops from Panjshir, in the spring of 1988, the detachments of Ahmad Shah Massoud entrenched themselves in this area and in the summer began to "crawl" to South Salang (north of Kabul).
At that time, the Soviet units carried out a number of combined arms operations, such as "Veil", "Blockade" and a number of local (private) military operations in the provinces of Kabul, Kapisa, Lagar, Baghlan and others, fought with large detachments of the armed opposition.

The leadership of Afghanistan, headed by the President of the Republic of Armenia Najibullah, tried by any means to delay the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from their country.
The President of the Republic of Armenia Najibullah personally asked the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Gorbachev M.S. leave part of the troops, division or brigade to protect communications. Its representatives also persistently persuaded the Minister of Defense of the USSR D.T. Yazov about organizing a military operation of the 40th Army to defeat the grouping of the leader of the armed opposition Ahmad Shah Massoud in the Panjshir Gorge. The data of Soviet intelligence did not confirm the information and requests of the RA leadership to consider Ahmad Shah Massoud's grouping as a priority threat to the state, and as a version, one of the ruling clans of the country was interested in mastering the deposits of metals and precious stones of Panjshir.
Therefore, the President of the Republic of Armenia Najibullah, during the withdrawal of the OKSV at the first stage, managed to convince the Soviet leadership that, at this stage, instead of withdrawing the 101st and 12th MSPs of the 5th Guards Motor Rifle Division from the city of Herat, to carry out the withdrawal of units of the 201st Motor Rifle Division from Kunduz city.
Subsequently, the President of the Republic of Armenia Najibullah repeatedly insisted to the Command of the OKSV on the destruction of the detachments of Ahmad Shah Massoud by the forces of the Soviet troops and thereby delayed the start of the withdrawal of troops at the second stage.
Instead of the planned date for the withdrawal of OKSV - November 15, 1988 - the start date for the withdrawal was postponed to the first days of January 1989.

When checking the state of affairs on organizational issues, after the first stage of the withdrawal of Soviet troops, it was established that all units were reorganized, personnel with weapons from other military districts were sent to permanent deployment points at their destination.
The repair stock of equipment was transferred to repair bases and factories (GBTU, Grau, GlavTU). The personnel who served the established terms of service were dismissed and sent to their place of residence.
After flying over the garrisons of Termez and Kushka, it was found that all activities related to the withdrawal of the OKSV at the first stage were basically completed.
In December 1988, Colonel (now Lieutenant General) Korolev V.S. was sent to study at the military academy of the General Staff for higher academic courses for the senior leadership of military districts and naval forces.
The training program included the study of changes in the organizational and staffing system of the branches of the Armed Forces and branches of the USSR. New methods of command and control of troops in a combat situation were mastered. Measures were worked out for the interaction of the ground forces with the troops of nuclear forces and space forces.

The training sessions were conducted using the means of automation and computerization introduced into the troops of all processes related to command and control of troops in various conditions of a combat situation. In the classroom, much attention was paid to the use of military weapons and the impact on their use of electronic warfare (electronic warfare).

Retired Lieutenant General Viktor Sergeevich Korolev, former Deputy Commander of the 40th Army for armaments, recalls:

“While in the classroom on January 7, 1989, I was summoned through the duty officer of the academy to the head of the academy, General of the Army G.I. Salmanov, who announced to me that my studies were interrupted by the decision of the leadership of the General Staff and I urgently need to leave for Tashkent to resolve issues related to ensuring the second stage of the withdrawal of troops, their disbandment and reorganization, and the redeployment of units to other military districts. This was due to the fact that a new leadership and military council of TurkVO was appointed. Lieutenant General I.V. became the new commander of the district troops. Fuzhenko, his first deputy - Lieutenant General G.G. Kondratiev and chief of staff - Lieutenant General Yu.D. Boukreev. And therefore, I, as the former deputy commander of the 40th Army for armaments and General V.V. Petukhov, who was previously in Afghanistan as an adviser, could provide practical assistance to the withdrawn OKSV troops at the second stage of the withdrawal, as well as in organizing their march and in matters of protection and defense of routes. In advance, the commander of the troops of the district, by his order, was given the task of ensuring the withdrawal in the eastern direction to General V.V. Petukhov, and to me on the withdrawal of troops in the western direction.
Starting from December 28, 1988, rear units, service, support and security units from the garrisons of the cities of Kabul, Bagram, Jabal-Ussaraj, Shindand and Puli-Khumri began to advance.
To organize uninterrupted passage across the State Border of the USSR, two operational groups were created from representatives of all departments and services of the district with the authority to control, resolve issues of reorganization, send withdrawn troops to a new duty station, demobilize conscripts, secondment officers and ensigns to a new duty station. Together with the officers of the operational groups in the city of Kushka and the city of Termez, the readiness of sites for equipment, the condition of residential towns and the organization of the state of weapons parks were checked.
January 20, 1989 I was personally assigned the task by the Commander-in-Chief of the troops of the Southern Direction - General of the Army N.I. Popov - to immediately leave for the city of Mary, the Turkmen SSR, where the 266th district ammunition depot was stationed, and organize the shipment according to the specified nomenclature of ammunition for heavy weapons and ensure their airlift by military transport aircraft to the Kandahar airfield, where at one time three-month stocks of ammunition left after the withdrawal of Soviet troops to formations and units of the 2nd Army Corps of General Kh.A. were destroyed as a result of sabotage. Olumi.

For this, an aviation regiment of transport aviation on AN-12 aircraft was placed at my disposal. Such an urgent task was solved for the reason that the formations and units of the 40th Army were either on the march, or ensured the security of the advancement of troops, being on the "blocks" and therefore practically could not provide assistance in delivering ammunition to Kandahar to the 2nd Army Corps of the Armed Forces RA.

The supply of ammunition stacks to the sides, the loading of aircraft, was carried out by personnel, ensigns and warehouse officers, day and night in the amount of 2,276 tons. The airlift was carried out nightly by 18-20 "boards" - AN-12 aircraft from the 27 units available in this regiment. In one night, each crew had to make two or three sorties, transferring by air from 100 to 150 tons. The pilots and personnel of the warehouse for 10 days, following the order of the command, continuously carried out loading operations and the transfer of ammunition. During this time, more than 1200 tons of shells for ground artillery and mines for 120-mm and 82-mm mortars were airlifted to Kandahar.
Things didn't go the way we planned. At the airfield of Kandahar, blocked by the Mujahideen, there was no normal navigation support, drive and tracking equipment. the runway was not illuminated.
During takeoff and landing, some of the aircraft received landing gear damage and other breakdowns.
To the credit of the pilots, soldiers and officers of other units of the 40th Army, by February 1, 1989, the task of providing ammunition to the 2nd AK in Kandahar was completed in full, the necessary range of ammunition was submitted on February 2.
Thanking the workers, personnel and officers of the warehouse, handing them valuable gifts, by order of the commander of the district troops, I left for the city of Kushka, where the 88th motorized rifle division was located, at the base of which the OKSV troops of the western direction went. Together with the commander of the 88th MSD, we checked the readiness of all facilities for receiving troops, the equipment of field parks, tent camps and food points. I examined and checked the readiness of the customs and border sites in the city of Kushka for the reception and passage of units.
On the morning of February 2, 1989, I passed through the State Border of the USSR to the settlement Turagundi, where he checked the organization of the evacuation of the district transshipment base, as well as the availability of a repair fund focused on the SPPM (assembly point for damaged vehicles) of the army.
Then, flying to the city of Termez, to the location of the 4th motorized rifle division, I made a detailed inspection of the areas of deployment of troops withdrawn to the east, where platforms for equipment (sumps) with elements of tent cities and field parks were already equipped.
Together with Major General V.V. Petukhov, we conducted an instructive session with representatives of the customs service and border control posts on the features of inspecting standard weapons and equipment.
I would like to draw your attention to the combat readiness of the OKSV troops deployed in Afghanistan and preparing to march towards the USSR-RA State Border.
According to the intelligence services of the OKSV, the transfer of rebels, weapons and ammunition to the Afghan border on vehicles of the Armed Forces of Pakistan was repeatedly noted. In September 1988 alone, the Pakistani army logistics delivered over 4,000 rockets from Peshawar to the Parachinar region, subsequently transferred to Kabul, Logar and Panjshir.

During the second period of the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the sending of foreign advisers and specialists to the territory of Afghanistan to provide support and assistance to the armed detachments of the rebels did not stop. Arab advisers acted in the provinces of Uruzgan and Ghazni, and Pakistani military specialists acted in the provinces of Kunar, Nangarhar, Paktia. The most significant material, financial and advisory assistance in Pakistan at that time was provided by Saudi Arabia and the United States.

During this period, the Command of the 40th Army decided on the procedure for the withdrawal of formations and units from the Republic of Afghanistan at stage II:

In accordance with the directive of the Minister of Defense of the USSR and the approved schedule of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, the withdrawal of formations and units of the 40th Army of the USSR Armed Forces from the Republic of Armenia was to be completed before February 15, 1989.
Based on this, the Commander of the 40th Army, Lieutenant General Gromov B.V. decided: to carry out the withdrawal of formations, units and institutions from the RA in two directions (eastern - the cities of Kabul, Bagram, Puli-Khumri, Hairatan; western - the cities of Shindand, Herat, Turagundi settlement) sequentially, garrison by garrison, starting from the most remote from the Soviet-Afghan border.
Combat support for the withdrawal of units and subunits of the 40th Army in the eastern direction in the period from January 2 to January 10, in order to exclude the impact of the rebels on the columns, it was decided to carry out by: occupying platoon strongholds on the routes of movement in the most dangerous places; the creation of artillery groups, the occupation of firing positions along the route of the advance of troops.
Parts of the technical support, it was decided to withdraw in advance to the indicated areas of deployment of the SPPM. With the help of the 201st Motor Rifle Division, equip and maintain night recreation areas in the city of Puli-Khumri and the city of Hairatone at the rate of 1900 military personnel and 300 pieces of equipment.
ZKP (reserve command post), OG (operational groups) of the army and KP (command post) of the 108th Motor Rifle Division - withdraw to pre-planned areas.

At the points of combat orders of the Commander of the 40th Army, Lieutenant General Gromov B.V. it was also stated:
“In the period from January 10 to January 28, 1989, withdraw to the territory of the USSR formations and units of logistic support: the rear of the 108th and 201st motor rifle divisions, the 103rd airborne division, the 59th AbrMO (army brigade of material support), the rear of the withdrawn regiments and establishments of garrisons (military hospitals), to carry out the transfer of personnel by air (about 30,000 military personnel) not involved in the combat crews of standard military equipment during the withdrawal of troops from the airfields of the cities of Kabul, Puli-Khumri, Shindanda in the period from 01/3/1989 to 01/31. 1989
In the period from January 28 to February 15, to carry out the withdrawal of combat units and subunits to the territory of the USSR.

To carry out fire engagement of the enemy with 10-15 minute fire raids from the moment the columns enter the zone of responsibility and accompany them with harassing fire at planned targets and fire at the call of artillery spotters in the columns.
Air cover for marching columns on the march is carried out by the forces of the Air Force units of the 40th Army and front-line aviation of the TurkVO troops from the airfields of the cities of Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif, Kakaydy.
Manage the withdrawal of troops from the KP - Kabul, ZKP - Naybabad, as well as the allocation of OG (operational groups) to the areas: Jabal-Ussaraja, per. Salang, Chaugani, Puli-Khumri, Hairaton, Termez, Tashkent.
To ensure the safety of the withdrawal of troops, to exclude the influence of the rebels, the withdrawal route was blocked by occupying platoon strongholds on commanding heights and areas of the most probable advancement of the rebels in the areas: Kabul-Kalakan - by two battalions of the 181st SME, the cities of Charikar - Jabal - Ussaraja - two battalions of the 682nd SME; Jabal-Ussaraja - Chaugani - 345th opdp; Chaugani - Dashi - 668th separate battalion "SpN", Dashi - sz (outpost No. 15 - Naibabad - 1st and 2nd motorized rifle battalions of the 122nd motorized rifle division and 773rd separate reconnaissance battalion of the 201st motorized rifle division ".
The control of the withdrawal of army troops was carried out from the command post of Kabul, the ZKP of Naibabad, the TPU of Shindand, as well as the operational groups of the army headed by:
Jabal-Ussaraj - Colonel V.F. Yakubovsky;
Salang Pass - Major General A.G. Sheenkov;
Chaugani - Major General V.G. Profitilov;
Puli-Khumri - Major General V.A. Vasenin;
Hairaton - Colonel V.A. Dybsky;
Termez - Colonel V.P. Shcherby;
Tashkent city - Colonel S.F. Kitsak.
Departure of the operational groups to the places of work - 01/03/1989 Departure of the operational group to Tashkent - 01/09/1989 Departure of the Army's ZKP - 01/07/1989
The army commander and the commander's task force managed the withdrawal of troops from the army command post in Dur-ul-Aman until 01/14/1989;
From 01/14/1989 to 02/2/1989, control was carried out from the army command post deployed on the basis of the 103rd airborne division; from 02.02.1989 - army command post in Naibabad.
Upon completion of the withdrawal, the task force of the army commander moves to Tashkent and manages the disbandment of the army from the command post - the transit point of Tashkent (Tuzel airfield).

Withdrawal of rear formations and units of the army, rear of divisions, regiments and garrison establishments.
The schedule for the withdrawal of units and divisions of the OKSV included the following:

01/13/1989 - the 59th AbrMO is withdrawn, the rear of the 108th motorized rifle division from the city of Bagram; crossing the State. Borders of the USSR - 59th AbrMO - January 14, 1989
01/15/1989 - the 47th order is withdrawn: the 668th separate battalion "SpN" blocks the Chaugani-Dashi sector, and the 47th order from the city of Puli-Khumri, under the protection of the 783rd separate reconnaissance battalion of the 201st motorized rifle division, continues to move to the city of Hairatan. Crosses the state border of the USSR on January 18, 1989.
01/17/1989 - army communications units are withdrawn from the city of Kabul to the city of Hairatan, the State border of the USSR is crossed on January 18, 1989.
01/19/1989 - army support units make a march from Kabul. The state border of the USSR was crossed on January 22, 1989.
01/21/1989 - the rear of the 103rd airborne division is advanced; The state border of the USSR was crossed on January 24, 1989.
01/23/1989 - the 45th smallpox (a separate engineer-sapper regiment) begins to move without an engineer-sapper battalion from the city of Charikar;
01/26/1989 - the 278th dbkr (road commandant brigade) is withdrawn from Chaugani. The state border of the USSR was crossed on January 27, 1989.
01/28/1989 - the 276th tank brigade (pipeline brigade) is withdrawn from the city of Puli - Khumri. Crosses the state border of the USSR on January 29, 1989.
01/29/1989 - the rear of the 180th and 181st MSPs from Kabul begin to move. The state border of the USSR was crossed on January 31, 1989.
01/30/1989 - the rear of the 201st Motor Rifle Division begins to move and on the same day they cross the State Border of the USSR.

Withdrawal of combat formations and units

From the Bagram garrison: 01/28/1989 the ground echelon of the Air Force and the 179th separate battalion "SpN" are being withdrawn, which, with access to the city of Hairatan, guarded and strengthened the regime zone.
The ground echelon of the Air Force crosses the border on January 30, 1989.
01/28/1989 - The 2nd Motorized Rifle Corps of the 180th Motorized Rifle Regiment, after being removed from the outposts, moves forward to reinforce the route in the area of ​​responsibility of the regiments;
01/28/1989 - The 781st separate reconnaissance battalion of the 108th motorized rifle division, after being removed from the blocks, is concentrated in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe Bagramsky crossroads as a reserve.

Garrison in Kabul. It is displayed in the period from 02/04/1989 to 04/04/1989 in three columns:
1. The ground echelon of the Air Force advances in the first column. The beginning of the movement is February 1, 1989. The state border of the USSR is crossed on February 4, 1989;
2. The 317th RPD of the 103rd Airborne Division advances in the second column after the rally in Kabul. Start of movement - 02/02/1989. Crosses the state border of the USSR on February 5, 1989. Security for the rally is carried out by the forces of the 357th checkpoint;
3. The third column advances the 357th pdp. The beginning of the movement - 02/04/1989. The state border of the USSR crosses on February 7, 1989.
The withdrawal of troops from the Kabul garrison was completed on February 7, 1989.

02/04/1989 After the withdrawal of troops from the city of Kabul and the transfer of outposts, units of the 181st MRR are removed from the blocks and march from the city of Jabal to the city of Ussaraj.
Units of the 180th SME are removed from the blocks at the section of the city of Kalakan - the "Bagramsky" intersection and are concentrated in the area of ​​​​the intersection.
02/05/1989 The 181st SME from the city of Jabal-Ussaraja makes a march to the city of Hairaton. Crosses the state border of the USSR on February 7, 1989.
The 180th MSR is being removed from the blocks at the section "Bagramsky" crossroads - the city of Charikar and is concentrated in the city of Jabal-Ussaraj.
02/07/1989 KP 108th Motor Rifle Division, 682nd Motor Rifle Division from Jabal-Ussaraj move to Hairatan. The state border of the USSR was crossed on February 9, 1989.
The 2nd battalion of the 177th SME, after the transfer of outposts in the Jabal-Ussaraj-Kalavulang sector, is concentrated in the city of Chaugani.
The 1st battalion of the 345th OPDP is removed from the “blocks” in the Jabal-Ussaraj-Kalavulang sector and concentrated in the city of Kalavulang.
02/08/1989 The 177th MRR, after the transfer of outposts in the Kala-vulang-Dashi section, is concentrated in the city of Puli - Khumri.
The 345th opdp after being removed from the "blocks" in the section of the city of Kalavulang - the city of Chaugani are concentrated in the city of Chaugani.
02/09/1989 The 345th opdp makes a march in the city of Puli-Khumri.
The 668th separate battalion "SpN" is removed from the "blocks" in the section of the city of Dashi-the city of Puli-Khumri;
The 2nd paratrooper battalion (airborne battalion) of the 350th paratrooper is removed from the “blocks” in the section of Dashi-Puli-Khumri.
02/10/1989 The 345th opdp, 668th about "SpN" makes a march to the city of Hairaton. The state border of the USSR was crossed on February 11, 1989.
02/11/1989 The 395th Motorized Rifle Division of the 201st Motorized Rifle Division, after the transfer of guard posts in the regime zone and in the section of the city of Puli-Khumri - the Mirza Pass, are concentrated in the area of ​​​​the pass (outpost No. 15) and makes a march from area No. 15 to the city .Hairaton.
Crosses the state border of the USSR on February 12, 1989.
02/12/1989 The 350th checkpoint is removed from the "blocks" and concentrated in the area of ​​the city of Aibak and marches to the area of ​​the city of Hairatan.
The state border of the USSR will be crossed on February 13, 1989.
The 122nd Motor Rifle Division of the 201st Motor Rifle Division, after the transfer of outposts, is removed from the "blocks" in the area of ​​the Tashkurgan Gorge and concentrated in the city of Naibabad. Crosses the state border of the USSR on February 13, 1989.
02/13/1989 The 1st Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 149th Motorized Rifle Division with the ground echelon of the Air Force makes a march from the city of Mazar-i-Sharif to the city of Hairatan. Crosses the state border of the USSR on February 14, 1989.
The 122nd SME (without the 3rd SME) makes a march from the city of Naibabad to the city of Hairatan. Crosses the state border of the USSR on February 13, 1989.
02/14/1989 Army command post, command of the 201st Motor Rifle Division with the 783rd Orb makes a march to the city of Hairaton. Crosses the state border of the USSR on February 14, 1989.
02/15/1989 3rd small brigade of the 122nd small brigade, optdn of the 108th small brigade, the transshipment base are brought to the city of Termez until 12.00.
The 783rd Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 201st Motor Rifle Division crosses the USSR state border until 15.00.
Commander of the 40th Army of the USSR Armed Forces in Afghanistan, General Gromov B.V. Crosses the state border of the USSR at 15.00 on February 15, 1989.

Western direction

The withdrawal of troops in the Western direction is carried out from February 1 to February 15, 1989 in ten columns.
The head of the military operations for the withdrawal of troops from the western direction is Major General N.P. Pischev.
02/04/1989 - a convoy from the city of Shindanda of the ground echelon of the Air Force begins to move, consisting of: the 403rd obato and the obmo of the 5th motorized rifle division. Crosses the state border of the USSR on February 5, 1989.
02/04/1989 One convoy of units of the 196th and 424th units in the amount of 434 vehicles of the district automobile battalions of the 246th KECH, the 704th military hospital and the 279th SEO are advanced. Crosses the state border of the USSR on February 6, 1989.
The rear of the 5th Motorized Rifle Division and the 371st Motorized Rifle Regiment, consisting of the 375th Obmo and the 460th Medical Battalion, in the amount of 284 vehicles, begin to move. Crosses the state border of the USSR on February 7, 1989.
02/07/1989 The beginning of the nomination of the management of the 5th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 371st Motorized Rifle Regiment, consisting of 360 units of military equipment and vehicles in the amount of 365 units. Crosses the state border of the USSR on February 8, 1989.
02/8/1989 Nomination of the 177th Orvb of the 5th Motorized Rifle Division, the 1st and 2nd motorized rifle battalions of the 371st Motorized Rifle Regiment after their removal from the blocks and the transfer of outposts (posts) from the city of Shindand to the city of Herat. Crosses the state border of the USSR on February 9, 1989.
02/09/1989 Nomination of the 12th SME in full force after removal from the "blocks" and transfer of outposts in the area from Herat to the Mirza-Rabati pass, consisting of 432 units of equipment. Crosses the border on February 10, 1989.
02/10/1989 The 101st MRR begins to move with 432 units of military equipment with the connection to the convoy of units removed from the "blocks" after the transfer of outposts (outposts) posts. Crosses the state border of the USSR on February 11, 1989.
02/11/1989 Nomination of combat support units of the 5th Motor Rifle Division as part of the 650th reconnaissance battalion and an engineer battalion. Removal from the "blocks" of units of the 101st MSP. The state border of the USSR was crossed on February 12, 1989.
02/12/1989 Promotion of motor transport columns consisting of 465 units. vehicles of the 1468th transshipment base of the district from the settlement of Turagundi. The state border of the USSR was crossed on February 13, 1989.
02/13/1989 Transportation of the 278th separate company of heavy vehicles from the army SPPM, with a repair fund of overhaul vehicles, and decommissioned armored hulls taken out from the garrisons of the Western direction. Crosses the state border of the USSR on February 14, 1989. The export was carried out by two flights - 278 op.TM.
02/14/1989 The advance of the convoy of the 1356th separate security battalion with the removal of its units from the "blocks" in the section of the Rabati-Mirza district to the regime zone of the settlement of Turagundi.

The last soldier of the Soviet troops, Major-General N.P. Pischev.

After the withdrawal of troops in the western direction, the 5th Guards. The MRD was reorganized and transferred to staff "B" - a reduced staff with the deployment of a reduced staff in the city of Kushka.
The 101st SME has been completely disbanded. The 1122nd anti-aircraft missile regiment and the 164th separate flamethrower company were also subject to disbandment. The 28th Army Artillery Regiment was reorganized into a jet regiment.
After the withdrawal in the eastern and western directions, repair units 4904 of the ARVB (army repair and restoration base) and the 59th ABrMO (army brigade of material support) were completely disbanded. Ground echelons of aviation units of front-line aviation and helicopter regiments and individual squadrons of army aviation were sent by rail. transport to the places of deployment:
168th IAP - to the airfield of Starokonstantinov, to the 24th Air Army of the Kiev Military District;
378th oshap - to the airfield of Postavy in 26 VA (Belarusian VO);
274th opib - to the airfield of Migalovo (Moscow Military District);
181st ovp - Davlenkanovo (Ural VVAU);
50th osap - with parts of support for the Lipki airfield (26 VA BVO).
Separate helicopter squadrons were redeployed with regular oratos (separate companies of aviation technical support):
205th OVE - to the Sudzhi airfield (23 VA Zabaikalsky VO);
239th OVE - to the airfield of Nikolaevka (Far Eastern Military District);
254th OVE - to the airfield of the city of Gissar (Air Force of the Central Asian Military District);
262nd OVE - to the airfield of Malino (Moscow Military District);
302nd OVE - to the airfield of the city of Osovtsy (26 VA Belarusian VO).
The remaining units of the Air Force with the means of support were relocated to the points of permanent deployment of the troops of the TurkVO and SAVO.

20 years ago, at 15.00 on February 15, 1989, citizens of the Soviet Union saw on television, live, a solemn meeting of our soldiers and officers at the last stage of the withdrawal of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Troops, when the Commander of the 40th Army of the USSR Armed Forces, General Gromov B.V. he was the last to cross the Friendship Bridge and left Afghanistan, and then his report to General of the Army Popov N.I., as well as the solemn passage of columns of armored vehicles with personnel as part of military units and subunits past the jubilant population.

Further, retired Lieutenant General Viktor Sergeevich Korolev, former Deputy Commander of the 40th Army for armaments, recalls:
“However, after the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, the activities of the officers of the weapons departments, rear services, personnel departments and the organizational and mobilization department of the district headquarters did not end. All these departments have dramatically increased work related to the reassignment of officers and sending them to new duty stations, the demobilization of personnel who have served their deadlines and sending those who have not completed their term to new duty stations. This work was carried out until April 1, 1989.

The armaments and rear services needed to conduct a documentary reconciliation and revision of the stocks of materiel exported from Afghanistan to the USSR, check the presence of the arrived weapons and military equipment according to the documents and determine its technical condition.
Then supernumerary weapons were withdrawn and transferred to other formations and units.
According to extraordinary orders (GBTU, GlavTU and Grau), weapons and equipment requiring major repairs were shipped to factories and bases.
After the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan at both stages and concentration in the garrisons of the city of Kushka and the city of Termez, there were some incidents when, in the atmosphere of a general holiday of returning home, the end of a long bloody war, due to a decrease in military discipline of officials of the arrived units, when the unloading of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers of weapons and ammunition remaining in the combat compartments, the children of local villages and villages took possession of ammunition. As a result, there were explosions of ammunition and accidents, due to which children suffered limb injuries and even deaths, especially in the city of Termez.
These were the main lessons and results of the measures taken to withdraw the Limited Contingent of Soviet Troops, the 40th Army, from the Republic of Afghanistan.”
In mid-July 1987, Major General V.S. Korolev, by order of the Minister of Defense of the USSR, was appointed deputy commander of the TurkVO troops for armaments and handed over the post of deputy commander of the 40th Army to Colonel A.A. Korunny, departed for Tashkent. After accepting the position of the ZKV of the district, he continued to assist the OKSV in the border garrisons of Termez and Kushka, where the withdrawn units and units were disbanded and further personnel were sent for further service in other military districts.

It should be recognized that the majority of the townsfolk and those citizens whose children and relatives did not take part in the hostilities, and even some of the participants in the Great Patriotic War, still believe that there was no war in Afghanistan, but there were separate skirmishes between OKSV units and formations of the Mujahideen. This is explained by the fact that in Afghanistan there was no continuous front of confrontation between the conflicting parties.

During the war in Afghanistan in 1979 - 1989, a new practice, little known to the world community, emerged of conducting full-scale combat operations by mobile assault squads in the conditions of military, armed confrontation of a focal nature.
Any prolonged war saturates the population with military technologies, equips it with trophies and forms sustainable knowledge and survival skills, unites it into armed communities, deprives it of human form in search of food and livelihoods. In a civil war, they become easy prey for international swindlers and bandits, are prone to violence and robbery, and are ready to fight anyone for money.
In the armed formations, detachments of the Mujahideen, there were fixed payments for each killed Soviet soldier, officer, called "shuravi". Particularly large rewards were paid for participation in hostilities, terrorist attacks, combat damage to Soviet equipment, comparable to the cost of housing or a car. A countless number of armed groups migrated across the territory of Afghanistan, fighting for money. Therefore, internecine small wars constantly broke out for control over the villages and the territory of the districts (districts).

Over the nine years of this "undeclared" war, more than 420 military operations were carried out, equated to army ones.

During the Second World War, about 1000 army operations were carried out, about 200 front-line and 51 strategic operations.

For nine years, Soviet troops in Afghanistan took part in hostilities that, in terms of their intensity, taking into account the scale of their peacekeeping tasks, a hot climate with large temperature drops, extremely difficult terrain, in mountain ranges with most slopes with inclination angles of more than 45 degrees seemed an insurmountable task for the army of any country with weapons and equipment of those years.
On this basis, calculations were made of the armed confrontation of the opposition in Afghanistan by leading foreign military experts in the field of strategy and tactics of the Cold War of the late 20th century.
Units and subunits of the 40th Army daily suffered significant losses in personnel, weapons and equipment, due to enemy fire, severe climate, infectious diseases, wounds, contusions, accidents in rough terrain.
At the same time, if we take into account the relief of the mountainous terrain and the occupied area of ​​​​the territory of the Republic of Afghanistan, which is equal to an area of ​​​​655,000 square kilometers, then in order to conduct full-fledged combat activities by the standards of the experience of the Great Patriotic War of 1941 - four combined arms fronts.

Conclusions and opinions of soldiers and officers, generals - participants in the hostilities in Afghanistan.

Today, after comparing the military-historical characteristics of the episodes of the war in Afghanistan in 1979-1989 with the wars in Korea, Vietnam, and other countries of the world in the second half of the 20th century, the miscalculations and mistakes of the political and military leadership of these countries, carrying out peacekeeping operations abroad, are comparable. his country, in the loss of influence on the course of events of the war. Thus, the total losses of the international contingent of the peacekeeping mission of the NATO countries in Afghanistan, the civilian population over a shorter period significantly exceeded the losses of Soviet troops and citizens of the country during the 10 years of the war.

At present, as follows from the reports of the international television channel Euronews dated January 29, 2009, since the entry of the peacekeeping contingent of NATO troops into Afghanistan, the area under crops and, accordingly, the production of opium in the country has increased 20 times and significantly exceeds the needs of the world market. drugs, which poses a large-scale threat to the life of all mankind.
The peacekeeping experience in Iraq and Yugoslavia also does not withstand the criticism of military historians and combat veterans, participants in the events of ending the confrontation between the conflicting parties.

It is obvious to every sane person: the unreasonably large material and monetary costs of conducting hostilities on the territory of the countries of the military conflict, the loss of manpower and equipment, the civilian population in the course of tasks to reconcile the warring parties in the modern period can be explained by other intentions of the "peacekeepers" - the merciless interests of the international capital, superprofits of the military-industrial complex.
Everything is known in comparison: the international practice of classifying local military conflicts and hostilities, after a year of events in Afghanistan, unequivocally defined the military operations of the Soviet troops and the armed confrontation that arose as a full-scale war using all available means on the territory of the state of Afghanistan: by the population, its Armed Forces, subdivisions and units of the Soviet troops. In the UN documents of 1980, which determines the policy and positions of the states of the world, the events in Afghanistan are unequivocally classified and prescribed as waging war in order to carry out a peacekeeping mission by inadequate use military force Soviet troops.
In the modern period, some peacekeeping countries, under the guise of a single "peacekeeping" strategy, have created the latest military doctrine for the use of secret aggressive operational plans for the implementation of national interests in the context of local military conflicts.
Little known to the world community, the practice of conducting full-scale combat operations by mobile assault squads in the conditions of a military, armed confrontation of a focal nature, the new requirements of the time for the combat capabilities of the army, formed during the war in Afghanistan in 1979-1989, in the events of other military conflicts of this period of modern history, finally determined the beginning of irreversible reforms and rapid qualitative changes in the armed forces of all countries of the world, their goals and objectives.
The experience and practice of applying the new operational art of combat operations, accumulated as a result of the war in Afghanistan of 1979-1989, the merging of combat tactics of the countries participating in other wars and military conflicts, the achievement of high efficiency in the mass use of airborne assault units, special forces and reconnaissance caused deep the processes of structural reform of the armies of the world, the creation of rapid reaction forces in their composition.

Global trends in the development of the military construction of the armed forces of all countries in the conditions of mass rearmament of armies, the use of a fundamentally new operational art of combat operations, highly effective command and control systems, the use of high-precision weapons, the creation of powerful forces and means of combat support (space reconnaissance and communications), and the transportation of units, have led to the refusal of the majority of civilized states from large armies.
The emergence of combat operational highly mobile components in the armies of the countries of the world, an increase in the depth and effectiveness of reconnaissance and fire damage, temporal and spatial capabilities for the movement of troops, an increase in the independence of combat tactical units, a sharp increase in their fire capabilities, large-scale changes in other components, influenced the nature of hostilities and general principles of warfare.

This report, in a brief form, presents the results of the main military operations, the opportunity to compare the bitter military experience with the experience of the armies of other states, while taking into account the daily losses of personnel and environmental impacts.
So, in the 70th Guards Omsbry (commanders: Guards Colonel E.V. Meshcheryakov, Guards Lieutenant Colonel Loginov V.A.), located 12 km from the city of Kandahar, in 1983, officers died in battles - 39, which amounted to 30% of the officers who participated in the hostilities, among the personnel - 186 people, and in other cases 30% of the number of personnel directly involved in the hostilities. In 1983, units of the 70th Guards. The Specialized Rifle Brigade made 326 combat exits, including night ones, in order to prevent the movement of caravans with weapons deep into the territory of Afghanistan, of which 32 cases involved combat operations.
In 1984, the total share of irreparable losses (together with sanitary ones) in the personnel of the 70th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade increased due to: the strengthening of the grouping of opposition detachments (up to 18,000 people), its weapons and equipment in the area of ​​​​responsibility, participation in their leadership by a significant number foreign hired military specialists; daily attacks on outposts in the green zone of the province, in the city of Kandahar; repelling attacks by Mujahideen assault groups on columns; other episodes of participation in active hostilities and amounted to 40% in relation to the rest of the direct participants in hostilities.
The combat reports of the commanders of the units of the 70th Guards Omsbr in 1984 stated: “... the weapons, equipment, wearable ammunition in the detachments of the Mujahideen were not inferior to the regular ones in the Soviet units, and often surpassed them qualitatively and allowed them to participate in battles with prolonged intense fire contacts, to use modern combat tactics, to resist, by maneuver, using the terrain, the fire of attached artillery and supporting aircraft ... ".
Retired Lieutenant General Viktor Sergeevich Korolev, former Deputy Commander of the 40th Army for armaments:
“The OKSV included 133 battalions, divisions. Of these, 82 battalions (61.72%) performed security functions, communications - 23, airfields - 14, military and economic facilities - 23, local authorities - 22. 51 battalions were involved in active hostilities throughout the country.
I would like to draw your attention to the fact that in the OKSV divisions there were from 12,000 to 17,000 personnel, while during the Second World War the division had from 3,000 to 4,000 people. motorized rifle brigade OKSV had a number of 3500 - 4000 people, 300 - 550 units. armored vehicles, and in the composition of motorized rifle regiments there were from 2500 - 3000 people, about 200 units. military equipment and 160 units. cars.
The military formations and units of the OKSV in terms of staffing, equipping with service weapons and equipment were four to five times the number of similar units during the Great Patriotic War.

The limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, in the period from 1979 to 1989, waged a full-scale war, in terms of its intensity and tension, the participation of personnel and weapons, not inferior to the combat operations of the Second World War, the war in Vietnam and Korea.

The war in Afghanistan of 1979-1989, according to many prominent military analysts of the armies of the countries of the World, as an episode of military art, is one of the most successful operations in the history of wars.

In the information bodies of the power structures of the Republic of Belarus and the minds of a limited part of civil society, an unfounded opinion about this war, in which Belarusians participated in the Soviet army, that internationalist soldiers cannot be equated with soldiers - veterans of the Great Patriotic War still rules.

The tasks assigned by the Soviet Government to the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan to protect the country's strategically important infrastructure facilities, cover the USSR State Border and the border area were carried out with the least possible losses during the military confrontation between the warring parties, continuous incursions by armed opposition groups, Mujahideen groups with the support of a number of leading foreign states, the presence of the most difficult climatic and unsanitary conditions in the mountain-desert area, the lack of civilized communications infrastructure, aggressive full-scale political, religious influence on the population.

These, in our opinion, are the main lessons and results of the measures taken to withdraw the Limited Contingent of Soviet Troops (40th Army) from the Republic of Afghanistan.

This circumstance makes it possible to consider the application of the "Law on Veterans" by the authorities of the Republic of Belarus on the principle of equal determination of the status of participants in the Great Patriotic War and participants in the war in Afghanistan in 1979-1989.

Veterans of the war in Afghanistan in a large majority support the President of the Republic of Belarus Lukashenko A.G. in all programs of domestic and foreign policy, believe in the wisdom of the leadership of our country, are confident in recognizing their participation in the war in Afghanistan as a personal contribution to national security and the bright future of their Fatherland, the Republic of Belarus.

Former Deputy Commander of the 40th Army for armaments, retired Lieutenant General Viktor Sergeevich Korolev.

The assistant to the chairman of the organization Shagov (Aleksandrov) A.A. took part in the selection and presentation of thematic materials from newspapers and the media for the "Information Message".

Advised the drafting of the "Information Report" Adviser to the chairman of the organization on science and high technologies, a graduate of the postgraduate school of the Higher School of the KGB of the USSR. F.E. Dzerzhinsky (now the Academy of the FSB), officer "Cascade-2", veteran of the special forces of the security forces "Vympel", member of the Public Organization of Veterans of the KGB of the Republic of Belarus "Honor" Pitsyk A.V.

Prepared and compiled Announcement» veteran of military intelligence of the USSR Ministry of Defense Osipov A.A. based on the texts of service reports, the book "War in Afghanistan" 1991. Ministry of Defense of the USSR, books “Special Forces of Russia. Encyclopedia, 2007, LLC Yauza Publishing House, Eksmo.

Osipov A.A. Currently, he is a correspondent for the printed organ - the newspaper "Peace and Security" of the International Public Association of Veterans of Special Forces of Security Agencies "Vympel".

The partisan regional organization of the city of Minsk NGO BSVVA is a co-founder of the International Union of Public Associations of Veterans of Airborne, Airmobile and Special Forces " international union paratroopers."

Chairman Osipov A.A.

Note:

Composition
Limited Contingent of Soviet Troops
in the Republic of Afghanistan

Author: Sukonkin Alexey Sergeevich, Vladivostok
As part of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in the Republic of Afghanistan in the period 1979-1989. included the following parts, connections and associations:
40th Combined Arms Army of the Turkestan Military District (Kabul, former residence of Amin)
34th Aviation Corps (later Air Force of the 40th Army)
Troops of the KGB of the USSR
Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR
Airborne Troops of the USSR Ministry of Defense
Parts and divisions of the GRU General Staff
Office of the Chief Military Adviser
40th OA
733rd oboo of the headquarters of the 40th OA subdivision 78864 Kabul
205th oro of the special department of the 40th OA
headquarters of the rear of the 40th OA pp 84641 Kabul
2nd zrbr (withdrawn in the USSR during the first withdrawal of troops in the early 80s)
353rd Guards Abr (withdrawn in the USSR during the first withdrawal of troops in the early 80s)
55th Guards Ap 40 OA "Hyacinth"
28th reap pp 85615 (popular name "madhouse") Shindand, Lashkargah
47th OTR "Luna" Kabul (at the final stage of the war, the division fired 92 launches)
103rd ops pp 52011 40th OA Kabul
254th (264th) ortp OSN (radio-technical intelligence) Kabul (three companies of the regiment were located in Kabul, Kandahar and Shindand).
822nd ortc OSN Bagram 141st ortb OSN (SAVO)
244th ortp (withdrawn to BelVO in 1989)
1996th ortb air defense pp 55996
1959th (1956th) about electronic warfare pp 15779
421st US
278th Rdkbr: Jabal-Ussaraj military unit 83437
-1083rd ODKB Jabal-Ussaraj military unit 34361
59th branch: Puli-Khumri
-425th oavtb
-446th oavtb pp 92053
-449th oavtb (1042nd column)
-424th oavtb
-650th oavtb
-714th oavtb
-659th oavtb -1323rd oavtb
-1476th oavtb (district)
-660th refueling battalion
-714th motor depot
-602nd Obmo Bairam-Ali
276th brigade: Puli-Khumri (formed from the 14th brigade of military unit 38021)
58th brigade:
-118th oavtb
-134th oavtb (1051st, 1052nd column) military unit 21231 Bagram
-262nd oavtb
-261st oavtb
1032nd column
6593rd column
1174th PTOR
125th VAI
71st VAI
4904th (4909th) repair and restoration base
-682nd orvb 3541st prtb
762nd Orvb
210th Oremre 40th OA Kabul
66th transshipment point
1594th transshipment base
-479th sanitary checkpoint
3557th warehouse of engineering property
6357th food warehouse

76th dental clinic

70th VG
341st VG Kabul
346th VG
743rd VG infectious Bagram
VEO
VEO
VEO
SEA
SEA
342nd UIR pp 06462
1154th UNR
1563rd VP MO
220th VP MO
3292nd VP MO
52628th field institution of the State Bank
5131st Base of Reinforced Concrete Structures
353rd optadn
395th Orvb AT AL
98th Orvb
164th orr
129th TP
135th SME
254th Guards SME
367th Guards SME
201st Motor Rifle Division: Kunduz
-122nd MSP 65753 Tash-Kurgan
-395th MSP bp 24785 Puli-Khumri
-149th Guards MSP 82869 Kunduz
-234th TP (launched in the USSR in 1980)
-998th sap "Starokonstantinovsky"
-1098th zrp (brought to the USSR in 1986)
-350th optadn Kunduz
-783rd orb pp 53336
- oisb pp 22430 Kunduz
-254th obs Kunduz
-340th orvb
-36th obmo
- campaign team
5th Guards Motor Rifle Division: Shindand
-101st MSP Herat
-12th Guards SME 33541 Herat (introduced into the DRA in March 1985 from PribVO, Gvardeysk)
-371st MSP 51883 Shindand
-373rd SME (in 1980 it was reorganized into the 70th Omsbr)
-24th Guards TP Shindand (withdrawn, then re-introduced)
-1060th ap Shindand

-278th oisb (?) Adraskan
-650th Orb Shindand
-388th Obs "Prague"
108th Motor Rifle Division: Kabul, from the summer of 1980 Bagram
-177th MSP bp 51863 Jabal-Ussaraj
-180th MSP 51884 Kabul
-181st MSP 51932 Kabul
-682nd SME 86997 Rukh, Panjshir (formed in March 1984 on the basis of the 285th Tank Regiment)
-285th TP (in 1984 it was reorganized into the 682nd MSP) -1074th Ap Hairahan
-zrp (introduced in the USSR in 1986)
-783rd (738th) optadn pp 83565
-271st OISB Bagram
-221st obmo bp 15559 Kabul
-781st orb
-808th obs (according to V. Grigoriev - 600th obs)
- OVKR according to MSD military unit 86302
- campaign team
186th Omsp pp 77800 (at the initial stage - in the northern regions of Afghanistan) - in 1980 it was reorganized into the 66th Omsbr
191st Omsp 39776 Ghazni
- omsb military unit 43151
860th Omsp 89933 Fayzabad, Badakhshan (attached to the 40th Army from SAVO)
66th brigade 93992 Jalalabad (according to some reports, the brigade was referred to as the 66th separate combined arms brigade) - formed in 1980 from the 186th brigade - as part of the brigade, in addition to the brigade set of forces, there was also the 48th brigade and one mountain rifle battalion
- campaign team
70th Motorized Rifle Brigade 71176 Kandahar (according to some reports, the brigade was referred to as the 70th separate combined arms brigade) - formed in 1980 from the 373rd Guards SMEs - as part of the brigade, in addition to the brigade set of forces, there was also one odshb (former 1- th pdb 39th odshbr) and one so-called. "desert" battalion
- campaign team
56th odshbr bp 74507 Gardez
-odshb in n.p. Souffl on the guard of the 668th ooSpN
103rd Guards Airborne Division: Kabul (subordination to the Directorate of the Airborne Forces) pp 16159, 13879
-350th BCP Kabul/Kandahar
-317th checkpoint 24742 Kabul, Bagram
-357th checkpoint 48059 Kabul
-387th updp (non-standard, formed to train young reinforcements, was disbanded after the division was withdrawn from the DRA. Did not take part in hostilities. Perhaps the regiment was on the territory of the TurkVO)
-1179th app pp 15789
-80th Guards ORR
-130th oisb
-62nd brigade (deployed in the DRA as a reinforcement, after the withdrawal of the division it was disbanded. The T-55AM tanks were in service)
-742th obs
-105th fence
-1388th obmo
-115th omedb
-8th detachment
-opdb Lashkargah
-opdb Girishk
-opdr Kalat
345th opdp Bagram (subordination to the Airborne Forces)
PU "Screen" Kabul (GRU GSh) at the headquarters of the 40th OA
797th RTs GRU military unit 44628 Kabul
RP GRU "Herat"
OAGr "Urgun"
OAGr "Kalat"
OAGr "Kandahar"
15th brig.: (1st brigade) bp Jalalabad
- Jalalabad Brigade Headquarters
-OSRS Jalalabad
-154th ooSpN (1st omsb) Jalalabad
-334th ooSpN (5th omsb) pp 83506 Asadabad (from the 5th detachment of special forces of the BelVO)
-177th oSpN (2nd OMSB) Ghazni (formed in the 22nd ObrSpN and transferred to the 15th)
-668th ooSpN (4th OMSB) Sufla in the Baraki-Barak area (from the 9th ObrSpN KVO)
22nd ObrSpN (2nd Omsbr) PP 11659 Lashkargah
-Lashkargah Brigade Headquarters
-OSRS Lashkargah
-173rd ooSpN (3rd OMSB) Kandahar (from the 12th ObrSpN ZakVO)
-370th oSpN (6th Omsb) pp 83428 Lashkargah (from the 16th ObrSpN MVO)
-186th ooSpN (7th Omsb) pp 54783 Shahdzhoy (from the 8th detachment of Special Forces of the PrikVO)
-411th ooSpN (8th omsb) pp 41527 Farah
897th OR RSA (RU 40th OA) Kabul
459th OrdnSpN pp 44633 (RU 40th OA) Kabul
The troops of the OKSV at any time could be supported by a strike of operational-tactical missiles deployed on the territory of the USSR and oriented towards targets in Afghanistan:
- regiment of front-line OTRK "Temp-S" (5 launchers) Kattakurgan (near Samarkand)
- brigade of the army OTRK "Oka" (12 launchers) Bayram-Ali (near Mary)
Troops of the KGB of the USSR:
115th composite border regiment Mazar-i-Sharif
DShMG - several groups from the military unit 2066 and 2033
MMG - several groups from the military unit 2066 and 2033
PU KGB USSR military unit 52628
221st OUS
303rd about PS Kabul
310th about PS KZ
311th about PS pp 26153
Operational detachments of the KGB "Cascade", "Cascade - 2, 3, 4"
- "Ural" - Kabul
- "Caucasus" - Kandahar
- "Karpaty" - Herat
- "Karpaty-1" - Shindand
- "Tibet" - Jalalabad
- "North" - Mazarai-Sharif
- "North-1" - Kunduz
- "Altai" - Ghazni
Squad "Omega"
All KGB detachments were in Afghanistan until 1984, after which they completed operational and combat activities and were withdrawn to the USSR.
Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR:
Detachment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs "Cobalt" (600 people) - attached to the "Cascade". It was bred in the USSR in the early 80s.
Air Force 40th OA
Aviation was initially reduced to the 34th Air Corps, and later to the Air Force
40th Army.
1325th Air Force Command Post
494th ACS node
177th meteorological group
344th guidance point
Fighter Aviation Regiments:
120th IAP MiG-23MLD Bagram (last regiment in time)
190th IAP MiG-23MLD Bagram
655th IAP MiG-23MLD
168th IAP
85th IAP Bagram
115th Guards IAP MiG-21bis operated from Bagram and Kokaity airfields (USSR)
Assault aviation regiments:
200th Oshae Su-25 Shindand (1980-1984)
378th Cap Su-25 Kandahar (formed in 1984 on the basis of the 200th Oshae)
Pilots of several regiments from the USSR fought in rotation (in particular, the 187th division of the Far Eastern Military District, the 80th division of the ZakVO, the 90th division of the PrikVO), and, unlike fighter and fighter-bomber aircraft, the pilots flew on the same machines, which were used until the full development of the resource (unless, of course, they had not been shot down before).
In total, the 200th Oshae and the 378th Shap lost 23 Su-25 aircraft in Afghanistan.
Fighter-bomber aviation regiments:
136th Ibap Su-17m4 squadron: Kabul, Bagram, Kandahar
217th Ibap Su-17m4 Shindand
The 156th Ibap Su-17m4 operated from the Mary-2 airfield
274th ibap
355th Ibap Su-17m4 Bagram (Afghan regiment)
Mixed Aviation Regiment:
50th osap bp 97978 (An-12, Mi-8, Mi-6) Kabul
Separate helicopter aviation regiments:
181st brigade Fayzabad
280th brigade bp 19888 Kandahar
289th OVP Kandahar (or error from 280 OVP)
290th OVP at the initial stage of the war in Bagram or Kabul
335th military unit Kunduz
338th OVP Bagram
339th ovp apparently Bagram or Kabul
361st OVP (Mi-24, Mi-8mt) (from Chirchik SAVO)
The crews of helicopter regiments also fought in Afghanistan:
101st ovp
292nd OVP (arrived from the 2nd Guards OA)
399th ovp (arrived from 32 OA)
486th OVP (arrived from the 8th Guards OA GSVG)
319th OVP (arrived from the 5th OA FEB)
Separate aviation squadrons:
205th ove Mi-8mt, Mi-24v Jalalabad ("Special Forces Squadron")
208th ove Mi-24, Mi-8mt Lashkargah, (according to other sources - Jalalabad)
239th ove Mi-8mt, Mi-24in Lashkargah ("Special Forces Squadron")
254th ove
262nd military unit 19888 Bagram (possibly from the 280th military unit)
292nd Ove Jalalabad
296th OVE (out of 3 OA)
302nd ove pp 65235 Shindand
320th ove
263rd UAE RTR pp 92199
339th Osae
Regiments of front-line bomber aviation of the 73rd Air Army of the TurkVO worked on targets in Afghanistan from the Kokaity airfield:

149th Guards Bap Su-24 (Alma-Ata)
143rd bap Su-24 (Kutaisi-1)
735th bap Su-24
87th detachment Su-24r (carried out photo control of the results of air raids, and reconnaissance of targets)
In addition, in 1984 and 1988-1989, crews of long-range aviation heavy bomber regiments worked on targets in Afghanistan from the airfields of the USSR:
from Khanabad airfield:
200 guards tbap Tu-16 (1984) (Bobruisk)
from the Mary-2 airfield (1984):

from Mary-1 airfield:
251 guards tbap Tu-16 (1988-1989) (Bila Tserkva)
from the Mary-2 airfield (1988-1989):
185 guards tbap Tu-22m3 (Poltava)
1225 tbap Tu-22m2 (White, ZabVO)
402 tbap Tu-22m3 (Orsha)
341 tbap Tu-22m3
840 tbap Tu-22m3 (Novgorod Soltsy)
52 tbap Tu-22m3 (Shaikovka)

Battalions and companies for the protection and provision of airfields
1350th obo
1352nd about Bagram airfield (400 people, 50 armored personnel carriers and armored personnel carriers, 9 AGS)
1353rd obo
1356th obo
1357th obo
1358th obo
oro Kandahar airfield pp 37466
Airfield support battalions:
134th separate aviation technical battalion
221st Air Force Obmo
30th obato
344th obato
358th obato
359th obato
377th obato
395th obato
396th obato
403rd obato
475th obato
1765th obato
Separate companies of airfield technical support:
245th orato
248th orato
249th orato
257th orato - reorganized as 403rd obato
266th orato
273rd orato
275th orato
276th orato
277th orato
Battalions and companies of communications and radio engineering support of the Air Force:
18th Obs and RTO
600th Obs and RTO
672nd Obs and RTO
682nd Obs and RTO
694th Obs and RTO
257th ors and RTO
716th orc and RTO - reorganized into 600th obs and RTO
802nd ors and RTO
1059th ors and RTO
Aviation support parts:
19th PARM
192nd PARM
392nd PARM
542nd Aviation Technical Base - reorganized into the 395th and 396th Obato and
248th orato
980th repair and technical base
310th laboratory of aviation medicine
250th flying aviation technical laboratory
447th flying aviation technical laboratory
27th district aviation training ground
32nd Army Aviation Range
Additional Information:
68th Motor Rifle Division: (by the end of December 1979 it was deployed on the territory of the TurkVO, but it was not introduced into the DRA, the tank regiment was not even deployed) subsequently prepared a reserve for the 40th Army.
The 467th training regiment of the Special Forces TurkVO Chirchik was formed in 1985 (it was not introduced into the DRA, it was preparing a reserve for active special forces).
The 387th Airborne Training Regiment (formed in 1980 and deployed in Fergana) was engaged in the preparation of the airborne troops for operations in Afghanistan.
357th Motor Rifle Division - was deployed and mobilized before the entry of troops into the DRA, possibly introduced by some regiments (860th OMSP?).
360th Motor Rifle Division - reorganized into the 108th Motor Rifle Division before entering the DRA.
Perhaps, at the final stage of the war in Afghanistan, a unit of the Marine Corps of the USSR Navy, presumably a battalion of the 810th Marine Brigade of the Black Sea Fleet, took part in the hostilities.

Soviet troops in Afghanistan were stationed in 179 military camps (32 garrisons). After the partial withdrawal of OKSV troops by November 10, 1988, units of the 40th Army were stationed in 122 military camps (17 garrisons).

ABBREVIATIONS
abr - artillery brigade
avtbr - automobile brigade
AK - army corps
ap - artillery regiment
DIA - ground forces aviation
bap - bomber regiment
BelVO - Belarusian Military District
VA - Air Force
VAI - military automobile inspection
Air Force - air force
VDV - airborne troops
vdd - airborne division
VP MO - military representation of the Ministry of Defense
guards - guards (guards)
GRU - Main Intelligence Directorate
General Staff - General Staff
zrp - anti-aircraft missile regiment
iap - fighter aviation regiment
ibap - fighter-bomber aviation regiment
KRC - command and intelligence center
KVO - Kyiv Military District
KEU - apartment maintenance department
KECh - apartment-operational part
MO - Ministry of Defense
msd - motorized rifle division
MSP - motorized rifle regiment
MSB - motorized rifle battalion
OAGr - operational-intelligence group
oavtb - separate automobile battalion
obato - a separate airfield technical support battalion
obvp - separate combat helicopter regiment
obmo - a separate battalion of material support
obo - separate guard battalion
about PS - a separate battalion of government communications
obrs - a separate communication brigade
obrSpN - a separate brigade for special purposes
about electronic warfare - a separate battalion of electronic warfare
obs - separate communications battalion
OA - Combined Arms Army
OVKG - district military clinical hospital
ovp - separate helicopter regiment
ovtae - a separate military transport air squadron
ove - separate helicopter squadron
odkb - separate road commandant battalion
odkbr - separate road commandant brigade
odshb - separate airborne assault battalion
odshbr - separate airborne assault brigade
ozrbr - separate anti-aircraft missile brigade
oisb-separate engineer-sapper battalion
oisp - a separate engineering and sapper regiment
omedb - separate medical battalion
omsb - a separate motorized rifle battalion
omsbr - a separate motorized rifle brigade
omsp - a separate motorized rifle regiment
ooSpN - a separate special forces detachment
OVBR - a separate combined arms brigade
opdb - separate paratrooper battalion
opdp - separate parachute regiment
optadn - separate anti-tank artillery battalion
orakdn - a separate missile division
orap - a separate reconnaissance aviation regiment
orato - a separate company of airfield technical support
orb - separate reconnaissance battalion
orvb - separate repair and restoration battalion
oreadn - separate rocket artillery battalion
oremr - a separate repair company
orlr - a separate radar company
oro - a separate security company
orSpN - a separate special-purpose company
orr - separate reconnaissance company
OR RSA - a separate company of reconnaissance and signaling equipment
ortu - a separate radio engineering unit
osap - separate mixed air regiment
osae - a separate mixed aviation squadron
otb - separate tank battalion
detachment - a separate tank repair battalion
otbvp - separate transport and combat helicopter regiment
otpbr - separate pipeline crew
oshae - a separate attack aviation squadron
pdp - parachute regiment
pogz - border outpost
pogo - border detachment
pp - field mail
prtb - mobile repair and technical base
PTOR - maintenance and repair point
reap - rocket artillery regiment
RP - reconnaissance point
rr - reconnaissance company
rtbr - radio engineering brigade
RTO - radio engineering support
rtp - radio engineering regiment
RU - Intelligence Directorate
RC - intelligence center
SAVO - Central Asian Military District
sap - self-propelled artillery regiment
SV - ground forces
SpN - special purpose
SEO - sanitary and epidemiological detachment
tbap - heavy bomber regiment
tp - tank regiment
TurkVO - Turkestan Military District
US - communication center
shap - assault air regiment

Afghan war statistics
As of 2000, information from the media of the Russian Federation
Total irretrievable casualties in Afghanistan (12/25/1979 - 02/15/1989)

Total deaths …………………………………………………….14453 people
Including:
In battle ……………………………………………………….9511
Died from wounds ………………………………………………2386
Died from diseases
Died in accidents, catastrophes, as a result
accidents, suicides ……………………………….…1739
By category:
Generalov ………………………………………………..…4
Officers ………………………………………………..…2129
Ensigns …………………………………………………….632
Sergeants and soldiers ………………………………………..11549
Workers and employees ………………………………...…….139
Missing and captured ……………………….…417
Were released ………………………………………..119
Returned home ………………………………………….97
Live in other countries …………………………….…….22
General sanitary losses in Afghanistan ……………..…..469685
Including:
Wounded, shell-shocked, injured ………………………53753
Got sick …………………………………………………...415392
Of them:
Returned to service …………………………………..…..455071
Dismissed for health reasons ……………………...…11654
Deceased (included
in the number of irretrievable losses)………………………..…2960
Of the 11654 dismissed according to comp. health inv. ……………….10751
1 gr. …………………………………………………………..672
2 gr. …………………………………………………………..4216
3 gr. …………………………………………………….….5863
Vehicle losses:
Aircraft …………………………………………………….…118
Helicopters………………………………………………..……333
Tanks …………………………………………………..……...147
BMP, BTR, BRDM …………………………………………….1314
Guns, mortars ……………………………………………433
KShM, KSh …………………………………………….……..1138
Engineering vehicles …………………………………..……510
Cars onboard fuel trucks ……………………….…11369
Losses of the local population 1 million 240 thousand people. (9% of the population). The maintenance of the 40th army and the conduct of hostilities cost the USSR 3 billion USD. Support 800M mode

The final decision to send troops to Afghanistan was made on December 12, 1979 at a meeting
The Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU and formalized by the secret resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU No. 176/125 "On the position in" A "" /.

| The participation of the USSR in the conflicts of the times cold war. War in Afghanistan (1979-1989)

Background material on the war in Afghanistan
(1979-1989)

40th Army
(USSR, 1979-1989)

History of creation

The 40th Army (40 A) was formed in the Turkestan Military District (TurkVO) on the directive of the Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces of December 16, 1979. Lieutenant General Yu. Tukharinov, first deputy commander of the TurkVO, was appointed commander of the army.

From December 10, 1979, by order of the Minister of Defense of the USSR D.F. Ustinov, the deployment and staffing of units and formations of the TurkVO and the Central Asian Military District (SAVO) was carried out.

On December 12, 1979, at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the final decision was made on the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan.

The general directive for staffing, deployment and putting on alert was not given, the troops were put on alert and deployed by separate orders of the command after oral orders from the Minister of Defense of the USSR. In just three weeks (until December 31, 1979) more than 30 such orders were issued.

The field administration (headquarters) 40 A was deployed in TurkVO, the administration of the 34th mixed aviation corps (34 sak) - in SAVO.

On December 24, 1979, USSR Minister of Defense D.F. Ustinov held a meeting with the leadership of the Ministry of Defense, where he announced the decision to send troops to Afghanistan and signed Directive No. 312/12/001.

Until December 25, 1979, about 100 formations and units were deployed, an army set of combat and logistic support units. More than 50,000 people from the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan were called up for additional staffing, about 8,000 cars and other equipment were transferred from the national economy. It was the largest deployment in the Central Asian region in the post-war period.

In TurkVO it was deployed:

Two motorized rifle divisions: (5 Guards Motor Rifle Division in Kushka and 108 Motor Rifle Division in Termez); 353rd cannon artillery brigade (353 pabr) 2nd anti-aircraft missile brigade (2 zrbr) 56th guards. air assault brigade (56 dshbr) 103rd separate communications regiment (103 ops) 28th army rocket artillery regiment (28 reap) as well as units, formations and institutions of special troops.

in SAVO was deployed:

860th Separate Motor Rifle Pskov Red Banner Regiment (860 OMSP) 186th OMSP (attached to 108th Motor Rifle Division)

The aviation included two aviation regiments of fighter-bombers (APIB) - the 136th and 217th, 115th Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment (IAP) and two separate helicopter regiments (OVP) - the 181st and 280th, 302- I am a separate helicopter squadron (ove) at the 5th Guards. MRD, parts of aviation technical and airfield support.

Three divisions were deployed as a reserve for the grouping being introduced (58th Motor Rifle Division - in TurkVO, 68th Motor Rifle Division and 201st Motor Rifle Division - in SAVO).

Also included in the grouping were: the 103rd Guards Airborne Division (103rd Airborne Division), the 345th Guards Separate Parachute Regiment (345th Guards Opdp).

The time for crossing the state border between the USSR and Afghanistan was set at 15:00 Moscow time on December 27, 1979.

By the time the 40th Army entered the territory of Afghanistan, there were already Soviet units. Introduced in early December, the GRU special detachment (the so-called "Muslim battalion"), formed in the summer of 1979 to perform special tasks, two battalions and the 9th company of the 345th Guards. opdp (one of which has been deployed since July of the same year, the second arrived along with the “Muslim battalion”).

Entering Afghanistan

The first to start the crossing was the 108th Motor Rifle Division, whose target was Kunduz. On the morning of December 25, 1979, the 781st Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 108th Motor Rifle Division was the first to be transferred to the territory of the DRA. Following him crossed the 4th Air Assault Battalion (4th Airborne Assault Battalion) of the 56th Guards Brigade, which was tasked with protecting the Salang Pass. The air border of Afghanistan was crossed by BTA aircraft with troops and military equipment on board.

From the Air Force, an aviation squadron (ae) of the 115th Guards flew to Bagram. IAP, the rest of the aircraft flew from the airfields of TurkVO.

Army Headquarters, 5th Guards. MSD, 56th Guards. dshbr (without one battalion), the 353rd artillery brigade, the 2nd anti-aircraft missile brigade, the 860th omsp, the 103rd hotel communications regiment, the 28th reap, army reinforcement and support units remained on the territory of the Soviet Union.

On the evening of December 27, 1979, the "Muslim battalion" (154th separate special forces detachment of the 1st formation) and special KGB groups stormed the palace of the Afghan leader Amin on the outskirts of Kabul, during which Amin was killed. In the city itself, units of the 103rd Guards operated. airborne forces, which captured important government and military institutions, and blocked the Afghan units stationed in Kabul.

On the night of December 27 to December 28, 1979, the 5th Guards entered Afghanistan. msd on the route Kushka - Shindand. On the morning of December 28, 1979, units of the 108th Motor Rifle Division, redirected to Kabul (except for the two SMEs remaining near Kunduz and Puli-Khumri), reached the Afghan capital and completely blocked it.

Command staff

Hero of the Russian Federation Lieutenant General Viktor Petrovich Dubynin April 30, 1986 - June 1, 1987

Hero of the Russian Federation Lieutenant General Gromov Boris Vsevolodovich June 1, 1987 - February 15, 1989

Armament, equipment and equipment

It should be noted that the Afghan war, after the Great Patriotic War, for the Soviet Army of the USSR Armed Forces turned out to be a convenient testing ground for testing weapons and the organizational structure of the troops. On it, directly representatives of the Soviet defense industry and the military could test the methods of warfare and the possibility of weapons.

Prior to this period, the assessment of the combat qualities of military equipment produced in the USSR could only be assessed indirectly - by operation in friendly states to which it was supplied and used in wars (Arab-Israeli conflicts, Vietnam war, Iran-Iraq war, etc. .).

During the entire Afghan war, there was a constant modernization of weapons and the reorganization of military units and formations of the 40th Army in search of optimal options. Some examples of weapons modernization, which were influenced by the realities of the Afghan war, can serve:

The appearance of infantry fighting vehicles BMP-1D, BMP-2D and the T-62M tank with increased armor.
. the appearance of the BTR-80 armored personnel carrier with improved ergonomics and a more reliable diesel engine.
. the appearance of reconnaissance and signaling equipment complexes (anti-personnel seismic sensors) 1K119 Realiya-1 and 1K124 Tabun.
. truck cab booking.
. installation of heat noise emitters and heat traps on Mi-24 attack helicopters and Mi-8 assault helicopters.
. installation of a more powerful power plant and reservation of the cabin of Mi-8 transport helicopters.
. modernization of sighting devices and additional reservation of nodes on the Su-25, Su-17 and MiG-27 attack aircraft.
. the use of new high-precision air-to-ground missiles Kh-25 and Kh-29L.

Also, while gaining combat experience directly in military units, military personnel, showing their own initiative, began to use standard weapons outside the framework established by service instructions and technical manuals.

Such examples can be:

Installation of automatic grenade launchers on the towers of armored personnel carriers and on various rotary supports (for example, on the rear axles of trucks dug into the ground).
. installation of ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft guns on trucks.
. installation of automatic mortars 2B9 "Vasilek" on the MT-LB tractor.
. installation of infantry machine guns on helicopters.
. the use of infantry flamethrowers and thermobaric shells to destroy enemy manpower in caves and underground utilities.
. the use of the ZSU-23-4 Shilka self-propelled anti-aircraft gun for firing at ground targets and its modernization for this task with an increase in the ammunition load, which required the removal of the radio instrument complex from the design.
. installation on tanks by military personnel and full-time repair shops, directly in military units, of mechanical protection against cumulative projectiles.

Directly in Afghanistan, the Soviet Army, for the first time in 40 post-war years, switched to a new type of field uniform, the so-called "Afghan", instead of the obsolete traditional tunic with open buttons, riding breeches and caps in the summer version and from an overcoat / pea jacket with wadded pants to a double-breasted jacket with fur collar and two-layer trousers. Also in Afghanistan, for the first time, dry rations for mountain shooters, a new type of blood substitute (perftoran), field filters for drinking water purification, and much more were tested.

Tanks in the 40th Army

Despite the presence near the southern borders of the USSR (in the Turkestan and Central Asian military districts) at the beginning of the 1980s, about 1000 modern T-64 and T-72 tanks with an automatic loader and a more powerful 125-mm cannon, the backbone of the tank fleet of the 40th Army were tanks T-55 and T-62. T-64 tanks as part of OKSVA were decommissioned due to problems in the operation of a two-stroke diesel engine in high altitude conditions.

Contrary to the established false opinion, the absence of more modern tanks was not due to the lack of a sufficient number of anti-tank weapons and armored vehicles from the enemy. The opposing side received a sufficient number of Chinese Type 78 recoilless rifles and American-made 75-mm M20 recoilless rifles, not to mention the saturation of enemy units with RPG-2 / RPG-7 hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers and their Chinese-made counterparts, as well as large-caliber machine guns of the DShK class, which the enemy successfully used against lightly armored targets (BTR, BMD, BMP, MT-LB, etc.):

Thanks to foreign financial assistance, the opposition was constantly building up its anti-tank arsenals. In 1984, the norm was the presence of one RPG for ten people, a recoilless gun, a DShK and 2-3 RPGs for a group of 25 people, and four DShKs, five BZOs (Recoilless Weapons - abbr.) and a dozen RPGs relied on a formation of a hundred fighters. Only in the first half of 1987, units of the 40th Army destroyed or captured 580 DShK machine guns and anti-aircraft mountain installations, 238 recoilless guns, 483 anti-tank grenade launchers. If in 1983-1985 one RPG-7 accounted for 10-12 militants, then in 1987 - already for 5-6 people ... "

The refusal of the military leadership to use more modern tanks can be considered an exceptionally successful design of the T-55 / T-62 in matters of reliability, maintenance and repair, as well as an assessment of the effectiveness of the use of tanks in mountainous areas, proven by practice:

Major General Lyakhovsky, assistant to the head of the Operational Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense in the DRA, recalled: “... tanks ... in most cases“ did not find ” operational scope for their use, could not fire at the tops of the mountains, got stuck in“ greenery ”and often became useless in battle ."

Soviet tankers did everything they could in Afghanistan. Whether in place of the T-55 American "Abrams" or German "Leopards", in guerrilla war they couldn't have done better. Characteristically, even during the 2001 operation, the Americans did not dare to operate in Afghanistan with a ground group, leaving the dirty work to the anti-Taliban opposition troops armed with Soviet equipment.

From a technical point of view, these tanks (T-55/T-62) performed well. The four-stroke diesel engine worked out for decades worked quite steadily both in the mountains and in the deserts of Afghanistan. The fine dust, which was a real curse, clogged the screens and cyclones of the air cleaner quickly enough, but its maintenance was not too difficult.

There were practically no complaints about the armament of tanks - 100-mm and 115-mm high-explosive fragmentation shells had a sufficient effect on unprotected manpower, and there was essentially no armored enemy in Afghanistan.

Armored vehicles in Afghanistan (1979-1989)
http://otvaga2004.narod.ru/otvaga2004/wars0/page/1_afghan_5.htm

sentry guard

OKSVA differed from the Groups of Soviet Forces in other states by one important factor - the order of deployment of units of "linear" regiments. If in the USSR Armed Forces in each artillery, motorized rifle, tank, airborne regiments or in motorized rifle and air assault brigades all units of the regiment / brigade were within the same military camp, then in OKSVA, directly in the military camp of the linear regiment / brigade, there were only 40-50% of all units of the regiment. Usually these were the Regimental Headquarters and the units attached to it (orchestra, commandant's platoon), combat support units (reconnaissance company, engineer company, chemical protection company, communications company), logistics support units (repair company, material support company, medical company) and also usually the first and second (according to the numbering within the regiment) battalion or division. The rest of the units were dispersed by platoons (motorized rifle / parachute / air assault) or artillery batteries along outposts along with standard military equipment.

In total, the forces of the 40th Army created 862 outposts, in which more than 35,000 people served.

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

In the winter of 1979, the USSR decided to send troops to Afghanistan - I told about how events unfolded in the first days of the Afghan war of 1979-1989, and today we will go through the battlefields of those years and see what is now left of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. There will be many more interesting posts about Afghanistan, so Add me in friends who hasn't done it yet.

In the press and official documents of those years, the name "Limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan" (OKSVA) sounded. In Soviet newspapers (especially those published before 1985), Soviet citizens were told all sorts of tales that "a small number Soviet soldiers help local Afghan dekhans build water pipelines and roads", and also "help fight off the Basmachi and bandits" that come from the mountains and interfere with peaceful Soviet construction.

In those years, almost none of the ordinary people thought about what was really happening in Afghanistan and how many people and equipment were actually sent there - information about this was classified, just like the number of zinc coffins that came to the USSR was classified from Afghanistan.

To start, a little history. Under the modest name "Limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan" was hiding nothing more than the whole 40th army, consisting of several motorized rifle, artillery, anti-aircraft and tank regiments, several special forces and landing brigades and many other auxiliary formations. In different years, the army had different commanders, and the separate Headquarters of the 40th Army was engaged in planning operations.

In contrast to the introduction of troops into or into (even with military clashes in Budapest), in Afghanistan he got into a full-fledged multi-year war, completely unaware of what he was getting into. Absolutely all the actions and decisions of the USSR speak eloquently about this - the tank groups introduced into Afghanistan could not really conduct combat operations due to the fact that the tank gun was not adapted to firing at targets high in the mountains - and in the first stages of the war, tanks were simply shot from the mountains Mujahideen, as in a dash. The same applies to the provision of troops - no one really thought about how and what would happen, apparently all decisions were made with the expectation that as soon as Soviet tanks appeared on the horizon, the Afghans would immediately surrender.

The fact that the Soviet army got into a full-fledged war was understood in the USSR only by 1981 - at that time, in the Asian republics of the USSR, special training began to be organized to train soldiers directly for Afghanistan, and in Afghanistan itself, along the route Termez - Hairaton - Puli- Khumri-Bagram began to build a unique pipeline for the supply of diesel fuel and aviation kerosene to the military. To protect the pipeline, it was also necessary to form a separate 276th pipeline brigade.

In general, every year the war in Afghanistan pumped out more and more new resources from the already not too rich USSR, by 1989 almost completely emptying the treasury. What happened next - you know.

02. And in the meantime, we are entering the Panjshir Gorge - these picturesque mountains served in the eighties as the scene of almost the most fierce battles in all of Afghanistan - detachments of Ahmad Shah Massoud fought in Panjshir, who himself was born and raised in Panjshir and raised the local population to fight against "shuravi".

03. In 1980, the detachments of Ahmad Shah numbered only about 1,000 soldiers, and by 1996 he already had a full-fledged army of 60,000 soldiers. Ahmad Shah also fought with the Taliban, but in the end they killed him, sending suicide bombers to him under the guise of reporters with explosives in a video camera.

04. The mountain serpentine from the side of Kabul leads all the time to the mountains, and here and there the remains of Soviet military equipment come across on the roadsides - here, for example, a military UAZ with a folding top, adapted for travel in hot climates.

05. The seats from the cabin have long been removed and, apparently, adapted by local residents for some household needs. The cabin offers mountain views.

06. The views in Panjshir, by the way, are amazing. Green valleys, clean mountain air, fast and cold river Panjshir - if not for the war, these places could be a wonderful tourist resort. However, the inhabitants of Kabul and so from time to time get here for the weekend to spend the day in nature.

07. Serpentine mountain roads. You need to drive carefully in Afghanistan - concrete chippers are far from being everywhere.

08. A rusty skeleton of an infantry fighting vehicle near one of the roads - apparently, something from the equipment of the 682nd motorized rifle regiment that stood in Panjshir in the mid-1980s.

09. A little further from the road, in the thickets near the cliff, the skeleton of the T-62 tank is rusting - you need to approach it very carefully, along the trodden paths - there are still very, very many mines in Afghanistan.

10. And these are the outskirts of the village of Rukh - at the bend of the road there was once a Soviet outpost, on the site of which you can still see the remains of broken military equipment. According to the story of the locals, there used to be many times more equipment - most of it was sold for scrap to Tajikistan and Pakistan.

11. Car upholstery riddled with bullets and shrapnel.

12. The skeleton of the tank, looking at the village once destroyed by the war - now new buildings are being built in Rukh and there is a beautiful stadium. Apparently, the tank was left here as a reminder of the past terrible war - the USSR bombed the mountainous parts of Rukhi with gas bombs so that "nothing alive would interfere with the construction of a military outpost" ...

13. On the way of the advance of the 40th Army deep into the Panjshir Gorge, villages with destroyed clay duvals completely destroyed, wiped off the face of the Earth - Soviet troops destroyed them in the first place, so that "nothing living would interfere with the advance of the army." It is dangerous to go inside - inside the destroyed villages there may still be the remains of mines and stretch marks.

14. Modern Panjshir tries to cope with the ghosts of that war in his own way - and basically nothing in the gorge reminds of it. People live a peaceful life, cultivating the fields and praying to their god - just like they did many years ago. Among these eternal mountains, the Soviet-Afghan war is perceived as an unfortunate and already very distant episode of history.

15. For the edification of posterity, in addition to a rusty tank at the entrance to Rukh, a small museum of broken equipment was also left, which is located not far from the mausoleum of Akhmat Shah Masud - the "Panjshir lion", as Ahmad Shah was called during his lifetime, is buried here, in these mountains.

16. Anti-aircraft gun, armored personnel carrier and several armored cars.

17. Anti-aircraft guns in Afghanistan were mainly used not for firing at aircraft (the Mujahideen did not have aircraft), but simply installed on outposts for 360-degree all-round defense and firing at targets high in the mountains.

18. Calculation devices:

19. "In emergency cases, to start the electric motor after the thermal relay trips, press the button and turn it clockwise until it stops. In order to avoid damage to the electric motor and the relay, the button can be left in the recessed position for no more than 1.5 minutes."

20. Next to the anti-aircraft gun, the T-34 tank of sand "Afghan" colors is rustier. Apparently, the tank got to Panjshir in the late eighties, when there were not so many modern tanks left.

21. An old tank, painted in Khokhloma and aiming its cannon at a mountain village - perhaps this is the best image of the presence of the USSR in Afghanistan.

22. Armored personnel carrier and several armored vehicles BRDM-2:

23. I don’t know what kind of technique.

24. And this, apparently, is the remains of a BTS-4 tank tractor.

25. This thing is made on the chassis of the T-44 tank and is designed to evacuate damaged, emergency tanks from the battlefield - I think she had a lot of work in Panjshir ...

26. And in the meantime, we are going to the area of ​​​​the Salang pass - the very one along which military equipment was driven from the USSR to Afghanistan.

27. There are now several Soviet bases left on Salanga, which were built and actively worked during the Soviet-Afghan war.

28. Previously, these buildings were guarded by motorized rifle units, and inside were employees involved in logistics calculations at Salanga.

29. Apparently, an electrical substation serving the entire base.

30. View of the former Soviet base from the inside:

31. Inside the premises, everything remained the same as with the “shuravi”. A long corridor with offices on the sides - once behind these doors the issues of supplying military equipment from the USSR to Afghanistan were resolved.

32. Workers who maintain the local road now live here.

33. Former offices are now adapted for living rooms.

34. Inside like this:

35. Corridors:

36. Huge tanks are hidden under the melted snow - either for fuel or for water.

37. Local workers show a pennant, donated by one of the tourists - former soldiers of the same 40th army.

38. And here is such a badge of a warrior-athlete, which the soldiers called "runner".

39. Nothing more reminds of the 40th Army on modern Salanga - except perhaps a pile of military scrap metal that was used as reinforcement in the construction of a new road.

40. When we were already leaving Salang, I looked at the former Soviet base (there were dozens of them only on Salang), remembered all the broken, rusting equipment and destroyed villages in the Panjshir Gorge, and the dead people - on both sides. And I thought - that's why it was all, for what? Who needed this war?

I don't have an answer to this question.

2002-2007 - Chairman of the People's Patriotic Party of Russia. General of the Army (1996).

• 1 Origins and early military career
  • 1.1 Years in military service
  • 1.2 Secretary of Defense
• 2 Social and political activities
• 3 Awards
• 4 Family and personal life
• 5 Notes

Origin and early military career

Born on December 1, 1936 in the village of Kurakino, Serdobsky District Penza region in a family of hereditary peasants. Father, Nikolai Ivanovich Rodionov, after demobilization in 1948, moved his family to the city of Mukachevo, Transcarpathian region of the Ukrainian SSR, to the location of his last duty station - the local mountain rifle division. As a result of long communication with the military, Igor himself, already in the senior classes of the school, firmly decided to become an officer. In his youth, he was fond of music at the same time: he studied at a music school in the accordion class, but failed to finish it, as the class was closed for ideological reasons (in order to combat jazz as "foreigners").

He received his military education at the Oryol Tank School named after M.V. Frunze, where he successively served as a cadet (October 1954 - May 1955), as an assistant platoon commander (May - November 1955), and finally, as a foreman of the cadet company of the school (November 1955 - October 1957 ).

In June 1970, he graduated from the Military Academy of Armored Forces named after Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovsky with a gold medal. 1978 - 1980 was a student of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces named after K. K. Voroshilov, which he graduated with honors.

In 1956, he joined the CPSU and remained a member until the party was banned in August 1991.

Years in military service

In the Armed Forces since 1954. After graduating from college and being promoted to the rank of officer, he was sent to the GDR to serve in the GSVG. From October to December 1957 he was at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief of the Group, from December 1957 to February 1958 - commander of a tank platoon of a tank regiment of a motorized rifle division, from February 1958 - commander of a tank platoon, and from April 1963 to December 1964 he held a command position in the same tank company of the heavy tank regiment of the 10th tank division of the 4th guards tank army of the GSVG.

For further service he was sent to the Moscow Military District: from December 1964 to May 1967 - commander of a tank company of a heavy tank regiment of a tank division of the MVO army corps, from May to August 1967 he was deputy commander of a tank battalion of a tank regiment of a tank division of the MVO army corps.

In 1970, as a deputy regiment commander, he was sent to the 24th motorized rifle Samara-Ulyanovsk Berdichevskaya, three times the Red Banner, orders of Suvorov and Bogdan Khmelnitsky iron division located in the Lviv region of Ukraine. Two years later he was appointed commander of the 274th regiment of this division.

Since 1974 - Deputy Commander of the Iron Division. In 1975 he was appointed commander of the 17th motorized rifle division of the Carpathian military district. In the same year he was returned to the Iron Division as its commander and remained in this position until February 1978.

After graduating from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces named after K. E. Voroshilov, he was appointed commander of the 28th Army Corps of the Central Group of Forces in Czechoslovakia (1980-1983), commander of the 5th Army (combined arms) of the Far Eastern Military District (1983-1985 years.), Then the commander of the 40th army of the TurkVO (Limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, 1985-1986). In 1986, he was appointed First Deputy Commander of the Moscow Military District (July 1986 - March 1988), then became Commander of the Transcaucasian Military District - Military Commandant of Tbilisi (April 1988 - August 1989). As the commander of the district, he led the dispersal of a demonstration in Tbilisi on April 9, 1989, during which 19 people died

After what happened in Tbilisi: “In September 1989, I turned to Yazov with a request to transfer me from Transcaucasia to any other district of the Soviet Union. He told me: “No, Gorbachev does not want to see you in the army at all. After Tbilisi, the West demands your punishment.” And I was quietly removed to the post of head of the Academy of the General Staff, where I served for seven years. From 1989 to 1992, he served as head of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces named after K. E. Voroshilov, and from 1992 to 1996 of the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

Minister of Defense

On July 17, 1996 he was appointed Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation. This appointment took place on the recommendation of the Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, General Alexander Ivanovich Lebed. October 5, 1996 he was awarded the rank of army general. As Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, I. N. Rodionov opposed the concept of military organizational development developed by Yu. M. Baturin and A. A. Kokoshin and opposed the introduction of alternative service. On December 11, 1996, by decree of the President of the Russian Federation, I. N. Rodionov was dismissed from military service to the reserve upon reaching the age limit for military service, becoming the “civilian” Minister of Defense. On May 22, 1997, Boris N. Yeltsin, at a meeting of the Defense Council of the Russian Federation, dismissed Rodionov from his post, making him responsible for the slow progress of the military "reform". According to Rodionov, the true reason for the dismissal lay in his attempt to prevent the weakening and collapse of the Russian Armed Forces, which did not meet with understanding in the Government of the Russian Federation.

“If you ask me what is the most negative experience in 50 years of service, then there were two of them: this is half a year under the command of Zaitsev, without any help from above, as you like - live with him, and we will look from the outside - who will devour whom. And the second is the earthquake in Armenia in 1988.”

Public and political activities

Since May 1994, Rodionov was President, then Chairman of the Council of the Interregional Public Organization of Veterans of the Armed Forces "Iron Division Club". In October 1995, he was elected a member of the Council of the public movement "Honor and Motherland".

In the parliamentary elections in December 1995, he ran for deputies of the State Duma of the second convocation from the Congress of Russian Communities, but was not elected.

After his dismissal from the Armed Forces in August 1997, he joined the organizing committee of the Movement for the Support of the Army, Defense Industry and Military Science (DPA), created on the initiative of Lev Rokhlin. By the end of the year, he retired from the activities of the DPA.

Since December 1998 - Chairman of the Central Committee of the Trade Union of Russian Servicemen.

According to I. N. Rodionov,

The evil empire is the USA, the world oligarchy and the world freemasonry. Structures that create conditions for their own survival at the expense of other nations. And world terrorism is an invention of the United States, which, after the collapse of the USSR, needed a new enemy.

On December 19, 1999, on the list of the electoral bloc "FOR VICTORY" (KPRF) from the Movement in Support of the Army, which is part of the bloc, he was elected to the State Duma of the third convocation. From January 26 to April 5, 2000, he was a member of the State Duma Committee on Labor, Social Policy and Veterans Affairs, then a member of the State Duma Committee on Veterans Affairs, a member of the Communist Party faction.

On February 23, 2002, he was elected chairman of the People's Patriotic Party of Russia (NPPR), the party did not have official registration in the Ministry of Justice, which allowed him to become a member of the electoral bloc and the Rodina party

On December 7, 2003, according to the lists of the Rodina electoral bloc, he was elected a deputy of the State Duma of the fourth convocation, a member of the State Duma Committee on Security. After the bloc was transformed into a party of the same name, he became a member of it.

March 10, 2005 entered the so-called. "People's Government of Russia" coalition "Patriots of Russia", which was headed by State Duma deputy Gennady Semigin.

In 2006, 2 other parties joined Rodina and it received a new name, Just Russia.

He passed away on December 19, 2014 after a long illness. He was buried on December 22 at the Federal War Memorial Cemetery.

Awards

• Order of the Red Banner,
• Order of the Red Star,
• Order "For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR" II and III degree,
• twelve medals (including the medal "In Commemoration of the 10th Anniversary of the Withdrawal of Soviet Troops from Afghanistan").

Family and personal life

• Wife - Rodionova (Naumets) Lyudmila Ivanovna
• Son Sergei (born 1961) - Lieutenant Colonel of the Marine Corps, participant in hostilities.

Hobbies include literature (works by M. A. Sholokhov, K. M. Simonov and A. I. Kuprin), music (mainly jazz), swimming, shooting from all types of military weapons, and fishing.

Notes

1. General Rodionov, who completed the First Chechen campaign, has died (Russian). LifeNews (December 19, 2014). Retrieved December 19, 2014.
2. 1 2 Igor Rodionov on the Panorama. EN»
3. N. I. Ryzhkov. "The Tragedy of a Great Country". - M.: Veche, 2007
4. 1 2 IGOR RODIONOV: “UNDER YELTSIN THE COUNTRY WAS RUNNED FROM AMERICA”
5. Igor Rodionov __ STARS SHIPPED THROUGH HELL
6. Who is the evil empire now? // KP.RU
7. Members of the People's Patriotic Party of Russia, Rodionov Igor Nikolaevich // Archive of the official website of the People's Patriotic Party of Russia
8. Rodionov Igor Nikolaevich, on the website of the Rodina party //archived version
9. The ex-Minister of Defense of Russia, General of the Army Igor Rodionov, was buried on December 22 at the Federal Military Memorial Cemetery.
10. Belarus medals. Russian collector

Predecessor: army General Pavel Sergeevich Grachev
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Heads of military departments of the Russian Empire, RSFSR, USSR, Russian Federation
Presidents of the Military Collegium	A. D. Menshikov A. I. Repnin M. M. Golitsyn-st. V. V. Dolgorukov B. Kh. Minikh N. Yu. Trubetskoy Z. G. Chernyshev G. A. Potemkin N. I. Saltykov
Presidents of the Admiralty College	F. M. Apraksin P. I. Sievers N. F. Golovin M. M. Golitsyn Jr. led. book. Pavel Petrovich I. G. Chernyshev I. L. Golenishchev-Kutuzov P. V. Chichagov I. I. Traverse
War Ministers of the Russian Empire	S. K. Vyazmitinov A. A. Arakcheev M. B. Barclay de Tolly A. I. Gorchakov P. P. Konovnitsyn P. I. Meller-Zakomelsky A. I. Tatishchev A. I. Chernyshev V. A. Dolgorukov N. O. Sukhozanet D. A. Milyutin P. S. Vannovsky A. N. Kuropatkin V. V. Sakharov A. F. Rediger V. A. Sukhomlinov A. A. Polivanov D. S. Shuvaev M. A. Belyaev
Naval Ministers of the Russian Empire	N. S. Mordvinov P. V. Chichagov I. I. Traverse A. V. Moller A. S. Menshikov F. P. Wrangel N. F. Metlin N. K. Krabbe S. S. Lesovsky A. A. Peshchurov I. A. Shestakov N. M. Chikhachev P. P. Tyrtov F. K. Avelan A. A. Birilev I. M. Dikov S. A. Voevodsky I. K. Grigorovich
Military and naval ministers (Provisional Government of Russia)	A. I. Guchkov A. F. Kerensky A. I. Verkhovsky
War and Naval Minister (Provisional All-Russian Government)	A. V. Kolchak
Military ministers of the Russian state	N. A. Stepanov D. A. Lebedev M. K. Diterikhs A. P. Budberg M. V. Khanzhin
Maritime Ministers of the Russian State	M. I. Smirnov
Committee of People's Commissars for Military and maritime affairs of the RSFSR	P. E. Dybenko V. A. Antonov N. V. Krylenko
People's Commissar of the RSFSR	N. I. Podvoisky
People's Commissariat of War People's Commissars of Defense Ministers of Defense of the USSR	L. D. Trotsky M. V. Frunze K. E. Voroshilov S. K. Timoshenko I. V. Stalin N. A. Bulganin A. M. Vasilevsky G. K. Zhukov R. Ya. Malinovsky A. A. Grechko D. F. Ustinov S. L. Sokolov D. T. Yazov M. A. Moiseev (acting) E. I. Shaposhnikov
Russian Defense Ministers	K. I. Kobets B. N. Yeltsin (acting) P. S. Grachev M. P. Kolesnikov (acting) I. N. Rodionov I. D. Sergeev S. B. Ivanov A. E. Serdyukov S. K. Shoigu

Afghan war (1979-1989)
Main events	Articles on the topic	government forces	Mujahideen	Help the Mujahideen
1979 Storming of Amin's Palace 1980-1985 The battle near the village of Khara Battle near the village of Shaest The death of the 1st battalion of the 682nd motorized rifle regiment Panjshir operations Herat operations Kunar operations 1985 The death of the Maravar company Battle of the 4th company near the village of Cognac Battle at Qishlaq Afrij Badaber uprising 1986 Assault on Javar Battle on Mount Yafsaj Operation Maneuver Operation Trap 1987 Operation "Highway" 1988 Fight at height 3234 Operation Typhoon 1989 Withdrawal of Soviet troops	Heroes of the Soviet Union (Afghan war 1979-1989) Military operations of the Afghan war (1979-1989) Fortified areas of the Afghan Mujahideen (1979-1989) Losses of aircraft of the USSR Air Force Peshawar Seven Shiite eight Big game Anglo-Afghan wars: 1838-1842, 1878-1880, 1919 Civil War in Afghanistan april revolution Muslim battalions Shuravi "Black stork" Tora Bora Javara Islamic Society of Afghanistan Islamic Party of Afghanistan	Democratic Republic of Afghanistan B. Karmal M. Najibullah Army DRA Special service "HAD" Soviet Union 40th Army Sergey Sokolov Vladimir Vostrov Sergei Akhromeev Victor Merimsky Valentin Varennikov Boris Gromov Viktor Dubynin Yuri Tukharinov Boris Tkach Alexander Rutskoy Pavel Grachev Igor Puzanov Mahmut Gareev Boris Pastukhov Igor Rodionov Ruslan Aushev Valery Vostrotin Valery Evnevich Alexander Skorodumov Vladimir Isakov Lev Rokhlin Ertaev Bakhytzhan Vitaly Raevsky Boris Kerimbaev	Afghan Mujahideen G. Hekmatyar B. Rabbani M. Nabi S. Mojaddedi Ahmad Shah Massoud D. Haqqani Abdul Haq Ismail Khan Abdul Ali Mazari Yunus Khales Said Mansour Muhammad Omar	USA Operation Cyclone Saudi Arabia Pakistan Egypt Great Britain

Rodionov Igor Nikolaevich Kovalenko, Rodionov Igor Nikolaevich Ostretsov, Rodionov Igor Nikolaevich Smolyarov, Rodionov Igor Nikolaevich Shchelokov

Rodionov, Igor Nikolaevich Information About

Ablazov Valery Ivanovich
Who fought, worked and led in Afghanistan?
Annotation:
To manage the processes, forces and means that the USSR had in Afghanistan, a special Commission of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU for Afghanistan was created in Moscow. Representatives of a number of political, military and economic organizations of the USSR worked in Afghanistan. Only their enumeration took up a large amount of material. In addition, some features of the management of the armed formations of the USSR in Afghanistan are given. In Kyiv in 2012, the book "Afghan arena. Diplomats and generals" was published. This is a reference documentary publication. The book managed to virtually bring together all the leaders of the upper echelon who acted in Afghanistan: ambassadors, chief military advisers, army commanders and other persons, to provide their biographical and documentary materials, as well as a point of view on the past events of many of them. This fragment is a small section of the book.

Who fought, worked and led in Afghanistan?

The military-political tasks that faced the Soviet side, and the means of achieving them, changed in accordance with the dynamically changing situation in Afghanistan and in the Afghan arena in general, which includes a number of states, one way or another participating in the Afghan conflict.
To manage the processes, forces and means that the USSR had in Afghanistan, a special Commission of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee for Afghanistan was created in Moscow, which included Andropov Yu.V., Gromyko A.A., Ponomarev B.N., Ustinov D. F.

Representatives of political, military and economic organizations of the USSR in Afghanistan.
Representatives of a number of political, military and economic organizations of the USSR worked in Afghanistan.

IN THE POLITICAL SPHERE:
Central Committee of the CPSU:
advisers in party organizations of the PDPA.
Leaders of groups of party advisers (Advisers of the Central Committee of the CPSU in the PDPA):
S.M.Veselov, L.I.Grekov, S.V.Kozlov, A.V.Romantsev, V.G.Lomonosov, N.T.Konyaev, P.P.Mozhaev, N.G.Egorychev. The last two group leaders were at the same time the Ambassadors of the USSR in Afghanistan. Party advisers were in Afghanistan from November 1978 to October 1988. Over the entire period, 316 party advisers, 45 advisers-teachers of the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee, 150 Komsomol advisers worked in these groups. The apparatus of advisers was completed at the expense of the released workers of the central, republican, regional, regional, city and district party committees. The republics of the USSR were represented in groups of party advisers as follows: the RSFSR - 144, Ukraine - 39, Kazakhstan - 27, Belarus - 12, Uzbekistan - 10, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Tajikistan - 5 each, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova - 4 each, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania - 3 each, Turkmenistan, Estonia - 2 each, in addition - Moscow 42, Leningrad - 4.
Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League:
counselors in youth organizations.
Leaders of groups of Komsomol advisers (Advisers of the Komsomol Central Committee in the Democratic Youth Organization of Afghanistan): N.I. Zakharov, V.A. Sidorov, V. Struchkov, A.P. Balan, D.G. Ostroushko.
During the entire period, about 400 Komsomol advisers and translators worked in groups, mainly from Tajikistan. Of the 150 Komsomol advisers, 27 represented the Komsomol of Ukraine.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
Embassy of the USSR in Afghanistan.
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassadors of the USSR in Afghanistan:
Puzanov A.M. (1972 - 1979),
Tabeev F.A. (1979-1986),
Mozhaev P.P. (1986 - 1988),
Egorychev N.G. (1988),
Vorontsov Yu.M. (1988-1989),
Pastukhov B.N. (1989-1991).

IN THE ECONOMIC SPHERE:
State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for Foreign Affairs economic relations(GKES):
representatives of the Main Engineering Department (GIU GKES),
representatives of the Main Technical Department (GTU GKES).
advisors and specialists.
Ministry of Education, Higher and Secondary special education THE USSR:
advisers, teachers and specialists of universities and schools in Afghanistan.
USSR Ministry of Health:
advisers and specialists in the medical institutions of Afghanistan.
Ministries of the chemical, gas, automotive industry, geology, energy and electrification, melioration and water management, the State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for Construction (Gosstroy of the USSR), etc.:
advisers and specialists, workers in enterprises.

IN THE MILITARY SPHERE:
The limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan (OKSVA) is a more political term than a military one. Usually, large formations of Soviet troops abroad were called groups of forces: the Northern Group of Forces (SGV), the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSVG), the Central Group of Forces (TsGV), the Southern Group of Forces (YUGV). In addition, there was a Group of Soviet Forces in Mongolia, a Group of Soviet Forces on the island of Cuba. In order to emphasize the temporality and limitations of the tasks and the group itself in Afghanistan, the specified term was used to designate it.
Ministry of Defense (MO), General Staff (GSh), main types of the Armed Forces of the USSR (Soviet Army):
- Operational group of the Ministry of Defense (MO) of the USSR.
Leaders of the Operational Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense:
Marshal of the Soviet Union Sokolov S.L. (1980 - 1984),
General of the Army Varennikov V.I. (1984 - 1989).
- Task Force of the General Staff (OG of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces).
Heads of the OG of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces:
Major General B.V. Gromov (March 1985 - April 1986),
Major General Yu.V. Yarygin (April 1986 - May 1987),
Major General V.S. Kudlay (May 1987 - January 1989).
Special OG of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces (to create 3-month supplies for the Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia), Major General A.G. Gaponenko (May 1988 - January 1989)
- Parts and subdivisions of the Central subordination.
Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU GSh):
- military attaches:
Colonel Baranaev A.B. (1977 - 1980),
Major General Krakhmalov S.P. (1980 - 1985),
Major General Sen V.T. (1985 - 1989),
Colonel Chizhikov A.E. (1989 - 1992);
- formations (brigades) of special forces,
- separate units of special forces.
10 Main Directorate of the General Staff:
- Group of military advisers.
- Office of the Chief Military Adviser.
Chief Soviet military advisers:
Major General Bondarets I.S. (1972-1975),
Lieutenant General Gorelov L.N. (1975-1979),
Colonel General Magometov S.K. (1979-1980),
General of the Army Mayorov A.M. (1980-1981),
General of the Army Sorokin M.I. (1981-1984),
General of the Army Salmanov G.I. (1984-1986),
Colonel General Vostrov V.A. (1986-1988),
Colonel General Sotskov M.M. (1988-1989),
Colonel General Shein B.P. (1989-1990),
General of the Army Grachev N.F. (1990-1991),
Lieutenant General Perfiliev B.S. (1991-1992),
General of the Army Gareev M.A. (Military Advisor to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the President of the Republic of Afghanistan 1989-1990),
Ground Forces (SV):
- Turkestan Military District (TurkVO).
Commanders of the TurkVO:
General of the Army Maksimov Yu.P. (1979 - 1984);
General of the Army Popov N.I. (1984 - 1989) ;
Colonel General Fuzhenko I.V. (1989 - 1991);
Colonel General Kondratiev G.G. (1991 - 1992).
- Task Force TurkVO;
- 40th combined arms army (40 OA) TurkVO;
Commanders of the 40th Combined Arms Army of the TurkVO:
Lieutenant General Tukharinov Yu.V. (1979 - 1980),
Lieutenant General Tkach B.I. (1980 - 1982),
Lieutenant General Ermakov V.F. (1982-1983),
Lieutenant General Generalov L.E. (1983-1985),
Lieutenant General Rodionov I.N. (1985-1986),
Lieutenant General Dubynin V.P. (1986-1987),
Lieutenant General Gromov B.V. (1987-1989).
The headquarters of the 40th Army was located in the Taj Beck Palace in Kabul, the former residence of Hafizullah Amin (Amin's Palace).
Air Force (Air Force):
- 34th Aviation Corps (later - Air Force of the 40th Army);
Commanders of the Air Force of the 40th Army:
Major General Lepaev B.A. (1980-1981),
Major General Shkanakin V.G. (1981-1982),
Major General Kalensky S.A. (1982-1983),
Major General Kolodiy G.V. (1983-1985),
Major General Kot V.S. (1985-1987),
Major General Romanyuk D.S. (1987-1989).
- Military transport aviation (VTA);
- Long-range aviation (YES);
- Front-line aviation (FA);
- Army Aviation (AA).
Airborne Troops (VDV):
- connection (103 vdd);
- separate parts (345 opdp).
Navy (Navy):
- part of the construction troops.

State Security Committee (KGB) of the USSR:
- subdivisions (detachments) of special purpose ("Thunder", "Zenith", "Cascade", etc.).
- Border troops of the KGB of the USSR (PV).
Task Force of the Main Directorate of Border Troops in Moscow, head of the Task Force, Lieutenant General I.G. Karpov.
Operational group of the Central Asian border district in Pyanj, head of the Operational group, Colonel N.T. Butko.
PV special forces (combined combat detachments (SBO), motorized maneuver groups (MMG), air assault maneuver groups (DShMG), aviation of the PVS of the Central Asian and Red Banner Eastern border districts),
coordination of combat operations management of special forces of the PV, Lieutenant General I.P. Vertelko.
PV advisors,
permanent representative of the PV, Major General A.A. Vlasov
- Representation of the KGB of the USSR in Afghanistan.
Heads of the Representative Office of the KGB of the USSR (KGB advisers in KhAD):
Colonel L.P. Bogdanov (1978 - 1980),
Major General V.N. Spolnikov (1980 - 1982),
Major General B.N. Voskoboynikov (1982 - 1984),
Major General N.E. Kalyagin (1984 - 1987),
Major General V.P. Zaitsev (1987 - 1989),
Major General V.A. Revin (1989 - 1991),

Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR:
- units (detachments) for special purposes ("Cobalt", etc.),
- units of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR,
- Representation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR in Afghanistan.
Heads of the Representation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR (Counselors of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Tsarandoy):
Major General of Militia N.S. Veselkov (1978 - 1979),
Major General A.M. Kosogovsky (1979 - 1980),
militia lieutenant general N.E. Tsygannik (1981 - 1983),
Lieutenant General of the Internal Troops A.V. Anikeev (1983 - 1984),
Lieutenant General of the Internal Troops A.M. Loginov (1984 - 1986),
Lieutenant General of the Internal Troops V.D. Egorov (1987 - 1988),
police lieutenant general G.A. Alekseev (1989 - 1990),

On the work of the Operational Groups of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces in Afghanistan.

The operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense (OG MO USSR) was formed on December 13, 1979, headed by the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army S. F. Akhromeev. It included generals and officers of the General Staff, as well as representatives from all types and branches of the USSR Armed Forces (USSR Armed Forces), the main and central departments of the USSR Ministry of Defense. At 22.00 on December 14, the OG of the USSR Ministry of Defense was already in Termez, on the Soviet-Afghan border, and began to coordinate actions to send troops to Afghanistan. However, General of the Army S.F. Akhromeev fell ill and left for Moscow on December 19, and the leadership of the OG of the USSR Ministry of Defense was entrusted to the First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union S.L. Sokolov, who, in this regard, in mid-December, D.F. Ustinov recalled from vacation. It was S.L. Sokolov had to carry out the overall leadership of the Soviet troops during their preparation and entry into Afghanistan.
At the initial stage of the "Afghan campaign" the OG of the USSR Ministry of Defense did a great deal of organizational work. She supervised the regrouping, mobilization and entry of troops into the territory of Afghanistan, as well as carrying out measures to remove Kh. Amin from power and establish the regime of B. Karmal. In subsequent years, under her leadership, the largest military operations were carried out, and the most complex issues of a military-political nature were resolved ...
The first to arrive in Kabul on December 23, 1979, in agreement with the leadership of the DRA, was the Operational Group of the Airborne Forces. It was formed from officers of the headquarters of the Airborne Forces. It was headed by the deputy commander of the Airborne Forces, Lieutenant-General Guskov N.N. The task force of the Airborne Forces conducted reconnaissance of the deployment areas of the 103rd Airborne Division and the 345th Airborne Division in Kabul and Bagram and the exit routes of the units after landing to the areas assigned to them. From December 28, she also carried out control over units of the 108th Motor Rifle Division, since the control of the 40th Army was introduced into the territory of the DRA only in the first days of January 1980.
At the same time, by decision of the Soviet political leadership, an operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union Sokolov S.L. entered Afghanistan. and since that time, the task force of the Airborne Forces has been abolished.
The operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense worked in Afghanistan for 10 months and in November 1980 returned to Moscow. Subsequently, she periodically traveled to Afghanistan for a period of 1.5 to 6 months. Until the end of 1984, it was invariably headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union Sokolov S.L., and then - Deputy Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army V.I. Varennikov. The last time the operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense arrived in Kabul on January 2, 1987 and left it on February 14, 1989.
The presence of the operational group of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR in Afghanistan was a forced measure. It was caused by the following circumstances:
1. The situation in this country required coordination and coordination of the efforts of all Soviet representatives (embassies, party and military advisers, representative offices of the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR, advisers and specialists in the economic departments of the DRA, the command of the TurkVO and the 40th Army, etc.) creating conditions for stabilizing the situation in the country.
Unfortunately, in fact, there was no coordination, and often even simple interaction, between representatives of the Soviet departments in Afghanistan. All of them acted separately, according to the instructions of their Moscow leadership, which did not allow them to achieve the necessary results. There was no authoritative general leader of all Soviet missions, endowed with appropriate powers (including in relation to the OKSV), in Afghanistan until the very end of the Soviet presence.
2. Combat operations on the territory of Afghanistan against detachments and groups of the armed opposition were carried out by Soviet troops, as well as formations and units of the Afghan army, operational units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security of Afghanistan. In order to achieve a greater effect of hostilities, it was necessary to coordinate the efforts of all these forces. This could be done by the chief military adviser. However, the 40th Army was not subordinate to him (even when the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, General of the Army A.M. Mayorov, was the chief military adviser). The representative offices of the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR and their leaders in Moscow generally considered the chief military adviser only an adviser to the Minister of Defense of the DRA (although officially he was called the Chief Military Adviser in the DRA) and strictly monitored that the GVS in the DRA "did not get into someone else's monastery" and did not issue recommendations on the conduct of hostilities directly to the ministers of state security and internal affairs of the DRA, bypassing the relevant representations.
3. The vast majority of issues in Afghanistan, including military ones, required the decisions of the top leadership of the DRA and the PDPA, the decisions of B. Karmal as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the PDPA and Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of the DRA. In fact, only the Soviet ambassador had the right to reach such a high level of the Afghan leadership, who was bound by the rules of the diplomatic service, the subordination of the USSR Foreign Ministry, which greatly hampered the work.
Considering all this, the Ministry of Defense was forced to send authoritative leaders to the DRA (RA): Deputy Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union S.L. Sokolov. and then Deputy Chief of the General Staff General of the Army Varennikov V.I. They could meet and resolve important issues not only with the leadership of the Ministry of Defense of the DRA (RA), but also with the political leadership of the country.
4. The reason for sending operational groups of the USSR Ministry of Defense to the DRA until the end of 1984 was also the fact that the Minister of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union Ustinov D.F. did not fully believe in the ability of the command of the TurkVO and the 40th Army to properly organize the combat activities of the OKSV. He believed that a "pusher" was needed in Afghanistan, the role of which Ustinov D.F. assigned to the task force.
In connection with such ideas of the Minister of Defense of the USSR, the operational group was often forced to interfere in the combat activities of the OKSV, in the direct command and control of the troops. For example, the daily review of incoming intelligence information with the participation of representatives various kinds reconnaissance (the prerogative of the army headquarters) was carried out in the operational group. In the same place, decisions were made on the implementation of intelligence information. The commander of the 40th Army received already turnkey solution on the use of forces and means of his army, signed by the head of the task force. In the task force, under the leadership of its head of intelligence, there were daily coordination meetings on intelligence. There were even attempts by the task force to manage specific operations (only two such operations were carried out).
The leaders of the operational group on behalf of the Minister of Defense of the USSR, each time approved by the commission of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU for Afghanistan, often had to meet and talk with B. Karmal, other statesmen, party and military figures of the DRA on issues of strengthening the fight against counter-revolution by the forces of the Afghans themselves and the stabilization of the military-political situation in Afghanistan. At the same time, they sought to encourage the Afghan side to fulfill the recommendations of the Soviet political leadership more fully and on time. However, such meetings were not of a regular nature.
In the interests of increasing the effectiveness of the fight against the opposition Afghan forces, the leadership of the task force actually had to coordinate the efforts of all Soviet missions in the DRA (RA).
Officially, the leadership of the USSR did not give such a right to either S.L. Sokolov or V.I. Varennikov, who replaced him, since they were only representatives of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Here their personal qualities played a role, their ability to find a common language with representatives of other departments, their readiness to take responsibility for the decisions made. It is regrettable that the Soviet leadership did not listen to the proposals of the USSR Ministry of Defense and did not appoint its plenipotentiary representative to Afghanistan back in 1980.
After Marshal of the Soviet Union Sokolov S.L. became Minister of Defense of the USSR at the end of 1984, and the task force was headed by General of the Army Varennikov V.I. The functions of the task force have changed somewhat. Until the end of 1986, she continued to work in the DRA periodically. After the Soviet political leadership made the final decision to withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the task force arrived in Kabul on January 2, 1987 and left it only on February 14, 1989.
A feature of the work of the operational group at this stage was that it did not interfere at all in the activities of the commander and headquarters of the 40th Army, commanders of all degrees, did not replace them, did not limit independence in making decisions and putting them into practice in Afghanistan. At the same time, through the operational group, the commander and headquarters of the army had access directly to the central planning and contenting bodies of the USSR Ministry of Defense, which made it possible to more quickly resolve all issues of combat activity and comprehensive support for formations and units of the army.
The main attention of the operational group was focused on assisting the command of the Armed Forces of the DRA (RA) and the chief military adviser in increasing the combat capability and combat readiness of the Afghan troops, their independent combat activities, without the participation of Soviet units.
In the spring of 1987, the Operational Group assisted the Afghan side in creating the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan as a permanent command and control body of the armed forces. Prior to the creation of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the control of forces engaged in an armed struggle against rebel groups was carried out by the ministers of defense, internal affairs and state security independently, independently of each other, without any coordination of their efforts.
With the creation of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the overall leadership of the military operations from the Afghan side was taken over by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the DRA (RA) Najibullah. At the same time, meetings were held daily from 8.00 in the morning under the chairmanship of Najibullah. From the Afghan side, the meetings of the Headquarters were attended by the ministers of defense, state security, internal affairs, the head of the General Staff, head of the department of defense and justice of the Central Committee of the PDPA. As necessary, depending on the issues under consideration, other military and civilian leaders were invited to meetings of the Headquarters. From the Soviet side, the head of the operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the chief military adviser in the DRA constantly participated in the work of the Headquarters. With the main report on the general situation in the country and the nature of the activities of the armed forces at the meetings of the Headquarters, the Chief of the General Staff delivered. His report was supplemented by ministers. After them, their assessments and conclusions were reported by the chief military adviser. The head of the operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense acquainted Najibullah and the ministers with the activities of the Soviet troops and expressed his recommendations and requests. The results were summed up by Najibullah. At meetings of the Headquarters, they made decisions arising from the current situation and Soviet recommendations, expressed wishes for involving Soviet units in operations in a particular region of the country. Often, political and economic issues were resolved at meetings of the Headquarters.
The task force did a lot of work to assist the leadership of the DRA in matters of increasing the staffing of the armed forces with officers, increasing the role of the Afghan army in defeating opposition detachments and groups, strengthening the cover of the border with Pakistan and Iran, strengthening and increasing the activity of the border troops, on the priority staffing, weapons and equipment of formations and units in the main directions, from where the Soviet troops were supposed to leave in the first place, etc.
The work of the Operational Group in the Soviet troops was carried out in several directions.
The main attention was focused on preventing unjustified losses of personnel and military equipment. Any fact of the loss of people and equipment was analyzed jointly with the headquarters of the army, formations and units. Some cases were personally investigated by the head of the OG of the USSR Ministry of Defense.
Practical assistance was provided in preparing troops for combat operations. The fortification equipment of outposts and posts was checked, measures were taken to increase their combat capabilities and security. Attention was paid to reconnaissance support for hostilities. Measures were taken to improve the tactics of operations in combat for both combined arms and aviation units and subunits. Decisions of commanders and plans for combat operations were constantly considered.
The operational group, together with the office of the chief military adviser and the command of the OKSV, took measures to reduce the participation of Soviet troops in active hostilities by maximizing the involvement of Afghan units and subunits in them so that the Afghan troops would gain as much combat experience as possible and responsibility for the independent solution of all diverse tasks.
Attention was paid to stabilizing the situation by political means through negotiations in different parts of the country. Some economic events were also organized directly by the operational group.
However, such work of Soviet officers, incl. and the head of the OG of the USSR Ministry of Defense, did not always meet the understanding on the part of Afghan officials who reported to their leadership (especially the employees of the MGB of the RA sinned with this) that supposedly Soviet commanders were negotiating to the detriment of the interests of Afghanistan, since they did not want to fight with adversary. The representative office of the KGB of the USSR was also jealous of such activities, believing that officers of the OKSV should not conduct such negotiations - their business was to fight, and not engage in political activities, which they informed their leadership in Moscow.
An important activity of the operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense in Afghanistan was the preparation of Soviet troops for the withdrawal from the RA, its planning and implementation. At the same time, the operational group was engaged in equipping the Afghan army, operational units of the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, took part in the formation of units to replace the Soviet troops at outposts, as well as the Special Guards of the Republic of Armenia, assisted the Afghan command in creating a new one for the Afghans types of troops - missile brigades and divisions.
Thus, the operational group of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR in Afghanistan carried out a large and varied work in the Soviet troops, in formations and units of the Afghan army, units of the MGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the DRA (RA). It had a significant impact on the political and military leadership of the country, prompting it to strictly and clearly implement all our recommendations. She did a lot of political work. Carried out constant constructive communication with the UN control bodies in Kabul, informing about the progress of the withdrawal of Soviet troops and drawing attention to violations of the Geneva agreements by the Pakistani administration.
The task force played an important role in managing the limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, increasing the combat effectiveness of the Afghan armed forces, and in acquiring the ability to independently, without Soviet troops, resist the onslaught of the counter-revolution. To the best of its ability, the operational group coordinated the activities of the Soviet missions in Afghanistan, trying to direct the efforts of all Soviet and Afghan departments to help stabilize the military-political situation in the country.
Regular group of representatives of the General Staff. Due to the fact that the operational group of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR was periodically in Afghanistan until the end of 1986, the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal of the Soviet Union Akhromeev S.F. in agreement with the Minister of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union Sokolov S.L. in March 1985, he established and sent to Afghanistan a full-time group of representatives of the General Staff (OG of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces) with a permanent location in Kabul. The OG of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces was headed by generals for special assignments of the Chief of the General Staff: Major General B.V. Gromov (March 1985 - April 1986), Major General Yu.V. Yarygin (April 1986 - May 1987), Major General V.S. Kudlay (May 1987 - January 1989). In addition, during the withdrawal of Soviet troops, a Special OG of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces was sent to manage the creation of 3-month reserves for the RA Armed Forces, headed by Major General A.G. Gaponenko (May 1988 - January 1989).
The OG of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces was created for the following purposes:
- implementation of direct verification on the ground of the implementation by headquarters and troops, Soviet military advisers at formations and units of the DRA army of directives and orders of the USSR Minister of Defense, Chief of the General Staff for the preparation, conduct of hostilities and their comprehensive support, as well as orders and directives of the Commander-in-Chief of the Forces of the Southern Direction, Commander of the Troops of the TurkVO and the 40th Army, Chief Military Adviser in the RA;
- providing the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces with timely and accurate information on the preparation and conduct of hostilities;
- assisting the headquarters and troops of the 40th Army and advisers in the RA Armed Forces in organizing measures to ensure the fulfillment of combat missions;
- exercising control and assistance in agreeing between the command of the OKSV and the GVS apparatus in the RA on issues related to their activities in the interests of fulfilling their joint combat missions;
- studying the experience of combat operations in Afghanistan, methods of using new means of armed struggle and tactical methods, methods of command and control in combat under the special conditions of the Republic of Armenia by Soviet and Afghan troops.
During the stay in Afghanistan of the operational group of the Ministry of Defense, a group of representatives of the General Staff was part of it and worked according to the plan of the head of the OG of the USSR Ministry of Defense.
The commander of the TurkVO troops sent its own task force to Afghanistan. It was insignificant in composition and worked only in the troops of the 40th Army, assisting its command. This operational group could not go to the Afghan side with proposals and wishes, as well as to the Soviet ambassador and other Soviet representatives. She dealt only with issues of combat training and combat activities of the army, and her head (as a rule, the deputy chief of staff of the district) could direct the combat operations of army units and subunits only according to the plan of the army commander.

Features of the organization of control of the Soviet troops.
The General Staff did not develop a plan for bringing troops into Afghanistan in advance, so a general directive for the mobilization of troops and command and control agencies was not given. Formations and units were put on alert after appropriate oral instructions from the Minister of Defense of the USSR D.F. Marshal of the Soviet Union Ustinov.
From mid-December 1979, the formation of a contingent of troops for entry into Afghanistan began at an accelerated pace. It was based on replenished formations and units stationed in TurkVO, which were almost all cropped. They were understaffed at the expense of local resources from the reserve. Taking into account the fact that representatives of the Central Asian republics served, as a rule, in construction units and motorized rifle troops, their training was low. The troops were brought to readiness by administrative order, on the basis of separate orders of the General Staff. In just three weeks, more than thirty such orders were issued.
In the Main Operational Directorate (GOU) of the General Staff, a special group of generals and officers from all types and branches of the Armed Forces worked, which prepared draft directives of the USSR Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff on mobilization and ensuring the entry of troops into the DRA, planned and carried out the transportation of troops, equipment, weapons, materiel to the Afghan border, carried out organizational activities, and also constantly monitored the military-political situation in Afghanistan, making its analysis.
The order to mobilize the field administration of the 40th Army was issued on December 16, 1979. First Deputy Commander of the TurkVO Troops, Lieutenant General Yu.V. Tukharinov, a member of the military council - the head of the political department of the army - Major General A.V. Taskaev, Chief of Staff of the Army - Major General L.N. Zevtsov-Lobanov, head of intelligence - Major General A.A. Korchagin.
Specific tasks for the introduction and deployment on Afghan territory were determined in the directive N 312/12/001, signed by the Minister of Defense of the USSR D.F. Ustinov and Chief of the General Staff N.V. Ogarkov, sent to the troops on December 24, 1979. In particular, the following explanation was given for the step being taken: “Given the military-political situation in the Middle East, the last appeal of the government of Afghanistan was considered positively. assistance to the friendly Afghan people, as well as the creation of favorable conditions for the prohibition of possible anti-Afghan actions by neighboring states ... ". Further, the troops were assigned tasks for the march and deployment in Afghanistan. Participation in hostilities was not provided.
Specific combat missions for formations and units to suppress the resistance of the rebels were set in the directive of the Minister of Defense of the USSR of December 27 N 312/12/002.
On December 31, 1979, the commander of the 40th Army, Lieutenant General Yu.V. Tukharinov, ended up in the hospital with pneumonia, and the next day, the chief of staff of the army, Major General L.N. In this regard, the commander of the TurkVO troops, Colonel-General Yu.P. Maksimov, arrived in Kabul and took over the leadership of the troops.
The nature and characteristics of the combat activities of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan left their mark on the organization of command and control. Troops were controlled from stationary and mobile command posts.
Stationary command posts of the army, air force, divisions, brigades, regiments were created immediately after the entry of Soviet troops into the territory of Afghanistan in the points of permanent deployment occupied by them. In addition, aviation guidance points (PN) were created at the airfields of Shindand, Jalalabad (since 1984) and Kandahar and the PU of the EU ATC (since 1985 RC EU ATC) of the interaction group with the Air Defense Command and the Air Force of the Republic of Armenia. Stationary command posts controlled the entire daily life and activities of subordinate troops, as well as their combat operations.
The basis of the stationary command posts was the combat control centers (CBU), which were formed in all levels of command from the army to the regiment, in all SPN battalions and in separate combined arms battalions. Until 1981, the duty shifts of the CBU for every day were formed at the expense of officers from the departments of the army headquarters, formations and regiments. Later they became established. The combat shifts of the CBU were headed by deputy commanders (commanders), heads of departments (departments).
The main tasks of the CBU were:
- collection of daily and combat information, its generalization and report to the commander (commanders) and chiefs of staff;
- transfer of decisions of the commander (commanders) to troops and other performers;
- coordination of all data of the situation with the apparatus of the chief military adviser in the RA (military advisers in the zones or under the commanders of the nearest Afghan units);
- daily report of daily and combat information to higher levels of command;
- ensuring reliable, stable and continuous command and control of subordinate troops.
The main duty of the CBU of all command posts was to provide overall leadership of military operations in its area of ​​responsibility. At all CBUs, workplaces for the commander (commanders), chiefs of staff and operational departments (departments) were equipped. Every morning at the CBU of the army, the commander listened to the general situation and intelligence information received by 8.00, and made a decision on its implementation. At the same time, the commander determined what intelligence information and what forces and means the 40th Army would take for implementation, what forces would be required for joint actions from the Afghan army, and what information it would be desirable to implement independently by Afghan means. The necessary orders were immediately prepared for the formations and units of the 40th Army.
After that, a coordination meeting on intelligence was held at the army headquarters. It was attended by the chief of staff of the chief military adviser in the DRA, adviser to the chief of intelligence of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the DRA, employees of the offices of the KGB and the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs at the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the DRA, the chief of staff and intelligence chief of the 40th army, officers reconnaissance and operational departments, the headquarters of the Rocket Forces and Artillery (RV and A) and the Army Air Force, representatives of the advisory apparatus of the DRA Air Force. At this meeting, there was an exchange of intelligence information obtained by various agencies and types of intelligence, an analysis of previously received information, and the decision of the army commander to implement the information by the forces of Soviet formations and units.
At the meeting, recommendations were made to the Afghan command to conduct independent military operations and requests for the allocation of forces and means for conducting joint operations with the Soviet troops in accordance with the decisions of the commander of the 40th Army.
Similar work took place daily in the formations and units of the Soviet troops in relation to their areas of responsibility.
In addition to the CBU, other administrative structures were created and functioned at the headquarters of the 40th Army (as part of the command post). After the appearance of a large number of radio equipment in the opposition detachments, a purposeful struggle against them was organized by the forces and means of the army. It included electronic suppression of enemy RES and their destruction by air strikes, artillery fire and the actions of troops. To control the forces and means of electronic warfare, a special control group "Screen" was created at the headquarters of the 40th Army, which included representatives of operational control, radio intelligence, artillery and air force headquarters, and other specialists.
Since the spring of 1984, the Veil control group has been operating at the army command post to control the forces and means fighting enemy caravans by carrying out ambush actions as part of the army plan. She coordinated mainly the ambush actions of the SPN units and military intelligence. This group was headed by the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army. Since the spring of 1987, general military units were also involved in conducting ambush operations according to the army plan (previously they conducted ambush operations according to the plans of formations and units). Since that time, the coordination of all ambush activities began to be carried out by the Barrier control group (instead of the Veil group).
The management of all daily and combat activities of aviation, including those attracted from the territory of the Soviet Union, was carried out by the aviation command post deployed at the headquarters of the 40th Army.
The supply of material resources to ensure the life and activities of the OKSV was mainly carried out by road transport. For this purpose, 96 companies of automobile columns were involved. Every day there were 1500-2000 cars on the way.
In order to control all automobile transportations on the territory of the Republic of Armenia, a Central Control Center (CDC) and two of its operational groups - "Salang" (at the Salang pass) and in Shindand were created at the headquarters of the rear of the 40th Army. The CDP was subordinate to control points and control posts on the routes. The core of the CDP was the combat control group.
All these bodies and control groups closely cooperated with the CBU of the army and informed it in due time about the situation in their area of ​​responsibility and about the decisions and measures taken.
A feature of the management of combat operations in Afghanistan was that the units conducting the battle were led not by regular bodies of formations and units, but by specially assigned operational groups. This was due to the fact that, as a rule, divisions and regiments performed several different tasks at once, each of which required continuous and firm control.
Operational groups for the management of combat actions (operations), depending on the scale of hostilities and the number of forces and means involved (Soviet and Afghan), consisted of 8-15 people. Initially, each time they were formed immediately before entering the hostilities, they were consolidated, they did not engage in direct planning, but received a ready-made battle plan developed by the corresponding headquarters.
Since 1981, the heads of operations and their control groups in the army, divisions and regiments began to be given special orders in advance, for the whole year, with a personal listing of the entire composition of the groups. The officers began to clearly know who was in which group, who was the leader, and when this or that group would control the combat operations. These orders determined the heads of operations - the army commander, commanders of divisions, brigades, regiments, chiefs of staff, deputy commanders (commanders), as well as deputy chiefs of staff of the army. Command and control groups conducted combat coordination exercises and, together with the head of the operation, made up command and control apparatuses ready for action at any time. They themselves developed each operation that they were supposed to manage, based on the decision of their leader, and took part in the preparation of the troops allocated for it. Control groups (operational groups) were fully responsible for the preparation and conduct of a particular operation.
The fighting was usually led by:
- units allocated from one regiment - the regiment's control group;
- subdivisions allocated from different regiments of one division - the division control group;
- subdivisions allocated from different divisions - army command and control groups.
The most complex and large-scale operations were led by the army commander with his control group.
The head of the operation (regardless of level) controlled the combat operations from a mobile command post on an armored base. Due to the special conditions of combat operations in Afghanistan and the small number of command and control groups, other command posts, as a rule, were not deployed. All officers involved in the management and support of hostilities were located together with the head of the operation at one command post, used a single communication center, and were under a single guard. The basis of the mobile command post, as well as the stationary one, was the CBU.
Mobile command posts of all instances were located near the combat area and moved, as a rule, once a day. Troop control was carried out only from the spot. Attempts to control units on the move due to the special conditions for the propagation of radio waves in the mountains were mostly unsuccessful.
When choosing the location of the command post, the main attention was paid not to the conditions for visual observation of the actions of the troops (although this was very desirable), but to the possibility of maintaining continuous, stable communication with the units engaged in combat, aviation and higher authorities. In this regard, the command posts were located on the dominant heights, and if it was impossible - in alignment with the gorges along which the units were advancing.
If the troops were operating along diverging gorges, the command post deployed at the junction of the gorges. In winding gorges, the location of the control point had to be changed more often so as not to lose communication in areas covered by mountain ranges. At the same time, the head of the operation tried to choose each new position of the command post at the break of the gorge.
The situation sometimes forced the head of the operation to move to the command post of a subordinate authority with his own means of communication and a small command and control group. So, in necessary cases, a forward command post arose.
Despite the fact that spare command posts were not created, the principle of continuity of command was strictly observed. This was achieved by transferring control when moving command posts to stationary control posts or to command posts of subordinate command and control units. For the period of moving the command post of the head of the operation, these command posts acted as a kind of ZKP.
Aviation combat operations were controlled from stationary command posts of the army air force and aviation units and from the command post of the air force task force under the head of the operation (created for the period of the operation), as well as combat control groups (GBU) and aircraft controllers. Since the troops in most cases conducted combat operations with reinforced battalions in certain areas, and in some directions even with companies, it was necessary to provide communication with aviation directly to their commanders. This problem was solved by assigning air controllers (regular and non-standard) with radio stations to companies and battalions.
The combat operations of the on-duty subunits were controlled from the stationary command posts of the units that sent these subunits. The direct command of the battle was carried out by full-time commanders of duty units from their mobile command and observation posts. At the same time, as a rule, along with the commander of the duty unit, there were artillery spotters and aviation gunners.
After the completion of hostilities and the return of the troops participating in them to their deployment points, the leaders of operations for each of them compiled detailed reports, which, along with plans for operations, were sent to the headquarters of the 40th Army and the TurkVO.
The experience of the combat activities of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan showed the need for a certain decentralization of command and control, which, in the specific conditions of the DRA, made it more flexible without violating the general principles of command and control.

On the management of the Border Troops of the KGB of the USSR

The border troops of the KGB of the USSR (PV), in agreement with the Afghan side, gradually increased their presence in Afghanistan.
In early March 1979, to strengthen the security of the USSR Embassy in Kabul, a group of border guards arrived, consisting of 20 people with reinforcements (service dogs, signal devices, night surveillance devices, etc.), and on September 4, they arrived on combat duty in the embassy town a separate PV company of 50 people.
In April - May 1979, 23 border guard officers arrived for advisory work in the DRA border service.
In the summer of 1979, Major General A.A., a permanent representative of the Soviet border troops, was sent to the DRA. Vlasov - head of the PV department.
The command to cross the state border for the special forces of the PV was received on January 6, 1980. At dawn on January 7, the first detachments crossed the border. The operation to bring border units into Afghan territory was led by the Chief of Staff of the Central Asian Border District, Major General I.G. Karpov.
The special forces of the Air Force took part in the hostilities - consolidated combat detachments (SBO), motorized maneuver groups (MMG), air assault maneuver groups (DShMG), Air Force aviation of the Central Asian and Red Banner Eastern border districts.
At the beginning of 1981, in order to increase the efficiency and coordination of the management of the actions of the special forces of the PV in Afghanistan, the Operational Group of the Main Directorate of the Border Troops in Moscow was formed, headed by Lieutenant General I.G. Karpov, and in the Central Asian border district - the Task Force in Pyanj, headed by Colonel N.T. Butko. The coordination of the combat operations of the special forces of the border troops was entrusted to Lieutenant General I.P. Vertelko. The created command and control system ensured flexibility in the management of service and combat activities and timely decision-making in a rapidly changing environment. Throughout the Afghan war, the head of the border troops, General of the Army V.A. Matrosov and the chief of staff of the border troops, Lieutenant-General Yu.A. Neshumov, and since 1985 - Lieutenant General I.Ya. Kalinichenko, constantly led the Operational Group of the Central Asian Border Circle and the command of the border detachments, assessed the current situation, clarified their combat missions.
Thus, by the end of 1981, a grouping of border troops and a system for managing the combat operations of special forces on the territory of the DRA were created.
The maximum strength of the PV group was in the period from 1988 to February 15, 1989 and consisted of more than 11 thousand border guards in connection with the withdrawal of army units from some northern regions of Afghanistan and a sharp intensification of rebel actions in the border zone and on the border itself.
As a result of the operations, the plans of opposition centers to seize the entire territory of Badakhshan and other areas adjacent to the Soviet-Afghan border were thwarted, large armed formations were defeated, which were forced to leave the border.