Salary of officers of the Russian army in the 17th century. Material support for officers of the Russian army in the reign of Alexander I. Benefits for professional affiliation

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On the gigantic ruins of our politicized military history, sometimes there are works that are not as much polluted as many others by tendentious conjuncture. Probably, you, too, will find Barinov's ideological bias and the reckless (even boastful) ambition of some of his conclusions.
But among the many colorful tares, you will definitely find stainless grains of that "numbers and textures" that are extremely curious, because they were taken from documents and Svitedel's confessions.
I was always and most of all interested in the state of the officer corps in the period that preceded the fall of the Empire. What were they like - those of our ancestors who, after 1917, fled to different and fiercely hostile armies? ...

Nikita Barinov.

TRAINING OF OFFICERS OF THE ROYAL ARMY (myths and reality)

If we objectively consider the position of the army at the time of death Russian Empire, a sad picture emerges easily. There is a myth about officers tsarist army. This is somewhat surprising, but it was created, in my opinion, primarily by Soviet propaganda. In the heat of the class struggle, the “gentlemen of the officers” were portrayed as rich, well-groomed and, as a rule, dangerous enemies, antipodes of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army in general and its command staff in particular. This was especially clearly manifested in the film “Chapaev”, where instead of the rather poorly dressed and trained troops that Kolchak had, Chapaev was confronted by the “Kappelites” in pure black and white uniforms, advancing in a “psychic” attack in a beautiful formation. According to high prosperity, training was also assumed, as a result - high level training and skills. All this was picked up and developed by lovers of "Russia that we lost" and the White Cause. Despite the fact that among them there are, of course, talented historians and just lovers of military history, often the praise of officers reached the point of absurdity.

In fact, the situation with the combat training of officers was initially sad. And not the last role in this was played by the rather difficult financial situation of the officers. Roughly speaking, the best students Gymnasiums simply did not want to "pull the strap" in the service of an officer, when much simpler and more profitable prospects for a career in the civilian field opened before them. It is no coincidence that the future Marshal Soviet Union, and at the beginning of the 20th century, Junker Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov wrote in his memoirs: “Of course, it was difficult for my then comrades to understand my decision to go to military school. The fact is that I graduated from a real school, as I noted above, with an average score of 4.3. With such a score, they usually went to higher technical educational institutions. to military schools, general idea, there was a youth weak in theoretical training. On the threshold of the 20th century, such an opinion about the command staff of the army was quite common. Boris Mikhailovich himself went into the army because “My parents lived very economically, because my younger sister Yulia also began to study in Chelyabinsk at the women's gymnasium. I had to think more than once about the questions: how to make life easier for my family? More than once the thought came to mind: “Why not go to military service?” Secondary education would allow to go directly to a military school. It was not even possible to dream of studying at the expense of parents for five years at a higher technical institution. Therefore, for now, to myself, I firmly decided to go along the military line.

Contrary to the cliché about officers as noble landlords, in fact, officers at the end of the Romanov era, although they usually came from nobles, were close to the raznochinets in terms of their financial situation.

“The presence of land ownership even among the generals and, oddly enough, the guards was far from a frequent phenomenon. Let's turn to the numbers. Of the 37 corps commanders (36 army and one guards), data on land ownership are available on 36. Of these, five had such. The largest landowner was the commander of the Guards Corps, Gen. V.M. Bezobrazov, who owned an estate of 6 thousand acres and gold mines in Siberia. Of the other four, one had no size of the estate, and each of the three had about one thousand acres. Thus, only 13.9% of the highest command category, which had the rank of general, had landed property.

Of the 70 chiefs of infantry divisions (67 army and 3 guards), as well as 17 cavalry (15 army and two guards), i.e. 87 people, 6 people do not have property data. Of the remaining 81, only five have it (two guards generals who were large landowners, and three army generals, of which two had estates, and one had his own house). Consequently, 4 people, or 4.9%, had landed property.

Let's turn to the commanders of the regiments. As mentioned above, we analyze all the grenadier and rifle regiments, and half of the infantry regiments that were part of the divisions. This amounted to 164 infantry regiments, or 61.1% of their total. In addition, 48 cavalry (hussars, lancers and dragoons) regiments, which were part of 16 cavalry divisions, are being considered. If we compare these figures with those for civil officials of the same classes, we get the following: “Let's turn to the list of civil ranks of the first three classes. In 1914, there were 98 second-class officials, of which 44 people owned land, which accounted for 44.9%; third class - 697 people, of which 215 people owned property, which accounted for 30.8%.

Let us compare the data on the availability of land ownership among military and civilian officials of the respective classes. So, we have: ranks of the second class - military - 13.9%, civil - 44.8%; third class - military - 4.9%, civilians - 30.8%. The difference is huge.”

On the financial situation, P.A. Zaionchkovsky writes: “So, the officer corps, which included up to 80% of the nobles, consisted of the service nobility and was no different from the raznochintsy in terms of material situation.” Citing Protopresbytor Shavelsky, the same author writes: “The officer was outcast of the royal treasury. Cannot specify class tsarist Russia, worse secured than officers. The officer received a beggarly content that did not cover all his urgent expenses /.../. Especially if he was a family, dragged out a beggarly existence, malnourished, entangled in debt, denying himself the most necessary.

As we have already seen, land holdings, even among the highest command staff, could not be compared with that of civilian officials. In part, this was due to the fact that the maintenance of officials was much higher than that of the generals: “As mentioned above, the annual salary of the head of a division was 6,000 rubles, and the maintenance of the governor was from 9,600 thousand to 12.6 thousand rubles a year, i.e. nearly double that." Only the guardsmen lived on a "big foot". General Ignatiev colorfully, although perhaps somewhat tendentiously, describes his service in, perhaps, the most elite regiment of the army of the Russian Empire - the Life Guards Cavalier Guard Regiment. He notes the enormous “cost” of service in this regiment, which was associated both with the cost of uniforms, two especially expensive horses, etc. However, P.A. Zaionchkovsky believes that even this was not the most “expensive” regiment. As such, he considers the Life Guards Hussar Regiment, while serving in which he had to spend 500 rubles a month - the salary of the head of the division! In general, the guard was a kind of completely separate corporation, the existence of which brought great confusion to the career growth of officers.

On the one hand, the guard was recruited at the expense of best graduates schools. To do this, it was necessary to get a "guards score" (more than 10 out of 12). In addition, thanks to a system in which graduates chose their vacancies in order of average scores, the best junkers went to the guard. On the other hand, there were only vacancies in the guards in the elite educational institutions. For example, it was almost impossible for a non-nobleman to get into the most elite Corps of Pages. Already the fourth in the semi-official list of the most prestigious schools, Aleksandrovskoe always had a minimum of guards vacancies, and therefore Tukhachevsky was very lucky that he managed to graduate from it the best among the junkers. Thus, the already closed schools, which had a significant number of vacancies, greatly limited the entry of unborn junkers there. However, this was far from the last obstacle to getting into the guard. According to the unspoken, but firmly implemented and noted by many researchers, the law: joining the regiment must be approved by the officers of the regiment. This closeness, caste could cover the way up the career ladder for any "freethinker", since loyal feelings were obligatory for service in the guard. Finally, the "property qualification" has already been mentioned. Thus, the guards were primarily wealthy, well-born officers. True, they needed to complete the course of schools perfectly, but most of the equally, if not more talented officers even the opportunity to go to guards regiment did not have. But the guard was the "forge of personnel" of the generals of the tsarist army! Moreover, promotion in the guards was, in principle, faster and easier. Not only did the guards have an advantage of 2 ranks over army officers, there was also no rank of lieutenant colonel, which further accelerated growth. We are not talking about connections and prestige! As a result, most of the generals came from the guards, moreover, most of the generals who did not have the education of the Academy of the General Staff came from there. For example, “in 1914, there were 36 army corps in the army, 1 guard corps. ... Let's turn to the data on education. Of the 37 corps commanders, the highest military education had 34 people. Of which the Academy General Staff 29 people graduated from the Artillery Academy - 2, engineering and law - 1 each. Thus, 90% had a higher education. The three who did not have a higher education included the commander of the guards corps, gene. V.M. Bezobrazov, 12th Army Corps, Gen. A.A. Brusilov and the 2nd Caucasian Corps, Gen. G.E. Berkhman. Of the listed corps commanders, 25 people in the past, and one (gen. Bezobrazov) currently served in the guard.

It is difficult to agree with the author that this was due solely to the "ability" of the guards. After all, it was they who, first of all, got to the highest positions, without having the formation of the Academy of the General Staff, which the author himself admits: “According to the “Schedule” of 1914, the Russian army had 70 infantry divisions: 3 guards, 4 grenadiers, 52 infantry and 11 rifle Siberian. Their chiefs were lieutenant generals ... By education: 51 people had a higher military education (46 of them graduated from the Academy of the General Staff, -41 - Military Engineering - 4, Artillery - 1). Thus, 63.2% had higher education. Of the 70 chiefs of infantry divisions, 38 people were guardsmen (in the past or in the present). It is interesting to note that out of 19 people who did not have a higher military education, 15 were guards officers. The advantage of the guards has already been shown here. As you can see, the "guards advantage" affects the level of commanders. Where does it go when the same people are appointed to a slightly higher post of head of the corps? Moreover, for some unknown reason, the author was mistaken about G.E. Berkhman’s lack of higher education, and the rest of the generals were just from the guard. Having no higher education, but very rich, Bezobrazov generally commanded the guards corps. Thus, the guard was the "supplier" of uneducated academic officers to the highest army echelons.

We can talk about such a serious problem as the lack of fairness in the distribution of ranks and positions: richer and more well-born officers, having got into the guard, had a much better chance of making a career than pulling the strap and sometimes more prepared (if only because of less ceremonial service conditions) army colleagues. This could not but affect either the quality of training of the highest command staff or psychological climate. It is known that division into "castes" reigned in the army. As already mentioned, in special group guardsmen stood out, who had significant preferences among all officers. But it cannot be said that there were no frictions and differences within the guards and the rest of the army. So the most educated officers traditionally served in engineering troops and artillery. This was reflected even in jokes: “the handsome one serves in the cavalry, the smart one in the artillery, the drunkard in the navy, and the fool in the infantry.” The least prestigious was, of course, the infantry. And the "aristocratic" cavalry was considered the most prestigious. However, she shared. So the hussars and lancers looked down on the dragoons. The 1st heavy brigade of the guards cavalry stood apart: the “court” of the Cavalier Guards and the Life Guards Cavalry Regiment, “fought” for the title of the most elite regiment. In the Foot Guards, the so-called. "Peter's Brigade" - Preobrazhensky and Semyonovsky regiments. But, as Minakov notes, even here there was no equality: Preobrazhensky was more well-born. In artillery, horsemen were considered the elite, but the serfs were traditionally considered "outcasts", which pretty much "backfired" in 1915 during the defense of fortresses. Of course, it cannot be said that such differences do not exist in other armies, but there was nothing good in separating and isolating different branches of the armed forces from each other.

Almost the only opportunity to accelerate career growth for talented army officers was admission to the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff. The selection process was very thorough. To do this, it was necessary to pass the preliminary exams, and then the entrance exams. At the same time, they were initially handed over by the best officers of the regiments. According to Shaposhnikov, in the year of his admission, 82.6% of those who passed the preliminary exams passed the competition. However, despite such a careful selection of applicants, applicants had serious problems with general education subjects. “1) Very poor literacy, gross spelling errors. 2) Weak general development. Bad style. Lack of clarity of thought and general indiscipline of the mind. 3) Extremely poor knowledge in the field of history, geography. Insufficient literary education However, it cannot be said that this applied to all the General Staff officers. On the example of B.M. Shaposhnikov, it is easy to see that many of them did not have even a shadow of the problems mentioned above in the document. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the subsequent problems with education in the Red Army were fundamentally different from those in the tsarist army. The image of a well-educated tsarist officer is fairly idealized.

Training at the Academy of the General Staff lasted two years. In the first year, both military and general education subjects were taken, while from the military officers mastered the disciplines related to the combat operations of the units. In the second year, general education subjects ended, and disciplines related to strategy were studied from the military. In addition, every day there were equestrian classes in the arena. As Shaposhnikov notes, this was a consequence of the experience of Russian- Japanese war, when the division, during the battles under the Yantai mines, Orlov's division dispersed, hitting a high kaoliang, when the horse of the chief of staff carried and he could not stop it, leaving the division completely decapitated, since the division commander was wounded. Perhaps this was already redundant for the positional slaughter of the First World War, but to the critical remark of Boris Mikhailovich himself about the archaic nature of the horse as a means of transportation compared to the car introduced in Europe, we will note that Russian industry simply did not have the ability to supply the army with a sufficient amount of transport. Buying it abroad was expensive and rather reckless from the point of view of independence from foreign supplies.

The training itself also had significant shortcomings. For example, many authors note a lack of attention to the development of initiative and practical skills in general. Classes consisted almost exclusively of lectures. As a result, instead of high-class staff workers, theorists were obtained, far from always representing how to act in a real situation. According to Ignatiev, only one teacher generally focused on the will to win.

Contrary to the well-known myth about the enthusiasm of the generals French school Grandmaison, "élan vitale"6, Shaposhnikov testifies to sympathy for German theories. True, he notes that the top generals were not familiar with German methods of war.

In general, the fighting spirit and readiness for self-sacrifice were the strengths of the career officers of the tsarist army. And there could be no talk of carelessness, like talking about absolutely secret things in a cafe, which Shaposhnikov describes in The Brain of the Army in relation to the Austrian army. The notion of an officer's honor cost a lot for the professional military. After the reforms carried out by Golovin, young officers of the General Staff received a generally good education, despite many shortcomings. It was especially important that the tactics German troops was no longer a revelation for them, as for more senior commanders. The problem of the latter was in a weak interest in self-development, in innovations both in technology and in the art of war. As A.M. Zaionchkovsky notes, the plight of the higher education commanders was partly the result of the General Staff’s inattention to the problem: “Paying great attention to the training of troops and the improvement of junior officers, the Russian General Staff completely ignored the selection and training of senior officers: the appointment of people who spent their whole lives after graduating from the academy in an administrative chair, immediately to the position of division chief and corps commander was not uncommon. Before the Russo-Japanese War, this situation was especially prominent. It came to jokes: “in 1905-1906. Commander of the Amur Military District Gen. N.P. Linevich, seeing a howitzer, asked with surprise: what kind of gun is this? The same author notes: “The same Lenevich (correctly Linevich - N.B.) did not know how to read maps properly and did not understand what trains were on schedule. “And among the commanders of regiments and brigades,” Shavelsky notes further, “sometimes there were complete ignoramuses in military affairs. Military science did not enjoy the love of our military ”Echoes them and Denikin:

“The Japanese war, among other revelations, led us to the realization that the command staff needed to learn. The oblivion of this rule was one of the reasons for the dependence of many chiefs on their headquarters. Before the war, the chief, starting from the position of regiment commander, could remain calm with the “scientific” baggage that he had once taken out of a military or cadet school; could not follow the progress of military science at all, and it never occurred to anyone to take an interest in his knowledge. Any check would be considered offensive ... The general condition of the unit and partly only its control during maneuvers provided a criterion for evaluating the commander. The latter, however, is very relative: with the inevitable conditionality of maneuvering actions and our general complacency in maneuvers, one could make as many gross mistakes as one liked and with impunity; a disapproving review in the description of large maneuvers, which reached parts in a few months, lost its sharpness.

In addition, the officer corps of the higher echelons was extremely old. By age, corps commanders were distributed as follows: from 51 to 55 years old - 9 people, from 56 to 60 - 20, and from 61 to 65 - 7. Thus, over 75% of corps commanders were over 55 years old. Average age their was 57.7 years. Only slightly younger were the divisional commanders. From 51 to 55 years - 17, from 56 to 60 - 48 and from 61 to 65 - 5. Thus, the bulk of the chiefs of infantry divisions were over 55 years old. Their average age was 57.0 years. True, the chiefs of the cavalry divisions were on average 5.4 years younger. And this was after the “cleansing” carried out by the energetic Minister of War Rediger, who, however, quickly lost his portfolio and was replaced by the less firm Sukhomlinov. their assistants - 7; corps commanders - 34; commandants of fortresses - 23; chiefs of infantry divisions - 61; chiefs of cavalry divisions - 18; chiefs separate brigades(infantry and cavalry) - 87; commanders of non-separate brigades - 140; commanders of infantry regiments - 255; commanders of separate battalions - 108; commanders of cavalry regiments - 45. He also petitioned for the dismissal of the most mediocre commanders from the army. But the problem was Nicholas II. The monarch, now praised with all his might, cared little about the combat effectiveness of the army, paying much more attention to its form and loyalty to the throne. The tsar in every possible way prevented the removal of generals he liked and the financing of the army to the detriment of the fleet. The appointment of Yanushkevich, who did not at all correspond to the position of chief of the General Staff, for example, became possible only thanks to the patronage of the Sovereign. No less blame lies with the prime minister, since the distribution of budget funds largely depended on him. That is why he defended against the dismissal of generals who showed talent in pacifying the rebels, and not on the battlefield. Quoting Polivanov's diary, P.A. Zayonchkovsky writes: “Received from e.v. magazine of the Higher Attestation Commission about corps commanders; consent was given for the dismissal of Gen. Shutleworth; against the decision to dismiss Gen. Krause and Novosiltsev - the highest resolution to "leave", but against the gene. Adlerberg: “I know him, he is not a genius, but an honest soldier: in 1905 he defended Kronstadt.” What blood cost the appointment of Rennenkampf, who did not particularly distinguish himself on the battlefields in Manchuria, but the “hero” of the suppression of the 1905 revolution, as commander of the army that invaded East Prussia- publicly known.

True, it cannot be said that they did not try to rectify the situation. As the same Denikin writes, “One way or another, after the Japanese war, the senior command staff was also forced to study. In the spring of 1906, for the first time, the order of the Minister of War appeared on the imperial order: “To establish the commander of the troops related classes senior commanders, from unit commanders to corps commanders, inclusive, aimed at the development of military knowledge. This innovation caused irritation at the top: the old people grumbled, seeing in it a desecration of gray hair and undermining authorities ... But things went little by little, although at first not without friction and even curiosities. It was possible to partially instill an interest in self-development in artillery business: “Never, probably, military thought worked so intensively as in the years that followed the Japanese war. They talked, wrote, shouted about the need to reorganize the army. The need for self-education increased, and, accordingly, interest in military literature increased significantly, causing the appearance of a number of new organs. It seems to me that if it were not for the lesson of the Japanese campaign and the upsurge and feverish work that followed it, our army would not have survived even several months of the ordeal of the world war ... ”However white general he immediately admits that the work was going at a very slow pace.

However, it cannot be said that these measures did not affect the combat capability of the army. A.A. Svechin writes: “No less progress should be noted in relation to the tactical training of troops and in the advanced training of middle and lower command personnel.”

But even this was not enough. It is hard to disagree with A.M. Zaionchkovsky, who gave a very short, but very capacious description of the Russian army before the First World War: “In general, the Russian army went to war with good regiments, with mediocre divisions and corps, and with bad armies and fronts, understanding this assessment in the broad sense of training, but not personal qualities.

Achilles heel the old army had a complete lack of any political training. The officers were ready to go to their death themselves, but they did not know how to lead. Svechin, in his book The Art of Driving a Regiment, points to the inability of career officers to communicate with soldiers, understand their needs and build discipline that is suitable not only in peacetime. It must be understood that the days of Friedrich's principle "a soldier should be more afraid of a non-commissioned officer's stick than enemy bullets" are long gone and it is impossible to keep a soldier at the front by force alone. Alas, no one simply taught this to Russian officers. And given the completely childish knowledge of social and political sciences, it is easy to understand that the officers were completely disoriented when faced with the propaganda of the socialist parties. The separation of officers from the mass of soldiers also had an effect. For example, Ignatiev notes that scuffle in the 1st Guards Cavalry Division was not used solely due to the Guards tradition. The so-called “train”, similar in meaning to modern hazing, was also considered quite normal. , All this was not noticeable for a significant part of the war, but the collapse of discipline, and as a result of the entire army in 1917, perfectly showed what inattention to the moral climate within the army team could lead to.

The beginning of the World War completely turned the system of officer training upside down. If before that they were trained according to a completely harmonious system, getting from the cadet corps to the school, and after graduation and service, the best of them could graduate from one of the academies, now, although the schools continued to train lieutenants, but only at a greatly curtailed accelerated course. But they could not meet the needs of the army. A significant number of ensign schools were opened, graduating officers with extremely poor skills and knowledge.

The most difficult situation was in the infantry. You can often see ratings like this:

“Our infantry regiments have lost over world war several sets of command personnel. As far as I can judge from the data I have, only a few regiments lost officers killed and wounded go down to 300%, but usually reach 400 - 500% or more.

For artillery, I do not have sufficiently complete data. Information on a number of artillery brigades speaks of a loss of officers (for the entire war) of 15-40%. Losses of technical troops are even less. In the cavalry, losses are very uneven. There are parts that have suffered greatly, in others the loss is quite insignificant. In any case, even the losses of the most affected cavalry units in comparison with the losses of the infantry are negligible.

The consequence of this situation was, on the one hand, a sharp "washout" of the personnel, the most trained staff. Those. even those officers who were available and commanded units, by the end of the war did not have sufficient education and experience. “The senior command (commander) staff, taken in the army alone, represents a group not so large in number that the results of its consideration could be applied without significant reservations to the entire Russian army ...

First of all, when considering data on the commanding staff, a significant percentage of temporary commanders is striking: namely, 11 out of 32 regiments ... According to the previous service before receiving the regiment, 27 regiment commanders (i.e., almost 85% of their total number) belong to combat officers ; the remaining five held positions in various institutions and institutions of the military department (corps, military schools, etc.). Among the 32 regimental commanders, there was not a single Gener officer. Headquarters. Undoubtedly, this is an accident, but a very characteristic accident, indicating a significant decrease among the infantry commanders of persons with a higher military education ... The qualifications for commanding regiments are very small for the majority:

from 1 to 3 months at 8 sets of regiments,

from 3 to 6 months at 11 regiments,

from 6 to 12 months at 8 sets of regiments,

from 1 to 2 years. at 3 sets of regiments,

over 2 years. at 2 sets of regiments,

The entire officer corps under study can be divided into 2 unequal, sharply different groups - into regular officers and into wartime officers.

The first group includes all staff officers, almost all captains (9 or 10) and a small part of staff captains (7 out of 38).

In total, there are 27 regular officers, i.e., not the full 4% of the total. The remaining 96% are wartime officers."

So, regular infantry officers are knocked out. And who replaced them? Here lies the very serious problem future Red Army. The fact is that the retired officers were replaced mainly by people who had completely inadequate training, both military and simply general education. The same author gives the corresponding tables:

Educational qualification Headquarters officers Captains Headquarters captains Lieutenants Second lieutenants Ensigns Total Percentage of the total number

Higher education — — 2 3 6 26 37 5

Secondary education 7 8 12 7 46 78 158 22

Secondary incomplete 4 2 3 20 37 81 147 20

Secondary incomplete — — 9 20 43 153 225 31

Training at home and at work — — 12 13 27 106 158 22

Total 11 10 38 63 159 444 725 100

Military training

Headquarters Captains

Staff captains

lieutenants

Second Lieutenants Ensigns

Total Interest

Full course of a peacetime school 11 9 7 1 - - 28 4

Full course of the wartime school - - 15 21 85 113 234 32

Ensign School - - 8 37 67 315 428 59

Did not pass schools (made for military distinctions) - 1 7 4 7 16 35 5

These tables speak volumes. First, it can be seen that the rank of "captain" was almost unattainable for a wartime officer. It was the senior officers, therefore, who were most interesting as the future personnel of the Red Army in terms of vocational training. On the other hand, they had already reached high positions under the "old regime" and therefore the incentive for a career in the new army under the new conditions was not so strong for them and therefore they were not as loyal as junior officers. Secondly, the difference in general education should be noted. His level of education for career officers was even, however, it should be noted that an incomplete secondary education was not quite what was required of an officer in such a technically saturated war as the First World War. But already among the staff captains there is complete discord. The officers appear higher education. Obviously, these are wartime volunteers who initially chose the civilian path for themselves, but whose fate was changed by the Great War. As the well-known military writer Golovin notes, this was the best material for obtaining officers, since an intellectual could easily evade conscription and therefore those who went into the army had not only the best general education, but also the best fighting spirit, and in some way the best moral qualities than, for example, the notorious "Zemhusars". On the other hand, many officers did not even have a secondary education, but a lower education or did not have general education at all. Only a little more than a third of staff captains had a completed secondary education. This suggests, on the one hand, that the intelligentsia did not really want to join the army. On the other hand, that the image of an officer of the "old army", as a native of the "educated classes", which became widespread in mass consciousness thanks to Soviet cinema is far from the truth. The army was replenished mainly by poorly educated people. There was some advantage to this as well. After all, this statistics speaks of the class proximity of wartime officers (and, obviously, it was they who were the main contingent among staff captains who did not receive a secondary education) to the new government.

Among lieutenants, second lieutenants and especially ensigns, the situation with education is getting even worse. Among the ensigns, only less than a quarter of the officers had a complete secondary education, and less than a third of the total number graduated from military schools, and not ensign schools.

Thus, two features should be noted. First, the personnel of the infantry was largely knocked out. Companies, and often battalions, were commanded by wartime officers, who, in principle, did not have sufficient training. Moreover, wartime officers did not have a tolerable education in order to be able to make up for the shortcomings of education in the future.

On the whole, it must be admitted that even before Great War officers had significant shortcomings in training. Moreover, if the young commanders managed to get an education in the reformed schools and academies, then the higher, older command staff continued to lag far behind the requirements of the time in terms of their qualities. The theses about the loss of the top commanding staff of the Red Army as a catastrophe are untenable. Even without mentioning the dubious benefits of the elderly generals of the First World War during the Second World War, of which France is a brilliant example, it is impossible not to see the superiority of the highest command staff of future opponents over domestic strategists, if not in talent, then in the level of training. Much worse was the knocking out of young officers during the First World War, and then the Civil. Unfortunately, unlike Germany, the Republic of Ingushetia failed to organize high-quality training of wartime officers, and this was for quite objective reasons: in Russia there simply were not enough educated people. Like the Franco-Prussian war, the war on Eastern Front won in large part by a Berlin schoolteacher.

It is interesting to note that the Red Army ended up in in large numbers not knocked out cadres of technical troops. But it was precisely these people “with a learned edging and a velvet collar”, according to Shaposhnikov, who had the largest percentage of those who graduated from the General Staff Academy among those accepted there, which indicates the best training. So out of 6 engineers who joined Shaposhnikov, all 6 graduated. Out of 35 artillerymen, 20, but out of 67 infantry officers, only 19!

________________________________________________________________________

Shaposhnikov B.M. Memories. Military scientific works. - M .: Military Publishing House, 1974. p. 55 Quoted from http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian...ikov/index.html

There with. 52.

P.A. Zayonchkovsky (1904-1983): Articles, publications and memoirs about him. - M.: ROSSPEN, 1998. p. 46. Quoted from: http://regiment.ru/Lib/A/7.htm

There with. 47

There with. 46

There with. 50-51

Ibid p. 51

Ignatiev A. A. Fifty years in the ranks. - M .: Military Publishing House, 1986. p. 58 Quoted from http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian...v_aa/index.html

Minakov S.T. SOVIET MILITARY ELITE IN THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE OF THE 20-30s http://www.whoiswho.ru/kadr_politika/12003/stm2.htm

Shaposhnikov B.M. Decree op. With. 35

P.A. Zaionchkovsky Decree op. With. 41

There with. 42

http://www.grwar.ru/persons/persons.html?id=378

Minakov S.T. Decree op. http://www.whoiswho.ru/kadr_politika/12003/stm2.htm

Shaposhnikov B.M. Decree op. With. 129.

Zayonchkovsky P.A. Decree op. With. 27

Shaposhnikov B.M. Decree op. With. 127.

Ignatiev A.A. Decree op. With. 102

There with. 99

Shaposhnikov B.M. Decree op. With. 135

Shaposhnikov B.M., The brain of the army. - M .: Voengiz, 1927 Quoted from: http://militera.lib.ru/science/shaposhnikov1/index.html

Zaionchkovsky A. M. The First World War - St. Petersburg: Polygon Publishing House LLC, 2002. - 878, p. ill., 64 colors. ill. - (Military History Library).

C.14-15. Quoted from http://militera.lib.ru/h/zayonchkovsky1/index.html

P.A. Zayonchkovsky Autocracy and the Russian army on turn of XIX-XX centuries, M., 1973. p. 174 Quoted from: http://regiment.ru/Lib/A/18/4.htm

Denikin A.I. The Old Army. Officers / A. I. Denikin; foreword A. S. Kruchinina. — M.: Iris-press, 2005. — 512 p.: ill. + insert 8 p. - (White Russia). Circulation 3000 copies. ISBN 5-8112-1411-1. Quoted from: http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian..._ai4/index.html p. 109

Zayonchkovsky P.A. Decree op. With. 41-42

There. pp.38-39

There with. 40.

Denikin A.I. Decree op. With. 110-111.

There with. 221.

Great forgotten war. - M.: Yauza; Eksmo, 2009. - 592 p. With. 7.

Zayonchkovsky A.M. Decree op. With. 16.

Ignatiev A.A. Decree op. With. 57.

There. pp.44-46.

Kamenev A.I. The history of officer training in Russia. — M.: VPA im. Lenina, 1990. p. 163 Quoted from http://militera.lib.ru/science/kamenev2/index.html

On the question of the officers of the Old Russian Army by the end of its existence. V. CHERNAVIN. Military collection of the society of zealots of military knowledge. Book 5, 1924, Belgrade. Quoted from http://www.grwar.ru/library/Chernav...orps/CC_01.html

Golovin H. H. Russia in the First World War / Nikolai Golovin. — M.: Veche, 2006. — 528 p. - (Military secrets of Russia). Circulation 3,000 copies. ISBN 5-9533-1589-9. With. 187 Quoted from: http://militera.lib.ru/research/golovnin_nn/index.html

Shaposhnikov B.M. With. 166-167.

1. On the question of the officers of the Old Russian Army by the end of its existence. V. CHERNAVIN. Military collection of the society of zealots of military knowledge. Book 5, 1924, Belgrade. Taken from http://www.grwar.ru/library/Chernav...orps/CC_01.html

2. Zaionchkovsky A. M. The First World War - St. Petersburg: Polygon Publishing House LLC, 2002. - 878, p. ill., 64 colors. ill. - (Military History Library).

3..Shaposhnikov B.M. Memories. Military scientific works. - M .: Military Publishing House, 1974. Quoted from http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian...ikov/index.html

4. P.A. Zayonchkovsky (1904-1983): Articles, publications and memoirs about him. - M.: ROSSPEN, 1998. Quoted from: http://regiment.ru/Lib/A/7.htm

5. Ignatiev A. A. Fifty years in the ranks. - M .: Military Publishing House, 1986. Quoted from http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian...v_aa/index.html

6.S.T.MINAKOV THE SOVIET MILITARY ELITE IN THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE OF THE 20-30s http://www.whoiswho.ru/kadr_politika/12003/stm11.htm

7.http://www.grwar.ru/persons/persons.html?id=378

8. B. M. Shaposhnikov, The Brain of the Army. - M .: Voengiz, 1927 Quoted from http://militera.lib.ru/science/shaposhnikov1/index.html

9. Kamenev A.I. The history of officer training in Russia. — M.: VPA im. Lenina, 1990. Quoted from http://militera.lib.ru/science/kamenev2/index.html

10. Denikin A. I. The Old Army. Officers / A. I. Denikin; foreword A. S. Kruchinina. — M.: Iris-press, 2005. — 512 p.: ill. + insert 8 p. - (White Russia). Circulation 3000 copies. ISBN 5-8112-1411-1. Quoted from: http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian..._ai4/index.html

Today we will talk about our army. Late 19th - early 20th century. How did our soldiers live then? How did our officers live then? Eyewitness word.

Colonel E.A. Nikolsky - went through a big military school. Cadet, young officer of the imperial army. Then in 1905-1908. he was in charge of the "Special Paperwork" at the Military Statistics Department of the General Staff and was responsible for working with military agents. Prepared a project for the creation in Russia ... intelligence. Main Intelligence Directorate. It is according to his template that our special service will be created only not by the tsarist government, but by the Bolsheviks.

I will say right away that Nikolsky's book is so interesting that we will return to it again. Therefore, I will not talk about his future fate yet.

So, the word is for Colonel Nikolsky (Quotes from the book by E.A. Nikolsky. Notes on the Past. Russian Way, Moscow, 2007)

It is interesting to remember the material side of life in general

military units late XIX century century. For some reason, the shooters were considered to have the rights, so to speak, of the “young guard”, but differed from ordinary infantry troops only in that soldiers and officers received slightly more salaries compared to infantry. So, a soldier received 3 or 4 kopecks more in a quarter of the year, an officer of a higher rank received 1 ruble and 25 kopecks more per month. All the maintenance received by the officers was composed of the following parts: salaries, canteens and apartment. In addition, a small amount was given for lighting and heating. The lieutenant received a salary - 26 rubles 25 kopecks, canteens - 15 rubles, apartment - 112 rubles a year and about 20 rubles for heating and lighting. Salaries and canteens were issued monthly, and apartment money, for heating and lighting - once every three months. Just a month - about 53 rubles.

It should be noted that there were obligatory expenses: monthly deductions were made from the maintenance for the officers' meeting, the library, for "borrowed capital", for the uniform artel, for the organization of the regimental holiday, for the New Year's Eve, breaking the fast on Easter day, various evenings and meetings of the authorities and persons inspecting the regiment. Thus, a junior officer received no more than 30-35 rubles a month in his hands, with the most accurate life, of which he had to pay at least 25-28 rubles for an apartment and a meeting at the table. What was left for other necessary expenses, such as, for example, a laundress, buying new linen?

The shooter received 54 kopecks in money every three months. For food at the disposal of the regiment, he was given the cost of ½ pound of meat with bones and lard, which was supposed to be 6 spools ** per day, and, in addition, the cost of a certain amount of greenery - all based on local reference prices for products. In general, the entire food allowance for a soldier did not exceed 7-9 kopecks per day. The quartermaster's office sold rye flour and buckwheat and millet groats according to the calculation 2.5<золотника>flour and 32 spools of buckwheat or barley groats per person per day. That's all the government gave the soldier; there was no holiday, no tea, no sugar, no coffee, no butter, nothing at all.

Getting up in the morning, the soldier drank, if he had his own money, his own tea with a small piece of his own sugar with black official bread, which he was given at the rate of 3 pounds per person. If a soldier had no money, then he drank one hot water with bread in winter, when there was a need to warm up a little, getting up from a cold bed. But not in all parts of the troops, the soldier received his 3 pounds of bread in his hands and could eat it when he wanted. In military units, in which the commanders observed special savings, the so-called "allowance from the tray" was used. With this method, the soldiers were not given bread for 3 pounds each in their hands, but during the meal they cut the bread into pieces. The soldiers took from the total mass as much as they wanted. Few of them, in this order, were able to eat their 3 pounds, part of the bread was not eaten, and considerable savings in flour were obtained, for which the commissariat returned the regiment with money that went into the regimental economic sums. But the soldier had no bread left for the morning.

Normally, in the army units located in the provinces, even in specially built barracks, there were no separate dining rooms. The barracks were built and, all the more, rented from private individuals of the smallest possible volume, and savings were pursued in rent, heating and lighting. As a rule, there were not even rooms for practicing verbal sciences and teaching soldiers to read and write, charters. Classes were held right where they slept, while the soldiers sat in groups on their beds. The barracks consisted of one large room, in which the soldiers spent all their time studying and resting, and two separate rooms, of which one housed the company storehouse, and the other sergeant major and company office. Sometimes there were small rooms for company workshops.

There was lunch at twelve o'clock. The soldiers wandered into the kitchen with bowlers and received cabbage soup or soup with cereals and herbs, a portion of boiled meat, consisting of small pieces strung on a stick, and porridge with lard. Lunch was not varied. Soups - borscht, cabbage soup or potato, porridge - buckwheat or barley. That's the whole menu of a soldier's lunch. During the Christmas and Great fasts, meat was not given, each was given for soup "A, a pound of dried or salted fish. Usually vobla or pike perch. For dinner at six o'clock, the soldiers received leftovers, if any, of soup from lunch, and porridge. That's all what fed our army.

The guards had a larger holiday*, and the units of the troops stationed in the settlements had their own plots of land on which they planted vegetable gardens, and therefore improved food with the money allocated for greenery.

The soldiers slept either on common bunks, or, if the regiment had sufficient economic sums, on separate bunks. There was no vacation from the treasury for beds, as well as for pillows, blankets and bed linen - the soldiers had, if they could, their own. The regiments, if the economic sums were sufficient, made blankets.

The economic sums were formed mainly from savings on the remnants of food sold directly by the commissariat **, savings on lighting the barracks and heating them. Usually after busy, i.e. at five o'clock in the afternoon, twilight reigned in the rooms, as the most limited number of lamps burned. It was the same in the cold season - not all stoves were heated, but in turn, and meanwhile, money for heating was released according to the calculation of all stoves and for all cold days.

The soldiers washed their dirty linen in the bath during the wash. They visited the bath once every two weeks, but meanwhile the military units received money for washing people and their linen separately according to the calculation of the number of soldiers and for each week.

Only after the first revolution did the government catch on, and the commander-in-chief of the St. Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich gave an order in which he promised in the shortest possible time to increase the content of both officers and soldiers and improve their life. Indeed, the maintenance of the officers was soon added: the younger ones - by 25 rubles a month, the older ones - correspondingly more. The following salaries were assigned to the soldiers: for an ordinary soldier - 50 kopecks per month and for a non-commissioned officer - a little more. The life of a soldier was significantly improved: tea and bed allowances were established, and the release of money for food was increased.
But even these measures were not sufficient, since the monetary allowance of our army, and food, and in general the content lagged far behind the expenses for the allowance of the armies of foreign states.

My comment: The same question is often asked: why did the Anglo-Saxons succeed in covert operations? Where did Russian intelligence and counterintelligence look?

Nikolsky answers these questions.

Just remember - the project for the creation of the Main Intelligence Directorate (just a project!) Was written by him ... in 1907!

Until this year, there was simply no intelligence in Russia.

I would like to put this question to the Emperor. So it won't answer.

We all know the results of such tragic blindness.

If we objectively consider the position of the army at the time of the death of the Russian Empire, then a sad picture easily emerges. There is a myth about the officers of the tsarist army. This is somewhat surprising, but it was created, in my opinion, primarily by Soviet propaganda.

In the heat of the class struggle, the “gentlemen of the officers” were portrayed as rich, well-groomed and, as a rule, dangerous enemies, antipodes of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army in general and its command staff in particular. This was especially clearly manifested in the film “Chapaev”, where instead of the rather poorly dressed and trained troops that Kolchak had, Chapaev was confronted by the “Kappelites” in pure black and white uniforms, advancing in a “psychic” attack in a beautiful formation. Accordingly, high income was supposed to be trained, as a result - a high level of training and skills. All this was picked up and developed by lovers of "Russia that we lost" and the White Cause. Despite the fact that among them there are, of course, talented historians and just lovers of military history, often the praise of officers reached the point of absurdity.

“Of course, it was difficult for my then comrades to understand my decision to go to a military school. The fact is that I graduated from a real school, as I noted above, with an average score of 4.3. With such a score, they usually went to higher technical educational institutions. In military schools, according to the general idea, there were young people who were weak in theoretical training. On the threshold of the 20th century, such an opinion about the command staff of the army was quite common.

Boris Mikhailovich himself went into the army because “My parents lived very economically, because my younger sister Yulia also began to study in Chelyabinsk at the women's gymnasium. I had to think more than once about the questions: how to make life easier for my family? More than once the thought came to mind: “Why not go to military service?” Secondary education would allow to go directly to a military school. It was not even possible to dream of studying at the expense of parents for five years at a higher technical institution. Therefore, for now, to myself, I firmly decided to go along the military line.

P.A. Zaionchkovsky writes about the financial situation: “So, the officer corps, which included up to 80% of the nobles, consisted of the service nobility and was no different from the raznochintsy in terms of financial situation.” Quoting Protopresbytor Shavelsky, the same author writes:

“The officer was an outcast of the royal treasury. It is impossible to point to a class in tsarist Russia that is worse off than the officer corps. The officer received a beggarly content that did not cover all his urgent expenses /.../. Especially if he was a family, dragged out a beggarly existence, malnourished, entangled in debt, denying himself the most necessary.

As we have already seen, land holdings, even among the highest command staff, could not be compared with that of civilian officials. In part, this was due to the fact that the maintenance of officials was much higher than that of the generals: “As mentioned above, the annual salary of the head of a division was 6,000 rubles, and the maintenance of the governor was from 9,600 thousand to 12.6 thousand rubles a year, i.e. nearly double that." Only the guardsmen lived on a "big foot". General Ignatiev colorfully, although perhaps somewhat tendentiously, describes his service in, perhaps, the most elite regiment of the army of the Russian Empire - the Life Guards Cavalier Guard Regiment. He notes the enormous “cost” of service in this regiment, which was associated both with the cost of uniforms, two especially expensive horses, etc. However, P.A. Zaionchkovsky believes that even this was not the most “expensive” regiment. As such, he considers the Life Guards Hussar Regiment, while serving in which he had to spend 500 rubles a month per month - the salary of the head of the division! In general, the guard was a kind of completely separate corporation, the existence of which brought great confusion to the career growth of officers.

On the one hand, the guard was staffed by the best graduates of schools. To do this, it was necessary to get a "guards score" (more than 10 out of 12). In addition, thanks to a system in which graduates chose their vacancies in order of average scores, the best junkers went to the guard. On the other hand, there were vacancies in the guard only in elite educational institutions. For example, it was almost impossible for a non-nobleman to get into the most elite Corps of Pages. Already the fourth in the semi-official list of the most prestigious schools, Aleksandrovskoe always had a minimum of guards vacancies, and therefore Tukhachevsky was very lucky that he managed to graduate from it the best among the junkers. Thus, the already closed schools, which had a significant number of vacancies, greatly limited the entry of unborn junkers there.

However, this was far from the last obstacle to getting into the guard. According to an unwritten, but firmly implemented and noted by many researchers law: joining the regiment must be approved by the officers of the regiment. This closeness, caste could cover the way up the career ladder for any "freethinker", since loyal feelings were required for service in the guard. Finally, the "property qualification" has already been mentioned. Thus, the guards were primarily wealthy, well-born officers. True, they had to complete the course of schools perfectly, but most of the equally, if not more talented officers did not even have the opportunity to enter the guards regiment. But the guard was the "forge of personnel" of the generals of the tsarist army! Moreover, promotion in the guards was, in principle, faster and easier. Not only did the guards have an advantage of 2 ranks over army officers, there was also no rank of lieutenant colonel, which further accelerated growth. We are not talking about connections and prestige! As a result, most of the generals came from the guards, moreover, most of the generals who did not have the education of the Academy of the General Staff came from there.

For example, “in 1914, there were 36 army corps in the army, 1 guard corps. ... Let's turn to the data on education. Of the 37 corps commanders, 34 had a higher military education. Of these, 29 people graduated from the Academy of the General Staff, 2 from the Artillery Academy, 1 each from Engineering and Law. Thus, 90% had higher education. The three who did not have a higher education included the commander of the guards corps, gene. V.M. Bezobrazov, 12th Army Corps, Gen. A.A. Brusilov and the 2nd Caucasian Corps, Gen. G.E. Berkhman. Of the listed corps commanders, 25 people in the past, and one (gen. Bezobrazov) currently served in the guard.

It is difficult to agree with the author that this was due solely to the "ability" of the guards. After all, it was they who, first of all, got to the highest positions, without having the formation of the Academy of the General Staff, which the author himself admits: “According to the “Schedule” of 1914, the Russian army had 70 infantry divisions: 3 guards, 4 grenadiers, 52 infantry and 11 rifle Siberian. Their chiefs were lieutenant generals ... By education: 51 people had a higher military education (46 of them graduated from the Academy of the General Staff, -41 - Military Engineering - 4, Artillery - 1). Thus, 63.2% had higher education. Of the 70 chiefs of infantry divisions, 38 people were guardsmen (in the past or in the present). It is interesting to note that out of 19 people who did not have a higher military education, 15 were guards officers. The advantage of the guards has already been shown here. As you can see, the "guards advantage" affects the level of commanders. Where does it go when the same people are appointed to a slightly higher post of head of the corps? Moreover, for some unknown reason, the author was mistaken about the lack of higher education from G.E. Berkhman, and the rest of the generals were just from the guard. Having no higher education, but very rich, Bezobrazov generally commanded the guards corps. Thus, the guard was the "supplier" of uneducated academic officers to the highest army echelons.

We can talk about such a serious problem as the lack of fairness in the distribution of ranks and positions: richer and more well-born officers, having got into the guard, had a much better chance of making a career than pulling the strap and sometimes more prepared (if only because of less ceremonial service conditions) army colleagues. This could not but affect either the quality of training of the senior command staff or the psychological climate. It is known that division into "castes" reigned in the army. As already mentioned, guardsmen were allocated to a special group, who had significant preferences among all officers. But it cannot be said that there were no frictions and differences within the guards and the rest of the army. So the most educated officers traditionally served in the engineering troops and artillery. This was reflected even in jokes: “the handsome one serves in the cavalry, the smart one in the artillery, the drunkard in the navy, and the fool in the infantry.” The least prestigious was, of course, the infantry. And the "aristocratic" cavalry was considered the most prestigious. However, she shared. So the hussars and lancers looked down on the dragoons. The 1st heavy brigade of the guards cavalry stood apart: the “court” of the Cavalier Guards and the Life Guards Cavalry Regiment, “fought” for the title of the most elite regiment. In the Foot Guards, the so-called. "Peter's Brigade" - Preobrazhensky and Semyonovsky regiments. But, as Minakov notes, even here there was no equality: Preobrazhensky was more well-born. In artillery, horsemen were considered the elite, but the serfs were traditionally considered "outcasts", which pretty much "backfired" in 1915 during the defense of fortresses. Of course, it cannot be said that such differences do not exist in other armies, but there was nothing good in separating and isolating different branches of the armed forces from each other.

Almost the only opportunity to accelerate career growth for talented army officers was admission to the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff. The selection process was very thorough. To do this, it was necessary to pass the preliminary exams, and then the entrance exams. At the same time, they were initially handed over by the best officers of the regiments. According to Shaposhnikov, in the year of his admission, 82.6% of those who passed the preliminary exams passed the competition. However, despite such a careful selection of applicants, applicants had serious problems with general education subjects. “1) Very poor literacy, gross spelling errors. 2) Weak general development. Bad style. Lack of clarity of thought and general indiscipline of the mind. 3) Extremely poor knowledge in the field of history, geography. Insufficient literary education. However, it cannot be said that this applied to all the General Staff officers. On the example of B.M. Shaposhnikov, it is easy to see that many of them did not have even a shadow of the problems mentioned above in the document. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the subsequent problems with education in the Red Army were fundamentally different from those in the tsarist army. The image of a well-educated tsarist officer is fairly idealized.

Training at the Academy of the General Staff lasted two years. In the first year, both military and general education subjects were taken, while from the military officers mastered the disciplines related to the combat operations of the units. In the second year, general education subjects ended, and disciplines related to strategy were studied from the military. In addition, every day there were equestrian classes in the arena. As Shaposhnikov notes, this was a consequence of the experience of the Russo-Japanese War, when the division during the battles near the Yantai mines Orlov's division dispersed, hitting a high kaoliang, when the horse of the chief of staff carried and he could not stop it, leaving the division completely decapitated, since the commander division was wounded. Perhaps this was already redundant for the positional slaughter of the First World War, but to the critical remark of Boris Mikhailovich himself about the archaic nature of the horse as a means of transportation compared to the car introduced in Europe, we will note that Russian industry simply did not have the ability to supply the army with a sufficient amount of transport. Buying it abroad was expensive and rather reckless from the point of view of independence from foreign supplies.

Another problem was the huge waste of time on some very outdated items, like the image of the terrain in strokes. In general, this art was such a memorable subject that many memoirists write about it with unkind words.
Contrary to the well-known myth about the enthusiasm of the generals for the French school of Grandmaison, "élan vitale"6, Shaposhnikov testifies to sympathy for German theories. True, he notes that the top generals were not familiar with German methods of war.

“Paying great attention to the training of troops and the improvement of junior commanders, the Russian General Staff completely ignored the selection and training of senior commanders: the appointment of people who spent their whole lives after graduating from the academy in an administrative chair immediately to the post of division chief and corps commander was not uncommon ." Before the Russo-Japanese War, this situation was especially prominent. It came to jokes: “in 1905-1906. Commander of the Amur Military District Gen. N.P. Linevich, seeing a howitzer, asked with surprise: what kind of gun is this? The same author notes: “The same Lenevich (correctly Linevich - N.B.) did not know how to read maps properly and did not understand what trains were on schedule. “And among the commanders of regiments and brigades,” Shavelsky further notes, “sometimes there were complete ignoramuses in military affairs. Military science was not loved by our military.” Denikin echoes them:

He also petitioned for the dismissal of the most mediocre generals from the army. But the problem was Nicholas II. The monarch, now praised with all his might, cared little about the combat effectiveness of the army, paying much more attention to its form and loyalty to the throne. The tsar in every possible way prevented the removal of generals he liked and the financing of the army to the detriment of the fleet. The appointment of Yanushkevich, who did not at all correspond to the position of chief of the General Staff, for example, became possible only thanks to the patronage of the Sovereign. No less blame lies with the prime minister, since the distribution of budget funds largely depended on him. That is why he defended against the dismissal of generals who showed talent in pacifying the rebels, and not on the battlefield. Quoting Polivanov's diary, P.A. Zaionchkovsky writes:

““Received from e.v. magazine of the Higher Attestation Commission about corps commanders; consent was given for the dismissal of Gen. Shutleworth; against the decision to dismiss Gen. Krause and Novosiltsev - the highest resolution to "leave", but against the gene. Adlerberg: “I know him, he is not a genius, but an honest soldier: in 1905 he defended Kronstadt.” What blood it cost to appoint Rennenkampf, who did not particularly distinguish himself on the battlefields in Manchuria, but the “hero” of the suppression of the 1905 revolution, as commander of the army that invaded East Prussia, is well known.

True, it cannot be said that they did not try to rectify the situation. As the same Denikin writes:

“One way or another, after the Japanese war, senior officers were also forced to study. In the spring of 1906, for the first time, the order of the Minister of War appeared on the imperial order: “To the commanders of the troops to establish appropriate occupations for the senior command staff, from unit commanders to corps commanders inclusive, aimed at developing military knowledge.” This innovation caused irritation at the top: the old people grumbled, seeing in it a desecration of gray hair and undermining authorities ... But things went little by little, although at first not without friction and even curiosities. It was possible to partially instill an interest in self-development in artillery business: “Never, probably, military thought worked so intensively as in the years that followed the Japanese war. They talked, wrote, shouted about the need to reorganize the army. The need for self-education increased, and, accordingly, interest in military literature increased significantly, causing the appearance of a number of new organs. It seems to me that if it were not for the lesson of the Japanese campaign and the upsurge and feverish work that followed, our army would not have survived several months of the ordeal of the world war ... ”However, the white general immediately admits that the work was very slow.

The Achilles' heel of the old army was the complete absence of any political training. The officers were ready to go to their death themselves, but they did not know how to lead. Svechin, in his book The Art of Driving a Regiment, points to the inability of career officers to communicate with soldiers, understand their needs and build discipline that is suitable not only in peacetime. It must be understood that the days of Friedrich's principle "a soldier should be more afraid of a non-commissioned officer's stick than enemy bullets" are long gone and it is impossible to keep a soldier at the front by force alone. Alas, no one simply taught this to Russian officers. And given the completely childish knowledge of social and political sciences, it is easy to understand that the officers were completely disoriented when faced with the propaganda of the socialist parties. The separation of officers from the mass of soldiers also had an effect. For example, Ignatiev notes that scuffle in the 1st Guards Cavalry Division was not used solely due to the Guards tradition. The so-called “train”, similar in meaning to modern hazing, was also considered quite normal. All this was not noticeable for a significant part of the war, but the collapse of discipline, and as a result, of the entire army in 1917, perfectly showed what inattention to the moral climate within the army team could lead to.

The most difficult situation was in the infantry. You can often see ratings like this:

“Our infantry regiments lost several sets of command personnel during the world war. As far as I can judge from the data I have, only in a few regiments does the loss of officers in killed and wounded go down to 300%, but usually they reach 400 - 500% or more.

1 to 3 months at 8 sets of regiments,
from 3 to 6 months at 11 regiments,
from 6 to 12 months at 8 sets of regiments,
from 1 to 2 years. at 3 sets of regiments,
over 2 years. at 2 sets of regiments,

The entire officer corps under study can be divided into 2 unequal, sharply different groups - into regular officers and into wartime officers.
The first group includes all staff officers, almost all captains (9 or 10) and a small part of staff captains (7 out of 38).
In total, there are 27 regular officers, i.e., not the full 4% of the total. The remaining 96% are wartime officers"

So, regular infantry officers are knocked out. And who replaced them? This is where the very serious problem of the future Red Army lies. The fact is that the retired officers were replaced mainly by people who had completely inadequate training, both military and simply general education. The same author gives the corresponding tables:

As the well-known military writer Golovin notes, this was the best material for obtaining officers, since an intellectual could easily evade conscription and therefore those who went into the army had not only the best general education, but also the best fighting spirit, and in some way the best moral qualities than, for example, the notorious "zemgusars". On the other hand, many officers did not even have a secondary, but a lower education, or did not have a general education at all. Only a little more than a third of staff captains had a completed secondary education. This suggests, on the one hand, that the intelligentsia did not really want to join the army. On the other hand, that the image of an officer of the "old army", as a native of the "educated classes", which became widespread in the mass consciousness thanks to Soviet cinema, is far from the truth. The army was replenished mainly by poorly educated people. There was some advantage to this as well. After all, this statistics speaks of the class proximity of wartime officers (and, obviously, it was they who were the main contingent among staff captains who did not receive a secondary education) to the new government.

In general, we have to admit that even before the Great War, the officers had significant shortcomings in training. Moreover, if the young commanders managed to get an education in the reformed schools and academies, then the higher, older command staff continued to lag far behind the requirements of the time in terms of their qualities. The theses about the loss of the top commanding staff of the Red Army as a catastrophe are untenable. Not even talking about the dubious benefits of the elderly generals of the First World War during the Second World War, of which France is a brilliant example, it is impossible not to see the superiority of the highest command staff of future opponents over domestic strategists, if not in talent, then in the level of training. Much worse was the knocking out of young officers during the First World War, and then the Civil. Unfortunately, unlike Germany, the Republic of Ingushetia failed to organize high-quality training of wartime officers, and this was for quite objective reasons: there simply were not enough educated people in Russia. Like the Franco-Prussian war, the war on the Eastern Front was largely won by a Berlin schoolteacher.

It is interesting to note that the Red Army received a large number of cadres of technical troops that were not knocked out. But it was precisely these people “with a learned edging and a velvet collar”, according to Shaposhnikov, who had the largest percentage of those who graduated from the General Staff Academy among those accepted there, which indicates the best training. So out of 6 engineers who joined Shaposhnikov, all 6 graduated. Out of 35 artillerymen, 20, but out of 67 infantry officers, only 19!

4. Monetary allowance of military personnel, its changes during the war years

During the years of the World War, a significant part of the estimates of the military department was spent on the maintenance of military personnel - approximately 40 percent. Compared with previous wars, this figure has slightly decreased (previously - three-quarters) due to the strengthening of the technical equipment of the army and, accordingly, the increase in the cost of acquiring weapons and equipment, their maintenance and operation.

The issues of the monetary allowance of military personnel were given exclusively great importance, they were often covered in the press, proposals were discussed to change the payment for the service of military personnel.

On the agenda State Duma more than once these questions have been the subject of heated debate. F. A. Maksheev, professor of the quartermaster academy, wrote: “The correct solution of the issue of the amount of the salary of officers and military officials is very important. The favorable resolution of the issues of manning with quite suitable personnel largely depends on this. military profession should not be paid worse than other professions public service. Military career should not be less attractive than another career."

Monetary allowance of officers divided into permanent leave and paid in special cases. Permanent payments included: salary, money for dining, housing, fodder, for hiring servants, representation. Travel allowances, lump-sum payments, rewards, additional salaries for orders, etc. were considered paid in special cases.

salary, as before, it was determined by the vast majority of officers and generals according to their military rank (Table 1). Professor F. A. Maksheev, already mentioned, in the same work noted the advantages of this rule. “Salary according to rank,” he wrote, “this emphasizes the importance of rank, which is very important in military life, since ranks determine the relationship of the military ... constituent part maintenance of officers, wherever they serve, should be paid according to rank. The rank must be given a proper meaning, otherwise it loses its meaning, respect for it is lost. Generals and officers in administrative positions were paid according to the positions they held, indicating them in the states, and the amount of this salary was lower than according to rank.

Table 1

The size of the monetary allowance of generals and officers from 1859 to 1917

(in rubles per year)

Some generals and officers had the right to receive "reinforced", i.e. increased salaries, including for service in remote areas (in the military districts: Petersburg, Kazan, Caucasus, Turkmen, Omsk, Irkutsk, Amur), as well as listeners military academies and officers of the permanent and variable composition of officer schools.

Special privileges were reserved for service in the guard, officers guards units the salary according to rank was determined higher by one step of his rank (for example, a second lieutenant - as a lieutenant).

In the military press in the years preceding the war, the question of increasing the salaries of officers was widely discussed; it was considered in the State Duma. The obviously low material support of the officers of the troops was recognized. "The question of content sufficient for a decent officer rank existence, is one of the most serious in the organization of officer life. In the most difficult financial situation - the officers of the combat units.

According to the conclusion of the Chief of the General Staff, the main reason for the 50-60 percent shortage of officers in some parts of the troops after the Russo-Japanese War was their insufficient provision. The War Department took care to create such living conditions for the officer corps under which the concern for their daily bread would disappear, and they would devote all their time to official work. To this end, the salaries of the officers of the troops were increased in two ways.

The first one. Since January 1909, the salary of the salary has been increased by issuing to combat officers who served in combat units and departments, special "additional money" according to the rank: colonel and lieutenant colonel - 480 rubles. per year, to the captain - 360 rubles, to the captain - 300 rubles, to the lieutenant - 240 rubles, to the second lieutenant - 180 rubles, to the ensign - 120 rubles.

The second way. The same money has been introduced for a long stay in the same military rank. The fact is that the financial situation of the officers was adversely affected by the slow promotion, since in this case the next military rank. As General A. A. Brusilov noted, the percentage of vacancies for the positions of commanders of individual units was very small, and therefore the vast majority of army officers were dismissed due to age with the rank of captain or lieutenant colonel. Involuntarily, the army officers looked listlessly at their lot. To limit to some extent adverse effect stay of officers for a long time in the same rank, an additional increase in the salary of officers who served in combat units is introduced, taking into account the length of service in a certain rank (for a staff captain and captain after 4 years of being in this rank - 120 rubles in year, lieutenant colonel and colonel after 5 years, respectively - 180 rubles per year).

Thus, the battalion commander, lieutenant colonel, could receive a yearly salary of 1080 rubles. additional 660 rub. (480 + 180), and the company commander, captain, to 900 rubles - 480 rubles. (360 + 120).

According to the Chief of the General Staff, measures to increase the payroll could not but have a positive effect on the replenishment and quality of the officer corps, in last years before the war, a lot of young people with higher education entered the military service.

Additional permanent salary increases were due to officers who served in remote areas. Their size depended on the quartering of the military unit and the duration of the officer's continuous service in remote areas. Upon appointment to service in these regions, an allowance for lifting and equipping was also paid, the amount of which was determined according to the marital status and the point of the new officer's service.

An additional allowance before the war was introduced to officer pilots, moreover, monthly and in a rather large amount (200 rubles). True, it could be paid no more than six months a year and only in those months when they were in the air for a certain number of hours. On the same grounds, additional maintenance was provided for members of the crews of balloons.

Mess allowance were paid to officers from the company commander inclusive and above, their size was established according to the position held. Particularly large amounts of canteen money continued to be received by generals and regimental commanders. For some positions, "reinforced", i.e., increased salaries of canteen money, were established, including for the positions of the military district administration, corps and divisional quartermasters.

Junior officers, platoon commanders, were not entitled to canteen money. They were reimbursed for their food expenses in the same way as in the last century.

apartment money continued to pay officers who were not provided with state-owned apartments. Their size depended on the place of residence ( settlements one of the 8 ranks was assigned) and the rank of officer. For example, the amount of apartment money was as follows: in the area, according to the 1st category, the company commander was due 544 rubles. per year (with a salary of 900 rubles per year), major general - 1666 rubles. per year, including for renting an apartment - 1332 rubles. (with a salary of 1800 rubles).

table 2

The amount of apartment money for generals and officers in 1913

(in rubles per year)

fodder money to feed the horses were paid to generals and officers, who were required to have their own riding horses.

List of officials who are entitled to representative money, was determined by the states and the order of the Minister of War. For a number of years, this money was relied upon in the troops: for the corps commander - 1,500 rubles. per year, division commander - 1500 rubles. and the brigade commander - 1200 rubles.

The monetary holidays paid to the officer corps, paid in special cases, included travel allowance. It included running money to pay for travel (including on horseback) in connection with the assignment to the service, transfers, and business trips. For example, a lieutenant general, division commander, was paid for travel on 12 horses, a colonel - on 5. Instead of "runs" it was allowed, at the request of the military, to receive travel documents for travel on railway. Per diem money was divided into travel, camp, marching and guard. They were paid: business trips - during business trips, camp - for the time spent in camps, marching - for the time of movement as part of the troops and mobile charges, guard - for the time of guard duty.

Lump sum payments provided for various groups of military personnel. Of interest is material incentives for training in military academies and primary promotion to officers. When enrolling in the first year of the academy, officers were given an allowance for books and training supplies - 140 rubles, when transferring to the next courses - 100 rubles each, after graduating from the academy - an annual maintenance salary. During the primary production, officers were entitled to a one-time allowance for acquiring in the amount of 300 rubles, and those who graduated from military schools received an additional purchase of a horse and saddle.

Awards, awards for excellent service paid in the form of additional salaries to officers for the merits and circumstances of the service. For some, it was issued monthly throughout the entire military service, regardless of the position held and the salary received, including with an increase in salary when appointed to another position. Other additional salaries were assigned only for a certain period, which was indicated when documenting this salary.

Surplus salary due With military personnel a military order or medal was assigned from the salary according to the rank in which the soldier was on the day of the feat. Cavaliers of the 4th degree were paid one third of the annual salary, 3rd degree - two thirds, 2nd degree - full salary, 1st degree - one and a half salary.

In 1912, the "Quartermaster's Journal" outlined the history of the development of the system of pay for officers over the course of half a century, starting from 1859, when a new table of salaries for officers was established.

For 50 years, the salary of commanders of companies, battalions and junior officers has increased the most (by about 3 times), for commanders of regiments and divisions it has increased by 1.6-1.8 times. True, it should be borne in mind that the basis for calculating this increase was completely incomparable: the salaries of junior officers were much lower than the salaries of senior officers, especially generals.

Many provisions on the monetary allowance of military personnel in times of peace were retained in war time. At the same time, significant changes were made to the monetary allowance of the servicemen of the troops of the army in the field.

First of all, it should be noted that the entire officer corps received an increased salary in the amounts established in 1899. As in past wars, "portions" were paid to take into account the special conditions and high cost of camp life. According to their purpose, they were divided into marching ones - from the day of mobilization and field ones - during their stay in the theater of war (field ones are twice as large as marching ones). By order of the Minister of War, each officer position was assigned a rank, according to which the amount of portioned money was established. Their maximum size is 20 rubles. and 10 rubles. per day (to the corps commander), the minimum is 2 rubles. 50 kop. and 1 rub. 25 kop. (platoon commander), i.e., the difference in size for these positions is eight times.

Among the one-time benefits, first of all, it should be noted military lifting money, which relied on the officers to acquire items necessary for the campaign (camping clothes, equipment). Their size was set depending on the rank (generals - 250 rubles, staff officers - 150 rubles, other officers - 100 rubles). Military lifting money was paid in double, one and a half and ordinary sizes. The list of positions, performing which a soldier was entitled to receive an increased allowance, was approved by the Minister of War. In a double size, for example, combat commanders in the troops received, in one and a half - in the headquarters of the front and the army.

A number of lump-sum benefits were provided due to the fact that the officers were required to have their own horses and carts. In this regard, an allowance was relied on for acquiring a horse, the purchase of means of transportation (crew or wagon), harness, saddles, and packs.

It is interesting to note that at the front for material support, a group of senior officers was singled out, to whom significant advantages in monetary allowance were established. This was done by introducing additional money in very large sums. Thus, the Commander-in-Chief of the armies of the front received this money in the amount of 12 thousand rubles a year, the commander of the army - 8 thousand, chief boss supply of the armies of the front - 5700 rubles. In addition, the same persons were provided with increased amounts of table money. They relied on the commander-in-chief of the armies of the front in the amount of the entire amount of additional money, and on the commander of the army - half of them.

Of particular interest is the financial support of the wounded military personnel and those who were captured.

Upon arrival at the medical institution, the serviceman submitted a written statement addressed to the head of the institution, indicating all types of monetary allowances that he received by the time of his departure from the military unit. In it, he also reported what part of the allowance was paid to his family. In addition to salaries and table money, the officers received per diem money: in the hospital - 75 kopecks. per day, with treatment at your own apartment - 1 rub. per day.

Officers who were wounded or ill in the theater of operations were given an allowance in order to provide assistance, since when leaving medical institution they could temporarily find themselves in a difficult financial situation. The amount of the allowance was determined depending on various circumstances and marital status within the limits: for generals and colonels - from 200 to 300 rubles, for staff officers - from 150 to 250 rubles, for other officers - from 100 to 200 rubles, for lower ranks - from 10 to 25 rubles. According to the rules for issuing benefits to the wounded, it was paid at the expense of the military fund, and the decision on its amount was made by the chief of the General Staff.

Wounded officers who lost part of their property at the front could claim an allowance in the amount of no more than the amount of military lifting money due. At the front, such a decision was made by the corps commander, and in the rear, in the event of the evacuation of officers due to injury or illness, by the commander of the military district.

Benefit with a rendering chain financial assistance could also be assigned to the family of a serviceman whose head was killed, died of wounds or illness, or was missing.

When leaving a medical institution for the front, one-time wartime benefits were paid not once, but with each return to the active army from a medical institution.

Officers who were captured, if they were not in the military service of the enemy, upon arrival from captivity, were paid a salary for the entire time they were in captivity (with a credit given to the family). The families of captured officers were paid half of his salary and table money, housing money in full, and, in addition, an allowance for hiring servants, if it was due to the officer before the capture.

Monetary allowance of the lower ranks(conscripts and extra-conscripts). The conscripts were on full free state content (premises, food, clothing and other services). They were given an insignificant monetary salary, which was mainly intended to provide them with the necessary pocket money to cover those small needs for which public money was not issued.

The salary of the lower ranks of military service was basic and enhanced (in remote areas and in the theater of operations), their annual size was determined by military rank.

Table 3

The army was interested in re-enlisted personnel, so they also sought to make their service tempting with the help of sufficient provision from the treasury. Their salary was set according to the salary scale for conscripts, but in order to improve their financial situation in order to be interested in military service, they were paid:

additional salary (annually from 280 to 400 rubles, depending on the rank and length of service);

a one-time allowance for two years of service - 150 rubles, for ten years: warrant officers - 100 rubles, non-commissioned officers - 500 rubles;

housing money in the amount of half of the norms for officers;

pension for 15 years of service in the amount of 96 rubles. in year.

It should be noted one circumstance characterizing monetary allowance not with better side. It is about mandatory in very large amounts, deductions from the monetary allowance. A list of these deductions was sent to all military schools before graduation, so that they, young officers, would know what expenses await them from the first steps of service in the regiment.

In the Guards and some other units, the retentions were exceptionally excessive. Here the officers had to live not on a salary, but on their own income. Therefore, these units were staffed with officers by young people from the upper strata of society, the privileged classes.

The list of mandatory deductions reached more than two dozen, including: for officer loan capital, officer meeting, for organizing regimental holidays, comradely and camp dinners, random deductions (for gifts and seeing off), an entrance fee for young officers upon arrival in the regiment and etc. Deductions of about 400 rubles were considered normal. per year, and in the "shelves of a broad nature" they reached 780 rubles. and even more than 1000 rubles. and then almost the entire salary of junior officers turned out to be deducted. At a meeting of the State Duma, an example was given of deductions from one second lieutenant in 1906, 1907 and 1908. In one month, the entire salary was withheld, in other months he was left with from one to eight rubles. Such a situation with deductions from monetary allowance was considered "a severe ulcer of officer life."

Banquet in the regimental officers' meeting

Of course, at the front, not all cash payments were justified from the point of view of achieving combat successes. General A. A. Brusilov, commander of the army, testifies that during the war partisan detachments according to the model Patriotic War 1812, and the pattern of that time was strictly observed, although the conditions for partisan operations in the world war were completely different. In particular, the enemy front was continuous and there was no way for the partisans to influence its communications, as in 1812. With bitterness, A. A. Brusilov concludes that in the end, in the spring of 1916, the partisans were disbanded, without bringing any benefit, and they cost a lot of money.

Table 4

Prices for food and manufactured goods

from the middle of the 18th century to the beginning of the 20th century

Note: prices are given in kopecks.

5. The new pension charter of 1912. Family support organization dead soldiers

During the period of the Russo-Japanese War and after its end, the issues of pensions for officers and their families were discussed more than once in the press. Such major shortcomings were noted as the appointment of a pension only if there was at least 25 years of service, a sharp difference in the size of pensions (for 25 years - 50 percent of the salary, and for 35 years - the full salary). The officers proposed “to give the army a good pension charter ... The length of service of the pension should begin after ten years of service and then a certain share should be added for each subsequent year until the full salary is earned. Such a pension charter will provide an opportunity in each this moment, without any compassion, remove from the army officers unsuitable for it. Under the current order, when the length of service of the pension begins only after 25 years, you willy-nilly have to endure an unsuitable element in the service.

From 1827 to 1912, that is, for 85 years, pensions were assigned according to the pension charter of 1827, which was criticized for the fact that pension provision was insufficiently linked to the service and pay of generals and officers.

In order to eliminate the imperfection of this charter, after the end of the war with Japan, the "Temporary rules on additional pensions" were put into effect, which were extended to line officers. By paying these pensions, they sought to achieve not only an increase in the size of the pension, but also the creation of conditions for the rejuvenation of the officer corps of the army. According to General A.I. Denikin, who had a considerable length of service in the army before the start of the World War, as a result of these changes in pension provision, as well as new certification rules and testing the knowledge of senior officers, both the voluntary departure of officers from the army and their "forced withdrawal". During 1906-1907. 50 to 80 percent of the chiefs were fired and replaced, from the regiment commander to the commander of the district troops.

The provisional rules introduced a new, quite reasonable, rule for assigning pensions. The right to a pension for the last rank and position was conditional on staying in them for at least two years. This was established in order to stop the desire to obtain the highest position and rank, only to retire immediately after receiving a promotion. The provisional rules applied until 1912, and then they were included in the new charter.

The charter of 1912 provides for an increase in the size of pensions, they are more dependent on the salary, features and length of service. military service. by the most important change, which led to an increase in pensions, was their calculation not only from salaries, as was the case for a century, but also from canteens and additional money. Bearing in mind that the size of the latter among generals and officers was quite significant, the amount of pensions increased significantly. The adoption of a new pension charter, which had a tangible impact on the position of pensioners, was considered, along with an increase in monetary allowance, one of the major measures on the eve of the war in common system measures to improve the material support of military personnel.

Generals, officers and their families had the right to a pension from the state treasury. The size of the pension was calculated from salaries (basic or "reinforced"), canteens and additional money. For 25 years of service, 50 per cent. salaries; for each year served over 25 years, the pension increased by three percent (up to 35 years). Full pension was considered for 35 years of service in the amount of 80 percent. salaries. The maximum and minimum pensions were set: 7,000 rubles. and 300 rubles. in year. The salaries of maintenance at the appointment of a pension were determined according to the last rank or position before dismissal, and with less than two years of service in them, according to the penultimate one.

Provided for the preferential calculation of seniority for retirement, including service in the army, disciplinary units, remote areas, in the positions of pilots and educational personnel, the time of business trips to areas affected by the plague. The greatest increase in pension experience was given by service in Port Arthur during the siege of the fortress and being in the plague area, when one month was counted as twelve.

When military personnel were dismissed due to illness or injury, the mandatory period of service for a pension was reduced, and for disabled people of the first group, a pension was assigned in the amount of the full annual salary of maintenance. According to special rules, pensions were assigned to pilots who were retired due to illness. They were entitled to a pension with a short length of military service.

Considerable advantages can be noted in the provision of pensions for servicemen who served in remote areas. They had three types of benefits: an increased pension, its appointment from a “reinforced” salary, preferential calculation of length of service (two days for three, three for four, four for five, depending on the areas of the area).

Benefits were also provided for a number of other persons in the appointment of pensions. It was not the minister of war, but the tsar personally, who appointed increased pensions to the minister, members of the military council and the Committee on the Wounded, commanders of military districts, corps commanders, heads of the main departments of the ministry and the families of all these persons. Additional monthly payments, which were due to those awarded the St. George Cross or medal, were added to the pension upon its appointment. By decision of the king, personal pensions were appointed. For example, in 1916, the widow of a deceased colonel, the mother of three dead officer sons, awarded with the order St. George, the pension was assigned in the amount of 3000 rubles. in year.

Pension provision for officers at the expense of funds from the emerital fund carried out in the same manner as before. The size of pensions depended on two factors: the duration of membership in the fund and the length of military service. There was the concept of "full salary of pensions", equal to the salary, and since 1912 - the amount of salary, canteen and additional money. In this amount, the pension was assigned with the length of military service and membership in the cash desk for more than 35 years. At lower rates, the size of the pension was set in shares of the full salary of the pension.

Table 5

The amount of the pension from the emerital fund

Three important conclusions arise from the rules for assigning a pension at the expense of the Emeritus Fund. First, only officers and generals with at least 25 years of military service could receive it. With the same length of service, a pension was also awarded from state budget. Officers who were members of the fund for quite a long time and paid dues, but did not serve in the army for 25 years, were not assigned a pension from the emerital fund. Second, a pension equal to salaries in cash was provided for over 35 years of military service. With such service, a full state pension (80 percent of maintenance) was also assigned. Long military service thus stimulated by high pensions from two sources. Thirdly, the right to receive a pension came only after 20 years of membership. Without this condition, even more than 25 years of military service did not provide an opportunity to use the capital of the cash desk. Such additional requirement was introduced in connection with the deterioration of the financial situation of the fund, it limited the number of applicants for help and at the same time stimulated membership of the fund.

In 1917, a report was published in the press on the cash turnover of the emerital cash desk of the military land department, which summed up the results of its 50-year activity. Over the years, pensions have been assigned to about 85 thousand people, more than half of them were military personnel. As of January 1915, there were about four tens of thousands of pensioners. It is significant that by 1915 the cash desk increased its capital to 111 million rubles, 93 percent. which was stored in interest-bearing securities that bring a steady income. Another constant source of cash - contributions from the monetary allowance of military personnel was less than this income. Profits from interest-bearing papers more than covered all expenses. In 1914, for example, these expenses were four times less than the income from interest-bearing papers. However, in connection with the ongoing war, an increase in the number of persons who were supposed to be provided from the cash desk and the deterioration in connection with this of her prosperous financial situation was expected.

Soldiers and their families in prewar years and the years of war continued to be helpat the expense of the Committee for the Wounded, whose income was, as before, mandatory contributions from institutions and organizations, voluntary donations and interest for the storage of disabled capital in credit institutions. An analysis of the data characterizing the state and use of the committee's funds on the eve of the war allows us to draw the following conclusions.

Firstly, the stable balance of disabled capital reached a large amount - more than 61 million rubles, it combined several dozen separate capitals of various denominations (target donations).

Secondly, the number of persons who were taken under the protection of the Committee for the Wounded increased noticeably. There were more than 100,000 people receiving pensions alone, and benefits were paid to more than 30,000.

Thirdly, the main part of the disabled capital was spent on the payment of pensions (over 80 percent), i.e., in order to provide regular assistance. The receipt of a monthly pension by a serviceman or a member of his family contributed to the stability of their financial situation, and the appointment of pensions for life or for a long time guaranteed their constant financial support. Assistance at the expense of disabled capital served as a good material support for military personnel or their families, since the amount of the pension could be half or more of their salaries.

Fourthly, the list of assistance and services provided at the expense of disabled capital has expanded (about two dozen). Particularly noteworthy is the merciful care of the Committee for the children of the fallen servicemen. Very multi-purpose sums were allocated for them, including for their maintenance in childhood, education in secondary and higher educational institutions and for other needs.

IN the war years were taken measures for the most rapid financial support for the families of fallen soldiers.

The family members of officers who went to war were paid all or part of the monetary allowance of the serviceman (salary and table money), according to the statement of the serviceman, as well as housing and money for hiring servants.

If the family of a serviceman remained to live in the military unit in which the head of the family served, then cash payments to the family were made by order of the commander of this military unit (according to appropriations for the treasury). If the family did not live at the location of the unit, or military unit departed for the front, then the care of the families lay with the district military commanders. The military units sent to these chiefs, on the territory of whose county the families would live, a certificate for the right to receive part of the financial support of the head of the family, as well as apartment money and for hiring servants. The certificate was sent only once and was replaced if necessary to increase, reduce or completely stop issuing the specified types of monetary allowance to the family (on the occasion of a change in the official position of a serviceman, abandonment of service, death).

On the basis of these certificates, the district military commander issued a monthly certificate to the family for receiving the due money from the local treasury, which remained in the treasury, and then was sent to the control body. All messages on the replacement of certificates or the termination of their validity were made by telegraph.

If there was no news from a soldier, his fate was unknown, then the family was paid a “temporary monetary allowance”, consisting of one third of the salaries of the monetary content (salary and table money) and full norms for hiring servants of money. Upon the appointment of a pension, the payment of this allowance to the family was stopped and a recalculation was made. At the same time, the family was entitled to an additional payment if the pension turned out to be more than temporary allowance. If, on the contrary, the pension was assigned in a smaller amount than this allowance was paid, then no deduction was made from the family.

In order to shorten the period of payment of temporary monetary allowance to the officer's family, to process the pension more quickly, a decision was made to assign conditional or temporary pensions. The final calculation of the pension required the submission of many documents and therefore the correct calculation of the pension could not be made, with very few exceptions, until the end of hostilities. Therefore, a conditional, or temporary, pension was introduced, for which a strict deadline was set - one month from the date of signing a pension application by a family member. The notice of the death of a serviceman, an application for a pension and a sheet with some additional information, the district military commander sent directly to the General Staff, which transferred these documents to the State Treasury. Then the district chief, the family and the local treasury were informed about the appointment of a pension.

At the end of hostilities, the military unit in which the deceased soldier served was obliged to send a verified service record to the General Staff to establish whether the assigned pension (conditional) was actually due. The results were reported to the State Treasury and the conditional pension was replaced by a permanent one.

But only those who received additional payments and bonuses managed to make money on the war. Napoleon distributed 16 million francs to the generals and marshals, Alexander I, after winning the war, 5 million rubles.

Surprisingly, all French prisoners were given a monetary allowance “for food” at the rate of 5 kopecks per day for each private, non-commissioned officer or non-combatant, 50 kopecks for a chief officer, 1 ruble for a major, 1.5 rubles for lieutenant colonels and colonels and 3 rubles for a general. The wives of the prisoners were also paid the same salary that they received in Napoleon's army.

Salary of the Russian Army

For the first time, Peter the Great began to pay salaries to his soldiers. Then the warrant officer earned 50 rubles, the colonel - 300 and 600 rubles. One kilogram of wheat flour cost 1 kopeck, a chicken - 2 kopecks, a horse - 30 kopecks.

Therefore, even junior officers at that time occupied a very enviable position in the society for material support.

However, later, the wage gap between civilian population and the army was reduced. And gradually the financial situation of the officers worsened even in comparison with the armies of other states.

And if in the XVIII - early XIX centuries, a significant part of the officers owned land and other property and salary was not the only source of existence for them, then already in the middle of the 19th century it became just that. In 1903, even among lieutenant generals, only 15.2% were landowners, and among officers, only a few possessed any property.

Before the war of 1812, the salaries of military personnel were increased, which was due to the preparation for military operations against France, the need to fill command positions in the army with experienced officers who retired during the reign of Paul I. However, they were paid salaries in paper banknotes, the rate of which fell sharply compared to silver .

The annual salary of a soldier under Alexander I was about 10 rubles. In addition, it was supposed to be 72 “meat” and 15 “salt” kopecks per year. Money was given to them 3 times a year, on the general construction of the unit.

For the expulsion of Napoleon's troops and the passage of the Russian army state border without exception, all servicemen of Alexander I were paid a semi-annual salary for a total of 4 million rubles. For rewards for winning battles and for providing medical care another million rubles went to the wounded officers. Another 300 thousand rubles were allocated for awards to those who distinguished themselves in parades and parades. Individual officers and generals received another 300,000 for their military exploits. For example, General Alexander Tormasov received 50,000 rubles for the first battle won by the Russian army in 1812 near Kobrin (with an annual salary of 2,000 rubles).

Monthly salaries of Russian officers in 1812 and 2012, and their equivalents in products at current prices

	Officer's salary in rubles	Equivalent in wheat flour (kg)	Beef equivalent (kg)	Equivalent in butter (kg)
Colonel



Ensign


Lieutenant of the modern Russian army

In the Russian army of the 19th century, there were three main types of payments to officers: salary (depending on the rank), table money (depending on the position) and apartment money (depending on the rank, city and marital status).

Pensions in the Russian army

According to the decree of May 21, 1803, officers who served impeccably for 20 years received invalid maintenance, 30 years - half salary according to the rank, and 40 years - full salary in the form of a pension. Salaries for disabled people were previously determined in the amount of 1/3 of the salary for the states of infantry regiments in 1802. Lieutenant colonel - 558-690 rubles, captain and staff captain - 340-400, lieutenant - 237-285, second lieutenant and ensign - 200-236. For 1 ruble, you could buy 10 kg of butter or 5 kg of beef.

Salary of the "Great Army"

Service in Napoleon's army was the duty of a citizen. Therefore, the soldiers' earnings were meager - the line infantry fusilier "clean" received 5 francs a month - the wages of a good worker in Paris in one day. With this money, a soldier could afford to go to a tavern several times a month or buy some small change.

Here is what Barres, an infantryman of the Imperial Guard, recalled: “Our salary was 23 sous and 1 centime per day (1 franc 16 centimes). For food, 9 sous were deducted from this money, 4 sous were kept in the company treasury for the purchase of linen and shoes, and the remaining 10 sous were given to us every 10 days as pocket money. We were well fed, and there was enough pocket money for all essentials, but often other deductions were made from this money, which were far from always absolutely legal, but we were in no hurry to complain, since the senior sergeants were all-powerful in the companies.

However, Napoleon's officers received a very solid salary. In terms of purchasing power, it was more than one and a half times the salary of Russian officers. The salaries of the officers of the Guards were especially great: already the captain of the Guards, by his income, could be safely attributed to very wealthy people.

"Do you like chocolate?" - Napoleon asked Marshal Lefebvre at a solemn reception, where the latter was informed of his elevation to ducal dignity. The old commander, somewhat surprised, answered in the affirmative. “In that case, I give you a pound of chocolate from Danzig, because, since you won it, he must bring you at least something,” and the Emperor, smiling, handed the package in the shape of a bar to the not understanding Lefebvre ... When through a few hours after returning to his place, Lefebvre bothered to open the "chocolate", he saw three hundred thousand-franc banknotes.

In addition to salaries and such gifts, Napoleon distributed among his generals and marshals 16,071,871 francs of various annual payments. True, he encouraged, first of all, those who stood out for their talent and courage and led regiments into the fire. “I am disgusted by the idea of rewarding them in the same way as those who shed blood,” said Napoleon.

But the supreme command had the largest incomes. Grand Army- Berthier (1,254,945 francs per year), Ney (1,028,973), Davout (910,000), Massena (683,375). For comparison, the annual income of the factories of the richest capitalist in France of that era, Oberkampf, was about one and a half million francs a year.

Monthly salaries of French officers in 1812 and 2012, their equivalents in products at current prices

Special money was also paid for an apartment, horses, uniforms, as a result, the actual income was about 1.5 times higher than that shown in the table.

Officer content in Russian and foreign armies for 1863 (in rubles)

Rank and position		Germany
Full general (corps commander)
Lieutenant General (Head of Division)
Major General (Brigade Commander)
Colonel (commander of the regiment)
Lieutenant colonel (battalion commander)
Captain (company commander)
Staff captain (company commander)

Second Lieutenant

All types of payments are included and averages for all branches of the military are taken; comparison is given in terms of rubles

From the book by S. Volkov "Russian officer corps"

Salary of officers of the Russian army in the 17th century. Material support for officers of the Russian army in the reign of Alexander I. Benefits for professional affiliation

Collection of ideal social studies essays

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