On July 10, the tank group of Hitler's general H.-V. Guderian crossed the Dnieper in the Mogilev region and rushed to Smolensk. Heavy fighting continued near Orsha. Here, on July 14, the battery of Captain I.A. Flerova for the first time introduced rocket launchers BM-13 ("Katyusha") into battle.
On the evening of July 15, German strike groups, advancing 200 km, broke into Smolensk, and on July 18 captured Yelnya.
July 30 Army Group Center went on the defensive. This was largely due to Hitler's decision to strengthen his troops in the Leningrad and Kiev directions, but one way or another, the German army was forced to defend for the first time since the beginning of World War II. By this time, the German troops had suffered heavy losses and felt a shortage of forces. Wehrmacht strategy in the war against Soviet Union turned out to be untenable.
In the second half of August, the troops of the Western and Reserve Fronts fought heavy battles near Yelnya. On September 5, Yelnya was liberated, and on September 8, the Yelninsky ledge was liquidated, which could be used by the Germans as a springboard for an attack on Moscow. Thus ended the two-month battle of Smolensk.
Order No. 270 "On cases of cowardice and surrender and measures to prevent such actions.""No step back!")
The top leadership of the country, headed by Stalin, sought to shift the responsibility for failures at the front onto the soldiers and commanders, accusing them of cowardice. August 16 Supreme High Command The Red Army adopted Order No. 270, which went down in history as one of the most inhumane documents.
Battles in Ukraine
In mid-July, when the German tank wedges had already reached Smolensk, the 5th Army of the Southwestern Front continued to hold out in the Pripyat marshes, threatening the communications of the enemy groups "South" and "Center". Fierce fighting went east of Zhytomyr - the Germans rushed to the capital of Ukraine. Fighting continued on the territory of southern Ukraine and Moldova.
Taking advantage of the 60-kilometer gap formed between the 5th Army and the units covering Kyiv, the German troops On July 11, they reached the near approaches to Kyiv but they couldn't take it. Stubborn protracted battles unfolded near Kiev.
In August, Army Group South, pushing back the Soviet southern front, went to the Dnieper in its lower reaches - from Kremenchug to Kherson. Remained in the German rear Odessa . Her defense began on August 5 and lasted 73 days (August 5 - October 16, 1941) . The city was defended by Black Sea sailors and the Primorsky army, replenished by the inhabitants of the city. Over 100 thousand inhabitants of Odessa participated in the construction of defensive lines around the city. The assault on Odessa undertaken by the Nazis on August 20 ended in failure. For more than a month, the city's defenders repulsed the attacks of superior enemy forces, and at the end of September, having received reinforcements by sea, they even launched successful counterattacks. In the first half of October, the troops defending Odessa were evacuated to the Crimea. On October 16, German-Romanian troops entered Odessa.
Exit German troops to the Dnieper south of Kyiv sharply complicated the situation in the entire south-western direction. There was a danger of an enemy strike from the south and north to the rear of the troops of the Southwestern Front holding the Kiev bridgehead. Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov reported to Stalin that the Southwestern Front must be withdrawn beyond the Dnieper. However, Stalin categorically refused to surrender Kyiv, guided by not so much military as political considerations. Zhukov was removed from the post of Chief of the General Staff and replaced by Marshal B.M. Shaposhnikov.
Defense of Kyiv July 7 - September 26, 1941. The worst assumptions came true: Guderin's tank group moved from the north to the rear of the Southwestern Front. Now the front commander, General Kirponos, asked for permission to withdraw troops to the line of the river. Psel, but was refused by Stalin and Shaposhnikov. The Bryansk Front, thrown against the Guderian group, failed to stop it. The Germans hit under the base of the ledge, creating a significant superiority in forces in the shock areas. The new Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Direction S.K. Timoshenko (he replaced S.M. Budyonny, who was removed for supporting the withdrawal proposal) decided to give Kirponos the sanction to leave Kiev, and even then verbally, only on September 16, when the Southwestern Front was already surrounded. Kirponos, afraid to follow the oral directive, requested a written confirmation. It took about a day to get it. Time was finally lost: the Germans sealed the encirclement. September 20 Kyiv fell. With a breakthrough from the boiler, the front command lost contact with the troops. General Kirponos and his staff were killed in action. Parts of the front, breaking into small groups, broke through the encirclement at their own peril and risk. The Red Army lost about 660 thousand people only as prisoners in the Kiev "cauldron". The blame for this second largest failure after the June defeat of the Western Front lies entirely with Stalin, who did not take into account the real situation at the front and the professional opinion of the military.
By the end of September 1941 The front line ran between Smolensk and Yelnya, west of Bryansk, east of Poltava and reached the shores of the Sea of Azov. The Germans captured the entire Baltic, Belarus, most of Ukraine, occupied the Pskov, Leningrad, part of the Novgorod, Kalinin, Smolensk, Bryansk regions of the RSFSR. They destroyed or captured almost the entire regular army that met them near the border. But they were infinitely far from the task set in the Barbarossa plan: in three months to inflict a final defeat on the Red Army and reach the Volga-Arkhangelsk line. Blitzkrieg failed. It is unlikely, however, that even the most far-sighted Hitlerite generals realized that even then Germany had lost the war.
Reasons for the failures of the Red Army in the first months of the war:
1) insufficiency of intelligence data, overestimation own forces, underestimation of the enemy's forces, which ultimately led to a general underestimation of the situation, and the decision to launch a general offensive was unreasonable;
2) military doctrine, which provided for military operations of an offensive nature only on foreign territory;
3) repression in the army on the eve of the war among commanders; lack of flexibility in management
4) dismantling of old and lack of new fortifications on the border (the border of the USSR was moved in 1940 in connection with the entry of Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia into the USSR)
5) the allocated forces and means were not enough, there was not enough time for the preparation of offensive operations, there was a delay in bringing the troops to combat readiness;
At the beginning of July 1941, the military-political leadership of Germany, having achieved significant operational results, was optimistic about the future prospects for conducting armed struggle in Eastern Front and did not doubt the possibility of simultaneously solving three tasks in the shortest possible time - the capture of Leningrad, the defeat of Soviet troops in the Right-Bank Ukraine, and a swift exit to Moscow. The latter task, no doubt, was considered a priority, since the capture of the capital of the USSR was to become a prerequisite for the final victory in the war. Therefore, the main blow General base Wehrmacht planned, as before, in the western (Moscow) direction.
The general plan of his actions at the first stage of the offensive was to ensure that the forces of Army Group Center would cut through the defenses of the Soviet troops, surround and destroy their Nevelsk, Smolensk, Mogilev groupings and thereby create favorable conditions for an unhindered advance to Moscow. To defeat the Western Front, which, according to the German command, had no more than 11 combat-ready formations, 29 divisions were involved (12 infantry, 9 tank, 7 motorized, 1 cavalry), 1040, more than 6600 guns and mortars, over 1 thousand troops. aircraft.
Anti-aircraft calculation air defense Red Army near Smolensk
The fighting in the Smolensk-Moscow direction began in extremely unfavorable conditions for the Western Front (commander of the troops - Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko, from July 10 at the same time was the commander-in-chief of the Western direction) conditions. By the end of the first ten days of July, the 22nd, 20th, 13th and 21st armies were in its first echelon, which had not yet completed their deployment. The defense was carried out hastily and therefore was insufficiently prepared in engineering terms. The troops lacked tanks, artillery, and air defense equipment.
Therefore, enemy strike groups concentrated in narrow areas, without encountering strong resistance, carried out deep breakthroughs in the areas of Polotsk, Vitebsk, north and south of Mogilev. by the most vulnerable spot in the defense of the Western Front were the adjacent flanks of the 22nd and 20th armies. In this direction, on July 9, the Soviet units left Vitebsk, which created a threat that the main forces of the German 3rd Panzer Group would go to the rear of the front. To prevent this, S.K. Timoshenko decided "by joint actions of the 19th, 20th and 22nd armies, in cooperation with the enemy, to destroy the enemy that had broken through and, having captured the city of Vitebsk, to gain a foothold on the front of Idritsa, Polotsk UR, Orsha and further along the Dnieper River."
However, a hastily prepared counterattack, carried out in conditions where the enemy had the initiative and air supremacy, did not lead to success. 22nd Army Lieutenant General F.E. Ershakova could not go on the offensive at all. Occupying the defense with the forces of six divisions in a strip 280 km wide, it was enveloped from the flanks and, under the threat of encirclement, began to retreat, waging separate battles in the Polotsk fortified area. Formations of the 19th and 20th armies of lieutenant generals I.S. Konev and P.A. Kurochkin attacked the enemy separately, as a rule, without artillery support, which was due to an extremely limited amount of ammunition. As a result, the German 3rd Panzer Group, developing an offensive north of Smolensk, by the end of July 15, advanced units almost unhindered reached Yartsevo, cut the Smolensk-Moscow highway and deeply enveloped the 16th, 19th and 20th armies from the east.
At the same time, by the evening of July 11, formations of the 2nd Panzer Group of the enemy captured a bridgehead on east coast Dnieper (south of Orsha). Having launched an offensive from it, on July 15 they broke into the southern part of Smolensk. An extremely difficult situation also developed in the areas of Mogilev, Chauss and Krichev, in which Soviet troops fought heavy battles in three isolated groupings. All this indicated that by mid-July the enemy had achieved major successes on the right wing and in the center of the Western Front. Deeply aware of the criticality of the situation, the Headquarters of the High Command sought to stop its further advance and create conditions for the elimination of the most dangerous intrusions. To this end, it not only strengthened the Western Front in every possible way, but also deployed the Reserve Army Front (Lieutenant General I.A. Bogdanov) in its rear, consisting of the 24th, 28th, 29th, 30th, 31st and 32nd armies. They received the task of preparing the defense at the turn of Staraya Russa, Bryansk.
Warriors of one of the units of the 20th Army are fighting on the banks of the Dnieper, west of Dorogobuzh. Western front. September 1, 1941. Photo by L. Bat
Events on the left wing of the Western Front developed in a completely different way. Here the 21st Army under the command of Colonel-General F.I. Kuznetsova launched an attack on Bobruisk with the aim of reaching the rear of the German 2nd Panzer Group. On July 13, the main forces of the army crossed the Dnieper and advanced 8-10 km during the day of the battle. Building on the success achieved, the Soviet units pushed back the enemy in the Bobruisk direction for another 12 km. And the 232nd Rifle Division, operating to the south, using the forests, covered almost 80 km with battles and captured the crossings on the Berezina and Ptich rivers.
Considering the results achieved as an undoubted success, the Headquarters of the High Command, along with solving the problem of increasing the depth of defense, decided to move on to large-scale offensive operations. On July 20, in negotiations over a direct wire with the Commander-in-Chief of the Western Direction, Marshal S.K. Timoshenko I.V. Stalin set him the task of creating strike groups at the expense of the Reserve Army Front, with the forces of which to capture the Smolensk region and push the enemy back beyond Orsha. In essence, the task was to go over to the counteroffensive.
His general plan was to deliver three simultaneous strikes from the areas south of Bely, Yartsevo and Roslavl in directions converging on Smolensk with the task of defeating German troops north and south of the city. For the offensive, operational groups were created under the command of generals V.Ya. Kachalova, V.A. Khomenko, S.A. Kalinina, I.I. Maslennikov and K.K. Rokossovsky. Each of them was supposed to strike in an independent direction, conducting an offensive in a strip 30-50 km wide. In general, the prevailing situation did not favor a counteroffensive in the western direction. The main thing is that the offensive capabilities of Army Group Center were not exhausted, and it was preparing to continue active operations. By concentrating mobile units in the areas of Yartsev and east of Smolensk, the enemy intended to complete the encirclement and destruction of the Soviet 20th and 16th armies covering the Vyazma direction.
On July 23, a group led by the commander of the 28th Army, Lieutenant General V.Ya., struck from the Roslavl region. Kachalov. Although the offensive was carried out under continuous attacks by German aircraft, the formations of the group managed to break the stubborn resistance of the enemy in two days and push him back across the river. Stop. However, an attempt to develop success along the highway to Smolensk was thwarted by the forces of two army and motorized corps, which went to the rear of the Soviet troops and surrounded them. During a breakthrough from the encirclement, Lieutenant General V.Ya. Kachalov died.
The offensive of the army group of Major General V.A. Khomenko from the border of the river. The howl began on July 25th. On the first day, only one rifle division was able to advance 3-4 km, the rest could not even break through the front line of the enemy defense. Two cavalry divisions of the group, operating on the right flank with the task of raiding the area of the cities of Demidov and Kholm, came under a counter attack and were forced to withdraw. Resuming the offensive in the following days, the formations of the group were still able to advance in depth by 20-25 km, but they did not fully complete the task set by the command of the Western Direction.
The offensive of the operational group of Lieutenant General S.A. did not develop either. Kalinin. She had the task of striking from the area north of Yartsev to Dukhovshchina. However, all the divisions of the group were brought into battle at different times in separate directions. The retaliatory actions of the enemy led to the fact that part of their forces was surrounded. Major General K.K. Rokossovsky at the appointed time was not able to start the task at all, since she was forced to reflect at the turn of the river. Vop numerous attacks of German troops rushing to Vyazma. Nevertheless, having stopped them, on July 28, the group launched a counterattack and provided a way out of the encirclement of the 16th and 20th armies.
In the course of a stubborn struggle in the first days of August 1941, a certain balance was established on the central sector of the Soviet-German front. Neither side achieved their goals. Nevertheless, the troops of the Western Direction thwarted the offensive of the 3rd Panzer Group of the enemy towards the Valdai Upland, planned by his command in the interests of Army Group North, broke through the encirclement around the 20th and 16th armies and helped their main forces retreat beyond the Dnieper , with their active actions, they achieved stabilization of the situation in the bands of the 22nd Army and the Central Front.
In the current situation, the Wehrmacht high command faced the question of how to use the available forces in the future. His decision was set out in Directive No. 34 of July 30, 1941, which left offensive tasks only to Army Groups North and South, and with regard to Army Group Center, it was indicated that it "transitions to the defensive, using the most suitable areas for this. At the same time, the 3rd and 2nd tank groups were redirected first to the right and left wings of the Western Front, and then to the stripes of the Soviet North-Western and South-Western fronts. On August 12, in addition to Directive No. 34, it was noted that the offensive in the Moscow direction would be continued "only after the complete elimination of the threatening situation on the flanks and the replenishment of tank groups."
In turn, the Headquarters of the Civil Code rightly believed that after the frontal attack of the enemy did not reach the target, one should expect his active actions on the flanks. Based on this, the main task was to, while holding the Velikoluksky and Gomel ledges and maintaining an overhanging position over the Army Group Center from the north and south, defeat its most important groupings - Dukhovshchinskaya and Yelninskaya. This was, in fact, the second attempt to seize the initiative in the western direction.
However, the enemy preempted the Soviet troops in going over to the offensive. On August 8, the 24th motorized corps of the 2nd tank group struck. Having broken through the defenses of the 13th Army of the Central Front and building on the success achieved, by August 21 he advanced 120-140 km and reached the Novozybkov-Starodub line. At the same time, the German 2nd Army, operating in the Gomel direction, deeply enveloped the 21st Army from the east, which, under the threat of encirclement, was forced to retreat to the south and leave the interfluve of the Berezina and the Dnieper.
The headquarters of the Supreme High Command (became known in this way from August 8) revealed the intentions of the German command to surround the 3rd and 21st armies and then go to the rear of the Southwestern Front, that is, bypass the entire grouping of Soviet troops in the Kiev direction. In order to prevent this, to repel possible enemy attacks on Bryansk and to prevent his subsequent attack on Moscow, the Bryansk Front was deployed between the Central and Reserve Fronts under the command of Lieutenant General A.I. Eremenko.
The change in the situation did not affect the decision of the Commander-in-Chief of the Western Direction to conduct a series of offensive operations in the zone of the Western Front. He, in accordance with the order of Marshal S.K. Timoshenko on August 4 was to, "firmly holding the left wing ... the line of the Dnieper River and repelling enemy attacks on his right wing, with the center to defeat and destroy his spiritual group." The solution to this problem was assigned to the 30th and 19th armies of generals V.A. Khomenko and I.S. Konev.
On August 8, formations of these armies struck in the direction of Dukhovshchina. They successfully overcame the resistance of the German troops at the forefront of defense, for several days they tried to build on their success, but they could not reach the operational depth. The Commander-in-Chief was forced to make adjustments to the plan of operation. Now he planned to attack the 30th (four rifle, tank and cavalry divisions) and 19th (five rifle and tank divisions) armies in directions converging on Dukhovshchina to surround and destroy the enemy and reach the line of Starina, Dukhovshchina, Yartsevo. From here it was planned to develop an offensive to the east of Smolensk with the aim of encircling the Yartsevo enemy grouping already in cooperation with the left-flank 20th Army of the front, restored after leaving the encirclement. To assist the 30th and 19th armies, an auxiliary attack was envisaged by two divisions of the 29th army and a raid on Velizh, Demidov of the cavalry group of Colonel L.M. Dovator.
The offensive of the shock group of the front began on August 17. However, in the zone of the 30th Army, the front line of defense of the German troops managed to break through only during August 23-25. After that, its formations were able to advance only 1-3 km. In the zone of the 19th Army on the first day, only one division wedged into a depth of 400-800 m. The Military Council of the Western Front decided to send reserves into battle. But their arrival did not outstrip the buildup of efforts by the enemy in the direction threatened for him. Because of this, the pace of advance was still low. In fact, it was limited to one or two attacks per day, as a result of which it was possible to capture a number of strongholds. The total advance of the 19th Army until the end of August was 8-9 km. But it was not possible to create a gap in the enemy's defense. were not successful and fighting parts of the forces of the Reserve Front on the Yelnin ledge.
In the current situation, the plan of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was to inflict significant damage on Army Group Center and eliminate the threat of its 2nd Panzer Group reaching the rear of the Southwestern Front. The task of defeating the latter was assigned to the Bryansk Front, which on August 25 included the troops of the abolished Central Front. The Western and Reserve Fronts were to continue offensive operations to destroy the Dukhovshchinskaya and Yelninskaya enemy groups.
But the main command of the Wehrmacht did not abandon the offensive. It resumed on August 22 on the left wing of Army Group Center, where a blow was struck against the 22nd Army of the Western Front. By the end of the next day, units of two German tank divisions reached the Velikiye Luki area. An attempt to restore the situation by inflicting a counterattack under the base of their wedging did not bring success, and the army began to withdraw. It entailed the abandonment of the occupied line by the neighboring 29th Army, which was in danger of being outflanked. The further advance of the enemy tank grouping was stopped only on the river. Western Dvina.
In the rest of the Western Front, 140 km wide, September 1 began offensive with the involvement of the 30th, 19th, 16th and 20th armies (a total of 18 divisions weakened in previous battles). By September 8, they were supposed to take control of the Velizh, Demidov, Smolensk line. At the same time, the front had to defeat up to 15 enemy divisions, largely replenished with people and military equipment. However, already the first days of the offensive showed that it would not be possible to break through the advance prepared defense of the German troops with available forces and without reliable fire damage. Unsuccessful attempts continued until September 10, when the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command ordered the transition to the defensive, noting that "a long offensive by the troops of the front against a well-entrenched enemy leads to heavy losses."
The offensive operation of the Bryansk Front with the aim of defeating the German 2nd Panzer Group did not lead to success either. In a strip 300 km wide, five strikes were delivered, each by the forces of three to four divisions. But such a dispersal of forces did not allow, after breaking through the enemy's shallow tactical defense zone in a number of areas, to develop success into operational depth. Moreover, as a result of the enemy counterattack between the Bryansk and Southwestern fronts, a gap of 50-60 km wide was formed, into which German tank divisions rushed in order to reach the rear of the Kyiv grouping of Soviet troops.
An important stage in the Battle of Smolensk was the Yelninskaya offensive operation, carried out by the forces of the 24th Army (Major General K.I. Rakutin) of the Reserve Front. Its goal was to encircle the enemy grouping in the Yelnya region and destroy it piece by piece. The shock groups of the army went on the offensive at 7 o'clock in the morning on August 30. But during the first day of the offensive in the northern sector, it was possible to push the enemy only 500 meters. In the southern sector, the advance was 1.5 km. Fulfilling the instructions of the commander of the front, General Rakutin on August 31 created a consolidated detachment, which, by the end of September 3, together with the units advancing from the south, narrowed the mouth of the Yelnin ledge to 6-8 km. German troops, being under the threat of encirclement, began to retreat. Three days later, army formations liberated Yelnya, and by the end of September 8, they reached the line of Novye Yakovlevichi, Novo-Tishovo, Kukuyevo. Repeated attempts to break through were unsuccessful.
Presentation of the Guards Banner
The main result of intense fighting in the zone of the Reserve Front in late August - early September was the elimination of the Elninsk ledge. As a result, the position of the 24th Army improved significantly, and the threat of dissection of the groupings of the Western and Reserve Fronts on their adjacent wings was removed. However, it was not possible to fully implement the plan to encircle and destroy the enemy. Its main forces in an organized manner, under the cover of the rearguards, carried out a withdrawal to a defensive line prepared in advance.
Nevertheless, it was a success and its importance in that difficult situation at the beginning of the war can hardly be overestimated. In order to somehow stimulate the troops, the Supreme Commander I.V. Stalin found perhaps the only form of encouragement for this - the creation of the Soviet guard. September 8, 1941 by order People's Commissar defense of the USSR, the 100th and 127th rifle divisions of the 24th army were transformed into the 1st and 2nd guards rifle divisions. Soon, on September 26, two more divisions of this army became guards: the 107th and 120th, renamed respectively the 5th and 6th guards rifle divisions.
During the Battle of Smolensk, which lasted two months, the irretrievable losses of the Red Army amounted to more than 486, and sanitary - more than 273 thousand people. 1348 tanks, 9290 guns and mortars, 903 combat aircraft were lost. In general, individual successful actions of the Soviet troops did not lead to a turning point in the operational situation, they could not force the German command to abandon their plans. Moreover, in the course of continuous offensive operations, they significantly undermined their combat capability, which negatively affected the further course of the armed struggle, and subsequently became one of the reasons for the heavy defeats near Vyazma and Bryansk in the fall of 1941.
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Due to the unfavorable course of border battles Soviet command from the end of June, troops of the 2nd strategic echelon began to be deployed along the middle reaches of the Western Dvina and the Dnieper in a strip of 450 km with the task of firmly holding this line and preventing the enemy from breaking through to Moscow. In addition to the troops already in it, the 22nd, 19th, 20th, 16th and 21st armies were allocated to the Western Front (commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko). By the beginning of the battle, they did not have time to fully turn around and create a stable defense.
The German command set the Army Group Center (commanded by Field Marshal F. Bock), advancing in the Moscow direction, the task of encircling the Soviet troops defending the line of the Western Dvina and the Dnieper, capturing the district of Orsha, Smolensk, Vitebsk and opening the shortest route to Moscow . By July 10, the mobile troops of Army Group Center, the divisions of the 2nd and 3rd tank groups and advanced formations of the 9th and 2nd field armies, entered the Dnieper and the Western Dvina.
Fierce fighting in the Smolensk region, the growing counterattacks of the Soviet formations disrupted the enemy's calculations. The strongest grouping of German troops, Army Group Center, was forced to go on the defensive and postpone the offensive in the Moscow direction for two months. Its losses from the beginning of the war until the end of September 1941 amounted to 229 thousand people. dead, wounded and missing. In the period from August 30 to September 8, the 24th Army of Major General K.I. Rakutin, who was part of the Reserve Front, which was headed by General of the Army G.K. Zhukov, defeated a large enemy group near Yelnya and forced it to retreat from the operational ledge. The Soviet Guard was born near Yelnya. On September 18, for massive heroism and military prowess in the battles near this city, the first in the Red Army were awarded the title of Guards to two formations of the 24th Army - the 100th and 127th Rifle Divisions, becoming respectively the 1st2nd Guards Rifle Divisions. By the same order, the 153rd and 161st Rifle Divisions were transformed into the 3rd and 4th Guards Divisions.
The battle of Smolensk delayed the enemy, but the Red Army paid for this success with great bloodshed. The total human losses of the Soviet troops in these battles amounted to almost 760 thousand people, of which 485,711 (64%) were irretrievable losses. During the battle, the Headquarters issued one of the toughest orders to start the war - No. 270, which today causes an ambiguous interpretation.
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Not only friends recognize, but our enemies are forced to admit that in our liberation war With fascist german invaders units of the Red Army, their vast majority, their commanders and commissars behave themselves impeccably, courageously, and sometimes downright heroically. Even those parts of our army that accidentally broke away from the army and were surrounded, retain the spirit of stamina and courage, do not surrender, try to inflict more harm on the enemy and leave the encirclement. It is known that individual units of our army, once surrounded by the enemy, use every opportunity to inflict defeat on the enemy and break out of the encirclement.
Deputy commander of the troops of the Western Front, Lieutenant General Boldin, being in the area of the 10th Army near Bialystok, surrounded by Nazi troops, organized detachments from the units of the Red Army remaining behind enemy lines, which fought for 45 days behind enemy lines and made their way to the main forces of the Western Front. They destroyed the headquarters of two German regiments, 26 tanks, 1049 cars, transport and staff vehicles, 147 motorcycles, 5 artillery batteries, 4 mortars, 15 heavy machine guns, 8 light machine guns, 1 aircraft at the airfield and a depot of bombs. over a thousand German soldiers and officers were killed. On August 11, Lieutenant General Boldin hit the Germans from the rear, broke through the German front and, having joined with our troops, led 1654 armed Red Army men and commanders out of the encirclement, of which 103 were wounded.
The commissar of the 8th Mechanized Corps, Brigadier Commissar Popel, and the commander of the 406th Rifle Regiment, Colonel Novikov, fought 1,778 armed men out of the encirclement. In stubborn battles with the Germans, the Novikov-Popel group traveled 650 kilometers, inflicting huge losses on the rear of the enemy.
The commander of the 3rd Army, Lieutenant General Kuznetsov, and a member of the Military Council, Army Commissar 2nd Rank Biryukov, with battles, led 498 armed Red Army soldiers and commanders of units of the 3rd Army out of the encirclement and organized the exit from the encirclement of the 108th and 64th rifle divisions.
All these and numerous other similar facts testify to the steadfastness of our troops, the high morale of our fighters, commanders and commissars.
But we cannot hide the fact that Lately there were several shameful facts of surrender. Some generals set a bad example for our troops.
The commander of the 28th Army, Lieutenant General Kachalov, being surrounded with the headquarters of a group of troops, showed cowardice and surrendered to the non-German fascists. The headquarters of the Kachalov group came out of the encirclement, parts of the Kachalov group made their way out of the encirclement, and Lieutenant General Kachalov preferred to surrender, preferred to desert to the enemy.
Lieutenant General [Major General] - ed.] Ponedelin, who commanded the 12th Army, having fallen into the encirclement of the enemy, had every opportunity to break through to his own, as did the vast majority of parts of his army. But Ponedelin did not show the necessary perseverance and will to win, succumbed to panic, chickened out and surrendered to the enemy, deserted to the enemy, thus committing a crime before the Motherland, as a violator of the military oath.
The commander of the 13th Rifle Corps, Major General Kirillov, who found himself surrounded Nazi German troops, instead of fulfilling his duty to the Motherland, organizing the units entrusted to him for a firm rebuff to the enemy and getting out of the encirclement, he deserted from the battlefield and surrendered to the enemy. As a result, parts of the 13th Rifle Corps were defeated, and some of them surrendered without serious resistance.
It should be noted that with all the above facts of surrendering to the enemy, the members of the military councils of the armies, commanders, political workers, special detachments who were surrounded, showed unacceptable confusion, shameful cowardice and did not even try to interfere with the cowardly Kachalov, Ponedelin, Kirillov and others to surrender to the enemy.
These shameful facts of surrender to our sworn enemy testify that in the ranks of the Red Army, staunchly and selflessly defending its Soviet Motherland, there are unstable, cowardly, cowardly elements. And these cowardly elements exist not only among the Red Army soldiers, but also among the commanding staff. As you know, some commanders and political workers, by their behavior at the front, not only do not show the Red Army soldiers an example of courage, stamina and love for the Motherland, but, on the contrary, they hide in cracks, fiddle around in the offices, do not see and do not observe the battlefield, but when the first serious difficulties in battle, they give in to the enemy, tear off their insignia, desert from the battlefield.
Is it possible to tolerate in the ranks of the Red Army cowards who desert to the enemy and surrender to him, or such cowardly commanders who, at the first hitch at the front, tear off their insignia and desert to the rear? No you can not! If we give free rein to these cowards and deserters, they will quickly decompose our army and ruin our Motherland. Cowards and deserters must be destroyed.
Is it possible to consider as commanders of battalions or regiments such commanders who hide in cracks during the battle, do not see the battlefield, do not observe the progress of the battle on the field, and still imagine themselves to be commanders of regiments and battalions? No you can not! These are not commanders of regiments and battalions, but impostors. If we give free rein to such impostors, they will in a short time turn our army into a continuous office. Such impostors must be immediately removed from their posts, demoted, transferred to the rank and file, and, if necessary, shot on the spot, putting forward in their place brave and courageous people from the ranks of the junior command staff or from the Red Army. I order:
Commanders and political workers who, during a battle, tear off their insignia and desert to the rear or surrender to the enemy, are considered malicious deserters, whose families are subject to arrest as the families of deserters who violated the oath and betrayed their homeland.
To oblige all higher commanders and commissars to shoot such deserters from the command staff on the spot.
Units and subunits that are surrounded by the enemy selflessly fight to the last opportunity, protect the materiel as the apple of their eye, break through to their rear of enemy troops, inflicting defeat on fascist dogs.
To oblige every soldier, regardless of his official position, to demand from a higher commander, if part of him is surrounded, to fight to the last opportunity in order to break through to his own, and if such a commander or part of the Red Army, instead of organizing a rebuff to the enemy, prefer to surrender to him - destroy them by all means, both ground and air, and deprive the families of Red Army soldiers who have surrendered from state benefits and assistance.
To oblige the commanders and commissars of divisions to immediately remove from their posts the commanders of battalions and regiments who hide in crevices during the battle and are afraid to direct the course of the battle on the battlefield, to demote them as impostors, transfer them to privates, and, if necessary, shoot them on the spot , putting forward in their place brave and courageous people from the junior command staff or from the ranks of distinguished Red Army soldiers.
Read the order in all companies, squadrons, batteries, squadrons, commands and headquarters.
Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the Red Army
Chairman of the State Defense Committee, Deputy. Chairman of the State Defense Committee V. MOLOTOV, Marshal of the Soviet Union S. BUDENNY, Marshal of the Soviet Union K. VOROSHILOV, Marshal of the Soviet Union S. TIMOSHENKO, Marshal of the Soviet Union B. SHAPOSHNIKOV, General of the Army G. ZHUKOV
1941: in 2 books. Book 2. M., 1998.
THE LAST LETTER OF THE RED ARMY E.M. ZLOBIN TO HIS PARENTS, JULY 20, 1941
Good afternoon, hello, dear parents, father and mother, and brothers Petya and Vasya and sister Tanya. And all other friends and comrades.
In the first lines of my letter I want to inform you that I am alive and well and that I wish you all the best if you were not beaten by a German there, no matter how far he was from you in the Smolensk region.
Dad and mom, you know that a German attacked the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, and I have been in combat since June 22 at 5 am. The German crossed the border, and we were no more than 20 kilometers from him in the camps, and from these days, dad and mom, I saw fear. As from the first days the German began to beat us, we will not find a place. We were surrounded by him. He thrashed us. About 50 people remained from the regiment, otherwise they were beaten or taken prisoner. Well, I forcibly jumped out of his greedy paws and fled. We were attached to another regiment, and we began to retreat to Kaunas. Passed 100 kilometers. On June 23 we approach Kaunas. How the planes, cannons, German machine guns met us there, how they began to hit us - we don’t know where to go ...
Dad and mom, the bridges across the Neman River were all destroyed, and we had one outcome - to cross the river in all combat. A lot of flooding, a lot of beating. I was still alive and stomped, and then I remained alive by force. The German is all behind us, we retreated, scattered everything - tanks, guns, machine guns, mortars. Well, in general, they fled without pants, retreated to Dvinsk. Cross the Vilyuya River again. The river is big, there are no bridges, again many died, and the German beats and beats. We approach Dvinsk, the whole city is busy. We are in Minsk - also busy and broken, we are in Polotsk - also busy. Here again the river - the Western Dvina, again many died. And he is chasing us, and we all retreat and retreat, he beats and beats us ... Hungry, barefoot, all rubbed feet (...)
We got out of the way. They began to feed us well: plenty of butter, cheese, sugar, crackers. The kitchen began to cook. Now we are in the rear for now. I don't know where it will take us.
And the German was met by new units of the Red Army. As they began to beat him, only feathers fly, and he began to suffer heavy losses and retreat.
Everyone, mom and dad. I remain alive and well. Zlobin E.M.
Last letters from the front. 1941. Collection. T.1. M., military publishing house. 1991
** Ponedelin P.G. (1893-1950), major general. In Aug. 1941 near Uman was taken prisoner; released from captivity in 1945. Shot by verdict of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court in 1950. Rehabilitated in 1956.
*** Kirillov N.K. (1897-1950), major general. In Aug. 1941 near Uman was taken prisoner; released from captivity in 1945. Shot by verdict of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court in 1950. Rehabilitated in 1956.
The battle of Smolensk (July 10 - September 10, 1941) is one of the largest defensive and offensive operations of the army of the Soviet Union against the German army in the period.
The operation was carried out on the territory of Smolensk and nearby cities. The battle of Smolensk, despite its name, is not a single clash between two armies, but a whole complex of large and small battles on the territory of the Western Front. It is also important to note that the Battle of Smolensk took place not only on the territory of Smolensk, but also affected many other cities.
It is customary to distinguish several main clashes during the battle of Smolensk:
- Bobruisk battle;
- Velikolukskoe battle;
- Gomel defensive operation;
- Dukhovshchinskaya operation;
- Elninskaya operation;
- Defense of Mogilev;
- Defense of Polotsk;
- Defense of Smolensk;
- Roslavl-Novozybkovskaya operation.
The main goal of the Smolensk operation was to prevent the enemy from breaking through towards the Moscow strategic direction, thereby enabling the USSR to more carefully organize the defense of the capital and prevent the Nazis from taking the city.
Reasons for the battle of Smolensk
In July 1941, the German command set a task for its army - to encircle and capture the Soviet troops located on the territory of the Western Front (Western Dvina, Dnieper, Vitebsk, Orsha, Smolensk). This was necessary in order to open the way for the Nazi army to Moscow. To carry out the operation, the Center group was sent, which included several large and well-equipped armies under the command of Field Marshal T. von Bock.
Preparations for the Smolensk operation
The Soviet command became aware of the plans, so an order was issued to immediately begin preparing their own defensive-offensive operation, which was supposed to protect the path to Moscow and push the Germans further from Smolensk and the front line. For these purposes, at the end of June, several Soviet armies were deployed on the middle reaches of the Dvina and Dnieper, which became part of the united Western Front under the command of S.K. Timoshenko.
Soviet soldiers were also sent to several other strategically important points, but they could not get there in time. Unfortunately, the preparation of the defense began too late, so by the beginning of the operation the Soviet army turned out to be fragmented, there was no single line of defense, it had significant gaps, which allowed the Germans to deliver a more accurate strike on weak points and shake the defense.
German troops reached Smolensk also not in in full force: part of the army was delayed by fighting in Belarus. However, even this delay could not significantly affect the balance of power: the German army was almost four times larger than the Soviet one, moreover, the Germans had the most modern technology and weapons.
The course of the Smolensk battle
The first attack took place on July 10, 1941, when the German army began to advance on the right wing and in the center of the Western Front. The advancing group consisted of 13 infantry, 9 tank and 7 motorized divisions, which was several times larger than the defensive detachments of the Soviet army. The attack ended with a complete breakthrough of the Soviet defense, which allowed the German troops to confidently move towards Mogilev. Mogilev was also captured in the shortest possible time, followed by Orsha, part of Smolensk, Yelnya and Krichev. Soviet army not only suffered losses and lost the operation, but also lost a number of divisions that ended up in a German encirclement.
On July 21, the Soviet army received reinforcements and could participate in the battles almost on an equal footing. At the same time, the command announced the start of a counteroffensive - the Soviet troops made an unexpected attack, a fierce battle ensued.
Unfortunately, this time it was not possible to defeat the German army, however, the Soviet soldiers broke the German resistance and actually forced Hitler's army to retreat. From that moment on, the Germans turned from attackers into defenders, and the initiative was in the hands of the command of the USSR army. Several Soviet detachments were reorganized to create a more powerful front.
On August 8, the picture changed again. The Germans again went on the offensive in the region of the Central and Bryansk fronts. This was necessary in order to secure the German army from the Soviet threat and provide an opportunity for a wider and more open offensive. The Germans managed to achieve the retreat of the Soviet army, but later it turned out that this was a strategic move by the USSR in order to bring new forces into remote areas. On August 17, the USSR again launched an offensive against the German troops, which ended in huge losses for the latter.
Throughout the campaign, the alignment of forces kept changing, and the initiative passed from the USSR to Germany, but the German army suffered more and more losses every day, while the Soviet troops were in a more advantageous position. On September 8, 1941, the USSR managed to completely eliminate the fascist threat in this direction and secure the paths to Smolensk and, accordingly, to Moscow from the west.
The results of the Smolensk operation
Despite the length of hostilities, as well as the numerical and technical superiority of the Nazis, the USSR still managed to defend Smolensk. The victory near Smolensk thwarted the further plans of the German command, which allowed the USSR to gain the advantage and time to organize the army.
The USSR managed to buy time to ensure the protection and defense of Moscow, which was the main goal of the Germans.
The concept of "Battle of Smolensk" usually includes the following operations:
Defense of Polotsk;
Defense of Smolensk;
Bobruisk battle;
Defense of Mogilev;
Gomel defensive operation;
Elninskaya operation;
Dukhovshchinskaya operation;
Roslavl-Novozybkovskaya operation;
Velikolukskoe battle.
The main goal of the Smolensk battle is to prevent the enemy (German troops) from breaking through to the Moscow strategic direction, thereby preventing the Nazis from approaching the capital.
Reasons for the battle of Smolensk
In July 1941, the German command set a task for its army - to surround the Soviet troops that were defending the borders of the Western Dvina and Dnieper, as well as to capture the cities of Vitebsk, Orsha and Smolensk in order to open the way for the troops to Moscow. To accomplish the task, the Center group was formed, which included several German armies, Field Marshal T. Von Bock became the commander-in-chief.
Preparation for the battle of Smolensk
The Soviet command, having learned about the plans of the enemy, began to develop its own defensive operation in order to detain German troops and prevent them from reaching Moscow. To do this, at the end of June, several Soviet armies were located on the middle reaches of the Dnieper and Dvina, which were later included in the Western Front under the command of Marshal S.K. Timoshenko. Unfortunately, by the beginning of the attack by the German troops, not all divisions managed to take their positions, which led to a serious gap in the Soviet defense. The density of troops was extremely low, which could have a negative impact on the further course of the battles. German troops also reached Smolensk not at full strength, some of them were detained in Belarus, however, despite this, by the time the operation began, the German group "Cent" had more than four times superiority over the Soviet troops of the Western Front. In addition, the Germans were more well prepared technically.
The course of the Smolensk battle
On July 10, 1941, the German offensive began on the right wing and in the center of the Western Front. A group consisting of 13 infantry, 9 tank and 7 motorized divisions was able to break through in the shortest possible time Soviet defense and move towards Mogilev. Soon the city was surrounded, Orsha was captured, and part of Smolensk, Yelnya and Krichev were also captured. Part of the Soviet army ended up in a German encirclement near Smolensk.
On July 21, Soviet troops received long-awaited reinforcements and a counteroffensive was launched in the direction of Smolensk. A number of Soviet troops attacked the German headquarters, a fierce battle began. Despite the fact that it was not possible to defeat the Germans, the centralized offensive of the fascist troops was nevertheless broken, and the troops were forced to switch to defensive tactics instead of offensive ones. Several Soviet armies during this period were combined to create a more effective offensive campaign.
On August 8, the Germans again went on the offensive in the region of the Central and Bryansk fronts. The offensive was designed to secure their own army from the Soviet threat and re-open the opportunity for an offensive. The Soviet army retreated, but this was only a strategic move, designed to strengthen the army and bring up new forces. After the reorganization, on August 17, Soviet troops again attacked the Germans, as a result of which the German army was again pushed back and suffered significant losses.
Battles with varying success for one side or another continued for some time, the German army was losing soldiers and its advantage, even despite small victories. As a result, on September 8, Soviet troops managed to completely eliminate the German offensive and secure Smolensk and the surrounding areas, opening the way to Moscow.
The results of the Smolensk battle
Despite the numerical superiority german army and lack of strength Soviet soldiers, the USSR still managed, albeit at the cost of significant losses, to recapture Smolensk and frustrate the further plans of the German command. The Smolensk operation was extremely important for the further course of the war, since the Germans lost the possibility of a direct attack on Moscow, and were forced to turn from attackers into defenders. The swift plan to capture the USSR was thwarted once again.
Thanks to the victory at Smolensk, the Soviet command was able to buy a little more time in order to more thoroughly prepare Moscow for the defense, which was just a matter of time.
