2nd Chechen war years. The war in Chechnya is a black page in the history of Russia. Victims and memory




	Chechnya, then the entire North Caucasus
	Invasion of militants in Dagestan, explosions of residential buildings
	Victory of the federal troops: 1 - Restoration of territorial integrity Russian Federation 2 - The actual liquidation of CRI 3 - The militants switched to insurgent activity
Opponents
Russian Federation	Islamic State of Dagestan
	Caucasian Emirate
	foreign fighters
	Al Qaeda
Commanders
Boris Yeltsin	Aslan Maskhadov †
Vladimir Putin	Abdul-Khalim Saidulaev †
	Doku Umarov (wanted)
Victor Kazantsev	Ruslan Gelaev †
Gennady Troshev	Shamil Basaev †
Vladimir Shamanov	Vakha Arsanov †
Alexander Baranov	Arbi Baraev †
Valentin Korabelnikov	Movsar Baraev †
Anatoly Kvashnin	Abdul-Malik Mezhidov †
Vladimir Moltenskoy	Suleiman Elmurzaev †
Akhmad Kadyrov †	Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov †
Ramzan Kadyrov	Salman Raduev †
Dzhabrail Yamadayev †	Rappani Khalilov †
Sulim Yamadayev †	Aslambek Abdulkhadzhiev †
Said-Magomed Kakiev	Aslanbek Ismailov †
	Vakha Dzhenaraliev†
	Ahmed Evloev
	Khattab †
	Abu al-Walid †
	Abu Hafs al-Urdani †
Side forces
80,000 troops	22,000 fighters

Over 6,000 dead	Over 20,000 killed

(officially called counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus (WHO) - the common name for hostilities on the territory of Chechnya and border regions North Caucasus. It began on September 30, 1999 (the date of entry of the Russian Armed Forces into Chechnya). The active phase of hostilities lasted from 1999 to 2000, then, as control was established armed forces Russia over the territory of Chechnya, has grown into a smoldering conflict, which actually continues to this day. From 00:00 on April 16, 2009, the CTO regime was canceled.

background

After the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements and the withdrawal Russian troops in 1996 there was no peace and tranquility in Chechnya and the regions adjacent to it.

Chechen criminal structures with impunity did business on mass kidnappings. Hostages were regularly taken for ransom - both official Russian representatives and foreign citizens working in Chechnya - journalists, humanitarian workers, religious missionaries, and even people who came to the funeral of relatives. In particular, in the Nadterechny district in November 1997, two Ukrainian citizens were captured who had come to attend their mother's funeral; in 1998, Turkish builders and businessmen were regularly kidnapped and taken to Chechnya in the neighboring republics of the North Caucasus; abducted French citizen, representative of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees Vincent Koshtel. He was released in Chechnya 11 months later, on October 3, 1998, four employees of the British company Granger Telecom were kidnapped in Grozny, in December they were brutally murdered and beheaded). The bandits profited from the theft of oil from oil pipelines and oil wells, the production and smuggling of drugs, the production and distribution of counterfeit banknotes, terrorist attacks and attacks on neighboring Russian regions. On the territory of Chechnya, camps were set up for the training of militants - young people from the Muslim regions of Russia. Mine-blasting instructors and Islamic preachers were sent here from abroad. Numerous Arab volunteers began to play a significant role in the life of Chechnya. Their main goal was to destabilize the situation in the Russian regions neighboring Chechnya and spread the ideas of separatism to the North Caucasian republics (primarily Dagestan, Karachay-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria).

In early March 1999, Gennady Shpigun, the plenipotentiary representative of the Russian Interior Ministry in Chechnya, was abducted by terrorists at the Grozny airport. For the Russian leadership, this was evidence that CRI President Maskhadov was not in a position to fight terrorism on his own. The federal center took measures to intensify the fight against Chechen gangs: self-defense units were armed and police units were reinforced along the entire perimeter of Chechnya, the best operatives of units to combat ethnic organized crime were sent to the North Caucasus, several Tochka-U rocket launchers were deployed from the Stavropol Territory. ", designed for delivering pinpoint strikes. An economic blockade of Chechnya was introduced, which led to the fact that the cash flow from Russia began to dry up sharply. Due to the tightening of the regime at the border, it has become increasingly difficult to smuggle drugs into Russia and take hostages. Gasoline produced at clandestine factories has become impossible to take out of Chechnya. The fight against the Chechens was also intensified. criminal gangs who actively financed the militants in Chechnya. In May-July 1999, the Chechen-Dagestan border turned into a militarized zone. As a result, the incomes of Chechen warlords were sharply reduced and they had problems with the purchase of weapons and payment of mercenaries. In April 1999, Vyacheslav Ovchinnikov, who successfully led a number of operations during the First Chechen War, was appointed commander-in-chief of the internal troops. In May 1999, Russian helicopters launched a missile attack on the positions of Khattab militants on the Terek River in response to an attempt by gangs to seize an outpost of internal troops on the Chechen-Dagestan border. After that, Interior Minister Vladimir Rushailo announced the preparation of large-scale preventive strikes.

Meanwhile, Chechen gangs under the command of Shamil Basayev and Khattab were preparing for an armed invasion of Dagestan. From April to August 1999, conducting reconnaissance in combat, they made more than 30 sorties in Stavropol and Dagestan alone, as a result of which several dozen military personnel, law enforcement officers and civilians were killed and injured. Realizing that the strongest groupings of federal troops were concentrated in the Kizlyar and Khasavyurt directions, the militants decided to strike at the mountainous part of Dagestan. When choosing this direction, the bandit formations proceeded from the fact that there are no troops there, and it will not be possible to transfer forces to this hard-to-reach area in the shortest possible time. In addition, the militants counted on a possible blow to the rear of the federal forces from the Kadar zone of Dagestan, which since August 1998 has been controlled by local Wahhabis.

As the researchers note, the destabilization of the situation in the North Caucasus was beneficial to many. First of all, Islamic fundamentalists seeking to spread their influence throughout the world, as well as Arab oil sheikhs and financial oligarchs of the Persian Gulf countries, who are not interested in starting the exploitation of oil and gas fields in the Caspian.

On August 7, 1999, a massive invasion of militants into Dagestan was carried out from the territory of Chechnya under the overall command of Shamil Basayev and the Arab field commander Khattab. The core of the militant group was made up of foreign mercenaries and fighters of the Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade associated with al-Qaeda. The plan of the militants to transfer the population of Dagestan to their side failed, the Dagestanis put up desperate resistance to the invading bandits. The Russian authorities offered the Ichkerian leadership to conduct a joint operation with the federal forces against the Islamists in Dagestan. It was also proposed to "resolve the issue of liquidating the bases, places of storage and recreation of illegal armed groups, from which the Chechen leadership in every possible way disowns." Aslan Maskhadov verbally condemned the attacks on Dagestan and their organizers and inspirers, but did not take real measures to counter them.

For more than a month there were battles between the federal forces and the invading militants, which ended with the fact that the militants were forced to retreat from the territory of Dagestan back to Chechnya. On the same days - September 4-16 - in several Russian cities (Moscow, Volgodonsk and Buynaksk) a series of terrorist acts were carried out - explosions of residential buildings.

Considering Maskhadov's inability to control the situation in Chechnya, the Russian leadership decided to conduct a military operation to destroy the militants in Chechnya. On September 18, the borders of Chechnya were blocked by Russian troops.

On September 23, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree "On Measures to Increase the Efficiency of Counter-Terrorist Operations in the North Caucasus Region of the Russian Federation." The decree provided for the creation of the United Group of Forces in the North Caucasus to conduct a counter-terrorist operation.

On September 23, Russian troops began a massive bombardment of Grozny and its environs, on September 30 they entered the territory of Chechnya.

Character

Having broken the resistance of the militants with the forces of the army units and internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (the command of the Russian troops successfully uses military tricks, such as, for example, luring militants into minefields, raids behind enemy lines, and many others), the Kremlin relied on the “Chechenization” of the conflict and poaching parts of the elite and former members of the Chechen armed formations took their side. So, in 2000, a former supporter of the separatists, the chief mufti of Chechnya, Akhmat Kadyrov, became the head of the pro-Kremlin administration of Chechnya in 2000. The militants, on the contrary, relied on the internationalization of the conflict, involving armed detachments of non-Chechen origin in their struggle. By the beginning of 2005, after the destruction of Maskhadov, Khattab, Baraev, Abu al-Walid and many other field commanders, the intensity of the sabotage and terrorist activities of the militants had significantly decreased. During 2005-2008, not a single major terrorist attack was committed in Russia, and the only large-scale operation of militants (Raid on Kabardino-Balkaria on October 13, 2005) ended in complete failure. However, since 2010, several major terrorist attacks have been noted, the terrorist act in Vladikavkaz (2010), the terrorist act at Domodedovo airport).

KGB General Filipp Bobkov in 2005 gave the following description of the actions of the Chechen resistance: “These operations are not much different from the military operations of the Israelis before the creation of their state on the territory of Palestine, and then the Palestinian extremists on the territory of Israel or now the Albanian armed formations in Kosovo.”

Chronology

1999

Aggravation of the situation on the border with Chechnya

Attack on Dagestan

August 1 - Armed detachments from the villages of Echeda, Gakko, Gigatl and Agvali in the Tsumadinsky district of Dagestan, as well as Chechens supporting them, announced that Sharia rule was being introduced in the area.
August 2 - In the area of the village of Echeda in the high-mountainous Tsumadinsky district of Dagestan, a clash broke out between policemen and Wahhabis. Deputy Interior Minister of Dagestan Magomed Omarov flew to the scene. As a result of the incident, 1 riot policeman and several Wahhabis were killed. According to the local police department, the incident was provoked by Chechnya.
August 3 - As a result of skirmishes in the Tsumadinsky district of Dagestan with Islamic extremists who broke through from Chechnya, two more employees of the Dagestan police and one serviceman of the Russian internal troops were killed. Thus, the losses of the Dagestan police reached four people killed, in addition, two policemen were injured and three more were missing. Meanwhile, one of the leaders of the Congress of the Peoples of Ichkeria and Dagestan, Shamil Basayev, announced the creation of an Islamic Shura, which has its own armed units in Dagestan, which established control over several settlements in the Tsumadinsky district. The Dagestan leadership is asking the federal authorities for weapons for self-defense units that are planned to be created on the border of Chechnya and Dagestan. This decision was made by the State Council of the People's Assembly and the Government of the Republic. The attacks of militants were qualified by the official authorities of Dagestan as: "an open armed aggression of extremist forces against the Republic of Dagestan, an open encroachment on the territorial integrity and foundations of its constitutional order, the life and safety of residents."
August 4 - Up to 500 militants thrown back from the regional center of Aghvali dug in at previously prepared positions in one of the mountain villages, but they do not put forward any demands and do not enter into negotiations. Presumably, they have three employees of the Tsumadinsky regional department of internal affairs, who disappeared on August 3. The power ministers and ministries of Chechnya have been transferred to a round-the-clock mode of operation. This was done in accordance with the decree of Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov. True, the Chechen authorities deny the connection of these measures with the hostilities in Dagestan. At 12.10 Moscow time, on one of the roads in the Botlikh district of Dagestan, five armed men opened fire on police officers who tried to stop a Niva car for inspection. In the shootout, two bandits were killed and a car was damaged. There were no casualties among the security forces. Two Russian attack aircraft delivered a powerful missile and bomb attack on the village of Kenkhi, where a large detachment of militants was prepared to be sent to Dagestan. The regrouping of the forces of the internal troops of the Operational Group in the North Caucasus began to block the border with Chechnya. In Tsumadinsky and Botlikhsky districts of Dagestan, it is planned to deploy additional units of internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation.
August 5 - In the morning, the redeployment of units of the 102nd brigade of internal troops began in the Tsumadinsky district in accordance with the plan for blocking the administrative Dagestan-Chechen border. This decision was made by Vyacheslav Ovchinnikov, commander of the internal troops, during a trip to the places of recent hostilities. Meanwhile, sources in the Russian special services said that a rebellion was being prepared in Dagestan. According to the plan, a group of 600 militants was transferred to Dagestan through the village of Kenkhi. According to the same plan, the city of Makhachkala will be divided into areas of responsibility of field commanders, as well as hostage-taking in the most crowded places, after which the official authorities of Dagestan will be asked to resign. However, the official authorities of Makhachkala refute this information.
August 7 - September 14 - from the territory of the CRI, detachments of field commanders Shamil Basayev and Khattab invaded the territory of Dagestan. Fierce fighting continued for more than a month. The official government of the CRI, unable to control the actions of various armed groups on the territory of Chechnya, dissociated itself from the actions of Shamil Basayev, but did not take practical actions against him.
August 12 - Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation I. Zubov said that the President of the CRI Maskhadov "has been sent a letter with a proposal to conduct a joint operation with the federal troops against the Islamists in Dagestan."
August 13 - Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin said that "strike will be inflicted on the bases and concentrations of militants, regardless of their location, including on the territory of Chechnya."
August 16 - CRI President Aslan Maskhadov introduced martial law in Chechnya for a period of 30 days, announced a partial mobilization of reservists and participants in the First Chechen War.

Air bombardments of Chechnya

August 25 - Russian aviation strikes militant bases in the Vedeno Gorge of Chechnya. In response to an official protest from the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, the command of the federal forces declares that it "reserves the right to strike at militant bases on the territory of any North Caucasian region, including Chechnya."
September 6 - 18 - Russian aviation inflicts numerous missile and bomb strikes on military camps and fortifications of militants in Chechnya.
September 11 - Maskhadov announced a general mobilization in Chechnya.
September 14 - Putin announced that "the Khasavyurt agreements should be subjected to an impartial analysis", as well as "temporarily impose a strict quarantine" along the entire perimeter of Chechnya.
September 18 - Russian troops block the border of Chechnya from Dagestan, Stavropol Territory, North Ossetia and Ingushetia.
September 23 - Russian aviation began bombing the capital of Chechnya and its environs. As a result, several electrical substations, a number of oil and gas plants, the Grozny mobile communications center, a television and radio broadcasting center, and an An-2 aircraft were destroyed. The press service of the Russian Air Force stated that "aircraft will continue to strike targets that gangs can use to their advantage."
September 27 - Chairman of the Government of Russia V. Putin categorically rejected the possibility of a meeting between the Presidents of Russia and CRI. "There will be no meetings to let the militants lick their wounds," he said.

Start of ground operation

2000

2001

January 23 - Vladimir Putin decided to reduce and partially withdraw troops from Chechnya.
June 23-24 - in the village of Alkhan-kala, a special combined detachment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the FSB conducted a special operation to eliminate a detachment of militants of field commander Arbi Baraev. 16 militants were killed, including Barayev himself.
June 25-26 - militant attack on Khankala
July 11 - Khattab's assistant Abu Umar was killed in the course of a special operation by the FSB and the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs in the village of Mayrtup, Shali district of Chechnya.
August 25 - Field commander Movsan Suleimenov, Arbi Barayev's nephew, was killed in the course of a special operation by FSB officers in the city of Argun.
September 17 - Mi-8 helicopter with a commission was shot down in Grozny General Staff on board (2 generals and 8 officers were killed).
September 17-18 - an attack by militants on Gudermes: the attack was repulsed, as a result of the use of the Tochka-U missile system, a group of more than 100 people was destroyed.
November 3 - during a special operation, the influential field commander Shamil Iriskhanov, who was part of Basayev's inner circle, was killed.
December 15 - Federal forces killed 20 militants in Argun during a special operation.

2002

January 27 - Mi-8 helicopter was shot down in the Shelkovsky district of Chechnya. Among the dead were Lieutenant-General Mikhail Rudchenko, Deputy Interior Minister of the Russian Federation, and Major-General Nikolai Goridov, Commander of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Chechnya.
March 20 - as a result of a special operation by the FSB, the terrorist Khattab was killed by poisoning.
April 18 - in his Address to the Federal Assembly, President Vladimir Putin announced the end of the military stage of the conflict in Chechnya.
May 9 - A terrorist attack occurred in Kaspiysk during the celebration of Victory Day. 43 people died, more than 100 were injured.
August 19 - Chechen separatists from the Igla MANPADS shot down a Russian Mi-26 military transport helicopter near the Khankala military base. Of the 147 people on board, 127 were killed.
August 25 - the well-known field commander Aslambek Abdulkhadzhiev was killed in Shali.
September 23 - Raid on Ingushetia (2002)
October 10 - in Grozny, an explosion occurred in the building of the Zavodskoy District Department of Internal Affairs. An explosive device was planted in the office of the head of the department. 25 policemen were killed, about 20 were injured.
October 23 - 26 - hostage-taking in the theater center on Dubrovka in Moscow, 129 hostages were killed. All 44 terrorists were killed, including Movsar Baraev.
December 27 - the explosion of the Government House in Grozny. More than 70 people were killed in the attack. Shamil Basayev claimed responsibility for the attack.

2003

May 12 - in the village of Znamenskoye, Nadterechny district of Chechnya, three suicide bombers carried out a terrorist attack in the area of the administration buildings of the Nadterechny district and the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. The car "KamAZ", stuffed with explosives, demolished the barrier in front of the building and exploded. 60 people died, more than 250 were injured.
May 14 - in the village of Ilskhan-Yurt, Gudermes region, a suicide bomber blew herself up in the crowd at the celebration of the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad, where Akhmat Kadyrov was present. 18 people were killed, 145 people were injured.
June 5 - A female suicide bomber blew herself up next to a passenger bus carrying air base personnel on their way to military base in Mozdok. 16 people died on the spot. Four more died from their wounds later.
July 5 - terrorist attack in Moscow at the rock festival "Wings". 16 people died, 57 were injured.
August 1 - Undermining a military hospital in Mozdok. An army truck "KamAZ" loaded with explosives rammed the gate and exploded near the building. There was one suicide bomber in the cockpit. The death toll was 52 people.
September 3 - a terrorist attack in the Kislovodsk-Minvody train on the Podkumok-White Coal section, the railway tracks were blown up using a landmine: 5 people were killed and 20 were injured.
November 23 - three kilometers east of Serzhen-Yurt, GRU special forces destroyed a gang of mercenaries from Germany, Turkey and Algeria, numbering about 20 people.
December 5 - suicide attack on the Kislovodsk-Minvody train in Essentuki: 41 people died, 212 were injured.
December 9 - suicide attack near the National Hotel (Moscow).
December 15, 2003 - February 28, 2004 - Raid on Dagestan by a detachment under the command of Ruslan Gelaev.

2004

February 6 - a terrorist attack in the Moscow metro, on the stretch between the stations "Avtozavodskaya" and "Paveletskaya". 39 people died, 122 were injured.
February 28 - well-known field commander Ruslan Gelaev was mortally wounded during a skirmish with border guards
April 16 - during the shelling mountain ranges Chechnya killed the leader of foreign mercenaries in Chechnya Abu al-Walid al-Ghamidi
May 9 - in Grozny at the Dynamo stadium, where the parade in honor of Victory Day was held, at 10:32 a powerful explosion thundered on the newly renovated VIP stand. At that moment, Chechen President Akhmat Kadyrov, Chairman of the State Council of the Chechen Republic Kh. Isaev, Commander of the Joint Group of Forces in the North Caucasus General V. Baranov, Chechen Interior Minister Alu Alkhanov and military commandant of the republic G. Fomenko were on it. Directly during the explosion, 2 people died, 4 more died in hospitals: Akhmat Kadyrov, Kh. Isaev, Reuters journalist A. Khasanov, a child (whose name was not reported) and two Kadyrov's guards. In total, 63 people, including 5 children, were injured in the explosion in Grozny.
June 21 - 22 - Raid on Ingushetia
July 12 - 13 - a large detachment of militants captured the village of Avtury, Shali district
August 21 - 400 militants attacked Grozny. According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Chechnya, 44 people were killed and 36 seriously injured.
August 24 - Explosions of two Russian passenger airliners killed 89 people.
August 31 - a terrorist attack near the metro station "Rizhskaya" in Moscow. 10 people were killed, more than 50 people were injured.
September 1 - 3 - a terrorist act in Beslan, as a result of which 334 people died, 186 of whom were children.
October 7 - an African-American demolition instructor Khalil Rudvan was killed in a battle north of Niki-Khita, Kurchaloevsky district.

2005

February 18 - as a result of a special operation in the Oktyabrsky district of Grozny, the forces of the PPS-2 detachment destroyed the "Emir of Grozny" Yunadi Turchaev, the "right hand" of one of the leaders of the terrorists, Doku Umarov.
March 8 - During a special operation by the FSB in the village of Tolstoy-Yurt, CRI President Aslan Maskhadov was liquidated.
May 15 - Vakha Arsanov, former vice-president of the CRI, was killed in Grozny. Arsanov and his accomplices, being in a private house, fired at a police patrol and were destroyed by the arriving reinforcements.
May 15 - Rasul Tambulatov (Volchek) "Emir" of the Shelkovsky District of the Chechen Republic was killed as a result of a special operation by the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the Dubov forest of the Shelkovsky District.
June 4 - Cleansing in the village of Borozdinovskaya
October 13 - An attack by militants on the city of Nalchik (Kabardino-Balkaria), as a result of which, according to the Russian authorities, 12 civilians and 35 law enforcement officers were killed. Destroyed, according to various sources, from 40 to 124 militants.

2006

January 31 - Russian President Vladimir Putin said at a press conference that now we can talk about the end of the counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya.
February 9-11 - in the village of Tukuy-Mekteb in the Stavropol Territory, 12 so-called militants were killed during a special operation. "Nogai battalion of the Armed Forces of the CRI", federal forces lost 7 people killed. During the operation, the federal side actively uses helicopters and tanks.
March 28 - in Chechnya, the former head of the department voluntarily surrendered to the authorities state security CRI Sultan Gelishanov.
June 16 - the "President of the CRI" Abdul-Khalim Sadulaev was destroyed in Argun
July 4 - A military convoy was attacked in Chechnya near the village of Avtury in the Shali region. Representatives of the federal forces report 6 killed servicemen, bandits - more than 20.
July 9 - The website of Chechen militants "Caucasus Center" announced the creation of the Ural and Volga fronts as part of the CRI Armed Forces.
July 10 - in Ingushetia, one of the terrorist leaders Shamil Basayev was killed as a result of a special operation (according to other sources - he died due to careless handling of explosives)
July 12 - on the border of Chechnya and Dagestan, the police of both republics destroy a relatively large, but poorly armed gang, consisting of 15 militants. 13 bandits were killed, 2 more were detained.
August 23 - Chechen fighters attacked a military convoy on the Grozny-Shatoy highway, not far from the entrance to the Argun Gorge. The column consisted of a Ural vehicle and two escort armored personnel carriers. According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Chechen Republic, four servicemen of the federal forces were wounded as a result.
November 7 - in the area of the village of Dai, Shatoi region, a gang of S.-E. Dadaev, seven riot police from Mordovia were killed.
November 26 - The leader of foreign mercenaries in Chechnya, Abu Hafs al-Urdani, was killed in Khasavyurt. Together with him, 4 more militants were killed.

2007

April 4 - one of the most influential militant leaders, commander Eastern Front ChRISuleiman Ilmurzaev (call sign "Khairulla"), involved in the assassination of Chechen President Akhmat Kadyrov.
June 13 - in the Vedeno district on the Upper Kurchali - Belgata highway, militants shot at a column of police cars.
July 23 - a battle near the village of Tazen-Kale, Vedensky district, between Sulim Yamadayev's Vostok battalion and a detachment of Chechen fighters led by Doku Umarov. It is reported about the death of 6 militants.
September 18 - as a result of a counter-terrorist operation in the village of Novy Sulak, the "Amir Rabbani" - Rappani Khalilov, was destroyed.
October 7 - Doku Umarov announced the abolition of the CRI and its transformation into the "Vilayat Nokhchicho of the Caucasus Emirate"

2008

January - during special operations in Makhachkala and the Tabasaran region of Dagestan, at least 9 militants were killed, and 6 of them were part of the group of field commander I. Mallochiev. There were no casualties on the part of the security forces in these clashes. At the same time, during the clashes in Grozny, the Chechen police destroyed 5 militants, among them was the field commander U. Techiev - the "emir" of the capital of Chechnya.
March 19 - an armed attack by militants was carried out on the village of Alkhazurovo. As a result, seven people, five law enforcement officers and two civilians, were killed.
May 5 - a military vehicle was blown up by a landmine in the village of Tashkola, a suburb of Grozny. 5 policemen were killed, 2 were wounded.
June 13 - night sortie of militants in the village of Benoy-Vedeno
September 2008 - the major leaders of the Dagestan illegal armed formations, Ilgar Mallochiev and A. Gudaev, were killed, up to 10 militants in total.
December 18 - a battle in the city of Argun, 2 policemen were killed and 6 wounded. 1 person was killed by militants in Argun.
December 23-25 - a special operation by the FSB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the village of Upper Alkun in Ingushetia. The field commander Vakha Dzhenaraliev, who had been fighting against the federal troops in Chechnya and Ingushetia since 1999, and his deputy Khamkhoev were killed, a total of 12 militants were killed. 4 bases of illegal armed formations have been liquidated.
June 19 - Said Buryatsky announced his accession to the underground.

2009

April 15 is the last day of the counterterrorist operation regime.

Aggravation of the situation in the North Caucasus in 2009

Despite the official cancellation of the counterterrorist operation on April 16, 2009, the situation in the region has not become calmer, rather the opposite. The militants leading the guerrilla war have become more active, and cases of terrorist acts have become more frequent. Since the autumn of 2009, a number of major special operations have been carried out to eliminate gangs and militant leaders. In response, a series of terrorist attacks were carried out, including, for the first time in a long time, in Moscow.

Combat clashes, terrorist attacks and police operations are actively taking place not only on the territory of Chechnya, but also on the territory of Ingushetia, Dagestan, and Kabardino-Balkaria. In some territories, the CTO regime was repeatedly temporarily introduced.

Starting from May 15, 2009, Russian power structures stepped up operations against militant groups in the mountainous regions of Ingushetia, Chechnya and Dagestan, which caused a reciprocal intensification of terrorist activity on the part of the militants. At the end of July 2010, there are all signs of an escalation of the conflict and its spread to nearby regions.

Command

Heads of the Regional Operational Headquarters for the Counter-Terrorist Operation in the North Caucasus (2001-2006)

The Regional Operational Headquarters (ROH) was established by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of January 22, 2001 No. 61 "On measures to combat terrorism in the territory of the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation."

German Ugryumov (January - May 2001)
Anatoly Yezhkov (June 2001 - July 2003)
Yuri Maltsev (July 2003 - September 2004)
Arkady Edelev (September 2004 - August 2006)

In 2006, on the basis of the ROSH, the Operational Headquarters of the Chechen Republic was created to conduct a counter-terrorist operation.

Commanders of the Joint Grouping of Troops (Forces) for Conducting Counter-Terrorist Operations on the Territory of the North Caucasus Region of the Russian Federation (since 1999)

The united group was formed by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of September 23, 1999 No. 1255s "On measures to increase the effectiveness of counter-terrorist operations in the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation."

Victor Kazantsev (September 1999 - February 2000)
Gennady Troshev (acting February - March 2000, commander April - June 2000)
Alexander Baranov (acting March 2000)
Alexander Baranov (acting July - September 2000, commander September 2000 - October 2001, September 2003 - May 2004)
Vladimir Moltenskoy (acting May - August 2001, commander October 2001 - September 2002)
Sergey Makarov (acting July - August 2002, commander October 2002 - September 2003)
Mikhail Pankov (acting May 2004)
Vyacheslav Dadonov (acting June 2004 - July 2005)
Evgeny Lazebin (July 2005 - June 2006)
Evgeny Baryaev (June - December 2006)
Yakov Nedobitko (December 2006 - January 2008)
Mykola Sivak (January 2008 - August 2011)
Sergey Melikov (since September 2011)

Conflict in literature, cinema, music

Books

Alexander Karasev. Traitor. Ufa: Vagant, 2011, 256 p. ISBN 978-5-9635-0344-7.
Alexander Karasev. Chechen stories. M.: Literary Russia, 2008, 320 p. ISBN 978-5-7809-0114-3.
Zherebtsova Polina Viktorovna Diary Zherebtsova Polina. Detective Press, 2011, 576 pp. ISBN 978-5-89935-101-3
Vyacheslav Mironov. "I was in that war."

Movies and series

War - Feature Film.
Alexandra is a feature film.
Forced March is a feature film.
Caucasian Roulette is a feature film.
Man's work (8 serial film).
Storm Gates (4-episode film).
Special Forces (TV series).
I have the honor (TV series).
Lethal force-3 "Ultimate strength" (1st - 4th series)
Distrust is a documentary.
Live (film, 2006) - feature film
Breakthrough (film, 2006) - feature film

Songs and music

Songs dedicated to the Second Chechen War:

"Lube"- "After the war" (2000), "Soldier" (2000), Let's go for ... (2002)
Yuri Shevchuk- Star (2006), Smoke (2009)
Timur Gordeev- Tell me, Major, We're going home.
Timur Mutsuraev- "Hava Baraeva" (view from the side of the militants)
Igor Rasteryaev- "Song about Yura Prishchepny" (2011)
Nikolai Anisimov- Rooks have arrived (2010)

Ilya Kramnik, military observer for RIA Novosti.

The second Chechen war of the latest Russian history officially completed. The National Anti-Terrorist Committee of Russia, on behalf of President Dmitry Medvedev, lifted the regime of the counter-terrorist operation (CTO) that had been in effect for almost 10 years. This regime was introduced in Chechnya by decree of Boris Yeltsin on September 23, 1999.

The operation, which began in August 1999 with the repulse of an attack by militants Basayev and Khattab on Dagestan, naturally continued on the territory of Chechnya - where the bandit formations thrown back from Dagestan territory retreated.

The second Chechen war could not but begin. The events that took place in the region after the signing of the Khasavyurt Accords in 1996, which ended the previous war, left no doubt that fighting flare up again.

Yeltsin era

The nature of the first and second Chechen wars differed greatly. In 1994, the bet on the "Chechenization" of the conflict was lost - the opposition units could not (and hardly were able) to resist Dudayev's formations. The entry of Russian troops into the territory of the republic, which were seriously constrained in their actions and were not too well prepared for the operation, aggravated the situation - the troops faced fierce resistance, which led to significant losses during the fighting.

Especially costly Russian army the assault on Grozny, which began on December 31, 1994. Disputes about the responsibility of certain individuals for losses during the assault are still ongoing. Experts lay the main blame on the then Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, who wanted to take the city as quickly as possible.

As a result, the Russian army got involved in weeks-long battles in a city with dense buildings. The losses of the armed forces and troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia in the battles for Grozny in January-February 1995 amounted to more than 1,500 people killed and missing, and about 150 units of irretrievably lost armored vehicles.

As a result of two months of fighting, the Russian army cleared Grozny of gangs that lost about 7,000 people and a large number of technology and weapons. It should be noted that Chechen separatists received equipment in the early 90s, seizing warehouses located on the territory of Chechnya military units with the connivance of the first authorities of the USSR, and then the Russian Federation.

With the capture of Grozny, however, the war did not end. The fighting continued, capturing more and more of the territory of Chechnya, but it was not possible to suppress the bandit formations. On June 14, 1995, the Basayev gang raided the city of Budennovsk in the Stavropol Territory, where they captured city hospital by taking hostage patients and staff. The militants managed to get to Budyonnovsk by road. The fault of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was obvious, but, for the sake of objectivity, it should be noted that chaos and decay in those days were almost ubiquitous.

The bandits demanded to stop the fighting in Chechnya and start negotiations with Dudayev's regime. Russian special forces launched an operation to free the hostages. However, it was interrupted by the order of Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, who entered into negotiations with Basayev by telephone. After an unsuccessful assault and negotiations, the Russian authorities agreed to allow the terrorists to leave unhindered if they released the captured hostages. Basayev's terrorist group returned to Chechnya. As a result of the attack, 129 people were killed and 415 were injured.

Responsibility for what happened was assigned to the director of the Federal Grid Company Sergey Stepashin and Interior Minister Viktor Yerin, who lost their posts.

Meanwhile, the war continued. The federal troops managed to take control of most of the territory of Chechnya, but the sorties of the militants who were hiding in the mountainous wooded area and enjoyed the support of the population did not stop.

On January 9, 1996, a detachment of militants under the command of Raduev and Israpilov attacked Kizlyar, and took a group of hostages in the local maternity hospital and hospital. The militants demanded the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Chechnya and the North Caucasus. On January 10, 1996, the bandits left Kizlyar, taking with them a hundred hostages, the number of which increased after they disarmed the checkpoint of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Soon, Raduev's group was blocked in the village of Pervomaiskoye, which was taken by storm by Russian troops on January 15-18. As a result of the attack by Raduev's gang on Kizlyar and Pervomaiskoye, 78 servicemen, employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and civilians of Dagestan were killed, several hundred people were injured of varying severity. Part of the militants, including the leaders, broke into the territory of Chechnya through gaps in a poorly organized cordon.

On April 21, 1996, the federal center managed to achieve a major success by eliminating Dzhokhar Dudayev, but his death did not lead to an end to the war. On August 6, 1996, gangs again captured Grozny, blocking the positions of our troops. The prepared operation to destroy the militants was cancelled.

Finally, on August 14, an armistice agreement is signed, after which negotiations between the representatives of Russia and Chechnya begin on the development of "Principles for determining the foundations of relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic." Negotiations end on August 31, 1996 with the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements. On the Russian side, the document was signed by Alexander Lebed, then Secretary of the Security Council, and on the Chechen side, Aslan Maskhadov.

De facto, the Khasavyurt Accords and the "treaty on peace and principles of relations between the Russian Federation and the CRI" that followed them, signed in May 1997 by Yeltsin and Maskhadov, opened the way to Chechnya's independence. The second article of the agreement directly provided for the construction of relations between the parties on the basis of the principles of international law and agreements of the parties.

Results of the first campaign

It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of the actions of Russian troops during the first Chechen war. On the one hand, the actions of the troops were seriously limited by numerous non-military considerations - the leadership of the country and the Ministry of Defense regularly limited the use of heavy weapons and aviation for political reasons. There was an acute shortage of modern weapons, and the lessons learned from the Afghan conflict, which took place under similar conditions, were forgotten.

In addition, an information war was unleashed against the army - a number of media and politicians conducted a targeted campaign to support the separatists. The causes and prehistory of the war were hushed up, in particular, the genocide of the Russian-speaking population of Chechnya in the early 1990s. Many were killed, others were expelled from their homes and forced to leave Chechnya. Meanwhile, human rights activists and the press paid close attention to any real and fictitious sins of the federal forces, but hushed up the topic of the disasters of the Russian inhabitants of Chechnya.

The information war against Russia was also waged abroad. In many Western countries, as well as in states of Eastern Europe and some ex-Soviet republics, organizations arose with the goal of supporting Chechen separatists. Assistance to gangs was also provided by the special services of Western countries. A number of countries provided shelter, medical and financial assistance to militants, helped them with weapons and documents.

At the same time, it is obvious that one of the reasons for the failures was the gross mistakes made by both the top leadership and the operational command, as well as the wave of army corruption, as a result of the purposeful and general decomposition of the army, when operational information could simply be sold. In addition, a number of successful operations by militants against Russian convoys would have been impossible if the Russian troops complied with the elementary statutory requirements for organizing combat guards, reconnaissance, coordination of actions, etc.

The Khasavyurt agreements did not become a guarantee of a peaceful life for Chechnya. Chechen criminal structures, with impunity, did business on mass kidnappings, hostage-taking (including official Russian representatives working in Chechnya), theft of oil from oil pipelines and oil wells, the production and smuggling of drugs, the production and distribution of counterfeit banknotes, terrorist attacks and attacks on neighboring Russian regions. Even the money that Moscow continued to send to Chechen pensioners was stolen by the authorities of Ichkeria. A zone of instability arose around Chechnya, which gradually spread across the territory of Russia.

Second Chechen campaign

In Chechnya itself, in the summer of 1999, the gangs of Shamil Basayev and Khattab, the most prominent Arab mercenary on the territory of the republic, were preparing for an invasion of Dagestan. The bandits counted on the weakness of the Russian government, and the surrender of Dagestan. The blow was delivered on the mountainous part of this province, where there were almost no troops.

Fights with the terrorists who invaded Dagestan on August 7 lasted for more than a month. At this time, major terrorist acts were carried out in several Russian cities - residential buildings were blown up in Moscow, Volgodonsk and Buynaksk. Many civilians died.

The second Chechen war was significantly different from the first. The bet on the weakness of the Russian government and the army did not materialize. The new Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin took over the overall leadership of the new Chechen war.

The troops, taught by the bitter experience of 1994-96, behaved much more carefully, actively using various new tactics that made it possible to destroy large militant forces with few losses. Separate "successes" of the militants cost them too much and could not change anything.

Like, for example, the battle at Hill 776, when the bandits managed to break out of the encirclement through the positions of the 6th company of the 104th parachute regiment of the Pskov Airborne Division. During this battle, 90 paratroopers, not having due to bad weather aviation and artillery support, during the day held back the onslaught of more than 2,000 militants. The bandits broke through the positions of the company only when it was almost completely destroyed (only six out of 90 people survived). The losses of the militants amounted to about 500 people. After that, terrorist attacks become the main type of actions of the militants - hostage-taking, explosions on roads and in public places.

Moscow actively used the split in Chechnya itself - many field commanders went over to the side of the federal forces. Inside Russia itself new war also enjoyed much more support than before. In the highest echelons of power, this time there was no indecision that was one of the reasons for the success of gangs in the 90s. One by one, the most prominent militant leaders are being destroyed. A few leaders who escaped death fled abroad.

Mufti of Chechnya Akhmat Kadyrov, who died on May 9, 2004 as a result of a terrorist attack, becomes the head of the republic, who went over to the side of Russia. His successor was his son - Ramzan Kadyrov.

Gradually, with the cessation of foreign funding and the death of the leaders of the underground, the activity of the militants decreased. The federal center has sent and is sending large sums of money to help and restore peaceful life in Chechnya. In Chechnya, units of the Ministry of Defense and internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs are stationed on a permanent basis, maintaining order in the republic. Whether the troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs will remain in Chechnya after the abolition of the KTO is not yet clear.

Assessing the current situation, we can say that the fight against separatism in Chechnya has been successfully completed. However, the victory cannot be called final. The North Caucasus is a rather turbulent region, in which various forces, both local and supported from abroad, are operating, seeking to fan the fire of a new conflict, so the final stabilization of the situation in the region is still far away.

In this regard, the abolition of the anti-terrorist regime in Chechnya will only mean the successful completion for Russia of another very important stage in the struggle for its territorial integrity.

The article tells briefly about the second Chechen war - Russia's military operation on the territory of Chechnya, which began in September 1999. Large-scale hostilities went on until 2000, after which the operation moved into a relatively calm phase, consisting in the elimination of individual bases and terrorist detachments. The operation was officially canceled in 2009.

The course of the second Chechen war
The results of the second Chechen war

Causes of the second Chechen war

After the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya in 1996, the situation in the region remained unsettled. A. Maskhadov, the head of the republic, did not control the actions of the militants, and often turned a blind eye to their activities. The slave trade flourished in the republic. In the Chechen and neighboring republics, Russian and Foreign citizens for which the militants demanded a ransom. Those hostages who for some reason could not pay the ransom were subject to the death penalty.
The militants were actively engaged in thefts from the pipeline passing through the territory of Chechnya. The sale of oil, as well as the underground production of gasoline, has become a significant source of income for the militants. The territory of the republic has become a transshipment base for the drug trade.
The difficult economic situation, the lack of jobs forced the male population of Chechnya to go over to the side of the militants in search of work. A network of bases for the training of militants was created in Chechnya. The training was led by Arab mercenaries. Chechnya occupied a huge place in the plans of Islamic fundamentalists. She was assigned the main role in destabilizing the situation in the region. The republic was supposed to become a springboard for an attack on Russia and a breeding ground for separatism in neighboring republics.
The Russian authorities were concerned about the increasing number of kidnappings, the supply of illegal drugs and gasoline from Chechnya. Great importance had an oil Chechen pipeline, which was intended for large-scale transportation of oil from the Caspian region.
In the spring of 1999, a number of tough measures were taken to improve the situation and stop the activities of the militants. Chechen self-defense detachments have significantly increased. Arrived from Russia the best specialists for counter-terrorism activities. The Chechen-Dagestan border has become a de facto militarized zone. Conditions and requirements for crossing the border have been significantly increased. On the territory of Russia, the struggle by Chechen groups that finance terrorists has intensified.
This dealt a serious blow to the income of the militants from the sale of drugs and oil. They had problems with paying Arab mercenaries and buying weapons.

The course of the second Chechen war

Back in the spring of 1999, in connection with the aggravation of the situation, Russia launched a helicopter missile attack on the positions of militants on the river. Terek. According to reports, they were preparing a large-scale offensive.
In the summer of 1999, a number of preparatory attacks by militants were made in Dagestan. As a result, the most vulnerabilities in Russian defense positions. In August, the main forces of militants invaded the territory of Dagestan under the leadership of Sh. Basaev and Khattab. The main striking force was the Arab mercenaries. The inhabitants resisted stubbornly. The terrorists could not withstand the vastly superior Russian army. After several battles, they were forced to retreat back. K ser. September, the borders of the republic were surrounded by the Russian army. At the end of the month, Grozny and its environs are bombed, after which the Russian army enters the territory of Chechnya.
Russia's further actions are to fight the remnants of gangs on the territory of the republic, with an emphasis on attracting the local population. A broad amnesty is announced for participants in the terrorist movement. The head of the republic becomes a former enemy - A. Kadyrov, who creates combat-ready self-defense units.
In order to improve the economic situation, large financial flows were sent to Chechnya. This was to stop the recruitment of the poor by terrorists. Russia's actions have led to some success. In 2009, the termination of the counter-terrorist operation was announced.

The results of the second Chechen war

As a result of the war, relative calm was finally achieved in the Chechen Republic. It was almost completely finished with the drug trade and the slave trade. The plans of the Islamists to turn the North Caucasus into one of the world centers of the terrorist movement were frustrated.

After the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya in 1996, the situation in the region remained unsettled. A. Maskhadov, the head of the republic, did not control the actions of the militants, and often turned a blind eye to their activities. The slave trade flourished in the republic. In the Chechen and neighboring republics, Russian and foreign citizens were kidnapped, for whom the militants demanded a ransom. Those hostages who for some reason could not pay the ransom were subject to the death penalty.

The militants were actively engaged in thefts from the pipeline passing through the territory of Chechnya. The sale of oil, as well as the underground production of gasoline, has become a significant source of income for the militants. The territory of the republic has become a transshipment base for the drug trade.

The difficult economic situation, the lack of jobs forced the male population of Chechnya to go over to the side of the militants in search of work. A network of bases for the training of militants was created in Chechnya. The training was led by Arab mercenaries. Chechnya occupied a huge place in the plans of Islamic fundamentalists. She was assigned the main role in destabilizing the situation in the region. The republic was supposed to become a springboard for an attack on Russia and a breeding ground for separatism in neighboring republics.

The Russian authorities were concerned about the increasing number of kidnappings, the supply of illegal drugs and gasoline from Chechnya. Of great importance was the Chechen oil pipeline, which was intended for large-scale transportation of oil from the Caspian region.

In the spring of 1999, a number of tough measures were taken to improve the situation and stop the activities of the militants. Chechen self-defense detachments have significantly increased. The best specialists in counter-terrorist activities arrived from Russia. The Chechen-Dagestan border has become a de facto militarized zone. Conditions and requirements for crossing the border have been significantly increased. On the territory of Russia, the struggle by Chechen groups that finance terrorists has intensified.

This dealt a serious blow to the income of the militants from the sale of drugs and oil. They had problems with paying Arab mercenaries and buying weapons.

In September 1999, a new phase of the Chechen military campaign began, which was called the counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus (CTO). The reason for the start of the operation was the massive invasion of Dagestan on August 7, 1999 from the territory of Chechnya by militants under the overall command of Shamil Basayev and the Arab mercenary Khattab. The group included foreign mercenaries and Basayev's militants. For more than a month there were battles between the federal forces and the invading militants, which ended with the fact that the militants were forced to retreat from the territory of Dagestan back to Chechnya. On the same days - September 4-16 - a series of terrorist attacks were carried out in several cities of Russia (Moscow, Volgodonsk and Buynaksk) - explosions of residential buildings. Considering Maskhadov's inability to control the situation in Chechnya, the Russian leadership decided to conduct a military operation to destroy the militants in Chechnya. On September 18, the borders of Chechnya were blocked by Russian troops. On September 23, the President of the Russian Federation issued a Decree "On Measures to Increase the Efficiency of Counter-Terrorist Operations on the Territory of the North Caucasus Region of the Russian Federation", which provides for the creation of a Joint Group of Troops (Forces) in the North Caucasus to carry out counter-terrorist operations. On September 23, Russian aviation began bombing the capital of Chechnya and its environs. On September 30, a ground operation began - armored units of the Russian army from the Stavropol Territory and Dagestan entered the territory of the Naursky and Shelkovsky regions of the republic. In December 1999, the entire flat part of the territory of the Chechen Republic was liberated. The militants concentrated in the mountains (about 3,000 people) and settled in Grozny. On February 6, 2000, Grozny was taken under the control of federal forces. To fight in the mountainous regions of Chechnya, in addition to the eastern and western groups operating in the mountains, a new grouping "Center" was created. On February 25-27, 2000, the "West" units blocked Kharsenoy, and the "Vostok" group closed the militants in the area of Ulus-Kert, Dachu-Borzoy, Yaryshmardy. On March 2, Ulus-Kert was liberated. The last large-scale operation was the liquidation of Ruslan Gelaev's group in the area of the village. Komsomolskoye, which ended on March 14, 2000. After that, the militants switched to sabotage and terrorist methods of warfare, and the federal forces countered the terrorists with the actions of special forces and operations of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. During the CTO in Chechnya in 2002, a hostage-taking took place in the Theater Center on Dubrovka in Moscow. In 2004, a hostage-taking took place at school number 1 in the city of Beslan in North Ossetia. By the beginning of 2005, after the destruction of Maskhadov, Khattab, Baraev, Abu al-Walid and many other field commanders, the intensity of the sabotage and terrorist activities of the militants had significantly decreased. The only large-scale operation of the militants (a raid on Kabardino-Balkaria on October 13, 2005) ended in failure.

Between 2005 and 2008, no major attacks on civilians or clashes with official troops were recorded. However, in 2010 there were a number of tragic terrorist acts (explosions in the Moscow metro, at Domodedovo airport). Long-term large-scale hostilities, of course, have a destabilizing effect on the situation not only in the North Caucasus, but throughout the entire Caucasus region. It can be said with certainty that tension will persist no matter how events develop in Chechnya.

In any case, in the short term, factors of political instability and the danger of terrorism associated with this will persist and even increase in the Caucasus.

From midnight on April 16, 2009, the National Anti-Terrorist Committee (NAC) of Russia, on behalf of President Dmitry Medvedev, abolished the CTO regime on the territory of the Chechen Republic.

Any hostilities cause damage to both property and people. According to statistics, 3684 people were lost on the Russian side. 2178 representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation were killed. The FSB lost 202 of its employees. More than 15,000 people were killed among the terrorists. The number of civilians who died during the war is not exactly established. According to official figures, it is about 1000 people.

The results of the Chechen wars

On August 31, 1996, in Khasavyurt, a Dagestan regional center on the border with Chechnya, Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Alexander Lebed and Chief of Staff of Chechen militants Aslan Maskhadov signed documents that put an end to the first Chechen war - the Khasavyurt agreements. Hostilities were stopped, federal troops were withdrawn from Chechnya, and the issue of the status of the territory was postponed until December 31, 2001.

The signatures under the Khasavyurt peace were put by the Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Alexander Lebed and the chief of staff of the armed formations of the separatists Aslan Maskhadov, the signing ceremony was attended by the head of the OSCE Assistance Group in the Chechen Republic Tim Guldiman.

The documents indicated the principles for determining the foundations of relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic. The parties pledged not to resort to the use of force or the threat of force, and also to proceed from the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The key points of the settlement were contained in a special protocol. Chief among them is the provision on "deferred status": the question of the status of Chechnya was to be resolved by December 31, 2001. A joint commission of representatives of the state authorities of Russia and Chechnya was supposed to deal with operational problems. The tasks of the commission, in particular, included monitoring the implementation of Boris Yeltsin's decree on the withdrawal of troops, preparing proposals for restoring monetary, financial and budgetary relations between Moscow and Grozny, as well as programs for restoring the republic's economy.

After the signing of the Khasavyurt Accords, Chechnya became de facto independent state, but de jure - a state not recognized by any country in the world (including Russia).

In October 1996, the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation adopted a resolution "On the Situation in the Chechen Republic", according to which the documents signed on August 31, 1996 in the city of Khasavyurt were considered "evidence of the parties' readiness to resolve the conflict peacefully, having no state legal significance."

93 State Duma deputies submitted a request to the Constitutional Court on the constitutionality of the Khasavyurt agreements. In December 1996, the Constitutional Court refused to accept the request of a group of deputies for consideration due to the lack of jurisdiction of the issues raised in it to the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation.

The Khasavyurt Accords and the signing of the Treaty “On Peace and Principles of Relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria”, which was signed by Boris Yeltsin and Aslan Maskhadov, in May 1997, did not lead to stabilization of the situation in the region. After the withdrawal of Russian armed forces in Chechnya, an interwar crisis began: destroyed houses and villages were not restored, due to ethnic cleansing and hostilities, almost the entire non-Chechen population left Chechnya or was physically destroyed.

The agreements did not affect the practice of taking hostages and extorting money by armed Chechen groups. For example, journalists Viktor Petrov, Bris Fletjo and Svetlana Kuzmina were kidnapped at the time of the Khasavyurt agreements. The theft of state property, drug trafficking and the slave trade developed.

Since the 2000s, Moscow has decided to pursue a policy of “Chechenization,” which was part of the Kremlin’s propaganda efforts to convince the Russians and the international community that the war in Chechnya is over and that peaceful life there is returning to normal, despite the incessant daring attacks of unkilled terrorists.

Be that as it may, the newly created Chechen authorities began to play an important role in neutralizing the attacks, which did not accept the defeat of the separatists. A new government structure is gradually being built in the republic. In March 2003, a referendum was held on the republic's constitution. He approved a new constitution that put an end to separatist aspirations and firmly established Chechnya as part of the Russian Federation.

The referendum opened the way for the election of the President of the Republic. In the October 2003 elections, Akhmad Kadyrov, who had been the de facto Chechen ruler appointed three years earlier by Russia, officially became president. Representatives of the republic again took their seats in the State Duma and the Federation Council. Chechnya is slowly returning to the political and legal space of Russia.

The reality, however, is that ethnic Chechen officials who cooperate with the federal authorities are prime targets for terrorists. Although the separatists have been militarily defeated and their organized militias destroyed or dispersed, hopes of a complete victory over them in the near future remain elusive, and guerrilla war in the Republic is likely to drag on for a long time.

In May 2004, President Kadyrov was killed by a terrorist bomb. After his death, his son, Ramzan, quickly emerged as the most influential political figure in the republic. Moreover, Vladimir Putin contributed to his rise in every possible way. Ramzan Kadyrov was appointed Chechen prime minister under the new president of Chechnya, Alu Alkhanov, backed by the Kremlin. Kadyrov quickly became the de facto supreme ruler of the republic.

On June 17, 2006, in connection with the death of Abdul-Khalim Sadulaev, Umarov assumed the duties of the President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. “Umarov is one of the most experienced field commanders, whose authority among the militants is comparable to the fame of Shamil Basayev,” the Caucasian Knot noted in those days. By his very first decrees, Umarov dismissed Shamil Basayev from the post of vice-premier and appointed him to the post of vice-president.

Umarov's address as the new president of Ichkeria, published on the Internet on June 23, 2006, stated that Ichkeria continues to remain an independent state, although occupied, and "the Chechen people pursue one and only goal - to be free and equal among all the peoples of the world." Announcing plans to expand the combat zone to the territory of Russia, Umarov noted: “However, at the same time, I responsibly declare that the targets of our strikes and attacks will be exclusively military and police facilities ... I, like my predecessors in the presidency, will also resolutely suppress all attacks on civilian objects and persons.

In March 2007, Ramzan Kadyrov was elected president of Chechnya. He got into his hands the actual control over the Chechen oil industry and over the large cash flows directed by Moscow to restore the economy of the republic. The Kremlin insists it brought stability and ensured a swift rebuilding of the republic's war-torn capital, Grozny.

The legal process of restoring constitutional order in the republic is coming to an end. But not everyone in Russia is convinced that "Chechenization" can firmly guarantee long-term stability in the republic, or that the Kremlin has placed its bets on the right local politician. Kadyrov is criticized for his youth and lack of education. Many observers are not sure that Kadyrov, given unlimited power, will be able to avoid the temptation of greater independence from the Kremlin.

On October 6, 2007, the self-proclaimed president of the CRI, Doku Umarov, announced the abolition of the CRI and proclaimed the formation of the Caucasian Emirate. In his appeal, Umarov proclaimed himself "the emir of the Mujahideen of the Caucasus", "the leader of Jihad", and, in addition, "the only legitimate authority in all territories where there are Mujahideen". A few days later, he formalized his “decisions” with decrees (“omra”) - Omra No. 1 “On the formation of the Caucasus Emirate” and Omra No. 4 “On the transformation of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria into Vilayat Nokhchichoy (Ichkeria) of the Caucasus Emirate” - both dated October 10, 2007 of the year. At the same time, he renounced the "constitution" of the CRI of 1992 - the "tagut law", which stated that "The people of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria are the only source all power in the state." and considers the only source of power not the people, but Allah.

This line, inspired by the Islamist ideologue Movladi Udugov, was sharply opposed by Akhmed Zakayev. According to Zakayev's supporters, by "telephone voting" among the members of the so-called. "CRI Parliament" Zakaev was elected "Prime Minister" of the CRI, since Umarov "withdrew himself from the duties of the president." For its part, the leadership of the "Caucasian Emirate" declared Zakayev's activities anti-state, instructing the Sharia court and the Mukhabarat security service to deal with him, accusing him of involvement in the death of CRI presidents Maskhadov and Sadulayev.

President of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov has repeatedly offered Umarov to surrender to law enforcement agencies. Kadyrov also repeatedly stated that Umarov was seriously ill and wounded.

“By order of the President of the Russian Federation, the National Anti-Terrorism Committee made changes to the organization of anti-terrorist activities on the territory of the Chechen Republic. Chairman of the Committee, Director of the FSB of Russia Alexander Bortnikov from 00:00 on April 16, 2009 the order declaring the territory of the republic a zone for carrying out “counter-terrorist operations” was cancelled. From the indicated time, measures to combat terrorism in Chechnya will be carried out in accordance with general order operating in other regions of the country, the committee notes. "Such a decision is intended to provide conditions for the further normalization of the situation in the republic, the restoration and development of its socio-economic sphere," the message emphasizes. The operational headquarters in Chechnya were given instructions aimed at optimizing the composition of the forces and means of the Joint Group of Forces for conducting counter-terrorist operations on the territory of the North Caucasus region, and improving the procedure for their use in modern conditions.

Conclusion

The Russian-Chechen conflict initially took the form of an acute legitimate contradiction, calling into question the very foundations political system Russia - a political community. The conducted analysis shows that the escalation of the conflict was the result of the weakness and inefficiency of such key components of the Russian political system as:

a) the constitutional legitimacy of the federal structure;

b) regulation of political, financial, economic, legal relations between the federal and regional levels of state power;

c) mechanism for making and implementing political decisions;

d) legal regulation of actions of the executive power in crisis situations, etc.

The very fact of the existence of an internal political conflict of this magnitude is unambiguous evidence of a deep crisis in the political system of the state. With regard to the conflict control strategy, the Chechen crisis identifies the inability of the Russian political system to implement a preventive set of control measures aimed at preventing, preventing and limiting political violence.

The Chechen wars brought heavy losses to both sides of the conflict. The conflict in Chechnya has caused a national hostility towards Chechnya to develop in Russia.

In the course of this term paper All assigned tasks were completed. The causes of the Chechen wars are revealed, as well as their results are summed up.

List of used literature

1. "Constitution of the Russian Federation" (adopted by popular vote on 12/12/1993) N 2-FKZ, dated 07/21/2014 N 11-FKZ)

2. The Constitution of the CRI (as amended by the Law of November 11, 1996, the Law of February 3, 1997). March 2, 1992 No. 108, Grozny

3. Decree of the Supreme Council of the Chechen-Ingush Republic "On the Provisional Supreme Council of the Chechen-Ingush Republic"

5. Grodnensky N. Unfinished war. History of the armed conflict in Chechnya. Military Historical Library - Harvest,; 2012.

6. Kiseleva, E. M. Shchagina. -M.: Humanit. ed. center VLADOS, 2012

7. Nikitin N. Results. What was // New time. - 2010. - No. 16

8. recent history Fatherland. XX century: Proc. for stud. higher educational institutions: In 2 volumes / Ed. A. F. Furman D. E. Chechnya and Russia: societies and states. M., 2013

9. Orlov O.P., Cherkasov “Russia - Chechnya: a chain of mistakes and crimes. 1994-1996". Human Right 2010.

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Orlov O.P., Cherkasov “Russia - Chechnya: a chain of mistakes and crimes. 1994-1996". Human Right 2010.

Constitution of the CRI (as amended, supplemented by the Law of November 11, 1996, the Law of February 03, 1997). March 2, 1992 .N 108, Grozny.

Russia (USSR) in Local Wars and Armed Conflicts in the Second Half of the 20th Century / Ed. V. A. Zolotareva. - M.: Kuchkovo field; Polygraphic resources, 2000.

Shokin S.D. Chechnya between the two wars // Russian Historical Journal. - 2003, No. 1

The latest history of the Fatherland. XX century: Proc. for stud. higher educational institutions: In 2 volumes / Ed. A. F. Kiseleva, E. M. Shchagina. -M.: Humanit. ed. center VLADOS, 2012

Furman D.E. Chechnya and Russia: societies and states. M., 2013

E. Payin. "The Second Chechen War and Its Consequences". [Electronic resource] URL – http://www.http://ru-90.ru/content/

Five most controversial documents in the history of Russian diplomacy” “Free Press”, December 7, 2013. [Electronic resource] URL – http://svpressa.ru/

Shitov A.V. Secrets of the Caucasian War. - M.: "Veche", 2005

Appeal of the CRI President Dokka Umarov. Electronic resource. URL http://web.archive.org/

Lukin O. Recent history: Russian-Chechen wars // Bulletin "Mostok". [Electronic resource] URL http://www.vestnikmostok.ru/

The “Second Chechen War” (officially called the counter-terrorist operation (CTO) is the common name for hostilities in Chechnya and the border regions of the North Caucasus. It began on September 30, 1999 (the date Russian troops entered Chechnya). The active phase of hostilities lasted from 1999 to 2000 a year, then, as the Russian Armed Forces established control over the territory of Chechnya, it escalated into a smoldering conflict, which actually continues to this day.

NCFD - North Caucasian Federal District

The second Chechen war began

August 1999, Chechen fighters attacked the Republic of Dagestan of the Russian Federation, this is how the second Chechen war began, terrorist attacks, attacks and incidents also entered a new stage from that moment, many innocent Russians died in August of this year, becoming victims of terrorists.
link: http://russian.people.com.cn/31519/6735684.html

Living history: the beginning of the second Chechen war

It is difficult to name the starting point for the beginning of the war in Chechnya. What will it be? The first attacks of militants on Dagestan? Introduction by Maskhadov of martial law in CRI? The beginning of the bombing of militant bases by our aircraft? Explosions of residential buildings in Buynaksk, Moscow and Volgodonsk? Or the start of a ground operation of the Russian army?
link: http://www.livejournal.ru/themes/id/21516

Dagestan. The beginning of the second Chechen war

On August 7, 1999, a 1,500-strong group under the command of Shamil Basayev invaded the territory of Dagestan. The militants immediately captured a number of villages in the Botlikh and Tsumadinsky districts. There were no Russian garrisons there, and the small local militia offered no resistance. The militants immediately began to fortify in the occupied territory, intending to use it as a springboard for a further offensive. Their next goal was to unite with their allies - the armed detachments of the Wahhabis, concentrated in the area of the villages of Karamakhi and Chabanmakhi.
link: http://www.warchechnya.ru/load

Second Chechen war. Beginning of the Chechen crisis

The Chechen crisis is a complex, multifactorial phenomenon. Many of its components are still difficult to assess objectively today. In general, such events cannot have an unambiguous interpretation; each of its participants has its own truth. At the same time, the current degree of knowledge of the problem allows us to draw a number of conclusions. The August events of 1991 in Moscow, followed by the collapse of the USSR, provided the multinational people of the CIR with a unique chance to change the regime of the communist bureaucracy to a democratic system of power by constitutional means, to determine the status of the republic through a referendum, to find an acceptable form of relations with the Russian Federation, thereby gradually gaining a real economic and political independence within the framework of a renewed federation.
link: http://www.seaofhistory.ru/shists-940-1.html

Causes of the second Chechen war from the point of view of Maskhadov

Ten years ago, the second Chechen war began. A war that, contrary to claims officials hasn't ended yet.

Below I publish excerpts from the transcript of an audio letter sent in 2000 by Aslan Maskhadov to his friend and colleague in the Soviet army, who asked not to be named.
link: http://01vyacheslav. livejournal.com/7700.html

Second Chechen War: Russia in the face of terror

After the tragedy at Dubrovka, the Kremlin hastened to announce the "success of a unique operation to free the hostages." Instead of serious organizational conclusions regarding the leadership of law enforcement agencies and special services that allowed the militants to Moscow, awards followed. So the title of Hero of Russia was given to FSB generals V. Pronichev and A. Tikhonov. The first one is Deputy director of the FSB and head of the headquarters for the release of hostages on Dubrovka, the second - the head of the FSB special forces center (which includes the Alfa and Vympel units). In less than 2 years, these same people will “mark themselves” in Beslan - they won’t become Heroes twice, but they won’t bear responsibility for the failed assault and numerous victims among the hostages either. More on this below.
link: http://www.voinenet.ru/voina/istoriya-voiny/784.html

Second Chechen. For Putin?

On September 23, 1999, a presidential decree was signed "On Measures to Increase the Efficiency of Counter-Terrorist Operations on the Territory of the North Caucasus Region of the Russian Federation." According to the decree, the United Group of Forces in the North Caucasus was created to conduct a counter-terrorist operation.
link: http://www.svoboda.org/content/article/1829292.html

The Second Chechen War as Part of Putin's PR Campaign

On September 14, 1999, shortly after the explosion of a second residential building in Moscow, Putin spoke at a meeting State Duma dedicated to the fight against terrorism.
link: http://www.razlib.ru/politika/korporacija_

The war against terrorists ended in Chechnya

On April 16, the regime of the counterterrorist operation (CTO), which has been operating in Chechnya since 1999, has been lifted, RIA Novosti reports with reference to the National Anti-Terrorism Committee.
link: http://lenta.ru/news/2009/04/16/regime/

"Second Chechen War" officially ended today

Today, the National Anti-Terrorism Committee issued the following statement: "From 00:00 Moscow time on April 16, the Chairman of the Committee, Director of the FSB Alexander Bortnikov canceled the order declaring the territory of the republic a zone for conducting a counter-terrorist operation." As a source from the presidential administration told The Morning News correspondent, the NAC made changes to the organization of anti-terrorist activities in the Chechen Republic on the personal instructions of Dmitry Medvedev. The source additionally told The Morning News that this decision was previously agreed with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.
link: http://www.utronews.ru/news/politics/001239868105700/

3 years ago the second Chechen war ended

Three years ago, the abolition of the counterterrorist operation of the federal forces in Chechnya was announced.
link: http://www.rusichi-center.ru/e/2965905-3

10 years ago the second Chechen war began

Everyone has their own date for the start of this war. Dagestanis believe: since August 7, when Basayev's gangs invaded the republic. Muscovites - since September 9, when they blew up the house in Pechatniki. The military - from September 30: the official entry of troops into Chechnya. Everyone has their own date for the end of this war. For the dead, it is long gone. The living have not come from her so far ...
link: http://bosonogoe.ru/blog/1556. html

Second Chechen War and its aftermath

In December 1994, the Russian authorities for the first time made an attempt to suppress Chechen separatism by military means, but after two years of bloody fighting, the army was forced to leave the Chechen Republic. The stubbornness of the Russian authorities, heading for military victory in Chechnya, led to the death of at least 30 thousand Chechens and 4.3 thousand Russian soldiers. This war, the economic damage from which is estimated at 5.5 billion dollars, to a large extent caused the all-Russian economic crisis in August 1998, when the state was unable to meet its exorbitant debts.
link: http://old.nasledie.ru/politvnt/19_38/article.php? art=53

The dragon fight is over. The snake chase has begun.

I do not understand why. The second Chechen war was not necessary. The solution to this problem could be based on the agreements signed by General Lebed in Khasavyurt - they could become the basis for achieving long-term peace in Chechnya. I think there are serious doubts that it was the Chechens who blew up the houses in Moscow. As you remember, this was the reason for the start of the second war. However, there are suspicions that it was a provocation of the Russian special services. It is strange that hexogen was used in the explosions, which was produced at a factory controlled by the KGB, and then there were incomprehensible exercises in Ryazan. The Chechen war had a negative impact on the confidence in the Russian authorities and on the attitude towards Russia on the part of democratic states.
link: http://flb.ru/info/34480.html

The Chechen way of "seaside partisans"

The story of the “seaside partisans”, who have been unsuccessfully caught by hundreds of law enforcement officers with helicopters for the third week, and from today by army units with armored vehicles, could have begun 10 years ago. But the second Chechen War and the petrodollar rain that hit Russia gave the country a reprieve. Now it is over, and it's time to pay old and new bills. If the preliminary information about Roman Muromtsev's group is correct, the Kremlin has for the first time received an organized group of militants on Russian soil who consider the ruling regime an enemy and are ready to kill its minions without hesitation.
link: http://www.apn.ru/publications/article22866.htm

The second Chechen war began exactly 10 years ago. And when did it end? And is it over?

By the time the second war broke out in October 1999, I was 26, with a wife and a two-year-old child who were completely dependent on me. We lived very hard and poor, and I had no time for politics. Then I thought to stay in St. Petersburg. Moreover, the news about the course of the war was rather reassuring: first they expanded the "cordon sanitaire", then they began to take control of settlements Chechnya, mostly without a fight. My city, Shali, peacefully let the federal troops in.
link: