Boyko L.A. Food supply as a security tool economic security Russia in 1917 / L.A. Boyko, A.P. Boyko // International Journal of Humanities and Natural Sciences. - 2017. - No. 8. – pp. 4-8
FOOD SUPPLY AS A TOOL
EC PROVISIONS ONOMIC SECURITY OF RUSSIA IN 1917
L.A. Boyko , Ph.D. philosophy. Sciences, Associate Professor
A.P. Boyko, student
Kuban State University
(Russia, Krasnodar)
Annotation. In this article, the problem of the food supply was considered. With baking as a catalyst factor that accelerated the revolutionary processes in Russia in 1917. In addition, the main indicators characterizing the state of the Russian economy in the pre-revolutionary period were studied. Analyzed the rule-making activities of the tsarist government, the Provisional Government and bodies Soviet power in the field of state regulation of the agrarian issue. It was concluded that the inefficient solution of the food issue was one of the And the rank of overthrowing the Romanov dynasty, then the Provisional Government and, as a result, the popularity of the Bolshevik party program and their coming to power as a result of the October Revolution of 1917.
Keywords: food crisis, Provisional Government, land socialization, state regulation of the economy, land reform, agrarian policy And ka, revolutionary rule-making.
The food crisis of the beginning of 1917 in Russia was not a d stva, and distribution and supply. He became one of the main reasons February b Russian Revolution of 1917d. The state power failed to overcome the crisis, in s fulfill the obligations to supply O contentment not only ARMY and , but also Rho with si and in general. The hardships of World War I th we were felt by the entire population of Russia: huge loss of life, abbreviated e decrease in national economic potential, economic devastation, epidemics, hunger caused by the fact that n and the front left 12.8 million peasants.
In 1916, the transport and fuel crises broke out, the railways, due to low throughput capacity, could not provide uninterrupted supply. V ku food in the city.Peasants, not receiving the necessary industrial t O Vars, did not supply agricultural products to the market, preferring to wait for better times.Already in the autumn of 1916, queues for food appeared in Moscow and Petrograd. To tami nutrition, spicy turned out to be prod O willful crisis. In November 1916, with the most acute political question om was the question of food supply to the front and rear. Society regardedfavorable food resolution T military crisis almost like saving the Romanov dynasty.
Since the autumn of 1916, the government took under its jurisdiction procurement measures to supply the population, which had previously been the responsibility of local self-government bodies. General food n ny plan in the winter of 1916/1917 approved R was awaited by the Central Bureau of Flour Milling andCommissioner-in-Chief for the purchase of chl e ba for the army, who gave outfits for military quartermasters.
Only during 1916 did theseveral ministers Agriculture . In Russia food crash brewing. Not only drastic reduction ur about zhaya, but also the unwillingness of the landowners sell bread at fixed prices imposed by the rights And in September 1916, led to the fact that and at the turn of 1916-1917. prices on food soared up. An acute food crisis was experienced by the central industrial regions, which were supplied with products imported from other regions of Russia.
Growth economic crisisled to an attempt to fully regulate the economy at the state level. Distribution system in citiescard products. State st A lo control the logisticssupply of enterprisesincluding private) and distribution their products. On November 29 1916 Minister Ze m model A. Rittich signed a resolution e nie "On the deployment of grain bread and f at rage acquired for needs related to defense ". Surplus appropriation was introduced in 31 provinces for bread. However tsarist government turned out to be unable to carry out surplus appropriation due to the dispersion of peasant x O farming, which led to the failure of the ultimate goal of harvesting bread.Centralization st A was the weakest point in the implementation of food policy. De i The activity of state bodies was disunited and fragmented.
In most provinces where there were A large orders for unwrapping were meant, local authorities refused it, preferring voluntary purchases of bread through agricultural b societies, zemstvos, cooperatives. Mass sabotage of government events Russian village at the turn of 1916/1917, as well as numerous contradictions in legal acts regulating the supply e ing, gave rise to constant friction between various bodies and institutions - both local and central.
However, these x measures were clearly not enough A exactly what it says reference about the financial and economic situationcountry, which was represented on the 17th n cooking 1917 at a meeting of the Council of Ministers. It emphasized that the sharp decline and elk industrial production, harvest bread fell by 50%, 4 times - from 8.5 billion rubles up to 33.5 billion rubles. state increased gift debt.Inflation increased: the purchasing power of the ruble fell to 27 kopecks.
January-February 1917Moscow and Petrograd received only a quarter of A frustrated food supplies, which caused a food crisis and became a prerequisitefor mass exhibitions at the captives of the workers. At the beginning of 1917 in Mo skwe was issued an official ban e nie to manufacture pastries, cakes, conf e you and other confectionery.
By the beginning of 1917, interruptions in food supplies to major cities Russia only got stronger. Due to the lack of bread in mid-February, 90 thousand rubles went on strike A fighters of Petrograd, who did not want those R sing speculation and rising prices. On February 18, the workers of Putilovsk joined them. O factory. The administration announced its closure, which was the reason for the start A lu mass demonstrations in the capital. Kr and sis, connected with the food supply of the capital due to the devastation in transport, splashed out on February 23 on the street And thousands of people of Petrograd workers x with the slogan a mi “Bread! ”, “Down with the war!”, “Down with and monarchy! Bread , according to evidence from about temporary appeared in Petrograd b to after the abdication of Nicholas II.
March 19, 1917 at the Ministry of Lands e delia was created Main land to O mitet (by July they were created in 1/3 g at Bernium of European Russia). By Position e to the decision on land committees of April 21 (May 4), 1917, they were created "for the preparation of land reform and for the development of h working out urgent temporary measures, pending the resolution of the land issue by the Constituent Assembly". This is perhaps the only measure that satisfies O meeting the demands of broad sections of us e leniya new Russia, wore rather demo n stratified character. Thus, from the solution of another of the main issues of the revolution - agrarian - Provisional A government actually evaded I waiving its decision before the convocation of the Founder th meeting.
The decision of the Provisional Government to introduce a grain mon O Polia by decree of March 251917 led to the dissolution of the first composition of the Provisional Government.
Recognizing the need for land reform, the Provisional And At the same time, in April 1917, the government issued a law "On the protection of crops." WITH O according to this law, landowners g A full reimbursement of loss T kov in case of popular unrest. One about temporarily banned the peasants O free seizure of landowners' lands; for participating in the riots they could attract e face criminal liability. All this could not but increase the discontent of the e stewardship agricultural policy bourgeois O th Provisional Government.
In the second coalition composition e change government were formed A we are the Ministry of Labor (Menshevik M.I.Skobelev), food (people d ny socialist A.V.Peshekhonov), statesmen R personal charity (cadet D.I. Shakhovsky ), who were supposed to organize the food supply. The Ministry of Food was charged with the responsibility of ensuring fixed food prices and redistributing food stocks. In the new post-revolutionary situation, under b The actions of the Provisional Government were obviously belated and insufficient s mi.
Having come to power, this government did not solve and could not solve any of the main questions of the revolution - agrarian and workers, about the fight against devastation and hunger, about war and peace.By the autumn of 1917, peasant riots had gripped Russia. Peasants n The government hoped that the revolution would quickly solve the problems of the countryside, but instead of land, the peasantry received only confusion. T big promises about the preparation of the agrarian e forms. Seizure of landed estates and mustache A deb took on a massive character. These were the first flashes of the civil war.
Replaced the Temporary pr A government, Soviet power could not have been consolidated without solving the fundamental problem O sa revolution - the question of land. At p A work on the "Decree on Land" Lenin and With used the Socialist-Revolutionary mandate on "socialization A land rations”, compiled on the basis of 242 local peasant orders, and c e personally included his section "On the Land" in the text of the decree. The order contained tr e the abolition of private ownership of land. According to the Decree on Land, T pronounced on the night of October 26-27, 1917city, landowners' lands confiscated through special commissions A chennyh local Soviets. Then these lands were transferred to the use of the cross b yanam, divided according to the principle of equalization b land use (i.e. equally, according to the labor standard - according to the number of workers And kov in the family who could handle the allotment; or according to the consumer norm - according to the number of eaters in the family). The decree meant the confiscation of the landowners' land, the abolition of their private property without redemption. WITH O according to the "Land Decree", each cross b the Yan land was to receive 2-3 acres of land, but for lack of those X nicks and cattle land could not be used I'm called.
The decree on land attracted all the peasants T on the side of the revolution. Earth passing A placed at the disposal of local peasants n committees and county soviets cross b Yang deputies. The Russian proletariat was small and consisted mainly of peasants thrown into the city, but who had strong ties with the countryside. Bol b the Shevist formulation of the agrarian question might have led them to turn back to the countryside.
On December 1, 1917, for the first time in world economic practice, a state at endowment of direct r e gyrating National economy and upra V leniya - the Supreme Council of the People's Economy t va (VSNKh).
In February, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee adopted the "Basic A law on the socialization of the land”, according to which the implementation of the “Decree on Land” began in the spring of 1918. The peasants should s Do you get 150 free of charge million acres of land, freed from debt bancam and from rent payments. On V Sun The Russian Congress of Soviets (July 4-10, 1918) adopted the Constitution of the RSFSR, in Chapter 5 of which the following e following provisions: the obligation of all citizens to work in accordance with n the maxim "Let him not work who does not eat."
Thus, the Bolsheviks carried out an agrarian reform, which included: the implementation of the "Decree on Land" and the law on the socialization of land, an equalizing e cases, and later introduced prodofree dictatorship - propsration of bread I am ladies.
It should be noted that the law and to legislate , including those related tosolving the food problemafter the October Revolution of 1917, all the highest bodies of the state had T military power: congresses of Soviets of the RSFSR, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and its Presidium, the Council of People's Commissars. Central b nye government departments (VSNKh, people's commissariats, etc.) were endowed with the right of legislative initiative, which reflected A elk in their preparation law projects, as well as issuing administrative active legal acts on matters of their jurisdiction[2, p. 15-16]. A common form of legislation has become a decree and a classic resolution issued by the highest bodies of state power. a sti. Moreover, they all had the same legal force.
A clear purpose of this or that fo R We normative act the legislator did not adhere: in the decree they could soda R compress detailed instructions for the implementation of the imperious prescription, while the regulation indicated common features R e guiding, and in the instructions they are conc e were typified, resolutions were drawn up as prescriptions, etc. e. This practice is understood T on – legal technique state n bodies and employees in the development of power-administrative acts are And was still in its infancy, normal array on the agrarian question forms and roved spontaneously, as the appearance of O blem, its systematization and hierarchization were then not the most important question A mi revolutionary rule-making.
Summing up, it should be noted that any imbalance in the food supply system of the state T va inevitably leads to an economic crisis e system as a whole, creates a number of threats to the economic security of the country. Experience of pre-revolutionary tsarist rights And government, and then the Provisional Ruler sstva, underestimatedthe importance of solving the agrarian question for the peasantry, as long as A hall that food system crisis n supply chain can lead to revolutionarye mood in society and become a catalyst change process lytic regime.
Bibliographic list
1. Bystrenko V.I. The agrarian question and the role of the peasantry in the revolutionary events in Russia in 1917 (to the 100th anniversary of February Revolution in Russia) // Science and the World.- 2017. - T. 2. No. 3 (43). - S. 27-31.
2. Zhuravlev V.V. Decrees of the Soviet government 1917- 1920 gg. How historical source. M., 1979.
3. Zakharchenko G.V. On some state-legal features in the practice of food distribution in the first years of Soviet power // Law and Practice. H A scientific works of the Institute of the Moscow State law academy named after O.E. Kutafin in the city. Kirov. - 2016. - No. 1 (15). - S. 51-54.
4. Karpachev M.D. on the crisis of food supply during the First World War // Yearbook on the agrarian history of Eastern Europe.- 2012. - No. 1. – S. 255-268.
5. Kondratiev N.D. The grain market and its regulation during the war and revolution.- M., 1991.
6. Oskin M.V. Food policy of Russia on the eve of February 1917G.: search for a way out of the crisis // Russian history.- 2011. - No. 3. - S. 53-66.
7. Oskin M.V. Food supply of the Russian army on the eve and fe's donkey ral revolution of 1917// Questions of history.- 2016. - No. 12. - P. 40-53.
8. On the establishment of landcommittees. Decree of the Provisional Government April 21, 1917 // Compendium Decrees and Resolutions of the Provisional Government. Issue 1. February 27 - May 5, 1917- 1917. - S. 192 - 197.
FOOD SUPPLY AS A TOOL FOR ENSURING ECONOMIC SAFETY
OF RUSSIA IN 1917
L.A. Boyko, candidate of science philosophy, associate professor
A.P. Boyko, student
Kuban state university
(Russia, Krasnodar)
abstract. In this article the problem of food security as a catalyst-factor, accelerating the revolutionary processes in Russia in 1917, was considered. In addition, the main indicators characterizing the state of the Russian economy in the pre-revolutionary period were studied. The normative activities of the tsarist government, the Provisional Government and the bodies of Soviet power in the sphere of state regulation of the agrarian question were analyzed. It was concluded that the ineffective solution of the food issue served as one of the reasons for the ove r throw of the Romanovs’ house, then the Provisional Government and, as a consequence, the popularity of the party program of the Bolsheviks and their coming to power as a result of the October 1917 coup.
keywords: food crisis, Provisional Government, socialization of land, state regulation of the economy, land reform, agrarian policy, revolutionary rule-making.
We know about the food crisis that broke out during the First World War in Russia mainly as interruptions in the supply of bread in large cities, mainly in the capital, in February 1917. Have there been similar problems before and have they persisted later? If the further efforts of the Provisional Government to supply cities with essential products simply receive little attention, then works devoted to the emergence and development of the food crisis in tsarist Russia can be counted on fingers.
The natural result of such an unsystematic approach is the idea of sudden interruptions in February 1917 and the complete collapse of supply and devastation after October revolution as different, unrelated phenomena. Which, of course, leaves a wide space for the most extreme, sometimes completely conspiracy interpretations. The author happened to read a number of works, which proved that the "bread riot" in Petrograd in the winter of 1917 was the result of a conspiracy, the deliberate creation of a deficit in order to cause popular unrest.
In fact, the food crisis, caused by a number of both objective and subjective reasons, manifested itself in Russian Empire already in the first year of the war. Basic research The food market of this period was left to us by N.D. Kondratiev, a member of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, who dealt with food supply in the Provisional Government. His work "The market for grain and its regulation during the war and revolution" was published in 1922 in an edition of 2 thousand copies and quickly became a bibliographic rarity. It was republished only in 1991, and today, thanks to the array of data provided by Kondratiev, we can get an impression of the processes that took place in the empire in the period from 1914 to 1917.
The materials of the questioning, which was conducted by the "Special Meeting" on food, give a picture of the origin and development of the supply crisis. So, according to the results of a survey of local authorities of 659 cities of the empire, conducted on October 1, 1915, 500 cities (75.8%) announced a lack of food products in general, 348 (52.8%) - a lack of rye and rye flour, and a lack of wheat and wheat flour - 334 (50.7%), about the lack of cereals - 322 (48.8%).
The survey materials indicate the total number of cities in the country - 784. Thus, the data of the "Special Meeting" can be considered the most complete cut of the problem in the Russian Empire in 1915. They show that at least three-quarters of the cities are in need of food products for the second year of the war.
A more extensive study, also referring to October 1915, gives us data for 435 counties of the country. Of these, 361 or 82% of counties report a shortage of wheat and wheat flour, 209 or 48% of counties report a shortage of rye or rye flour.
Thus, we have before us the features of the impending food crisis of 1915-1916, which is all the more dangerous because the survey data fall on the month of autumn - October. From the simplest considerations, it is clear that the maximum amount of grain falls on the time immediately after the harvest - August-September, and the minimum - in the spring and summer of the next year.
Let us consider the process of the emergence of a crisis in dynamics - we will determine the moment of its occurrence and the stages of development. Another survey gives us the results of a survey of cities by the time of the onset of food need.
As for rye flour, a basic food product in the Russian Empire, out of 200 cities surveyed, 45 or 22.5% say that the shortage occurred at the beginning of the war.
14 cities, or 7%, attribute this moment to the end of 1914.
The beginning of 1915 was indicated by 20 cities, or 10% of the total. Then we observe consistently high rates - in the spring of 1915, problems arose in 41 cities (20.2%), in the summer in 34 (17%), in the fall of 1915 - in 46, or 23% of the cities.
Polls on the lack of wheat flour give us similar dynamics - 19.8% at the beginning of the war, 8.3% at the end of 1914, 7.9% at the beginning of 1915, 15.8% in spring, 27.7% in summer, 22 .5% in autumn 1915.
Polls for cereals, oats and barley show similar proportions - the outbreak of war leads to a lack of food in about 20 percent of the cities surveyed, as the first hysterical reactions to the outbreak of war subside, the development of the food crisis dies down by winter, but by the spring of 1915 year there is a sharp surge, steadily growing further. It is characteristic that we do not see a decrease in dynamics (or we see an extremely slight decrease) by the autumn of 1915 - the time of harvest and maximum number grain in the country.
What do these numbers mean? First of all, they testify that the food crisis originated in Russia with the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 and developed in subsequent years. Surveys of cities and counties in October 1915 testify to the spillover of the crisis into 1916 and beyond. There are no grounds for assuming that the February grain crisis in Petrograd was an isolated phenomenon and not the result of an ever-developing process.
An interesting fuzzy correlation of the emergence of need in cities with crops, or lack thereof. This may indicate not a shortage of grain, but a breakdown in the food distribution system - in this case, the grain market.
Indeed, N.D. Kondratiev notes that the grain in the period 1914-1915. there were many in the country. Stocks of grain, based on the balance of production and consumption (excluding exports, which practically ceased with the outbreak of war), he estimates as follows (in thousand pounds):
1914-1915: + 444 867.0
1915-1916: + 723 669.7
1916-1917: - 30,358.4
1917-1918: - 167,749.9
Thus, there was bread in Russia, there was even more of it than required, based on the usual consumption norms for the country. 1915 turned out to be a very fruitful year. The deficit occurs only from 1916 and develops in the 17th and 18th. Of course, the mobilized army consumed a significant part of the bread, but obviously not all of it.
To obtain Additional information about the dynamics of the food crisis, let's take a look at the rise in bread prices over this period. If the average autumn prices for grain in European Russia for 1909-1913 are taken as 100 percent, in 1914 we get an increase of 113% for rye and 114% for wheat (data for the Non-Black Earth region). In 1915, the growth was already 182% for rye and 180% for wheat, in 1916 - 282 and 240 percent, respectively. In 1917 - 1661% and 1826% of the prices of 1909-1913.
Prices rose exponentially despite the redundancy of 1914 and 1915. We have clear evidence of either a speculative rise in prices with an excess of product, or a rise in prices under pressure from demand with low supply. This again may indicate the collapse of the usual methods of distribution of goods on the market - for one reason or another. Which we will look at in more detail in the next chapter.
Lyskov D.
Until the beginning of 1917, the government managed to avoid a fall in the standard of living of the population and serious problems supplying cities with food
RBC publishes a series of columns dedicated to the 100th anniversary of the Russian Revolution
In the year of the centenary of the revolution of 1917, one of the most pressing issues for historians is the evolution of the standard of living of the main sections of the country's population in 1914-1917. Soviet historiography gave a very negative assessment of this evolution, emphasizing high inflation, rising costs, a food crisis, a shortage of goods, and a catastrophic deterioration in the situation of workers and peasants. The scale of these negative changes was assessed differently in the works of various authors, however, the most thorough statistical assessments were made in last years. An important question is when the collapse in the standard of living of the townspeople began - in 1915-1916 (that is, even before the revolution) or already in 1917?
War and life
It should be noted that in the works of contemporaries, the range of opinions on the dynamics of the standard of living of the Russian population during the war years was quite wide. Thus, the famous economist Vladimir Tverdokhlebov (during the revolution Chief Editor"Commercial and Industrial Newspaper") noted in January 1917 that in Russia "in these years of the greatest ruin, the population consumes and spends more than in peacetime, the budgets of most of the population have increased", that "a normal soldier's ration turned out to be a luxury for peasant war. From different parts of Russia, Tverdokhlebov notes, it was reported that "peasant women are buying up chintz and other materials in an unprecedented size." Urban population, in his opinion, as a whole also increased their income. At the same time, Tverdokhlebov admits that "the prices of vital products, shoes, clothes have doubled, tripled and more." Discussing the issue of increasing the budget of the population, he comes to the conclusion that wages have not risen due to rising prices, but, "on the contrary, the rise in prices is caused by an increase in income and demand for goods."
A much less optimistic assessment of the situation was given in 1918 by Sergei Prokopovich (a well-known economist, Minister of Trade and Industry, Minister of Food of the provisional government). He noted that the rise in prices for all goods during the war years increased the well-being of "those classes of the population who cover their expenses by selling products and products, including the peasants of the black earth zone." The nutrition of the peasants during the war years "undoubtedly improved", but at the same time the supply of purchased goods worsened, especially in the third year of the war. As for the factory workers, their well-being, as Prokopovich notes, was determined by the extent to which the increase in wages lagged behind the increase in prices for consumer goods. The introduction of the "prohibition" was expressed "in the cessation of Monday absenteeism", an increase in the intensity and quality of work, and an increase in labor productivity by 20-25%.
The position of the workers was determined not only by their wages and increases to it; a certain role was played by state support for families conscripted into the army in the form of government food rations, as well as public assistance to families conscripted into the army. All this activity made it possible to maintain an acceptable (in war conditions) standard of living for the main segments of the population during the first two war years, but since the end of 1916 and especially after the February Revolution, the problem of providing the population with food has become more acute.
The catastrophic rise in prices during 1917 reflects the dynamics of the budget index (calculated in the 1920s), the value of which in January 1917 was 294, and in December of the same year already 1545 (the value of this index in 1913 is taken as 100). Taking into account the increase in the high cost of living, the average real wage (in 1913 rubles) was 258 rubles. in 1913, 278 rubles. in 1916, 220 rubles. in 1917 and only 27 rubles. in 1918. Of course, the dynamics of the average real wage in different industries varied significantly.
"Fixed prices"
As noted Soviet historian Arkady Sidorov, the first year and a half of the war, the Ministry of Agriculture easily coped with the procurement of food for the army, with the help of local authorities - city councils, which enjoyed the right to regulate prices. In August 1915, the government created a Special Conference on Food, which set "fixed prices", with which local prices had to be consistent. However, firm prices turned out to be noticeably lower than the market ones. At the end of 1916, the issue of distribution of grain, the distribution of its mandatory supplies among the provinces and districts of the country, was put on the agenda. At the same time, the supply situation developed differently in different cities. Thus, the consumption norms in Moscow, which had developed by May-June 1916, gave, according to Sidorov, "in general, a relatively favorable picture of the food business." The card system in Moscow developed gradually. Sugar distribution cards were introduced in August 1916. In March 1917, the rationing system was extended to bread, and then to a whole range of products.
The most reliable estimates of the country's socio-economic situation during the war years were obtained recently in the publications of Andrei Markevich and Mark Harrison. They show that production in the "goods and non-military services" sector decreased from 1913 to 1916 by 8.2%, and agricultural production - by 20.7%. These data indicate a moderate decline in the real sector of the economy. However, the growing needs of the army for food, as well as the sharply increased transport problems, made it difficult to provide food to the townspeople.
In recent years, the works of the well-known St. Petersburg historian Boris Mironov have received a noticeable response, in which he notes that the grain harvest in Russia during the war years fully satisfied the demand of the population. The increased consumption of the army was mainly offset by a decrease in needs in the rear (due to mobilizations). A more significant factor was the cessation of exports, which in peacetime, as a rule, absorbed more than 20% of the net harvest of grain. Describing the financial situation of the Russian population during the war, Mironov notes that it was better than the German one. In Germany, the bread rationing system was introduced in January 1915, and by the end of 1916 it had extended to all essential foodstuffs. The norm of bread gradually decreased and in 1917 reached only 170 grams per day, oils and fats - up to 60-90 grams per week. Introduced with the outbreak of war, the state grain monopoly in 1916 took the form of a forced distribution of food. In Russia, however, fixed prices for bread, obligatory for state purchases for the army, were established in August 1915, almost a year later than in Germany. In the summer of 1916, a year and a half later than in Germany, a rationing system arose in the cities of 34 provinces, which rationed bread and sugar (at the same time, the rations were significantly higher than in Germany).
On the other side of the front
Interestingly, the rise in prices in Russia during the war years was quite comparable with the rise in prices in other warring countries. So, in 1917, the wholesale price index in Germany was 179, in Great Britain - 206, in France - 262, in Italy - 306 (100 was taken as the value of the index in 1913), in Russia in 1916 - 199.3.
Sources show that the real wages of Russian workers began to decline markedly from the spring of 1917. According to Mironov, the food crisis that manifested itself in Russia on the eve of the revolution was due not so much to objective as to subjective factors. And the catastrophic nature of the problem of supplying the capital and a number of major cities received after February.
Comparing the economic situation of the countries participating in the war, the director of the Institute Russian history Russian Academy of Sciences Yuri Petrov notes that Russia's performance against this background does not look hopeless. Thus, the decline in GDP per capita for 1914-1917 in Russia amounted to about 18%, while in Germany - over 20%, and in Austria-Hungary - more than 30%. Of interest is his assessment of the measures taken Russian government supplying the population with food. Despite the insufficient effectiveness of these measures, the Russian authorities did not dare to apply a system of strict food consumption rationing because of fears of a social explosion. The German government, on the other hand, introduced food rationing. This caused serious dissatisfaction and certainly led to a temporary increase social tension, however, for the Russian Empire, as Petrov notes, the rejection of such a policy turned into a disaster. The food crisis of the winter of 1916-1917 gave impetus to mass protest movements that culminated in a revolution.
In general, we can conclude that the standard of living of the main sections of the country's population in 1914-1916 gradually decreased and until the end of 1916 still allowed families to make ends meet; this factor was not leading in the brewing of the events of February 1917. The collapse begins at the beginning of 1917 (when transport troubles became a serious obstacle to the uninterrupted delivery of food to the cities) and especially after the February Revolution, when the disorder of the financial system developed rapidly, and the introduction of food cards could not change much. Against the background of the unsuccessful course of the war, this factor further exacerbated the growing political instability in the country between February and October 1917.
Leonid Borodkin Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Head of the Center economic history Faculty of History, Moscow State UniversityThe Russian army and the food crisis in 1914-1917. / Oskin M.V. June 20th, 2011
Issues of History, No. 3, March 2010, pp. 144-152
Oskin Maxim Viktorovich- candidate historical sciences, Senior Lecturer at the Police Academy. Tula.
A product that gives a high energy potential cannot but be present in the diet of a warrior. War is an energy-consuming phenomenon, associated with incredible physical and psychological stresses in peacetime - in war every moment can be the last: "Attack without a portion of meat is a bad attack"1. Therefore, in the Russian army at the beginning of the 20th century. meat ration was a significant amount. For a country where the peasant population rarely saw meat on their table, this circumstance played a huge role in the diet of a soldier. Before the First World War, meat consumption, according to slaughterhouse data, was 95.5 million poods, or 22 pounds per person per year2. At the same time, the average peasant consumed no more than 1.3 poods (21–22 kg) of meat per year, while in the army the norm was about 4 poods (64 kg) per year. In addition, "according to the statistics of surveys of recruits, it turns out that 40% of them almost the first time after entering the military service ate meat..."
Since the beginning of the First World War, meat rations in the army were the main supplier of calories for a soldier. Therefore, the military department went for its unjustified increase: if before the war the meat ration was 1 pound (410 g), then with its beginning it was already 1.5 pounds (615 g); every day the army needed more than 17 thousand heads of cattle. In total, during the war, the number of portioned cattle consumed by the Russian army reached 32 million heads4. But only the first three months of the war, the army could use the trophies. Since November 1914, the supply of food and fodder to the front has been entirely dependent on the delivery from the rear (only in the summer of 1915 did the troops use the cattle evacuated from the territory they were leaving)5.
The quality of the meat, according to the standards adopted by the commissariat, was the highest. The "Regulations on Wartime Grocery Stores" dated September 30, 1912 established the following criteria: "The meat must be completely benign, fresh, from healthy, well-fed livestock of local or imported breeds, without taking away fat, both from the outside and the inside carcasses. Failure to receive is allowed, but only from those carcasses that are accepted into the warehouse; according to the calculation - 2.5 poods of failure instead of 1 pood of meat. The finger attached to the meat is not moistened; the reaction of the meat is sour, the hole from pressing the finger will soon level out ; good meat should feel firm to the touch, unlike bad meat, which appears wet and flabby. The color is neither pale scarlet nor deep red, matching the color of a ripe raspberry. The smell is pleasant, meaty, slightly fragrant; the musty smell of meat is detected more easily. all, if the end of a slightly heated knife is stuck until the bones touch and, taking it out, sniff it.Frozen meat is also allowed to be taken, but only once frozen.It should have a flat, smooth surface and covered with frost, as it were. Its color is pale gray, and a bright red spot appears from the touch of a finger or a hot knife. The meat is so dense that it is difficult to cut with a knife; meat fibers are separated by crystals of frozen water in a pure, uncolored form. Frozen meat carcasses with red smudges on the tendons and fat in some places are recognized as carcasses frozen for the second time.
In view of the absence of a special food agency, the Ministry of Agriculture was responsible for supplying the front with food, the head of which in August 1915 headed the Special Meeting (OSOPp) on food. With regard to the supply of troops with meat, in February 1915, "To alleviate the meat crisis in the Army in the Field, the Council of Ministers adopted the following decisions: 1) Strengthen the purchase of cattle in areas closest to the theater ... 2) Strive to replace beef meat with pork and mutton... 3) Reduce the supply of meat... The 1.5-pound meat supply existing at the front does not at all correspond to the usual diet of the vast majority of the country's population and is somewhat exaggerated... 4) 5) Expand the production of canned meat... 6) Taking into account the possibility of a shortage of meat, despite all measures to increase its procurement, use salted, dried and dried fish to feed the troops, as well as some other products, for example , eggs, which, due to the lack of export abroad, can be harvested in large quantities"6.
As early as the autumn of 1914, due to transport difficulties, part of the meat ration began to be issued as corned beef, since its transportation was easier and more convenient. The evolution of the meat ration shows its gradual decline. The order for the armies of the North-Western Front of October 7, 1914 established rations of 3/4 pound of meat and 1/4 pound of corned beef. In March 1915, when the Headquarters beckoned with victory in the Carpathians - a pound of meat on the Southwestern Front. Order dated May 17, 1915 on the North-Western Front: 1/2 pound of meat, 1/4 pound of corned beef, and also "the cost of 1/4 pound of meat should be used to improve the food of the lower ranks, acquiring those products that it will be possible to purchase in places". This is already below the peacetime norm. In January 1916, an improvement is seen: ... 3/4 pound of meat (307 g) for the military area and 1/2 pound (204 g) for the rear area. From April 7, 1916, until the end of the war, the meat ration was 1/2 pound of meat, "moreover, it was allowed to count fish as well as meat waste"7.
The last norm is the objectively possible limit for the country to issue meat in the army in the course of a protracted war. First of all, because the gigantic growth in the size of the Armed Forces threatened to undermine the possibilities of domestic animal husbandry. Already in 1915, the annual consumption of meat by the army amounted to 60% of the pre-war consumption of the entire population of Russia. In absolute terms, these were relatively small numbers, but they could destroy the domestic herd of cattle. In addition, the Minister of Agriculture A. N. Naumov noted that the meat allowance of the village increased to 150% compared with the pre-war period. After his resignation, on July 1, 1916, in the "Russian Word" he published some data on the state of the food business in Russia; in particular, that "one should expect a shortage in the supply of meat to the population. But even here there can be no question of the specter of hunger, and in the worst case, the population will have to come to terms with the need to endure some hardships. This has already been recognized by the army, where the meat portion has been reduced. the state can demand more from the population, because the meat capital, in the name of the interests of the whole country, must be protected. Thus, in the first year and a half of the war, the fragile pre-war balance between the production and consumption of meat, based on the low consumption of meat products by the Russian countryside, was disturbed. That is, even with the ideal formulation of the food business, the crisis of the existing system was inevitable; the only way out to cover the formed and continuously deepening shortage of meat could only be a reduction in its consumption.
They saved money, first of all, at the front, where the issuance of meat was centralized in the form of rations. For example, at the end of July 1916 on the Western Front, "in order to preserve the stock of live cattle, the commander-in-chief of the front ordered to cook food 2 times a week from canned food and 1 time a week from fish. a pound of meat, that is, put 1 serving for two people"8. Savings on each serving - 35 g of meat (rations of 410 g - the weight of canned food is 375 g), and for 1.5 million people - 52.5 tons per day. The average weight of cattle in military herds is 15 pounds (240 kg). In total, the daily savings amounted to 220 cows - rations for approximately 4 infantry divisions.
At the end of 1915, some calculations were made. According to the OSOpp, 10 million heads of cattle were slaughtered during the 18 months of the war. This figure was 20% of livestock suitable for slaughter throughout Russia, and 30% in European Russia. At the same time, the annual increase amounted to 7 million heads. According to calculations, in 1913 there were 52.4 million heads of cattle in Russia. The annual increase is 9 million head, which was the peacetime consumption. In the first year of the war, the army received 5 million heads and another 4 million were lost during the Great Retreat. Thus, by October 1915, the number of cattle had dropped to about 43 million heads.
At the same time, the home front also increased the consumption of products previously inaccessible to it: meat, sugar, butter, white bread. The reason is "rations" payments from the state to the families of soldiers. If before the war the surplus money was spent on taxes (taxation in the Russian Empire was the maximum possible for the half-impoverished masses of the country's peasant population), now rations were issued in cash in the equivalent of the minimum consumer basket, and therefore the village was able to increase its consumption: "In the face of the army and the sober village ... an almost new consumer appeared. Millions of people who before the war did not eat meat at all or very rarely began to receive it now as an essential product of daily nutrition "9. Meat consumption in Russia increased from 0.3 (4.8 kg) to 4 - 5 (64 - 80 kg) pounds per year. At the same time, meat consumption compared to the pre-war level in England amounted to 62%, in Germany - 12%. Even if we take into account all the errors, then in Russia the population as a whole began to eat more meat than in Germany, which before the war was the leader in meat consumption (54 kg per year)10.
Therefore, in the second year of the war, the main task of the authorities was to preserve the meat fund. The military-political leadership of the state realized that if there is an existing trend, the number of livestock in the country will decrease, and the further, the faster, in increasing progression. The armed forces increased, the consumption of the rear also, but meanwhile the number of reproductive livestock decreased, since it was they who went for meat. There was only one way out - reducing the consumption of meat in the rear and at the front, until the current situation with livestock was strengthened.
On March 1, 1915, it was decided to carry out a complete census of all types of livestock, and first of all in those provinces in which their delivery to the army was already scheduled. The rate at that moment demanded from the rear 15 thousand heads of cattle daily. The Council of Ministers recognized the possibility of filing no more than 5,000 heads, suggesting that Headquarters make purchases in the areas closest to the theater of operations. The purchase of cattle was carried out under the threat of requisition in the event of refusal to sell it at prices reduced in comparison with commodity prices. Therefore, the supply of livestock and meat for the needs of the army was taken over by the zemstvos, "... in order to prevent, in the words of the Ministry of Agriculture, the requisition of livestock by other organizations little aware of local conditions, in view of the unplanned unplannedness that is inevitable during such requisitions, leading to economic disruption. life" 11.
In the same 1915, in order to save domestic cattle breeding from depletion, on the basis of a decree of the Council of Ministers, several Special Expeditions were organized to the outskirts of the empire and neutral countries of the East. Siberia, Turkestan, Semirechie, Persia, Mongolia, Manchuria and even Australia were involved in the supply of the warring empire. The largest of them was the Special Expedition of the scientist, Colonel P.K. Kozlov for the purchase of livestock in Mongolia and some ...
We know about the food crisis that broke out during the First World War in Russia mainly as interruptions in the supply of bread in large cities, mainly in the capital, in February 1917. Have there been similar problems before and have they persisted later? If little attention is simply paid to the further efforts of the Provisional Government to supply cities with essential products, then the works devoted to the emergence and development of the food crisis in Tsarist Russia can be counted on the fingers.
The natural result of such an unsystematic approach is the idea of sudden interruptions in February 1917 and the complete collapse of supply and devastation after the October Revolution as different, unrelated phenomena. Which, of course, leaves a wide space for the most extreme, sometimes completely conspiracy interpretations. The author happened to read a number of works, which proved that the "bread riot" in Petrograd in the winter of 1917 was the result of a conspiracy, the deliberate creation of a deficit in order to cause popular unrest.
In fact, the food crisis, caused by a number of both objective and subjective reasons, manifested itself in the Russian Empire already in the first year of the war. A fundamental study of the food market of this period was left to us by a member of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party N.D. Kondratiev, who dealt with food supply in the Provisional Government. His work "The market for grain and its regulation during the war and revolution" was published in 1922 in an edition of 2 thousand copies and quickly became a bibliographic rarity. It was republished only in 1991, and today, thanks to the array of data provided by Kondratiev, we can get an impression of the processes that took place in the empire in the period from 1914 to 1917.
The materials of the questioning, which was conducted by the "Special Meeting" on food, give a picture of the origin and development of the supply crisis. So, according to the results of a survey of local authorities of 659 cities of the empire, conducted on October 1, 1915, 500 cities (75.8%) announced a lack of food products in general, 348 (52.8%) - a lack of rye and rye flour, and a lack of wheat and wheat flour - 334 (50.7%), about the lack of cereals - 322 (48.8%).
The survey materials indicate the total number of cities in the country - 784. Thus, the data of the "Special Meeting" can be considered the most complete cut of the problem in the Russian Empire in 1915. They show that at least three-quarters of the cities are in need of food products for the second year of the war.
A more extensive study, also referring to October 1915, gives us data for 435 counties of the country. Of these, 361 or 82% of counties report a shortage of wheat and wheat flour, 209 or 48% of counties report a shortage of rye or rye flour.
Thus, we have before us the features of the impending food crisis of 1915-1916, which is all the more dangerous because the survey data fall on the month of autumn - October. From the simplest considerations, it is clear that the maximum amount of grain falls on the time immediately after the harvest - August-September, and the minimum - in the spring and summer of the next year.
Let us consider the process of the emergence of a crisis in dynamics - we will determine the moment of its occurrence and the stages of development. Another survey gives us the results of a survey of cities by the time of the onset of food need.
As for rye flour, a basic food product in the Russian Empire, out of 200 cities surveyed, 45 or 22.5% say that the shortage occurred at the beginning of the war.
14 cities, or 7%, attribute this moment to the end of 1914.
The beginning of 1915 was indicated by 20 cities, or 10% of the total. Then we observe consistently high rates - in the spring of 1915, problems arose in 41 cities (20.2%), in the summer in 34 (17%), in the fall of 1915 - in 46, or 23% of the cities.
Polls on the lack of wheat flour give us similar dynamics - 19.8% at the beginning of the war, 8.3% at the end of 1914, 7.9% at the beginning of 1915, 15.8% in spring, 27.7% in summer, 22 .5% in autumn 1915.
Polls for cereals, oats and barley show similar proportions - the outbreak of war leads to a lack of food in about 20 percent of the cities surveyed, as the first hysterical reactions to the outbreak of war subside, the development of the food crisis dies down by winter, but by the spring of 1915 year there is a sharp surge, steadily growing further. It is characteristic that we do not see a decrease in dynamics (or we see an extremely slight decrease) by the autumn of 1915 - the time of harvest and the maximum amount of grain in the country.
What do these numbers mean? First of all, they testify that the food crisis originated in Russia with the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 and developed in subsequent years. Surveys of cities and counties in October 1915 testify to the spillover of the crisis into 1916 and beyond. There are no grounds for assuming that the February grain crisis in Petrograd was an isolated phenomenon and not the result of an ever-developing process.
An interesting fuzzy correlation of the emergence of need in cities with crops, or lack thereof. This may indicate not a shortage of grain, but a breakdown in the food distribution system - in this case, the grain market.
Indeed, N.D. Kondratiev notes that the grain in the period 1914-1915. there were many in the country. Stocks of grain, based on the balance of production and consumption (excluding exports, which practically ceased with the outbreak of war), he estimates as follows (in thousand pounds):
1914-1915: + 444 867.0
1915-1916: + 723 669.7
1916-1917: - 30,358.4
1917-1918: - 167,749.9
Thus, there was bread in Russia, there was even more of it than required, based on the usual consumption norms for the country. 1915 turned out to be a very fruitful year. The deficit occurs only from 1916 and develops in the 17th and 18th. Of course, the mobilized army consumed a significant part of the bread, but obviously not all of it.
To get more information about the dynamics of the food crisis, let's take a look at the rise in bread prices over this period. If the average autumn prices for grain in European Russia for 1909-1913 are taken as 100 percent, in 1914 we get an increase of 113% for rye and 114% for wheat (data for the Non-Black Earth region). In 1915, the growth was already 182% for rye and 180% for wheat, in 1916 - 282 and 240 percent, respectively. In 1917 - 1661% and 1826% of the prices of 1909-1913.
Prices rose exponentially despite the redundancy of 1914 and 1915. We have clear evidence of either a speculative rise in prices with an excess of product, or a rise in prices under pressure from demand with low supply. This again may indicate the collapse of the usual methods of distribution of goods on the market - for one reason or another. Which we will look at in more detail in the next chapter.
Notes:
N.D. Kondratiev, "The market for bread and its regulation during the war and revolution." M .: "Nauka", 1991. Pp. 161.
ibid., p. 162.
ibid., p. 161.
ibid., p. 141
ibid., p. 147
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Chapter 10
The food crisis was made up of a number of factors affecting the country's economy, both individually and collectively.
First of all, with the outbreak of the First World War in Russia, a series of mobilizations took place, withdrawing many millions of workers from the economy. This was especially painful for the countryside - the peasants, unlike factory and factory workers, did not have "armor" from being sent to the front.
The scale of this process can be estimated based on the growth in the number Russian army. If the peacetime army consisted of 1,370,000 people, then in 1914 its number increased to 6,485,000 people, in 1915 - up to 11,695,000 people, in 1916 - 14,440,000 people, in 1917 - 15,070,000 people
Enormous resources were required to supply such a large army. But at the same time and naturally, the withdrawal of such a large number of workers from the economy could not but affect its productivity.
Secondly, in Russia, the reduction of sown areas began. At least at the first stage, it was not directly related to the mobilization of the male population into the army, as we will see below, and should be considered as a separate factor.
The reduction in sown areas occurred both due to the occupation of a number of territories, and under the influence of internal factors. They need to be divided. So, N.D. Kondratiev notes that "the occupation was determined in a more or less complete form by 1916," which makes it possible to assess the lands that were no longer in circulation. The figures are as follows: the total sown area on average for 1909-1913. - 98 454 049.7 dec. The total sown area of the provinces occupied by 1916 is 8,588,467.2 dess. Thus, 8.7% of the total sown area of the empire fell under occupation. The figure is large, but not fatal.
Another process took place under the influence of internal political and economic factors. If we take the total sown area (minus the occupied territories) in 1909-1913 as 100%, the dynamics of the sown area in subsequent years will appear before us in the following form:
1914 – 106,0%
1915 – 101,9%
1916 – 93,7%
1917 – 93,3%
"The total reduction in the sown area under the influence of political and economic factors is insignificant and gives only 6.7% by 1917," the author of the study states.
Thus, the reduction in sown areas in itself could not yet cause a food crisis. What was the reason for the shortage of foodstuffs that arose from 1914 and then rapidly developed?
The question is slightly clarified by a look at the reduction in sown areas depending on the type of farms - peasant and privately owned. The difference between them is that the former were aimed primarily at feeding themselves (within the economy and the community), sending only unclaimed surpluses to the market. Their closest analogue is a simple family running their own household. The latter were built on the principles of a capitalist enterprise, which, using hired labor, is aimed at making a profit from the sale of the crop. It does not have to look like a modern American farm - it can be a landowner's latifundia, using peasant labor, and a prosperous peasant household, who bought additional land and cultivates it with the help of hired workers. In any case, the harvest from this "surplus" land is intended exclusively for sale - it is simply excessive for the economy, and it is impossible to cultivate these lands themselves with the help of the economy alone.
In general, in Russia, without taking into account the occupied territories and Turkestan, the dynamics of sown areas by type of farms will look like this: for 1914, peasant farms provide 107.1% of the average for 1909-13, and privately owned farms - 103.3%. By 1915, peasant farms show an increase in sown area - 121.2 percent, and privately owned - a decrease to 50.3%.
A similar picture remains for almost every part of the country, taken separately - for the black earth zone, for the Non-Black Earth region, for the Caucasus. And only in Siberia, privately owned farms do not reduce the area under crops.
“It is extremely important to further emphasize,” writes Kondratiev, “that the reduction in the sown area is especially rapid in privately owned farms. And the above-mentioned relative stability of the sown area for the first two years of the war is attributed exclusively to the peasant farms.
That is, the peasants, having lost their hands, but having a good idea of what war is, tighten their belts and expand crops - through the efforts of the whole family, women, children and the elderly. And the capitalist economies, also having lost their hands (mobilization also affected the market work force), reduce them. In these farms there is no one to tighten their belts, they are simply not adapted to work in such conditions.
But the main problem was (and therefore Kondratiev especially draws attention to the situation that has arisen) that the marketability of grain of privately owned farms was incommensurably higher than that of the peasant. By 1913, landowners and prosperous farms provided up to 75% of all marketable (going to the market) grain in the country.
The reduction of sown areas by these farms resulted in a significant reduction in the supply of grain to the market. Peasant farms to a very large extent fed only themselves.
By the way, interesting topic for reflection could be the question of what would have happened to Russia if Stolypin's agrarian reform before the war had succeeded.
Finally, the third factor that had a serious impact on the formation of the food crisis was the transport problem.
In Russia, historically, the division of regions into producing and consuming, or, in other terminology, into areas of surpluses and areas of shortcomings. So, the Tauride province, the Kuban region, the Kherson province, the Don region, the Samara, Yekaterinoslav provinces, the Terek region, the Stavropol province and others were redundant in terms of bread.
Petrograd, Moscow, Arkhangelsk, Vladimir, Tver provinces, Eastern Siberia, Kostroma, Astrakhan, Kaluga, Novgorod Nizhny Novgorod, Yaroslavl provinces and others were insufficient.
Thus, roughly speaking, the most important areas of surpluses lay in the southeast of European Russia, the areas of shortages - in the northwest. Accordingly to this geography, markets were formed in the country - productive and consumer, as well as trade routes were built, distributing the flows of grain cargo.
The main means of transport serving the food market in Russia was the railway. Water transport, playing only an auxiliary role, could not compete with the railway either due to development or geographical localization.
With the outbreak of the First World War, it was precisely the share of railway transport that accounted for the vast majority of transportation - both huge masses of people for mobilization, and titanic volumes of food, ammunition, uniforms for their supply. Water transport could not help in any way in the western direction due to natural geographical reasons - the water arteries connecting the east and west of Russia simply do not exist.
With the beginning of mobilization, the railways of the western region - almost 33% of the entire railway network - were allocated to the Military Field Directorate almost exclusively for military needs. For the same needs, a significant part of the rolling stock was transferred to the western region. The administration of the railways was thus divided between military and civil authorities.
Never and nowhere has multi-authority brought good. Not only that, the entire burden of supplying the western mobilized area fell on the eastern region. Rolling stock stopped returning from the western region. Perhaps he was much more needed in the front line - even for sure. But such questions required a single decision-making center, with a sober assessment of all the pros and cons. In our case, by the summer of 1915, the debt of the western region to the eastern region reached 34,900 wagons.
One of the most important causes of the food crisis is opening before us - the railways, providing huge military supplies and experiencing an acute shortage of rolling stock, could not cope with the needs of civilian traffic.
In reality, due to confusion, the lack of a unified leadership, changes in the entire traffic schedule and the mobilization of part of the rolling stock, transportation in the country fell as a whole. If we take the average number of shipments for 1911-1913 as 100 percent, then already in the second half of 1914 their volume amounted to 88.5% of the pre-war level, and special grain shipments - only 60.5%
"Such significant demands of the war on railways, - states Kondratiev, - led to the fact that the main railway arteries of the country, connecting the main areas of surplus food products with consuming centers within the country, turned out to be by the end of the first year of the war or completely inaccessible to private commercial cargo .., or this access was extremely difficult."
The food market in Russia collapsed. This is where the cause of the shortage of foodstuffs from the first year of the war with the surplus of grain lies, this is the reason for the avalanche-like rise in prices. Here lies one of the reasons for the reduction in sown areas - if there is no market, there is no point in growing.
Similar problems arose in industry - the private, and by and large, the general supply of raw materials and fuel fell apart. If the defense factories in this situation had a chance to stay afloat (it disappeared in 1916, as discussed below), then for the rest of the enterprises without a general militarization of the economy, the prospects looked extremely bleak.
At the same time, behind one big problem, there was a no less, if not greater, problem. Trying to somehow compensate for the shortage of wagons and locomotives, as well as all the falling freight traffic, the railway workers significantly, in excess of the standards, increased the use of available rolling stock.
As is often the case in the operation of complex systems, in critical circumstances there is a great temptation to bring them to excess operating modes, squeeze them to the maximum, overclock them to the limit, achieving temporary compensation for the losses that have occurred. But the system, having reached a certain threshold of possibilities, inevitably and irrevocably goes haywire.
Something similar happened to the railway transport in the Russian Empire. “The average daily mileage of a cash freight car and a steam locomotive is increasing ... The number of loaded and accepted cars and their total mileage are increasing ...,” writes Kondratiev. a turn for the worse."
Notes:
N.D. Kondratiev, "The market for bread and its regulation during the war and revolution." M .: "Nauka", 1991. Pp. 158
ibid., p. 121
ibid., p. 121
ibid., p. 122
TSB, article " Agriculture"
N.D. Kondratiev, "The market for bread and its regulation during the war and revolution." M .: "Nauka", 1991. Pp. 96
ibid., p. 136
ibid., p. 137
ibid., p. 136
ibid., p. 137
ibid., p. 138
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