On November 28, 1943, the Tehran Conference began its work. It was the first meeting of the leaders of the countries participating in the Anti-Hitler coalition face to face during the entire war. It was on it that agreements were reached on the opening of a second front in Europe against Germany. This meeting traditionally attracts a lot of attention of researchers, not only because of its historical significance, but also because the Nazis allegedly intended to turn the tide of the war by assassinating three leaders at once. And only the actions of Soviet intelligence prevented this.
Over the past 74 years, history has become a legend and has taken on a life of its own. However, in reality there was no assassination attempt, most likely. This whole story with the averted assassination attempt was originally a cunning disinformation on the part of Stalin, which was supposed to serve the Soviet interests. With the help of this story, the leader of the USSR hoped to put additional pressure on the allies in anti-Hitler coalition and get an additional trump card in the difficult negotiations on the second front.
Preparation
After the outbreak of the war, the leaders of the countries that fought against Nazi Germany conducted quite lively diplomatic affairs. Conferences of representatives of the USA, the USSR and Britain were repeatedly held in various cities. But every time these were either meetings at the level of the heads of foreign affairs agencies, or in a truncated format. For example, in August 1942, the British leader Churchill came to a conference in Moscow, but the Americans were represented by Averell Harriman, Roosevelt's personal representative.
Averell Harriman is Roosevelt's personal representative. Collage © L!FE Photo: © Wikipedia.org
During the first two and a half years of the war, the leaders of the three leading powers never once met in in full force. Meanwhile, after the Battle of Kursk in the war there was a final turning point. From that moment it became clear that the meeting of the three leaders was inevitable and would take place in the near future. Since it was necessary to discuss not only questions about the supply of Lend-Lease or the opening of a second front, but also to outline some contours of the post-war world.
However, choosing a venue for the meeting was much more difficult than agreeing to hold it. All countries were far enough from each other, and whichever option they chose, it would be quite inconvenient for at least one of the leaders to get there. In addition, war was raging in Europe, so routes had to be designed with this in mind.
If the issue of holding the conference was agreed upon fairly quickly, back in early September 1943, then the choice of its venue dragged on for several months and was determined literally at the last moment. The conference would have been conveniently held in London, where at that time the governments-in-exile of a good half of the European countries were based. However, the path there was not safe for Roosevelt and Stalin. Churchill suggested Cairo, where a large number of British soldiers, but it was inconvenient for Stalin to get there.
Roosevelt suggested organizing a meeting in Alaska, which would be the best option in terms of security. However, Stalin did not agree to this. Firstly, he was afraid to fly by plane, and secondly, the way there would take a very long time, and in the event of some unforeseen changes on the fronts, the Soviet leader would be cut off from Headquarters for a long time.
The meeting could have been arranged in Moscow, but that was not the best option from a diplomatic point of view. Then it turned out that Stalin looked down on his allies so much that he did not even want to leave Moscow for the sake of meeting with them.
As a result, it was decided to hold a meeting on neutral territory, so that no one would be offended. The choice fell on Iran. Stalin was not far away, Churchill was not too far from overseas British possessions. And Roosevelt - that Cairo, that Tehran - is approximately the same, since in any case they would have to get there and there by sea.
Iran's main advantage was its security. Formally, it was a neutral country. But in fact, back in 1941, Soviet and British troops during joint operation preventively occupied the country in case the Germans tried to break through to the oil fields.
There were Soviet and British army units in Iran. Their special services were also active. So from a security point of view, Iran was the ideal option among the neutral countries. Because the country was an important transit point for the supply of Lend-Lease goods to the USSR, and in connection with this, all German agents in the country were cleared out long ago and thoroughly by both the British and Soviet special services.
Conference
On November 8, 1943, 20 days before the opening of the conference, Roosevelt agreed to the proposal to hold it in Tehran. Active preparations have begun. Each of the leaders of the coalition got to the appointed place by his own route. Stalin left for Baku on a specially guarded armored train. In the capital of the Azerbaijan SSR, he boarded a plane piloted by the chief Soviet pilot civil aviation Viktor Grachev, who carried high nomenklatura ranks.
The American president traveled to Cairo on the largest American battleship, the Iowa, accompanied by a combat escort of ships. In Cairo, he met with Churchill, who was waiting for him, and together they flew to Tehran.
For three days the allies discussed the opening of a second front, having decided on the timing. The front was scheduled to open in May 1944, later the dates were moved a few weeks. In addition, issues of the post-war structure of the world were discussed. The outlines of a new international body, the United Nations, were discussed. The post-war fate of Germany was also discussed.
Tehran, Iran, December 1943. Front row: Marshal Stalin, President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill on the portico of the Russian Embassy; back row: General of the Army Arnold, Chief of the US Air Force; General Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial general staff; Admiral Cunningham, Lord of the First Sea; Admiral William Leahy, President Roosevelt's Chief of Staff - during the Tehran Conference. Collage © L!FE Photo: © Wikipedia.org
Unprecedented security measures were taken during the conference. In addition to the fact that Soviet and British troops were already in the country, additional NKVD units were introduced into Tehran to guard especially important facilities. In addition, the whole country was entangled in a dense Soviet-British intelligence network. Soviet residencies were located in almost every more or less large locality in the zone of Soviet occupation. Approximately similar situation was observed in the British zone of occupation. The buildings where the meetings of the leaders of the anti-Hitler coalition took place, as well as the routes of their movement, were cordoned off by three or four rings of armed guards. In addition, air defense units were stationed in the city. In a word, Tehran could withstand a real assault by an entire army, although it had nowhere to come from in the desert.
Nevertheless, Stalin immediately stunned the arriving Churchill and Roosevelt with the news that the Soviet secret services had just prevented an assassination attempt on them, frustrating the insidious plans of the Nazis. As if Soviet intelligence managed to capture several dozen German saboteurs who were planning a terrorist attack, but some may have managed to escape, so he cordially invites colleagues to stay in the Soviet embassy under reliable guard.
Churchill only smiled slyly, pretending to believe. Iran was literally flooded with British agents, besides, in the last half century, the country was in the British sphere of influence and the British felt as at ease there as at home. Even the German agents that existed in the country before the war have been purged in several steps over the past two years due to the importance of Iran for Lend-Lease routes.
But Roosevelt was much less aware of the situation in Iran. American intelligence in Iran was not as extensive as British or Soviet intelligence, so he listened more closely to Stalin's words. And when the Soviet leader offered to move everyone to the Soviet embassy under the pretext of security, Churchill flatly refused, saying that this was not necessary. But Roosevelt agreed and moved to live in the Soviet representation.
However, do not underestimate the credulity of the American president. This step was influenced by two other significant factors. First, unlike the British embassy, which was located next to the Soviet one, a few meters away, the American one was located in another part of the city. And Roosevelt would have to travel alone through the city every day, which was inconvenient for the guards.
Secondly, and most importantly, Stalin and Roosevelt had been looking for an opportunity to get closer for a long time, but it never seemed to come up. Unlike the staunch anti-communist Churchill, Roosevelt was more sympathetic to Stalin. There was even some sympathy between the two leaders. For this reason, Stalin believed that by eliminating the influence of the British leader on Roosevelt, the American could be made much more accommodating. Having settled the American president in the Soviet embassy, the Soviet leader could be the master of the situation, feeling at home, had additional opportunities to "process" Roosevelt, and in addition, the president's conversations could be tapped by Soviet intelligence. Thus, Stalin killed three birds with one stone.
But the American president could not just take and settle in the Soviet embassy under the pretext that he had to travel far for meetings. Such a move would be hostile in the United States, where the country's leader would have to make excuses for a long time. That is why the trick with an imaginary attempt was needed. Thus, Stalin gave Roosevelt a legitimate opportunity to move to the Soviet embassy and not be booed for it. This whole story was designed not for Churchill (Stalin knew perfectly well that he would not believe), but for Roosevelt, who took advantage of a convenient pretext and later explained to the Americans that he had accepted the Soviet proposal, since the USSR special services had information about a possible assassination attempt and this was necessary with security point of view.
The fact that this whole story was nothing more than a diplomatic ploy is evidenced by the fact that the Soviet side did not even bother with a more or less plausible legend of the assassination attempt. When the British (perhaps on the initiative of the cunning Churchill, who figured out the maneuver) asked if it was possible to see the detained German saboteurs, they were told that this was by no means possible. Attempts to find out the details of the disclosed conspiracy through Molotov were also unsuccessful. The Soviet People's Commissar stated that he did not know any details of this case.
From left to right: Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin sit together at a dinner in the Victorian drawing room of the British Mission in Tehran in Iran, celebrating Winston Churchill's 69th birthday on November 30, 1943. Collage © L!FE Photo: © Wikipedia.org
It is quite possible that on the eve of the meeting, the Soviet secret services really could have arrested several suspicious local residents, as they say, just in case. But do not think that these were selected saboteurs, armed to the teeth, sent personally by Hitler.
The legend of the assassination
The classic legend of the assassination attempt is full of inconsistencies, which is not surprising. It began to be developed many years after the end of the war by the efforts of Soviet publicists.
So, according to the classical version, in the spring and summer (the season differs in various sources) in 1943 soviet spy Nikolai Kuznetsov, under the name of Paul Siebert, who served in the German administration in Rovno, got drunk the excessively talkative SS Sturmbannführer Hans Ulrich von Ortel, who told him that he would soon participate in a responsible mission in Tehran, which would even surpass Skorzeny's operation to rescue Mussolini.
Kuznetsov immediately reported this to the right place. Meanwhile, in the summer of 1943, a group of German paratroopers-radio operators landed in Iran, who were supposed to prepare the base for the arrival of Skorzeny's main sabotage group. However, Soviet intelligence was well aware of this and all agents were soon captured. Upon learning of this, the Germans were forced to cancel the operation at the last moment. Regarding the specific method of assassination, the versions differ depending on the fantasy of publicists. Everything is like in the best spy novels: infiltrating under the guise of waiters and being shot at dinner, digging through a cemetery, a suicide-piloted plane with explosives, etc. stories from spy action movies.
Nikolai Kuznetsov in German uniform, 1942. Photo: © Wikipedia.org
It is quite obvious that even with the slightest attention to detail, the version looks extremely doubtful. Firstly, Kuznetsov, with all his desire, could not report on the operation conceived by the Germans in the summer of 1943, because then even the leaders of the countries themselves did not know when this conference would take place. Only at the beginning of September, an agreement was reached on the meeting, and only on November 8 was the venue chosen. However, in Lately this inconsistency was noticed and now they write about the autumn of 1943, although in classical sources the extraction of valuable information dates back to spring and summer.
Secondly, Ortel could not brag to Kuznetsov that an operation more abruptly than the rescue of Mussolini was planned, since this operation took place only in September 1943, while most sources claim that Kuznetsov transmitted information about this no later than the summer of 1943. Thirdly, it is highly doubtful that some supernumerary SS man Ortel from Rovno could have been privy to the details of such a secret operation. Fourthly, the same Skorzeny, who is considered the leader of this operation, after the war claimed that no SS-Sturmbannführer Hans Ulrich von Ortel, who allegedly belonged to his group, never existed (in various Soviet sources he is called Paul Ortel, then Oster in general).
In addition, the assertion that the first group of saboteurs was thrown into Iran in the summer of 1943 to prepare for an assassination looks very doubtful. How could the Germans know where the meeting would take place, when even its participants themselves, who had not yet agreed on it, did not know this.
But even if we imagine that someone just mixed up the dates and names, and the Germans were actually preparing this operation, how could they get to Iran? The pre-war agents were completely destroyed, which means that people would have to be transferred from Germany. But how to do that? For landing operations, the Germans, as a rule, used DFS 230 and Go 242 gliders, which were towed by Ju 52 or He-111 bombers. However, these bombers had a very limited flight range, and for such an operation, the Germans needed to have field airfields in the Middle East.
For obvious reasons, the Germans did not have such airfields in Iran itself. For the same reason, they did not have them in the USSR bordering Iran. Only Iraq, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia remain. Türkiye adhered to neutrality and had no German airfields. Iraq and Arabia were in the British sphere of influence. The only airfields in the Middle East that the Germans had (Syrian airfields were used under an agreement with Vichy France) were lost by them back in the summer of 1941, when de Gaulle's "Fighting France" under active participation British troops took control of Syria.
The only aircraft that could do this was the Ju 290 long-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft, capable of flying six thousand kilometers. However, the Germans had only a few of these aircraft and almost all of them were used to search for sea convoys off the British coast. And for such a landing operation, given the capacity of the aircraft, it would take at least 5-10 such aircraft, which were piece goods (only about 50 of them were built during the entire war). According to Skorzeny's memoirs, it was with great difficulty that they managed to get one such aircraft to send six agents to Iran in the summer of 1943. They were supposed to, in coordination with detachments of local rebels, organize sabotage on Lend-Lease routes. According to Skorzeny, the group was discovered almost immediately and did not make any headway.
Actually, it is this attack that is often confused with the imaginary transfer of saboteurs to Iran to assassinate the leaders of the anti-Hitler coalition. In reality, she has nothing to do with her; after this unsuccessful attempt, the Germans no longer made such landings.
Finally, the Nazis simply did not have time to prepare it. The allies themselves only on November 8 (20 days before it began) agreed to hold a conference in Tehran. At German intelligence It must have taken some time to get this information. Thus, the Germans would have had no more than 7-15 days to prepare the most difficult operation in the most difficult conditions. And this is in the conditions of completely defeated local agents and the total domination of the Soviet-British intelligence services and the army in Iran, and unprecedented security measures. Obviously, under such conditions, the preparation of such a complex operation was simply impossible.
By the way, Skorzeny himself has always denied that such an operation was being developed. He did not deny that he met with Hitler and the heads of the German secret services after the information about the Tehran meeting became known to the Nazis. However, after Hitler asked if something could be done, he was briefly described the existing layouts, and they were so unfavorable that it immediately became clear that this mission was impossible, and the issue was closed without much discussion. It is for this reason that Skorzeny himself and his immediate superior Schellenberg ignored her in her memoirs, and no traces of planning this operation could be found in the captured German archives.
Yuri Andropov and Nikolai Shchelokov. Collage © L!FE Photo: © RIA Novosti, Wi kipedia.org
In reality, the whole story with the assassination attempt was a cunning diplomatic ploy by Stalin, aimed primarily at the American leader. If Roosevelt had believed in her, he would have been very grateful to his Soviet colleague for his concern and felt a sense of duty towards him, becoming more accommodating. But even if he did not believe, this story gave Roosevelt a "legal" opportunity to relocate to the Soviet embassy, which was in the hands of both. Ultimately, the ploy played into the hands of the Soviet side. At the Tehran Conference, Stalin and Roosevelt actually acted as a united front against Churchill. The American president basically agreed with Stalin and supported his initiatives, while Churchill was left alone.
In fact, during the conference, Roosevelt went against Churchill, who insisted on an attack on the Balkans through Italy, and spoke in favor of opening a second front in northern France. Roosevelt supported Stalin on the issue of the division of defeated Germany, as well as on the issue of organizing the UN. De facto, at the Tehran Conference, an internal Stalin-Roosevelt mini-coalition arose within the anti-Hitler coalition, since at that time there were no conflicts of interests between the USA and the USSR, while there were always between Britain and the USSR.
Evgeny Antonyuk
From the first days of the war, President Roosevelt linked America's aid in arms and supplies to the Soviet Union with an end to persecution of the Church. The day after Hitler invaded the USSR in June 1941, he notified Stalin that American aid and religious freedom went hand in hand. Throughout 1942, he reminded Stalin that great help from the United States will not be until the ROC is restored in the USSR. Stalin surrendered to Roosevelt two months before the Tehran conference.
How Roosevelt's demand to end the persecution of religion and the Church in the USSR is described in the book by the American historian Susan Butler "Stalin and Roosevelt: a great partnership" (Eksmo, 2017). For informational purposes, we present an excerpt from this book:
"The most significant steps that received the approval of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Stalin took in the religious sphere. Two months before the Tehran Conference, Stalin officially abandoned his anti-religious policy. He knew that the negative attitude of the Soviet Union towards religion was a constant problem for Roosevelt The President knew that this provided ample opportunity for the enemies of the Soviet Union in the United States (especially the Catholic Church) to criticize the Soviet system, but it also offended him personally.Only those closest to Roosevelt were aware of his deep religiosity.
Rexford Tugwell, a close friend of Roosevelt and a member of the Columbia University Brain Trust (a group of academics) who made the first recommendations for Roosevelt's policy as president, recalled that when Roosevelt thought about organizing, creating, or establishing something, he asked everyone his colleagues to join him in prayer as he asked for divine blessings on what they were about to do. Presidential speechwriter Robert Sherwood believed that " his religious faith was the most powerful and most mysterious force that lived in him".
Roosevelt took every opportunity to stress the need for religious freedom in the Soviet Union. The day after Hitler's invasion of the USSR in June 1941, he notified Stalin that American aid and religious freedom went hand in hand: " Freedom to worship God as conscience dictates is the great and fundamental right of all peoples. For the US, any principles and doctrines of the communist dictatorship are as intolerant and alien as the principles and doctrines of the Nazi dictatorship. No imposed domination can and will not receive any support, any influence in the way of life or in the system of government from the American people.".
In the autumn of 1941, when the German army approached Moscow and Averell Harriman, together with Lord Beaverbrook, the British newspaper magnate and Minister of Supply, was about to fly to Moscow to agree on a program of possible American-British deliveries to the Soviet Union, Roosevelt took advantage of this opportunity to speak again in defense of freedom of religion in the USSR. Stalin was in a hopeless situation, and Roosevelt knew that a more favorable moment might not present itself to him. " I believe that this is a real opportunity for Russia to recognize freedom of religion as a result of the conflict.", Roosevelt wrote in early September 1941.
He took three steps. First, the president invited Konstantin Umansky, the Soviet ambassador in Washington, to the White House to inform him that it would be extremely difficult to approve in Congress the assistance to Russia, which, as he knew, was urgently needed, due to the strong hostility of Congress towards the USSR. . He then suggested: If in the next few days, without waiting for the arrival of Harriman in Moscow, the Soviet leadership authorizes coverage in the media mass media issues relating to freedom of religion in the country, this could have a very positive educational effect before the Lend-Lease Bill enters Congress". Umansky agreed to assist in this matter.
On September 30, 1941, Roosevelt held a press conference during which he instructed journalists to familiarize themselves with Article 124 Soviet Constitution, which spoke about the guarantees of freedom of conscience and freedom of religion, and publish this information. (After this information was duly publicized in the press, Roosevelt's nemesis, Hamilton Fish, the Republican congressman for Roosevelt's Hyde Park district, sarcastically suggested to the President that Stalin be invited to the White House "so that he could be baptized in the swimming pool. White House")
Roosevelt then instructed Harriman, who was already ready to leave for Moscow, to raise the issue of religious freedom in the course of communication with Stalin. As Harriman recalled, " the president wanted me to convince Stalin of the importance of loosening restrictions on religion. Roosevelt was concerned about possible opposition from various religious groups. In addition, he sincerely wanted to use our cooperation during the war to influence the hostile attitude of the Soviet regime towards religion. Harriman raised this issue in a conversation with Stalin in such a way that it became clear to him: political situation and negative US public opinion about Russia will change for the better if " The Soviets will be ready to ensure freedom of religion not only in words but in deeds". As Harriman recounted, when he explained it, Stalin " nodded his head, which meant, as I understood it, his willingness to do something".
Harriman raised the subject also in a conversation with Molotov, who made it clear that he did not believe in Roosevelt's sincerity. " Molotov frankly told me the great respect he and others had for the president. At some point, he asked me if the president, such a smart, intelligent person, is really as religious as he seems, or is it done for political purposes" Harriman recalled.
The reaction of the Soviet side was quite understandable. Umansky may have reported to Moscow that Roosevelt never went to Sunday services at the National Cathedral, the Episcopal Church that presidents and the cream of the society from among the parishioners of the Episcopal Church in Washington traditionally attended during the service (although he sometimes visited St. Lafayette Square). Obviously, Umansky did not know that Roosevelt avoided the National Cathedral because he could not stand Bishop James Freeman presiding in Washington.
Harriman managed to achieve the minimum. Solomon Lozovsky, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, waited a day after Harriman's departure from Moscow, called a press conference and read out the following statement: " The public of the Soviet Union learned with great interest about President Roosevelt's statement at a press conference on religious freedom in the USSR. All citizens are recognized freedom of religion and freedom of anti-religious propaganda Along with this, he noted that the Soviet state "does not interfere in matters of religion", religion is a "private matter". Lozovsky concluded the statement with a warning to the leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church, many of whom were still in prison: " Freedom of any religion implies that religion, church or any community will not be used to overthrow the existing and recognized authority in the country".
The only newspaper in Russia to cover the event was Moskovskiye Novosti, an English-language publication read only by Americans. The newspapers Pravda and Izvestiya ignored Lozovsky's comments. Roosevelt was not pleased as he expected more. As Harriman recalled, " he let me know it wasn't enough and chastised me. He criticized my inability to achieve more".
A few weeks later, after seeing latest project"Declaration of the United Nations", prepared by the State Department, which was supposed to be signed on January 1, 1942, by all countries at war, Roosevelt asked Hull to include a provision on religious freedom in the document: " I believe that Litvinov will be forced to agree with this.". When the Soviet ambassador Litvinov, who had just replaced Umansky, objected to the inclusion of a phrase regarding religion in the text, Roosevelt played on this expression by changing "religious freedom" to "religious freedom." This change, essentially insignificant and unprincipled, allowed Litvinov , without distorting the truth, to inform Moscow that he was able to force Roosevelt to change the document and thereby satisfy Stalin.
In November 1942, the first change took place in the anti-religious position of the Soviet government: Metropolitan Nikolai of Kiev [and Galicia], one of the three metropolitans who led the Russian Orthodox Church, became a member of the Emergency state commission for detecting and investigating atrocities Nazi German invaders. Now, two months before the Tehran conference, Roosevelt has achieved important results and strengthened his position. Stalin, who took part in the closing and/or destruction of many churches and monasteries in Russia, began to view religion not through the narrow lens of communist doctrine, but from the perspective of Roosevelt.
On September 4, 1943, in the afternoon, Stalin summoned G. Karpov, the chairman of the Council for the Russian Orthodox Church under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Georgy Malenkov and Lavrenty Beria, to his "near dacha" in Kuntsevo. Stalin announced that he had decided to immediately restore the patriarchate, the patriarch-led system of church government that had been abolished in 1925, and open churches and seminaries throughout the Soviet Union. Later that evening, Metropolitans Sergius, Nikolai and Alexiy were summoned to the Kremlin, and Stalin informed them of the fateful decisions that had been made.
P.S. Thus, the restoration of the Patriarchate and at least partial legalization Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union, the merit was solely of Franklin D. Roosevelt's perseverance. How "comrade Stalin" really treated the Russian church is perfectly shown by this picture:
At 18:37 a question was received in the section of the Unified State Examination (school), which caused difficulties for the student.
Question causing difficulty
Why did Roosevelt support Stalin and not Churchill on the issue of opening a second front?Answer prepared by experts Learn.Ru
In order to give a full answer, a specialist was involved who is well versed in the required subject "USE (school)". Your question was as follows: "Why did Roosevelt support Stalin, and not Churchill, on the issue of opening a second front?"
After a meeting with other specialists of our service, we are inclined to believe that the correct answer to your question will be as follows:
Roosevelt supported Stalin on the issue of opening the Second Front in Normandy, and not in the Balkans, as Churchill suggested, because he wanted to defeat Germany as soon as possible. And there was no military logic in Churchill's proposal, because if the Germans landed in the Balkans, it would be easier for them to defend themselves. In addition, Roosevelt was interested in the allied countries helping America in the fight against Japan. Stalin announced his readiness to start a war against Japan immediately after the victory over Germany, if the allies recognize the new western borders USSR
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Now I want to talk about Stalin's statements regarding relations with the allies during the war, specifically with Roosevelt and Churchill. France did not have major forces in Europe, and Stalin began to pay attention to her, in fact, from the Potsdam Conference and after it. His attention had previously been occupied mainly by Roosevelt and Churchill. Stalin, in his own words, was more sympathetic to Roosevelt, because the US president was sympathetic to our problems. What brought Roosevelt closer to Stalin was his dislike for the English monarchy and its institutions.
Stalin once told about such an episode. When the heads of the powers met at dinner during the Tehran Conference, Roosevelt, raising his glass, offered to drink to the President of the Soviet Union, Mr. Kalinin. Everyone drank. After some time, Churchill, also raising his glass, announced a toast to the King of Great Britain. Roosevelt said he would not drink. Churchill was offendedly wary, and he - in no way: "No, I will not drink. I cannot drink for the English king. I cannot forget the words of my father." It turns out that when Roosevelt's father left for America from Europe, already on the ship he told his son about the British king: "He is our enemy." The son did not forget this and, despite the etiquette, did not raise his glass.
In business conversations and disputes that arose, very often Stalin met with support from Roosevelt against Churchill. Thus, Stalin's sympathies were clearly in favor of Roosevelt, although he also appreciated Churchill and treated him with respect. He was a major politician not only in England, he occupied one of the leading positions in world politics. With the failure of the end of 1944 in the Ardennes, when the Germans seriously threatened the Allied forces on the second front, Churchill turned to Stalin for help so that we could pull back german armies. To do this, we had to hold an extraordinary offensive operation. We held it, although we had planned it for a much later date. This was a demonstration of friendship and assistance to an ally who had a difficult situation. This was carried out very well by Stalin, he knew how to understand such things and put them into practice. I remember how Stalin returned several times to the characterization of Eisenhower. He noted his nobility, chivalrous approach to relations with an ally. Several times I heard such statements during conversations in a narrow circle with Stalin after the war, but even before I moved to Moscow.
When I started working again in Moscow and visited Stalin more often, he began to invite me often when he went on vacation to the Caucasus. I felt that he simply did not tolerate loneliness and was even afraid of it. He developed a physical fear of being alone. It was quite expensive for all of us (I'm talking about members of the country's leadership that surrounded Stalin). It was considered a great honor to rest with him and dine with him. But it's also a lot of physical work. Once I spent a whole month with him. He put me right next to him. We had to live nearby, eat lunch and dinner together all the time. But this is the outer side of the matter. And if you knew what this really means, what kind of physical activity it is, how much you had to eat and generally consume what is harmful or unpleasant, so as not to violate personal relationships! The attitude towards you was shown the most good, friendly, and you had to make sacrifices. But such a life was partly useful in that there were conversations from which one could benefit and draw various political conclusions. In the course of such conversations, I repeatedly heard from Stalin very flattering comments about Eisenhower's decency. Stalin said that when we were advancing on Berlin, if the Allies had not Eisenhower, but some other supreme commander of their troops, we would, of course, not have taken Berlin, we simply would not have had time. The Americans would have occupied it before us. And this is true, because the Germans concentrated their main forces against us and were willingly ready to surrender to the West. Stalin turned to Eisenhower with a letter saying that, in accordance with the inter-allied treaty and taking into account the blood that was shed by our people, we would like our troops to enter Berlin first, and not the allied ones. As Stalin said, Eisenhower then held his troops and stopped the offensive. He gave our troops the opportunity to defeat the Germans and occupy Berlin. Thus, we gained priority by capturing the capital of Germany.
Another person wouldn't go for it. But if Berlin had been captured by the Americans, then, according to Stalin, the question of the fate of Germany would have been decided differently, and our situation would have deteriorated significantly. Eisenhower showed such chivalrous nobility and was faithful to the word given to us by Roosevelt. He respected the memory of Roosevelt.
At this time, Truman became the new president of the United States, whom Stalin neither respected nor appreciated. And, apparently, he did the right thing, because he deserved such an attitude. And here is another fact that Stalin spoke about, also referring to the end of the war, when the Germans were already pinned by our troops to the surrender wall and could not resist, they had to lay down their arms and surrender. Many of them did not want to surrender to our troops and moved west in order to surrender to the Americans. Stalin's appeal to Eisenhower followed again: it was said that the Soviet troops shed blood, defeated the enemy, and the enemy, who stands in front of our troops, surrenders to the Americans: this is unfair. Eisenhower then ordered not to take the Germans prisoner (it seems that it was in Northern Austria, where Malinovsky was advancing with us) and invited the commander of the German forces to surrender to the Russians, since it was the Russian weapons that defeated his army. And so it happened.
Stalin also said that he made a similar request to Churchill. On the site in Northern Germany, which was occupied by Montgomery, the Germans also fled from Rokossovsky's troops to the British. Stalin asked that the British did not take them prisoner and forced them to surrender to our troops. “Nothing like that!” Stalin was indignant. “Montgomery took all of them and took their weapons. So our troops defeated the Germans, and Montgomery reaped the result of the defeat.” Both Eisenhower and Montgomery are both representatives of the bourgeois class. But they decided in different ways and in different ways respected the principles of partnership, agreement, word, honor. When I dealt with Eisenhower, it was always in front of me, as it were, of his past actions. I remembered the words spoken by Stalin and believed them. After all, Stalin could not be suspected of sympathy for anyone. In class matters, he was incorruptible and irreconcilable. It was he who had a very strong political trait, for which he enjoyed great respect among us.
At the end of the war, Stalin was very worried that the Americans would not cross the demarcation line of the Allied forces. I have already said that there was organized German resistance against us, while the Americans advanced more calmly and easily crossed the demarcation line. Stalin doubted whether they would yield, whether they would keep their word given by Roosevelt. After all, they could say that their troops would remain where they left, and this would now be the dividing border of the occupation areas. But no, the Americans withdrew their troops and positioned them along the line that had been drawn in Tehran, even before the victory over Germany. This also testifies to the decency of Eisenhower. Such facts formed the basis of Stalin's good attitude towards Eisenhower. Therefore, Stalin invited Eisenhower to the Victory Parade and expressed our recognition of his merits by awarding him the highest military order of the USSR - "Victory". This is a very high award.
True, Field Marshal Montgomery was awarded the same order. But in this case, there is a formal fulfillment of our duty in relation to the ally, because the British also awarded our superiors with their orders. Only official reciprocity took place here, and Stalin singled out Eisenhower in particular.,
Nikita Khrushchev
From Sergey999: A look at the question from across the ocean*********************************
At first glance, there could be nothing in common between them: an American patrician, the offspring of the oldest noble family, an aristocrat to the marrow of his bones, bathed in luxury all his life, a graduate of the most prestigious educational institutions, who reached the highest power in a democratic way, a political romantic who dreamed of world democracy with himself at the head - and a Caucasian bandit, disguised as a revolutionary, walking knee-deep in blood, cunning and intrigues made his way to the top, a rude and vulgar dork, a ruthless despot and a tyrant who aspired to world domination. And yet, the fact is that until his death, US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt ardently courted the Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin in the hope of subordinating him to his charm.
Roosevelt's romance with Stalin is one of the least known pages in the history of World War II. To this day, in “respectable society” it is inconvenient to even mention it: the slightest hint of this kind is met with hostility as a “McCarthy sortie”. However, secular convention is secular convention, but no one denies what was perfectly known to everyone who happened to be in the corridors of power in Washington in those years: the American president passionately sought the location of the Soviet tyrant and did not want to hear warnings from those who understood the character better than him. and the true intentions of America's "valiant ally".
Almost from the first moment after Franklin Roosevelt came to power, Washington's attitude towards Moscow changed dramatically: hostile alertness was replaced by lively sympathy and sincere affection. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, who had no illusions about communism, wrote indignantly in his memoirs about the ease with which the Soviet Union gained diplomatic recognition early in the Roosevelt administration.
The employees of the Soviet embassy and consulates, who overwhelmingly carried out intelligence missions, were given complete freedom of action, no one paid attention to their blatant violations of standard rules and prohibitions. Such connivance was especially striking against the backdrop of the strict surveillance of potential Nazi agents, installed by the FBI on orders from above.
When Whittaker Chambers appeared in 1939 with a senior administration official, Adolf Berle, with evidence of the existence of Soviet agents in the State Department, he simply filed the documents presented to him in the case, but did not give it a go. Any hints of the existence of a communist underground or Soviet agents in the United States met with a unanimous rebuff from the left-liberal circles, whose views were completely shared in the White House.
On July 25, 1941, Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt's closest adviser and confidant, arrived in Moscow for a personal meeting with Stalin. During several cordial conversations with the American emissary, the Soviet leader assured him of the invincible power of the Red Army, but at the same time demanded all-round assistance - from tanks, aircraft, artillery pieces and Vehicle to industrial raw materials and foodstuffs. And all this on a colossal scale.
Hopkins took careful notes. Upon returning home, he published an article with impressions of his Kremlin meetings, where the Soviet leader was described in prayerful tones. But even before arriving in Washington, in order not to lose time, Hopkins sent a telegram to his patron asking him to immediately start deliveries, which the Soviet Union so badly needs. Roosevelt immediately rushed to fulfill the requests of a new ally.
On August 1, even before the return of his faithful assistant from Moscow, the president announced at a government meeting that from now on, Soviet needs should be given top priority. The Soviet Union became the most favored country in every sense of the term. Hopkins took personal control of the assistance provided to Moscow. Everyone who had anything to do with Lend-Lease supplies knew that the Soviet demands had to be given the green light, otherwise you wouldn't end up in trouble.
At the same time, the administration led an intensified agitation in favor of a new ally. At the time, anti-Soviet sentiment was strong in America, and Congress was unenthusiastic about the prospect of unlimited aid to Moscow. In addition, the United States had not yet entered the war, the economy was functioning in peacetime, and american army experienced a catastrophic shortage of literally everything - from weapons and ammunition to military equipment and equipment. And then suddenly it was proposed to forget about their own needs and throw all their strength into supporting the regime, which a few weeks ago was a staunch ally Nazi Germany. Without support public opinion It would be difficult for the White House to overcome the resistance of lawmakers.
Particularly negative was the attitude towards the "godless Soviets" among believers. In the hope that the Vatican would set American Catholics on the right path, the president sent a message to the Pope, assuring him that he, Roosevelt, “hopes to persuade the Russian government to restore religious freedom,” and reminding the Roman pontiff: “At present, Russia can never be considered an aggressor. It is Germany." At the same time, the White House called in hundreds of pro-Soviet leaders of Protestant denominations to help them. In early November, at a press conference, Roosevelt assured journalists that religious freedom was guaranteed in the USSR, citing Article 124 of the Soviet Constitution as evidence.
The President of the United States several times tried to persuade the Soviet government to make some kind of even a purely symbolic gesture in the direction of religious tolerance, but he did not succeed. Nevertheless, he managed to convince himself that Stalin had nothing against religion. Upon his return from the Yalta conference in February 1945, Roosevelt told his associates that he had caught in the character of Stalin "something that breaks out of the image of a Bolshevik revolutionary" and, apparently, is rooted in the seminary past. Soviet leader. “The features of a true Christian gentleman are visible in him,” the president summed up. One can imagine how the “Kremlin highlander” laughed when he was told about this characteristic.
Roosevelt tried just as zealously to please Stalin on the question of a second front. As soon as Hitler, after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, thoughtlessly declared war on America, Moscow began to insist on the immediate invasion of France by Anglo-American forces in order to relieve pressure on the Red Army.
The British generals, who knew the situation much better than their overseas allies, were convinced that it would be possible to really talk about the invasion no earlier than 1944. They had no doubt that an attempt to land in France with meager available forces would inevitably turn into a disaster, not to mention the fact that the American army was completely unprepared for military operations at that time. For experts it was an axiom that landing operation of this magnitude would require extensive preparation.
But Roosevelt didn't want to hear anything. He sent message after message to Churchill, demanding the immediate opening of a second front. “Even if we cannot count on complete success,” the US President wrote, “the main goal will be achieved.” And what is this purpose? To make Stalin happy! And this despite the fact that at the time being described, the United States could deploy on the European front only five relatively combat-ready divisions and no more than 500 of the required 5,700 air support aircraft.
The following curious episode eloquently testifies to the psychological mood that prevailed in the White House. At a meeting to discuss the opening of a second front, Churchill's military adviser, General Alan Brooke, asked US Secretary of War George Marshall how the American command plans to organize the immediate transfer of reinforcements to the shore if the assault troops succeed in seizing the bridgehead. To which Marshall casually replied that he had not thought about it, and indeed, this question was not worth paying attention to. That is, the Master ordered - so go ahead! What other additions are there!
What the Allies could expect if they tried to invade France, as Roosevelt wanted, was clearly demonstrated by the deplorable results of the landing by the British in the French port of Dieppe in August 1942. The operation, as if conceived as a substantive lesson for the Americans, involved 6,000 well-trained and well-equipped paratroopers, mostly commandos, who also had the factor of surprise on their side. The Germans easily repulsed the attack, the British lost 70% of their personnel killed, wounded and captured.
The Dieppe operation showed that for the time being there was nothing to dream of a second front in the European theater of operations. Considering the enormous concentration of forces and resources required by the invasion of Normandy in June 1944, it is terrible even to imagine how the attempt to storm the heavily fortified coast with the insignificant forces that the Allies could scrape together two years earlier would have ended. But what were the considerations of military expediency for Roosevelt in comparison with the need to please Stalin?
After the triumphant return of Harry Hopkins from Moscow in July 1941, Roosevelt was obsessed with holding a secret tête-à-tête with Stalin. He bombarded the Soviet leader with flattering letters, begging for a date, but Stalin invariably evaded, citing busyness. And why did he need such a meeting? Roosevelt tried to please him in everything. Finally, Stalin nevertheless relented and agreed to the summit, but, alas, not face-to-face with his admirer, but with the participation of the head of the British government. In November 1943, the heads of the three allied powers arrived in the capital of Iran.
The American embassy in Tehran was one and a half kilometers from the British and Soviet embassies, located almost next to each other. Churchill sent a telegram to Stalin asking him to convey to Roosevelt an invitation to stay at the British Embassy. Stalin "forgot" to forward the British Prime Minister's telegram to the destination, but for his part invited Roosevelt to stay at the Soviet embassy, referring to a conspiracy of German intelligence invented by him to kidnap the US president.
Roosevelt gladly accepted the invitation. It is not difficult to guess that Soviet intelligence stuffed the room assigned to the distinguished guest with listening devices in advance, and was fully aware of all the intentions of the Americans. But for Roosevelt, the main thing was that Stalin's invitation gave him hope for a secret meeting with the Soviet leader. His dream came true with a vengeance - the leaders of the United States and the USSR met three times in secret from the third participant of the summit, in the presence of only interpreters. During these meetings, almost all items on the agenda of the official meeting were settled, which, because of this, turned into an empty formality.
One of the main issues of the summit was related to the future of Poland. Stalin did not hide his intention to retain the territorial acquisitions of the USSR - the fruits of the Soviet-German pact of 1939. The geopolitical reality left the United States no choice: they would have had to give in to the Soviet demand anyway. But it was reasonable to assume that in exchange Roosevelt would negotiate some concessions from Moscow. However, judging by the minutes of the meetings, which were kept by the president's interpreter Charles Bowlen, this did not happen.
Roosevelt himself raised the issue of Poland and stated that he personally fully shared the point of view of Mr. Stalin, but for political reasons he could not make his position public. The President explained that 6-7 million American Poles form a powerful electoral bloc, and on the eve of the 1944 elections, the prospect of losing their votes worries him greatly.
But lest Stalin be offended, the US president sweetened the pill by announcing that he had no objection to the Soviet Union's annexation of the three Baltic states. The realist Churchill was well aware that in any case Stalin would not let Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia out of his clutches, but from the point of view of the highly experienced British prime minister, this should at least try to get reciprocal concessions. Roosevelt's hasty obsequiousness robbed the West of such hope.
Roosevelt stabbed Churchill in yet another important issue, agreeing with Stalin that one should not rush to post-war reconstruction Germany and France. The Soviet position was dictated by a sober calculation - strong Western European powers would become an obstacle to the spread of Moscow's hegemony over the entire continent. By supporting Stalin, the US President gave the green light to the expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence not only in Eastern Europe, but even further - all the way to the English Channel. And it is not Roosevelt's fault that his successor Truman stopped Soviet expansion on the Elbe.
But the FDR made an even more serious concession on the question of a "third" front. From the very beginning of the war, Churchill toyed with the idea of striking at the "soft underbelly of Europe" - in parallel with the landing in Normandy, to launch an offensive in Italy with access to the Po Valley, from where the Anglo-American troops could threaten southern France, the Balkans, Austria and Germany proper. With long persuasion, the British Prime Minister managed to persuade the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces, General Eisenhower, to his point of view. Even Roosevelt eventually supported the "Italian strategy" in the hope that Stalin would like the idea of an operation in the upper Adriatic that would play into the hands of Tito's Communist partisans.
But Stalin easily figured out true intention Churchill - to block the Soviet Army's access to Central Europe - and set himself the goal of preventing its implementation in any case. There is no doubt that the outcome of the war would have been quite different if Roosevelt had insisted on accepting the plan of his British ally. (By the way, the Wehrmacht command, as it turned out, fully shared Churchill's point of view on the strategic importance of Northern Italy: despite the desperate situation on the eastern and western fronts, to the very last days of the war, huge German forces were concentrated in the Po Valley - over a million soldiers and officers.)
At the very first official meeting of the Tehran conference, Stalin announced that the Allies' first priority was to agree on the exact date for the start of Operation Overlord (the opening of a second front by forcing the Channel), immediately begin planning and preparing the operation, and, as for the Italian campaign, curtail offensive fighting after the capture of Rome and transfer the liberated troops to southern France with the task of moving north to join the invading army, which will land in Normandy.
Upon hearing Stalin's demand, Roosevelt immediately forgot all the arguments of the British ally and came out in support of the Soviet position, in fact transferring control over the strategy of military operations not only on the Eastern Front, but also in Western Europe to the Soviet leader. After all, Stalin promised to enter the war against Japan after the defeat of Germany, and Roosevelt decided that it was a gentleman's duty to encourage his ally by agreeing to his demands. The fate of Eastern and Central Europe was sealed.
Thus, Stalin got everything he wanted in Tehran, without losing anything at all. Moreover, Roosevelt in every possible way made it clear to him that he considered only him, Stalin, his equal, and assigned the role of a junior partner to Churchill. Before the Tehran conference, the British prime minister suggested that the US president hold a preparatory meeting to agree on the positions of the Western powers, but Roosevelt refused, and at the summit he emphatically took the side of Stalin, who made fun of the British prime minister in every possible way.
As Keith Eubanks wrote, “Roosevelt insulted Churchill and fawned over Stalin, seeking his friendship and approval. However, Stalin mocked not so much Churchill as the President of the United States, who mocked his ally to please the tyrant.” Many of those present watched with amazement and bitterness as the leader of the world's leading democracy humiliates the leader of the allied country, which for two years heroically waged a one-on-one fight against Nazi Germany, and at the same time fawns over the despot, who had mercy on Hitler while England was bleeding.
Roosevelt's unrequited flirtation with Stalin was continued in February 1945 at the Yalta Conference. As a matter of fact, in Yalta, the concessions made by Roosevelt to Stalin at the Tehran conference were only confirmed and consolidated, which liberal historians interpret as a manifestation of elementary common sense: they say, Soviet troops have already occupied the countries of Eastern Europe, and it was clear that Moscow was not going to release tasty prey from its claws.
But it is one thing to bow before necessity and recognize the geopolitical reality, and quite another to obsequiously sanction it. Meanwhile, this was precisely the outcome of the Yalta meeting. Roosevelt gave Stalin a generous gift, recognizing the moral legitimacy of Soviet territorial gains. As Chester Wilmot wrote, “ main question was not that it was Stalin who would capture, but that he received sanction for this. So they were absolutely right. Soviet historians who built the post-war division of Europe to the Yalta summit. It was in Yalta that it was forged iron curtain, shortly after the end of the war, partitioned off the continent.
During the meeting, Roosevelt was forced to support Churchill, who rejected the Soviet demand for the immediate recognition of the Soviet puppet created in Lublin as the legitimate government of Poland. However, that evening he changed his mind and wrote to Stalin that "the United States will never, under any circumstances, support any provisional government of Poland that is hostile to your interests."
Now Churchill could resist as much as he wanted: having Roosevelt's note, Stalin knew that his hands were untied. The immediate cause of World War II was the enslavement of Poland by the Nazi predator. One of the main outcomes of the war was the enslavement of Poland by another - communist - predator with the blessing of the US president.
Roosevelt's generosity came to a head when discussing how the Soviet Union would be rewarded for entering the war against Japan after the fighting in the European theater was over. Stalin easily got everything he wanted: the southern part of Sakhalin, the Kuriles and the ice-free port of Dairen on the Kwantung Peninsula. Although the port belonged to the sovereign Republic of China, both interlocutors decided that they could not inform the head of the Chinese government, Chiang Kai-shek, for the time being. Sometime later, on occasion.
A tragicomic impression is produced by that part of the conversation where Stalin explained to the interlocutor what his indefatigable demands were based on. With a deep sigh, the Soviet leader told Roosevelt that he had a difficult task to "report" to his people about the obligations that he had taken on their behalf. The people will be dissatisfied with their leader when they find out that they will have to fight again, and not with anyone, but with Japan, “with whom we have nothing to share,” Stalin emphasized. To reconcile the Soviet people with such an unpleasant prospect, he concluded, is possible only with the promise of a fairly solid compensation. Roosevelt was touched to the core.
And another priceless gift Roosevelt gave to Stalin shortly before his death. 28 March 1945 Commander-in-Chief of Forces Western allies General Eisenhower sent a telegram to Stalin describing his strategic plan for the remaining weeks of the war. Eisenhower announced Soviet ally that is going to move the bulk of its troops into southbound- to Dresden and further to Bavaria. There was not a word about Berlin in the telegram, although in early February, at a meeting in Malta that preceded the Yalta summit, the Anglo-American Joint Headquarters unanimously decided that Berlin should be chosen as the direction of the main attack.
Stalin could not believe his luck. He was well aware of the enormous strategic and psychological advantages the side that would be the first to capture the capital of the Reich and the bunker where the Nazi leadership, led by Hitler himself, was hiding, would receive. The capture of Berlin was the main point of the Soviet strategy to establish its hegemony over Central Europe. Stalin was aware that Eisenhower would never have made such an offering to him without specific instructions from his president, as Roosevelt transparently hinted to him at Yalta.
Churchill fell into a deep shock when he learned about Eisenhower's telegram. Throughout the war, he tirelessly thought about how to block the communist hordes from entering the heart of Europe, but at the very last moment, when it seemed that there was nothing to worry about, Roosevelt suddenly planted such a pig on him. The British Prime Minister was clearly aware of the colossal military and political importance of Berlin. It was clear to him: the outcome of the war and the post-war balance of power in Europe largely depend on whose hands the capital of the Third Reich ends up.
In hindsight, Roosevelt's apologists argued that nothing terrible had happened: they say, Soviet army in any case, it would have reached Berlin first, since at the time of sending the Eisenhower telegram it was much closer to the German capital than the Anglo-American troops. However, on eastern front the Germans fought desperately, and in the west they offered only token resistance.
On April 11, the 9th US Army, under the command of Lieutenant General William Simpson, reached the Elbe. Berlin was less than 100 kilometers away. German resistance was broken, American troops were waiting for an easy ride. Their commander was sure that in two days at the latest he would be at Berlin. But suddenly he received an order from General Omar Bradley: to stop the offensive and in no case force the Elbe.
An enraged Simpson rushed to Bradley to find out who could give such an idiotic order. He briefly replied: "Ike" (Eisenhower's nickname). Everything became clear. Both generals knew that the highly experienced courtier and dexterous politician Eisenhower (it was for these qualities that he was first of all chosen for the post of commander-in-chief of the allied forces) would never have acted over the head of the Joint Anglo-American Headquarters without the unequivocal instructions of Secretary of War George Marshall - a faithful executor the will of the president. Soviet troops broke through to Berlin only towards the end of April.
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How to explain such a passionate desire of Franklin Roosevelt to win the favor of the Soviet tyrant? Why did he always indulge Stalin in everything, why did he meekly endure any insults from him and in response write tender letters expressing unbreakable friendship? Why did he get into unbridled delight from the rare and rather mean compliments given to him by the Soviet despot? To the extent that even Stalin's gracious permission to call him "Uncle Joe" was perceived by Roosevelt in Tehran as a great favor.
And it cannot be said that Roosevelt lived in a vacuum and could not get good advice from intelligent people. There was no shortage of specialists in the president's inner circle who knew the value of the Soviet regime and its leader, from US ambassadors to the USSR William Bullitt, Averell Harriman and Admiral Standley to experienced diplomats Cordell Hull, Charles Bowlen, Loy Henderson and George Kennan. All of them repeatedly tried to open the president's eyes to the true nature of his idol. But Roosevelt was deaf to all warnings, preferring to listen to those who sang in unison with his own feelings.
When discussing the reasons for the pro-Soviet sentiments of the US president, it is impossible to overestimate the influence of his closest friend, confidante, adviser and ambassador-at-large, Harry Hopkins, whom the president even moved to the White House in 1940 to always have at hand. They wrote about Hopkins: “He “always knew when to open his mouth, and when to remain silent, when to push, and when to retreat, when to go ahead, and when to go around”, “Hopkins feels Roosevelt’s moods in a purely feminine way”, “He knows how advise under the guise of flattery and flatter under the guise of advice. Approximately in the same spirit, contemporaries described the secret of the charms of the Marquise Pompadour, who bewitched the French king Louis XV.
Harry Hopkins carried out the most delicate assignments of his patron. The degree of his closeness to Roosevelt is evidenced, for example, by a telegram signed by the president, with which Hopkins arrived in Moscow on July 25, 1941 for a personal meeting with Stalin. The telegram said: "I ask you to give Mr. Hopkins the same confidence as if you spoke directly to me." In a word, it was not for nothing that he was called the “second self” of Roosevelt.
Meanwhile, Harry Hopkins was known as an ardent supporter of the Soviet Union and an ardent admirer of Stalin. But it is possible that it was not even a matter of Hopkins' personal sympathies, which in those years were shared by the entire "progressive" intelligentsia. The Soviet intelligence reports intercepted and decoded as part of Operation Venona provide strong evidence that Hopkins was not just an enthusiastic admirer of Moscow, but its direct agent.
However, we must not forget that Hopkins and other Soviet fellow travelers surrounded by Roosevelt were still nothing more than servants, obedient to the will of their master. If the president did not feel sympathy for Stalin, no persuasion of advisers could have forced him to change his position. He listened to them only to the extent that their whispering strengthened his own convictions. But if not someone else's influence, then what explains the attraction of the head of the most powerful democracy in the world to the bloody despot, who seemed to be at the opposite end of the ideological spectrum?
The intellectual premises of Roosevelt's pro-Soviet sympathies are to be found in his Wilsonism. In the first quarter of the last century, the American elite prayed to Woodrow Wilson, bowing to the moral authority and puritanical idealism of this President of Princeton University and then President of the United States, who devoted his life to the struggle for democratic ideals. Contrary to his campaign promises, Wilson brought the country into the First world war in which he saw a crusade for world democracy.
In Wilson's eyes, the center of evil in the world was imperialism and its personification - the British Empire. Roosevelt fully shared the views of his idol. For him, the "imperialist" Churchill was far more dangerous and repulsive than the communist Stalin - despite the fact that Churchill always had an ardent sympathy for America, not to mention the fact that his mother was half American.
To be fair, Roosevelt was far from alone in his dislike of the British imperialist system. The vast majority of Americans, brought up on the ideas of democracy and experiencing an atavistic dislike for the country with which their ancestors had to fight for their independence, experienced similar feelings.
The main argument of the supporters of US neutrality, who argued that the treacherous Albion would fool the innocent America around their fingers and use it as an obedient tool to achieve their goals, sounded very convincing to many Americans. And if Hitler, fulfilling his allied obligations, had not declared war on America the day after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, it remains to be seen whether Roosevelt would have succeeded in dragging his country into World War II in Europe.
Like Wilson, Roosevelt was interested not so much in the war itself as in the post-war world order, in which he averted Soviet Union prominent role. The eminent diplomatic historian Sir John Wheeler-Bennet wrote: “President Roosevelt dreamed of creating the United Nations within the framework of the American-Soviet alliance and managing world affairs to the detriment of the interests of Great Britain and France. That is why he made such huge concessions to Marshal Stalin.”
There is also no doubt that Roosevelt's sympathy for Stalin was to a certain extent explained by ideological affinity - and here, probably, Soviet agents and fellow travelers from the American president's entourage played a significant role. After all, what was the Roosevelt " New Deal”, if not an attempt to build socialism in America? Isn't it the same system, adjusted for Russian barbarism and Asianism, that Stalin erected?! Didn't the USSR Constitution proclaim the same freedoms that underlie the American state system?!
Franklin Roosevelt was extremely power-hungry, power for him was the alpha and omega of politics. The absolute despotic power enjoyed by Stalin fascinated him. Not like this miserable Churchill, who regularly reported to his cabinet and, at the first request, like a boy, was obliged to run to Parliament and answer to the deputies. Thank God, he, Roosevelt, does not have to report to anyone. In Stalin, he felt a kindred spirit.
This did not escape the shrewd Churchill. At some point at one of the summits, finding himself between Roosevelt and Stalin, he remarked: “Here I stand, an instrument of democracy, between two dictators.” The concept of a people's representative as the sole spokesman for the collective will of the people is one of the most tempting ideas in political history, and Roosevelt, of course, was its adherent.
But in addition to worldview and ideological factors, in no case should one underestimate the significance of circumstances of a purely personal nature. George Kennan wrote that Roosevelt's egocentrism and selfishness, his "political infantilism, unworthy of a figure of such caliber as the FDR," lay at the heart of the ardent flirtation of the US President with the "Kremlin highlander."
Roosevelt was extremely successful in his political career, he succeeded in everything, no one could resist his charm. He had no doubt that he would charm the Soviet leader as well. "I'm sure I can handle Stalin much better than your Foreign Office or my State Department," he wrote arrogantly to Churchill.
Roosevelt was absolutely convinced that as soon as he appeared before Stalin, as the Soviet despot would melt, all ideological differences would fade into the background, and comrades-in-arms would move hand in hand to the shining heights of friendship and cooperation. That is why the President of the United States so insistently sought a personal meeting with the master of the USSR. And the more Stalin resisted his flirting, the more Roosevelt became inflamed - so the old rake, who had never known refusal before, the more persistently besieges the coquette, the more stubbornly she resists his claims.
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During the 1991 war for the liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi occupation (Operation Desert Storm), the commander of the anti-Iraqi coalition, American General Norman Schwarzkopf, described Saddam Hussein as a military leader as follows: art, tactics for him is a dark forest, he is a useless general and, in general, a would-be soldier. Well, otherwise he is, of course, a great warrior.”
Franklin Delano Roosevelt led a disastrous internal politics. Knowing nothing about economics, he long years tightened and deepened economic crisis. He laid the foundation for the imperial presidency and elevated class struggle to the founding principle of the Democratic Party, which it still adheres to today.
A match for the inside was also his foreign policy. With the overwhelming military and economic power of the United States, Roosevelt could, if not completely, then to a large extent, dictate the terms of the post-war world order and put up a barrier to communist expansion. Instead, he indulged Stalin in everything and did not lift a finger to prevent the aggressive encroachments of his idol and not allow him to capture half of Europe.
Well, otherwise, Roosevelt, of course, was a great president.
