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Dnieper airborne operation. Dnieper airborne operation 24 airborne brigade in 1943

On the night of September 24-25, 1943, an airborne landing began. Chukhrai told how it was organized best of all. According to his memoirs, he and his platoon of two squads in the amount of 24 people ran around the airfield from one plane to another for 3 hours, looking for empty and refueled ones. As a result, the platoon flew in two planes, between which there was no communication at all. The landing itself took place in a situation of anti-aircraft fire from the ground. And from his landing brigade (and not just a platoon or company), junior lieutenant Chukhrai is the only survivor.

According to the plan of the operation, navigation support was to be provided in the areas of airfields, on flight routes for aviation and in landing areas, and on landing sites, signal lights, radio transmitters and drive radio stations of the air defense system. And although this worked in the areas of airfields, there was no navigation support at all on the routes of flight of aircraft with landing forces, much less in the areas of landing.

And the Pchela radio navigation station, which was mobile on rails, arrived at its destination near the village of Kapustintsi when the landing had already been completed. Therefore, the aircraft landed almost blindly, without any navigational support.

Despite negative experience the Vyazemsky airborne operation in the winter of 1942, no practical conclusions were drawn in this regard. All the tasks of directing the main forces of the landing were shifted to the shoulders of the forward detachments, which, after landing, were supposed to illuminate the landing areas with the help of a series of signal rockets.

But the idea fell through a complete mess, both at the airfields, in the air, and on the ground after landing. Plus, the Germans, waiting for the landing and seizing the landing documents from the dead and captured, began massive launches of multi-colored rockets from different directions, which completely misled not only transport aviation, but also paratroopers.

In this regard, it is interesting to recall the airborne operation carried out by the Germans on the Belgian fort Eben-Emael. Not only was the preparation of the operation going on for a year, but also the group of Hauptmann Koch (consisting of two sections) was in the air for two days (alternately changing each other). Being essentially a relay between those who performed the task, support means and command.

"Technical support" of the Bukrinsky landing force.

In order to have an understanding of how and with the help of what situational understanding was carried out when planning an operation, at the beginning of the 40s of the last century, it is necessary to dwell in more detail. I'll start with the Germans, since at the time of 1943, they used the following means of communication for the landing (and not only) units (the list is far from being a complete list from the list):

  • - Shortwave radio station Torn. Fu. b1: frequency range: 3.0 - 5.0 MHz; output power - 1 Watt; set weight - 20 kg; the year it was put into service was 1937. Despite its light weight, it was the most effective radio station for communicating with the regimental headquarters. Since 1940, the radio station has been supplied with 24 types of antennas and a device for cryptographic protection of transmitted information;
  • - VHF radio station Fug10a or its second name Feld. fu F: frequency range: 28 - 33 MHz; output power - 0.15 watts; weight with battery - 11.5 kg; the year of adoption is 1942. This radio station is clearly shown in the 2002 film “Star”, the only moment is that the VHF radio station cannot operate on HF frequencies, even if Lieutenant Travkin really wants it;

  • - VHF radio station Kleinfunksprecher d, KlFuSpr.d (Dorette): frequency ranges and radio station options for tasks: 32 - 38 MHz; 38 - 45 MHz; 45 - 55 MHz; 55 - 88 MHz (directly field radio stations for organizing combat between infantry, tanks and artillery); 107 - 123 MHz (for aviation guidance); 132 - 145 MHz (for combat operations in the city). Output power - 0.2 watts; weight with battery - 3.1 kg; adoption - January 1943;
  • - Optical communicator Lichtsprechgerät 80/80. The signal is transmitted to a light beam from a 5-watt bulb. For high-quality transmission of voice information, two optical devices looked exactly at each other, in this case the communication range was limited only by the accuracy of pointing one device at another. As a rule, it was used to organize closed communications at the tactical level (between platoons and squads, between companies and command posts) at a distance of up to 5 km. Year of adoption - 1940.

The Soviet side at the time of World War II did not have its own VHF radio stations at all, and there were no optical communicators even in bold developments. Until mid-1942, reconnaissance and landing units used the pre-war HF radio station RB stands for "bomber radio station", since 1941 it has also been called 3-R. By September 1942, it was modernized, it received the name RB-M, that is, "modernized bomber radio station."

Since September 1942, a modernized version of the RB-M radio station was used, which was called "Sever". The Soviet radio stations listed by me of 1940-1942, despite the fact that they are tactical-level radio stations, were intended to transmit information from 400 km. These are good indicators, but there was no communication over shorter distances.

Directly at the landing site, to provide signaling, a signal pistol of 1926, or a Shpagin lighting and signal pistol of 1942, was used. On this, the means of interaction with the Soviet side ended.

We continue further. The second landing in the amount of three special groups landed under the Bukrinsky bridgehead on the night of September 27-28. The task of the landing groups was the same - to find the paratroopers who had already landed and to transfer to them the means of communication (the Sever radio station) to organize interaction with the front headquarters. However, the landing of these groups took place directly in the area blocked by the Germans and all three groups were destroyed by the Germans. And all means of communication, as well as ciphers and negotiation tables, are captured.

According to Chukhrai, it is known that a total of 4575 people took part in the landing, at the headquarters of the Airborne Forces in Moscow (after 25 days in the guardhouse), he learned about 4 more who made their way to their paratroopers. A total of 5 people is 0.1% of 4575. Thus, the Germans destroyed 99.9% of the landing force. Just imagine the numbers: five people out of 4575! If this did not grind the human resource into nothing, into dust into feces, into dust - then what?

Once again, pay attention to the dates. Operation planning begins on September 17th. On the 19th it is already approved. It turns out that the rear service of the Voronezh Front of Army General Vatutin transferred the request for fuel for the preparation of aviation for the landing of an airborne assault to the command of transport aviation in plain text. German signal intelligence service - intercepted this application, evaluated and mapped a possible place for transmitting and receiving information. The amount of intercepted information grew, as a result of which a reconnaissance aircraft with leaflets was sent towards the Smorodino airfield.

Why the Soviet side needed the Bukrinsky bridgehead at all is not known for certain. The form of defense by the German units of this bridgehead is fully consistent with the form that was previously in the area of ​​the so-called "small land" near Novorossiysk.

Besides. The Bukrinsky bridgehead is not only ravines and lowlands with a sharp rise on the right bank. The left bank is heavily swamped. Establishing a crossing in such conditions is nothing more than an unnecessary and unjustified waste of people. But the Soviet command, even in the face of the complete failure of all offensive capabilities, still stubbornly stormed this bridgehead, sowing the area with the corpses of their own soldiers, who are dug up in those places every year, to the present.

In terms of the number of Soviet armies that stormed the bridgehead, the Bukrinsky bridgehead fully corresponded to the place where the Dnieper was breached on October 15, 1943 between Kremenchug and Dnepropetrovsk. In both places, up to 4 Soviet armies were concentrated. A week later, the Bukrinsky bridgehead is reinforced by two more armies. Thus, by the end of October 1943, 6 Soviet armies were operating under only one Bukrinsky bridgehead. This is quite comparable to the storming of Berlin.

Conclusions.

Soviet historians argue that with their offensive actions, the Soviet units fettered the defensive plans of the German command. Is it really? No. This is wrong. From September 28 to December 31, 1943, the Bukrinsky bridgehead was defended alternately by units of the 24th and 48th tank corps. With their successful defensive actions, based on the use of the tactical properties of the terrain, these units released all available German reserves for their actions against the breakthroughs of the Soviet armies in other places along the Dnieper from Kiev to Zaporozhye.

In ancient times, Sun Tzu, in his famous treatise, taught: “You need to build calculations based on what promises benefits. Then you can use the potential of the situation and manage external circumstances. The potential of the situation is what allows you to keep the balance of power under control in accordance with the available benefits.


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Airborne troops. The history of the Russian landing Alekhin Roman Viktorovich

DNIPRO AIRBOARDING OPERATION

Throughout the summer of 1943, the airborne divisions were involved in the ground operations of the Red Army. The 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th and 9th Guards Airborne Divisions were introduced into the Steppe Front, many of these divisions took part in the Battle of Kursk . Also on the Kursk Bulge, the 13th and 36th Guards Rifle Divisions, created on the basis of airborne corps, took part. By the end of the summer, the 1st, 7th and 10th Guards Airborne Divisions were transferred to the Kharkov region and became part of the armies: the 1st and 10th were subordinate to the 37th Army, the 7th became part of 52nd Army.

Also, all summer long, 20 separate guards airborne brigades of the VGK Reserve were understaffed and trained. All parts of the Airborne Forces were stationed in the Moscow region.

By the second half of September 1943, Soviet troops reached the Dnieper and captured a number of bridgeheads on the move. A few weeks before the approach of the Red Army troops to the Dnieper, the command of the Airborne Forces began to work out an airborne operation, which was supposed to facilitate the crossing of the Dnieper and contribute to the encirclement and liberation of Kyiv.

By September 16, 1943, the headquarters of the Airborne Forces completed the development of the operation, determined the purpose, composition and tasks of the landing force, and the very next day the decision to conduct an airborne operation was made by the Stavka. The general plan of the operation was to land on the left bank of the Dnieper six guards airborne brigades, united in two consolidated corps, which were supposed to prevent the regrouping of enemy troops when the Red Army ground forces began to force the Dnieper. The first to land in the Kanev region (in the offensive zone of the Voronezh Front) was to land a consolidated corps, the commander of which was General I. I. Zatevakhin. The second corps under the leadership of A. G. Kapitokhin was supposed to land in the offensive zone of the Southern Front a few days later.

On September 19, the representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command G.K. Zhukov approved the plan of operation. On September 21, six guards airborne brigades were alerted: 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th Guards Airborne Brigade. The 1st, 3rd and 5th were attached to the Voronezh Front, the 4th, 6th and 7th were attached to the Southern Front. The parachutes were repacked, as well as the cargo was stowed in airborne soft bags. After that, parts of the brigades were redeployed by rail to the airfields of Lebedin, Smorodino and Bogodukhov in the Sumy region.

The purpose of the landing was to block the reserves that the Germans could put forward to repel the forcing of the Dnieper at the Bukrinsky bridgehead.

By September 23, an operational group of airborne troops was created, which was supposed to control the landings. The group was located at the Lebedin airfield, in close proximity to the command post of the long-range aviation task force and the headquarters of the 2nd Air Army. Soon the group received direct communication with the headquarters of the 40th Army, in the zone of which it was planned to drop the first landing.

The reconnaissance aircraft of the 2nd Air Army began photographing the areas of the upcoming drop, and the reconnaissance agencies of the 40th Army were also withdrawn behind enemy lines to clarify the situation.

To carry out the landing, 180 Douglas and Li-2 military transport aircraft (1st, 53rd and 62nd air divisions of the ADD) and 35 gliders were involved. Gliders were supposed to land brigade artillery. The airfields were 175–220 kilometers away from the drop areas, which made it possible to make two or three sorties in one night.

In the interests of the airborne assault, it was planned to use the firepower of the breakthrough artillery corps, for which artillery spotters were introduced into the airborne assault, and a squadron of spotter aircraft was also allocated to control artillery fire. By this time, the types of artillery fires had already been determined, areas were designated for applying barrage fire at the request of the landing force.

On September 22, the advanced units of the Voronezh Front captured the first bridgeheads beyond the Dnieper. By the middle of the day on September 23, the commander of the front, General N.F. Vatutin, through the commander of the Airborne Forces, specified the task of the landing force. It was decided to start the deployment of the first two brigades on the night of September 25, 1943.

The haste in the preparation of the Dnieper airborne operation was due to a catastrophic lack of time, which subsequently affected the results of the entire operation ...

The brigade commanders issued their decisions to carry out the operation only by the end of September 24 - literally an hour and a half before boarding the planes. Company and platoon commanders were given the combat mission immediately before boarding the aircraft, and the personnel received the combat mission already in the air.

The forward detachment of aircraft of the 101st ADD regiment, led by Hero of the Soviet Union Valentina Grizodubova, with paratroopers of the 3rd Guards Airborne Brigade, took off at 18:30. Two hours later, planes with fighters from the 5th Guards Airborne Brigade took off. In total, on the night of September 25, 298 sorties were made (instead of the planned 500), 3050 people and 432 containers from the 3rd Guards Brigade and 1525 people and 228 containers of the 5th Guards Brigade were dropped. The landing artillery was not lifted into the air, since the Smorodino airfield had not received the required amount of fuel by that time. Also, due to the lack of fuel at the Bogodukhov airfield, the landing of units of the 5th brigade was suspended in the middle of the night. And only from the Lebedin airfield, by the end of the night, was the deployment of units of the 3rd Guards Airborne Brigade completed.

As a result, 2017 people and 590 containers with cargo from the planned number were not thrown out on the first night.

The landing was carried out in difficult meteorological conditions, with strong enemy anti-aircraft fire, as a result of which the Long-Range Aviation lost three aircraft. In one of the downed aircraft was the entire administration of the 3rd Guards Brigade, headed by the brigade commander, Colonel P. I. Krasovsky. They all died. There is a mention of the Hero of the Soviet Union I.P. Kondratyev that the commander of the 3rd brigade, Lieutenant Colonel V.K. Goncharov, was wounded in one of the first battles and subsequently evacuated to the Po-2 to the Soviet rear. Perhaps Goncharov, being the commander of the 1st brigade, after the death of Krasovsky was urgently appointed commander of the already landed 3rd brigade and was immediately parachuted into the German rear.

Many aircraft crews were unable to orient themselves and made a drop far from the planned areas. As a result, a significant number of paratroopers landed directly on the battle formations of the German 112th and 255th infantry divisions, as well as on the 24th and 48th tank corps, where they were either destroyed or captured almost immediately. Also, many paratroopers fell into the Dnieper and drowned, a number of paratroopers were parachuted onto the battle formations of their troops and subsequently returned to the location of non-landing units.

Already in the process of disembarkation, it became clear that the operation did not go according to plan. Communication (and, accordingly, control) with the landing units was lost. Instead of the planned landing area of ​​10 by 14 kilometers, the actual landing spread was 30 by 90 kilometers.

A series of mistakes made during the preparation of the operation put the landing units in the most difficult conditions. All attempts by the commanders to assemble their units during the night were unsuccessful.

Realizing what had happened, the headquarters of the Airborne Forces decided to stop further landings. Attempts to establish contact with the landing force for a long time had no success. On the night of September 28, three special groups with radio stations were thrown into the landing area, but their fate remained unknown. On the afternoon of September 28, a Po-2 aircraft sent over the front line was shot down. At the same time, reconnaissance aviation discovered a concentration of large enemy forces that had not been seen before.

However, by the end of the first day after the landing, up to forty small groups of paratroopers united in the area from Rzhishchev to Cherkasy. These groups began to inflict sensitive blows on the enemy. For example, on September 30, a group led by Senior Lieutenant S. G. Petrosyan, in the village of Potok, defeated the German garrison with a sudden night attack, destroying up to 100 Nazis, up to 30 vehicles with ammunition were captured, 3 anti-aircraft guns were destroyed, up to 30 vehicles. A few hours later, the same group destroyed a German artillery column. Senior Lieutenant Petrosyan organized an ambush on the path of the German artillery division and, when the Nazi column was drawn into the entire depth of the ambush, ordered to open fire. As a result of the battle, up to 80 Nazis, 15 vehicles, 6 guns and two mortars were destroyed.

On October 5, in the Kanev forest, Lieutenant Colonel P. M. Sidorchuk united several detachments of paratroopers, thus forming the 3rd brigade, consisting of three battalions and four combat support platoons: reconnaissance, sapper, anti-tank and communications. The next day, a group with a radio station went to the location of the brigade, and on the same day, for the first time after the landing, a communication session took place with the command of the 40th Army.

All the time they were behind enemy lines, the brigade conducted active combat operations. The Germans sent significant forces to destroy the brigade, but they could not eliminate such a powerful airborne sabotage group in their rear. In addition to performing sabotage tasks, the brigade carried out detailed reconnaissance of the enemy defense system along the Dnieper, which was immediately reported to higher headquarters.

By October 26, there were already about 1,200 people in the brigade, which made it possible to form a fourth battalion at the end of October. Also, together with the brigade, the partisan detachments “For the Motherland”, “Named after Kotsyubinsky”, “Dad” (commander K.K. Solodchenko), “Named after Chapaev” (commander M.A. Spezhevoy), “Fighter” (commander - P. N. Mogilny), 720th partisan detachment of the GRU General Staff.

On the night of November 12, the Assistant Chief of Staff of the 52nd Army, Major Dergachev, arrived at the location of the brigade on a Po-2 aircraft, who reported to the brigade commander the procedure for forcing the Dnieper by the troops of the 52nd Army. On the night of November 14, units of the 254th Infantry Division began crossing the Dnieper, and the brigade assisted in the crossing, and subsequently, together with units of the division, took part in the defeat of German troops in the Cherkassy region.

On November 28, units of the 3rd Guards Airborne Brigade surrendered their positions to the 7th Guards Airborne Division and were withdrawn to the city of Kirzhach to a point of permanent deployment.

During the Dnieper airborne operation, more than 2,500 people from among those who landed died or went missing. During the fighting behind enemy lines, the paratroopers, together with the partisans, destroyed about three thousand fascists, derailed 15 enemy echelons, destroyed 52 tanks, 6 self-propelled guns, 18 tractors, 227 various vehicles and many other equipment. It is noteworthy that the Battle Banner of the 3rd Guards Airborne Brigade landed behind enemy lines along with units. During the landing, Captain M. Sapozhnikov had the Battle Banner, who was immediately seriously wounded and hid from the Germans in a haystack for 14 days until he was discovered by local residents. The Ganenko family retained the Battle Banner of the brigade, and in early 1944 Anatoly Ganenko handed over the banner Soviet command. For this feat, the Ganenko brothers, 32 years after the event itself, at the request of paratrooper veterans, were awarded medals "For Courage".

Three members of the Dnieper landing on April 24, 1944 were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union:

Commander of the 2nd Infantry Brigade of the 5th Guards Airborne Brigade, Major A. A. Bluvshtein;

Commander of the 3rd Infantry Brigade of the 5th Guards Airborne Brigade, Senior Lieutenant S. G. Petrosyan;

PTR gunner of the 5th Guards Airborne Brigade, Junior Sergeant I.P. Kondratyev, who on November 13–16, 1943, in a battle in the Svidovok area, destroyed 4 tanks, 2 armored vehicles and 3 trucks with infantry with PTR fire. In battle, he was wounded in the back and in 1944 he was demobilized due to his wound.

The future famous film director Grigory Chukhrai took part in the Dnieper landing - then he was a lieutenant, commander of a communications platoon. The war left its mark on the work of this wonderful director - you can see this by watching the films he shot.

The following fact is also noteworthy: as part of the 5th Guards Airborne Brigade, a medical instructor Nadezhda Ivanovna Gagarina (Mikhailova), who was then only 16 years old (!), landed behind enemy lines. In the battles in the area of ​​​​Svidovok and Sekirna, she, being the only surviving medical worker of the battalion, assisted 25 wounded paratroopers, but she herself was wounded twice. For 65 days, she, along with all the other paratroopers, steadfastly endured the trials that fell to her lot. Gagarina was awarded the medal "For Military Merit". 51 years after these events, in May 1994, in the city of Yekaterinburg, she opened the Airborne Forces Museum and became its director.

In addition to Gagarina, there were many women in the landing force who were medical workers, signalers. Survivors after returning from the mission were awarded orders and medals.

Despite the mass heroism shown by the Soviet paratroopers, the goals of the landing were not achieved. According to the first results of the Dnieper landing, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command reacted immediately. On October 3, 1943, Stavka Directive No. 20213 "On the reasons for the failure of the airborne assault on the Voronezh Front" was issued.

However, despite this, the headquarters of the Southern Front planned an operation that provided for the landing of units of the 6th and 7th Guards Airborne Brigade beyond the Dnieper, and immediately on October 13, 1943, Stavka Directive No. landings.

The 1st, 4th, 6th and 7th brigades and part of the forces of the 5th brigade, which were not thrown behind enemy lines, were returned to their permanent deployment points in mid-October.

At the end of October, the 1st, 2nd and 11th Guards Airborne Brigades were consolidated into the 8th Guards Airborne Corps and transferred to the 1st Baltic Front, where an airborne landing was planned. However, the landing did not take place, the control of the corps was transferred to the ground forces, and on December 15, 1943, the brigades were returned to their permanent deployment point.

Guards airborne divisions took part in crossing the Dnieper as ordinary infantry. In particular, the famous Evenk sniper I. N. Kulbertinov served in the 7th Guards Airborne Forces of the 2nd Guards Airborne Division, who during the period of the struggle for the Dnieper in a short time destroyed 59 Nazis. In total, by the end of the war, the sniper had 484 fascists destroyed in his account.

The 1st, 2nd, 5th, 6th and 7th Guards Airborne Divisions, as well as the 41st Guards Rifle Division took part in the Korsun-Shevchenko operation.

The 6th and 9th Guards Airborne Divisions and the 13th Guards Rifle Division took part in the liberation of Kirovograd.

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Battle for the Dnieper

Dnieper river, USSR

Red Army victory

Opponents

Commanders

G. K. Zhukov
K. K. Rokossovsky
I. V. Konev
N. F. Vatutin

Erich von Manstein
Gunther Hans von Kluge

Side forces

2,650,000 soldiers
51,000 guns
2400 tanks
2850 aircraft

1,250,000 soldiers
12,600 guns
2100 tanks
2000 aircraft

Military casualties

Irretrievable 417 323 people,
sanitary 1,269,841 people

From 400,000 people
up to 1,000,000 people

Battle for the Dnieper- a series of interconnected strategic operations of the Great Patriotic War held in the second half of 1943 on the banks of the Dnieper. Up to 4 million people took part in the battle on both sides, and its front stretched for 1400 kilometers. As a result of a four-month operation, the Left-Bank Ukraine was almost completely liberated by the Red Army from the German invaders. During the operation, significant forces of the Red Army crossed the river, created several strategic bridgeheads on the right bank of the river, and also liberated the city of Kyiv. The battle for the Dnieper became one of the largest battles in world history.

Description of the battle. Features of the definition

The battle for the Dnieper became one of the bloodiest - according to various estimates, the number of losses on both sides (including the dead and wounded) ranged from 1.7 million to 2.7 million. Considering the significant space on which the battle took place, some historians refuse to count the battle for the Dnieper in one single battle. In their opinion, the most bloody battle in the history of mankind was the Battle of Stalingrad.

The main battles, the totality of which is the battle for the Dnieper, are:

  • The first stage of the battle was the Chernigov-Poltava operation (August 26 - September 30, 1943). It includes:
    • Chernigov-Pripyat operation (August 26 - September 30, 1943)
    • Sumy-Priluki operation (1943) (August 26 - September 30, 1943)
    • Poltava-Kremenchug operation (1943) (August 26 - September 30, 1943)
  • The second stage of the battle is the Nizhnedneprovsk operation (September 26 - December 20, 1943). It includes:
    • Melitopol operation (September 26 - November 5, 1943)
    • Zaporozhye operation (1943) (October 10-14, 1943)
    • Pyatikhat operation (October 15 - December 20, 1943)
    • Znamenskaya operation (October 22 - November 5, 1943)
    • Dnepropetrovsk operation (October 23 - December 23, 1943)
  • Usually they are not divided into stages and are considered independent:
    • Dnieper airborne operation (September 1943)
    • Kyiv offensive(1943) (November 3-13, 1943)
    • Kiev defensive operation (November 13 - December 23, 1943)

In close connection with the battle for the Dnieper is the Donbass offensive operation, which was carried out simultaneously with it, which official Soviet historiography sometimes also considers integral part battles for the Dnieper. To the north, the troops of the Western, Kalinin and Bryansk fronts also conducted the Smolensk and Bryansk offensive operations, preventing the Germans from transferring their troops to the Dnieper.

Before the battle

After finishing Battle of Kursk the Wehrmacht lost all hope of a decisive victory over the USSR. Losses were significant, and worse, the army as a whole was much less experienced than before, as many of its best fighters had fallen in previous battles. As a result, despite significant forces, the Wehrmacht could only realistically hope for tactical success in the long defense of its positions from the Soviet troops. German offensives from time to time brought significant results, but the Germans could not translate them into a strategic victory.

By mid-August, Hitler realized that the Soviet offensive could not be stopped - at least until an agreement was reached in the ranks of the Allies. Therefore, his decision was to buy time by building numerous fortifications to contain the Red Army. He demanded that the Wehrmacht soldiers defend positions on the Dnieper at any cost.

On the other hand, Stalin was determined to force the return of the occupied territories. The most important in this respect were the industrial regions of Ukraine, both because of the extremely high population density and because of the concentration of coal and other deposits there, which would provide the Soviet state with the resources it so lacked. Thus, the southern direction became the main direction of attack of the Soviet troops, even to the detriment of the fronts north of it.

Beginning of the battle

Preparation of the German defense

The order to build a complex of defense structures near the Dnieper, known as " Eastern shaft", was given to the German headquarters on August 11, 1943 and began to be carried out immediately.

Fortifications were erected along the entire bank of the Dnieper, but the hopes for providing a reliable and massive defense in such a short time were not great. As a result, the "Eastern shaft" was not equally strong throughout the front. The most serious fortifications were concentrated in the places of the most probable crossing of Soviet troops: near Kremenchug and Nikopol, as well as in Zaporozhye.

In addition to defensive measures, on September 7, 1943, the SS and Wehrmacht forces were ordered to completely devastate the territories from which they had to retreat, in order to slow down the advance of the Red Army and try to complicate the supply of its formations. This order on the tactics of "scorched earth" was carried out strictly, accompanied by the mass extermination of the civilian population.

On August 26, 1943, Soviet divisions began to move along the entire 1,400-kilometer front stretching from Smolensk to the Sea of ​​Azov. It was a large-scale operation involving 2,650,000 men, 51,000 guns, 2,400 tanks and 2,850 aircraft, divided into five fronts:

  • Central Front (20 October renamed 1st Belorussian Front)
  • Voronezh Front (20 October renamed 1st Ukrainian Front)
  • Steppe Front (20 October renamed 2nd Ukrainian Front)
  • Southwestern Front (20 October renamed 3rd Ukrainian Front)
  • southern front(20 October renamed 4th Ukrainian Front)

In total, 36 combined arms, 4 tank and 5 air armies were involved in the operations.

Despite the significant numerical superiority, the offensive was extremely difficult. German resistance was fierce - fierce battles were fought for every city and every village. The Wehrmacht made extensive use of the rearguards: even after the withdrawal of the main German units, a garrison remained in every city and at every height, hindering the advance of the Soviet troops. However, by the beginning of September, in the offensive zone of the Central Front, Soviet troops cut through the German front and rushed to the Dnieper through the resulting gap. On September 21, they liberated Chernigov during the Chernigov-Pripyat operation.

Three weeks after the start of the offensive, despite the huge losses of the Red Army, it became clear that the Wehrmacht could not deter Soviet attacks in the flat, open space of the steppes, where the numerical superiority of the Red Army easily ensured its victory. Manstein requested 12 new divisions to help in the last hope of stopping the offensive, but the German reserves were already dangerously depleted. Years later, Manstein wrote in his memoirs:

As a consequence, on September 15, 1943, Hitler ordered Army Group South to retreat to the defensive fortifications on the Dnieper. The so-called "run to the Dnieper" began. Despite all efforts, the Soviet troops could not preempt the enemy in reaching the Dnieper. However, the German troops did not have time to take up a reliable defense along the western bank of the Dnieper. On September 21, they were the first to reach the Dnieper and the next day, the troops of the 13th Army of the Central Front in the Chernobyl region crossed it on the move. The next day, September 22, the troops of the Voronezh Front achieved the same success in the bend in the region of Veliky Bukrin.

To the south, a particularly bloody battle for Poltava unfolded. The city was well fortified, and the garrison defending it was well prepared. After a number of unsuccessful assaults, which seriously slowed down the offensive of the Soviet Steppe Front, its commander, General I. S. Konev, decided to bypass the city and go straight to the Dnieper. After two days of fierce street fighting, on September 23, the Poltava garrison was destroyed. On September 25, the armies of the Steppe Front also reached the Dnieper.

So, by the end of September 1943, Soviet troops everywhere reached the Dnieper and captured 23 bridgeheads on it. In the hands of the German troops, only the Nikopol-Krivoy Rog bridgehead remained on east coast Dnieper in Donbass. On the southernmost sector of the front, the Molochnaya River divided the opponents. However, the hardest battles were yet to come.

Dnieper airborne operation

In order to weaken resistance on the right bank of the Dnieper, the Soviet command decided to land paratroopers on the right bank. So, on September 24, 1943, the Dnieper airborne operation was launched. The goal of the Soviet paratroopers was to disrupt the approach of German reinforcements to the newly captured bridgeheads on the Voronezh Front.

The operation ended in complete failure. Due to the pilots' poor knowledge of the area, the first wave of troops was dropped on Soviet positions and, in part, on the Dnieper. The second wave of 5,000 paratroopers was scattered over an area of ​​several tens of square kilometers. Moreover, due to poorly conducted reconnaissance of the area, which did not allow detecting the mechanized units of the Germans, most of the landing, in the absence of anti-tank weapons, was suppressed shortly after the landing. Separate groups, having lost radio contact with the center, tried to attack the German supply units or joined the partisan movement.

Despite heavy losses, the Dnieper airborne operation diverted the attention of a significant number of German mechanized formations, which made it possible to carry out the crossing of troops with fewer losses. However, after the failure of the Vyazemsky and Dnieper landing operations, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command refused to continue the massive use of the landing force.

Forcing the Dnieper

Choice of action scenario

The Dnieper is the third largest river in Europe, after the Volga and Danube. In the lower reaches, the width of the river can reach 3 kilometers, and the fact that the river was dammed in some places only increases the possibility of its overflow. The right bank is much higher and steeper than the left, which only made the crossing more difficult. In addition to everything, the opposite bank was turned by soldiers german army into a huge complex of barriers and fortifications, according to the directives of the Wehrmacht.

Faced with such a situation, the Soviet command had two options for solving the problem of forcing the Dnieper. The first option was to stop the troops on the eastern bank of the Dnieper and pull additional forces to the places of crossings, which gave time to find the weakest place in the German defense line and the subsequent attack in that place (not necessarily in the lower reaches of the Dnieper), to begin a massive breakthrough and encirclement of the German defense lines , squeezing German troops into positions where they would be unable to resist overcoming defensive lines (actions very similar to the tactics of the Wehrmacht when overcoming the Maginot Line in 1940). This option, accordingly, gave the Germans time to gather additional forces, to strengthen the defense and regroup their troops to repel the onslaught of Soviet forces at the appropriate points. Moreover, it exposed the Soviet troops to the possibility of being attacked by German mechanized units - this, in fact, was the most effective weapon of the German forces since 1941.

The second option for the development of events was to deliver a massive blow without the slightest delay, and force the Dnieper on the move along the entire sector of the front. This option did not leave time for the final equipment of the "Eastern Wall" and for the preparation of repelling the attack on the German side, but led to much larger losses on the part of the Soviet troops.

Soviet troops occupied the coast opposite from the German troops for almost 300 kilometers. All the few regular watercraft were used by the troops, but they were sorely lacking. Therefore, the main forces crossed the Dnieper using improvised means: fishing boats, improvised rafts made of logs, barrels, tree trunks and boards (see one of the photographs). The big problem was the crossing of heavy equipment: in many bridgeheads, the troops could not quickly transport it in sufficient quantities to the bridgeheads, which led to protracted battles for their defense and expansion and increased the losses of Soviet troops. The entire burden of forcing the river fell on the rifle units.

Forcing

The first bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnieper was conquered on September 22, 1943, in the area of ​​the confluence of the Dnieper and the Pripyat River, in the northern part of the front. Almost simultaneously, the 3rd Guards Tank Army and the 40th Army of the Voronezh Front achieved the same success south of Kyiv. On September 24, another position on the western bank was recaptured near Dneprodzerzhinsk, on September 28, another one near Kremenchug. By the end of the month, 23 bridgeheads had been created on the opposite bank of the Dnieper, some of them 10 kilometers wide and 1-2 kilometers deep. In total, by September 30, 12 Soviet armies crossed the Dnieper. A lot of false bridgeheads were also organized, the purpose of which was to simulate a mass crossing and disperse the firepower of German artillery. From an eyewitness account of a reconnaissance tanker:

For his courage and heroism, the commander was awarded the Order of Bohdan Khmelnitsky.

The crossing of the Dnieper is the clearest example of the heroism of the Soviet troops. The soldiers, using the slightest opportunity to cross the river, crossed the river on any waterborne craft and suffered heavy losses under the fiercest fire of the German troops. After that, the Soviet troops practically created a new fortified area on the conquered bridgeheads, actually digging into the ground from enemy fire, and covering the approach of new forces with their fire.

Bridgehead defense

Soon the German troops launched powerful counterattacks at almost every crossing, hoping to destroy the Soviet troops before the heavy equipment reached the other side of the river and joined the fight.

So, the crossing at Borodaevsk, mentioned by Marshal Konev in his memoirs, was subjected to powerful enemy artillery fire. Bombers were located almost everywhere, bombing the crossing and military units located near the river. Konev mentioned, in this regard, the shortcomings in the organization of air support from the Soviet side, about the establishment of air patrols in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe crossing of troops, in order to prevent the bombing of approaches to the crossings, and about his order to send reinforcements of artillery to the front line so that it repels enemy tank attacks . When the Soviet aviation became more organized and improved the synchronization of its actions with the ground forces of the front, with the support of the fire of hundreds of guns and artillery formations of the Katyusha guards mortar, the situation with the defense of the crossings began to improve. Forcing the Dnieper became relatively safer for Soviet soldiers.

Such situations were not isolated, becoming a problem almost along the entire forcing line. Despite holding all the crossing points in the hands Soviet army, the losses on her part were truly colossal - at the beginning of October, most divisions retained only 25-30% of the face value of personnel and weapons. Nevertheless, the Soviet efforts were crowned with success - during the fierce battles that lasted throughout October, all bridgeheads on the Dnieper were held, most of them were expanded, and sufficient forces were accumulated on them to resume the offensive.

Right Bank Campaign

Taking the lower reaches of the Dnieper (Lower Dnieper operation)

By mid-October, the forces assembled by the command in the area of ​​the lower crossings across the Dnieper were already capable of launching the first massive attack on the German fortifications on the opposite bank in the southern part of the front. So, a powerful attack was planned on the front line of Kremenchug-Dnepropetrovsk. At the same time, large-scale military operations and the movement of troops were launched along the entire front in order to divert German forces (and the attention of his command) from the southern crossings and from the Kiev area.

By the end of December 1943, the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian front in the course of the Pyatikhat operation, the Znamenskaya operation and the Dnepropetrovsk operation, they created and controlled a huge strategic bridgehead in the Dnepropetrovsk-Kremenchug region, more than 300 kilometers wide along the front and in some places up to 80 kilometers deep. To the south of this region, the Soviet command carried out the Melitopol operation, which ended with the cutting off of the Crimean group of German troops from their main forces. All hopes of the Germans to stop the offensive of the Soviet troops were lost.

Kyiv offensive operation of 1943

In the central sector of the battle, in the strip of the Voronezh Front, events developed very dramatically. A shock grouping of the front was assembled at the Bukrinsky bridgehead. In October 1943, she went on the offensive twice in order to liberate Kyiv with a blow from the south. Both attacks were repulsed by the Germans. Then, by the beginning of November, one tank and one combined-arms armies, as well as several corps, were secretly withdrawn from this bridgehead and transferred to the Lyutezhsky bridgehead north of Kyiv. The blow from there was a complete surprise for the enemy. On November 6, Kyiv was liberated and a second strategic foothold was created around it.

Attempts by the German command to liquidate it and return Kyiv were repulsed by Soviet troops during the Kyiv defensive operation. With its completion, the battle for the Dnieper is considered completed.

Results of the battle

The battle for the Dnieper was another major defeat for the Wehrmacht forces. The Red Army, which Hitler intended to destroy on the Dnieper, not only was not destroyed, but also forced the Wehrmacht to retreat. Kyiv was liberated, and the German forces were unable to resist the Soviet troops in the area of ​​the lower crossings. The right bank was still largely in the hands of the German command, but both sides clearly understood that this situation would not last too long. The most important industrial regions of the Donbass and the metallurgical centers of southern Ukraine, vast territories with a population of tens of millions of people, were liberated. Despite the great destruction, their restoration began immediately, and already at the beginning of 1944, a rapid increase in the output of military products began there.

In addition to this, the battle for the Dnieper clearly demonstrated the strength and power of the partisan movement. " rail war”, carried out by Soviet partisans from September to October 1943, greatly interfered with the supply of the warring German divisions, being the source of many problems in the German troops. Already at the beginning of 1944, the Red Army began the liberation of the Right-Bank Ukraine.

The battle for the Dnieper is characterized by examples of mass heroism of fighters and commanders. It is indicative that 2438 soldiers were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for crossing the Dnieper. Such a massive award for one operation was the only one in the history of the war. Here are just a few of the many who received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for the successful forcing of the Dnieper River and the courage and courage shown at the same time (full list Heroes of the Soviet Union for crossing the Dnieper is contained in the book: The Dnieper is a river of heroes. - Ed. 2nd, add. - Kyiv: Publishing house of political literature of Ukraine, 1988):

  • Avdeenko, Pyotr Petrovich - Major General, commander of the 51st Rifle Corps
  • Akhmetshin, Kayum Habibrakhmanovich - assistant commander of a saber platoon of the 58th Guards Cavalry Regiment of the 16th Guards Cavalry Division, guard foreman.
  • Astafiev Vasily Mikhailovich - Guard Captain
  • Balukov, Nikolai Mikhailovich - commander of a machine-gun company of the 529th rifle regiment of the 163rd rifle division of the 38th army of the Voronezh Front, senior lieutenant.
  • Dmitriev, Ivan Ivanovich - pontoon platoon commander, lieutenant
  • Zelepukin, Ivan Grigoryevich - Guards Sergeant, Commander of the Mortar Company of the 202nd Guards Rifle Regiment of the 68th Guards Rifle Division.
  • Zonov, Nikolai Fedorovich - guard lieutenant, commander of a sapper platoon of the 1st Guards Separate Airborne Engineer Battalion of the 10th Guards Airborne Division of the 37th Army of the Steppe Front. On the night of October 1, 1943, his platoon ferried the personnel of the 24th guards regiment, and then participated in repelling enemy counterattacks on the right bank of the river.
  • Kiselev, Sergey Semyonovich - assistant platoon commander of the 78th Guards Rifle Regiment of the 25th Guards Red Banner Sinelnikovskaya Rifle Division of the 6th Army of the Southwestern Front, Guards Senior Sergeant.
  • Kotov Boris Alexandrovich - mortar crew commander, sergeant
  • Lobanov, Ivan Mikhailovich - squad leader of the 20th separate reconnaissance company of the 69th Red Banner Sevskaya Rifle Division of the 18th Rifle Corps of the 65th Army of the Central Front, sergeant.
  • Fesin, Ivan Ivanovich - Major General
  • Budylin, Nikolai Vasilyevich - commander of the 10th Guards Rifle Regiment of the 6th Guards Rifle Division of the 13th Army of the Central Front, Guard Lieutenant Colonel,
  • Kolesnikov, Vasily Grigorievich - company commander of the 385th Infantry Regiment of the 112th Infantry Division of the 60th Army of the Central Front, captain.
  • Pilipenko, Mikhail Korneevich - junior sergeant, signal intelligence officer, 1318th rifle regiment of the 163rd rifle division of the 38th army of the Voronezh Front, later lieutenant general of the USSR in the signal troops, colonel general of Ukraine.
  • Ruvinsky, Veniamin Abramovich - colonel, commander of the 228th separate engineer battalion of the 152nd rifle division of the 46th army of the Southwestern Front.
  • Sharipov, Fatykh Zaripovich - senior lieutenant, commander of a tank company of the 183rd tank brigade of the 10th tank corps of the 40th army of the Voronezh Front.
  • Kombarov, Yegor Ignatievich - Sergeant, 25th Guards Mechanized Brigade of the 1st Ukrainian Front.

Chronicle of military Fryazino: 1943. Formation of the 3rd Guards Airborne Brigade. Dnieper landing. 3rd GVDB behind enemy lines.

History of Fryazino

Research and memories

Georgy Rovensky,

candidate of technical sciences

Chronicle

military Fryazino:

1943

Formation of the 3rd Guards

airborne brigade.

Dnieper landing.

3rd GVDB behind enemy lines.

Press service of the city administration

Fryazino

1998.

Veterans of the 3rd and 5th Guards. airborne brigades;

Tamara Makarovna Antsiferova, history teacher of school No. 1 (Fryazino),

enthusiast-organizer of the Poisk group,

Museum of Military Glory and meetings of veteran paratroopers;

eternal memory of the paratroopers of the 3rd and 5th guards. GVDbr.,

killed in the Dnieper landing in 1943

and in subsequent battles in Ukraine,

in Hungary, Austria and Czechoslovakia

dedicated.


HEART CANNOT FORGET!

Dedicated to studentsschool N 1, Fryazino

Years sooty with the smoke of war...

There is Fryazino, a city near Moscow itself,

Where the guy is related to the landing fate.

This is where his parachute first opened.

And he left his youth forever here.

Then half of Europe went under fire

And today songs are composed about him.

Since then, a lot of water has flowed under the bridge,

But Fryazino's heart could not forget.

The gray-haired veteran returned here

And as if there were no diseases, no wounds ...

Found my school where I was placed

In those years, his guards battalion,

Sat down on the steps and stood up in memory

A deafening barrage of military time:

Roads through the flames of the burning earth,

And those who died in the battles along the roads,

And the joy of victory, and the bitterness of loss ...

The soldier sat on the steps and cried.

Probably very important for memory

Years sooty with the smoke of war.

21.3-9.06.81

Mikhalev Viktor Stepanovich, veteran of the Airborne Forces,

guards retired lieutenant colonel (Volgograd).

Fryazino - 35 years later

These moving poems about the tears of a soldier, given on the previous page, were written by veteran paratrooper V. Mikhalev in hot pursuit of the first meetings of paratroopers in Fryazino.

And the meetings began in May 1978, when School No. 1, which was then located in its 4-storey pre-war building, hosted the Council of Veterans of the 3rd Guards Airborne Brigade. This was the first meeting with the paratroopers, who 35 years ago, in March-September 1943, were undergoing combat training in Fryazino. From here they went to the heroic landing beyond the Dnieper.

At that meeting, it was decided to gather a large collection of paratroopers for the next year. Fryazino also prepared for this meeting. History teacher Tamara Makarovna Antsiferova, a wonderful enthusiast and organizer of the Poisk group of schoolchildren, collected a lot of documents. A large exhibition of photographs of paratroopers was made in the assembly hall of the school, several stands told about the landing area, about the combat route of the 317th rifle regiment, which absorbed the surviving soldiers of the 3rd and 5th GVDB. The opening of the exhibition was reported in the newspapers.

I don't know why, but I came very early to this exhibition, long before the arrival of the guests. The hall was still empty. But I was struck by how many Fryazino women of about fifty also came early, waiting for the opening of the hall, and slowly passing from stand to stand, peered for a long time at the faces of the living and dead paratroopers. And only then, after a few minutes, I realized what it was.

It was LOVE.

Yes, they were probably the girlfriends of those who did not return from the war. Among these photographs they were looking for their loved ones or their comrades. A bitter notch on a girl's heart. She kept reminding and made me cry.

I will always remember this meeting with the past, And, in fact, in addition to the memory of the paratroopers, this short essay was written in gratitude to the heartfelt memory of their girlfriends.

P.S. Danielyan, a reconnaissance paratrooper from distant Armenia, arrived in Fryazino with the last train. It was a warm night. Where to go? Unknown city. There are no souls on the street. He wandered around the unknown stone city built after the war until his sixth sense led him to the familiar school building where his landing brigade was formed in 1943. He sat on the steps of this school until the morning, remembering his fighting friends, and as he later told at the meeting, he burst into tears on the steps, realizing how many years had passed, how many of his friends had died, and what happiness that fate had brought him back to this warm midsummer night in his youth.

Fryazino. Spring 1943

With the beginning of the war, the construction of the socialist city "Radio Lamp", as the future city of electronics was to be called, ceased. But a huge five-story house with an arch and two houses transverse to it (around the future Alley of Heroes) had already been built, a street running from the Radiolamp plant to Shchelkovsky highway and further to Moscow, was already named Moscow, and two five-story houses on it set its appearance. Two quarters of two-story cinder-block houses formed the future Lenin Street with the outlined boulevard and squares. Two dozen two-story houses made of wood-chip panels have become along Institutskaya and Tsentralnaya streets. Since 1938, a four-story brick school building was built in a birch grove, and it accepted the first students. (In September 1998 School No. 1 will celebrate its 60th anniversary).

Since May, two battalions of the 3rd Guards Airborne Brigade and the commander, Colonel V.K. Goncharov, have settled in the school building. The other buildings of the village housed the services of the brigade. Two more battalions were placed further away, 12 km north of Fryazino along the highway - in the village of Kablukovo near the fast river Vorya.

The 5th airborne brigade (commander - Colonel P.A. Sidorchuk) was formed in the city of Kirzhach ( Vladimir region) 70 km north of Fryazino. They were expected by a common cross combat path with the 3rd brigade in the Dnieper landing. And then for a long time fate will unite the few surviving paratroopers in the 317th Guards Airborne Regiment.

In total, the main operational reserve of the Stavka was formed around Moscow during these months. Supreme High Command- 20 Guards Airborne Divisions. After Battle of Stalingrad and the counteroffensive that had begun, for the Soviet troops, the continuous pace of the offensive was important. Indeed, on the “shoulders of the retreating enemy”, the defense lines prepared by the Germans were overcome with fewer losses. The airborne brigades were the most mobile reserve of the Stavka. Moreover, their combat effectiveness was confirmed in the street battles for Stalingrad (the basis of the army of General Rodimtsev was airborne divisions).

“The first to arrive in Fryazino was our separate anti-aircraft machine-gun company from the graduates of the Omsk School,” T.M. Antsiferova wrote in his letter. Galaktionov A.A., crew commander. - The anti-aircraft gunners were housed in a two-story red-brick house. The company took under the protection of the bombers working village. It was at the end of April. Then the brigade commander arrived with his staff. Thus began the formation of an airborne brigade with four paratrooper battalions, a separate tank battalion, a communications company, an artillery company and other services of the brigade, the total strength of which was to be 5,000 experienced and trained fighters. As A.A. Galaktionov recalls, the 3rd brigade was formed on the basis of the 3rd

airborne division, of which, after the Stalingrad battles, almost nothing remained.

... A training balloon was raised in a field between a forest and old village Fryazino, and the village boys ran to look at unusual training.

After three obligatory jumps from balloons, when the paratrooper must remember the method of landing, learn to trust the parachute, stop being afraid of heights, jumps from the plane began. Trucks took everyone to the Chkalovsky airfield, where, on a vast field, from a height of 1-2 km, paratroopers were trained in landing. Here it was necessary to comprehend the science of parachute control, the skill of accurate and heap landing of the group. In July, the brigade also made a general landing in the bend of the Moskva River near Ramensk. And of course, in the meantime, there was fire training and knowledge of the basics of hand-to-hand combat. Training, training, every day, sometimes at night.

All new fighters arrive in part. They must be trained and infused into the ranks of the paratroopers, where the success of the operation depends on mutual assistance to a greater extent than in the infantry.

There were no rest days. A friendship was struck up between quick and energetic guys with village girls and girls from neighboring villages. It was here that amateur art was formed. The May holidays were fun.

The high authorities came, checked the training of the fighters. They were probably pleased to see how an excellent combat unit worthy of the title of Guards was being formed from diverse recruits and old soldiers. After 40 years, Grigory Chukhrai will remember in a conversation with a Krasnaya Zvezda correspondent that he was awarded a gold watch by the commander of the Airborne Forces for excellent combat training of the company.

“Here, in Fryazino, we were preparing for new battles,” this famous film director told the townspeople at a meeting in the Istok Palace of Culture in 1979. - I was an experienced fighter with fire training near Kharkov and Stalingrad, a junior lieutenant. We trained new paratroopers, taught them to jump with a parachute, hand-to-hand combat.

In the meantime, I was instructed to prepare amateur performances as well. good program we prepared, showed in Moscow. She turned out to be one of the best.

And then one day an order comes: "Junior Lieutenant Grigory Chukhrai to appear in Nakhabino." The brigade commander read and ordered to go on the road. In Nakhabino there was a school of the Airborne Forces.

I come to the school, I walk along the corridors. Some people hover around the foreman. I come up and try to find out why they called. It turned out that a concert brigade was being formed.

"No," I thought. "That's not for me, I must return to my comrades."

Colonel Monin came up: "What's the noise?" I explained to him that I had been preparing a platoon for so long, the guys would go to the rear, and I would sing songs, but for nothing.

The colonel became furious: "What do you think I sing songs for?" And he ordered me to be enlisted in the concert brigade. But at night I threw my greatcoat over the barbed wire, silently crossed over and returned to Fryazino.

And the loading has already begun. I reported to the battalion commander that I had violated the order. The battalion commander also approved my decision. So I ended up taking part in the Dnieper operation.”

22-24.09.43. Voronezh Front: Bukrinsky bridgehead.

By the second half of September 1943, Soviet troops defeated the Nazi troops in the Left-Bank Ukraine and in the Donbass, reached the Dnieper on a 700-kilometer front from Loev to Zaporozhye.

By mid-September 1943, the troops of the 40th Army of the Voronezh Front, exhausted by stubborn battles with the enemy rearguards, were 150 km from the Dnieper. The situation demanded an increase in the pace of the offensive in order to cross the Dnieper before the retreating German troops took up defensive positions on its right bank. To this end, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command subordinated to the front from its reserve the 3rd Guards Tank Army under the command of Lieutenant General P.S. Rybalko.

On September 19, 1943, the command of the 9th mech. corps received an order from the commander of the 3rd Guards. TA go to the Dnieper and force it in the bend at the Monastyrek, Zarubintsy section, further seize the Great Bukrin, Dudari, Ivankovo ​​line.

Dnieper shaft. The Germans considered it their impregnable fortress - the "Eastern Wall". The right "German" bank of this mighty river rose 10-30 meters above the left bank, which was a natural fortress.

... On the night of September 22 reconnaissance detachment of the 6th tank corps, consisting of a motorized rifle platoon, landed on two tanks, and a machine-gun platoon on a truck, broke through to the Dnieper.

On two small boats found, the crossing of the first reconnaissance group began. Thus, in the area of ​​the 10-km bend, inside which the villages of Veliky and Maly Bukrin, Zarubintsy and others were located, a bridgehead began its way of the cross, which later received the name of Bukrinsky.

After reconnaissance, the landing party reported that there were no Germans in Zarubintsy, their units were stationed 10 km away, in Grigorovka.

In the meantime, an intensive crossing began on a German half-pontoon raised from the water and another large boat discovered.

By the morning of September 22 the entire 1st battalion of the 69th mechanized brigade was in Zarubintsy and took up defensive positions.

The first group dug in at the height of "Calm" in the direction of Grigorovka. Here, between two deep ravines, lay the road to the banks of the Dnieper occupied by our soldiers. At 14 o'clock. a German convoy appeared. A fight ensued. However, having established that the defense of the height was carried out by small forces, the enemy went over to the attack. His tanks opened fire and immediately knocked out a heavy machine gun. With the support of the fire of our tanks from the left bank and machine-gun fire from the outskirts of Zarubintsy, two German attacks on the hill were repulsed. The fight lasted until the evening. With the onset of darkness, the enemy retreated.

In the middle of the day, enemy aircraft began to actively operate in the area of ​​​​the crossing. The crossing was stopped, the boats were camouflaged.

On the night of September 2369th fur. br. resumed the crossing on boats and makeshift rafts. In the morning the motorized infantry was already on the right bank, and at 7 o'clock. 30 min. launched an offensive to expand the bridgehead.

At 6 o'clock. on the morning of September 23 the crossing of the approaching units of the 161st division of the 40th army began. Having unloaded on the shore, occupied by the 69th mech. brigade, they launched an attack on Traktomirov.

On the night of September 24 the approaching units of the 6TK pontoon brigade put the ferry into operation. The crossing of parts of the 71st mech began. br. Over the next two days, significant forces were expected to enter the bridgehead - the rest of the 71 mbr and parts of the 70 mbr.

Under these conditions, the command of Voronezh. front gave the order to land the 3rd and 5th airborne brigades (about 10,000 people).

Operation plan

The decision to drop an airborne assault during the crossing of the Dnieper was taken by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command even during the advance of troops to the river.

The forces of the 1st, 3rd and 5th GVDB were supposed to seize the territory 20 km from the Dnieper bend after landing (30 km along the front and 10-20 km in depth) and prevent the transfer of enemy units to the crossing points of the advancing troops. In the future, it was assumed that advancing units would come to the aid of the paratroopers.

The landing was planned to be carried out within two nights. For this purpose, 180 Li-2 aircraft and 35 gliders were allocated. The initial area for landing on planes included three airfields - Lebedin, Smorodino, Bogodukhov - at a distance of 175-220 km from the drop area, which made it possible to carry out two or three aircraft sorties in one night.

On the first night, it was planned to land the 1st and 5th Guards GVDB. The landing of gliders with 45-mm guns was planned in the intervals between the dropping of parachute echelons. The concentration of the GVDB, as well as aviation, was planned to be completed by September 22, that is, two days before the start of the drop, which was planned for September 24, 1943.

For the delivery of combat cargo to the airborne assault during the battle and the evacuation of the wounded, 35 aircraft were allocated, of which 25 Li-2 and 10 Po-2.

Each paratrooper took with him food for two days and 2-3 sets of ammunition.

On September 19, the plan for the airborne operation was approved by General of the Army G.K. Zhukov, representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters. At the same time, G.K. Zhukov pointed out that the commander of the troops of the Voronezh Front should clarify the task of the airborne assault on the eve of the drop, taking into account the situation that had developed by that time.

By the time of the landing, the 1st GVDB failed to prepare for the landing, and the 3rd and 5th brigades received the order to land. It was decided to leave the 1st GVDB instead of the 3rd brigade in reserve, ready to be thrown out on the second or third night.

Leap into the night

«

As a result, 2017 people were not thrown out on the first night, which accounted for 30 percent of the total landing force and 590 packages with combat cargo.

The paratroopers jumped into the night, into the unknown. In compact groups, they were supposed to occupy part of the territory to receive loads of ammunition and 45-millimeter cannons and capture the foreground of the Bukrinsky bridgehead.

But the reality turned out to be different.

The pilots, having hit the shelling of anti-aircraft guns, left the fire, gaining altitude and dodging the calculated course. As a result, part of the paratroopers was thrown into the Dnieper and died, the rest were scattered over a territory 10 times larger than the specified one, and could not form a fighting fist.

At the same time, the command of the Voronezh Front, which ordered the landing, did not take into account that over the past day, trying to delay the development of the offensive on the bridgehead, the German command had already pulled several divisions and tank units into this region. Most of the paratroopers, therefore, were dropped directly into the battle formations of the Germans and were met with dense fire already in the air.

On September 24, the enemy withdrew troops to the area of ​​the Bukrinsky bend, which had crossed from the left bank of the Dnieper River near Kanev. By the end of September 24, the 112th and 255th German infantry divisions appeared here.

Consequently, over the past three days before the landing, the enemy concentrated large forces in the Bukrinsky bend of the Dnieper, which were located in settlements, forming around them strongholds and defense centers just in those areas where the landing of the 3rd and 5th GVDB was planned. This abrupt change in the situation in the airborne landing area was not timely established by reconnaissance of the troops of the front.

On the night of September 25, 1943, 298 sorties were made from all airfields instead of 500 planned and 4575 people and 660 packages of ammunition were dropped, including 3050 people and 432 packages from the 3rd GVDB and 1525 people and 228 packages from the 5th GVDB.

From the Smorodino airfield, from which 45-mm guns were supposed to land, not a single plane could take off that night due to unpreparedness.

Due to the lack of fuel for aircraft, the landing of the 5th GVDB from the Bogodukhov airfield was suspended by one in the morning on September 25.

The landing of the 3rd GVDB from the Lebedin airfield was completely completed by dawn on September 25 (except for 45-mm guns).

As a result, 2017 people were not thrown out on the first night, which accounted for 30 percent of the total landing force and 590 packages with combat cargo. Radio contact with the discarded units could not be established.

On the night of September 28, three groups of paratroopers with radio stations were thrown out, but the fate of these groups remained unknown. On the afternoon of September 28, a Po-2 plane was sent, but it was shot down while flying over the front line. Other measures taken did not give positive results either.

Further landing of troops was stopped. The remaining unlanded units of the 5th GVDB and 1st GVDB were returned to their permanent locations.

In the battle formations of the Germans

Despite all the difficulties and the complexity of the situation, the paratroopers did not lose heart. They showed the greatest courage, the highest sense of duty to the Motherland. Each of them, barely touching the ground, boldly attacked the enemy, often engaging in hand-to-hand combat with him; stubbornly, to the death stood on the defensive.

Fighting with the pressing enemy, the paratroopers understood that their way to accomplish the assigned task was to unite. And they aspired to it.

By the end of the first day, as it turned out later, more than 40 separate groups of paratroopers were operating in the area from Rzhishchev to Cherkasy. These groups, as communications were established among themselves, united into larger detachments, which made it possible to inflict serious blows on the enemy.

Almost four important days were lost by German troops in battles with landing forces. During this time, not only all units of the 9th Mechanized Corps, but also units of the 40th Army managed to cross over to the Bukrinsky bridgehead.

From 24 to 25 September, the 71st fur crossed the bridgehead. br., and from September 26 to 27 - the 70th fur. br. 9th fur. corps. At the same time, units of the 47th and 23rd Corps of the 40th Army crossed the Dnieper.

General Rybalko decided to build two bridges in the area of ​​Zarubintsy and Grigorovka.

Meanwhile, stubborn battles to expand the bridgehead continued. Our units advanced 4 km and captured a grove southwest of Traktomirov, heights on the northern outskirts of Vel. Bukrin; 69th and 71st fur. br. - heights on the eastern outskirts of Vel. Bukrin and on the northern outskirts of Mal. Bukrin, Kolesishche (see map).

September 26 the Germans, with the support of 16 tanks, launched strong counterattacks on the positions of the 69th and 71st fur. br. These counterattacks were successfully repulsed, but the pressure of the enemy was increasing.

Enemy aircraft in groups of 10 to 50 aircraft bombed our troops on the bridgehead and at the crossing on the left bank. There were no anti-aircraft weapons to reliably cover the crossing yet. Therefore, forcing was carried out only at night.

By September 27 9th fur. Corps of the 3rd Guards TA, having transferred all its motorized infantry, anti-tank artillery, mortars and 11 tanks to the bridgehead, and with battles expanded the bridgehead along the front 11 km and in depth 6 km.

Suffering significant losses, the corps and the 1127th regiment of the 40th Army, which arrived on the evening of September 28, continued to expand the bridgehead.

Pushing the paratroopers into the forests, the Germans began preparations for delivering a decisive blow on the eve of the completion of the construction of bridges.

The morning of September 29 came. About 500 enemy guns and mortars rained down on our forward positions. From Mal. Bukrina and Kolesishche went on the attack german tanks, and behind them dense lines of infantry. A fierce battle broke out. Under the onslaught of superior forces, our units retreated to the second line of defense. By evening, the German attack bogged down. The further offensive of the enemy was stopped by the heroism and courage of the soldiers of the 6th Panzer Corps.

So the Bukrinsky bridgehead was captured and held.

The feats of warriors were highly appreciated. Orders and medals were awarded to 2000 fighters, sergeants and officers. Only in the 69th fur. br. the title of Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded to 41 people, incl. 32 from the forward battalion, which captured and held the bridgehead until the approach of the main forces.

The heroism of the paratroopers was almost not noted. There is no mention of the landing either in the article "Bukrinsky bridgehead" in the Military Encyclopedia, or in an extensive article by the former commander of the 3rd Guards. mechanized corps of Major General K. Malygin in the "Military History Journal" in 1968.

3rd GVDB behind enemy lines

Groups and detachments of paratroopers of the 3rd and 5th GVDB, operating in the rear areas of enemy formations, boldly attacked the Nazis, smashed their headquarters, disrupted communications, destroyed manpower and military equipment. Here are some stories from the memoirs of paratroopers.

At the origin of the joint brigade

The commander of the 2nd battalion of the 3rd GVDB, Major V.F.Fofanov, landed west of Rzhishchev. After signaling the collection to the landing site, 22 paratroopers came out to him, mostly those who flew with him in the same plane. By the morning of September 25, 7 more people joined the group. During the day, Major Fofanov took vigorous measures to establish contact with the command and other units of the brigade. At the same time, he sent sentinels to the most important directions, organized the direct defense of the area where the group was located and all-round observation.

Having received information about the presence of an enemy garrison in Medvedovka, he decided to raid it on the night of September 26, capture a prisoner and clarify the situation in the area. During the attack on the garrison, 8 German soldiers but failed to capture the prisoner.

Lost hope to set in this moment communication with the command of the brigade, as well as with other units of the landing force, Major Fofanov decided to withdraw the group to the Veselaia Dubrava area, and then go to the designated area of ​​defense of the landing force. Before the start of the movement, he decided to re-raid the enemy garrison in Medvedovka. During the raid, the paratroopers blew up one enemy tank, destroyed three carts and two cars. Having replenished their food stocks at the expense of those captured from the enemy, the group began preparations for moving to another area.

However, on the evening of September 28, the group was attacked by the enemy. Having beaten off the attack, the paratroopers, under the cover of night, left the occupied area and began to advance into southbound, and by the end of September 29, the group entered the defense area of ​​the 3rd Guards Brigade. The paratroopers were in the area for two days. Several other small groups joined them, but no additional data on the brigades could be obtained. During these days, paratroopers attacked enemy garrisons in the settlements of Tulitsy and Shandra, destroying one tank, three vehicles and up to 40 enemy soldiers and officers.

Subsequently, the group moved south and by October 1 entered the forest southeast of Potashni. During the raid, the paratroopers carried out raids on enemy garrisons in the settlements of Yakhny, Potaptsy and Biyevitsy. The paratroopers exterminated in these battles over 80 enemy soldiers and officers, 9 vehicles and a significant amount of military equipment.

In the area of ​​​​Maslovka, the group was attacked by the enemy with a force up to an infantry battalion. By the end of the day, the paratroopers were surrounded. Major Fofanov decided to hold his positions at all costs, and break out of the encirclement at night. Night fell, the Nazis stopped their attacks and, leaving cover, withdrew the main forces of the battalion to the outskirts of the settlement.

The plan for breaking away from the enemy was as follows. Specially assigned paratroopers were to covertly go out to three cars parked at a separate house on the outskirts and blow them up. The main group by this time should have been ready for a quick exit.

It all happened. There were several muffled explosions. The dark night was illuminated by the bright flames of burning cars. Panic arose among the garrison, and indiscriminate shooting began. At this time, the paratroopers quickly left the area they occupied.

The group continued to move eastward and only on October 21 arrived in the Taganchan forest. Major V.F. Fofanov headed the headquarters of the combined airborne brigade.

The heroic death of the detachment of Major Evstropov

The deputy head of the political department of the 3rd GVDB, Major I.Ya. Evstropov, immediately after landing, led a group of 22 people. Soon another 9 paratroopers approached the group.

During the first three days, Major Evstropov failed to obtain information about other units of the brigade and about the airborne assault as a whole. He decided to withdraw the group to the area north of Potashni and begin sabotage operations on enemy communications.

Soon the enemy opened the location of the group. After repulsing the first attack of the enemy, Major Evstropov changed the area. However, the enemy continued to pursue the group and soon blocked it. The paratroopers fought bravely. The first three enemy attacks were repulsed. Attacks by larger forces followed. The encirclement ring around the paratroopers was shrinking. In a critical situation, at the command of Major Evstropov, "Attack follow me! We will not surrender alive!" the guards rushed at the enemy. All paratroopers died the death of heroes. Major Evstropov at the last moment blew himself up with the last grenade. A handful of Soviet paratroopers told about this heroic battle many years later, the inhabitants of Potash.

The fate of the group Lieutenant Tkachev

Senior Lieutenant E.G. Tkachev acted proactively. After landing and orienting, he realized that he was too far from the planned drop area. By the morning of September 25, the senior lieutenant led a group of 23 people. “We will beat the enemy on our own for the time being. At the same time, we will take measures to establish communication with other units of the landing force,” he told the paratroopers.

Moshny. Soon contact was established with partisans operating in the Moshna area. Soon another 21 paratroopers joined the group. The number of the detachment reached more than 400 people.

After uniting with the partisans, Senior Lieutenant Tkachev, through the headquarters of the partisan movement of Ukraine, reported to the front headquarters the situation in the area of ​​his landing. In response, he received an order to act jointly with the partisans and take measures to establish contact with the airborne assault.

A joint command of partisans and paratroopers operating in the area was created, which included senior lieutenant Tkachev and his deputy lieutenant A.N. Vadyasov from the paratroopers.

From September 26 to October 20, the paratroopers conducted active sabotage and reconnaissance operations in the area of ​​​​Moshna, Sofiyivka, Belozerye. During this period, more than 130 invaders were exterminated, including 11 officers, 9 vehicles with military equipment, 4 cars, 2 motorcycles were destroyed, 5 bridges were blown up.

On October 23, Senior Lieutenant Tkachev received an order from the front headquarters to introduce his detachment into the United Airborne Brigade operating in the Taganchansky Forest.

The actions of the detachments of Major Lev and Lieutenant Chukhrai

In a small area west and southwest of Buchak, a significant number of paratroopers from the 3rd and 5th airborne brigades landed. By the morning of September 25, three groups were formed here: Major N.S. Lev, lieutenants G.N. Chukhrai and S.A. Zdelnik. However, they all acted in isolation, out of touch with each other.

Major Lev, leading a group of 27 paratroopers, led it in a southerly direction, trying to quickly reach the brigade's defense area. The group advanced covertly, with reconnaissance and security measures, avoiding encounters with large enemy forces.

However, there were no paratroopers there. For two days, Major Lev took energetic measures to establish contact with the landing units, and only after that he decided to go to connect with the units advancing from the front.

On September 29, when approaching the village of Glinchik, Major Lev met with groups led by lieutenants Chukhrai and Zdelnik. He united these groups and began active sabotage operations in the rear areas of formations and associations of German troops. At the same time, he took measures to establish communication with other groups.

The group carried out a series of attacks on enemy communications, enemy garrisons, as a result of which they exterminated more than 30 Nazis, destroyed 4 cars, 3 anti-aircraft guns, set fire to a depot of military equipment, captured 18 machine guns and a significant amount of ammunition and food.

On October 4, Major Lev decided to continue reaching the front line and try to establish contact with the advancing troops.

In the Troshchin area, the enemy discovered the paratroopers and attacked them. All day on October 5, the paratroopers repelled enemy attacks. With the onset of darkness, the groups broke away from the enemy and retreated to a grove south of the Bunchak settlement. From here, Lieutenant Chukhrai with two paratroopers penetrated the front line and reported on the situation in this area. He returned back accompanied by a partisan guide. Thus, communication was established with the troops operating from the front.

Odyssey of Captain Krotov's group

Captain N. Krotov did not have time to touch the ground, when he heard the imperative question: "Where did you come from?" It turned out that at the landing site there was a small group of partisans returning to their area after a successful raid on the German garrison in the village of Novaya Gunta.

Captain Krotov clarified the situation with the partisans, sent patrols in order to establish contact with other landing units. Having not achieved positive results, he decided to act together with the partisans. By the end of September 25, he managed to unite about 200 paratroopers, mainly from among the scouts of the 5th GVDB. The location of the detachment was chosen as a small island in a marshy area of ​​the forest, difficult to reach even for pedestrians.

Captain Krotov deployed sabotage operations in a fairly large area. Sudden raids on enemy garrisons, columns of troops and carts, on bases and warehouses of the enemy in six days, 2 tanks were knocked out, 3 cars were destroyed, a bridge was blown up, and up to 30 Nazis were exterminated.

Soon it became known from the partisans that a large airborne assault was operating in the Taganch region. Captain Krotov, continuing active operations, sent reconnaissance to the Taganch region, and then brought his detachment there, which included 225 people, 4 heavy and 7 light machine guns, 3 anti-tank rifles, 100 machine guns, 125 rifles and carbines.

Suren Petrosyan's paratroopers

Skillfully acted group Art. Lieutenant S. Petrosyan. This group won its first victory over the enemy at a height of 180.3. There, surrounded by the Nazis, the soldiers who landed simultaneously with his company were fighting. Petrosyan decided to attack the enemy from the rear. With a shout of "Hurrah" the group quickly rushed to the attack. The Nazis quickly turned around and opened heavy fire. But when our soldiers defending the height went on the attack, the Nazis faltered and rushed to the forest in a panic. Only a few of them managed to escape.

However, the first victory did not bring the usual joyful revival. Too great were the losses suffered by the paratroopers during the landing. After burying their fallen comrades, the paratroopers vowed to avenge their deaths.

On September 28, Petrosyan learned that the German commandant's office, the headquarters of the artillery unit, a police school and a large number of technology. To defeat the garrison, the senior lieutenant created three groups of fifty people. Each of them, in turn, was divided into four subgroups. Three were intended for attack, and one for cover. In addition, the commander singled out two groups of six people to destroy telephone and telegraph communication lines and cover roads, giving them machine guns each.

On September 30, at nightfall, the detachment began to move. The commander made a halt 2 km from the settlement. Here he was met by scouts and reported the latest data on the enemy garrison. In accordance with the data received, it was necessary to slightly change the plan of action. It was decided to take the starting positions at 2 hours 50 minutes, the attack to begin at midnight.

At the headquarters where the first group operated, there were three sentries: one stood at the entrance to the school, the other two patrolled around the premises. The paratroopers, after waiting for the right moment, attacked the sentries, but one of them managed to shoot. In order not to waste time and not give the enemy the opportunity to prepare to repel the attack, the paratroopers went on the attack. Throwing grenades into the windows, they broke into the premises and completed the defeat of the enemy in hand-to-hand combat.

It was easier for the second group. There were only a few soldiers and officers in the police school, who were unable to put up serious resistance. The third group launched the attack a little later, the Nazis had time to prepare and opened heavy fire. The paratroopers lay down. The commander, leaving cover in front of the front, immediately began to bypass the enemy on the right and soon attacked them on the flank, but did not achieve success. The Nazis, illuminating the area with rockets, tightly covered all the approaches to the ammunition depot and equipment with fire. At this time, the second group, having defeated the police school, attacked the enemy from the rear.

As a result of successful actions, the detachment defeated the headquarters of the anti-aircraft artillery division, captured important documents, up to 30 vehicles with ammunition. More than 100 enemy soldiers and officers, 3 anti-aircraft guns, more than 30 vehicles, a large number of communications equipment and other property were destroyed in the battle.

As soon as the paratroopers, exhausted by battle and march, concentrated in the forest south of Maslovka, a report was received from intelligence about the appearance of an enemy artillery column. Senior Lieutenant Petrosyan made a bold decision - to attack the column and crush it on the march in the forest. The paratroopers set up an ambush in the middle of the grove.

The fire was opened simultaneously on the entire column and caused confusion in the ranks of the enemy. Disabled lead cars blocked the way for others, and cars that tried to turn off the road got stuck in ditches. Throwing equipment, the Nazis hurried to hide in the folds of the terrain. At this time, the reserve was brought into battle. By morning the column was destroyed. The detachment destroyed more than 80 soldiers and officers, 6 guns, 2 mortars and 15 vehicles and trailers.

A well-chosen ambush site, simultaneous fire on the entire column ensured the defeat of superior enemy forces.

From the Maslovka area, the detachment fought its way to Kanev, where, according to local residents, large landing forces were operating.

Lieutenant Colonel Sidorchuk takes command into his own hands

By October 5, in the forest near Kanev, where the group led by Petrosyan began to advance, several detachments of paratroopers were concentrated. Even during the landing, the commander of the 3rd GVDB, Colonel Goncharenko V.K. was wounded and subsequently taken out through a partisan airfield to mainland. The 3rd and 5th GVDB brigade, united from the paratrooper detachments, was headed by the commander of the 5th GVDB, Lieutenant Colonel Sidorchuk

On October 6, a group of signalmen with a radio station entered the location of the brigade, with the help of which, for the first time after the release, radio contact was established with the headquarters of the 40th Army.

Soon the headquarters of the Airborne Forces organized the supply of paratroopers with ammunition and food.

Having created a base in the Kanevsky forest, the brigade stepped up operations on enemy communications and defeated several enemy garrisons. The Nazis withdrew from the front and threw field units to fight the landing. They continuously attacked the paratroopers. For three days, the paratroopers courageously and steadfastly held their positions.

With only light weapons, it was difficult to hold back the onslaught of the enemy. And the enemy decided, having strengthened his tank and artillery units, to deliver a decisive blow on the morning of October 12th. But he came to an empty place. Back on the night of October 11, the main forces of the landing force secretly left the forest with the permission of the front commander.

On October 19, the brigade commander received an order from the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front, in which Sidorchuk was ordered to unite under his command a detachment of senior lieutenant Tkachev, operating in the forests 5-10 km south of the town of Moshny, and other small groups of paratroopers conducting military operations in this area .

Being in the Taganchansky forest, paratroopers in small groups continued to disrupt the communication of enemy troops. October 22 they blew up the canvas railway in the Korsun section - the Tagancha station, as a result of which the echelon with the Nazis was destroyed. In the same area, on October 23, a trainload of ammunition and other military equipment was derailed. On the Korsun - Sakhnovka - Mizhirich highway, paratroopers from ambushes destroyed vehicles and attacked columns. A daring raid on the garrisons in Buda-Vorobievskaya on the night of October 23 destroyed the headquarters of the 157th reserve enemy battalion, killed more than 50 soldiers and officers, destroyed an anti-aircraft gun and 4 vehicles. At the same time, a group of paratroopers destroyed the enemy's warehouses in the village of Potashnya, destroying 34 vehicles and several dozen Nazis.

Since that time, the effectiveness of airborne assault operations has become higher. His attacks on the enemy began to be carefully prepared and carried out according to a single plan. The enemy felt it too.

The Hitlerite command began to intensively transfer field units removed from the front to the Taganchan forest, to send special punitive detachments, and to make extensive use of aircraft for reconnaissance of the areas where the paratroopers were located and for delivering air strikes against them. In the leaflets distributed, the Nazis claimed that the airborne assault would be crushed in the coming days; indicated that for each paratrooper a reward in the amount of 6 thousand occupation marks was appointed.

On the morning of October 23, the enemy launched an offensive. But it was not unexpected for the paratroopers. They prepared carefully to repel the attack of the enemy. The warriors steadfastly held a circular defense. Everyone understood that in these battles not only his personal fate was decided, but also the fate of the landing force as a whole. But every day it got harder and harder. The decisive day was 23 October. A participant in those battles, reserve colonel P.N. Nezhivenko, recalls: "... the day of October 23 was a day of continuous bloody battle. Enemy attacks followed one after another. From the front - a sea of ​​\u200b\u200bfire, from the air - continuous bombing. Enemy aircraft hung over us with impunity . The only salvation from them there was constant close contact with enemy attacking units. In the battalion of Captain V.N. Krotov, almost all the officers were out of order. I led a group of paratroopers. The enemy attacked furiously all day. At the end of the day another attack began. The Germans tried at all costs to throw us off the dominating high-rise. He managed to break through on the left flank of a neighbor. The Nazis began to seep into the rear of our group. The battalion commander jumped into the trench and commanded: "Not a step back! Stand to the death!" And here Major VF Fofanov appeared. With a landing knife in one hand, with a grenade in the other, he rushed forward with an exclamation: "Guards! Let's show the fascist bastards how Soviet paratroopers attack!" A hand-to-hand fight ensued. The enemy did not survive. We opened heavy fire on the fleeing fascists with the last bullets."

At night, the brigade broke out of the ring, carrying the wounded. But not everyone managed to get out of the encirclement. Was also wounded. Sergeant Nezhivenko. He ended up in a partisan hospital. When he recovered, he fought in the partisan detachment before full release Cherkasy from the Nazis. Like many veterans of the Dnieper landing, Petr Nikolayevich proudly wears the medal "Partisan of the Patriotic War" next to the front-line awards.

Raid in the Cherkasy forests

The paratroopers also suffered losses in these battles. They also had a difficult situation with ammunition. A break in the fighting became necessary. The brigade commander decided to break away from the enemy and take the brigade to another area. After a thorough reconnaissance, taking advantage of the onset of darkness, the brigade units began to leave the Taganchansky forest in the direction of Sakhnovka and further into the Cherkasy forest.

On the night of October 26, the brigade arrived in Cherkasy Forest, in the area northeast of Bolshoy Staroselye. With the increase in the total number of brigade to 1.2 thousand people in the period from 27 to 30 October, another battalion was formed.

In the Cherkasy forest area, the brigade went on the defensive and continued to fight, violating the German rear and control. In the period from October 28 to November 11, reconnaissance and sabotage groups blew up bridges, destroyed transport columns, destroyed communications, and made daring raids on enemy garrisons. The enemy began to pull up new forces to the Cherkasy Forest in order to first block the landing force and then destroy it.

During this time, the paratroopers reconnoitered the enemy defense system along the Dnieper and in tactical depth, and all information was transmitted to the headquarters of the front, in the zone in which the brigade operated. Due to the fact that the troops of the front were preparing to cross the river, the brigade commander established communication directly with the headquarters of the 52nd Army, which was operating in the Cherkassy direction.

From Fryazino - beyond the Dnieper.

Grigory Chukhrai, film director, laureate of the Lenin Prize, tells(from a speech at the Istok Palace of Culture in May 1979)

... They correctly say that due to the ineptitude of the pilots and the mistakes of the navigators, both brigades were dispersed over a large area.

We flew for a short time. I was the oldest on the plane. Jumped in the support group to prepare the landing of the rest of the groups.

The pilots gave the signal to land. I'm standing at the hatch. I skip half of my own, then I have to jump myself to be on the ground in the middle of the group. Suddenly the paratrooper rested against the edges of the hatch, he did not want to jump. "Dnieper!" - screams. Well, I know all these tricks and evasions, fear of jumping, pushed him harder with my knee, and he flew down, and then he jumped out himself.

But the paratrooper turned out to be right, they really threw us over the Dnieper, and no matter how I controlled the parachute, I managed to land only on the very shore. I gathered my guys only 4 out of 24. Yes, even from a half-platoon of guys from the 5th brigade, who landed with us.

About two platoons of Germans went towards us. But we occupied a small forest not far from the shore and held out until nightfall. At night, the Germans withdrew, probably, the fist was going to fight against the main forces of the landing. And we went to the German rear, cut off communications, killed the Germans, smashed the headquarters. One large headquarters was destroyed, many senior officers were killed, and important documents were seized. The guys fought desperately.

We tried to contact ours. We spent all the batteries, could not establish contact with the command. There were rumors about a large landing in the district, but we could not get through to our comrades: the Germans surrounded them tightly.

Then they decided to send three people, including me, through the Dnieper for communication. Actually, I crossed the front lines many times, but this time the transition was very difficult. The Germans were vigilant, because very close in the rear were large forces of paratroopers. For three days we lay in ambush, set up patrol schedules for the Germans, chose options for crossing ...

And here we are with ours. There they received an order to withdraw their detachment across the front line.

So we returned to Moscow. First we went to the Mausoleum. It was a painting. We are on Red Square: some in German trousers, some in a German uniform, some in something else.

And at the headquarters we were not very kindly met, they accused us that we did not want to join the main forces, sat out in the forests, and returned. We left for Fryazino disappointed.

But I have already said that I was lucky in my life. During the November offensive, a large headquarters was captured beyond the Dnieper, and detailed documents about the actions of our group were found there. Thus, our reports were confirmed. I was awarded the order"Red Star", the comrades received the Order of Glory and the medal "For Courage". We were summoned to the headquarters, presented with awards, thanked for our courageous and decisive actions, and read excerpts from German documents about our struggle: the Germans numbered 250 of us, and there were about 30 of us. I was proud of my award.

I leave the headquarters and come face to face with Colonel Monin:

Ah, it's you, the fugitive. - Guilty, Comrade Colonel! - 25 days of arrest.

So I ended up on forced rest.

Then I was recalled from the brigade to organize and prepare the landing of Slovaks and Czechs to help the Slovak uprising. It was a very exciting and heroic operation.

Then I ended up in the 104th division, in Romania and Hungary. Here, on the very border with Austria, I was seriously wounded and met Pobeda in the hospital. There I was commissioned.

I returned to Moscow, passed several exams for the directing department, and after graduating from the institute I became an assistant director.

And my military fate turned out happily for me, and in my post-war fate, luck also accompanied me. I am a laureate of the Lenin Prize, People's Artist of the USSR, I have a favorite teaching job, I continue to direct films.

But I don't want young people to think that life is a ceremonial march. Life is not only about victories. The merit of my generation was that in the most difficult conditions we remained true to our ideals, and we won. Nothing in life comes easy. Winning is a lot of work. And the more labor is invested, the more joyful is the victory. ... Do not expect gifts from life.

Capture of the Dnieper bridgehead near the village of Svidovok

On November 11, 1943, the brigade commander received an order from the commander of the 52nd Army, in which he ordered the airborne brigade to go on the offensive on the night of November 13, to seize the Lozovka-Elizavetovka-Sekirna-Svidovok line on the banks of the Dnieper in order to ensure the crossing of the Dnieper River in parts operating from the front.

By one in the morning on November 13, 1943, the units of the brigade went to their original position and, having carried out reconnaissance, at the signal of the brigade commander at 16-00, they simultaneously attacked all enemy strongholds.

The actions of the paratroopers in this swift attack were distinguished by decisiveness and courage. Assault groups of paratroopers used hand grenades and burst into the strongholds with a swift throw. The Germans, stunned by the suddenness of the blow, could not offer organized resistance and began to scatter in a panic. Following the assault groups, the main forces of the 4th and 5th companies began to advance. The 4th company was followed by a reserve. At this time, the 6th company attacked the enemy in the area of ​​the 73.8 mark, but advanced slowly, meeting enemy fire resistance.

The enemy soon recovered from the unexpected blow, but the 4th and 5th companies of Major Bluvshtein's battalion had already managed to capture the nearest strongholds. However, before reaching the center, they were stopped by heavy machine-gun fire and tank fire. The 6th company also did not overcome the enemy resistance at the 73.8 mark. She tried to break into the settlement south of the bend in the road, but had no success and lay down, continuing the firefight with the enemy.

At this time, the neighbor on the left, met by heavy fire, covered himself from the enemy with one platoon, and sent the main forces around the strong point.

The battalion commander Major Bluvshtein also took measures (for this battle he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, he was repeatedly in Fryazino at meetings of paratroopers). He ordered the battalion reserve to bypass the enemy from the east and attack the center of his resistance. A platoon of machine gunners, hiding behind houses, quickly went to the center of the enemy's fortified position.

The battalion under the command of A. Mikhailov fought his way to Svidovka, here the commander was wounded, Suren Petrosyan took command. (he was also awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union). The battalion attacked the center of enemy resistance. Following them, the 4th and 5th rifle companies of the neighbors went on the attack. The resistance of the enemy in the center of the settlement was broken. He, having lost two more tanks, retreated into the bushes northeast of Svidovka. The remnants of the Nazi unit, driven out by the forces of the 6th and 5th rifle companies from the area of ​​​​mark 73.8, also retreated there.

However, the situation with the release of the battalion to the north-eastern outskirts of Svidovka changed dramatically. Before the infantry battalion and seven enemy tanks, advancing from Dakhnovka, they shot down the cover sent from the 2nd paratrooper battalion, quickly approached Svidovka and turned around to strike at the flank and rear of the battalion.

Here, near Svidovk, the armor-piercer I. Kondratiev showed special courage and skill. With well-aimed shots from an anti-tank rifle, he knocked out 5 tanks and 2 self-propelled guns in this battle. For this fight he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

By 5 o'clock after a stubborn battle, the task assigned to the brigade was successfully completed.

Again in the ring of the enemy

However, the troops of the front during the night of November 13 failed to force the Dnieper. This allowed the enemy to withdraw part of the forces from the coast and direct them against the paratroopers. Attacking from the south and east, the Germans began to push the 2nd and 4th airborne battalions and created a threat to encircle the main forces of the brigade. The brigade commander ordered the battalions to withdraw to the forest south of Svidovka and go on the defensive.

In these last battles in the rear of the fascist troops, the paratroopers, as in all previous ones, showed swiftness in attacks and the highest stamina in defense. The female paratroopers also showed courage and selflessness in battle.

As a very young girl, Nadya Gagarina voluntarily went to the front. And in your first fight with fascist invaders she joined the airborne assault in the rear of the German troops. For sixty-five days and nights, paramedic Nadezhda Gagarina fought courageously behind enemy lines. In only one battle, she took out from the battlefield and saved the life of 21 paratroopers. Already in post-war years students high school N 8 of the city of Cherkasy in a letter to the brave paratrooper wrote: "... Thank you for your great feat in the name of peace. We swear to be faithful to the high traditions of the heroes of the Great Patriotic War, to grow up as true patriots of our great Motherland ..."

Just as courageously fought V.I.

Among the paratroopers and partisans, striking towards the troops advancing through the Dnieper in the Svidovka area, there were also French patriots who were brought by the Nazis to build a narrow gauge railway. They established contact with the Cherkasy underground, gave them a radio and important information about the deployment of German troops, and in May 1943. made an escape and arrived at the partisans, taking with them four carts with rifles, a machine gun and ammunition.

The fighting of the paratroopers diverted the attention of the enemy from the troops of the 52nd Army, who were preparing to force. Thanks to this, on the night of November 14, the 254th Infantry Division was able to transport approx. 800 men and capture a small foothold below Svidovka.

The brigade by 19 o'clock on November 15 again took possession of locality Svidovok and connected with the 254th Infantry Division. By the morning of November 16, the paratroopers again captured the strongholds of Sekirna and Elizavetovka, thereby expanding the bridgehead and the crossing area for the troops of the 52nd Army.

With the active assistance of the paratroopers, the enemy was driven out of nearby settlements with heavy losses.

At this turn, the OGVDB fought fierce battles for four days with suitable enemy reserves from the Smela direction, which helped the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front in successfully encircling and destroying the enemy in Cherkassy.

The subsequent combat operations of the units of the 3rd and 5th GVDB to expand the captured bridgehead took place until November 28 in close cooperation with units of the 294th and 254th rifle divisions.

On November 28, 1943, they surrendered their positions to the 7th Guards Airborne Division and were withdrawn from the battle.

The guards-paratroopers, despite the most difficult, difficult conditions, showed massive heroism and courage.

With the thought of the Victory, the guards-paratroopers on the night of September 24 took off in planes from the starting area in order to throw themselves into the rear fascist troops. With the thought of the Motherland, the paratroopers went into a deadly battle with the enemy. Some of them burned up in the sky under the canopy of the parachute. Many death overtook the earth. Those who were threatened with fascist captivity died heroically. But the paratroopers fought on. Withstood. We won.

All paratroopers were awarded military orders and medals. Major A.A. Bluvshtein and Senior Lieutenant S.G. Petrosyan, armor-piercer I. Kondratyev were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for exceptional stamina, personal courage and combat successes shown in battles behind enemy lines.

Combat airborne operations in the 2nd World War.

Army General S.M. Shtemenko recalls that when reporting the first results of forcing the Dnieper River in September 1943, Stalin was especially annoyed by the failure to use the 1st, 3rd and 5th GVDB. A special order on this issue stated: "The release of a mass landing at night testifies to the illiteracy of the organizers of this case, because, as experience shows, the release of a mass night landing even on one's own territory is fraught with great difficulties."

The war has revealed weak sides Airborne: the dependence of their landing on weather conditions, greater vulnerability at the time of landing behind enemy lines and collection, poor technical equipment, the difficulty of supporting landing forces during the battle due to the front line and additional supply of ammunition and other combat equipment.

This is confirmed by the results of military operations in other countries.

German mass airborne assault in 1941 during the capture of the island of Crete although it led to the capture of this important foothold in the Mediterranean, it was accompanied by such heavy losses (more than 60% of losses by the end of the first day) among the paratroopers thrown into the battle formations of the British to capture airfields that the German command abandoned massive airborne assaults and no longer applied them.

Three large airborne operations were carried out by the allied forces of the United States and Great Britain on the European continent.

In the Arnhem airlanding operation in 1944 to capture the bridges across the Rhine, the US 141st Airborne Division, which landed at a large distance (60 km) from the main forces, came under a tank attack and was unable to complete its combat mission. Having lost 7.5 thousand paratroopers, she broke through the encirclement and went to connect with the main forces.

Operations in which the landing was carried out at a distance of 10-15 km from the front and were reinforced by the offensive of the front troops were successful. However, paratrooper losses remained extremely high. In the Normandy operation of 1944 night landing led to a significant dispersion of paratroopers over a large area, by the end of the first day the losses amounted to more than 50%, and only a successful mass landing of an amphibious assault, which developed the success of the paratroopers, decided the outcome of the operation.

Brigade Banner Rescue Awards

On June 11, 1976, the Decree of the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian SSR was published: “For high patriotism, courage and courage shown during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45, to award Gannenko A.F. and Gannenko S.I.”. A photograph of Anatoly Ganenko at the battle banner of the 3rd GVDB, which he and his mother preserved, is today in the Museum of Military Glory (Fryazino).

It was the 14th day after the paratroopers landed. Anatoly's brother, Victor, together with a neighbor went for straw. From one stack they began to load the wagon with pitchforks. A barely audible groan reached them. Someone asked for a drink. What to do? Nearby, about fifty meters away, the Nazi foragers took straw. Victor pretended to be repairing the cart. The Germans left, then Viktor and Zinaida dug up the straw and found a wounded paratrooper officer in it. Captain N.I. Sapozhnikov lay here for 14 days, wounded in the shoulder and legs while still in the air. He asked for a drink.

Ganenko decided to help the paratrooper officer. Having healed a little, the brothers decided to transport the captain to the previously discovered group of wounded paratroopers. Only then did it become clear that the captain had the Brigade Banner and documents. German search parties were combing all the places, and the paratroopers were in a hurry to leave. But Sapozhnikov could not go. We decided to take it in turns. In order to protect the banner from being captured by the enemy, the paratroopers decided to leave it to Anatolia for preservation.

The Ganenko family kept their secret. In early 1944, the flag and documents were handed over to the Soviet command. Thus, the banner of the 3rd GVDB was saved, which is currently in Central Museum Armed Forces.

In September 1988, it left the museum building for the first time since the war. Accompanied by a military escort, the banner arrived in Fryazino, where a solemn meeting of paratrooper veterans was held. Each of them, kneeling down, kissed at this meeting their battle banner, scorched by the smoke of conflagrations and stained with the blood of heroes.

Fryazino remembers the heroes of the Dnieper

"We learned about the heroism of the paratroopers, about their partisan battles, by establishing contact with the Council of Veterans of the 3rd and 5th GVDB," says Tamara Makarovna Antsiferova, a teacher of history and local history at school No. 1 in Fryazino, the initiator of the creation of the school Museum of Military Glory and the "Poisk" group - We started collecting materials about the heroic deeds of the paratroopers already in 1976. We found more than 200 veterans, began to correspond with many, and they sent memoirs and photographs to the museum.

In May 1978, our "Search" was at the anniversary meeting of paratroopers in the village. Svidovok Cherkasy region (Ukraine). It brought together former paratroopers from all over our country from the Arctic to Sakhalin. There they met with the standard-bearer of the brigade, Nikolai Sapozhnikov. He accepted the banner of the brigade in our city, jumped with it on that memorable night. During the landing, he was badly wounded. The banner was saved by 16-year-old Anatoly Ganenko.

We saw how relatives of the victims came to this meeting with the only hope of finding out what happened to their brother, father. We heard how, 34 years after the war, we managed to establish the circumstances of the death of the battalion commander Zhernosekov, whose battalion was stationed at our school. We met the doctor of the brigade, V.I. Koroleva, who had gone through three concentration camps. The guys saw with their own eyes what the front-line brotherhood means.

Then the guys got acquainted with an extraordinary person, V.M.Dyachenko from Pavlodar, who became a friend of our school for many years. An excellent musician and poet, he collected a lot of information about the fallen comrades. One of his songs became the anthem of our Poisk squad.

In June 1978, 11 members of Poisk were once again in the Cherkassy region. We walked through the forests, through the villages where the paratroopers fought, were at their

graves, met partisans and underground fighters - fighting friends of the paratroopers, recorded on a tape recorder the memories of residents - witnesses of those distant days.

Having collected materials about the heroism of the paratroopers, we turned to the City Council with a proposal to perpetuate the memory of the paratroopers. The session of the City Council decided to install on the building of school N 1 memorial plaque and memorial sign. One of the streets of Fryazino was named the paratroopers passage, today more than 2,000 people live on it.

On September 23, 1778, on the 35th anniversary of the Dnieper landing, veteran paratroopers from Armenia, Ukraine, the Moscow region and Moscow arrived at our school to meet with students. Some of them have not seen each other since then. Sergeant Major, now Candidate medical sciences VB Fritz met with his fighter Ilyichev. The Astakhov brothers met with joy with their platoon commander S.V.Barankin.

The students of the school listened with excitement to the story of the brave scout P.S.Danielyan about how, having received an invitation, he got ready to travel at night, how he arrived at night in the city of his distant youth and, having found the school, kissed its walls.

Former paratrooper M.E. Shayet then said: "How could I imagine that someday I would again be in that city, at that school, from where I went to the front in a formidable year."

The veterans handed over to the museum a sculptural figure of a paratrooper and a model of a parachute tower. An old friend of our school, Dyachenko, brought numerous gifts from the schools of the Cherkasy region, gave us a bag of high-yielding Ukrainian wheat, three capsules of earth from the mass graves of paratroopers. Thus a great friendship was born, which connected the paratroopers with our school and the city of Fryazino.

Based on the materials of these meetings, Rudolf Mikhailovich Popov made the film "Paratroopers". This wonderful film was watched by thousands of children from all schools in the city, several generations of schoolchildren.

By May 9, we send congratulations to dozens of veterans of the Dnieper landing. At first there were 300 addresses, but every year it becomes less and less."

The great selfless work of T.M. Antsiferova was repeatedly noted by the Chairman of the Council of Veterans of the 3rd GVDB Petr Nezhivenko. He spoke about friendship with the city of Fryazino, school No. 1 and the work carried out jointly with it on the pages of the magazines "Veteran of War" and "Russian Warrior".

... High above the entrance to the former building of school No. 1, there is a figure of a paratrooper. The artist A.Davydova and the sculptor I.Frolov created a wonderful dynamic image of the "winged warrior" - the parachutist's foot has already touched the ground, the parachute inflated by the wind is falling, and the PPSh assault rifle is ready to go into battle. And the inscription: "Here, during the Great Patriotic War, the 3rd and 13th airborne brigades were formed."

A commemorative plaque on the passage of the Paratroopers also recalls the feat of the GVDB, which was formed in Fryazino. Here, 19 years ago, the paratroopers, who had gathered for a meeting, planted an alley of birches. They have long grown and have become as memorable as the name of the passage.

In April 1998, the Second Fryazino Local History Readings dedicated to the 55th anniversary of the formation of the 3rd GVDB and the Dnieper landing were held at the Museum of Military Glory of School No. 1. Guys - "cadets" of the military sports club "Mayak-SN" came to a meeting with the Chairman of the Council of Veterans P. Nezhivenko, and their leader Vyacheslav Pirogov told about the little-known chronicle of the capture of the Bukrinsky bridgehead, to whose aid the 3rd and 5th troops were parachuted. I am GVDB.

Military roads of fighters of the 3rd GVDB. 1944-1945

In January 1944, in the city of Teikovo (Moscow Military District), by order of NPO No. 003 of 19.1.44 and order of the Airborne Forces No. 0025 of 26.1.44, the 13th Guards was formed from 19.1.44 to 1.3.44. airborne division based on the "3rd GVDB, which left behind enemy lines after landing on the right bank of the Dnieper on September 25, 1944", the 8th GVDB, formed in June 1943, and the 6th GVDB, formed from the remnants of 6, 13 and 15 GVDB. ... Division Commander - Guards Major General Kozin ".

By order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 0047 dated 12/18/44 and by order of the 37th Guards. building No. 0073 dated 12/21/44 on the basis of 13 GVDB (3 and 6 GADB in in full force and one rifle battalion each from the 98th and 99th GVDB) was created in the city of Bykhov (Mogilev region of the Byelorussian SSR) the 103rd Guards Rifle Division (317th, 322nd and 324th Guards Rifle Division with attached units).

317th Guards. The regiment was awarded the Battle Banner of the 3rd GVDB. With this banner, the guards of the 37th Guards. corps building 9 guards. armies on the 2nd Ukrainian Front fought in Hungary and Austria, Germany and Czechoslovakia.

"For the battles to defeat the enemy grouping southwest of Budapest and forcing the Raba River, the regiment was awarded the Order of Alexander Nevsky by the Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces dated 26.4.45, and the division" for battles with German and Hungarian invaders during the capture of the city of Papa and Davecher "the Order of Kutuzov 2nd degree, and for the battles in Austria "when mastering the city of Sombel, Kaluvar, Keset" - the Order of the Red Banner. From May 6 to 12, pursuing scattered groups of Germans, the division passed Gaaden, Vienna, Litshan, Trezhbol (Czechoslovakia). Here she ended the war.

By the end of the war, the regiment had 207 officers, 766 sergeants, 1446 privates. Of these, they were awarded - orders: 7 - Red Banner, 1 - Alexander Nevsky, 1 - Suvorov 1st class, 64 - Patriotic War 1st and 179 - 2nd class, 478 - Red Star; medals: 204 - "For Military Merit", 1384 - "For Courage", 1122 - "For the Victory over Germany".

After nine months of post-war service in Hungary (Aldie and Szeged), the regiment was sent to their homeland, to the camp "Seltsy" in the Rybkovsky district of the Ryazan region (from 02/07/46).

Remember, paratrooper!

There, beyond the Dnieper, in the Bukrinsky expanse

The steppe breeze is walking peacefully...

There is a sacred place near Cherkassy -

Monument to the fallen in the village of Svidovok.

Rise up, veteran! Forget your wounds

Remember those who died in battles,

These are paratroopers and partisans.

You bow to them to the ground!

Remember, paratrooper, how we flew away

Shadow at night among the clouds,

Rage and hatred burned in the heart,

Whirlwind we fell upon the enemies!

The years of war are long gone

Many fighting friends are not with us,

And the whiskey of the guards turned gray -

The memory of those who survived.

Waves of the Dnieper, like a mighty force,

They carried the glory of heroes with them ...

Every autumn over a mass grave

Cranes fly peacefully.

V. Mikhalev.

“Along the banks of the Dnieper from Rzhyshchiv to Cherkassy, ​​like watchmen of memory, monuments rise above the mass graves. There are many obelisks among them, under which the heroes of the Dnieper landings sleep with eternal sleep. Only the inscriptions on them amaze with their tragic brevity.

There are more than 15 mass graves on the frontiers scorched by fire and the Bukrinskaya bend. We may never know the names unknown soldiers winged infantry, but the feat accomplished by the heroes of the Dnieper landing is immortal.

A. Oliynik. Dneprovskiy
landing. "A red star"


Council of Veterans 3 GVDB 1998

1. Colonel Petr Nikolayevich Nezhivenko - Chairman of the Council of Veterans since 1978. Organizer of 12 meetings of veterans at the battlefields in Cherkassy and Fryazino. In 1943 - a member of the Dnieper landing, scout, armor-piercer, partisan.

2. Petty officer Bolokhov Alexander Georgievich, deputy. chairman. In 1943 - a scout, a member of the Dnieper landing.

3. Sergeant Major Tambovskaya Lidia Isakovna, Secretary of the Council, Moscow. In 1943 - a radio operator, a member of the Dnieper landing.

4. Major Semyon Vladimirovich Barankin - Treasurer of the Council, commander of the intelligence platoon, participant in the Dnieper landing. Ryazan.

5. Demchenko Vladimir Efimovich, Kyiv. In 1943 - partisan.

List of paratroopers of the 3rd GVDB and guests invited to Fryazino to celebrate Victory Day and the 55th anniversary of the formation of the 3rd GVDB in Fryazino. 1998

Abolvasov N.P. Ekaterinburg.

Kolomiytseva N.N., Voronezh.

Andreev P.P. Kaluga.

Krylov V.F. Voronezh.

Ankundinov A.I. Rostov.

Kulikov I.R. Kharkov, Ukraine.

Barankin S.V. Ryazan.

Kushkov F.I. Arkhangelsk.

Bekerman I.Ya. Kharkov, Ukraine

Livanov F.K., Bashkiria.

Belov L.E. Bashkortostan.

Mikhailova-Gagarina N.I. ek-burg

Belyaev N.A. Kemerovo.

Muchkaev S.M. Kalmykia.

Volkov N.I. Ivanovo.

Myslyaev V.S. Tatarstan.

Volkov N.N. Fryazino.

Nazarov Yu.N. Chelyabinsk.

Volokhov A.G. Moscow.

Nezhivenko L.N. Balashikha, Mos. O.

Voroshilov V.P. Arkhangelsk.

Nemchaninov F.G. Kharkov, Ukraine

Galaktionov A.A. Omsk.

Pashkov E.P. Chelyabinsk.

Ganzha E.A. Chelyabinsk.

Pletnev I.A. Novosibirsk.

Ganichev I.V. Kazakhstan.

Polidorova G.S. Moscow.

Gorbunov M.N. Bashkiria.

Popov B.A. Stary Oskol, Belg. O.

Danielyan P.S. Armenia.

Rassovai V.A. Belarus.

Dedov N.S. Kazakhstan.

Rimin K.I. Novosibirsk.

Demchenko V.E. Kyiv, Ukraine.

Rodnyansky A.I. Lvov, Ukraine.

Dimova T.A. Kemerovo.

Rudenko V.A. Poltava, Ukraine.

Dorofeev A.I. Berdyansk, Ukraine.

Rybak F.S. Primorsky Krai.

Dyachkovsky V.P. Ukraine

Tambovskaya L.I. Moscow.

Zhukov I.T. Stavropol.

Udovichenko V.G. Kyiv, Ukraine.

Zaitsev P.I. Dnepropetrovsk, Ukr.

Fomenkov I.I. Tver.

Ivannikov A.E. Moscow.

Khannanov I.G. Permian.

Ivanov-Eshchenko V.M. Krasnoyarsk.

Khmel P.P. Novosibirsk.

Kabarulin A.I., Altai.

Chernozipunnikov A.G. Ek-burg.

Kaplan S.N. Gorlovka, Ukraine.

Chukhrai G.N. Moscow.

Kozlov A.V. Komi.

Shubin N.N. Krasnodar.

Chernova M.I., wife of paratrooper Chernov V.M., writer. Lipetsk.

Goncharova-Popova V.V., daughter of the 3rd GVDB Goncharova V.K., Tyumen.

Polovinka GK, Cherkasy, Ukraine, Chairman of the Council of Partisans and Underground Workers.

Ozerran V.E. Cherkasy, Ukraine, Council of Veterans of Partisans and Underground Workers.

Kalyuzhnaya Zh.F. Chairman of the village council of the village of Svidovok, Ukraine

Aseeva L.I. Pavlodar, Kazakhstan, leader of the "Poisk" detachment.

Additions May 2010-06-09

The 3rd airborne brigade was formed from the personnel of the 226th rifle division in the city of Chernigov.

The brigade was commanded by:
G. A. Kovalev
...

Literature:
Soviet airborne. Military history essay. - Moscow: Military Publishing, 1986, 2nd ed.

Airborne brigade, staff dated 04/23/1941

Name L / s total

CONTROL

DEP. INTELLIGENCE AND SCOOTER COMPANY

4 parachute battalions, each. 546

DEP. ARTILLERY DIVISION

DEP. ANTI-MACHINE GUN COMPANY

JUNIOR COMMAND SCHOOL

DEP. COMMUNICATION COMPANY

Personnel

Material part

45 mm anti-tank guns 12

50mm mortars 18

Backpack flamethrowers 288

Machine guns 16

Light machine guns 108

When landing, two battalions formed a parachute battle group and two battalions formed a glider battle group. At the same time, their separate platoons were also united in two, forming companies: communications, reconnaissance scooter, machine gun, mortar and artillery battery.

The latter was transferred to the airborne combat group, as well as an anti-tank battery and an anti-aircraft machine-gun company of the brigade.

The airborne combat group of the corps was formed on the basis of the corps artillery regiment and tank battalion. Being distributed among brigades, each such group included an artillery battalion (a full-time battalion of a corps artillery regiment plus 45-mm cannons of brigades and battalions), a tank company (a regular company of a corps TB), a mortar company and an anti-aircraft machine gun company (both - brigade subordination)

Forum materials about the Dnieper landing