SONG ABOUT THE KOMSOMOL GODDESS
I look at the photo:
two pigtails, a stern look,
and a boy's jacket
and friends are standing around.
Outside the window all the rain shadows:
there is bad weather in the yard.
But habitually thin fingers
touched the holster.
Soon she will leave the house
soon the thunder will break out all around,
but the Komsomol goddess ...
Ah, this, brothers, is about something else!
And no gods in sight
only things are thunder around,
but the Komsomol goddess ...
Ah, this, brothers, is about something else!
B. Okudzhava, 1958
Time passes, you grow up and start to analyze, and not just sing songs with a guitar, dry wine and barbecue.
From the age of 13 she sang about the "Komsomol goddess" and other "commissars", and Okudzhava himself was something of a god of the Soviet intelligentsia.
Wherever you come to the gatherings - an hour later people with glassy eyes began to deduce: "I'll bury a grape seed in the ground-oo-oo ..." - and everyone looked meaningfully at each other. Like we are here not some kind of worker-peasant, but a hard-working intelligentsia terribly oppressed by the government.
There is a brilliant film based on Okudzhava's story - "Zhenya, Zhenechka and Katyusha".
There are some good poems.
But these are "... habitually thin fingers touched the holster", "commissars in dusty helmets", who also liked to touch holsters, and how ...
Still, time is a great thing. Okudzhava has diamonds, of course, but under a layer of thick ash that covers them.
No, I can’t love him the way I used to, I don’t want to sing about the “commissars” and “Komsomol goddesses” of the 20s and 30s of the last century. What they have done - God be their judge.
But in addition to everything, Yu. Rost laid out "from memory" such statements by Okudzhava, which are simply (if they are absolutely true) hard to believe. Yu. Rost planted on Okudzhava's birthday with his "memories" such a big, fat pig, which only the kindest, most faithful "friend" can put on.
The following is a striking text from Novaya Gazeta.
Okudzhava: “But mostly it was horror and the destruction of souls. There were people who recalled the camp with pleasure. One woman sat with my mother. And then, when the convicts met, they talked about the past, about the nightmares of the camp, she happily recalled: Do you remember how we lived together, how I poured soups for you? That was the time!
My comment: a person SURVIVED thanks to friendship, mutual assistance, and he does not "happily remember" the CAMP - but how everything is turned inside out! A. Sinyavsky wrote "Walks with Pushkin" in the camp, by the way.
Okudzhava: “I wanted to say something else. When I just went to the front, a passion was raging in me to protect, participate, be useful. It was the youthful romanticism of a person not burdened with worries, family. I don’t remember that ordinary people went to the front joyfully. Oddly enough, the intellectuals volunteered, but we are bashfully silent about this until now. And so the war was an absolutely tough duty. Moreover, the workers, as a rule, were protected by all sorts of letters, because it was necessary to make shells. But the peasants ripped off the ground.
The suppression apparatus functioned exactly the same as before, only in extreme conditions more harshly, more frankly."
My comment: nonsense. The workers didn't fight? There was a general mobilization, as you know. Only a person of a narrow-minded mind can call it a "suppression apparatus". "Suppression apparatus"? - so these were your own "commissioners" and "goddesses", later sung in songs.
Okudzhava: “I remember that one military material was written: either a stupid person can sing about the war, or if this is a writer, then only the one who makes it the subject of speculation. And therefore I cannot read all these stories and novels of our military writers, I understand that they are unreliable. Miscalculations, defeats - all this is hushed up. And now especially. The past 60 years have generally turned into a lie. In the Tchaikovsky Hall poetry evening. I go out, read poems against Stalin, against the war, and the whole audience applauds (this is what I say, for example). Then Andrey Dementiev comes out and reads poetry about how nicely we fought, how we poured the Germans in, so let them know their place, let them remember who they are, and the audience applauds again.
My comment: L. Tolstoy "sang" the war? Or not? Or yes?
And the hall is idiots, of course. The people are a bunch of idiots, obviously incapable of understanding what war is without instructions and generally devoid of brains.
What follows is a masterpiece:
Okudzhava: “Few people think that the Germans themselves helped the Soviet Union to defeat themselves: imagine if they didn’t shoot, but gathered collective farmers and told them: we have come to free you from the yoke. Choose your form of government, you want collective farm - please, collective farm. If you want an individual farm - please. If they turned our slogans into deeds, they could win the war.
But our systems are similar. They did exactly the same as we would. It's just that our country turned out to be more powerful, darker and more patient."
Yuri Rost
The last two paragraphs... I don't know what words to use here. At least strange.
Hope I'll be back then
when the trumpeter lights out.
When the pipe is brought closer to the lips
Hope I stay safe
the earth is not damp for me.
And for me your worries
and the good world of your worries.
But if a whole century passes and you get tired of hoping,
Hope, if death spreads its wings over me,
You order, then let the wounded trumpeter get up,
So that the last grenade could not finish me.
But if suddenly, someday, I fail to save myself,
Whatever new battle would shake the globe of the earth,
I will still fall on that one, on that only Civil,
And the commissars in dusty helmets will bow silently over me.
other chords of Okudzhava Bulat
Translation of the text of the song by O. Mityaev - B. Okudzhava. Sentimental March (Hope I'll be back then)
Hope, I'll be back then
when trumpeter will play lights out.
When the pipe to the lips will bring
Hope, I will remain whole,
not for me the land of raw.
But for me your worries
good world and your worries.
But if a century will pass, and you hope you get tired,
Hope if you need me death will open its wing
You order, then let the wounded trumpeter will just stand up,
To the last grenade to finish me off failed.
But if suddenly, one day, I to protect themselves will fail
Whatever the new battle was not pocacola b earth,
I will still fall on that, on the one Gradskoj,
And the Commissars in dusty helmets will bend silently over me.
other chords Okudzhava Bulat
"And commissars in dusty helmets..."
Alexander Rifeev
The title uses a line from a very famous song by Bulat Okudzhava. I am on the main avenue named after the leader of the world proletariat in a very large old city in the Urals. A wide avenue in the center of the passage is divided by a long public garden made of trees and ornamental shrubs, benches are located along the public garden, the public garden itself is fenced with cast iron gratings. Behind the lattice fence on both sides of the square, tram tracks were laid. Between the tracks and sidewalks there is a roadbed. There is also a tram stop on the sidewalk. In the square, on a pedestal made of wild stone, facing the main city square "1905", there is a monument. The figure on the pedestal leaned forward in a revolutionary impulse, as if she were speaking at a large and crowded meeting. On the stone: "To Yakov Mikhailovich Sverdlov - the Ural proletariat." (The city then bore his name - "Sverdlovsk". Now the city has returned its old, no less glorious and famous name - "Ekaterinburg".) Still, it is interesting, what were you really like, knights and leaders of the great Russian revolution?
In a stormy Soviet history there is one very important episode. This villainous assassination of enemies proletarian revolution on political leader Bolshevik-internationalists V.I. Lenin. It was after him that the so-called. "Red Terror".
Chronicle from the newspapers of that time:
“Yesterday, August 30 (1918), at about 9 pm, an assassination attempt was made on Comrade V.I. Lenin, who was making a speech at the Michelson plant. When leaving the rally, V.I. Lenin was stopped by two women who started a conversation with him about the latest decree of the Moscow Soviet on the free transport of one and a half pounds of bread.
At this time, when they were detaining V.I. Lenin, shots rang out, with which the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars was wounded in the arm and in the back. The intellectual girl who shot was detained. Tov. V.I.Lenin was transported to the Kremlin. According to the doctors, the injury does not inspire fear.”
Official bulletin.
“Two blind gunshot wounds were ascertained; one bullet entered over the left shoulder blade, penetrated the chest cavity, damaged the upper lobe of the lung, caused a pleural hemorrhage and lodged in the right side of the neck above the right collarbone. Another bullet penetrated the left shoulder, shattered the bone and got stuck under the skin of the left shoulder area, there are signs of internal bleeding. Pulse 104. The patient is fully conscious. Involved in treatment the best specialists surgeons."
“Not fear and embarrassment, but hatred and revenge…”; “...Beware, gentlemen, White Socialist-Revolutionaries and White Mensheviks! Beware, gentlemen officers and saboteurs! “Beware, gentlemen, bourgeois, Russians and “allied”, paying money hired killers!"; “Do you want a war, a merciless war – at the front and in the rear, on the street and in houses? The working class takes up the challenge. Against your leaders, he also has the means. We have enough of your hostages”; “War is like war. To your vile, petty, individual terror, the working class will respond with mass, merciless class terror, of which you have not yet dreamed. Workers! The time has come when either you must destroy the bourgeoisie, or it will destroy you ... ”(Pravda, August 31, 1918)
First information.
“In the radiogram of the chairman of the central executive committee Ya.M. rallies, spoke to the workers of the Mechelson plant in the Zamoskvoretsky district of Moscow. When leaving the rally, V.I. Lenin was wounded. Two shooters have been arrested." In the same first radiogram, Ya.M. Sverdlov declares: “The working class will respond to the attempt against its leaders by even greater rallying of its forces, will respond with merciless mass terror against the enemies of the revolution.”
Simultaneously with Ya.M. Sverdlov, another radio telegram was sent from the Moscow Council of Workers and Red Army Deputies signed by Chairman L. Kamenev. The latter also calls for "the iron hand of the insurgent proletariat to fall on the years of dying capitalism." Kamenev further declares: “We will be merciless. On our way, we will sweep away all obstacles.” ("Kyiv thought", September 1, 1918) Source: V.I. Kurbatov "Assassination of leaders" pp.29-32
So, on August 30, 1918, in Moscow, at the Michelson plant, V.I. Lenin was seriously wounded by two shots. He was shot by Fanny Kaplan associated with the Socialist Revolutionary Party. On the same day in Petrograd, Leonid Kannegiser killed the chairman of the Petrograd Cheka, MS Uritsky. Although Kaplan and Kanegiser acted alone, these assassination attempts on V.I. Lenin and M.S. "Red Terror" with mass executions of hostages.
Reference. Fanny Efimovna Kaplan was born in 1890 in the Volyn province in Ukraine. Her father was a teacher in the Jewish religious primary school. Fani had three sisters and three brothers. Her real name and surname is Feiga Khaimovna Roidman. Under this surname, she lived until the age of 16.
During the revolution of 1905, Fanny Kaplan joined the anarchists. In revolutionary circles, she was known under the pseudonym "Dora". In 1906, on December 22, she was arrested in Kyiv in connection with the organization of a terrorist bomb explosion. During the bombing, Kaplan herself was slightly injured and partially lost her sight. No one else was injured in the explosion (the explosion occurred in a hotel room). Kaplan's accomplice - Yakov Shmidman managed to escape. Military field court in Kyiv on December 30, 1906 sentenced her to death penalty, which, due to the minority of F. Kaplan, was replaced by eternal hard labor.
At first, F. Kaplan was imprisoned in Maltsevskaya hard labor prison, then in the Akatui hard labor prison of the Nerchinsk mining district (Transbaikalia). There, F. Kaplan met Maria Spiridonova, a well-known figure in the Russian revolutionary movement. Under the influence of Spiridonova, Kaplan from an anarchist became a socialist-revolutionary (socialist-revolutionary). In 1913, according to an amnesty declared for the 300th anniversary of the Romanov dynasty, F.Kaplan's stay in hard labor was reduced to 20 years.
F. Kaplan was in hard labor until February Revolution 1917 After her release, she lived for some time in Chita. In April 1917 she arrived in Moscow. In the summer of 1917 she was in a sanatorium for former political prisoners in the city of Evpatoria in the Crimea. October Revolution found F. Kaplan in Kharkov, where she underwent an operation on her eyes (during hard labor, Fanny Kaplan periodically had bouts of blindness). From Kharkov, F.Kaplan moved to Simferopol, where she worked at training courses for workers of volost zemstvos.
F.Kaplan with an umbrella and a briefcase in his hands was arrested immediately after the injury of V.I. Lenin. Witnesses to the assassination attempt did not see F. Kaplan shooting at Lenin, nor did they see her standing next to Lenin. F. Kaplan had a Browning in his briefcase. During the interrogation, F. Kaplan confessed to the attempt on Lenin. F. Kaplan was shot on September 3, 1918 in the Kremlin by commandant N. Malkov. The body, according to N. Malkov, was burned and buried in the Alexander Garden.
And now let's consider the specific circumstances of the case, as they are presented according to V.I. Kurbatov "Assassination of leaders" p.32-71. My comments are in italics.
1. The results of shooting from a distance of two or three meters are very mediocre, which is not surprising - F. Kaplan did not see well and had no experience in shooting from a pistol or revolver (provided that she really shot at Lenin, if we accept as a condition that she shot everything if not Kaplan, then such results of the shooting can only be regarded as evidence of a staged assassination attempt).
2. There were three or four shots in total (all witnesses to the assassination heard three shots, after which four cartridge cases were found at the scene of the assassination).
3. In addition to Lenin, the woman who talked to him, M.G. Popova, was also slightly injured. It can be concluded that a small-caliber weapon with a low-power cartridge was used. The book does not say anything about this, it is possible that it was a revolver or a 6.35 mm Browning pistol.
4. "Browning" No. 150489 was picked up by the worker A.V. Kuznetsov near the car and on September 2, 1918 was handed over (in response to a newspaper note about a request to hand over a revolver not found at the scene of the assassination) to the same investigator in charge of the assassination case .
5. The execution of F. Kaplan before the end of the investigation proves that either the investigation knew for certain that there was no conspiracy and the loner shot (I wonder, for what reason, on the 4th day of the investigation, could you already be sure of this?), Or by execution F .Kaplan cut off her ties with the real organizers of the assassination (in this case, the persons interested in hiding the traces of the person had to be surrounded by Lenin).
6. The case of the assassination attempt on V.I. Lenin was handled by: Chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee Ya.M. and member of the board of the Cheka V.E. Kingisepp, deputy. chairman of the Cheka Ya.Kh.Peters, head. otd. VChK N.A. Skrypnik.
7. During 4 days and nights (August 30, 31 and September 1, 2) more than 40 witnesses to the assassination attempt were interrogated. Fifteen people were involved in the investigative case of F.Kaplan. After the execution of F. Kaplan and the end of the investigation, all of them were released.
8. In F.Ye.Kaplan's case No. H-200, 124 sheets were stitched and numbered. Sheets 52, 76, 102 are repeated twice. Sheets 1, 78 - once. Case sheets 11, 84, 87, 94 are missing.
9. D.N. Kursky was the first to interrogate F.Kaplan; she refused to answer his questions. Interrogation protocols compiled by Y.Kh. Perers and N.A. Skrypnik On August 31, 1918, the arrested woman signed “F. Kaplan”. On August 31, V.E. Kingisepp joined the interrogations. F. Kaplan gave answers about her past life, but she still refused to answer questions about her accomplices in the attempt.
10. The main witness of the assassination attempt, Lenin's driver Stepan Gil, gave the following testimony: "I saw the shooter" only "after the shots were fired." Then he remembered “a woman's hand with a Browning”, from which “three shots were fired. The shooting woman threw a revolver at my feet and disappeared into the crowd. This revolver lay at my feet. With me, no one raised this revolver. He would later say that he "pushed him under the car with his foot". Neither a revolver was found under the car, nor a Browning rifle was found at the scene of the assassination. (Why such a confusion with weapons, then a Browning revolver, then a Browning pistol, was it really impossible to distinguish a revolver from a pistol?)
By the way, in addition to the above: from any revolver it is possible to fire cartridges with an arbitrarily weakened powder charge; because the mechanism of the revolver operates only on the muscular strength of the shooter and there will be no delays in firing, therefore the revolver is an ideal weapon for staging an assassination attempt on Lenin, but firing a pistol with cartridges with a weakened powder charge will lead to a failure of the automatic mechanism and the pistol will have to be fired before each shot recharge manually.
11. The behavior (according to the memoirs of J. Peters) in these days of the second person after Lenin - Y. M. Sverdlov is as follows. On August 31, in the evening, Sverdlov told Peters that in the morning an official report should be given in Izvestia of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. Write briefly, he advised. These "conspirators" will have to be released - there is nothing against them, Peters said. So far, this lady does not smell of any connections with any organization, but the fact that she is a right-wing Socialist-Revolutionary, I said. And in general, amateurs like us should be imprisoned ourselves.
Sverdlov did not answer. September 2 Sverdlov convenes the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, calls Peters. Peters says new data is emerging, an investigative experiment, a fingerprint examination will be carried out. Sverdlov agrees - the investigation must continue. However, Kaplan will have to be dealt with today. “Is there a confession in the case? Eat. Comrades, I am making a proposal - to shoot citizen Kaplan for the crime she committed ”(Y.M. Sverdlov).
“Yesterday, by order of the Cheka, the right-wing Socialist-Revolutionary Fanny Royd (aka Kaplan) who shot at comrade V.I. Lenin was shot.” "News of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee", September 4, 1918
There is a clear interest of Ya.M. Sverdlov in the immediate death of F. Kaplan. Already on the second day, even before the end of the investigation, he accused his former comrades-in-arms in the proletarian revolution of the assassination attempt. Why such a rush?
12. Despite allegations that the life of the leader of the revolution hangs in the balance, it is reliably known: 1. After being wounded, V.I. Lenin climbed the steep stairs to the third floor on his own (S. Gil). 2. The doctor A.P. Vinokurov, who arrived first, found V.I. Lenin undressing by the bed. 3. When V.I. Lenin was bandaged left hand He didn't let out a single groan. It shocked everyone then. ("News of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee"). 4. On September 3, 1918, Vladimir Ilyich got out of bed and left without outside help. For what the paramedic on duty was punished (ibid.).
It is known that on September 2, 1918, the decision of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee took place, and on September 5, the Council of People's Commissars adopted a resolution on the "Red Terror". Therefore, only on September 5, there are reports in the press that the life of V.I. Lenin is out of danger.
On the same day, Dr. Obukh gave an interview to the Pravda newspaper. Since there were no reports of the operation in the press, the correspondent asked: “And the bullets? What about the operation? In response, Dr. Obukh said literally the following: “Well, well, you can take them out even now - they lie on the very surface. In any case, extracting them does not pose any danger, and Ilyich will be completely healthy in a few days. If the bullets were under the skin on the surface of the body, then why didn’t anyone try to extract them for a whole week?
Based on this, some researchers of the history of the assassination attempt, for example, in the version of the assassination attempt published by O. Vasiliev in Nezavisimaya Gazeta on August 29, 1992, argued that there were no bullets at all, since Kaplan fired blanks! (But then what about the wound of M.G. Popova?)
Other researchers of the history of the attempt on the leader claimed that Lenin was shot at by his own people and the organizer of the attempt was called none other than Ya.M. Sverdlov himself! (Emperor Nicholas II and his family with accompanying persons, on the instructions of the same Ya.M. Sverdlov, were killed very successfully on July 17, 1918 in Yekaterinburg, but here for some reason they wentof off?)
And remains eternal question: who is to blame and who benefited from it?
So what was it, a fatal tragedy or an attempted comedy that allowed the Bolshevik internationalists to start the “Red Terror” in the country, in fact, the Jewish nationalist terror? And another question, what is the price?
So exceptionally freedom-loving and democratic Jewish Israelis estimated the freedom of two of their soldiers in July-August 2006 at more than one and a half thousand lives of Lebanese Arabs and more than 160 lives of their own Israelis. But the Bolshevik-Leninists valued the leader’s shot-through suit at thousands and thousands of lives of the victims of the “Red Terror” in Russia.
Which one do you think is more principled?
But it would be dishonest not to mention other, also principled Jewish commissars. IN last years so-called During the Gorbachev perestroika, Jewish liberal-democratic propagandists, as a newly discovered truth, reported various long-known "fried" facts from the times of Lenin, Stalin and Khrushchev. In the then ranking of the main villains national history the first three places firmly belonged to Lenin, Stalin and Beria. Together with them, the name of another villain was also mentioned. He was a smaller rank, but also did not leave our perestroika indifferent. His name is Mekhlis Lev Zakharovich, in Stalin's time the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Army and the Minister of State Control. One legend was told about him, which eventually became an anecdote. Here she is.
Mekhlis makes a report to Stalin after the war. One of the points: the general (name, surname) glorified in the war left his wife, started a “relationship” with an artist from the Moscow theater, then left her too. Now the general new novel with a nurse from the medical unit. Having reported, Mekhlis asks: “What are we going to do with the general, Comrade Stalin?” An oppressive silence reigns. Stalin is silent, Mekhlis is waiting for the will of the leader. Without waiting, Mehlis continues on. When the list of items ended, Mekhlis again: “Joseph Vissarionovich, so what are we going to do? The general is doing something with his women!” Stalin: “What, what. We will envy! The listeners concluded that Mekhlis was a "big scoundrel." Not so long ago, Yu. Rubtsov's book "Stalin's Alter Ego" appeared on bookstores. This is about Mehlis. I took the book in my hands. Scrolled through. Y. Rubtsov evaluates Mekhlis extremely negatively. Put her back. The fact that Mehlis is bad, I knew before, and the fact that he is “very bad” is no longer interesting to me at all. Ah, if only there were more intelligence in my head!
A small reference from the Military Encyclopedia. “MEHLIS Lev Zakharovich (1889-1953), Soviet military leader, political worker of the Red Army, Colonel General (1944). On military service in the Russian army from 1911, in the Red Army 1918-1922, 1938-1946. Graduated from the Institute of Red Professors (1930). Until 1938 he worked in the apparatus of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. In 1938-42, with the rank of army commissar of the 1st rank, he became deputy. People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and headed the highest political agencies of the Red Army (Political Administration of the Red Army, since 1940 - the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda, since 1941 - the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army). Since 1940 People's Commissar of State Control. In 1942-1945, a member of the Military Council of the 6th Army, Voronezh, Volkhov, Bryansk, Steppe, 2nd Baltic, Western, 2nd Belorussian and 4th Ukrainian fronts. From the post of People's Commissar of the State Control was not released in 1946-1950. continued to serve as Minister of State Control. Quite a normal reference, there is nothing compromising. But to some other famous historical figures The "Military Encyclopedia" is not so indifferent.
Here, for example, is a reference to the villain of all times and peoples, Lavrenty Beria:
"BERIA Lavrenty Pavlovich (1899-1953), Soviet statesman and military leader, Marshal Soviet Union(1945), Hero of the Social. Labor (1943). He graduated from a technical school (1919). Since 1921 in the state security agencies. In 1938–45 People's Commissar, in 1953 Minister of the Interior of the USSR, since 1941 Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (since 1946 the Council of Ministers of the USSR). Member of the Great Patriotic War State Committee Defense (GKO), since 1944 deputy. GKO Chairman. He was a member of the closest political environment of I.V. Stalin. One of the most active organizers mass repression 30 - early 50s, arrested in June 1953, deprived of all titles and awards; on charges of conspiracy to seize power, sentenced to death by the Special Judicial Presence of the Supreme Court of the USSR, shot. Or another reference to an equally interesting person.
“FRINOVSKY Mikhail Petrovich (1898-1940), Soviet statesman and military leader, commander of the 1st rank (1938). In military service since 1916, in the Red Army since 1918. He graduated from the Higher Academic Courses at the Military Academy. M.V. Frunze (1927). Participant civil war: squadron leader. Since 1919, in various positions in the state security agencies. Since 1933, the head of the Main Directorate of the Border Guard and the OGPU troops, in 1934-37 the head of the Main Directorate of the Border and Internal Troops of the NKVD, since 1937, the 1st Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR and the head of the Main Directorate state security. In 1938-39 People's Commissar of the Navy. Arrested in 1939, convicted in 1940, shot.
Let's take a closer look at Beria and Frinovsky in Chap. 5. "The struggle of Anti-civilization with Russia" in paragraph 3.5.2. “No, guys, it’s not like that, it’s not like that, guys…”, but for now, back to Mehlis. So, thanks to his lack of curiosity and liberal-democratic propagandists, Mekhlis became to me, as in a thieves' song, "not at all interesting."
And in the spring of 2006, a program dedicated to the Great Patriotic War was broadcast on the TV Center channel. The next episode is on the air. In 1941, Mekhlis, visiting the front line at the front, noticed that often dead Red Army soldiers were not buried for several days, information about the dead was not collected, and data on the dead was not kept. After the report of Mehlis to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, i.e. Stalin, special funeral teams were created in the army and records of data on fallen soldiers. And this is already very interesting! It turns out that our generals, making their careers and glory on soldier's blood, did not care at all about the dead soldiers, and only the intervention of Mehlis, as the chief commissar of the Red Army, saved thousands of the dead from obscurity. It turns out that the "bad" Mekhlis is morally better than many of our generals, all together and each separately?
And already in the summer of 2006, Y. Mukhin's book "If it weren't for the generals!" appeared on sale. Chapter 6 "Commissars" of this book just discusses the fate and life of Mekhlis on the basis of data from Yu. Rubtsov's "Alter ego of Stalin", which I so stupidly once let go of. I offer you an abbreviated text of the chapter, without moral judgments and emotions, in the dispassionate style of the Military Encyclopedia.
Mekhlis L.Z. was born in Odessa in 1889. He graduated from the 6th grade of the Jewish school. Worked as a clerk. In 1907, he joined the Zionist Paole Zion (Workers of Zion) party. Soon he got out of it. In 1911 he was called to royal army to the 2nd Grenadier Artillery Brigade. A year later he became a scorer. Later he served as a non-commissioned officer as a platoon fireworker. He served in the old army until January 1918. After demobilization, he joined the Bolshevik Party. In 1919 he was sent as a commissar to the active army. At first he was the commissar of the reserve brigade in Yekaterinoslav. On May 10, 1919, the detachments of Ataman Grigoriev captured the city. Mekhlis with two dozen Red Army soldiers makes his way out of the city. He meets reinforcements going to Yekaterinoslav, together with him he fights with the Grigorievites for two days, until they are driven out of Yekaterinoslav.
Then he was appointed commissar of the 2nd International Regiment in the 14th Army. The regiment distinguished itself in battles with Denikin's men. Then Mekhlis was appointed commissar to the 46th division. The division had the glory of a partisan and there "it was risky to call yourself a communist." “The weight of the hand of the new commissar in the division was felt immediately. First of all, the political department, the special department and the revolutionary tribunal were strengthened, the commanders and political workers, about whom there was doubt, were removed from their posts. Instead of them, he appointed "verified" people. In relation to "traitors, self-seekers and cowards" he acted harshly ... ". The command at that time valued Mehlis more not as a political commissar, but as a knowledgeable military officer. Soon the 46th Rifle Division became part of the 13th Army. The army was entrusted with the task of preventing the withdrawal of the 3rd Army Corps from Northern Tavria to the Crimea Volunteer army Major General Ya.A. Slashchev. But it was not possible to intercept Slashchev's corps. By January 24, 1920, only one 46th division reached the Perekop and Chongar isthmuses. At first, the Reds even took Perekop and Armyansk. But then they paid a very high price for it. Slashchev collected all the reserves and, with heavy losses for the Reds, pushed the 46th division over the isthmus. In March, the 13th Army began to advance again and even broke through the defenses on the Perekop Isthmus, but was again driven back by Slashchev's troops.
Having accumulated strength by spring, the Whites on April 14, 1920, south of Melitopol, near the village of Kirillovka, landed troops as part of the Alekseevsky Infantry Regiment and the Kornilov artillery battery. The enemy tried to cut railway through which the entire 13th Army was supplied. All this happened directly in the rear of the 46th division. New boss divisions Yu.V. Sablin and military commissar L.Z. Mekhlis organized the destruction of the landing force. Mekhlis, together with a detachment formed from parts of the Melitopol garrison, stopped the landing. And the approaching 409th regiment defended the railway. The enemy along the coast from the side of the Arbat Spit broke through to Genichesk and went into the rear of the 411th regiment, the regiment began to retreat. Mehlis hurried to meet the retreating, stopped them and organized a counterattack. In this battle, Mehlis was wounded. On April 18, 1920, Sablin and Mekhlis were presented by the Revolutionary Military Council of the 13th Army for awarding the Orders of the Red Banner.
On July 22, 1920, the Revolutionary Military Council of the South-Western Front appointed L.Z. Mekhlis commissar of the Strike Group of the Right-Bank Ukraine. The group was given the task of crossing the Dnieper with a subsequent attack on Perekop. On the night of August 7, the group crossed the Dnieper and captured a bridgehead in the Kakhovka area. Five days later, the enemy forced the Pravoberezhnaya group to retreat to Kakhovka. Here, on September 7, 1920, on the Kakhovka bridgehead, the enemy, having gone on the offensive with the forces of the Kornilov infantry division, supported by artillery and tanks, tried to capture the Kakhovka bridgehead. Mehlis also participated in repelling the enemy. "As an experienced artilleryman, he himself stood at one of the guns and ordered the battery to open rapid fire on the tanks."
During the years of the Civil War, L.Z. Mekhlis participated: in the battles to liberate the city of Yekaterinoslav from the Grigorievites; in the battles of the 2nd International Regiment with Denikin; turned the 46th division into a combat-ready formation; in the battles of January 1920 in the Crimea; in the defeat of the Alekseevsky landing; in the battles to hold the Kakhovka bridgehead. It should be noted that Mehlis had experience of fighting with an exceptionally strong opponent. Lieutenant General Ya.A. Slashchev was considered one of the most successful and talented commanders white movement. In 1921, Slashchev returned from exile to the USSR and until 1929 taught tactics at the Higher Command Courses Shot.
After the end of the Civil War, Mekhlis worked in the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection (Rabkrin), in the apparatus of the Council of People's Commissars. In 1922, Stalin entrusted Mekhlis with work in the apparatus of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. From 1926 to 1929, inclusive, Mekhlis studied at the Institute of Red Professors. Then he is sent as an executive editor to the Pravda newspaper, and soon he becomes the editor-in-chief of Pravda. In 1937, after the disclosure of a conspiracy in the Red Army and the suicide of one of the leaders of the conspiracy, Ya.B. Gamarnik, the post of head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army became vacant. At the end of 1937, Mekhlis was appointed to the post of head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army. During these years, the USSR held two armed conflicts (Khasan and Khalkhin-Gol) and the Soviet-Finnish war. In all these theaters of military operations, there was also the Chief Commissar of the Red Army L.Z. Mekhlis. The following statements of our politicians about LZ Mekhlis are known. N. S. Khrushchev: “He was a truly honest man, but in some ways he was crazy.” JV Stalin about Mekhlis: "I can't do anything with him." Stalin allegedly said this after Mekhlis challenged the decision of I.V. Stalin himself to reinstate an employee who was previously dismissed for violating labor discipline.
L.Z. Mekhlis did not have any political tact in relation to the so-called. God's chosen nation, which by its worst representatives always creates a strong racist political organization in the host country. When, after the pre-war purge of the army, they calculated the following, among the garbage swept by Mehlis, the percentage of Jews turned out to be several times greater than the percentage of them in general in the army. After that, the curious asked the question: what is the nationality of Mehlis himself? He replied that by nationality he was not a Jew, but a communist. And by this, of course, he offended the racists from God's chosen people very much. Therefore, the victims of Stalinism and the hero of democracy from L.Z. Mekhlis did not work out.
In August 1940, the institute of military commissars in the Red Army was abolished and Mekhlis was appointed to the post People's Commissar People's Commissariat of State Control. Mehlis became a scourge for the party-state nomenclature. In the first half of 1941 alone, Mekhlis organized over 400 audits, thoroughly disturbing and arousing the hatred of the highest bureaucracy. Horrible: people's commissar of light industry, people's commissar of state farms, people's commissar of the shipbuilding industry, people's commissar of the oil industry, people's commissar navy, People's Commissar of the meat and dairy industry. He even suffered (an unheard of thing!) Attorney General. At the request of Mekhlis, the Prosecutor General was forced to bring some of his heads of departments to justice.
The day before the start of the Great Patriotic War Namely, on June 21, 1941, L.Z. Mekhlis was again returned to the People's Commissariat of Defense and appointed head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army. Some examples of the activities of LZ Mekhlis during the Great Patriotic War. The episode with the organization of funeral teams by Mehlis has already been given above. And now how Mekhlis cared for the living. In the book, Rubtsov cites the memoirs of the head of the Main Directorate of Logistics of the Red Army, General of the Army A.V. Khrulev (a famous and glorious military surname). Quote: “Having checked the situation in the 4th Army, Mekhlis telegraphed on January 4 to the head of the rear of the Red Army, General Khrulev: “The situation with food forage is intolerable. As of January 2, according to the data of the Logistics Directorate, in units and warehouses of the army there was 0 meat, 0 vegetables, 0 canned food, 0 biscuits. In some places, they give out 200 grams of bread. What is here - handlessness or conscious enemy work? Further “At one of the meetings with the participation of the commanders and members of the military councils of the fronts, Stalin asked if anyone had any complaints about material support? Everyone was silent. Only Mekhlis said that "the rear is working very poorly, does not fully provide the troops with food." Stalin immediately summoned Khrulev to a meeting and offered to explain himself.
The head of the rear dared to ask who was complaining and about what? “And what do you think? – followed by a counter question. Khrulev writes further: “I answer: “Most likely, this is Mekhlis.” As soon as I uttered these words, there was an explosion of laughter in the office. It intensified even more when Mekhlis outlined the essence of the claims: “You all the time do not release us bay leaves, vinegar, pepper, mustard.”
The fact is that the main food of the Russian soldier is flour products, as the most high-calorie ones, and meat. But these are insipid foods, and without acid and spices, they very quickly begin to be poorly absorbed by the body. In peacetime, a person receives the necessary amount of acids from vegetables, especially pickled ones. Since the time of Peter the Great, this issue has been resolved in the Russian army in the following way: the army was centrally supplied only with bread and cereals, about a kilogram of bread and 100 grams of cereal per person per day. For everything else, sums of money were issued, and each company, hundred, squadron or battery ran its own household, buying vegetables, meat, other products and fodder for horses. In peacetime, they even planted vegetable gardens for themselves. But since 1846, soldiers were supposed to be given mandatory: 22 grams of salt, 1 gram of pepper and 62 grams of vinegar per day. For example, in the "Reference book for officers" printed in 1913, in the section "Food in wartime" was: in terms of grams): vinegar - 62 grams; citric acid - 1 gram. So it turns out that the political commissar Mehlis, as a former non-commissioned officer of the old Russian army, knew all these subtleties perfectly, and the head of the rear of the Red Army, General Khrulev, who received money and orders for this, did not understand the essence of the issue, and did not want to understand . Yu.Rubtsov gives some more interesting facts.
Quote: “Organizational conclusions followed such telegrams. In particular, the head of the rear of the neighboring North-Western Front, General N.A. Kuznetsov, suffered. Under pressure from Mehlis, he was sentenced to death, which, however, was later replaced by demotion to the rank and file. Further “On the Volkhov front, for example, he stood up for the former regiment commander Kolesov, who was groundlessly brought to party responsibility. And at the request of the chief surgeon of the front, Professor A.A. Vishnevsky, he achieved an order for the major of the medical service Berkovsky, who was undeservedly bypassed with awards. On the Western Front, he actively contributed to the restoration of the former post of deputy commander of the 91st Guards Rifle Division for the rear, lieutenant colonel of the quartermaster service I.V. Shchukin.
The role of Mehles in the history of the defeat of the Crimean Front in May 1942 is interesting. landing operations from December 25, 1941 to January 2, 1942, they captured a number of bridgeheads on the Kerch Peninsula and liberated Feodosia. Three armies were transferred to the Crimea - 44, 47, 51st. But already on January 15, 1942, the Germans again captured Feodosia, and with much more weak forces. Stalin recalls Mekhlis from the Volkhov front and sends him to the Crimea. Two days later, Mekhlis reports to Stalin. “Arrived in Kerch on January 20, 1942 ... I found the most unsightly picture of command and control ... Kozlov of the Komfront (Lieutenant General Dmitry Timofeevich Kozlov. Approx. Author) does not know the position of the units at the front, their condition, as well as enemy groupings. There is no data on the number of people, the presence of artillery and mortars for any division. Kozlov leaves the impression of a commander who is confused and unsure of his actions. None of the leading workers of the front has been in the army since the occupation of the Kerch Peninsula ... ". Further, on February 15, 1942, Mekhlis was summoned to Stalin to report on the readiness of the troops of the Crimean Front for the offensive. Stalin was dissatisfied with the report and allowed the timing of the offensive in the Crimea to be pushed back. Mekhlis requested 271st, 276th and 320th rifle divisions from the North Caucasus Military District to reinforce the front. In a conversation with the commander of the troops of the North Caucasus Military District V.N. Kurdyumov on February 16, he demanded that the divisions be cleared of "Caucasians" (Mekhlis's term) and replaced with military personnel of Russian nationality. Further, Mekhlis's notes on the troops of the Crimean Front: “400 rifle divisions by April 11 had nothing but rifles”, “12 sbr. Tank speed is bad. They crawl like turtles." “Military intelligence works poorly”, “389 sd. There were no battle formations, they are marching in herds. It can be understood that Mekhlis was familiar with the real situation and knew the state of the troops of the Crimean Front to the level of the brigade, inclusive. The task of the Crimean Front was to advance against the 11th german army General Manstein, to release the besieged Sevastopol and liberate the Crimea. The offensive began on February 27, 1942. The Crimean Front, consisting of 13 divisions, acted against 3 German divisions of Manstein's 11th Army. Already on March 2, the offensive was stopped due to a clear failure. On March 9, 1942, Mekhlis sent a proposal to Stalin to remove Kozlov. But only the chief of staff of the front, Major General Tolbukhin, was removed. On March 29, 1942, Mekhlis sent a new report with a request to replace Kozlov. Stalin replied: “You demand that we replace Kozlov with someone like Hindenburg. But you can't help but know that we don't have Hindenburgs in reserve." (The full text of Stalin's answer to Mekhlis is given by A. Isaev in "Offensive of Marshal Shaposhnikov. The history of the Second World War, which we did not know." P. 274-275.) Mekhlis proposed replacing Kozlov with K.K. Rokossovsky. Realizing that K.K. Rokossovsky, most likely, they would not give him, he also offered others: N.K. Klykov or V.N. Lvov. Stalin did not replace Kozlov, and this is how it all ended.
The Germans began their offensive on May 8, 1942. The balance of power was as follows. The Crimean Front had 296 thousand people, 498 tanks, 4668 guns, 574 aircraft. The enemy had a strength of 150 thousand people, 180 tanks, 2470 guns, 400 aircraft. The Germans immediately pressed all three armies of the Crimean Front to the sea, and already on May 19, 1942, they completely captured the Kerch Peninsula. Our losses: 176 thousand people killed, captured, wounded, 3.5 thousand guns and mortars, 347 tanks, 400 aircraft, 10,400 vehicles and 860 artillery tractors were lost. Including 1,133 guns, 258 tanks, 323 aircraft were captured by the enemy. Enemy losses amounted to about 7,500 people. Already on May 13, the command of the Crimean Front began to cross over to Taman, by May 17, the entire command of the front had already left the Kerch Peninsula, leaving their troops there. On the night of May 20, 1942, Mekhlis with the last groups of soldiers crossed the strait to the Taman Peninsula. After the defeat of the Crimean Front, Lieutenant-General D.T. Kozlov was demoted and received command of the 24th Army. In October 1942, he became deputy. commander of the Voronezh Front. And in 1943 he was "pushed" to Far East. Mekhlis was punished more severely (apparently, Stalin could not forgive himself that Mekhlis turned out to be more perspicacious than he, Stalin himself!, and removed Mekhlis away from his eyes, as a reproach for his personnel mistake that led to the Kerch disaster). He was removed from the post of head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army and his rank was reduced by two steps from the army commissar of the first rank to the corps commissar. Later, Mekhlis was a member of the Military Council of the 6th Army and a number of fronts (see reference), he ended the war on the 4th Ukrainian Front. Last rank of Colonel General.
After the war, L.Z. Mekhlis served as Minister of State Control of the USSR. And the thieves from the party-Soviet nomenklatura lost their peace for a long time. Here is the data from the book by V. Sirotkin “Who robbed Russia?”. pp. 86-87. Quote: “And at the same time in the same year (1948, ut. Aut.), judging by the report of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 28,810 employees of the Ministry of Trade and consumer cooperation were prosecuted for embezzlement under the law of 1947 and imprisoned - for 10 thousand people. 225 people more than in 1947. Moreover, the cost of goods stolen from the state: only from January to September 1948, "gostorgashi" stole goods and embezzled 169 million "new Stalinist" rubles - 28 million more than in 1947 ., and their "smaller brothers" - consumer cooperators - by 326 million, or 20.5 million more than in the previous year. ... In April - May 1948, the OBKhSS of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, together with party and Soviet bodies, immediately carried out "control measurements" throughout the country of 81 thousand 700 shops, canteens, tents, stalls of the USSR Ministry of Trade, as well as numerous ORSs of large ministries and departments . And it turned out: in 16 thousand 087 trading “points” they serve the buyer precisely on the principle “you can’t deceive - you won’t sell” ... As a result, 4 thousand 929 people thundered into prison with confiscation of property under the law of 1947. End of quote. And although Mekhlis is not mentioned here, but remembering his fight against thieves back in 1940-41, one can guess that Lev Zakharovich could not do without the energy and integrity here either. At the end of 1949, L.Z. Mekhlis suffered a stroke, followed by a heart attack. In the summer of 1952, L.Z. Mekhlis was sent for treatment to the Crimea, where he died on February 13, 1953.
There were also such Jewish commissars who, with their vile decisions (like Ya.M. Sverdlov and many others), did not carry out repressions of the Russian population, did not save themselves in the war in rear positions, did not bow to enemy bullets, did not bend before high authorities, greedy hands to people's good they did not hold out, and they fought for communism not only in words, but also in deeds. But this breed of people, extremely rare among our dear Jews, died out like mammoths back in the time of Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev. Alexander Rifeev
