November 30, 1939 in the morning, at 8 hours 30 minutes, several hundred thousand soldiers of the Red Army crossed the Soviet-Finnish border along its entire length. One of the most shameful wars in the history of the twentieth century began.
The war, which in Soviet and post-Soviet historiography was called the Soviet-Finnish, and in the works of Western historians - Winter, because fighting took place in winter: peace was concluded on March 13, 1940.
Stalinist propaganda piled mountains of lies around this war - about both its causes, and the incident that became the immediate reason for it, and the course of hostilities, and about the losses of the parties and the circumstances of the conclusion of peace. After 1940, until the very collapse of the USSR, official Soviet historiography preferred not to mention this, as the poet Alexander Tvardovsky said, “unfamous” war at all.
And if they did remember, they did it “patter”, without going into details. Nothing fundamentally changed after the collapse of the USSR. Despite the fact that in the 90s of the last century a number of fairly objective studies devoted to this topic appeared, the general tone and assessments of the Winter War remained basically unchanged. The opinion is still being imposed that Stalin's decision to start a war against Finland was due to "objective necessity". “On the northwestern borders of the USSR, the task was to ensure the security of Leningrad,” this is how he explains to Russian applicants the main reason for the Soviet Finnish war manual for applicants to universities "History of Russia from ancient times to the end of the twentieth century" edited by V. Kerov 2008 edition.
Now, after the publication in May of this year. Decree of Dmitry Medvedev "On the Commission under the President Russian Federation on countering attempts to falsify history to the detriment of Russia's interests”, an objective study of one of the most shameful pages in the history of the USSR is becoming increasingly problematic for our northeastern neighbors.
Attempts to justify the aggression against little Finland have become part of the ideological justification of the imperial-nationalist hysteria, which the current Kremlin leadership is diligently (and not unsuccessfully) fanning. It proclaimed itself the heir to the USSR, but does not want to bear any, even moral, responsibility for the criminal actions of this state in the international arena. Last year's "operation to force Georgia to peace" clearly demonstrated that Moscow, for the sake of "improving the geopolitical situation," again does not hesitate to use armed force against neighboring sovereign states.
Today it is already well known that, according to the secret protocols to the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact (Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact) signed on August 23, 1939, the two totalitarian regimes divided spheres of influence in Eastern Europe between them. The Treaty of September 28, 1939 on friendship and border formalized the de facto alliance between Hitler and Stalin, and also allowed the latter to “exchange” the Lublin and part of the Warsaw provinces of Poland for Lithuania, which belonged to the USSR in accordance with the August agreements.
Modern Russian historiography prefers to consider the Soviet-Finnish war as a "separate episode", not directly related to the events of World War II. However, it was precisely in fulfillment of allied obligations to Hitler that on September 17, 1939, Soviet troops struck in the back of Poland, which was still resisting Nazi Germany. At the same time, the Soviet Union, in an ultimatum form, offered Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Finland to conclude "treaties of friendship and mutual assistance." According to them, it was supposed to introduce "limited" contingents of Soviet troops into these countries, thereby putting an end to the "anti-Soviet policy", and in fact - turning these states into Soviet satellites. It was clear that this was only the first step towards their complete annexation by the Soviet Union. The leaders of the Baltic states rushed to seek help and support from both Germany and Britain and France, which at that time were already at war with each other, but were not actively fighting. The Nazis rudely replied that the Baltics should agree to Stalin's "proposal", while the French and British protested. However, Moscow ignored them. On September 28, Estonia, on October 5, Latvia and on October 10, 1939, Lithuania capitulated to Stalin, signing enslaving treaties. The leaders of these countries reassured themselves: “there is no other way out anyway”, there is no way to resist the Soviet military machine. They were severely punished for their weakness and desire to "somehow agree" - almost the entire pre-war political elite of the Baltic states died in Siberian camps, and the peoples suffered inhuman suffering during the 50 years of Soviet occupation. Already in the summer of 1940, the Baltic states were deprived of statehood and annexed by the Soviet Union. The capitulatory position of their leadership gave rise to the myth of "voluntary reunification" with the USSR.
And only Finland flatly refused to sign an agreement that would actually turn it into a Soviet colony. It was October 5, 1939 - the same day that Latvia capitulated. Stalin did not expect such obstinacy from a country that was 55 times (!) inferior to the Soviet Union in terms of population. However, already
On October 14, the Kremlin offered Helsinki a "compromise" option: lease the Finnish port of Hanko for 30 years to develop a Soviet naval base there; transfer to the USSR several islands in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland, most of the Karelian Isthmus and the Rybachy Peninsula - a total of 2761 square meters. km in exchange for 5529 sq. km of Soviet territory in Karelia. For the most densely populated regions of the country, deserted forests and swamps in Karelia were offered. But the most unpleasant thing was that Stalin wanted to get the Mannerheim Line on the Karelian Isthmus without a fight. It turned out that the already low chances of the Finnish army to provide successful resistance in the event of Soviet aggression were reduced to almost zero. Stalin tried to use the experience of his ally Hitler, who a year earlier forced Czechoslovakia to "voluntarily" first abandon the Sudetenland, along with its super-powerful defensive structures, and six months later, freely seized the whole country.
But long before that, in conditions of extreme secrecy, the formation of the “Finnish people's army". Its basis was the Soviet 106th Mountain Rifle Division, to which all Soviet Finns and Karelians were transferred in a fire order. They were dressed in captured Polish uniforms with Finnish distinctions. After the defeat of the Finnish state, the "People's Army" were to become a stronghold of the occupying forces in the conquered country. In three and a half months, four divisions of the "people's army" were formed, united in the 1st Rifle Corps. However, the necessary number of Finns, Karelians, Vepsians and Izhors in the USSR simply did not exist, and already
On February 1, 1940, the FNA command received permission to be equipped with Russians as well. Then fighters with such “Finnish” surnames as Tazhibaev, Polyansky, Ustimenko appeared in it ... The headquarters of the corps was headed by brigade commander Romanov, who has since become Raikas, and the political department - Tereshkin, from October 1939 to April 1940 was called Tervonen. Only the commander of the FNA was the real Finn Aksel Anttila, a regular officer of the Red Army, who was repressed in 1937, and in 1939 was urgently returned from the Gulag. Not a single (!) Out of almost a thousand Finnish soldiers who fell into Soviet captivity during the Winter War, he did not agree to join the ranks of this "army", despite the terrible pressure from the Soviet Chekists.
The combat capability of her "soldiers" was extremely low. During the entire period of the war, they practically did not participate in hostilities. They were kept for the "liberators" parade in occupied Helsinki. Therefore, the assertion of modern Russian historians that the cause of the Soviet-Finnish war was the uncompromising position of Helsinki regarding the mentioned "territorial proposals" of the Soviet side is completely untrue. Stalin's plan to "exchange territories in order to move the border away from Leningrad" was just a smokescreen - back in October, he decided to capture all of Finland.
In the 20th of November, reports appeared in Soviet newspapers about "the constant provocations of the White Finnish military on the Soviet border", about the "uprising of the Finnish working people against the bourgeois regime." A
On November 26, the NKVD organized a provocation near the Soviet village of Mainil on the border with Finland - the location of the Soviet 68th regiment was fired from mortars. According to false Soviet statements, four Red Army soldiers were killed and nine wounded. But in fact, there were no losses - in
In the 1990s, the Russian historian Aptekar found in the archives information and reports from the 70th Rifle Division, which included the 68th Regiment. There are no reports of shelling from the Finnish side, and no losses were recorded on November 25-28 in the division. On November 28, the Soviet Union unilaterally terminated the non-aggression pact with Finland, and on November 30 it launched a war.
December 1 in the first captured USSR locality In Finland - the holiday village of Terijoki, directly on the Soviet border, a "people's government" was created, headed by the Comintern leader Otto Kuusinen. Already on December 2, the USSR recognized its puppets as the only legitimate government of Finland and concluded a “friendship agreement” with it. It is curious that all the above information is taken from open sources- Soviet central newspapers
November-December 1939. But since then, not a single Soviet source has ever mentioned the "people's government", to whose "help" the Soviet "liberators" went. The heroic popular resistance offered to the self-proclaimed "liberators" by the small nation made this propaganda version completely unacceptable.
Stalin ordered the troops of the Leningrad Military District to break the resistance of the Finnish army within two weeks and occupy the country. The Soviet grouping, concentrated before the start of the war on the Finnish border, outnumbered its armed forces in terms of personnel by 1.6 times, in terms of the number of guns and mortars - by 5.4, aircraft - by 9.1, tanks - by 88 (!) times ! The Finns managed to put up 265 thousand militias against the aggressor. Only 38 thousand of them were military personnel. Many mobilized did not even have military uniform- only a military buckle on a "home" belt and a cockade on a civilian hat. The Soviet "liberators", having taken such a militia prisoner, shot him as a "bandit". The poorly armed Finnish army felt a shortage of ammunition: a supply of cartridges - only for two and a half months of fighting, artillery shells and mines - for one month.
And despite this, the troops of Marshal Mannerheim offered heroic resistance for three and a half months. Only in the battle of Suomussalve in December 1939 - January 1940 were the 163rd and 44th Soviet infantry divisions surrounded and almost completely destroyed. As a result, the Soviet troops lost more than 27 thousand killed, frozen and captured, and the losses of the Finns amounted to only 900 people. Stalin, in a state of euphoria after the victorious march of Soviet troops through Western Ukraine and Belarus a few months earlier and after the crushing defeat inflicted on the Japanese at Khalkhin Gol, fell into a cold shower. On January 7, 1940, the Northern Front was created, troops and equipment were driven to the Karelian Isthmus in an endless stream. In the end, the huge numerical and technical advantage of the Soviet troops brought results - after three and a half months of fierce fighting, all lanes of the Mannerheim line in its western part were broken through, and on March 13, Soviet troops took the city of Viipuri (which turned into the "Russian city of Vyborg") - further direct road to Helsinki. However, Stalin took into account the Finnish government's request for a cessation of hostilities, and on March 12 (the day before the capture of Viipuri) the Soviet-Finnish peace treaty was signed, virtually without discussion, "without reading". Under its terms, Finland lost the entire Karelian Isthmus and the coast of Lake Ladoga, some areas in Karelia and in the North, leased the Khanko Peninsula to the USSR. It would seem that Stalin won the war, having received more than he demanded in November 1939. Then why did he refuse to completely conquer Finland?
In fact, the war ended in a shameful defeat for the USSR. Finnish troops lost 26,600 people dead (a very significant loss for such a small country - almost 1% of the population). Stalin at the end of the war announced 48,475 deaths from the USSR. According to the lists of names compiled in 1949-1951 by the Main Personnel Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Soviet losses in this war amounted to 126,875 people killed, died of wounds, diseases and missing. Meanwhile, most Western historians consider these figures too low and estimate the number of dead Soviet servicemen at 150-200 thousand. Hundreds of thousands more wounded and frostbitten. The version about the voluntary entry of the "Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic" into the USSR, about the workers and peasants, with tears of joy in the eyes of the Soviet soldiers-liberators, no longer passed. The Sovietization of Finland was delayed. Fortunately, forever.
The winter war of 1939-1940, in which Finland defended its independence, had rather tangible consequences for the USSR: as an aggressor, it was expelled from the League of Nations. Frustrated by the huge losses and the inability to quickly defeat a weaker enemy, Stalin expelled Kliment Voroshilov from his post as People's Commissar for Defense. And Hitler, who closely followed the "successes" of his new ally on the Karelian Isthmus, following the results of the Winter War, said: "The Soviet Union is a colossus with feet of clay without a head." If, they say, the small and poorly armed Finnish army was able to resist the Red Army for so long and successfully, then the Wehrmacht will smash it to smithereens in a few weeks. It was as a result of the Winter War that Hitler got rid of the panic fear of fighting on two fronts - in the West and East at the same time. It can be assumed that if it were not for the “wise” Stalinist decision to attack Finland and the shame that the “invincible and legendary” Red Army covered itself on the Karelian Isthmus, Hitler would not have dared to attack the USSR until the final victory over Britain.
The immediate consequence of the Winter War was the continuation war - in 1941-1944, the Finns fought against the USSR already in alliance with Germany, seeking to return their lands. Today it has already been proven that on the eve and at the beginning of World War II, the greatest desire of the Finnish elite, in particular Mannerheim, was to maintain neutrality, to "sit out", just as the Swedes managed to do. These hopes of the Finns were trampled underfoot by Stalin. Without the war of 1939-1940 against Finland, there would have been no blockade of Leningrad (the Finns closed the ring around the city from the north), and hence the death from starvation of hundreds of thousands of Leningraders ...
On the eve of Victory Day on the shelves bookstores Petrozavodsk published a book by Finnish authors - Eloise Engle and Lauri Paanenen "Soviet-Finnish War. Breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line 1939-1940". interest in this bloody war has not faded for decades on both sides of the border. But, apparently, the authors of the book do not set themselves the task of objectively understanding the causes of the military conflict. moral responsibility for winter war they are trying to pass it on to the Soviet side.
But how was it really? In order to understand this complex issue, we decided to compare the facts presented in the book by Finnish authors with the historical materials given in interesting book famous publicist Yuri Mukhin "Crusade to the East. "Victims" of World War II. 1941-1945", published in the series "War and Us".
It is known that before the Second World War, Leningrad was extremely vulnerable from a military point of view. Finnish authors mention this rather dully, as an insignificant fact. "In light of Soviet security concerns," they write, "the border was too close to Leningrad. Or so the Russians claimed." This short phrase, with reference to the opinion of the Russians, which the authors clearly do not intend to reckon with, limits their analysis of the most complex political realities that have taken shape on the eve of the war. The reluctance of the authors to delve into the reasons for the outbreak of a military conflict between the two neighboring states also explains the fact that of the many archival materials now open about the Soviet-Finnish war, the book cites only Khrushchev's memoirs. However, the disgraced general secretary is far from being objective in them; he gives biased and false assessments to many political events in order to exonerate himself by exposing the mistakes of others. “We just had to shout, and the Finns would have obeyed,” writes Khrushchev. “If this had not happened, one shot would have been enough for the Finns to raise their hands and surrender. In any case, we thought so.” And the authors of the book immediately draw the conclusion: "The Russians did not expect to meet the resistance of the Finns."
Yury Mukhin's book deals with the vulnerability of Leningrad on the eve of World War II in more detail. And this story of the author is especially valuable because it is based on many archival documents. So, Y. Mukhin writes that the capture of Leningrad for a strong enemy fleet was not a big problem even without aviation. "For the main calibers of artillery of enemy battleships, Kronstadt is not a great hindrance, and when capturing the Leningrad ports, the supply of troops by sea turned Leningrad region into an area from which the enemy army can easily strike at the heart of Russia. Therefore, among the tsars, the main idea for the defense of St. Petersburg was to prevent the enemy fleet from approaching the St. Petersburg approaches. To do this, the Gulf of Finland and all approaches to it during the First World War were blocked by minefields. But the mines can be removed. Therefore, the main task Baltic Fleet there was a prevention of breaking through minefields - his ships were supposed to sink enemy ships when trying to remove mines.
But after all, in the USSR, after the revolution, nothing was left of this, - the author clarifies. - The southern coast was almost entirely in Estonia, and from the Finnish border it was possible to fire at Leningrad from field guns. Sea mines, of course, could be placed; but not protected from the shore, they would be instantly removed. The position of both Leningrad and the USSR was tragic in its defenselessness.
And Hitler in Mein Kampf"did not hide the fact that the III Reich would be built on the territories of the USSR. Therefore, when Germany annexed Austria on March 12, 1938, it was the first call for the USSR. And already in April 1938, the first Soviet proposals were secretly received by the Finnish government. The USSR asked Finland to guarantee that she would resist the Germans in the event of their attack on Finland, for which the Soviet Union offered its troops, fleet and weapons. The Finns refused.
The USSR was looking for options. By autumn, he no longer offered a direct treaty, did not offer troops, but only asked for an agreement on the protection of the coast of Finland by the Baltic Fleet, if Finland was attacked by the Germans, the Finns again refused and did not even try to continue negotiations. Meanwhile, England and France had already betrayed Czechoslovakia and the USSR in Munich. An ally of the USSR - France - refused to defend Czechoslovakia, the second ally - Czechoslovakia itself - surrendered the Sudetenland to the Germans without firing a shot. It became clear that for the West all treaties on military alliances are nothing more than a piece of paper. Something more real was needed to protect Leningrad, had to rely only on their own strength.
In October 1938, the USSR offered the Finns assistance in building a military base on the Finnish island of Gogland in the Gulf of Finland and the right, if Finland could not cope with the defense of this island, to defend it together. The Finns refused.
The Soviet Union asked Finland to lease four small islands in the Gulf of Finland for 30 years. The Finns refused. Then the USSR asked to exchange them for its territory. At this stage, the former brave (Order of St. George) general of the Russian army, and by that time the commander-in-chief of the Finnish army, Marshal Mannerheim, learned about the negotiations. He immediately offered the Finnish government to exchange not only the requested islands, but also the territory of the Karelian Isthmus, which the Soviet side did not even remember at that time. This shows how understandable from a military point of view were the requests of the Soviet Union and how stupid were the subsequent claims that the USSR allegedly wanted to "seize Finland."
Finnish Marshal Mannerheim fought the entire Second World War on the side of the Axis countries, namely, they and their accomplices were tried by the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal. Mannerheim eluded the court, but that didn't make him any less guilty. In addition, no matter how you look, but Mannerheim in 1939-1944. lost two wars, which is also not the best recommendation for a marshal. Therefore, in his memoirs, Mannerheim dodges as best he can to obscure these two points and present the events of those times in a light favorable to the Finns. From this point of view, it would be beneficial for him to forget something in history and assert that in 1939 the war between Finland and the USSR began because the USSR wanted to capture and enslave the Finns. But let's give Mannerheim his due - in this case he did not want to appear a fool and writes about the flaring up conflict: " On March 5, 1939, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Litvinov, through the Finnish ambassador to Moscow, Yury Koskinen, proposed starting new negotiations. This time, the Soviet Union demanded a 30-year lease on the islands of the Gulf of Finland, Gogland, Lavansaari, Seskar, and both Tyutyarsaari islands. The goal of the Soviet Union was not to build fortifications on these islands, but to use them as observation posts on the way to Leningrad. Acceptance of these proposals would mean an improvement in relations between our countries and beneficial economic cooperation for us.
In a response that was transmitted on March 8, the Finnish government stated that it could not talk about transferring the islands to another state, since they were an inseparable part of the territory, the inviolability of which the Soviet Union itself recognized and approved in the Tartu Peace Treaty, when these islands were declared neutral territory. People's Commissar Foreign Affairs, as it was felt, expected such an answer and directly offered to transfer to Finland as compensation part of the territory of Eastern Karelia, lying north of Lake Ladoga. This proposal was rejected on 13 March. To this, Litvinov remarked that he did not consider the answer final.
For further negotiations, the Soviet government sent its ambassador in Rome, Stein, to Helsinki, who had previously held a diplomatic post in the Soviet embassy in Finland, and on March 11 he contacted Foreign Minister Erkko. Stein argued that the security of Leningrad in the event of an attack from the Gulf of Finland depended on the transfer of these islands to the use of the Soviet Union, and believed that a lease agreement would be the best solution. Such a decision would guarantee the preservation of Finnish neutrality. The Soviet Government is also prepared to exchange the islands for an area of 183 square kilometers located next to our eastern border. Finland's written commitment to oppose any violation of its neutrality was considered meaningless unless it was accompanied by practical measures. The Finnish government continued to stand on its negative position.
I thought that we should agree with the Russians in one way or another if by doing so we would improve relations with our powerful neighbor. I talked to Foreign Minister Erkko about Stein's proposal, but I failed to persuade him. I also visited President and Prime Minister Cajander to express my views in person. I noticed that the islands do not matter to Finland ...
My point of view was not understood. I was told, in particular, that a government that dared to propose something like that would be immediately forced to resign, and that no politician would be ready to act against public opinion in this way. To this I replied that if there really was no person who, in the name of such a vital cause for the state, would risk his popularity among the people, then I offer myself at the disposal of the government, for I am sure that people will understand my honest intentions. I went even further, noting that it would be beneficial for Finland to come up with a proposal to withdraw the border line from Leningrad and receive good compensation. Even when Vyborg-Skayani rejoined Finland in 1811, many were of the opinion that the border was too close to St. Petersburg. So thought, in particular, the Minister - Secretary of State Rehbinder, and, as I often heard at home, my grandfather's father, State Councilor S.E. Mannerheim, was on the same point of view.
I seriously warned Ambassador Stein not to leave for Moscow empty-handed. However, that is what happened. On April 6, he left Helsinki without completing the task entrusted to him. Parliament was not informed about the purpose of Stein's visit. The short-sighted concealment of this fact can only be regretted."
The Russian tsars, - the author of the book clarifies, - had nothing to fear from the fact that the border of the principality runs 20 miles from the capital. The USSR was not afraid of this border as long as the Finns were considered neutral and not involved in any aggressive designs against the USSR. But as soon as the Finns denied the USSR its absolutely legitimate requests to protect Leningrad, the question could not help but arise, why are they doing this? Why, hiding from the people and the Parliament, are they trying to weaken the USSR in its future conflict with Germany? After all, no matter who wins the approaching war between the USSR and Germany, if Finland remains neutral, she will not benefit from this. Consequently, in a future war, Finland was not going to remain neutral and, which logically followed from the behavior of the Finnish government: weakening the defense of Leningrad, Finland planned to attack the USSR at a convenient moment. Now, naturally, the question of the Finnish border in the suburbs of Leningrad could not but be raised.
In March 1939, Germany completely occupied Czechoslovakia, and under these conditions, the Soviet Union formulated the final proposals of Finland: to lease to it for 30 years a piece of land on Cape Hanko (at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland) and to exchange the Finnish territory of the Karelian Isthmus (up to defensive "Mannerheim Line") over a much larger territory of the USSR. Moreover, it was Cape Hanko that remained the main request. And this can be seen in the negotiations.
When the Finns seemingly agreed to move the border on the Karelian Isthmus not by the requested 20-70 km, but only by 10 km and exchange this territory for Soviet territory, they received in response: "the proposal is not acceptable, but is subject to reconsideration."
Was the agreement with the USSR on the transfer of the border acceptable to Finland? Answering this question, the author of the book "Crusade to the East. "Victims" of the Second World War. 1941-1945" recalls that before the Bolsheviks came to power in Russia, Finland had never been a sovereign state, i.е. never had its own territory. Finnish tribes settled either in Sweden or in Russia. The territory that Finland had in 1939 is a product of the agreement between the post-revolutionary Finns and Lenin. (Moreover, the Bolsheviks at that time had no time for the future security of Russia, they "liberated" all the peoples of Russia in order to reduce the number of their enemies in the counter-revolutionary camp. Even Ukraine was "liberated", recognizing the rebellion on its territory as legal.) And the fact that the agreement agreed upon, but may be modified by agreement. Finland could not change its territory at the request of Sweden or Germany - it did not agree with them and was not located on their former territories. But the Finnish government was obliged to conclude a new, mutually beneficial agreement with Russia, since there was nothing illegal in this. After all, it was not for nothing that Mannerheim offered himself as responsible for the exchange of territories - this would have brought him nothing but glory, since the territory of Finland increased at the suggestion of the USSR.
This is also confirmed by the fact that the Finnish government carefully concealed the essence of the USSR's requests not only from the Finnish people, whom it allegedly feared in this matter, but also from the legislature. And this suggests that the arguments of the Finnish government were so far-fetched that they could not be discussed not only in the press, but also in parliamentary commissions. The demands of the USSR were reasonable and fair. It is interesting that the USSR at first did not stutter about the transfer of the Karelian Isthmus to it, although the absurdity of such a close passage of the border was visible to itself.
It is characteristic that even if Molotov conducted negotiations with Germany, the author notes, Stalin personally spoke with the Finnish delegation. What did he offer! We will not talk about the economic side, about the amount of compensation, about prices in mutual trade. When the Finns said they couldn't stand foreign base on his territory, he offered to dig a canal across Cape Hanko and make the base an island, offered to buy a piece of land on the cape and thereby make the territory Soviet, and, having received a refusal and interrupting the negotiations, it would seem, completely, returned to them a few days later and offered Finns to buy a few small uninhabited islands at Cape Hanko, which the Finnish delegation, not very strong in geography, had not even heard of.
In the magazine "Rodina" for December 1995, a map of the latest territorial proposals of the USSR to Finland is given. From the absurd smallness of the territory requested from the Finns and the vastness of the Soviet territory offered in return, it is already clear how important this Cape Hanko was for the USSR.
When you read the description of the then negotiations, it becomes indisputable that the Finns would obviously never agree to any requests from the USSR. That is, if, say, the USSR agreed to the Finnish proposal to move the border by 10 km and only, then the Finns would take back this consent with the next step. When the parties want to negotiate, they look for options and benefits. For example, the USSR offered to pay for the resettlement of Finns from the Karelian Isthmus. But the Finnish side was not interested in how much he would pay. The Finns seemed to agree to the exchange, but they were not interested in where the USSR would give them land, how much this territory would be beneficial to them - they did not bargain. The Finns had their own plans.
What was Finland striving for without entering into any new agreements with the USSR? To a military conflict? From the operational plans of the Finnish army, preserved in the Military Archives of Finland, it follows that "immediately after the attack of the USSR, it was supposed to go on the offensive and occupy a number of territories, primarily in Soviet Karelia ...".
Moreover, the Finnish government looks no more stupid than Hitler. In 1941, Hitler vigorously attacks the USSR, and already on April 12, 1942, he issues an idiotic tirade to explain the failure of the blitzkrieg: "The whole war with Finland in 1940 - as well as the entry of the Russians into Poland with outdated tanks and weapons and dressed inappropriately in the form of soldiers is nothing more than a grand disinformation campaign, since Russia at one time had weapons that made it, along with Germany and Japan, a world power.
According to Hitler, it turns out that Stalin deliberately pretended to be weak so as not to frighten Hitler before attacking the USSR. That is, in 1941, Hitler also presented his desire to see the USSR as weak as reality.
But how could Finland, with its 3.5 million population, have plans to seize the territory of the USSR with its 170 million?! But the fact is, writes the author of the book, that Finland's plans were based on the fact that she would be helped in the war with the USSR, and these plans were justified and real.
On January 29, 1939, at a cabinet meeting, Chamberlain announced that the Allies would openly engage in hostilities against Russia. However, when assessing the maturity of the Scandinavian countries, the British expressed fear that the participation of the Anglo-French troops on the side of Finland would scare the Scandinavians away from the fight against the USSR, then Norway and Sweden would again "crawl into the shell of the policy of neutrality."
On February 5, the British Prime Minister went to Paris to discuss with the French at the Supreme Military Council specific plan joint intervention in Northern Europe. At the council, Chamberlain put forward a plan to land an expeditionary force in Norway and Sweden, which, in his opinion, would expand the Finnish-Soviet military conflict and at the same time block the supply of Swedish ore to Germany. However, the first task was the main one. "Preventing the defeat of Finland by Russia this spring is extremely important," the decision of the British War Cabinet emphasized, "and this can only be done by significant forces of well-trained troops sent from Norway and Sweden or through these countries." Daladier joined Chamberlain's opinion. It was decided, in addition to the French contingents, to send to the Scandinavian theater and to Finland the 5th, 44th and 45th British infantry divisions, formed specifically for sending to France.
The decision to send significant contingents of regular expeditionary forces to Sweden, Norway and Finland meant a new stage in the escalation of anti-Soviet designs. Western allies. Now the question was raised not so much about helping Finland as about launching an open war against the Soviet Union. At this time in French ruling circles the idea of organizing an offensive against the USSR with "giant pincers" was hatched: a strike from the north (including the occupation of Leningrad) and a strike from the south.
It must be said that the British know how to keep secrets about their dastardly role in World War II. But keep a secret about inciting Finland to the USSR failed. The archives of Britain were made available, and Soviet historian He describes the Anglo-French fuss as follows: “On January 24, 1940, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff of England, General E. Ironside, presented the memorandum “The Main War Strategy” to the military cabinet. “In my opinion,” Ironside emphasized, “we can provide effective assistance to Finland only in if we attack Russia, if possible, with more directions and, most importantly, we will strike at Baku, the oil production area, in order to cause a serious state crisis in Russia. " Ironside, expressing the opinion of certain circles of the British government and command, was aware that such actions would inevitably lead the Western allies to war with the USSR, but in the current situation he considered it completely justified.
Around the same time, the French general staff also made an assessment of the situation. On January 31, General M. Gamelin, expressing the point of view of the French General Staff, stated with confidence that in 1940 Germany would not attack Western countries, and proposed to the British government a plan for the landing of an expeditionary force in Petsamo, in order to launch active military operations against the Soviet Union together with Finland. According to the French command, the Scandinavian countries are not yet "ripe" for independent action on the side of Finland.
And the British historian Len Deighton explains why the British failed to keep secret their plans to attack the USSR after Finland: “The French Air Force allocated five squadrons of Martin Maryland bombers, which were to take off from bases in northeastern Syria and strike The target codenames Berlioz, César Franck and Debussy became a Gallic touch, while the RAF would deploy four squadrons of Bristol Blenheim bombers and a squadron of antiquated single-engine Vickers Wellesleys based at Mosul airfield in Iraq.
To prepare for the night raid, it was necessary to take aerial photographs of the targets. On March 30, 1940, a civilian Lockheed 14 Super-Electra with passenger aviation markings took off from RAF Habbaniya airfield in Iraq. The crew was dressed in civilian clothes and carried false documents. They were pilots of the 224th Squadron of the Royal Air Force, which was armed with Lockheed Hudson aircraft, a military version of the Elektra. The British had no difficulty photographing Baku, but when on April 5 the scouts went to photograph the oil berths in the Batumi region, the Soviet anti-aircraft gunners were ready to meet. Elektra returned with only three-quarters of its potential targets on the negatives. All images were forwarded to the General Headquarters of the forces in the Middle East in Cairo, in order to compile flight maps with the designation of targets.
On February 13, the British Chiefs of Staff Committee instructed its representatives in the Allied Joint Military Committee to prepare a directive, on the basis of which the planning organs of the headquarters could prepare a plan of action for the Anglo-French troops in Northern Finland, the "Petsam operation", which provided for the landing of more than 100 thousand Anglo-French troops in Norway and Sweden.
In reviewing this plan on February 15, the Chief of the Imperial Staff, General Ironside, emphasized that the troops that would operate in Northern Finland should have a line of communication. If they land at Petsamo, they will be forced to either turn east, capturing Murmansk and Murmansk railway, or to the west, opening their way through Narvik.
As a result of the discussion, it was decided to help Finland by landing troops in Petsamo or its environs in order to cut the Murmansk railway, and subsequently capture Murmansk in order to turn it into a base for the operation.
The first section of the plan, which outlined the political factors that could influence the course of the operation, stated that the landing in the Petsamo area would inevitably bring the Allied forces into direct and immediate confrontation with the Russian armed forces, and therefore it should be assumed that the war with Russia will be the natural result, since the invasion of Russian territory will be a necessary integral part upcoming operation.
The author of the book notes that the aggressiveness of Finland in those years was obvious. After all, if the USSR, having started the war, decided to seize Finland, then the rest of the Scandinavian countries stood in line. They should have been scared, they should have gone to war immediately. But ... When the USSR began to be expelled from the League of Nations, out of 52 states that were members of the League, 12 of their representatives were not sent to the conference at all, and 11 did not vote for the exclusion. And among these 11 are Sweden, Norway and Denmark. That is, Finland did not seem like an innocent girl to these countries, and the USSR did not look like an aggressor.
Finnish authors are cunning when they write that "the result of the aggression was the exclusion of the USSR from the League of Nations and the secret grins of the Nazis about the failure of the Russians in the North." And again, in the Finnish book, Khrushchev’s memoirs are used to reinforce the shaky arguments: “The Germans watched with undisguised joy as we were defeated by the Finns. Here the Red Army finally showed itself in action. In all likelihood, it was this campaign that changed the whole picture of the Second world war, if not world history itself.
Constantly quoting Khrushchev, Finnish authors for some reason forget about Mannerheim, who wrote: “However, it immediately turned out again that Finland cannot expect active assistance from the Scandinavian countries. If such countries as Uruguay, Argentina and Colombia, at the Assembly of the League of Nations decisively sided with us, then Sweden, Norway and Denmark declared that they would not take part in any sanctions against the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Scandinavian countries abstained from voting on the exclusion of the aggressor from the League of Nations!
Yuri Mukhin notes that the Finns were overwhelmed with optimism because they had strong potential allies behind them. Plans for a war with a neighbor in relation to the USSR were exclusively offensive in Finland. (Finland abandoned these plans only a week after the start of the war, when it really tried to attack). According to these plans, the fortifications of the "Mannerheim Line" repelled an attack from the south, and the Finnish army advanced along the entire front to the east into Karelia. The border of the new Finland was to be pushed back and pass along the line of the Neva - the southern coast of Ladoga - east coast Lake Onega - the White Sea and the Arctic Ocean (including the Kola Peninsula) "That's it!
At the same time, the area of Finland doubled, and the land border with the USSR was more than halved. The border would pass entirely along deep rivers and sea-like lakes. It must be said that the goal of the war set by the Finns, if it were achievable, does not raise doubts about its reasonableness.
Even if there were no Finnish documents on this matter, these offensive plans could be guessed. Look again at the map, the Finns strengthened a small piece (about 100 km) of the border with the USSR on the Karelian Isthmus with the "Mannerheim Line" - exactly in the place where, according to the plans, their permanent border should have passed. And the thousand kilometers of the rest of the border? Why didn't the Finns strengthen it? After all, if the USSR wanted to capture Finland, the Red Army would have gone there from the east, from Karelia. The "Mannerheim Line" is simply meaningless if Finland was really going to defend, not attack.
But, in turn, with the offensive plans of Finland, the construction defensive lines on the border with Karelia it became meaningless - why spend money on this if Karelia goes to Finland and fortifications will need to be built, or rather, completed, on the new border! On the border, which was to be conquered in 1939.
Yes, from the point of view of the Finnish state, the plan to move the border to a profitable line and double the Finnish territory was reasonable. But, I repeat, - the author of the book notes, - it was based on self-deception: the criminal actions of the "fifth column" in the USSR, expressed in the treacherous behavior of Marshal Blucher in battles with the Japanese on Lake Khasan, were accepted as generally the inability of the Red Army to fight. They probably didn’t believe the reports of the Soviet press about the victories at Khalkhin Gol, but they believed the political intelligence, which claimed that 75% of Soviet citizens hate Soviet power. In this case, the Finnish government based its decisions on clearly erroneous data.
In the autumn of 1939, the USSR concluded agreements on assistance with the Baltic countries. Their status has not changed. They remained bourgeois and independent, but Soviet military bases were placed on their territory. The southern coast of the Gulf of Finland has become more or less protected. The problem of the northern shore of the bay remained. Stalin invited the Finnish delegation to the talks, intending to conduct them personally. The invitation was made by Molotov on 5 October. The Finns immediately rattled their weapons and embarked on the warpath. On October 6, Finnish troops began to advance to their starting lines. On October 10, the evacuation of residents from the border cities began, on October 11, when the Finnish delegation arrived in Moscow, the mobilization of reservists was announced. Until November 13, for more than a month, Stalin tried to persuade the Finns to provide the USSR with a base on Hanko. Useless. Except that during this time the Finnish side defiantly evacuated the population from the border areas, from Helsinki and brought the size of the army to 500 thousand people.
"We were able to transfer both the covering troops and the field army on time and in excellent condition to the front. We got enough time - 4-6 weeks - for combat training of troops, familiarizing them with the terrain, for continuing the construction of field fortifications, preparing demolition work, as well as for laying mines and organizing minefields," Mannerheim rejoices in his memoirs.
Even large countries, such as the USSR, set aside no more than 15 days for their mobilization. And Finland, as we can see, was not only fully mobilized, but was idle for a month and a half.
Mukhin draws attention to the "trifle" episode that preceded the war. Four days before the start of the war between the USSR and Finland, on November 26, 1939, the Finns fired artillery at the territory of the USSR, and 3 Red Army soldiers were killed and 6 wounded in the Soviet garrison of the village of Mainila. Today, of course, Russian and Finnish historians "established" that either these shots did not occur at all, or the Soviet Union itself fired on its troops in order to get a pretext for war.
What is there to do? War is war. And on November 30, the Leningrad Military District began to tame the obstinate Finland. The matter did not proceed without difficulty. It was winter time, the terrain was very difficult, the defense was prepared, the Red Army was poorly trained. But most importantly, Finns are not Poles. They fought hard and hard. It goes without saying that Marshal Mannerheim asked the Finnish government to cede to the USSR and not bring things to a war, but when it began, he led the troops skillfully and decisively. Only by March 1940, when the Finnish infantry had lost 3/4 of its strength, the Finns sued for peace. Well, the world is the world. On Hanko began to create military base, instead of the territory to the "Mannerheim Line" on the Karelian Isthmus, they took the entire isthmus with the city of Viipuri (now Vyborg). The border was moved deep into Finland almost along its entire length. Stalin was not going to forgive the killed Soviet soldiers to the Finns.
"The Finns turned out to be excellent soldiers. We soon realized that this piece was too tough for us." During the 105 days of 1939-1940, one of the most difficult military campaigns of the early period of the Second World War was waged," Eloise Engle and Lauri Paanenen again quote Khrushchev's memoirs in their book and further report: "Under the conditions of the world war, this campaign was relatively small, and nevertheless, according to various estimates, 2 million soldiers took part in it from the Finnish and Soviet sides. The Soviet Union lost approximately 1,000 aircraft and 2,300 tanks. Only in 1970, in his memoirs, Khrushchev published the loss of Russians - 1 million people.
“The entire“ world community ”, - Yuri Mukhin notes on this occasion, - is sure that the USSR wanted to conquer Finland, but it didn’t succeed. This idea passes not only without discussion, but also without real evidence. Meanwhile, it’s enough to look at a map of Finland and try to plan a war to capture it yourself. I am sure that even a fool would not have climbed to capture it through the Karelian Isthmus, since it was in this place that the Finns had three lanes of fortification of the Mannerheim Line. But for a thousand kilometers of the rest of the border with The Finns had nothing in the USSR. In addition, this area was passable in winter time. Surely anyone, even an amateur, will plan the entry of troops into Finland through unprotected sections of the border and its division into parts, deprivation of communication with Sweden and access to the shores of the Gulf of Bothnia If the goal is to capture Finland, there is no other way to act.
But in reality the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. proceeded like this. Here is what is reported on this subject in the book "Crusade to the East. "Victims" of the Second World War. 1941-1945".
"On the Finnish border - from Lake Ladoga to the Barents Sea (900 km in a straight line) 9 rifle divisions were deployed against the Finnish troops, that is, one Soviet division had 100 km of front, and this is such a front that the division cannot defend Therefore, it is not at all surprising that parts of these divisions were surrounded by the Finns during the war.But on the Karelian Isthmus against the "Mannerheim Line", along with lakes 140 km long, they acted (from south to north) 28, 10, 34, 50 , 19th, 23rd, 15th and 3rd rifle corps, 10th tank corps, as well as separate tank brigades and parts of the RGK, i.e. at least 30 divisions. Soviet command deployed troops, it is quite obvious that it was not going to conquer and occupy Finland, the purpose of the war was to deprive the Finns of the "Mannerheim Line" - a defensive belt that the Finns considered impregnable. Without these fortifications, even the Finns should have understood that with a hostile attitude towards the USSR, no fortifications could save her.
It must be said that the Finns did not understand this hint from the first time, and in 1941 Finland again began a war with the USSR and this time chose a worthy ally for itself - Hitler. In 1941, I remind you, we asked her to come to her senses. Useless. Great Finland from the Baltic to the White Sea did not allow the Finns to live in peace, and new frontier through the system of the White Sea-Baltic Canal fascinated them like a rabbit's boa constrictor.
In fact, the Finns in this case personify the Russian proverb "the beaten itches." They can even be respected for their exceptional persistence - after all, they tried to swallow Karelia with their last breath, so to speak, sticking out their tongues to the waist. "Finland was gradually forced to mobilize its trained reserves up to the age of 45, which did not happen in any of the countries, even in Germany," admits Mannerheim.
In 1943, the USSR again offered peace to Finland. In response, the Prime Minister of Finland concluded a personal pact with Hitler that he would not withdraw from the war until the complete victory of Germany. In 1944, our troops went deep into Finland, hacking the newly rebuilt "Mannerheim Line" without major problems. The thing smelled of burning. The prime minister, with his personal commitment to the Fuhrer, resigned, and Baron Karl Mannerheim was appointed in his place. He made a truce.
It also numbs the Finnish falsifiers of history. The authors of the Finnish book write: “The Russians had enough time to develop their plans, choose the time and place for the attack, and they significantly outnumbered their neighbor. But, as Khrushchev wrote, “... even in such most favorable conditions, only with great with labor and at the cost of huge losses, we were able to win. Winning at this price was actually a moral defeat."
Of the total number of 1.5 million people sent to Finland, the USSR's losses in killed (according to Khrushchev) amounted to 1 million people. The Russians lost about 1,000 aircraft, 2,300 tanks and armored vehicles, as well as a huge amount of various military equipment, including equipment, ammunition, horses, cars and trucks."
The losses of Finland, although disproportionately smaller, were devastating for the 4 million people. If something like this had happened in 1940 in the United States, with a population of more than 130 million, American casualties in just 105 days would have amounted to 2.6 million killed and wounded."
The fact that the USSR lost the war because its combat losses were several times higher than that of the Finnish army is a poor idea, - Yuri Mukhin retorts this passage, - but it also needs to be confirmed somehow. In 1996, it was proved that in the war of 1939-1940. Soviet dead and missing were 70 thousand people, and even 176 thousand wounded and frostbite. No, another author, A.M. Nosov, argued, I think better: there were 90 thousand killed and missing, and 200 thousand wounded. And by 1995, the historian P. Aptekar calculated quite accurately - only those killed and missing missing was, it turns out, 131,476 people. But he did not even count the wounded - you see, hundreds of thousands. As a result, Kommersant-Vlast of March 30, 1999 already boldly estimates the losses of the USSR in that war at half a million, i.e. The bill is already in the millions! That's right, why feel sorry for them, Stalinist scoops?
But what about the Finnish losses? The Finnish historian T. Vihavainen “calculated them exactly” - 23 thousand. In connection with this, P. Aptekar joyfully counts and even highlights in bold: “It turns out that even if we proceed from the fact that the irretrievable losses of the Red Army amounted to 130 thousand people, then for every Finnish soldier and officer killed, five of our compatriots are killed and frozen to death."
The Finnish historian I. Hakala writes that by March 1940 Mannerheim simply had no troops left. And where do they go? And the historian Hakala issues the following phrase: "According to experts, the infantry lost approximately 3/4 of its composition (in mid-March, already 64,000 people). Since the infantry at that time consisted of 150,000 people, its losses were already 40 percent" .
No, gentlemen, in Soviet schools they didn’t teach to count like that: 40% is not ¾, - the author of the book notes. - And Finland had more than 150 thousand infantry. The fleet was small, there were almost no aviation and tank troops (even today the Finnish Air Force and Navy, together with border guards - 5.2 thousand people), artillery of 700 barrels - a maximum of 30 thousand people. Like it or not, there were no more than 100 thousand troops besides the infantry. Consequently, 400 thousand fall on the infantry. And the loss of infantry in 3/4 means the loss of 300 thousand people, of which 80 thousand should be killed.
But this is a calculation, but how can you confirm it, if the "democrats" have all the archives, and they do what they want with them? It remains to wait. And the wait will pay off. Apparently, also on the anniversary of the Soviet-Finnish war, the historian V.P. Galitsky in 1999 published a small book "Finnish prisoners of war in the camps of the NKVD." He tells how it was for them, the poor. Well, along the way, rummaging through our and Finnish archives, he, without thinking, cites the losses of the parties not only in prisoners, but also in general, and not only inflated ours, but also, apparently, genuine Finnish. They are as follows: the total losses of the USSR - 285 thousand people. Finland - 250 thousand. Killed and missing: the USSR - 90 thousand people, Finland - 95 thousand people.
“Under the terms of the peace treaty,” the Finnish authors state with regret, “the following went to Russia: the second largest city in Finland, Viipuri (now Vyborg); the largest port in the Northern Arctic Ocean Petsamo; strategically important area of the Hanko peninsula; the largest Lake Ladoga and the entire Karelian Isthmus - the place of residence of 12 percent of the population of Finland.
Finland refused in favor of the Soviet Union from its territory with a total area of 22 thousand square kilometers. In addition to Viipuri, she lost such important ports as Uuras, Koivisto, the northern part of Lake Ladoga and the important Saimepa Canal. Two weeks were given for the evacuation of the population and the removal of property; most of the property had to be abandoned or destroyed. A huge loss for the country's economy was the loss of the forest industry of Karelia with its excellent sawmills, woodworking and plywood enterprises. Finland also lost part of the enterprises of the chemical, textile and steel industries. 10 percent of enterprises in these industries were located in the Vuoksa river valley. Almost 100 power plants went to the victorious Soviet Union."
“I don’t know how it is with the West, but Finland’s debt to the USSR,” Yuri Mukhin notes in conclusion, “Mannerheim really paid to the coin - Stalin followed this. limit is stupid, but even she can guess that she is fattening due to the export deliveries to the West of nickel from those mines that were legally mined in this "lost" war.
Prepared Olga Andreeva
Exactly 80 years ago, on November 30, 1939, the Soviet-Finnish war began. Today it is very fashionable to blame this war exclusively on the then leadership of the Soviet Union, which allegedly launched "unheard of aggression against small and peaceful Finland." But in fact, many reasons led to this war. Including very vicious Finnish nationalism...
As you know, before the revolution, Finland, with the rights of the Grand Duchy, was part of Russian Empire. The position of Finland in the Russian Empire in general was very surprising - nothing like world history just doesn't know! As historian Igor Pykhalov said:
“It was a real state within a state. Russian governor-generals were extremely nominal in the Grand Duchy of Finland. There was a completely autonomous legal system and its own legislative assembly - the Sejm (which met once every five years, and since 1885 - once every three years, while receiving the right to legislative initiative), as well as separate army legislation - they did not take recruits in the Principality of Finland, but the principality had its own army. Plus, separate citizenship, which the rest of the inhabitants of the empire, including Russians, could not obtain. In general, the Russians were very limited in property rights here - it was extremely difficult to buy real estate in the principality. There was also a separate religion, its own post office, customs, a bank and a financial system ... ".
Not only did the tsarist government do everything to help the development of the Finnish national culture. Since 1826, the Finnish language has been taught at the University of Helsingfors (Helsinki). In the same years, Finnish literature began to be published and distributed, and often at public imperial expense. And in 1918, Finland gained independence from the hands of the Bolshevik government under Lenin. However, the issue of Finnish independence was considered by the tsarist regime - the First World War… And what was the gratitude of the Finns? Truly "immeasurable"!
Bloody dreams of a great Finland
At the very beginning of 1918, a short civil war broke out here between the local communists and their white opponents. The Whites won, who staged a simply monstrous massacre not only for their Reds, but also for the Russian population - and indiscriminately! Especially tragic events happened in Vyborg. From the official note of the Soviet government dated May 13, 1918, signed by Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Georgy Chicherin:
“Here mass executions of innocent residents of Russian origin took place, monstrous atrocities were committed against the peaceful Russian population, even 12-year-old children were shot. In one barn in Vyborg, as the witness reported, the latter saw two hundred corpses, mostly Russian officers and students. The wife of the murdered lieutenant colonel Vysokikh told a witness that she saw how the Russians being destroyed were lined up in one line and shot from machine guns ... One of the witnesses saw the corpses of Russians in two sheds in three tiers - about 500 people. The bodies were mutilated beyond recognition."
However, the young Finnish state did not do away with the genocide of Russians. At that time, his political leadership was dominated by the ideas of Finnish great-power nationalism, according to which Great Finland should unite under its auspices all the Finno-Ugric peoples of northern Russia, up to the Northern Urals. Thus, the Finns set out to seize the territories of present-day Karelia, Murmansk and Arkhangelsk regions. It is noteworthy that the “Greater Finland” project was supported by absolutely all political parties and movements of the country, even the left ones: for example, two social democratic politicians of the country Oskar Tokkola and Voinma Vaino published a very serious study on this topic “Greater Finland within Natural Borders”. And it wasn't just words...
Having barely suppressed his Bolsheviks, General Gustav Mannerheim, the supreme commander of the Finnish army, pronounced the famous “sword oath”, in which he declared that he would “not sheath his sword” before expelling the Bolsheviks from both Finland and Russian East Karelia. After that, gangs of Finnish nationalists began regular invasions of Soviet territory in order to push the Finnish border at least to the White Sea. The Soviet Republic, which at that time was waging a hard struggle with its White Guards and foreign interventionists, fought off these attacks with great difficulty, which literally did not stop for several years.
The last such raid happened at the end of 1921, when another detachment of Finnish regular troops invaded our territory and captured the city of Ukhta, where a puppet Independent Karelian state was proclaimed, which immediately turned to the Finnish government with a request to join Finland. However, by that time the Civil War in Russia was over, and the regular units of the Red Army released their forces to restore order in the border zone. In February 1922, our troops defeated the Finns with several powerful blows, throwing them abroad. Only after that did Finland agree to sign a full-fledged peace treaty with the Soviet Union.
A very cold world
However, the Finns did not rest on this - dreams of a Greater Finland still haunted them. This time, the bet was made on a big war with the Russians by one of the great powers, which Finland could join in order to later take part in the division of Russian lands. This policy was determined by the words spoken by the first Finnish Prime Minister Per Evind Svinhufvud: "Any enemy of Russia must always be a friend of Finland."
As Igor Pykhalov writes, adhering to this simple rule, the Finnish leadership was ready to enter into an anti-Russian alliance with anyone - for example, with Japan, which literally teetered on the brink of a full-scale war with our country throughout the 30s. From Soviet diplomatic correspondence, July 1934: “...Finnish Foreign Minister Haxel probed the ground regarding the prospects for our military clash with Japan. At the same time, in confidential conversations, Haxel did not hide the fact that Finland is guided by our defeat in this war "...
By the way, these signals were also confirmed by foreign diplomats. Thus, the Polish envoy to Helsinki, Franz Harvat, reported to Warsaw that Finland's policy is characterized by "aggressiveness against Russia ... The position of Finland towards the USSR is dominated by the question of joining Karelia to Finland." And the Latvian ambassador wrote to his superiors that “the Karelian issue is deeply rooted in the minds of Finnish activists. These circles are looking forward to a conflict between Russia and some great power, formerly with Poland, and now with Germany or Japan, in order to realize their program. The American military attaché in the USSR, Colonel Faymonville, reported in September 1937 to Washington: “The most pressing military problem of the Soviet Union is preparation to repel a simultaneous attack by Japan in the East and Germany, together with Finland in the West” ...
So, the reproaches that in 1935 the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union Maxim Litvinov directly expressed to the Finnish ambassador in Moscow are not surprising: “In no other country does the press wage such a systematically hostile campaign as in Finland. In no neighboring country is there such open propaganda for attacking the USSR and seizing its territory as in Finland"...
Tensions did not subside on the Soviet-Finnish border either. The Finns provided their territory for the transfer of White Guard terrorists to the USSR. Once, in June 1927, such a group of saboteurs, accompanied by a Finnish guide, crossed the border, entered Leningrad, where they threw grenades at a meeting of communists, killing and injuring 26 people. After that, the terrorists returned to Finland ... Finns themselves killed ours. Over the years, they have repeatedly shelled our territory with all types of weapons. One of these incidents happened on October 7, 1936 on the Karelian Isthmus, where the Soviet border guard Spirin was shot point-blank by Finnish soldiers ...
What they wanted is what they got
Thus, Finland did not hide her hostility towards our country. This problem became even more aggravated by the end of the 30s, when the world faced a real threat of the outbreak of World War II. It was obvious to the Soviet leadership that Finland was unlikely to remain a neutral party and, of course, would try to convenient occasion join anyone who will fight with Russia. Meanwhile, the Finnish border at that time passed literally in the suburbs of Leningrad, the second capital of our country. And from the Finnish coast of the Baltic Sea it was very convenient to block the actions of the Soviet navy located in Kronstadt.
Meanwhile, the Finns themselves did not hide the name of their likely ally in the upcoming war. Because it dramatically expanded ties with Nazi Germany - and in all areas, but especially in the military sphere. German warships actually received a second registration in Finnish ports, and in August 1937 they solemnly received a large squadron of German submarines. And in the Finnish capital Helsinki itself, at the very beginning of 1939, the Germans deployed the so-called Cellarius Bureau, a spy office that conducted total espionage against our Baltic Fleet and the troops of the Leningrad Military District ... In general, with all these undisguised threats, something had to be do.
And since 1938, intensive negotiations began between our country and Finland on the exchange of territories. The main proposals from the Soviet Union were: the transfer of the border from Leningrad along the Karelian Isthmus by 90 kilometers, the transfer to our country of a number of strategic islands in the Baltic Sea and the long-term lease of the Finnish peninsula of Hanko, "locking" the entrance and exit to the Gulf of Finland, which is important for our fleet. In exchange, Moscow offered the Finns more extensive lands in Eastern Karelia…
It must be said that the Finns had sane politicians who understood the Soviet Union's concern for their security and who wanted to leave Finland neutral in the upcoming big war. And they really tried to find a reasonable compromise with Moscow. However, in the end, the more influential war party won the upper hand in Helsinki, which flatly refused to “yield to the Bolsheviks” in anything.
The official reason for the war was the so-called Mainil incident, when on November 26, 1939, near the village of Mainila, Soviet troops were unexpectedly fired from Finnish territory with artillery fire. In total, seven gun shots were fired, as a result of which three privates and one junior commander were killed, nine people were wounded. Today, Finnish historians, and even some of our liberals, are trying to prove that it was allegedly a purely Soviet provocation, but they cannot provide any serious evidence. And if you consider that such shelling by the Finns happened before, then everything falls into place.
The shelling was clearly perpetrated by local Russophobes from among the military in their usual manner to spoil our country in the borderlands. They just didn’t take into account that this time the Soviet Union was set up more decisively than before. And on November 30, the war, which the supporters of Great Finland so dreamed of, really began. Only the Finns had to fight without powerful allies, so their defeat in 1940 became quite natural ...
Until the end of 1939, the Soviet government tried to negotiate with Finland that the border should run as far as possible from the cradle of the revolution. “We won't be able to move Leningrad, so we'll have to move the border,” Stalin said, and the most difficult negotiations began. Finland was offered twice as much territory in Karelia in exchange.
At that moment, a big political game was being played in the world: Germany captured Poland, the war with the Soviet Union was a matter of time. The Soviet leadership tried to delay it to the last. In this turmoil, it was not up to Finland. Moreover, the Soviet Union has never offered such favorable terms to anyone. But Finland said no. Moscow did not believe their ears.
The Soviet command allocated two weeks to prepare a plan for the Finnish campaign. When the campaign began, Soviet troops could only reach the so-called Mannerheim Line, a defensive line that the Finns had been gradually building since the 1920s. The Soviet troops stood up, suffering huge losses.
Propaganda on both sides worked in full force. Soviet newspapers explained that the war was not with the Finns, but with the capitalists who were exploiting the Finnish people, and on the radio they broadcast a new song "Take Us, Suomi Beauty". Finns rested on the fact that soviet soldiers die for the interests of the red commissars, who were portrayed on the posters as overweight drunken cowards. The soldiers of the Red Army were offered to surrender and exchange weapons for a well-fed life in Finnish captivity.
Both sides hit wide of the mark. In 1939, the Finns lived much better than in 1918, and the Soviet commissars were not cowards at all, and fairy tales about a well-fed Finnish rear quickly lost their charm after the massive starvation deaths of Soviet prisoners of war. During a short lull, the Soviet troops regrouped, pulled up artillery and seriously engaged in reconnaissance of the Finnish fortification system. Soldiers of the Red Army equipped trenches for guns.
On the second attempt, the Soviet troops broke through the Mannerheim Line, then took Vyborg, and Finland was on the verge of defeat. Marshal Mannerheim told the Finnish government: there are only a few days of strength left, sign a peace treaty, otherwise it will be capitulation in a week. The USSR agreed to a peace treaty, gave Finland a chance to save face and a reason to talk about its victory in the Winter War. But conclusions have been drawn.
Bair Irincheev, director of the Military Museum of the Karelian Isthmus: “The lessons that the Red Army learned from the Finnish war are that we need new tanks, new types of aircraft dive bombers, attack aircraft, that we need to develop fighters with a higher flight speed and, probably, the most important it is necessary to increase the level of combat training”.
Also in the USSR, submachine guns, Finnish earflaps, Finnish Molotov cocktails, Finnish knives and Finnish tactics of ski units were adopted.
The 80th anniversary of the start of the Finnish war is celebrated on both sides of the border. A diorama has been opened in Vyborg, which presents unique exhibits of that time, and Finnish history buffs are going to Lokhya, to the museum near Kalervo.
Kalervo Kaare, creator of the "Military Museum": " Historical facts should not cause anger or hatred in young people. History is history. It teaches us to make smarter decisions."
And now, 80 years later, Russian reenactors on the Karelian Isthmus are attacking a Finnish machine gun so that viewers can feel the atmosphere of the beginning of that war. Unfamous, but unexpectedly relevant in terms of analyzing its causes and results in the current difficult international situation.
On November 30, 1939, the Winter (or Soviet-Finnish) War started. For a long time, the position about the bloody Stalin, who tried to capture harmless Finland, dominated. And the alliance of the Finns with Nazi Germany was considered to be a necessary measure in order to confront the Soviet "Evil Empire". But it is enough to recall some well-known facts of Finnish history to understand that not everything was so simple.
Privileges for Finns within the Russian Empire
Until 1809 Finland was a province of the Swedes. The colonized Finnish tribes had neither administrative nor cultural autonomy for a long time. official language spoken by the nobles was Swedish. After joining the Russian Empire in the status of the Grand Duchy, the Finns were given wide autonomy with their own diet and participation in the adoption of laws by the emperor. In addition, they were released from forced military service, however, the Finns had their own army.
Under the Swedes, the status of the Finns was not high, and the educated wealthy class was represented by Germans and Swedes. Under Russian rule, the situation has changed significantly in favor of the Finnish inhabitants. Finnish also became the official language. With all these allowances, the Russian government rarely interfered in the internal affairs of the principality. The resettlement of representatives of Russians to Finland was not encouraged either.
In 1811, as a generous offering, Alexander I transferred the Vyborg province, recaptured by the Russians from the Swedes in the 18th century, to the Grand Duchy of Finland. It should be noted that Vyborg itself had a serious military and strategic importance in relation to St. Petersburg - at that time the Russian capital. So the position of the Finns in the Russian "prison of peoples" was not the most deplorable, especially against the backdrop of the Russians themselves, dragging out all the hardships of maintaining and defending the empire.
Ethnic politics in Finnish
The collapse of the Russian Empire gave the Finns independence. October Revolution proclaimed the right of every nation to self-determination. Finland was at the forefront of this opportunity. At this time, not without the participation of the Swedish stratum dreaming of revanchism in Finland, the development of self-consciousness and national culture was outlined. This was expressed mainly in the formation of nationalist and separatist sentiments.
The apogee of these trends was the voluntary participation of the Finns in the battles of the First World War against Russia under the German wing. In the future, it was these volunteers, the so-called "Finnish huntsmen", who took special Active participation in bloody ethnic cleansing among the Russian population, unfolding on the territory of the former principality. On the commemorative coin issued for the 100th anniversary of the Independence of the Republic of Finland, the scene of the execution of the peaceful Russian population by Finnish punishers was depicted. This inhumane episode of the ethnic cleansing carried out by the Finnish nationalist troops is safely hushed up by modern chroniclers.
The massacre of the "Reds" began in Finland in January 1918. Russians were mercilessly destroyed regardless of political preferences and class affiliation. In April 1918, at least 200 Russian civilians were killed in Tampere. But the most terrible tragedy of that period occurred in the very "Russian" city of Vyborg, occupied by rangers. On that day, Finnish radicals killed every Russian they met.
An eyewitness to that terrible tragedy, Katonsky, told how the “whites”, shouting “shoot the Russians,” broke into apartments, took unarmed residents to the ramparts and shot them. According to various sources, the Finnish "liberators" took the lives of 300 to 500 unarmed civilians, including women and children. It is still not known exactly how many Russians fell victim to ethnic cleansing, because the atrocities of the Finnish nationalists continued until the very 1920s.
Territorial claims of the Finns and "Greater Finland"
The Finnish elite sought to create the so-called "Great Finland". The Finns no longer wanted to get involved with Sweden, but they expressed claims to Russian territories that were larger than Finland itself in area. The demands of the radicals were exorbitant, but first of all they set out to capture Karelia. The Civil War, which weakened Russia, played into the hands. In February 1918, the Finnish General Mannerheim promised that he would not stop until he liberated the lands of Eastern Karelia from the Bolsheviks.
Mannerheim wanted to seize Russian territories along the line of the White Sea, Lake Onega, the Svir River and Lake Ladoga. It was also planned to include the Kola Peninsula with the Pechenga region into Greater Finland. Petrograd was given the role of a "free city" like Danzig. On May 15, 1918, the Finns declared war on Russia. The attempts of the Finns to put Russia on the shoulder blades with the help of any of its enemies continued until 1920, when the RSFSR signed a peace treaty with Finland.
Finland was left with vast territories to which they historically never had rights. But peace did not follow for a long time. Already in 1921, Finland again tried to resolve the Karelian issue by force. Volunteers, without declaring war, invaded the Soviet borders, unleashing the Second Soviet-Finnish War. And only by February 1922 Karelia was completely liberated from the Finnish invaders. In March, an agreement was signed on ensuring the inviolability of the common border. But the situation in the border zone was still tense.
"Mainil incident" and a new war
According to Per Evind Svinhufvud, Prime Minister of Finland, every enemy of Russia can become a Finnish friend. The nationalist Finnish press was full of calls to attack the USSR and seize its territories. On this basis, the Finns even made friends with Japan, accepting its officers for training. But the hopes for a Russo-Japanese conflict did not come true, and then a course was taken towards rapprochement with Germany.
Within the framework of the military-technical union in Finland, the Cellarius Bureau was created - a German center whose task was anti-Russian intelligence work. By 1939, with the support of German specialists, the Finns had built a network of military airfields ready to receive dozens of times more aircraft than the local Air Force had. As a result, on the eve of World War II, a hostile state was formed on the northwestern border of Russia, ready to cooperate with a potential enemy of the Land of Soviets.
Trying to secure its borders, the Soviet government began to take drastic measures. We agreed with Estonia peacefully, concluding an agreement on the introduction of a military contingent. It was not possible to agree with the Finns. After a series of unsuccessful negotiations, on November 26, 1939, the so-called “Mainil incident” occurred. According to the USSR, the shelling of Russian territories was carried out by Finnish artillery. The Finns call it a Soviet provocation. But one way or another, the non-aggression pact was denounced and another war started.
During the Second World War, Finland again made a desperate attempt to become a state for all Finns. But representatives of these peoples (Karelians, Vepsians, Vods)
