The conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty. Japan and the USSR - history in documents. Reaction in the world to the signing of the pact

DECLARATION

In accordance with the spirit of the Neutrality Pact concluded on April 13, 1941 between the USSR and Japan, the Government of the USSR and the Government of Japan, in the interests of ensuring peaceful and friendly relations between \76\ both countries, solemnly declare that the USSR undertakes to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of Manchukuo -Go, and Japan undertakes to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the Mongolian People's Republic.

By authorization of the Government of the USSR for the Government of Japan
V. Molotov Iosuke Matsuoka
Yoshitsugu Tatekawa

WUA RF. F.Za - Japan. D. 113.

APPLICATION EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN THE PEOPLE'S COMMERCIAL FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V. M. MOLOTOV AND THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF JAPAN

Top secret

Dear Mr. Molotov!

With reference to the Neutrality Pact signed today, I have the honor to state that I expect and hope that trade. An agreement and a fishing convention will be concluded very soon and that at the earliest opportunity, Your Excellency and I, in the spirit of reconciliation and mutual concessions, will try to resolve within a few months the issue regarding the liquidation of concessions in Northern Sakhalin acquired under agreements signed in Moscow on December 14 1925, in order to eliminate any questions that do not contribute to the maintenance of cordial relations between the two countries.

In the same spirit, I would also like to draw attention to what would be good for both of our countries, as well as Manchukuo and Outer Mongolia, to find in the near future a way to create joint and (or) mixed commissions of countries interested in the settlement of border issues and handling border disputes and incidents.

Yours very sincerely, Matsuoka

II. Letter from the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan Iosuke Matsuoka

Top secret

Dear Mr. Matsuoka!

“Referring to the Neutrality Pact signed today, I have the honor to state that I expect and hope that a trade agreement and a fisheries convention will be concluded very soon and that at the earliest opportunity, Your Excellency and I, in a spirit of conciliation and mutual concessions, will endeavor to resolve within a few months, a question concerning the liquidation \77\ of concessions in Northern Sakhalin acquired under agreements signed in Moscow on December 14, 1925, in order to eliminate any questions that do not contribute to the maintenance of cordial relations between the two countries.

- IN In the spring of 1941, the USSR and Japan signed a neutrality pact. After that, the Japanese, although they were allies of Hitler, did not take part in the attack on the Soviet Union. Although in the autumn of 1941 their offensive could help the Germans take Moscow. What were they guided by - concepts of honor or pragmatic considerations?
- It was a pragmatic decision. After the clashes at Khasan and Khalkhin Gol, they understood that the Red Army was a strong enemy. Therefore, from the end of 1939 until the spring of 1941, the Japanese Kwantung Army carried out maneuvers, working out possible scenarios for an attack on the USSR. After June 22, Hitler put pressure on the Japanese leadership, demanding that they immediately enter the war. However, the Japanese were in no hurry and continued to wait for the "most favorable moment" for the attack - it was supposed to come at a clear turning point in the war in favor of Germany. War Minister Tojo said that the attack should take place when the Soviet Union "is like a ripe persimmon, ready to fall to the ground." Therefore, Tokyo regularly pushed back the dates for Japan's entry into the war. Often it looked like this: another dispatch came to Tokyo from Berlin, the German ambassador was invited, and in his presence, under the chairmanship of the emperor, meetings were held at which the alleged terms and prospects of the war with the USSR were discussed.

- Allegedly - that is, it was a hoax?
- Yes. The Japanese were well aware that they did not need a war with the USSR now. Japan needed resources it never had, not then, not now. The fact that the Japanese captured Manchuria in 1931 gave them a springboard for expanding their influence on the continent, but not a raw material base. They were interested in French Indochina, Dutch India and other territories where there was oil, rubber, access to raw materials needed for aluminum production, so the war with the United States for supremacy at sea was a priority. Having secured its material base, Japan was ready to start a war with the USSR and did not abandon these plans until 1943, when a turning point occurred in the war on pacific ocean in favor of the United States on the one hand, and Battle of Stalingrad- with another.

- And as a result, the USSR violated the neutrality pact by attacking Japan in August 1945.
- Yes, now the Japanese are accusing us of violating it, while they honestly observed it at one time. This is cunning, in 1941-43 the Japanese attacked Soviet convoys. These were, of course, isolated cases, but, nevertheless, the Soviet side cited them as an argument when they informed the Japanese side of the early termination of the pact. Moreover, Japan was an aggressor country and itself often violated the foundations of international law, violating the treaties and agreements concluded.

- Did the Japanese have some special militaristic spirit or is it a myth?
- What we call Japanese militarism appeared by historical standards relatively recently - in 1868, after the so-called. Meiji Restoration, when imperial power was restored. And before that, since 1192, Japan was actually ruled by the shoguns and there was no centralized army. And given the insular position of the country and the policy of self-isolation pursued by the authorities, there was no great practical need for this. Each principality had its own few samurai units.

And when the empire appeared in 1868, and after another 4 years - the regular Japanese army, they were able to integrate the old feudal samurai principles - about honor, loyalty, courage and duty - with the thesis of the divinity of the emperor and embody it in new capitalist realities. If earlier every samurai was devoted to his master, now every ordinary soldier served the emperor. The system has changed only externally, its internal content and functioning mechanisms have remained unchanged.

And from 1868 to 1945, the Japanese were told that they were a unique nation under the divine protection of the emperor, a direct descendant of the sun goddess Amaterasu. They were told that each warrior is endowed with a special spiritual power and the soul of a warrior becomes complete only when he dies for the emperor. In this case, he automatically enters the pantheon of Shinto deities, who are worshiped in the famous Yasukuni Shrine, where there are tablets with the names of soldiers who died for Japan, including those who were recognized as war criminals after the war. Therefore, for every Japanese, the highest honor was death on the battlefield for the empire and the emperor. Hence the fearlessness and fanaticism that surprised opponents so much. And if a person just died or was stabbed to death in a drunken fight, he disappears - and that's it, he does not become one of the kami deities.

Does he have an immortal soul?
- According to Shinto canons - no. Everyone in Shinto is mortal. Buddhism is another matter, but who was interested in it at that time? official state religion and the ideology was Shinto.

From 1872 until 1945, Japan constantly participated in various conflicts and always emerged victorious from them. After each such victory, the belief of the Japanese in their chosenness and the power of divine patronage only grew. In 1879, using far from diplomatic methods, they annexed the Ryuko archipelago. King Ryuko was invited to Japan for an official event, settled in a luxurious residence, but after that they were told that they would not be released until he transferred his rights to rule to the Japanese emperor. They kept him for 7 years until he signed what was required of him. 1874 - successful expedition to Taiwan, 1876 - expedition to Korea, 1894-95 - the first Sino-Japanese war, which they won. Then the Russo-Japanese War, the First World War, in which Japan sided with the Entente and received former German colonies in the Far East. 1927 - Shandong incident, then Manchuria was captured. Vast territories were under the control of Japan.

At the same time, the Japanese have always acted extremely pragmatically. For example, before the future Russo-Japanese War, they attended to the search for allies. Because they had the experience of the war with China in 1894-95, when there was no such ally. At that time, Japan won and received the Liaodong Peninsula, but Russia, France and Holland intervened, under pressure from which the Japanese were forced to return it. Now they expected to conclude an alliance with England, given the friction between her and Russia.

In order to gain attention from the British, they sent the former Prime Minister Ito Hirobumi to St. Petersburg, who successfully negotiated a Russo-Japanese military alliance. However, on the eve of the signing of the treaty, he received an order to curtail the mission and return. In fact, the Japanese were not going to conclude an agreement with Russia. It was a front - in order to force Britain to conclude an alliance as quickly as possible. The British, having learned about the negotiations between the Russians and the Japanese, themselves expressed a desire to sign such an agreement, and it was valid until 1923.

Was Emperor Hirohito, who ruled during World War II, an independent figure or a plaything in the hands of the military?
- Officially, of course, the emperor was a key figure. Schoolchildren from the first grades studied the myths and legends associated with the emperor, in the lessons of moral education they were read about the miracles that took place around him. As he went to some province, the people fell on their faces, after which all the blind received their sight. How the house burned down and the only surviving object was a portrait of the emperor, etc. But in reality, the military ruled everything. However, the military elite was not united. All the time there was a conflict between the army and the navy. It began in the 19th century, when representatives of two principalities - Satsuma and Choshu - occupied command posts: the first - in the ground forces, and the second - in the navy. This conflict is one of the reasons for Japan's defeat in World War II.

Commander-in-Chief of the Occupation Forces in Japan, General Douglas MacArthur and Emperor Hirohito

The Shandong Incident was planned by the navy in order to obtain funding. The second Sino-Japanese war of 1937 was started by representatives of the ground forces in order to change financial flows in their favor. During the war, it often happened that the naval forces carried out an operation, captured an island with the help of an amphibious assault, then this territory had to be occupied and held ground forces but they didn't move there. And when the Americans launched an offensive in 1945 on Okinawa, many territories turned out to be simply empty.

- Is it true that the emperor was peaceful?
- As a child, according to the reviews of guardians and educators, Hirohito was thoughtful and phlegmatic. He was very fond of science, marine biology and taxonomy - the systematics of plants and animals. He liked to play poker, drink good wine. How much he was responsible for the war is a moot point.

- Why was he not only not tried as a war criminal, but even removed from power?
- Stalin demanded that he be declared a war criminal and hanged. Great Britain demanded the same New Zealand and the Japanese left. However, the Americans did not go for it. Immediately after the defeat, the emperor was summoned to the headquarters of the occupying forces to General MacArthur, and for 3 days negotiations were going on, and in fact - bargaining. Over the previous years, the emperor became a symbol of society, and if he were gone, inside Japan would begin social conflict, the repayment of which the Americans would have to spend a lot of effort. Therefore, a wise decision was made: the emperor transferred part of his powers to the Americans, agreements were reached on reparations, and controlling stakes in a number of large companies passed into the hands of the Americans. In exchange, the existing political system was preserved.

- Why then were the allies not afraid of the conflict in German society?
- Still, in Japan, the Americans were alone, and in Germany, the influence of the USSR was great. We also demanded that the Japanese emperor be punished as a war criminal, and therefore were removed from all post-war processes in Japan, even the peace treaty in San Francisco was forced to refuse to sign. Back in May 1945, relations between the USSR and the USA were more or less normal, and by August they were in a deep crisis. The very same atomic bombings were not intended for Japan, but for the Soviet Union, to show him the power of American weapons. On August 8, the USSR entered the war - and on the same day the first bombardment. This is no coincidence. The task of the Americans during this period was to prevent the USSR from entering the war with Japan and to force Japan to capitulate before the Soviet landing.

Was it not the Americans themselves who were interested in the speedy entry of the USSR into the war with Japan and demanded appropriate promises from Stalin?
- Yes. But that was back in the days of Roosevelt, with whom Stalin had good relations. And then came Truman, who looked at things quite differently. He feared the strengthening of Soviet influence in the Far East in the event of the participation of the USSR in the defeat of Japan. The same island of Hokkaido, according to preliminary agreements, was supposed to be given to the USSR along with South Sakhalin and the Kuriles. Of course, the US did not want this.

It was precisely because of the fear of expanding Soviet influence in the East that the Americans changed their policy towards Japan. Immediately after the surrender, they began radical transformations there. There was a program of three D: democratization, decentralization and demilitarization. The Americans carried out this policy until 1947, and in 1948 a sharp 180-degree turn began. Because before that, the Americans were counting on expanding their influence in China. And when it became clear that China was falling under the control of the USSR, the stake was placed on Japan as the only possible American outpost. All war criminals were released from prisons, militaristic professors who had previously been banned from teaching returned to universities, the Japanese were allowed to create a national security reserve - what later became the Self-Defense Forces. In 1947, the Americans wrote a constitution for Japan that stated that it was forbidden to have a military force. But already in 1949 these forces appeared.

- Does the restriction, according to which no more than 1% of the budget should be spent on defense, still exist?
- Yes. But this is not so little. Plus there's another 1% of the emergency budget, so that's 2%.

- Why did the Americans think that imperial Japan was better than democratic Japan to counter the USSR?
- It's not even about the imperial speech. Democracy presupposes the freedom of all parties, including the communist and socialist ones, the punishment of war criminals, freedom of speech. But the Japanese press in the days of this democracy, seeing what the occupying American troops were doing in Japan, spoke of them very unflatteringly. And many Japanese suffered from leftism, that is, they were oriented towards the USSR. This is exactly what the Americans were afraid of, so democracy was curtailed and the Communist Party banned.

The experience of the peoples who suffered defeat - the Germans after 1918 or modern Russians, reflecting on the loss in cold war, - shows that such peoples are prone to revanchism. Why did the Japanese begin to turn to the left, and not dream of revenge?
- Japanese society is different from Western, it has its own rules. This is an Eastern society with its own rules and specifics. First, there is no individualism. One person - me - does not appear anywhere in Japan. Everything is decided by the team, as a rule - by the work team, because the family often also comes last. The Japanese never make individualistic decisions, which, by the way, is really bothering them now. When some problems arise in the economy and an urgent decision needs to be made - for example, to raise the discount rate - this decision will not be made until it is discussed with all interested parties and a consensus is reached. As a result, time will be wasted. This is the so-called. nemawashi - "linking the roots." There is no radicalism in the nature of the Japanese at all. As for the post-war period, the Japanese found an outlet in the fact that they mobilized themselves in the economy. They decided to show themselves to the whole world as a leading industrial power. In fact, this became a new state ideology.

- How was it formulated?
Differently. For example, Yoshida Shigeru, the first post-war prime minister, said that the task of the Japanese is to survive the bitterness of defeat and capture other countries without military force but economically. What they achieved in the 60-70s, when Japanese cars and household appliances began to spread around the world. The state set the task of increasing the well-being of the population, and these were not populist statements, but real steps. If the government said that every home should have a refrigerator or a color TV set by a certain year, it worked. As well-being grew, the people moved away from left-wing ideas, which was greatly facilitated by the press, showing the superiority of Japan over the USSR.

After the occupation, the emperor renounced his divine status, the Americans began democratization - and what, society so easily rebuilt from militarism to the values ​​​​of freedom?
- Yes. That's right, because the Japanese are used to believing what the head says. Since the head himself said that he was no longer a god, it means that he was not a god. Thinking Japanese understood everything perfectly. And the lower classes of society perceived differently. They felt that the emperor was forced to say so because he was placed in such conditions. The time will come - and he will take revenge. That is, they took it as a temporary trick.

- Why do the Japanese now love Americans, but not us, although the Americans bombed them?
- If you ask young people who bombed them, 99% will answer that they were Russians. Because the Americans are allies who ensure their security, and you yourself understand what relations between our countries are. If you take a history textbook for any grade in the school and open the chapter on the Second world war, it will say: “On August 8, 1945, the USSR treacherously attacked Japan. Atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As a result, Japan was forced to capitulate." From this passage it follows that it was the USSR that dropped the bombs.

Well, this is quite some kind of textbook for vocational schools. And if you study history more deeply, you can’t get away from the role of the Americans.
- The fact of the matter is that no matter how thick a history textbook is, it will contain two pages about the years 1920-40.

- Is this a consequence of American influence or do the Japanese themselves think that it is better for them?
- In the 50s it was, of course, American influence. Now in Japan, nationalistic tendencies are quite strong. This is largely the merit of former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, who was the first in post-war history since 2005 to use the words " national interests”, “national security”, went to Yasukuni Shrine.

- Didn't you go to him?
- Defiantly - did not go. But why he went, of course - to annoy the Chinese. And the people support him. When everything was good in the economy, in 1950-80s, no one cared about politics. For the Japanese, there are two main concepts: antei and anzei. stability and security. If everything is in order with this, the people have no more questions for the government. But in 1991, a serious economic crisis, the standard of living began to fall sharply enough, and the post-war system collapsed. The Japanese used to be the leaders of the Asian economy, but now they have been crushed by China and other countries. And nationalistic ideas are one of the ways to unite and concentrate the nation.

- Now in Japan democracy?
- Approximately the same as ours. Right now they have Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. but 99% of the Japanese know who will be the next prime minister. Everything is agreed in advance with all interested parties.

- So it can be compared with the Chinese political system?
- Essentially, yes. This is a clan system, just those samurai clans that have received the right to public administration for supporting the establishment of imperial power in 1868. If you look at the biography of any politician, his father was involved in politics, and his grandfather, and so on.

- But clans must compete with each other.
- Everything is clearly divided there. Someone becomes prime minister, someone is responsible for the industry, someone for finances.

- Aggravation of conflicts is possible?
- Hardly ever. There are rare exceptions - for example, the Lockheed case, when the current prime minister, whom many did not like, was deliberately set up and accused of taking bribes from the American company Lockheed to purchase faulty aircraft. He, following the code of the samurai, retired. But most often such resignations are negotiated in advance. The prime minister takes an unpopular step, knowing in advance that after this he will have to resign.

- Is it true that the Japanese are more cruel?
- Yes, quite tough. But they just have a different attitude towards death. Death is something simple. Therefore, to shoot a person is not even a punishment for him. But if a person suffers before death, this is already a punishment. Therefore, there are so many all sorts of exquisite ways in which the Japanese, like the Chinese, by the way, executed Christian missionaries. And they haven't changed, it just doesn't show up in the current conditions. Also, one should not forget the Shinto attitude towards filth - blood, corpses, etc.

- The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki for the Japanese today - is it a tragedy or just a page of history?
- Yes, it is a tragedy that is greatly experienced. A lot of people died and suffered, many witnesses are still alive. The Japanese are terribly afraid of everything connected with the word "atom". Many Japanese tourists who come here carry dosimeters and check the background all the time. Constantly held conferences, discussions of the bombing. In general, they are very fond of history - the Japanese in the subway read serious historical research like we have detectives in paperback.

Hiroshima after the atomic bombing

- Do they think that we bombed them?
- I spoke to the youth. When they begin to read seriously, the picture changes for them. Just recently, we met with Japanese students who came to us on an exchange, two of them said: “But wasn’t it you who dropped the bombs?”

- What is the Japanese motivation to learn Russian?
- Many Japanese of the older generation who worked in the USSR or visited Soviet camps have a very good attitude towards the Soviet Union and the Russian people and tell their children about it

Why did they like the camps so much?
- They liked the attitude of people. Mutual assistance, mutual assistance - the Japanese suffered, and some grandmother treated them to a pie. A lot of students who come to us say that their relatives told them about the hospitality of Russians.

- Why do they not like the Chinese and go to Yasukuni Shrine to annoy them?
- Now it is the result of economic competition. But in general, the Japanese as a nation were formed on Chinese culture, and the Chinese always emphasize this on occasion. The Japanese really don't like it. When China was weak, the Japanese were content. Now that the situation has changed, ask any Japanese on the street: “How do you feel about the Chinese?” - the reaction will be very ambiguous.

- That is, there will be no polite Japanese smile?
- It's not that there won't be a smile... Just recently I was in Tokyo - a sign hangs on the doors of the slot machine hall: "Chinese are not allowed to enter." More precisely, it says in hieroglyphics: "Foreigners are not allowed to enter." But you go inside - they start talking to you nicely in English. You answer them in Japanese - they generally melt. You ask: “How is it? It says here that foreigners are not allowed.” A slight smile follows and the answer is: "Well, this is not written for you, but for the Chinese." In hotels, the same signs can be in restaurants.

- Do the Chinese treat them the same way?
- It seems to me that the Chinese are more condescending towards the Japanese. They now have a sense of pride and superiority. That's when everything is bad in China, then the state propaganda machine turns against the Japanese, students are sent to hold rallies with posters on the streets, Japanese flags are burned.

- The Japanese do not go to rallies against the Chinese?
- No. They mostly go to anti-Russian rallies. On February 2, Northern Territories Day, quite large rallies gather in many cities.

- But Russians are allowed into the slot machine halls.
- I did not encounter that they were not allowed somewhere. But, on the other hand, they easily distinguish the Chinese, and the Europeans are all the same for them. Moreover, the Americans are their allies. .

On March 24, in a conversation with Molotov, the Japanese minister announced that he was going to Berlin and Rome to establish personal contacts with the leaders of the Axis powers in connection with the conclusion of the tripartite pact, since the exchange of views on this issue was carried out only by telegraph. However, this does not exclude the fact that he, as the closest assistant in the past of Count S. Goto, the initiator of the restoration of relations with the USSR in 1925, is striving to develop good relations with Moscow.

During a meeting with Stalin, Matsuoka confirmed his intention to improve relations with Moscow. To this, Stalin replied: “Whatever the ideology in Japan or even in the USSR, this cannot prevent the practical rapprochement of the two states, if there is a desire on both sides ... As for the Anglo-Saxons, the Russians have never been their friends and now, perhaps, They don't want to be friends with them." He concluded by supporting the drive of the Axis states to control the capitalists.

The Japanese minister recalled that in 1932 he supported Moscow's initiative to conclude a non-aggression pact. And although the Japanese government did not respond to this proposal at that time, he continued individual work in favor of such a pact. After his appointment in 1940 as the head of the Japanese Foreign Office, the implementation of this idea came to him as an urgent need, in addition to resolving issues such as the conclusion of a trade agreement and the signing of a new fisheries convention, negotiations on which progressed quite successfully.

Touching upon the issue of Japanese oil and coal concessions in Northern Sakhalin, Matsuoka recalled that they were granted in 1925 (until 1995) as compensation for the damage caused to Japan in connection with the incident in Nikolaev during the Civil War, where many Japanese were killed.

In response to Molotov's proposal to liquidate concessions, the Japanese minister raised the issue of selling Northern Sakhalin, referring to the fact that the Japanese came to this island as early as the 16th century, and the Russians "took" it from Japan relatively recently, at the beginning of the Meiji period (1875 G.). At the same time, Matsuoka spoke in favor of speeding up the resolution of the issue of the border between the USSR and Manchukuo.

He further emphasized that Japan, having concluded an alliance with Germany, was not going to quarrel with the USSR and would strive to ensure that the same relations were maintained between the Soviet Union and Germany. However, if the USSR cooperates with the USA against Japan as against a common enemy, then the latter will be forced, having attacked the USSR, to deal with its opponents separately.

In response, Molotov said that since 1932, when Japan rejected the Soviet proposal for a non-aggression pact, the situation in the world has changed significantly - now the USSR has such an agreement with Germany, and Japan has an alliance pact with the latter. The pact between the USSR and Germany turned out to be possible, since, according to Molotov, she correctly understood the interests of the Soviet Union, which, in turn, realized the interests of Germany.

Making it clear that it was expedient for Japan and the USSR to use this example, Molotov stated: “As for the non-aggression pact between the USSR and Japan, the Soviet side also takes this issue seriously, proceeding from the attitudes from which it proceeded when concluding agreements with Germany.

This circumstance, from our point of view, is of fundamental importance for assessing the different interpretations of the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact, which will be discussed below.

Regarding the issue of recognition by the Soviet Union in 1925 of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty between Russia and Japan, Molotov said: “We cannot leave unchanged what was established in the relations between our countries after the defeat of Russia in 1905. treaty with about the same feeling as in Germany they treat Treaty of Versailles. So the Treaty of Portsmouth is a poor basis for the development and improvement of relations. Moreover, Japan violated this treaty in relation to Manchuria.

The Soviet leader also regarded the reminder of the Nikolaev events as inappropriate, referring to the fact that they occurred at the last stage Japanese intervention in the Amur and Primorye, during a period of very bad relations between the two countries.

On the question of the interests of the USSR and Japan in the area of ​​Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, Molotov said that he considered the offer to sell Northern Sakhalin "as a joke." “With us, no one would understand now the sale of Northern Sakhalin, because they remember that only as a result of the defeat in 1905, Russia was forced to give up the southern half of Sakhalin,” Molotov continued. - Our public opinion it would be more understandable if, in amending the Treaty of Portsmouth, concluded after the defeat, the question of buying the southern part of Sakhalin was raised, and the question of price could be settled by agreement. Now it would be more correct to raise the question of buying from Japan not only the southern part of Sakhalin, but also some group of the Northern Kuril Islands(our italics. - K. Ch.)».

Thus, it is obvious that the growing threat from Germany forced the USSR to talk not about the gratuitous return of South Sakhalin and the Kuriles, but only about buying part of these territories.

Molotov expressed the hope that the Japanese government, striving to conclude a non-aggression pact based on consideration of mutual interests, as Germany did in 1939, would favorably approach the issue of the USSR buying the Northern Kuril Islands and the southern part of Sakhalin.

Regarding relations with the United States, Molotov assured that the Soviet government "has no intention of concluding an agreement to attack Japan."

At the end of the conversation, the head of the Soviet government proposed that we confine ourselves to concluding a Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact so that "issues requiring lengthy discussion would not need to be touched upon." At the same time, Molotov added that “during his meetings in Berlin with Hitler and Ribbentrop, and in particular in the last conversation with Ribbentrop, he was quite specifically told that Japan would meet the Soviet side on the issue of concessions in Northern Sakhalin” on the recommendation of his main ally in the tripartite pact.

On March 26, Matsuoka arrived in Berlin and from the next day began negotiations with Ribbentrop and Hitler.

Without disclosing how to implement the Barbarossa plan - the plan of war against the USSR, Ribbentrop expressed an interest in Japan, as an ally of Germany, not interfering in this possible war (in accordance with Article 5 of the tripartite pact), since Germany expected to independently decide the fate of all territories The USSR after its lightning defeat without the participation of Japan. At the same time, the latter was supposed to help Germany by striking at Singapore, the main British military base in the Far East.

But the Japanese minister, limiting himself to a personal promise, made it clear that he was not going to remain an extra in the event of the division of the territory of the USSR after its defeat. Matsuoka made no secret of his intention to conclude a neutrality pact with the USSR, which would serve as a guarantee of the security of Japan's rear during its expansion to the South, directed against the interests of England and especially the United States in this area.

From this point of view, the opinion of the former head of the information department of the Japanese Ministry of War, Lieutenant General X. Hata, who, being in Soviet captivity, noted in his testimony: “As for the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact, this step was aimed at strengthening of the Japanese position towards the United States".

In a conversation with Ribbentrop on March 29, Matsuoka expressed his intention once again to invite the USSR to join the tripartite pact. Ribbentrop replied that "at the present time, due to the change in the situation, the question of this is no longer on the table," and advised Matsuoka, during conversations with Soviet leaders in Moscow, not to touch upon or even enter into discussions with them of any issues related to this pact. .

There is an opinion that, in accordance with the instructions of his government, which allowed the conclusion of a neutrality pact instead of a non-aggression pact with the USSR, Matsuoka negotiated its signing, being in Moscow on March 24 on his way to Germany and on his way back, starting on April 7. In fact, this point of view is not supported by the above recording of these negotiations, from which it follows that only the Soviet side raised the issue.

Nevertheless, Matsuoka, with broad powers, was determined to conclude a non-aggression or neutrality pact, contrary to Ribbentrop's warning, in order to maintain a free hand both in relation to Berlin and Moscow. This is supported by the following telegram from the German Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in Tokyo dated July 5, 1941:

“Regarding the question of Japan's relations with Soviet Russia, for the purpose of your personal orientation, I would like to correctly highlight the report of our conversation with him on the topic of the Japanese-Russian non-aggression pact or neutrality.

According to your telegram No. 685 of May 6, 1941, Matsuoka informed you at the time that after his departure from Berlin he did not count on the possibility of concluding a Japanese-Russian neutrality pact. He expressed the same thing in his conversation with me, and only thought of taking advantage of the opportunity if the Russians expressed their readiness for it. By what Matsuoka sent you at that time, apparently, he meant to say that after the Berlin talks I should have reckoned with the possibility of concluding a pact. The same statement was made by Matsuoka to Count Schulenburg in Moscow after agreement had already been reached on the conclusion of the pact and just before its formal signing. At the same time, Mr. Matsuoka presented the conversation with me in such a way as if he had told me that he could not avoid discussing in Moscow the long-awaited question of the Japanese-Soviet neutrality or non-aggression pact, that he, of course, was against any haste, but that he would have to something to do if the Russians will meet the Japanese desires. I seemed to agree with his thought.

What Matsuoka told you and also Count Schulenburg is not true. The topic of the Japanese-Soviet non-aggression and neutrality pact was raised in a conversation between Matsuoka and myself on March 26, 1941, and, according to a note made by Ambassador Schmidt immediately after our conversation, this topic developed in this way.

In connection with the remark about the long-discussed Russo-Japanese trade treaty, Matsuoka bluntly asked me if he should not stop in Moscow on his way back to discuss a non-aggression pact or a neutrality pact with the Russians. At the same time, he emphasized that the Japanese people would not allow Russia to directly join the three-power pact, which would cause a general cry of indignation throughout Japan. I replied to Matsuoka that there was nothing to think about accepting Russia as a member of the pact, and advised him, if possible, not to raise in Moscow the issue of concluding the aforementioned non-aggression pact or neutrality, since this would not fit into the framework of the current situation.

The final decision on the conclusion of the pact was made only as a result of a conversation between Stalin and Matsuoka on April 12, 1941, when the latter was ready to leave Moscow without signing the pact. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan was invited to the Kremlin during an evening viewing of the play by A.P. Chekhov "Three Sisters".

At the beginning of the conversation, Matsuoka expressed the opinion that "if something happens between the USSR and Germany, he will prefer to mediate between the USSR and Germany." Since "Japan and the USSR are border states, he would like to improve relations between Japan and the USSR."

In response to Stalin's remark about whether the tripartite pact would interfere with this, the interlocutor answered in the negative, emphasizing that he spoke in this sense in his conversation with Ribbentrop.

Developing this idea, Matsuoka explained that the fundamental issues of relations between Japan and the USSR must be resolved from the point of view of "big problems, meaning Asia, the whole world, without being limited and not carried away by trifles", such as, for example, the question of Sakhalin, in order to "get rid of the Anglo-Saxons" in Asia, in particular in India, Iran and China.

To this, Stalin replied: “The USSR considers cooperation with Japan, Germany and Italy a big question. About this Comrade. Molotov notified Hitler and Ribbentrop when he was in Berlin and when the question arose of turning the pact of three into a pact of four. But Hitler, according to Stalin, said that for the time being he did not need military assistance from other states. Based on this, Stalin informed his Japanese interlocutor that “the question of the pact of four and cooperation with the USSR can arise, but only if the affairs of Germany and Japan (obviously in the fight against the Anglo-Saxons. - K. Ch.) go badly", and therefore the Soviet government now limits itself in relations with Japan to the neutrality pact, but considers it "as the first step and a serious step towards future cooperation on major issues."

Further, the interlocutors agreed that the issue of the territorial integrity of the MPR and Manchukuo should be fixed in a separate declaration attached to the pact, and the issue of the liquidation of Japanese concessions in Northern Sakhalin should be stated in exchange letters simultaneously with the signing of the pact. Stalin suggested that the letters indicate that the concessions would be liquidated within "two or three months," but then agreed to Matsuoka's wording - "within a few months."

Emphasizing the importance of this issue, Stalin approached the map and, pointing to Primorye, said that "Japan holds in its hands all the exits of the Soviet Primorye to the ocean - the Kuril Strait near the southern Cape of Kamchatka, the La Perouse Strait south of Sakhalin, the Tsushima Strait near Korea." Therefore, the sale of Northern Sakhalin to Japan in general would mean the strangulation of the Soviet Union. "What kind of friendship is this?" the Soviet leader reasonably asked, and in the end he won a concession from Matsuoka, promising to consider later the issue of supplying 100,000 tons of oil to Japan as compensation.

On April 13, a neutrality pact was signed in Moscow with an attached communiqué, and the letters mentioned were exchanged.

In Art. 1 of the pact contained the obligation of the parties, based on the desire for peace and friendship between the USSR and Japan, to maintain peaceful and friendly relations between themselves and mutually respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the territories of the other contracting party.

Art. 2 provided that in the event that one of the contracting parties was the object of military actions on the part of one or more third states, the other contracting party will remain neutral throughout the entire conflict.

Art. 3 established the duration of the pact for five years, and each contracting party could, one year before the expiration of this period, declare its intention to denounce the present pact after the expiration of the five-year period of its validity. Otherwise, the pact was automatically renewed for another five years.

The declaration, which was signed by Molotov, Matsuoka and Tatekawa, contained a statement that, based on the spirit of the neutrality pact in order to ensure peace and friendly relations between the USSR and Japan, the parties undertake to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the MPR and Manchukuo.

Matsuoka and Molotov exchanged strictly confidential letters. Matsuoka's letter, which Molotov confirmed receipt in a reply letter, contained commitments to conclude a trade agreement and a fishing agreement in the near future, to liquidate Japanese concessions in Northern Sakhalin within a few months, and to establish as soon as possible a mixed commission of representatives of the USSR, Japan, Mongolian People's Republic and Manchukuo -go to resolve border issues and deal with border disputes and incidents.

The Neutrality Pact was met with approval both in the Soviet and Japanese press. However, in Berlin, the signing of the pact caused displeasure, as in Germany they were surprised that Matsuoka did not heed Hitler and Ribbentrop's hints about the possibility of war between Germany and the USSR. In this regard, Ribbentrop even protested to the Japanese ambassador to Germany, Oshima.

Until recently, domestic researchers believed that this pact was concluded in case the USSR and Japan were attacked by other states, and since Japan itself attacked them and, therefore, turned out to be not an “object of hostilities”, but its subject, this agreement not related to the Soviet-Japanese war of 1945.

However, the publication of documents and materials on Soviet-German relations showed that the obligation contained in both the Soviet-German and Soviet-Japanese pacts not to attack one's partner if he becomes an "object of hostilities" applies to any war, regardless from the one who unleashed it.

Despite the fact that the main goal of concluding a neutrality pact with the USSR was to ensure the security of Japan's rear, which gave it the opportunity to pursue an aggressive policy towards Asian countries and the United States, Soviet historiography traditionally placed excessive emphasis on Tokyo's intention, by concluding this agreement, to camouflage accelerated preparations. to an attack on the USSR immediately after the start of German aggression. In addition, it was alleged that even before the conclusion of the neutrality pact, the German leaders at the talks in Berlin informed Matsuoka about the possibility of a German attack on the USSR in the very near future.

Soviet historiography also outlines the point of view of Japanese military circles, especially the leadership of the Kwantung Army, on the role of the neutrality pact as a means of "buying time for the adoption independent solution about the beginning of the war against the Soviets". Claiming that this opinion reflected the unified position of all circles in Japan, the researchers at the same time give three different concepts of action. Japanese authorities in the event of a war between the USSR and Germany: 1) after the German attack on the USSR, immediately begin military operations against it; 2) fall upon the USSR after a preliminary successful expansion into southbound; 3) make a final decision on the start of a wide expansion against the USSR or in the south, depending on the successes or failures of Germany in the war with the Soviet Union.

So, the researcher of Soviet-Japanese relations A.A. Koshkin (Arkadiev) pointed out the following reason that prompted the ruling circles of Japan to sign a neutrality pact: “In an effort to ensure the empire the greatest possible freedom of action and create the prerequisites for a surprise Japanese attack on the USSR, the Japanese military-political leadership found it expedient in the current situation to conclude the Japanese -Soviet Neutrality Pact. Also, AA. Koshkin believed that Japan's obligations under the tripartite pact could serve as a basis for her to attack the USSR.

“In concluding a neutrality pact with the Soviet Union,” he wrote, “the Japanese leadership sought to use it, on the one hand, as a cover for preparing for an attack on the USSR, and on the other, as a means of providing Japan with freedom in choosing the timing of anti-Soviet aggression.”

Developing this idea, A.N. Nikolaev supports the opinion of the Tokyo Tribunal, expressed in the verdict, that the conclusion of a neutrality pact with the USSR put the Japanese government in an “ambiguous position, since at that time it had obligations towards Germany under the Anti-Comintern Pact and the Three Powers Pact.”

In fact, the text of the additional protocol to the Anti-Comintern Pact (Article 1), not to mention its main text, as well as the tripartite pact (Article 3, taking into account Article 5), as already noted, do not contain any obligation for Japan to attack without fail. on the USSR at the request of Berlin or Rome, especially since in these treaties the question of measures against the USSR is raised only if it commits an unprovoked attack, and not itself becomes the object of attack.

The accusation of Japan of holding, simultaneously with negotiations on a pact with the USSR, negotiations on a five-year extension of the Anti-Comintern Pact also misses the target. (It was later extended until November 26, 1946).

In our opinion, the point of view deserves attention, according to which “the Anti-Comintern Pact of Germany, Italy and Japan was unambiguously directed not only and not so much against the USSR as a state, but against a certain area (more precisely, directions. - K. Ch.) its foreign policy expansion, which was conducted by the hands of the Comintern ... Later, Stalin carried out a repressive "purge" of internationalists in this organization (in the terminology - "Atlantists") and thereby cleared the way for improving the relations of the USSR with Germany and Japan, which corresponded to the plans of the "Europeans" in these countries that advocated an alliance of European states against such "Atlantic" powers as Great Britain and the United States.

However, negotiations on the extension of the Anti-Comintern Pact were conducted in 1940-1941. in parallel with the negotiations on the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact, not because the tripartite pact formally canceled the Anti-Comintern Pact, as V. Molodyakov believes, but because this was done in fact: firstly, as a result of Stalin’s purge of the international core of the Comintern and the transformation of this organization that formally existed until 1943, in addition international department Central Committee of the CPSU; secondly, as a result of a radical reorientation of its participants. The USSR, in turn, also refused to use the Comintern as a means of its foreign policy expansion against the Axis powers.

And since the Comintern in the period immediately after the conclusion of the tripartite pact existed only formally, the negotiations on the extension of the Anti-Comintern Pact were also of a formal nature. This is supported by the fact that the additional members of the axis, the satellites, first joined the Tripartite Pact and only then the Anti-Comintern Pact.

As for the evidence of Matsuoka's treachery precisely during the period of preparation for the conclusion of a neutrality pact with the USSR (since the summer of 1940), as well as his awareness of the timing of the German attack on the USSR, then to clarify these issues, one should turn to other documents.

The most convincing argument in favor of the fact that Matsuoka, even during the period of preparation for the conclusion of the neutrality pact with the USSR, was ready to violate it, is the statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, made by him during a conversation with Ribbentrop in the spring of 1941 in Berlin. Matsuoka bluntly stated that in the event of a war between Germany and the USSR, the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact "immediately loses force."

Matsuoka began to receive reliable information about the timing of the German attack on the USSR only a few days after returning to Tokyo, when the pact with the USSR had already been signed. So, the first message - a ciphered telegram from the Japanese ambassador to Germany, which arrived in Tokyo three days after the conclusion of the pact, read: "This year Germany will start a war against the USSR." The same information began to arrive in Tokyo soon from the military attaches of Japan in other states.

Until May 1941, Foreign Minister Matsuoka, even after receiving information from the Japanese ambassador to Germany, Oshima, about an imminent attack on the USSR, did not rule out the possibility that this message from Berlin to Japan aims to mask the preparations for a new massive offensive by German troops on England.

But at the end of May - beginning of June, Matsuoka nevertheless began to persuade the emperor of Japan to annul the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact, so that, after Germany unleashed a war against the Soviet Union, he would occupy Siberia up to Irkutsk.

Nevertheless, even in early June, Matsuoka believed that the probability of German aggression against the USSR was 40% against 60% of the possibility of resolving the conflict.

This opinion was shared by General base Japan and Minister of War Tojo.

“As a matter of fact, I signed a neutrality pact,” Matsuoka said at the 32nd coordination meeting of the government and headquarters on June 25, 1941, “because I believed that Germany and the USSR would not start a war. If I had known that they would go to war, I would have preferred to take a more friendly position towards Germany and would not have concluded a neutrality pact.

True, this statement, in our opinion, cannot be taken for granted, since the Japanese Foreign Minister was made clear enough at the beginning of 1941 from Washington that an impending war of Germany against the USSR was made in order to avoid an alliance between Tokyo and Moscow, and during his conversations in Berlin in the spring of 1941. And although he really did not know about the outbreak of war in the very near future, most likely it was the fear that if this war broke out, it would be difficult to secure Japan by a pact with the USSR, and Matsuoka's haste in this question .

In favor of the point of view that he was not specifically informed of the specific dates of the attack, is evidenced by the directive of Hitler's office of March 5, 1941: during the upcoming negotiations with Japan, i.e. with Matsuoka in Berlin, in no way let him know about the existence of the adopted December 18, 1940 of the Barbarossa plan, according to which preparations for war with the Soviet Union were to be completed by May 15.

That is why in the spring of 1941 Tokyo, despite alarming reports from Berlin, did not speed up measures to prepare for an attack on the USSR. This can be seen from the fact that from 1939 to mid-1941, the personnel of the Kwantung Army increased by only a few tens of thousands of people - from 270 thousand to 300-350 thousand people, which amounted to no more than half of the number of Soviet troops in the Far East