The psychology of affective processes is the most confusing part of psychology. This is where the greatest differences exist between individual psychologists. It is worth noting that they do not find agreement either in facts or in words. Some call feelings what others call emotions. Some consider feelings to be simple, finite, indecomposable phenomena, always similar to themselves and changing only quantitatively. Others, in contrast to ϶ᴛᴏ, believe that the range of feelings contains an infinity of nuances and that feeling is always part of a more complex whole. (...) A simple enumeration of fundamental disagreements could fill entire pages. (...)
FUNCTIONAL VIEWPOINT
When a desire arises to study some psychological phenomenon, it is most useful, in my opinion, to begin by considering it in a functional aspect, in other words, before analyzing the details of a ϶ᴛᴏth phenomenon with the help of a magnifying glass, so to speak, it is better to consider it less magnified in order to , to take into account its functional significance, its general place in behavior.
Applying ϶ᴛᴏt methodological principle to the study of affective phenomena, we must first of all ask ourselves the question: what are feelings for and what are emotions for? And if this question seems overly categorical, one can ask: what are the situations in which feelings and emotions arise, what role do these phenomena play in the individual's behavior?
It cannot be denied that the functional point of view has already found its fruitfulness in psychology. Let us recall Gross's theory of play, which showed the importance of play for the development of a child, the ideas of Freud, who examined mental disorders from the standpoint of their functional value. I myself have considered in this way sleep, hysteria, also intellect and will. Undoubtedly, the functional approach is only an introduction to a more complete study. At the same time, it is important for clarifying the ways in which further searches can be conducted.
By asking questions less about what things are than about what they do, functional psychology focuses on behavior. It is worth noting that it is thus closely related to behaviorism. At the same time, she also clearly differs from him, since she is interested in behavior, its patterns, determination, and not in the method by which these patterns are studied. It is worth saying that it does not matter much for her whether these methods are objective or introspective. (...)
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FEELINGS AND EMOTIONS
(...) We asked ourselves: what are feelings for in everyday life and what are emotions for? To these two questions, we immediately have very different answers: feelings in our behavior are useful, while emotions will not be expedient.
Indeed, it is quite easy for us to imagine a person who would never experience emotions, who would never experience convulsions of fear or anger, but who would nevertheless be viable. At the same time, we cannot imagine a person devoid of feelings - a range of affective nuances that allow him to determine the value of things to which he must adapt, a person who would not distinguish between what is good for him and what is harmful.
On the other hand, observations show how maladaptive emotional phenomena can be. Emotions arise precisely when some reason prevents adaptation. A person who has the opportunity to escape does not experience the emotion of fear. Fear is revealed only when it is impossible to escape. Anger arises only when the enemy cannot be hit. An analysis of bodily reactions during emotions provides evidence that the subject here does not perform adaptive actions, but vice versa - reactions that resemble primitive instincts (϶ᴛᴏ was shown by Darwin) (...)
The uselessness or even harmfulness of emotions is known to everyone. Imagine, for example, a person who has to cross the street, if he is afraid of cars, he will lose his cool and run. Sadness, joy, anger, weakening attention and common sense, often force us to commit undesirable actions. In short, the individual, once in the power of emotion, "loses his head."
From a functional perspective, emotion appears as a regression of behavior. When, for one reason or another, the natural, correct response cannot be made, the opposing tendencies involve primitive ways of responding. And these primitive reactions, the rudiments of reactions that were once useful, can be both contractions of peripheral muscles, and phenomena of vascular, inhibitory, secretory, visceral, etc. Some of them may not have biological significance (for example, tears) and arise solely as a result of the spread of a nerve impulse that has not found a natural outlet. (...)
PERIPHERAL THEORY OF EMOTION
In my opinion, the James-Lange theory will be the only one that explains the existence of specific bodily phenomena in the emotional state. By treating bodily phenomena as the result (rather than the cause) of emotion, the old theories made emotion an entirely mysterious process. Excluding the above, important facts speak in favor of the James-Lange theory: the suppression of emotion during the suppression of peripheral phenomena, as ϶ᴛᴏ asserted, as well as the emergence or intensification of certain emotional states during the consumption of poisons, alcohol, coffee, hashish, etc.
The peripheral theory of James and Lange, however, encounters very great difficulties. If emotion is only the consciousness of peripheral changes in the body, then why is it perceived as an "emotion" and not as "organic sensations"? Why, when frightened, am I aware of the “presence of fear” in myself, and not just some organic impressions, trembling, heartbeat, etc.?
I do not know if anyone has yet made an attempt to answer this objection. It does not seem, however, that it would be very difficult to make ϶ᴛᴏ. Emotion is nothing but the consciousness of the form or "Gestalt" of numerous organic impressions. In other words, emotion is the ϶ᴛᴏ consciousness of the global attitude of the organism.
Such an undivided and general perception of the whole, which in the past I have called "syncretic perception"2, will be a primitive form of perception. It is known that in the case of emotional perception, it is more useful to know the general attitude of the body than individual elementary sensations that combine into a whole. Perception of the details of internal sensations should not be of great interest to the individual. Action is the most important thing for the body. But does he realize that general attitude, which he will awaken in relation to the environment? (...)
Many of the impressions we receive are interpreted by us in different ways, depending on the direction of our interests.
It is worth noting that ϶ᴛᴏ is especially true for tactile impressions, which are sometimes perceived as objective, and sometimes as subjective. It is not difficult to check ϶ᴛᴏ in experiment. It is worth saying - put your hand on the table. It is important to note that the same tactile impression will be perceived, depending on the direction of your attention, either as a “tactile sensation”, or as a “solid object”, a table. At the moment when your interest is directed at yourself (for example, during the corresponding Psychological experiment), you will feel the hand, and not the table at all.
The same thing happens in the case of emotion. If in a state of anger you pay attention to the kinesthetic sensations in clenched fists, to the trembling of their lips, etc., you will no longer be aware of anger. Or let the anger take over you; in such a case, you will no longer perceive separately the trembling of the lips, the blanching, or other isolated sensations that arise in various parts of the tense muscular system.
What consciousness grasps in emotion is, so to speak, the form of the organism itself, or its attitude.
This peripheral conception, which treats emotion as consciousness of the organism's attitude, will, moreover, be the only one capable of considering the fact that emotion is directly, unconditionally "understood" by those who experience it. Emotion contains the ϲʙᴏ value in itself. A child who for the first time experiences great fear, great joy, or is seized with an outburst of anger, as far as we can judge ϶ᴛᴏm from observation or from his own memory, immediately understands what has happened to him. It is worth saying that in order to successfully understand the meaning of such an explosion of his organism, he does not need past experience, which he needs to understand the impressions delivered by sight or hearing, impressions that do not have any immediate or absolute significance. But what does it mean to "understand"? Doesn't "understanding" essentially consist in adopting an attitude towards an object? If ϶ᴛᴏ is so, and if such acceptance of the attitude itself is due to reasons of an innate and instinctive nature, then it is not at all surprising that emotions are understood unconditionally.
The last remarks allow us to understand how ... anti-psychological will be the classic "central" understanding of emotions: "We tremble because we are afraid, we cry because we are upset, we clench our teeth because we are angry." (...)
In fact, it assumes that we can, with the help of simple intellectual perception, determine that the situation we are in is “dangerous”, “threatening”, “disappointing”, etc. But “danger”, “disappointing”, etc. ... will not be facts of consciousness caused by external influences, such as, for example, sensations of color or temperature. It is we ourselves who color things or external situations, projecting onto them those feelings that they generate in us and which they excite, causing a reaction in our body. The child finds a big dog or darkness terrifying because they evoke reactions in him, the consciousness of which we call "fear."
To claim, as the classical theory does, that a situation causes fear because we find it terrifying is either not explaining why we find the situation terrifying at all, or spinning in a vicious circle. (...)
FUNCTIONAL UNDERSTANDING OF AFFECTIVE PHENOMENA
We argue that emotion can give meaning to the situation that gave rise to it. This provision needs to be clarified. Indeed, if emotion is a disorder of conduct, an ill-adapted act, how can it give things the right meaning?
We must not forget, however, that emotion, being an objectively poorly adapted act, nonetheless represents an integral reaction that has biological significance. Objective non-adaptation may be subjective usefulness. The installation adopted by the body does not lead to an effective resolution of the situation. It is worth noting that she nevertheless “understands” herself, orients herself in a certain direction, so to speak.
I believe that to explain the paradox of maladaptive reactions, which at the same time play a useful role - since it is undeniable that fear, anxiety, sadness, joy are of great importance in human life - it is easiest to put forward the following hypothesis. Emotion will be a mixture with a varying proportion of adaptive and non-adaptive responses. The closer an emotion is to the form of a shock, an explosion, the greater the proportion of non-adaptation in it compared to adaptability.
considered in time, the two parts of an emotional phenomenon usually follow each other. Sometimes an emotion begins with shock, with maladaptive reactions that gradually transform into useful behavior. Sometimes, on the contrary, a useful adaptation manifests itself first, and when it encounters an obstacle, it is followed by an emotional explosion. Do they not show us the existence of such forms of affective processes by observing emotional phenomena in everyday life?
The inability of an explosive emotion to usefully influence behavior can be illustrated by the following example, taken from many others.
Let's say two people are walking through a forest at night. It is important to note that one of them, more emotional, is in great fear. The other remains calm. Then they must return, also at night, through the same forest. The fearful person will take precautions. It is worth noting that he will grab a weapon, take a dog with him. The second person will not change his behavior. The affective experiences during the first passage through the forest will undoubtedly be what later changed the behavior of the first traveler. In spite of ϶ᴛᴏ, we may ask: does emotion as such (considered as upsetting reactions) cause a change in subsequent behavior? Indeed, it is not at all difficult for us to imagine a brave person who, passing through the forest, notes that such a journey is not safe, and draws a conclusion without experiencing the slightest emotion of fear. At the same time, his further behavior will change in the same way as the behavior of a person who is frightened: he will take with him a weapon, a dog. Comparison of these two cases shows that fear does not play the role that we are usually inclined to see.
What happened to brave man? The passage of the dark forest sharpened his attention, evoked thoughts about possible protection, in short, determined the attitude "to be on the lookout." Wouldn't the perception of this attitude be what constitutes the "consciousness of danger"? And is it not possible to say that in a person who has experienced fear, subsequent behavior in useful side was changed precisely by the ϶ᴛᴏth precautionary setting? By the way, this attitude was mixed with emotion or alternated with it, and it can be said that the behavior was changed in a useful way not due to emotion, but independently of it.
Do not these reflections lead us to the assumption that, along with emotions, there are reactions that differ from them in their adaptability, and, consequently, the ability to usefully orient behavior? These reactions, given attitudes, as well as the subject's consciousness of their presence, we unite together under the general name of feelings.
In addition to the emotion of fear, we must then have a “feeling of fear”, which would be better called a “feeling of danger” and which should consist in the consciousness of a defense attitude. In addition to the emotion of anger, there must be a “feeling of anger”, which it would be better to call Oy “warlike feeling” and which consists in the consciousness of the attitude to attack and fight. (...)
For the emotions of joy and sadness, ϲᴏᴏᴛʙᴇᴛϲᴛʙ feelings will be feelings of pleasant and unpleasant, pleasure and pain, as they are depicted in modern psychology, and they will also be only the consciousness of a positive or negative attitude of the organism in relation to the current situation. (...)
It seems to me that the point of view presented here combines various facts and creates some advantages, which I consider below.
RECONCILIATION WITH A COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF EMOTIONS
Our ideas allow, to some extent, to reconcile the peripheral theory with the generally accepted understanding of emotions.
The generally accepted opinion that fear often arises after realizing the danger of the situation in which we are, will be true. Only ϶ᴛᴏ awareness does not lead, as the classical theory suggests, to a purely intellectual judgment. According to our theory, it consists in the "feeling of danger." Therefore, we will say that the emotion of fear follows the feeling of danger;
϶ᴛᴏ happens when we are unable to escape or defend ourselves naturally; Normally developing behavior is then replaced by disturbed behavior. According to this principle, the ϶ᴛᴏt approach differs profoundly, however, from the classical theory, since it assumes that neither emotion nor a sense of danger are directly caused by perception. The development of an affective phenomenon is always extremely importantly preceded by reactive processes. It is the appearance of the ϶ᴛᴏth process that warns us against danger. Emotion, therefore, will awake only as a special phase of the reactive process. When the completion of adaptive reactions encounters an obstacle in activity, they are replaced by primitive reactions. In cases where emotion arises suddenly, for example, when we start at an unexpected sound, the James-Lange theory retains its full value in its usual form.
The following diagram depicting theories of emotion will make it clear
how we understand them:
|
Perception - emotion - organic reactions |
|
|
Note that the James-Lange theory |
Perception - organic reactions - emotion |
|
Modified Peripheral Theory |
Perception - installation (to escape), feeling (danger) - organic reactions - emotions (fear) |
|
Escape without emotion |
Perception - installation (on the run), feeling (danger) - flight () |
INTELLECTUAL SENSES
Our theory of the senses also has the advantage that it makes room for intellectual feelings. Note that the term "intellectual feeling" does not have a strictly defined meaning. In the work "Psychology of Feelings" Ribot combines under this name only surprise, amazement, curiosity, doubt. Other authors add to this list the general feeling that arises from the movement of our thought, from its success or futility. In my opinion, one should go much further and include in intellectual feelings all those elements of thinking that Jeme calls transitional and which do not represent the subject content: similarity, implication, coincidence, certainty, possibility, those thousands of relationships that we express in words: but, if, and why, after, before, as well as thoughts expressed in words: future, past, conditional, negation, affirmation, etc.
William Djeme saw everything very well: “If only such phenomena as feelings exist at all, then as much as it is certain that in rerum natura3 there are relations between objects, it is equally and even more certain that there are feelings that these relations are known. There is no union or preposition and even adverb, prefix or change, intonation of a nation in human speech that does not express one or another shade of those relations that we are in this moment really feel existing between the larger elements of our thinking ... We should talk about feeling and feeling if, feeling but and feeling through ... "
It is very curious that these insightful remarks by James, which in their essence contain a fruitful idea for the psychology of thinking, shared the fate of a lost letter. (...)
In the work "Association of ideas" (1903), which sharply argues with associationism, I revived the idea of James and tried to develop it in a biological aspect. Every intellectual feeling is considered there as a response to adaptive reactions or attitudes of the organism. “Couldn’t the body,” I narrated, “serve as the source of those numerous ideas, to which, ϶ᴛᴏ no doubt, in the external world, acting on the senses, nothing corresponds, but which may well be awareness of the reactions of the body to the environment?” (p. 317) I applied this point of view to "understanding", making it adaptive again, and defined the sense of understanding as "awareness of an adaptation that has taken place, more or less complete." (...)
However, we are left with one difficult question: why do intellectual feelings seem to us objective, while other feelings and emotions are "our own states"?
But is it ϶ᴛᴏ? Indeed, many intellectual feelings, such as certainty, doubt, affirmation and negation, logical
conclusion, etc., depending on the circumstances, on the direction of our interests at the moment, may seem to us both objective and subjective. On the other hand, are other feelings always subjective? We know how easily they are objectified. Aesthetic experiences are objectified in the beautiful, disgust in the repulsive, etc. We say that an event (objective) will be sad, joyful, shameful, comical or unpleasant. When we say that work is unpleasant, we place ϶ᴛᴏ “unpleasant” either in the work or in ourselves, depending on the context of our thoughts.
In my opinion, the subjectivity or objectivity of the knowable content will always be the result of a secondary process, depending on the acquired experience. Initially, the states of our consciousness are neither objective nor subjective. Note that they gradually become one or the other, as necessary to adapt to the physical or social environment.
FEELINGS AND INTERNAL SENSATIONS
The functional concept discussed above allows us to clarify the difference between feelings and internal or organic sensations, in particular the sensations of hunger, thirst, fatigue, and also synesthesia. Often such a distinction is not made and people speak of "feeling" tired or hungry.
In my opinion, the sensations of hunger, thirst, fatigue (perhaps, the feeling of pain can be added to them) are significant in themselves and do not have; they are phenomena that receive significance only from those attitudes, tendencies and movements that they instinctively evoke, and it is precisely such instinctive reactions that make them significant for the behavior of the individual. But these instinctive reactions will be nothing but the basis of feelings: feelings of pleasant or unpleasant, desire, need.
Based on all of the above, we come to the conclusion that internal sensations will be states that are clearly different from feelings, which are the essence of attitudes. Inner sensations inform us about certain states of our body in the same way that external sensations inform us about the state of the environment. But the vital significance of organic sensations can only be determined by the existence of the senses. (...)
Feelings express in some way the relationship between a certain object or situation and our well-being (it can also be said that they express our attitude towards a situation or object) physiological basis such a relationship will be the installation itself. Feeling - ϶ᴛᴏ awareness of such an attitude. In contrast to ϶ᴛᴏ, sensations present only objects, in relation to them we take the attitude of Object, presented by internal sensations, such as sensations of hunger,
thirst, fatigue - ϶ᴛᴏ our own body. But it is precisely this attitude to our own state that our body is capable of adopting a certain attitude. It is clear that there is a very intimate connection between inner sensations and feelings, but. because both of them have their ϲʙᴏth source in the body. This does not prevent us, however, from clearly distinguishing them from a functional point of view. It is worth noting that they oppose each other in the same way as the reaction of pro. opposes the object that called it.
McDougall (Me Dougall) William (June 22, 1871 – November 28, 1938), Anglo-American psychologist. Initially engaged in biology and medicine, under the influence of the "Principles of Psychology" by W. James, he turned to the study of psychology, first in Cambridge, then in Göttingen under H. Muller. Lecturer at University College London and Oxford. Professor at Harvard (1920-1927) and at Duke University (1927-1938) in the USA.
It is worth noting that he considered the aspiration - “horme” (Greek - aspiration, impulse) to be the basis of mental life, which is why the psychology of W. McDougall is often called sgormic. "Gorme" is interpreted as striving for a biologically significant goal, due, according to W. McDougall, to a special kind of predispositions - innate instincts or acquired inclinations. Emotional experiences are considered as subjective correlates of these predispositions. The emotional sphere in the process of its development in a person receives a hierarchical structure. At first, several basic emotional formations (sentiments) become leading,
and then, with the already established character - one central one, called McDougall egoic (from "ego", Greek - "I") Reflections on the clinical phenomenon of "multiple" personality prompted W. McDougall to develop a metapsychological concept of personality, based on the ideas of monadology G Leibniz. According to ϶ᴛᴏmu, each person represents a system of “potentially thinking and aspiring monads” (“I”), converging on a certain “higher” monad - “> a bridge”, which, through the hierarchy of monads, controls the entire psychophysical life of a person.
Compositions: Main Problems social psychology. M., 1916; physiological psychology. L., 1905; psychology. L, 1912; Body and Mind. L., 1912; Group Mind. L., 1920; Outline ot Psychology. N. Y., L., 1923; James. N. Y., 1927; Character and the Conduct of Life. N. Y., L., 1927; Energies of Men. "L., 1933; The Riddle of Life. L., 1938.
Literature: FlugelJ. William Me Dougall. - British. J. Psycho]. 1939, v. 29.
The Swiss psychologist E. Claparede (1873-1940), supporting Hall's idea of the need to create integrated science about the child - pedology, did not accept his interpretation biogenetic law. Claparede believed that a certain similarity between the phylo- and ontogenetic development of the psyche exists not because the child’s psyche contains the stages of development of the species and ancient instincts that he must overcome (as the theory of recapitulation suggests), but because there is a general logic of the development of the psyche in phylogenesis and ontogenesis. It is this general logic of development that determines the similarity of processes (but not their identity!). Therefore, there is no fatal predetermination in the development of the child, and external factors (including education) can accelerate its course and even partially change its direction.
Clapared proposed to divide child psychology into applied and theoretical, believing that they have a different range of problems. He considered the task of theoretical child psychology to be the study of the laws of mental life and the stages mental development children. He divided applied child psychology into psychognostics and psychotechnics. Psychognostics was aimed at diagnosing, measuring the mental development of children, and psychotechnics was aimed at developing methods of education and upbringing.
Considering that mental development does not need additional stimuli or factors that would push it, Clapared developed the idea of self-development, self-expansion of those inclinations that a child already has at birth. The mechanisms of this self-development are play and imitation.
With all the breadth of the range of problems that interested Claparede, thinking and the stages of its development in children were at the center of his research interests. He (like later his student J. Piaget) actually identified the development of thinking with mental development, and therefore the criterion for dividing childhood into periods for him was the transition from one type of thinking to another.
Exploring the formation of the intellectual sphere of children, Claparede discovered one of the main properties of children's thinking - syncretism, that is, the indivisibility, fusion of children's ideas about the world. He argued that mental development proceeds from grasping appearance to naming the object (verbal stage), and then to understanding its purpose, which is already a consequence of the development logical thinking. L.S. Vygotsky later spoke about the same direction in the development of children’s thinking - from fusion to dismemberment, disputing V. Stern’s statement that the child first understands a part (a single object) and only then begins to combine individual parts into a holistic image of the world .
Swiss psychologist, professor at the University of Geneva (1908). One of the founders of the Pedagogical Institute. J.J. Rousseau in Geneva (1912) and the journal Archives of Psychology (1902). Continuer of traditions french school empirical psychology. Author of works devoted to the connection of psychology with clinical and teaching practice, questions of vocational guidance, etc. The theory of the game of the child put forward by K., close to the biological concept of K. Gross, but with greater reliance on psychological content (for example, in assessing needs), gained fame.
Great Definition
Incomplete definition ↓
KLAPARED Edouard
24.3. 1873, Geneva, - 29.9.1940, ibid.), Swiss. psychologist, prof. University of Geneva (since 1908). One of the founders of ped, in-ta them. J. J. Rousseau in Geneva (1912) and zhurn. "Archives de Psychologie" ("Archives of Psychology", 1902). The successor of the traditions of the French. empirical schools. psychology (T. Ribot, P. Janet, A. Biney and others). K. asserted the activity of consciousness, highlighting the role of interests, motives and needs in behavior. In works devoted to the connection of psychology with clinical. and ped. practice, K. showed the importance of knowledge of psychology and for successful education. influence on the character, will, and other aspects of the personality, and for organizing the learning process. K. introduced into the ped. practice method so-called. thinking aloud, in which the student, solving a difficult task for himself, talks about the search for a solution. K. dealt with issues of career guidance, warning against excessive confidence in tests in predicting learning outcomes. Paying great attention to the study of the child's psyche, K. put forward a number of important ideas about the quality different levels in the ontogeny of the process of generalization, on the relationship between the awareness of differences and the awareness of similarities, etc. These ideas had a Mean. influence on modern zarub. genetic psychology, in particular on the theory of J. Piaget. The theory of the game of the child put forward by K., close to biol, gained fame. concepts of K. Gross, but with greater reliance on psychol. content (eg in a needs assessment).
Cit.: Lassociation des idees, R., 1903; Leducation fonctionnelle, Nchat. - R., P931]; Le sentiment dinferiorite chez lenfant. Cahi-ers de pedagogie experimentale et de Psychologie de lenfant, Gen., 1934; in Russian per. - Psychology of the child and experiments. Pedagogy, St. Petersburg, 1911; Prof. orientation, its problems and methods, M., 1925; How to determine the mental abilities of schoolchildren, L., 1927.
(1873-1940) - Swiss psychologist, specialist in applied psychology. developmental psychology, educational psychology, delay mental development. Founder of the Applied Psychology Association. Educated at the University of Geneva ( MD, 1897). Following the study of natural sciences and medicine K. turned to the study of psychology. He studied at the University of Geneva with his close relative, Theodore Fleuroy, with whom he later long years collaborated and replaced him as professor of psychology at Geneva University in 1915 (remained in this position until the end of his days). In 1901, together with T. Flern, K. founded and until 1940 edited the journal Archives de Psychologie. Conducted a large social and professional work: was general secretary 2nd International Congress of Psychology (1904) and 6th International Congress of Psychology (1909). He was elected permanent secretary of the International Psychological Congress and life president of the Committee international association psychotechnical conferences. Region scientific interests K. was very broad, including topics such as sleep, the work of the intellect, problem solving and education, neurology and psychiatry. In 1912, he founded the J.J. Rousseau, conceived by him as a center for innovative research and practical developments in the field of education. Subsequently, the Institute became an international center for experimental research in the field of child psychology, and it was there that Piaget carried out many of his studies. K. has always insisted on the importance of a functional approach. For example, considered a dream as functional state that meets the needs of the body and protects it from overwork. K. proved that sleep must be accompanied by active inhibition, carried out due to control from nervous system. The central place in his worldview was occupied by ideas about the contact between the organism and the environment, which brought his position closer to pragmatism. He introduced the law of conscious development (Low of becoming conscious), from which it followed that mental activity does not affect consciousness as long as the body successfully performs its functions. If only environment puts forward new demands, mental processes will be intercepted by consciousness. This dynamic approach to consciousness arose from K. through the unification of psychoanalysis and comparative psychology. He developed an experimental method in which the subject must tell a scheme for solving a problem. Thanks to this method, many studies K. inherent features of cognitive psychology, which arose much later. K. one of the first to define the subject of child psychology, proposing to divide it into applied and theoretical, believing that they have a different range of problems studied. He considered the task of theoretical child psychology to be the study of the laws of mental life and the stages of the mental development of children. At the same time, he divided applied child psychology into psychognostics and psychotechnics. Psychognostics was aimed at diagnosing, measuring the mental development of children, and psychotechnics was aimed at developing teaching and upbringing methods adequate for children of a certain age. Speaking about the fact that mental development does not need additional stimuli or factors that would push him, K. substantiated the idea of self-development, self-deployment of those inclinations that already exist in a child at birth. The mechanisms of this self-development are play and imitation, thanks to which it receives a certain direction and content. From his point of view, the game is a more universal mechanism, because It is aimed at the development of different aspects of the psyche, both general and special mental functions. K. singled out games that develop the individual characteristics of children, intellectual games (developing their cognitive abilities) and affective games (developing feelings). Imitation is connected mainly with the development of behavior, voluntary activity of children, because. it is based on the association between the images of movements (shown by adults) and these movements themselves, that is, traces of their muscular sensations. Despite the wide range of problems that interested K., in the center of his research interests was the study of thinking and the stages of its development in children. He (like later his outstanding student J. Piaget) actually identified thinking with mental development, and therefore the criterion for dividing childhood into periods for him was the transition from one type of thinking to another. Investigating the formation of the intellectual sphere of children, K. discovered one of the main properties of children's thinking - syncretism, that is, indivisibility, the fusion of children's ideas about the world with each other. He argued that mental development (that is, the development of thinking) moves from grasping the appearance to naming an object (verbal stage), and then to understanding its purpose, which is already a consequence of the development of logical thinking. Supporting the idea of G.S. Hall about the need to create a comprehensive science of the child - pedology, he did not accept Hall's interpretation of the biogenetic law. K. believed that a certain similarity between the phylo-and ontogenetic development of the psyche exists not because the child’s psyche contains the stages of development of the species and ancient instincts that the child must overcome (as the theory of recapitulation suggests), but because there is a general logic of development psyche both in phylogenesis and ontogenesis. It is this general logic of the development of the psyche that determines the similarity of these processes, but not their identity, therefore there is no fatal predetermination in the development of the child and external factors (including education) can accelerate its course and even partially change direction. The main works of K.: LstiAssociation des idttes, P., 1903; Psychologie de lstienfant et pedagogie experimentale, Delachaux, 1905, 1922 (in Russian. Per. Psychology of the child and experimental pedagogy, M.-L., 1932); Autobiography / In C. Murchison (ed), History of psychology in autobiography, v.l, Clark University Press, 1930; LstiEducation fonctionelle, Delachaux, 1931. In Russian. per. also published: Professional orientation, its problems and methods, M., 1925; How to determine the mental abilities of a schoolboy, L., 1927; Feelings and emotions / Psychology of emotions. Texts, Moscow, Moscow State University, 1984. L.A. Karpenko, V. I. Ovcharenko
The popularity of pedology led to the development of a mass pedological movement not only in America, but also in Europe, where it was initiated by such famous scientists as E. Maiman, D. Selly, V. Stern, E. Claparede and etc.
Development of children's and educational psychology in England is closely associated with the name George Selley. In his books "Essays on the Psychology of Childhood" (1895) and "Pedagogical Psychology" (1894-1915), he formulated the main provisions of the associationist approach to child development. These works contributed to the penetration of psychological ideas into educational establishments, a partial change in training programs and the style of communication between teachers and children.
J. Selley proceeded from the fact that a child is born only with the prerequisites of the main mental processes, which are formed during the life of children. To such prerequisites, he attributed the three elements that form the basis of the main constituents of the psyche - the mind, feelings and will. At the same time, the innate element from which the mind is formed is sensation, for feelings it is the sensual tone of sensations, anger and fear, and for the will it is innate forms of movements, i.e. reflex, impulsive and instinctive movements.
Associated throughout life individual elements(sensations, movements), which are combined (integrated) into a holistic image of an object, into a representation or concept. A constant attitude (feeling) to the environment and volitional behavior are also formed. Of great importance in the formation of associations, from the point of view of J. Selly, is attention, due to which strictly defined, and not any elements are connected to each other. Helps assimilation and exercise, which accelerates and strengthens the connection of elements into a single whole.
Although Selly did not make significant discoveries, since almost all representatives of this trend spoke about the structure of consciousness and the integration of elements based on association, his works had great importance for practical child psychology and pedology, since Selley studied what associations and in what order appear in the process of mental development of children. His research showed that the first associations are associations by similarity, then gradually images of objects based on associations by contiguity are formed in children, and at the end of the second year of life, associations by contrast arise. The data obtained by J. Selly also made it possible to identify the main stages in the cognitive, emotional and volitional development of children, which must be taken into account in their education.
Based on these provisions, a follower of J. Selley Maria Montessori developed a system of exercises that promote the intellectual development of children preschool age. The basis of this system, which is quite common today, was the training of sensations as the main elements of thinking, the awareness and integration of which contribute to the cognitive development of children.
The Swiss psychologist played an important role in the development of child psychology. Edward Claparede. He founded the Association for Applied Psychology and Pedagogical Institute them. Rousseau in Geneva, which has become an international center for experimental research in the field of child psychology.
Supporting Hall's idea of the need to create a complex science of the child - pedology, he did not accept his interpretation of the biogenetic law. E. Claparede believed that a certain similarity between the phylo- and ontogenetic development of the psyche exists not because the child’s psyche contains the stages of development of the species and ancient instincts that the child must overcome (as the theory of recapitulation suggests), but because there is a common logic development of the psyche in phylogenesis and ontogenesis. It is the general logic of the development of the psyche that determines the similarity of these processes, but not their identity, therefore there is no fatal predetermination in the development of the child and external factors (including education) can accelerate its course and even partially change direction.
E. Clapared proposed to divide child psychology into applied and theoretical, since, in his opinion, they have a different range of problems being studied. He considered the task of theoretical child psychology to be the study of the laws of mental life and the stages of the mental development of children. At the same time, he divided applied child psychology into psychognostics and psychotechnics. Psychognostics was aimed at diagnosing, measuring the mental development of children, and psychotechnics was aimed at developing teaching and upbringing methods adequate to a certain age.
Speaking about the fact that mental development does not need additional stimuli or factors that would push it, Claparede developed the idea of self-expansion of those inclinations that already exist in a child at birth. He considered the mechanisms of this self-development to be play and imitation, thanks to which it receives a certain direction and content. From his point of view, the game is a more universal mechanism, as it is aimed at developing different aspects of the psyche, both general and special mental functions. Clapared distinguished games that develop the individual characteristics of children, intellectual games (developing their cognitive abilities) and affective games (developing feelings).
He associated imitation mainly with the development of behavior, voluntary activity of children, since it is based on the association between the images of movements (shown by adults) and these movements themselves, i.e. traces of their muscular sensations. When a movement is repeated, the sensation from it merges with the appearance of this movement, after which it is possible to complete this task first when its image appears, and then with a verbal command. Thus, E. Clapared spoke not only about the internalization of voluntary movements, but also about the need to move from the motor to the figurative and only then to the internal plan.
Despite the wide range of problems that interested Claparede, the study of thinking and the stages of its development in children was at the center of his research interests. He (like later his famous student J. Piaget) actually identified thinking with mental development, and therefore the criterion for dividing childhood into periods for him was the transition from one type of thinking to another.
He identified four stages in mental development:
- 1. From birth to 2 years - at this stage, children are interested in the external side of things, and therefore intellectual development is mainly associated with the development of perception.
- 2. From 2 to 3 years - at this stage, children develop speech and therefore they cognitive interests focused on words and their meanings.
- 3. From 3 to 7 years - at this stage, the actual intellectual development begins, i.e. development of thinking, and in children common mental interests predominate.
- 4. From 7 to 12 years old - at this stage, the individual characteristics and inclinations of children begin to appear, since their intellectual development is associated with the formation of special objective interests.
Exploring the formation of the intellectual sphere of children, E. Clapared discovered one of the main properties of children's thinking - syncretism, i.e. indivisibility, fusion of children's ideas about the world with each other. He argued that mental development moves from grasping the appearance to naming the object (verbal stage), and then to understanding its purpose, which is already a consequence of the development of logical thinking. L.S. later spoke about the same direction in the development of children's thinking - from fusion to dismemberment. Vygotsky, challenging the assertion of V. Stern that the child first understands a part (a single object) and only then begins to combine the individual parts into a holistic image of the world.
Based on the fact that the development of abilities is due to hereditary factors, E. Clapared distinguished general and special giftedness, and general giftedness appeared, from his point of view, childhood and contacted the general high level all mental properties of the child. He attributed giftedness in the narrow sense to a mature age and connected it with a person's ability to solve new problems.
Thus, E. Clapared laid the foundations of an independent industry psychological science - developmental psychology, having had a significant impact on understanding the range of problems it solves and its task.
An invaluable contribution to the study of the mental development of children early age was made famous American psychologist Arnold Lucius Gesell.
A.L. Gesell is the creator of the Yale Clinic of Normal Childhood, which studied the mental development of young children - from birth to 3 years. The periods of infancy and early childhood were at the center of Gesell's scientific interests due to the fact that he believed that in the first three years of life the child goes through most of his mental development, since the pace of this development is highest precisely in the first three years, and then with gradually slow down over time. On this basis, he also created a periodization of mental development, in which three periods were distinguished - from birth to a year, from one year to three years and from three to eighteen years, the first period being characterized by the highest rates of mental development, the second by average, and the third - low.
A. Gesell's research was aimed at developing the normative development of the psyche in the first three years of life,
A. Gesell's clinic developed special equipment for objective diagnosis of the dynamics of the mental development of young children, including film and photography, "Gesell's mirror" (semi-permeable glass used for objective observation of children's behavior). He also introduced new methods of research into psychology - longitudinal (a method of longitudinal study of the same children over a certain period of time, most often from birth to adolescence) and twin ( comparative analysis mental development of monozygotic twins). Based on these studies, a system of tests and indicators of the norm for children from 3 months to 6 years old was developed according to the following indicators - motor skills, speech, adaptive behavior, personal and social behavior. The modification of these tests underlies the modern diagnostics of the mental development of children.
Particular attention was paid to the study of the spiritual development of the child by the German psychologist William Stern.
W. Stern was educated at the University of Berlin, where he studied with the famous psychologist G. Ebbinghaus. After receiving his doctorate, he was invited in 1897. to the University of Breslau, where he worked as a professor of psychology until 1916. Remaining a professor of this university. V. Stern founded in 1906. at the Berlin Institute of Applied Psychology. At the same time, he began to publish the "Journal of Applied Psychology", in which he, following G. Munsterberg, developed the concept of psychotechnics. However, he was most interested in research into the mental development of children. Therefore, in 1916 he accepted the offer to become the successor of the famous child psychologist E. Meiman as head of the psychological laboratory at the University of Hamburg and editor of the Journal of Educational Psychology. At this time, he was also one of the initiators of the organization of the Hamburg Psychological Institute, which was opened in 1919. In 1933 Stern emigrated to Holland, and in 1934. moved to the United States, where he was offered a professorship at Duke University, which he held until the end of his life.
V. Stern, one of the first psychologists, put the analysis of the development of the child's personality at the center of his research interests.
The study of a holistic personality, the laws of its formation became the goal of the theory of personalism developed by him. This was especially important at the beginning of the century, as research child development At the time, they focused mainly on the study cognitive development children. V. Stern also paid attention to these issues, exploring the stages of development of thinking and speech. However, from the very beginning, he sought to explore not the isolated development of individual cognitive processes, but the formation of an integral structure, the personality of the child. The foundations of the theory of personalism, developed by V. Stern, are set out in his fundamental work "Person and Thing" (1906-1924).
V. Stern believed that a personality is a self-determined, consciously and purposefully acting integrity, which has a certain depth (conscious and unconscious layers). He proceeded from the fact that mental development is self-development, self-deployment of the inclinations that a person has, directed and determined by the environment in which the child lives. This theory was called the theory of convergence, since it took into account the role that two factors play in mental development - heredity and environment. The influence of these two factors was analyzed by V. Stern on the example of some of the main types of children's activities, mainly games.
V. Stern understood development itself as growth, differentiation and transformation of mental structures. At the same time, speaking of differentiation, he, like the representatives of Gestalt psychology, understood development as a transition from vague, indistinct images to more clear, structured and distinct gestalts of the surrounding world. This transition to a clearer and more adequate reflection of the environment goes through several stages, transformations that are characteristic of all basic mental processes. Mental development has a tendency not only to self-development, but also to self-preservation, i.e. to the preservation of the individual, innate characteristics of each child, primarily to the preservation of individual rates of development.
V. Stern became one of the founders of differential psychology, psychology individual differences, to which his book "Differential Psychology" (1911) is devoted. He argued that there is not only a normativity common to all children of a certain age, but also an individual normativity that characterizes a particular child. Among the most important individual properties, he just named the individual rates of mental development, which are also manifested in the speed of learning. Violation of this characteristic can lead to serious deviations in development, including neuroses. Stern was also one of the initiators pilot study children, testing and, in particular, improved the ways of measuring the intelligence of children, proposing to measure not mental age, but IQ.
Preservation individual features perhaps due to the fact that the mechanism of mental development is introception, i.e. connection by the child of his internal goals with those that are set by others. Stern believed that the potential possibilities of a child at birth are rather uncertain, he himself is not yet aware of himself and his inclinations. The environment helps the child to realize himself, organizes him inner world, gives it a clear, formalized and conscious structure. At the same time, the child tries to take from the environment everything that corresponds to his potential inclinations, placing a barrier in the way of those influences that contradict his internal inclinations. The conflict between the external (environmental pressure) and internal inclinations of the child has and positive value for its development, since it is precisely the negative emotions that this discrepancy causes in children that serve as a stimulus for the development of self-awareness. Frustration, delaying introception, makes the child look into himself and the environment in order to understand what exactly he needs for a good sense of self and what exactly in the environment causes him a negative attitude. Thus, V. Stern argued that emotions are associated with the assessment of the environment, help the process of socialization of children and the development of reflection in them.
The integrity of development is manifested not only in the fact that emotions and thinking are closely related, but also in the fact that the direction of development of all mental processes is the same - from the periphery to the center. Therefore, first, contemplation (perception) develops in children, then representation (memory), and then thinking, i.e. from vague ideas they pass to the knowledge of the essence of the surrounding.
Investigating the stages of the mental development of children, V. Stern for the first time conducted a systematic observation of the process of speech formation. The results of this work were reflected in the book by V. Stern "The Language of Children" (1907). Having singled out several periods in the process of speech development, he emphasized that the most important of them is the one associated with the child's discovery of the meaning of a word, the discovery that each object has its own name, which he does at about a year and a half. This period, about which V. Stern first spoke, later became the starting point for the study of speech by almost all scientists who dealt with this problem. Having singled out 5 main stages in the development of speech in children, V. Stern described them in detail, in fact, having developed the first standards in the development of speech in children under 5 years old. He also identified the main trends that determine this development, the main of which is the transition from passive to active speech and from word to sentence.
A well-known German psychologist also made a significant contribution to the development of child psychology. Carl Buhler. After graduating from the University of Berlin, he at one time joined the Würzburg school, known for its experiments in the field of thinking. However, he gradually moved away from this direction, creating his own concept of the mental development of the child. From 1922 he lived and worked in Vienna, and from 1938 in the USA.
In his theory, he tried to combine the positions of the Würzburg school and Gestalt psychology, transforming the concept of association and applying the laws of genetics to mental development. Fairly noting that each of the psychological directions reflects one of the real aspects of a person's mental life, K. Buhler sought, by combining these approaches, to overcome the methodological crisis in which psychology found itself in the first third of the 20th century. In his work "The Crisis of Psychology" (1927), K. Buhler argued that overcoming this crisis is possible by integrating the three main psychological schools of that time - introspective psychology, behaviorism and cultural studies of mental development.
Based on the concepts of the Würzburg school and Gestalt psychology, he considered the study of the intellectual development of the child a priority for his research. At the same time, he sought to study precisely creative thinking, the moment of insight, which subsequently led him to the idea that the intellectual process is always, to a greater or lesser extent, creativity.
Developing the idea of the role of creativity in mental development, K. Buhler put forward a heuristic theory of speech. He said that speech is not given to the child in finished form, but is thought out, invented by him in the process of communicating with adults. Thus, unlike Stern, K. Buhler insisted that the process of speech formation is a chain of discoveries.
In the first stage, the child discovers the meaning of words. This discovery occurs by observing the impact on adults of the sound complexes that the child invents. Manipulating adults with the help of vocalization, the child discovers that certain sounds lead to a certain reaction of the adult (give, I'm afraid, I want, etc.), and begins to use these sound complexes purposefully. In the second stage, the child learns that every thing has its own name. This discovery expands lexicon child, since he not only invents names for things himself, but also begins to ask questions about names in adults. In the third stage, the child discovers the meaning of grammar, this also happens on his own. Through observation, the child comes to the discovery that the relationship of objects can be expressed by changes in the sound side of the word, for example, by changing the ending (table - tables).
K. Buhler also considered the intellectual development of children to be a creative process, the features of which he revealed in his work Spiritual Development of the Child (1924). Turning to the process of problem solving, he revised the relationship between association and awareness, stating that the child links together only what is already recognized as a whole, i.e. first there is an act of thinking, which ends with an association between conscious parameters. This awareness is an instantaneous creative process. K. Buhler called the process of instantaneous grasping of the essence of things “aha-experience”. Such grasping of relations, i.e. the process of "aha-experiencing" is the process of thinking. Thus, thinking, according to K. Buhler, does not depend on past experience and is a creative act of the child himself.
Analyzing the connection between thinking and creativity, K. Buhler came to the conclusion that the development of drawing has a direct impact on the intellectual development of children. Therefore, he was one of the first child psychologists to study children's drawings. He believed that a drawing is a graphic story built on the principle oral speech, i.e. a child's drawing is not a copy of the action, but a story about it. Therefore, K. Buhler noted, children love stories in pictures so much, they love to look at them and draw on their own.
The analysis of children's drawings led K. Buhler to the discovery of the concept of "scheme". He said that if a child uses a concept in speech, then in a drawing he uses a scheme that is a generalization of the image of an object, and not its exact copy. Thus, the scheme is, as it were, an intermediate concept, making it easier for children to master abstract knowledge. These provisions of K. Buhler are also used in modern developmental programs (primarily designed for preschoolers).
He identified three main stages of mental development: instinct; training education conditioned reflexes); intellect (appearance of “aha-experience”, awareness of a problem situation).
In addition to intellectual development, as the transition from stage to stage, emotions develop, and the pleasure of the activity shifts from end to beginning. So, with instinct, an action first occurs, and then pleasure comes from it (for example, a frog first jumps after a fly, swallows it, and then enjoys eating). In training, activity and pleasure go hand in hand; so the dog, jumping through the hoop, is rewarded with a piece of sugar. Finally, during intellectual activity, the child can imagine what pleasure he will get, for example, from a tasty candy or from communicating with a friend even before the start of this activity. It is the intellectual stage that is the stage of culture and enables the most flexible and adequate adaptation to the environment, K. Buhler believed.
In his opinion, intelligence begins to develop in children after a year, and at first it manifests itself mainly in external activity (chimpanzee-like age), and then in internal activity. Speaking about the importance of children's play for mental development, K. Buhler emphasized its role precisely in the formation of emotions. Modifying the theory of Gross and Stern, he introduced the concept of functional pleasure. Arguing that the game is at the stage of training, and therefore the game activity is associated with obtaining functional pleasure, K. Buhler explained the fact that the game does not have its own product. This is not due to the fact that it serves only to exercise innate instincts, but to the fact that the game does not need a product, since its goal is the very process of playing activity. Thus, in the theory of the game, the first explanation of its motivation, as well as the motivation of the exercise, which is necessary for the mental development of the child, appeared.
