VOLUNTEER ARMY, the main military force of the White movement in southern Russia in 1918–1920.

It arose on December 27, 1917 (January 9, 1918) from the Alekseevskaya organization - a military detachment formed on November 2 (15), 1917 on the Don by General M.V. Alekseev to fight the Bolsheviks. Its creation pursued both a military-strategic and political goal: on the one hand, the Volunteer Army, in alliance with the Cossacks, was supposed to prevent the establishment of Soviet power in southern Russia, on the other hand, to ensure free elections to the Constituent Assembly, which was to determine the future state structure countries. It was recruited on a voluntary basis from officers, cadets, students, high school students who fled to the Don. The supreme leader is Alekseev, the commander is General L.G. Kornilov. Center of deployment - Novocherkassk. Initially, there were about two thousand people, by the end of January 1918 it had grown to three and a half thousand. It consisted of the Kornilov shock regiment (commander Lieutenant Colonel M.O. Nezhentsev), officer, cadet and St. George battalions, four artillery batteries, an officer squadron, an engineering company and a company of guards officers. Later, the Rostov Volunteer Regiment (Major General A.A. Borovsky), a naval company, a Czechoslovak battalion and a death division of the Caucasian division were formed. It was planned to increase the size of the army to ten thousand bayonets and sabers, and only then begin major military operations. But the successful offensive of the Red troops in January-February 1918 forced the command to suspend the formation of the army and send several units to defend Taganrog, Bataysk and Novocherkassk. However, a few detachments of volunteers, not having received serious support from the local Cossacks, could not stop the onslaught of the enemy and were forced to leave the Don region. At the end of February 1918, the Volunteer Army moved to Yekaterinodar to make the Kuban its main base (the First Kuban Campaign). On February 25, it was reorganized into three infantry regiments - Consolidated Officer (General S.L. Markov), Kornilov shock (M.O. Nezhentsev) and Partizansky (General A.P. Bogaevsky), on March 17, after connecting with units of the Kuban the regional government - into three brigades: 1st (Markov), 2nd (Bogaevsky) and Horse (General I.G. Erdeli). On April 10–13, the Volunteer Army, which had increased to six thousand people, made several unsuccessful attempts to take Ekaterinodar. After the death of Kornilov on April 13, General A.I. Denikin, who replaced him as commander, led the thinned detachments to the south of the Don region in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe villages of Mechetinskaya and Egorlykskaya.

In May-June 1918 the situation Volunteer army strengthened due to the liquidation of Soviet power on the Don and the emergence of a new ally - the Don army of ataman P.N. Krasnov, who handed over to her a significant part of the weapons and ammunition he received from the Germans. The number of the Volunteer Army increased to eleven thousand people due to the influx of Kuban Cossacks and the addition of a three thousandth detachment of Colonel M.G. Drozdovsky to it. In June, it was reorganized into five infantry and eight cavalry regiments, which made up the 1st (Markov), 2nd (Borovsky), 3rd (M.G. Drozdovsky) infantry divisions, 1st cavalry division (Erdeli) and the 1st Kuban Cossack Division (General V.L. Pokrovsky); in July, the 2nd Kuban Cossack division(General S.G. Ulagai) and the Kuban Cossack Brigade (General A.G. Shkuro).

On June 23, 1918, the Volunteer Army began the Second Kuban Campaign (June-September), during which it defeated the troops of the Kuban-Black Sea Soviet Republic and took Ekaterinodar (August 15-16), Novorossiysk (August 26) and Maykop (September 20), established control over the main part of the Kuban and the north of the Black Sea province. By the end of September, it already numbered 35-40 thousand bayonets and sabers. After the death of Alekseev on October 8, 1918, the post of commander-in-chief passed to A.I. Denikin. On October 28, the volunteers took control of Armavir and ousted the Bolsheviks from the left bank of the Kuban; in mid-November, they took Stavropol and inflicted a heavy defeat on the 11th Red Army, led by I.F. Fedko. Since the end of November, they began to receive large deliveries of weapons from the Entente through Novorossiysk. In connection with the increase in the number of Volunteer Army was reorganized into three army corps (1st General A.P. Kutepov, 2nd Borovsky, 3rd General V.N. Lyakhov) and one cavalry corps (General P.N. Wrangel ). At the end of December, she repelled the offensive of the 11th Red Army in the Yekaterinodar-Novorossiysk and Rostov-Tikhoretsk directions, and in early January 1919, inflicting a strong counterattack on it, cut it into two parts and threw it back to Astrakhan and beyond Manych. By February, the entire North Caucasus was occupied by volunteers. This made it possible to transfer the grouping of General V.Z. Mai-Maevsky, formed from selected regiments, to the Donbass to help the Don Army retreating under the onslaught of the Bolsheviks, and the 2nd Army Corps to the Crimea to support the Crimean regional government.

On January 8, 1919, the Volunteer Army became part of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia; Wrangel was appointed its commander. On January 23, it was renamed the Caucasian Volunteer Army. In March, it included the 1st and 2nd Kuban cavalry corps. Deployed in April in the Donbass and Manych, the army went on the offensive in the Voronezh and Tsaritsyno directions and forced the Reds to leave the Don region, Donbass, Kharkov and Belgorod. On May 21, the units operating in the Tsaritsyno direction were separated into a separate Caucasian army, and the name Volunteer Army was returned to the left-flank (Voronezh) group; May-Maevsky became its commander. It included the 1st (Kutepov) and 2nd (General M.N. Promtov) army, 5th cavalry (General Ya.D. Yuzefovich), 3rd Kuban cavalry (Shkuro) corps.

In the offensive of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia against Moscow, which began on July 3, 1919, the Volunteer Army was assigned the role of the main striking force - it was supposed to capture Kursk, Orel and Tula and capture the Soviet capital; by this time, more than 50 thousand bayonets and sabers were in its ranks. In July-October 1919, volunteers occupied Central Ukraine (Kyiv fell on August 31), Kursk and Voronezh provinces and repelled the August counteroffensive of the Bolsheviks. The peak of their success was the capture of Orel on October 13. However, due to heavy losses and forced mobilization, the combat effectiveness of the army in the autumn of 1919 decreased significantly.

During the offensive of the red units in October-December 1919, the main forces of the volunteers were defeated. On November 27, Denikin deposed Mai-Maevsky; On December 5, Wrangel again led the Volunteer Army. At the end of December, Soviet troops Southern Front cut it into two parts; the first had to retreat beyond the Don, the second - to Northern Tavria. On January 3, 1920, it actually ceased to exist: the southeastern grouping (10 thousand) was reduced to a separate Volunteer Corps under the command of Kutepov, and from the southwestern (32 thousand) the army of General N.N. Schilling was formed. In February-March 1920, after the crushing defeat of the Whites in the Odessa region and in the North Caucasus, the remnants of volunteer formations were evacuated to the Crimea, where they became part of the Russian Army, organized by Wrangel in May 1920 from the surviving units of the Armed Forces of southern Russia.

Ivan Krivushin

100 years ago, on January 7, 1918, the Volunteer Army was created in Novocherkassk to fight the Bolsheviks. Trouble in Russia was gaining momentum. Reds, whites, nationalists formed their troops, with might and main they were in charge of various gangs. The West was preparing for the dismemberment of the murdered Russian Empire.

The army received the official name of the Volunteer. This decision was made at the suggestion of General Lavr Kornilov, who became its first commander in chief. Political and financial leadership was entrusted to General Mikhail Alekseev. The army headquarters was headed by General Alexander Lukomsky. The official appeal of the headquarters, published two days later, stated: “The first immediate goal of the Volunteer Army is to resist an armed attack on the south and southeast of Russia. Hand in hand with the valiant Cossacks, at the first call of his Circle, his government and the military ataman, in alliance with the regions and peoples of Russia who rebelled against the German-Bolshevik yoke - all Russian people who have gathered in the south from all over our Motherland will defend to the last drop of blood, the independence of the regions that gave them shelter and are the last stronghold of Russian independence. At the first stage, about 3 thousand people signed up for the Volunteer Army, more than half of them were officers.

In the conditions of the complete disintegration of the old army, General Mikhail Alekseev decided to try to form new units outside the composition of the former army on a voluntary basis. Alekseev was the largest military figure in Russia: during the Russo-Japanese War - Quartermaster General of the 3rd Manchurian Army; during the First World War - Chief of Staff of the armies of the Southwestern Front, Commander-in-Chief of the armies of the North-Western Front, Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. During February Revolution In 1917, he advocated the abdication of Nicholas II from the throne and, by his actions, largely contributed to the fall of the autocracy. That is, he was a prominent February revolutionary, and was responsible for the subsequent collapse of the army, the country and the beginning of unrest and civil war.

The right wing of the Februaryists-Westerners, having destroyed the "old Russia" - hoped to create a "new Russia"- the creation of a "democratic", bourgeois-liberal Russia with the dominance of the class of owners, capitalists, the bourgeoisie and large landowners - that is, development according to the Western matrix. They wanted to make Russia a part of an "enlightened Europe", similar to Holland, France or England. However, hopes for this quickly collapsed. The Februaryists themselves opened Pandora's box, destroying all the bonds (the autocracy, the army, the police, the old legislative, judicial and punitive system) that held back the contradictions and rifts that had been building up in Russia for a long time. Events begin to develop according to a poorly predictable scenario of spontaneous rebellion, Russian unrest, with the strengthening of radical left forces demanding a new development project and fundamental changes. Then the Februaryists relied on a "firm hand" - a military dictatorship. However, the rebellion of General Kornilov failed. And the Kerensky regime finally buried all hopes for stabilization, in fact, doing everything so that the Bolsheviks simply took power, almost without resistance. However, the class of owners, the bourgeoisie, the capitalists, their political parties - the Cadets, the Octobrists, were not going to give up. They began to create their own armed forces in order to return power by force and "calm down" Russia. At the same time, they hoped for the help of the Entente - France, England, the USA, Japan, etc.

Part of the generals who had previously strongly opposed the regime of Nicholas II and the autocracy (Alekseev, Kornilov, Kolchak, etc.), and hoped to take leading positions in " new Russia”, was used to create the so-called. The White Army, which was supposed to return power to the former "masters of life." As a result, whites, separatist nationalists and interventionists ignited a terrible civil war in Russia that claimed millions of lives. Owners, the bourgeoisie, capitalists, landowners, their political superstructure - liberal-democratic, bourgeois parties and movements (only a few percent, together with the entourage and servants of the population of Russia) became "white". It is clear that the well-groomed rich, industrialists, bankers, lawyers and politicians themselves did not know how to fight and did not want to. They wanted to return "old Russia", without a tsar, but with their power - a rich and contented caste ("crunch of French rolls") over the poor and illiterate masses of the people. Professional military men signed up to fight - officers who, after the collapse of the old army, wandered around the cities in masses doing nothing, Cossacks, simple-minded young men - cadets, cadets, students. After the expansion of the scale of the war, the forcible mobilization of former soldiers, workers, townspeople, and peasants has already begun.

There were also high hopes that "the West would help." And the masters of the West really "helped" - to kindle a terrible and bloody civil war in which Russians killed Russians. They actively threw “firewood” into the fire of a fratricidal war - made promises to the leaders of the white armies and governments, supplied ammunition and ammunition, provided advisers, etc. They themselves had already divided the skin of the “Russian bear” into spheres of influence and colonies and soon began to divide Russia, simultaneously carrying out its total plunder.

On December 10 (23), 1917, Georges Clemenceau, Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of War of France, and Robert Cecil, Deputy Foreign Minister of Great Britain, at a meeting in Paris, concluded a secret agreement on the division of Russia into spheres of influence. London and Paris agreed that from now on they would consider Russia not as an ally in the Entente, but as a territory for the implementation of their expansionist plans. The areas of alleged military operations were named. The English sphere of influence included the Caucasus, the Cossack regions of the Don and Kuban, and the French - Ukraine, Bessarabia and Crimea. Representatives of the United States did not formally participate in the meeting, but they were kept informed of the negotiations, and in the administration of President Woodrow Wilson, at the same time, a plan was ripe for expansion into Far East and Eastern Siberia.

The leaders of the West rejoiced - Russia was lost, the "Russian question" was resolved once and for all! The West has got rid of a thousand-year-old enemy that prevents it from establishing full control over the planet. True, our enemies will once again miscalculate, Russia will survive and be able to recover. Russian communists will win and eventually create a new Russian empire - the USSR. They are implementing an alternative globalization project - the Soviet (Russian), once again challenging the West and giving hope to humanity for a just world order.

Alekseevskaya organization

The right wing of the Western-Febralists (future Whites) and part of the generals decided to create a new army. It was supposed to create such an organization that, as an "organized military force... could resist the impending anarchy and the German-Bolshevik invasion. Initially, they tried to create the core of such an organization in the capital. General Alekseev arrived in Petrograd on October 7, 1917 and began to prepare the creation of an organization in which it was supposed to unite officers of the spare parts, military schools and those who simply found themselves in the capital. At the right moment, the general planned to organize combat units from them.

According to V. V. Shulgin, who happened to be in Petrograd in October, he attended the meeting that took place at the apartment of Prince V. M. Volkonsky. In addition to the host and Shulgin, M. V. Rodzianko, P. B. Struve, D. N. Likhachev, N. N. Lvov, V. N. Kokovtsev, and V. M. Purishkevich were present. That is, prominent Februaryists who previously participated in the overthrow of Nicholas II and the destruction of the autocracy. Main question in the business he started, he ran into a complete lack of funds. Alekseev was “morally supported”, they sympathized with his cause, but they were in no hurry to share the money. To the moment October revolution Alekseev's organization was supported by several thousand officers who either lived in Petrograd or ended up in the capital for one reason or another. But almost no one dared to give battle to the Bolsheviks in Petrograd.

Seeing that things were not going well in the capital and that the Bolsheviks could soon cover the organization, Alekseev on October 30 (November 12) ordered the transfer to the Don of "those who wanted to continue the fight", supplying them with fake documents and money for travel. The general appealed to all officers and junkers with a call to fight in Novocherkassk, where he arrived on November 2 (15), 1917. Alekseev (and the forces behind him) planned to create statehood and an army on part of the territory of Russia that would be able to resist Soviet power .

General of Infantry M. V. Alekseev

Alekseev went to the Ataman Palace to the hero of Brusilovsky, General A. M. Kaledin. In the summer of 1917, the Large military circle of the Don Cossack army, Alexei Kaledin, was elected Don military ataman. Kaledin became the first elected chieftain of the Don Cossacks after Peter I abolished the election in 1709. Kaledin was in conflict with the Provisional Government, as he opposed the collapse of the army. On September 1, Minister of War Verkhovsky even ordered the arrest of Kaledin, but the Military Government refused to comply with the order. On September 4, Kerensky canceled it on the condition that the Military Government would "guarantee" Kaledin.

The situation on the Don during this period was extremely difficult. The main cities were dominated by the "alien" population, alien to the indigenous Cossack population of the Don, both in terms of their composition, features of life, and political preferences. In Rostov and Taganrog, socialist parties, hostile to the Cossack authorities, dominated. The working population of the Taganrog district supported the Bolsheviks. In the northern part of the Taganrog district there were coal mines and mines of the southern ledge of Donbass. Rostov became the center of resistance to "Cossack dominance". At the same time, the left could count on the support of spare military units. The "out-of-town" peasantry was not satisfied with the concessions made to it (wide admission to the Cossacks, participation in stanitsa self-government, transfer of part of the landowners' lands), demanding a radical land reform. The Cossack front-line soldiers themselves were tired of the war and hated the "old regime". As a result, the Don regiments, which were returning from the front, did not want to go to new war and defend the Don region from the Bolsheviks. The Cossacks went home. Many regiments handed over their weapons without resistance at the request of small red detachments, which stood as barriers on the railway lines leading to the Don region. Masses of ordinary Cossacks supported the first decrees of the Soviet government. Among the Cossacks-front-line soldiers, the idea of ​​\u200b\u200b"neutrality" in relation to the Soviet government was widely adopted. In turn, the Bolsheviks sought to win the "labor Cossacks" over to their side.

Kaledin called the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks criminal and declared that until the restoration of legitimate power in Russia, the military government assumes full power in the Don region. Kaledin from Novocherkassk introduced martial law in the coal-mining region of the region, deployed troops in a number of places, began the defeat of the Soviets and established contacts with the Cossacks of Orenburg, Kuban, Astrakhan and Terek. On October 27 (November 9), 1917, Kaledin declared martial law throughout the Region and invited members of the Provisional Government and the Provisional Council of the Russian Republic to Novocherkassk to organize the fight against the Bolsheviks. On October 31 (November 13), the delegates of the Don, who were returning from the Second Congress of Soviets, were arrested. During the following month, the Soviets in the cities of the Don region were liquidated.

Thus, Kaledin opposed the Soviet regime. The Don region became one of the centers of resistance. However, Kaledin, in conditions when the masses of ordinary Cossacks did not want to fight, wanted peace, and at first sympathized with the ideas of the Bolsheviks, could not decisively oppose the Soviet government. Therefore, he warmly received Alekseev as an old comrade-in-arms, but refused the request to “give shelter to the Russian officers”, that is, to take the future anti-Bolshevik army for the maintenance of the Don military government. He even asked Alekseev to remain incognito, “not to stay in Novocherkassk for more than a week” and to transfer the Alekseev formation outside the Don region.

Despite such a cold reception, Alekseev immediately began to take practical steps. Already on November 2 (15), he published an appeal to the officers, urging them to "save the Motherland." On November 4 (17), a whole party of 45 people arrived, headed by staff captain V. D. Parfenov. On this day, General Alekseev laid the foundation for the first military unit - the Consolidated Officer Company. Staff Captain Parfenov became the commander. On November 15 (28), it was deployed to an officer company of 150-200 people under the command of Staff Captain Nekrashevich.

Alekseev, using his old connections with the Stavka generals, contacted the Stavka in Mogilev. He gave M.K. Dieterikhs an order to send officers and loyal units to the Don under the guise of their redeployment for further staffing, with the issuance of money for the officers to travel. He also asked to remove the decomposed "Sovietized" military units from the Don region by disbanding or sending them to the front without weapons. The question was raised about negotiations with the Czechoslovak corps, which, according to Alekseev, should have willingly joined the struggle for the "salvation of Russia." In addition, he asked to send batches of weapons and uniforms to the Don under the guise of creating army stores here, to give orders to the main artillery department to send up to 30 thousand rifles to the Novocherkassk artillery depot, and in general to use every opportunity to transfer military equipment to the Don. However, the imminent fall of the Stavka and the general collapse of the railway transport prevented all these plans. As a result, weapons, ammunition and ammunition were bad at the beginning.

When the organization already had 600 volunteers, there were about a hundred rifles for everyone, and there were no machine guns at all. The military depots on the territory of the Don Army were full of weapons, but the Don authorities refused to issue them to volunteers, fearing the wrath of the front-line Cossacks. Weapons had to be obtained both by cunning and by force. Thus, on the outskirts of Novocherkassk, Khotunok, the 272nd and 373rd reserve regiments were quartered, which had already completely decomposed and were hostile to the Don authorities. Alekseev suggested using the forces of volunteers to disarm them. On the night of November 22, volunteers surrounded the regiments and disarmed them without firing a shot. The selected weapons went to volunteers. Artillery was also mined, as it turned out - one cannon was "borrowed" in the Donskoy reserve artillery division for the solemn funeral of one of the dead junker volunteers, and they "forgot" to return it after the funeral. Two more guns were taken away: completely decomposed units of the 39th Infantry Division arrived in the neighboring Stavropol province from the Caucasian front. Volunteers became aware that an artillery battery was located near the village of Lezhanka. It was decided to capture her guns. Under the command naval officer E. N. Gerasimov, a detachment of 25 officers and cadets went to Lezhanka. During the night, the detachment disarmed the sentries and stole two guns and four ammunition boxes. Four more guns and a supply of shells were bought for 5 thousand rubles from Don artillery units that returned from the front. All this shows the highest degree of decomposition of the then Russia, weapons, up to machine guns and guns, can be obtained or “acquired” in one way or another.

By November 15 (28), the Junker company was formed, which included cadets, cadets and students under the command of staff captain V. D. Parfenov. The 1st platoon consisted of cadets from infantry schools (mainly Pavlovsky), the 2nd from artillery, the 3rd from naval schools, and the 4th from cadets and students. By mid-November, the entire senior year of the Konstantinovsky Artillery School and several dozen cadets of Mikhailovsky, led by staff captain N. A. Shokoli, were able to get through from Petrograd in small groups. On November 19, after the arrival of the first 100 cadets, the 2nd platoon of the Junker company was deployed into a separate unit - the Consolidated Mikhailovsko-Konstantinovskaya battery (which served as the core of the future Markov battery and artillery brigade). The Junker Company itself turned into a battalion (two Junker and "Cadet" companies).

Thus, in the second half of November, the Alekseevskaya organization consisted of three formations: 1) a consolidated officer company (up to 200 people); 2) Junker battalion (over 150 people); 3) Consolidated Mikhailovsko-Konstantinovskaya battery (up to 250 people) under the command of Captain N. A. Shokoli). The Georgievsky company (50-60 people) was in the formation stage, and there was an entry into the student squad. The officers made up a third of the organization and 50% of the cadets (that is, the same element). Cadets, students of secular and religious schools made up 10%.

In November, Kaledin nevertheless decided to give a roof over his head to the officers arriving at Alekseev: in one of the infirmaries of the Don branch of the All-Russian Union of Cities, under the fictitious pretext that a "weak team, recovering, requiring care" would be placed here, volunteers were placed. As a result, a small infirmary No. 2 in house No. 36 on the outskirts of Barochnaya Street, which was a disguised hostel, became the cradle of the future Volunteer Army. Immediately after finding shelter, Alekseev sent conditional telegrams to loyal officers, meaning that the formation on the Don had begun and it was necessary to start sending volunteers here without delay. On November 15 (28), volunteer officers arrived from Mogilev, sent by the Headquarters. IN last days November, the number of generals, officers, cadets and cadets who entered the Alekseevsky organization exceeded 500 people, and the "infirmary" on Barochnaya Street was overcrowded. Volunteers again, with the approval of Kaledin, was rescued by the Union of Cities by transferring Alekseev infirmary No. 23 on Grushevskaya Street. On December 6 (19), General L. G. Kornilov also reached Novocherkassk.

The big problem was the collection of funds for the core of the future army. One of the sources was the personal contribution of the participants in the movement. In particular, the first contribution to the "army cash desk" was 10 thousand rubles, brought by Alekseev with him from Petrograd. Kaledin allocated personal funds. Alekseev counted on the financial assistance of Moscow industrialists and bankers, who promised him support at one time, but they were very reluctant to respond to the requests of the general's couriers, and for all the time 360 ​​thousand rubles were received from Moscow. By agreement with the Don government, in December, a subscription was held in Rostov and Novocherkassk, the funds from which were supposed to be divided equally between the Don and Volunteer armies (DA). About 8.5 million rubles were collected, but, contrary to the agreements, 2 million were transferred to YES. Some volunteers were quite wealthy people. Under their personal guarantees in Rostov branch The Russian-Asian Bank received loans totaling 350 thousand rubles. An informal agreement was concluded with the bank's management that the debt would not be collected, and the loan would be counted as a gratuitous donation to the army (the bankers would later try to return the money). Alekseev hoped for the support of the Entente countries. But during this period, they still had doubts. Only at the beginning of 1918, after the armistice concluded by the Bolsheviks on Eastern Front, from the military representative of France in Kyiv, 305 thousand rubles were received in three steps. In December, the Don government decided to leave 25% of the state fees collected in the region for the needs of the region. Half of the money collected in this way, about 12 million rubles, was placed at the disposal of the newly created DA.

By the beginning of 1919, the volunteer army included: 5 infantry divisions, 4 plastun brigades, 6 cavalry divisions, 2 detached. con. brigades, an army artillery group, spare, technical units and garrisons of cities. The size of the army extended up to 40 thousand bayonets and sabers, with 193 guns, 621 machine guns, 8 armor. cars, 7 armored trains, and 29 airplanes.

The main mass of the troops was reduced to five corps: I, II and III army, Crimean-Azov and I cavalry (generals Kazanovich, May-Maevsky, Lyakhov, Borovsky and Baron Wrangel), later, in February, the II Cube was formed. Corps of Gen. Laying down. In February, the I and II Corps included units of the former Astrakhan and Southern armies transferred by the Don ataman, on which so many hopes were placed by German circles and which, unfortunately, were then already in the stage of complete collapse.

At the beginning of December 1918, the Volunteer Army was located in four main groups: 1. The Caucasian group (I, III, I kon., Later II kon. Corps with attached units) with forces of 25,000 and 75 guns was located between Manych and the Caucasian foothills at Mineralnye Vody. She had a common task - the final liberation North Caucasus to the Caucasus Range, mastering the western coast of the Caspian Sea and the lower reaches of the Volga, which made it possible to get in touch with the British at Anzali and with the Urals at Guryev and cut off Soviet Russia from Baku and Grozny oil.

2. Donetsk detachment (gen. May-Maevsky) with a force of 2.5–3.5 thousand and 13 guns. in the Yuzovka region, it covered the Donetsk coal region and the Rostov direction.

3. Crimean detachment of gene. Baron Bode (later Borovsky), initially only 1.5-2 thousand and 5-10 guns, covered Perekop and Crimea, bases and parking Black Sea Fleet; he was supposed to serve as a frame for the formation of the Crimean Corps on the site.

4. Tuapse detachment of gene. Cherepov (2nd division with attached units) with a force of 3000 and 4 guns. had the task of covering our main base - Novorossiysk - from Georgia.

Thus, we had 32,34 thousand of all active forces and about 100 guns, of which 76% were concentrated in the main theater.

The enemy had the following forces against us: 1. In the North Caucasian theater - XI and XII (forming) Soviet armies, numbering up to 72 thousand and about 100 guns.

2. In the Rostov and Crimean directions, during December, the united gangs of the “father” Makhno operated with a force of 5-6 thousand and in the lower reaches of the Dnieper - 2-3 thousand Petlyura ataman Grigoriev transferred to the side of the Soviets. In addition, the entire northern Tavria was flooded with unorganized, "apolitical" gangs engaged in robbery and robbery. Only from the end of December, after capturing Kharkov, did the Bolsheviks send the first regular divisions from the Kozhevnikov group through Lozovaya to the southeast, against Mai-Maevsky, and to the south, in the direction of Aleksandrovsk.

3. On the Sochi direction stood, echeloning from Lazarevka to Sukhumi, three to four thousand Georgian troops, under the command of the gene. Koniev.

In total, therefore, on the fronts of the Volunteer Army in contact with us, there were about 80 thousand Soviet troops and 3-4 thousand Georgians.

When on December 26, 1918, the unification of the Volunteer and Don armies took place, and the theater of war expanded with new vast territories, it became necessary to separate the Volunteer Army and create a unifying headquarters body under me. I accepted the title of "Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in the South of Russia", the former army headquarters became the headquarters of the commander-in-chief, and for the Volunteer Army, the formation of a new headquarters was started.

Very important question on the appointment of the commander of the Volunteer Army. I considered the most worthy candidate for this post - in terms of the breadth of military horizons and personal prowess - a participant in the Volunteer Movement from the very first steps of his general Romanovsky. Once, after another report, I offered him a choice - the army or the headquarters of the commander in chief. I did not hide the fact that his departure would be difficult for me: there is no suitable deputy, I will have to appoint a random person, and I will remain alone in my big work and in my experiences. On the other hand (before our eyes, we had the example of the unforgettable Markov), I had no doubt that Romanovsky, once in service, would emerge from the suffocating atmosphere of politics, quickly gain the recognition of the troops, deploy his combat abilities and cover himself and the army with glory. Ivan Pavlovich thought for a day and the next morning he said that he would stay with me ... He sacrificed his future to our friendship.

The paths of the Lord are veiled from our eyes with an impenetrable veil. Who knows what the fate of the army and Romanovsky would have been like then ... Whether it would have carried him to the crest of a wave or buried him in the abyss ... We know only one thing: this decision cost him his life later.

Having discussed the question of the commander with the chief of staff, they settled on the gene. Baron Wrangel. He was younger than other corps commanders and had only recently joined the Volunteer Army - this should have caused resentment. But in the last glorious battles in Urup, Kuban, near Stavropol, he showed great energy, impulse and the art of maneuver. The appointment of Baron Wrangel took place. One of the worthy corps commanders, pioneer, gene. Kazanovich resigned because of this, others grumbled but complied. The army chief of staff was Gen. Yuzefovich.

In view of the subsequent deployment of the Crimean-Azov Corps into the army, troops subordinate to Gen. Wrangel, received the name of the Caucasian Volunteer Army. From December 27 to January 10, to allow the gene to finish. Wrangel operation I con. corps on the tracks from Petrovsky to the line of the Holy Cross - Mineralnye Vody, the army was temporarily commanded by the gene. Romanovsky.

On January 1, 1919, I gave the order: “Fourteen months of hard struggle. Fourteen months of high feat of the Volunteer Army. Having started the fight alone - when the statehood was collapsing and everything around, powerless, weak-willed, hid and lowered its hands, a handful brave people challenged the destroyers of their native land. Since then, blood has been shed, leaders and ordinary Volunteers are dying, dotting the fields of Stavropol, Don and Kuban with their graves.

But through the horrors of the war, through the malice and distrust of their secret enemies who had not learned anything, the Army brought the pure and unsullied idea of ​​a United Great Power Russia. The exploits of the Army are immeasurable. And I, who shared with her long, hard days and sorrow and joy, am proud that I stood at her head.

I do not have the opportunity now to directly lead the Volunteer Army, but until the end of my days it will remain dear and close to my heart. I sincerely thank all my dear comrades-in-arms, whose unparalleled deeds live and strengthen the hope for the salvation of Russia.

The name "volunteer" - the army was retained only by tradition. For the correct mobilization was started in the Kuban Cossack units in the spring, and in the regular ones - from August 2, 1918. Three successive mobilizations of this year raised ten age classes in the North Caucasus (conscription age 1910–1920), in the Azov Territory - so far two (1917, 1918 and partly 1915, 1916), in the Crimea one (1918 - 1920). ). In view of the fact that the revolution had smashed the accounting departments everywhere, my headquarters could not establish the exact percentage of those who evaded. According to his approximate calculations, this figure for the North Caucasus was determined at 20-30%. The mobilized went to the spare parts, where they were subjected to brief training, or - due to the arbitrariness of military units - in large numbers directly into their ranks. The number of those who passed through the army receiver in 1918 was determined at 33 thousand people. By the end of 1918, a widely different source of replenishment was used - captured Red Army soldiers, who had already begun to enter the army in many thousands in both of these ways.

All this new element, which poured into the Volunteer cadres, gave them both strength and weakness. The ranks increased, but the appearance dimmed and the monolithic ranks of the old Volunteering stratified. The feverish pace of events in the midst of the unceasing conflagration of a general civil war, if it allowed superficial education, then ruled out the possibility of education. The mass of reserve battalions mobilized during their stay in the rear, in a peaceful environment, was completely passive and obedient. During the second half of 1918, about 5% deserted from the reserve battalions. But, having gone to the front, they found themselves in an extremely difficult psychological situation: fighting in the ranks of the Volunteers, they had against themselves their fellow villagers, fathers and brothers, also taken by the Red Army on mobilization; military happiness changed, their villages passed from hand to hand, changing their mood along with the authorities. And desertion at the front increased significantly. Nevertheless, the main Volunteer units were able to melt the entire heterogeneous element in the crucible of their combat traditions, and, according to the general opinion of the commanders, the mobilized soldiers outside their provinces for the most part fought valiantly.

Concerning Kuban Cossacks, it bore much greater burdens: it put up ten age classes in the army and during the struggle on the territory of the Kuban, almost without exception became ranks as garrisons of villages and separate, partisan-type detachments. Natural horsemen - Kuban reluctantly went to the plastun battalions; their infantry was therefore weak and small in number, but the cavalry divisions still made up the entire mass of the Volunteer cavalry, providing invaluable services to the army.

With regard to the old Volunteers, we were still formally bound by a four-month "contract". The first period for the main mass ended in May, the second in September, the third ended in December. Back in August, I wanted to put an end to this relic of the early days of Volunteerism, but the bosses concluded that psychologically it was premature ... It seems to me that even then they were already mistaken. On October 25, I ordered the conscription of all officers under 40 years of age, giving those of them who were released from the army either to leave its territory within seven days, or to undergo a mandatory conscription again ... And a month and a half later, an order was issued to cancel four-month terms of service, which became finally obligatory. To the credit of our Volunteer officers, it must be said that these orders not only did not meet with any protest, but did not even attract attention to themselves in the army - the conviction of the necessity and obligation of service was so firmly established.

So, from the end of 1918, the institution of volunteering finally receded into the realm of history, and the volunteer armies of the South became popular, since the intellectual predominance of the Cossack and service officer elements did not leave an outwardly class imprint on them.

From January 1919, a department was established at the headquarters that was in charge of the formations. Troops of special types of weapons were usually organized in the rear and were ready to go to the front; it was the same with the Kuban regiments, which were recruited territorially in their districts. With the formation of the infantry, the situation was different: it was unusually difficult to supply the material part of the regiments with the help of our feeble army commissariat, and the headquarters put up with the formations at the front, where the chiefs, who were directly interested in their strengthening, found the opportunity, with sin in half, to put on shoes, dress, arm and equip new parts.

But the battles were in full swing, the front, due to the great disparity of forces, always needed reinforcements, there were no reserves in the rear, and new units rushed into battle long before they were ready. The enemy did not give us time to organize. We did not have such a protective curtain, which for Ukraine was represented by the German cordon, for Siberia - by the front people's army, for Georgia - the Volunteer Army. Volunteer units were formed, armed, studied, educated, melted away and replenished again under fire, in incessant battles. Nevertheless, military units born and raised at the front in such a situation, sometimes due to the weakening of cadre regiments, were more combat-ready than rear formations.

Another major evil in the organization of the army was the spontaneous desire for formations - under the slogan "the revival of historical parts Russian army". The "cells" of the old regiments, especially in the cavalry, arose, became isolated, strove for separation, turning the combat unit - the regiment - into a mosaic team of dozens of old regiments, weakening the ranks, unity and strength of it. Such formations also arose in the rear, existed behind the scenes for whole months, extracting private funds or taking advantage of the connivance of authorities of various ranks, weakening the front and sometimes turning the ideological slogan “under native standards” into a cover for selfishness.

Also great was the desire of the chiefs to form "special purpose" units. Such, for example, are the "Flying detachment of the special purpose of the Caucasian Volunteer Army" (under General Wrangel), led by captain Baranov, who had a rather obscure purpose - to fight sedition ... "Wolf Hundreds" gene. Skins - his personal guard, gradually losing combat value, burdened with prey ... "Punitive detachments", formed by the Stavropol military governor, gen. Glazenap, turned into life guards of wealthy local sheep breeders, etc. ...

We struggled with all these everyday phenomena, but, obviously, not severely enough, since, changing external forms, they continued to exist.

By the time the Allies arrived, the remnants of our Black Sea Fleet, which had survived the Novorossiysk disaster, were on the Sevastopol roadstead. Among them are the battleship (dreadnought) Volia, the cruiser Cahul, more than a dozen destroyers, several submarines, old battleships and many small auxiliary vessels. Most of the warships required major repairs.

As I already said, with the arrival in Sevastopol, the Allies raised their flags on our ships and occupied them with their teams. Only on the Kagul, three destroyers under repair and on the old battleships there were still Russian flags.

It was necessary for someone to take over the protection of the Andreevsky flag and homeless Russian property. The centers of attraction were only the Ukrainian State and the Volunteer Army. The first substantiated its right to the Russian inheritance by the "historical borders of the Great Ukraine", which included the entire northern Black Sea coast, and the promise of the Germans to transfer the entire Black Sea Fleet to Ukraine by November. The second acted as the all-Russian military center of the South. The foundations of Ukraine by that time were so odious in the eyes of the Russian public and naval officers that the issue of subordinating the fleet was a foregone conclusion and did not require the slightest struggle.

The whole difficulty lay in choosing a person who could lead the fleet and successfully lead the cause of its revival. I had absolutely no acquaintances in sea circles and was forced to be guided by the opinion of the sailors who were in contact with the headquarters. The result was a picture of complete desolation. I was given only two names: one - Rear Admiral Prince Cherkassky, who remained somewhere in Soviet Russia and whom we never managed to find; the other is Vice Admiral Sablin; the latter's activities as commander of the Soviet fleet before Novorossiysk catastrophe still needed clarification, and he himself was then living abroad. I had to stop at Admiral Kanin, who enjoyed a certain popularity in the marine environment and authority in maritime matters, but did not differ in the quality of a military leader ...

On November 13, I gave the order to appoint Adm. Kanina i.d. commander of the Black Sea Fleet. Kanin, under the influence of the "Ukrainian" admirals Pokrovsky, Klochkovsky and others, hesitated for some time, then took office, and the accession of the Black Sea Fleet to the Volunteer Army was automatic and painless. The connection is nominal, as it was command staff, but there were no warships at his disposal. A long, absurd and deeply offensive struggle began with the allied naval command for the right to exist for the Russian fleet.

Only at the beginning of January, the then senior French Admiral Amet offered Kanin to equip two destroyers that were still under repair; at the same time, the allied command gave permission to prepare the cruiser "Cahul" for shipment to Novorossiysk in order to ... raise the flooded steamer "Elborus".

Meanwhile, battles soon began along the coast of the Black and Azov Seas, and the help of the fleet became necessary. Again, as in the early days of Volunteerism - in the days of wooden armored trains and stolen cannons, young officers equipped old steamers and barges, with a quiet move and the wrong mechanism, armed them with guns and walked along the coast, engaging in battle with the Bolsheviks, risking hourly becoming a victim of the elements or fall into enemy hands. And our warships at that time were languishing in captivity from the allies ...

Meanwhile, the staff of naval institutions grew exorbitantly, the naval officers gathered in large numbers in Sevastopol languished in idleness, and the combat readiness of even an insignificant number of ships that was provided to us was moving poorly. In March, Sablin arrived and replaced Kanin. Sablin already had to get into the wave of the first evacuation of the Crimea and be a witness to a difficult picture of how the allies, in a general panic mood, sank our best submarines, blew up the cylinders of cars on ships left in Sevastopol, drowned and took away supplies. It was unspeakably painful to see how the synodic of the remnants of the Russian fleet, which escaped death at the hands of the Germans, the Bolsheviks and the sailor oprichnina, grew ...

"Cahul", the submarine "Seal" and 5 more destroyers and 2 submarines in tugboats managed with great difficulty to take out to Novorossiysk, where they began to repair, arm and equip them. Our resolute protests, the indignation with which the Russian public reacted to the fact of the inactivity of the troops and fleet of the Allies in the tragic Odessa and Crimean events, and perhaps the increased confidence in the forces of the South, forced the Allies to stop counteraction: in the summer of 1919 during the operation on the secondary mastering the Crimea and Novorossia, the fleet already included 1 cruiser, 5 destroyers, 4 submarines and a dozen two armed steamers, boats and barges. By autumn, the allies returned to us all the other captured ships, including the Volya dreadnought, which received the name General Alekseev.

The supply of the armies was in the hands of the chief chief of supplies, directly subordinate to the chief of the military administration. Until February 1919, the main source of supply was the Bolshevik stocks we seized. At the same time, the troops, not trusting the requisition commissions, tried to use the captured for their own needs without a plan and system. Part of the stock was obtained from the former Romanian front. All this was accidental and extremely insufficient. In November, by the time the Allies arrived, the official report of the headquarters painted the following picture of our supply:

The lack of rifle cartridges took on catastrophic proportions more than once. “There were periods when several tens of thousands of cartridges remained for the entire Army, and if a machine gun had 2–3 belts at the beginning of the battle, then this was considered very, very prosperous” ... The same situation was with artillery cartridges: “By November 1 the entire stock of the army warehouse consisted of 7200 light, 1520 mountain, 2770 howitzer and 220 heavy shells. Outfit only cast-offs”… Sanitary supply… “may be considered non-existent. No medicines, no dressings, no underwear. There are only doctors who are powerless to fight diseases. There are no individual packages at all. Often there are cases when the complete absence of dressings forced the use of dirty linen by the wounded themselves ... "The menacingness of our situation was all the greater because by spring, thanks to continuous bloody battles and epidemics, the number of wounded and sick in medical institutions of the armies reached 25 thousand .

From the beginning of 1919, after the Germans left the Transcaucasus, we managed to get several transports of artillery and engineering supplies from the warehouses of Batum, Kars, Trebizond. And in February, the delivery of English supplies began. Since then, we have rarely experienced a lack of combat supplies. The sanitary facilities have improved. Uniforms and equipment, although they came in large sizes, but far from satisfying the needs of the fronts. In addition, it was gradually plundered at the base, despite the establishment of the death penalty "for the theft of items" captured weapons and uniforms. It melted along the way and, having finally arrived at the front, disappeared in abundance, carried away by the sick, wounded, prisoners, deserters ...

It is remarkable that any kind of theft of military property and its sale to the side met in society with an indifferent, often patronizing attitude. The market has its own laws: its ultimate contraction evokes opposition that is alien to moral motives. The uniforms that came to the Don, after distribution to the Cossacks, were usually sent to the villages and hid at the bottom of the Cossack hides that were still not empty.

With their own care, our supply agencies prepared an absolutely insignificant part of the needs. There are many reasons. There were also general ones arising from the financial difficulties of the army, the insufficient industrial development of the North Caucasus, the general collapse of trade and industry; there were also private ones - the templates of a normal war and a normal field situation, our lack of system and creativity, imperiously required by the situation, completely different and exceptional; finally - the general demoralization of morals.

One of the prominent army commissaries wrote at that time about the persecution raised by society and the press against the commissariat: “Industry is destroyed; there are no raw materials in the army, technical and Vehicle almost not; there are few experienced specialists, the market situation, which is not regulated by any financial and industrial bodies, willfully aspires to boundless heights. The rear, the supply agencies must strain all their creative, administrative and inventive abilities in order to give the army at least the little that is necessary under such conditions. Working conditions are immeasurably more difficult than during the Austro-German war, and require exceptional special knowledge, experience and energy.

Meanwhile, instead of competent workers, specialists, school and extensive experience prepared for the work of supplying the army, well acquainted with the organization of supply, the industrial world and the market, the supply business is in the hands of exclusively officers General Staff unfamiliar either with the market, or with the commercial and industrial world, or with political economy, or with the qualifications of its goods and products.

Laws and norms are behind the times, and new ones have not yet been created. Each active purveyor is compelled at his own risk and fear to exceed many times the rights that are given to him by law. Events happen with incredible speed, and life does not tolerate delay. In order to keep up with life, one has to throw aside all paper norms and break all sorts of laws, which requires competent, honest performers, freedom of action and complete trust.

“Honest performers, complete trust”, of course, this is the fundamental basis for the success of the work. But where to get them! When on the Don, in the Kuban, panama hats came to light one after another ... When for several months the main commissariat of the armed forces was under the influence of Tagantsev's senatorial audit appointed by me ... The audit conscientiously searched for "guilty", brought to justice large small violators of the law, but did not know how to find the sins of the system, did not know how and could not change the general conditions that nourished crime.

In this regard, we saw little help from the public, which so unanimously responded to the needs of the army in 1916: the military-industrial committee, the Zemgor, the Red Cross were destroyed and were just beginning to show their activity. From "democracy"? One of Schrader's organs, Rodnaya Zemlya, describing the crying needs of the army, said: “Would the army need anything if it were surrounded by the ardent and loving solicitude of Russian democracy? Of course not: the Russian people know how to selflessly give their last shirt, their last piece of bread to someone they trust, in whom they see a fighter for the bright and just cause of the people. Obviously, there is something in the atmosphere surrounding the Volunteer Army that dampens our democracy ... ". The Russian people and Mr. Schrader's democracy are far from being the same thing. The people rejected this "democracy" on the Volga, in the East, in the South, throughout Russia. But he also did not adopt in his parental love either the red or the white army: he did not voluntarily sacrifice either his wealth or his life to them.

The notorious private trade apparatus apparently underwent a serious rebirth with the revolution: I do not remember the major transactions of our supply agencies with reputable trading firms, but on the other hand, the types of predatory speculators who corrupted the administration, robbed the population and the treasury and made millions were vividly imprinted in my memory: M - in the Kuban, Ch. - on the Don and in the Crimea, T. Sh. - in the Black Sea region, etc., and so on. But they were all partisans, born of timelessness and alien to the traditions of the industrial class.

A large commercial and industrial nobility appeared on the territory of the Army, mainly after the fall of Odessa and Kharkov in early 1919. Many people from its ranks managed to take out part of their wealth from the conflagration of the Russian temple, still retained credit, and most importantly, organizational experience on a wide state scale. We expected help from them, and above all with regard to the armies. This help was really offered, but in such a peculiar form that it is worth dwelling on it ...

On September 14, 1919, between the Don government, represented by the head of the department of trade and industry, Bondyrev, and the Mopit Partnership, an agreement was concluded for the supply of the Don army and the population of a foreign manufactory. “Mopit” was a commission agent of the treasury, taking upon himself “with the fullest assistance of the Don troops” on the territory of the Don and, without the knowledge of the command, on the territory of the Volunteer Army (§ 2) - buying up raw materials, sending and selling them abroad, buying them there and delivering them to Don Manufactory. Fixed capital for turnover, in general up to a billion rubles, was to be issued by the Don treasury in parts in advance; absolutely all expenses, somehow: transportation, storage, duties, etc., fell on the treasury. "Mopit" for the service of the Don army took 19% as "organizational expenses" and entrepreneurial profit for the purchase of raw materials and 18% for the operation with manufactory. The whole contract was full of ambiguities and omissions, which allowed, if desired, to significantly expand the size of profits. But the strangest thing was that the articles of the agreement made its fulfillment dependent on the goodwill of Mopita, provided him with the opportunity to take advantage of all the benefits of selling precious Don raw materials, which were bought relatively cheaply.

Article 9 read: “If the advances received by the partnership for the export of raw materials abroad and its sale are covered by the supply of goods or the currency proceeds from the sale of raw materials within the stipulated period, then the Partnership undertakes to return to the army the advances received, with interest accruing from the date of delay in the amount of collected by the State Bank for the accounting of promissory notes... And nothing more.

I got acquainted with this agreement from the newspapers. I did not have the right to interfere in the internal affairs of the sovereign Don, but since all exports were regulated by the Special Conference and the supply to the Don Army was not guaranteed by the contract, I ordered the Partnership to stop issuing permission to export raw materials and grain abroad. The Special Commission then considered the agreement and, after clarifying its articles by the founders and modifying it, the Special Conference found it possible to allow the activity of Mopit.

A. V. Krivoshein, explaining his participation in Mopiga, complained to me about “newspaper insinuations” and claimed that its founders pursued exclusively state goals, and he personally “got acquainted with the contents of the ill-fated agreement for the first time, when the newspaper campaign had already begun.” “The founders of Mopit,” he wrote, “an extensive group of Muscovites who have long enjoyed respect and all-Russian fame turned to me with a proposal to elect me as chairman of the council, attaching political importance to this as an extra opportunity to unite them on a common platform now and especially in view of the upcoming arrival in Moscow. The idea - to establish here a major Moscow business and, thus, to unite the black earth south with industrial Moscow more closely - seemed correct and timely "...

But the society, excited by this case, saw in it only commerce, not politics. Part of the press extremely sharply took up arms against the “Mopitians”, whom the most moderate in their conclusions “Priazovsky Kray” determined the guilt with the following words: “... There are no elements of deliberate deceit or deliberate introduction into an unprofitable deal in the contract ... Its difficult side lies in the fact that eminent Muscovites are also among the many who profit from the army, in the civil war "...

Be that as it may, the press, society, and the army gradually came to the same conclusion. No more Minins! And the army fought in difficult conditions and grumbled only when the enemy overcame and had to retreat.

Our treasury was still empty, and therefore the content of the Volunteers was positively beggarly. Established in February 1918, it amounted to 30 rubles per month for soldiers (mobilized), for officers from ensign to commander-in-chief, in the range from 270 to 1000 rubles. In order to imagine the real value of these figures, one must take into account that the subsistence minimum for a worker in November 1918 was determined by the council of the Yekaterinodar trade unions at 660-780 rubles.

Twice later, at the end of 1918 and at the end of 1919, by means of extreme tension, the scale of the basic officer content was raised, respectively, by 450-3000 rubles. and 700-5000 rubles, never reaching a match with the rapidly growing high cost of living. Each time an order was given to increase the content, the next day the market responded with a price increase that absorbed all the increase.

A lone officer and soldier at the front ate from a common cauldron and, although poorly, were dressed. Nevertheless, officer families and a large part of the non-front-line officers of headquarters and institutions were in poverty. A number of orders established increases for the family and high cost, but all these were only palliatives. The only radical means of helping families and thereby raising moral condition their heads at the front, there would be a transition to in-kind allowance. But what the Soviet government could do with the Bolshevik methods of socialization, surplus appropriation and wholesale requisitions was impossible for us, especially in autonomous regions.

Only in May 1919 was it possible to provide pensions to the ranks of the military department and the families of the dead and killed officers and soldiers. Prior to this, only an insignificant lump-sum allowance of 1.5 thousand . rubles ... From the allies, contrary to the established opinion, we did not receive a penny.

The wealthy Kuban and Don, who owned a printing press, were in slightly better conditions. “For political reasons”, without any contact with the high command, they always established the maintenance of their servicemen at a higher standard than ours, thereby causing displeasure in the Volunteers. Moreover, the Donets and Kuban were at home, connected with him by a thousand threads - blood, moral, material, economic. Russian Volunteers, leaving the limits of Soviet reach, in the majority became homeless and destitute.

In addition to the garrisons of cities, spare, training and emerging units, which in general amounted to another 13-14 thousand.

G. recruitment was carried out at the expense of mobilized, as well as captured Red Army soldiers, who together make up the bulk military units army.

Immediately after the creation of the Volunteer Army, numbering about 4 thousand people, entered into hostilities against the Red Army. In early January 1918, she operated on the Don together with units under the command of General A. M. Kaledin. At the end of February 1918, under the onslaught of the Red troops, the Dobrarmia units left Rostov and moved to the Kuban - the “First Kuban Ice Campaign” began. In the village of Shenzhiy, on March 26, 1918, a 3,000-strong detachment of the Kuban Rada under the command of General V. L. Pokrovsky joined the Volunteer Army. The total strength of the Volunteer Army increased to 6,000 soldiers.

On March 27-31 (April 9-13), the Volunteer Army made an unsuccessful attempt to take the capital of the Kuban - Yekaterinodar, during which the Commander-in-Chief General Kornilov was killed by a random grenade on March 31 (April 13), and the command of the army units in the most difficult conditions of complete encirclement by many times superior forces the enemy was received by General Denikin, who succeeds in the conditions of incessant fighting on all sides, retreating through Medvedovskaya, Dyadkovskaya, to withdraw the army from flank attacks and safely get out of the encirclement beyond the Don, largely due to the energetic actions of the one who distinguished himself in battle on the night of 2 (15) on April 3 (16), 1918, at the crossing of the Tsaritsyn-Tikhoretskaya railway, the commander of the Officer Regiment of the General Staff, Lieutenant General S. L. Markov.

According to the memoirs of contemporaries, events developed as follows:

At about 4 o'clock in the morning parts of Markov began to cross the railroad tracks. Markov, having captured the railway gatehouse at the crossing, deployed infantry units, sent scouts to the village to attack the enemy, hastily began crossing the wounded, the convoy and artillery. Suddenly, the armored train of the Reds separated from the station and went to the crossing, where the headquarters was already located along with Generals Alekseev and Denikin. There were a few meters left before the crossing - and then Markov, showering the armored train with merciless words, remaining true to himself: “Stop! Such-rasta! Bastard! You will suppress your own!”, rushed on the way. When he really stopped, Markov jumped back (according to other sources, he immediately threw a grenade), and immediately two three-inch guns fired grenades point-blank at the cylinders and wheels of the locomotive. A heated battle ensued with the crew of the armored train, which was killed as a result, and the armored train itself was burned.

In June 1918, a 3,000-strong detachment of the General Staff of Colonel M. G. Drozdovsky joined the Volunteer Army. On June 23, the army (numbering 8-9 thousand), with the assistance of the Don Army under the command of ataman P. N. Krasnov, began the Second Kuban campaign. The basis of the Volunteer Army was the “colored” units - Kornilov, Markovsky, Drozdovsky and Alekseevsky regiments, subsequently deployed during the attack on Moscow in the summer and autumn of 1919 in the division.

On August 15 (2), 1918, the first mobilization was announced in part of the Volunteer Army, which was the first step towards turning it into regular army. According to the Kornilov officer Alexander Trushnovich, the first mobilized - the Stavropol peasants were poured into the Kornilov shock regiment in June 1918 during the fighting near the village of Medvezhye.

The state of the material part of the Army during this period was evidenced by the Markov artillery officer E. N. Giatsintov:

It's funny for me to watch films in which the White Army is depicted - having fun, ladies in ball gowns, officers in uniforms with epaulettes, with aiguillettes, brilliant! In fact, the Volunteer Army at that time was a rather sad, but heroic phenomenon. We were dressed in any way. For example, I was in trousers, in boots, instead of an overcoat I was wearing a coat of a railway engineer, which the owner of the house where my mother lived, Mr. Lanko, gave me in view of the late autumn. In the past, he was the head of the section between Ekaterinodar and some other station.
This is how we flaunted. Soon the sole of the boot on my right foot fell off, and I had to tie it with a rope. These are the "balls" and what "epaulettes" we had at that time! Instead of balls, there were constant battles. All the time we were pressed by the Red Army, very numerous. I think we were one against a hundred! And we somehow fired back, fought back, and even at times went over to the offensive and pushed the enemy back.

In combat terms, some units and formations of the Volunteer Army had high fighting qualities, since it included a large number of officers who had significant combat experience and sincerely devoted to the idea of ​​the White movement, but since the summer of 1919 its combat effectiveness has decreased due to heavy losses and the inclusion of mobilized peasants and captured Red Army soldiers in its composition.

The legendary Kornilov [“Not a man, but an element”] Runov Valentin Aleksandrovich

Formation of the Volunteer Army

December 25, 1917 in Novocherkassk Kornilov was appointed the first commander of the Volunteer Army. The distinctive sign of this army was a corner sewn onto the sleeve from ribbons of national colors. The army headquarters was formed, headed by General A. S. Lukomsky and in charge of all organizational, administrative, economic issues, as well as the highest operational leadership of the army. He had his own headquarters and General Alekseev. The discrepancy between the number of staffs and the combat composition of the army was sharply evident and condemned in the troops. Disapproval was caused by the wide scope that the chiefs, who previously held high posts and were accustomed to a large scale of work, wanted to give to this undertaking, a large number of staff workers who were not fit for military service, and, of course, the spontaneous desire of headquarters of all times to self-reproduction.

Partly on this basis, at the end of January 1918, there was a misunderstanding between General Kornilov and General Lukomsky, after which General Romanovsky assumed the post of chief of staff of the army. Lukomsky was appointed representative of the army under the Don Ataman Kaledin.

A. I. Denikin.

M. G. Drozdovsky.

Denikin writes: “The Don policy led to the fact that the commander of the Volunteer Army, General Kornilov, lived in secret, walked in civilian clothes, and his name was not officially mentioned in the Don institutions. The Don policy deprived the nascent army of another very significant organizational factor ... Who knows officer psychology , that understands the meaning of the order. Generals Alekseev and Kornilov, under other conditions, could have given the order to gather all the officers of the Russian army on the Don. Such an order would be legally contestable, but morally obligatory for the vast majority of the officers, serving as an incentive for many weak in spirit. Instead, anonymous appeals and "prospects" of the Volunteer Army were distributed. True, in the second half of December, in the press published on the territory of Soviet Russia, fairly accurate information about the army and its leaders appeared. But there was no authoritative order, and the morally weakened officers were already making deals with their own conscience.

The goals pursued by the Volunteer Army were first made public in a proclamation issued on 27 December. It prescribed:

1. Creation of “an organized military force that could be opposed to the impending anarchy and the German-Bolshevik invasion. At the same time, it was said that the volunteer movement should be universal. Again, as in the old days, 300 years ago, all of Russia must rise as a nationwide militia to defend its desecrated shrines and its trampled rights.

2. “The first immediate goal of the Volunteer Army is to resist an armed attack on the South and South-East of Russia. Hand in hand with the valiant Cossacks, at the first call of his Circle, his government and the Army Ataman, in alliance with the regions and peoples of Russia who rebelled against the German-Bolshevik yoke - all Russian people who have gathered in the South from all over our Motherland will defend to the last drop of blood, the independence of the regions that gave them shelter and are the last stronghold of Russian independence, the last hope for the restoration of Free Great Russia.

3. But next to this goal, another goal is set before the Volunteer Army. “This army should be that effective force that will enable Russian citizens to carry out the work of state building of Free Russia ... The new army should stand guard over civil freedom, under the conditions of which the owner of the Russian land - its people - will reveal their sovereign will through the elected Constituent Assembly.

All classes, parties and individual groups of the population must bow before this will. The army being created will serve it alone, and all those participating in its formation will unquestioningly obey the legitimate authority set by this Constituent Assembly.

In conclusion, the appeal called "to join the ranks of the Russian army ... all those who cherish the long-suffering Motherland, whose soul is weary of filial pain for her."

The formation of the Volunteer Army progressed rather slowly. On average, up to eighty people signed up to its ranks per day. And there were few soldiers. Most of them were officers, cadets, students, cadets, and high school students. Each of them gave a subscription to serve four months and promised unquestioning obedience to the command. The state of the treasury made it possible to pay volunteers with extremely low salaries: in January 1918, an officer received 150, a soldier - 50 rubles.

A. I. Denikin writes: "The People's Militia" did not work out. By virtue of the conditions of recruitment that had been created, the army in its very bud harbored a deep organic defect, acquiring a class character. There is no need that its leaders came from the people, that the officers were for the most part democratic, that the whole movement was alien to social elements struggle, that the official creed of the army bore all the signs of statehood, democracy and benevolence towards local regional formations ... The seal of class selection fell firmly on the army and gave ill-wishers a reason to arouse mistrust and fear against it among the masses of the people and oppose its goals to popular interests. It was clear that under such conditions the Volunteer Army could not fulfill its mission on an all-Russian scale. But the hope remained that it would be able to resist the pressure of Bolshevism, which was still unorganized, and thus give time to strengthen a healthy public and people's self-consciousness, that its strong core would eventually unite around itself the still inert or even hostile popular forces.

And yet, by mid-January 1918, a small (only about five thousand people) army was created, but rather strong in its unity of views. It included the Kornilov regiment, which arrived on the Don from the Southwestern Front, officer, cadet, St. George battalions, four artillery batteries, an engineering company, an officer squadron and a company of guards officers. General Kornilov believed that it was necessary to increase the size of the army to at least ten thousand people.

Martial law throughout December and the first half of January Soviet command regarded rather pessimistically. The reports exaggerated both the strength of the volunteer army and the activity of its intentions. So, on December 31, when the volunteer units had not yet gone to the front, and the Don units were holding meetings, they reported from the Southern Front: “The situation is extremely alarming. Kaledin and Kornilov go to Kharkov and Voronezh... The Commander-in-Chief asks to send detachments of the Red Guards to help. Commissioner Sklyansky informed the Council people's commissars that the Don has been mobilized without exception, fifty thousand white troops have been gathered around Rostov.

In the twentieth of January, the offensive of the Soviet troops on Rostov and Novocherkassk was indicated. Since that time, work on the formation of the army has actually ceased. All personnel were moved to the front. At the request of Kaledin, the 2nd officer battalion was sent to the Novocherkassk direction, where the Cossacks refused to fight the Bolsheviks. It was not necessary to count on the support of the nonresident population in the Cossack regions, because they always envied the Cossacks, who owned big amount land, and, taking the side of the Bolsheviks, it first of all hoped, on an equal footing with the Cossacks, to take part in the division of landowners' lands.

At the end of January, the army headquarters, as well as most of it, moved from Novocherkassk to Rostov. Kornilov, as Denikin notes, was guided by this decision as follows: the important Kharkov-Rostov direction was abandoned by the Don and taken entirely by volunteers, the move created some isolation from the Don government and the Soviet, which irritated the army commander, and finally, the Rostov and Taganrog districts were non-Cossack, which made it easier to some extent, the relationship between the volunteer command and the regional authorities.

Every day in Rostov was full of various organizational events. At the same time, General Kornilov, as at the front, held a large number of meetings. Roman Gulya described one of them as follows: “Second Lieutenant Dolinsky, Kornilov’s adjutant, led us to the reception room, next to the general’s office. In the waiting room, like a statue, stood a Tekin. We were not the first. A few minutes passed, the office door opened: some military man came out, followed by Kornilov, kindly seeing him off. Lavr Georgievich greeted everyone. “You come to me, gentlemen?! he asked us. "That's right, Your Excellency." - "Okay, wait a bit," and left.

... The door of the office soon opened. "Please gentlemen." We entered the office, a small room with a desk and two armchairs beside it. "Well, what's your business? Tell us,” the general said and looked at us. His face was pale and tired. The hair is short, with a strong grey. His face brightened up with small, coal-black eyes.

"Allow me, Your Excellency, to be absolutely sincere with you." “That’s the only way, that’s the only way I admit it,” Kornilov quickly interrupts.

Lavr Georgievich, listening to our request not to separate from Colonel S ..., draws with a pencil on paper, occasionally looking at us with black penetrating eyes. His hand is small, wrinkled, on his little finger is a massive expensive ring with a monogram.

We're done. “I know Colonel S., I know him well. That you have such a good relationship with him makes me happy, because only with a sincere relationship can one really work. This should always be the case with the boss and subordinates. I will fulfill your request." Little pause. We thanked and wanted to ask permission to get up, but Kornilov interrupted us: “No, no, sit down, I want to talk to you ... Well, how are you there, at the front?” And the general asks about the last battles, about allowances, about the mood, about the premises, about every little thing. It is felt that he lives by this, that this is “everything” for him.

... The general said goodbye. "Bow to Colonel S.," he said after us. Leaving the office, we ran into a young military man with a completely white head. "Who is this?" I ask the adjutant. He smiles, “Don't you know? This is the White Devil, the centurion of the Greeks. The general found out that he was zealous in arrests and executions, and called him out.”

After passing the brilliant headquarters hall, we left. Kornilov produced on us great impression. What pleasantly struck everyone when meeting Kornilov was his extraordinary simplicity. In Kornilov there was not a shadow, not a hint of the Bourbonism so often found in the army. Kornilov did not feel "his excellency", "general of the infantry." Simplicity, sincerity, gullibility merged in him with an iron will, and this made a charming impression. There was "heroic" in Kornilov. Everyone felt it and therefore followed him blindly, with delight, into fire and into water. Another major advantage of Kornilov was the absence of greed in him. Extremely moderate in his habits, indifferent not only to luxury, but even to simple comfort, he did not feel the need for money and in the midst of that bacchanalia of theft and theft remained impeccable to the end.

M. O. Nezhentsev.

By the time the Volunteer Army arrived in Rostov, all railways, leading from the European part of Russia to Novocherkassk and Rostov, were already in the hands of the Red Guards. The influx of replenishment to the army almost stopped. Only a few daredevils got through. The Red Guard detachments were pressing from the west and from the east. Kornilov's troops began to suffer heavy losses. Count on holding some offensive operation it was difficult.

General Kornilov hoped to get help from the highlanders of the Caucasus. Officers were sent there with instructions to get in touch with the persons who were at the head of the mountain peoples and to recruit volunteers. The same task was assigned to General Erdeli, who was in Eketerinodar to communicate with the Kuban government and the ataman. On January 20, he sent a telegram that he was coming to Rostov together with Prince Devlet Giray, who promised to put up to ten thousand Circassians. Arriving in Rostov, the prince clarified that he undertakes to put up two thousand Circassians within two weeks, and subsequently the rest. For this, in addition to weapons and rather significant amounts for the maintenance of his fighters, he asked for about a million rubles.

Of course, General Kornilov understood that it was dangerous to trust Prince Girey. But he took the risk anyway. General Alekseev at first categorically refused, but in the end he nevertheless decided to give out about two hundred thousand rubles. Prince Giray did not agree to this and, offended, left for Yekaterinodar.