Kursk province and the people of Kursk in the First World War. Simbirsk during the First World War

Military mobilization in the Vladimir province in 1914

(organization and conduct)

In 2014, the whole world celebrated the 100th anniversary of one of the most tragic pages in the history of mankind - the beginning of the First World War. This war, which claimed the lives of millions of people, causing colossal losses and destruction, in our country, until recently, was called "forgotten". However, nowadays the situation is changing and there is more and more research on this topic. But even today there are still a lot of unexplored questions regarding the history of the Great War.

Among them, a special place is occupied by the theme of military mobilization in the Vladimir province in 1914. Its organization and conduct are the subject of this study. To date, there is no complete and clear picture of how the mobilization was organized, in what conditions it took place, how many spares were mobilized and recruits were called up, how those called up for mobilization and conscription, and the population - about deliveries to the army.

The source base of the study is archival documents of the Russian State Military Historical Archive (RGVIA) - the fund of the main department of the general staff (F. 2000); State Archive Vladimir region(GAVO) - the fund of the Vladimir provincial conscription presence (F. 638), the fund of the office of the Vladimir governor.

Various aspects of this topic were touched upon in the works of Vladimir and Ivanovo researchers. In the book of Kovrov local historians A.L. Kollerov and A.V. Samoilov, detailed material is given on the expected recruitment of those mobilized in the event of a possible mobilization in 1914, according to the mobilization schedule No. 20 (in the Russian Empire there were pre-drawn plans in case of military mobilization. The replacements were supposed to be drafted into the army according to the mobilization schedule No. 20). In the work of the Shuisky researcher A.Yu. Gulidov 2 gives some information about the attitude of the population of the Vladimir province to mobilization. In the article by A.V. Babakov 3 considers the topic of conscription of persons liable for military service during the First World War on the example of the city of Suzdal and the Suzdal district. However, all of the above works do not give a complete picture of how and under what conditions military mobilization was carried out in 1914; there are no exact data on the number of those mobilized from the Vladimir province.

For local control of ground military forces and military establishments on the eve of the war, the Russian Empire was divided into military districts: St. Donskoy 4 .

The Vladimir province, along with the Moscow, Tver, Nizhny Novgorod, Vologda, Yaroslavl, Kostroma, Smolensk, Kaluga, Tula, Ryazan and Tambov provinces, was part of the Moscow Military District. During the First World War, this district was one of the main suppliers of resources for the front.

Content of numerous armed forces for the state in peacetime - a costly and unproductive business. The peacetime army is a regular (first-line) troops, the burden of the initial stage of the war falls on it. However, the use of exclusively first-line formations can lead to the destruction of army personnel in a short time. Therefore, already in the first operations, those formations that will be created at the beginning of the war from reservists should also be used. Since in peacetime no unit is contained in in full force, during mobilization, reservists (in Russia they were called spares) replenish existing personnel units to the state of wartime, while the other part of the spare goes to the formation of new units and formations.

Conscription for military service on the eve of the First World War was carried out on the basis of all-class personal military service, which was introduced on January 1, 1874 to replace the recruiting system. The military regulations were changed in 1888 and 1906. with a reduction in the terms of service of those drafted. The last major changes were made to the charter by the law of June 23, 1912, and further clarifications were made in December 1912 and April 1, 1913. Conscription in the Russian Empire was universal. A number of categories were granted deferrals from conscription or complete exemption from military service. Of the citizens who did not have the right to deferment and exemption from service, only those who were drawn by lot went to serve. Young people from the age of 21 were subject to the call. The service life was 3 years for employees in infantry and artillery units; 4 years for other ground forces and 5 years for the navy. The ranks who served in the infantry and artillery were in the reserve for 15 years, the ranks of other ground forces - 13 years, the fleet - 5 years. But in all cases, the age limit for the state in the reserve was up to 38 years. At the end of the term of stay in the reserve, the persons who were in it were assigned to the State Militia, in which they were up to 43 years of age. Those who were not subject to conscription in peacetime were enlisted as warriors of the 1st and 2nd categories. In wartime, they were called up for service along with conscripts 5 .

During the First World War, the order in which recruits were drafted changed significantly. A number of norms of conscription legislation were suspended, while others demanded partial or complete replacement. Thus, the circular of the department of military service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs No. 86 dated September 3, 1914, addressed to the governors, established similar restrictions and exemptions from the charter for military service. In particular, taking into account the need to increase the contingent of recruits, casting lots was canceled, because. it was the preferential 1st category that went through this procedure, therefore, the persons included in the draft lists were called up in sequential order of numbers. In cases where there were many conscripts in the counties, the recruits were divided into 2 lines for the convenience of the work of the presences and the acceleration of recruitment military units. The deadline for admission to military service for the draft of 1914 was postponed from February 15 to April 1, 1915. Students who studied at foreign educational institutions were obliged to return to the empire, and the delay was established only for senior students, etc. In general, the recruitment of recruits only in 1914 was carried out in accordance with the current legislation. In 1915–1917 they were early, i.e. persons under the age of 20 were called up 6 .

Military mobilization during the First World War consisted of the conscription of subjects of the empire (reserves, lower ranks, recruits and militia warriors) and supplies from the population of horses, cars and ships. Military mobilization can be divided into separate stages, depending on the type of conscription (calling for reserves, recruits, organization of the state militia) and on their form (general throughout the empire, additional in individual provinces). The successful conduct of mobilization depended on many factors: the work of military command and control bodies, the quality of communications and transport capabilities, and so on. 7

Mobilization schedule No. 20, put into effect in July 1914, ordered to mobilize 32,196 people and 10,572 horses 8.

As can be seen, according to the mobilization schedule No. 20, in addition to the reserve lower ranks, horses were also required to be supplied to the troops. In the Russian Empire, in addition to performing universal military service for the male part of its population, there was also universal military horse service (for the population that owned horses). This type of duty was introduced in Russia in 1876. Its essence consisted in the supply of horses by the population for military needs, at a predetermined price for each variety. All horses fit for military service were subject to delivery, with the exception of: those who were in the palace stables, owned by generals of staff and chief officers, etc. Horses assigned to postal stations, stallions and mares kept exclusively for breeding both in state and private horse factories were also not subject to military horse duty.

In order to facilitate the supply of horses to the troops, military horse sections were created. The division into sections was arranged as follows: the county was territorially divided into volosts, they were also part of the sections in full. Those. in the Vladimir province at the time of the outbreak of the First World War, there were 13 counties, they were divided into volosts, each of which at the same time was a military horse section. Cities were divided into separate sections, and in large cities several military horse sections could be formed. In each section, a collection point was determined for the delivery of horses.

All administrative activities for military horse service were in the hands of the provincial and district presence for military service. The supervision of the activities of these institutions was entrusted to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Each military horse section was headed by a head, who was elected to this position by the county zemstvo assembly or the city duma.

Reception of horses at delivery points, in military horse sections was carried out by selection committees, which included: a member of the zemstvo council, a provincial official and an officer of the military department. The procedure for the delivery of horses was as follows: each county presence for military service, having received an order to supply horses, immediately informed the heads of the military horse sections, determining the day no later than which the horses were to arrive at the delivery point. As the horses were brought to the delivery point, the head of the section first accepted horses from those who wanted to hand them over voluntarily, and only then the missing number was collected through the procedure of casting lots.

For each adopted horse, a receipt was immediately issued with a coupon, according to which the bearer was paid an amount of money, depending on the variety of the accepted horse and on the area where the reception was made. The amount of remuneration was set by special schedules and published in the media. mass media. At the same time, 20% could be added to the price announced in the schedule, if the horse was surrendered by its owner voluntarily. In case of failure to provide horses to the collection point without good reason, the perpetrators were subject to a fine in the amount of double the price determined for the highest grade of horses. If the horses from the whole military horse section were not delivered to the delivery point without good reason, then they were forcibly confiscated from their owners.

In response to the outbreak of hostilities by Austria-Hungary against Serbia, on July 16 (29), 1914, Nicholas II signed a decree on general mobilization. On July 17 (30), 1914, general mobilization was announced in Russia. Germany, in response to these actions, presented an ultimatum to Russia to cancel the decision to mobilize within 12 hours. This did not happen and on July 19 (August 1) Germany declared war on Russia. The Russian Empire entered the First World War.

On July 17 (30), 1914, the inhabitants of the Vladimir province were informed about the general mobilization that had begun in the countryside through horse messengers, and residents of cities - through policemen.

It is worth noting that almost everywhere the beginning of the war was met with rather great enthusiasm. A significant number of volunteers in the province (mostly city dwellers) signed up for the army themselves, without waiting for the draft. Volunteers were factory workers, office workers, students and even students. So, on September 9, 1914, almost a whole class (18 students) of the Vladimir real school voluntarily went to the front. Unlike cities, the countryside provided relatively few volunteers, which is not surprising, given that mobilization occurred at the height of field work, and villages and villages did not experience a surplus. work force. However, the villagers showed great vigilance, carrying out the decisions of the draft commissions. So, in the village of Kutukovo, Vladimir district, a reserve lower rank who came from Moscow to say goodbye to relatives, after a message from fellow villagers, was detained and immediately sent to the military commander under escort, although officially he had time to see his relatives.

Even minors went to the front. There is information about at least 4 juveniles - immigrants from the Vladimir province, who were wanted by the police. There was information about them that they were sent to the active army 9 .

There were isolated cases of protest. Thus, a peasant from Gavrilovskoye of the Yanevsky volost Ivan Grigoryevich Terentyev, the lower rank of the army reserve, senior non-commissioned officer of the 10th Infantry Regiment, during his call on July 18, 1914 by the Suzdal district military commander to the assembly point, reported that he did not consider going to war necessary. He was arrested and held at the police station. A few days later, on July 22, 1914, he announced his desire to join the ranks of the army, where 10 was soon sent.

I must say that in 1914 (from 01.07 to 31.12) military mobilization consisted of 6 mobilization events: this is the call for spares (July 17), militia warriors (July 25, September 20, November 20, December 30), recruits for a planned call (October 1), horses, carts and cars (October 17). The total number of those called up is 79642 people, 11602 horses, 150 wagons, 199 sets of harness and 9 cars 11 . The total number of all mobilized forces within the limits of the Moscow Military District reached the figure of 613,994 people 12 .

The appendix to this work presents a table compiled on the basis of archival data from the SAVO, indicating the exact number of those called up from the counties of the Vladimir province.

It can be seen from the table that 38,630 reserve people were called up, which is slightly more than the expected mobilization, where it was planned to call up 32,196 reserve lower ranks. These data once again confirm that there were practically no cases of evasion, since the figures for the planned mobilization of spares, warriors and recruits into the active army were significantly overfulfilled.

According to the report of the Vladimir governor to the provincial office, the turnout of those called up to the assembly points took place without delays and any difficulties. The conscripts knew about the purpose of the conscriptions, they did not express any displeasure. The mood at the assembly points was solemn. The only moment that was characterized in negative tones was the behavior of those called up before being sent to the troops, which was considered unsatisfactory. They often abused alcohol and often behaved inappropriately 13 .

They called teachers, doctors, employees, etc. into the active army. However, the main contingent that served to recruit the army was the peasantry.

The supply of horses to the troops was successful - the plan was overfulfilled: instead of the expected 10,572 horses, 11,602 horses were handed over. But there were still isolated cases of evading deliveries in the province. So, on October 17, the peasants of the Borisov volost, in their complaint to the Vladimir governor, pointed to numerous violations by the head of the military horse section and the volost foreman, namely: horses were not confiscated from some residents (relatives and good acquaintances of the above-mentioned officials) under the pretext of that gray horses were not accepted into the army. As a result of such actions, 2 horses were taken away from some peasants 14 .

In general, the mobilization of 1914 in the Vladimir province was successful. Many people involved in this event, and these are mainly volost foremen, clerks, zemstvo chiefs, heads of military horse sections and their assistants, members of the selection committee, received the medal "For the work on the excellent implementation of general mobilization", established by the emperor February 12, 1915

During this study it was possible to establish that the mobilization measures in the Vladimir province in 1914 were carried out promptly and without failures, according to the deadlines set earlier. Mobilizations and planned conscription proceeded calmly, without mass unrest of those called up, on the wave of a general patriotic upsurge. A huge amount of work and all procedures for the implementation of these measures fell on the shoulders of the Vladimir governor V.N. Creighton, as well as provincial and district conscription presences. Without well-defined, coordinated actions on the ground, the implementation of military mobilization campaigns with such success would be extremely difficult.

In the first year of the war, 79,642 people were called up and mobilized from the Vladimir province. At the same time, the mobilization plans were overfulfilled: more reserve lower ranks were called up than expected, for 6434 people, as well as horses - for more than 1000 heads. All of the above figures are entered in scientific circulation first.

The Vladimir province carried out military mobilization successfully and in the first year of the war gave the active army more than what was planned earlier.

Notes:

1. Kollerov A.L., Samoilov A.V. Unforgotten war - unforgotten destinies. Kovrovskiy, Gorbatovskiy, Klyazminskiy infantry regiments: military way, history, exploits (to the 100th anniversary of the beginning of the First World War). Vladimir, 2014.

2. Gulidov A.Yu. Socio-political life of the Russian province during the First World War (on the materials of the Vladimir province). Dis. … cand. ist. Sciences. Ivanovo, 2010.

3. Babakov A.V. The call to war of the inhabitants of the city of Suzdal and the Suzdal district during the First World War (on the 100th anniversary of the start of the war) // Our Opolye: a collection of local lore. M.: Nashe Opole, 2014. No. 3 (10).

4. Oskin M.V. History of the First World War. M., 2014. S. 68.

5. Golovin N.N. Military efforts of Russia in the world war. Paris, 1939. S. 13, 14.

6. RGVIA. F. 2000. Op. 3. D. 2676. L. 127–130.

7. The organization and conduct of military mobilization were within the competence of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the military and naval ministries. The scheme of institutions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs can be represented as follows: the department of military service - provincial (regional) for military service of presence - county (district and city) for military service of presence - recruiting stations and military horse stations. For the military department: mobilization department General Staff(hereinafter - GUGSH) - headquarters of military districts - heads of local brigades - district military commanders. At the headquarters level of the Moscow Military District, a significant role was played by the chief of staff, the commander of the district troops and the mobilization department.

Administrative activities for mobilization readiness were concentrated under the jurisdiction of the Main Directorate of General Staff. According to his instructions, the headquarters of the military districts compiled mobilization schedules, which consisted of two parts: district and military statements. Mobilization activities were to be carried out according to pre-compiled mobilization schedules. According to them, there was a distribution of all registered spare ranks on the basis of accounting data and mobilization needs for troops and mobilization transportation plans, which indicated where, on what days of mobilization, which teams, what numbers were to be sent to military units. The basis of all mobilization orders were pre-composed calculations of needs, funds and time, made in each military unit. All calculations were reduced to mobilization schedules, periodically updated in accordance with the current strategic and political situation, the availability of supplies of people, horses and carts. Mobilization schedules were taken as the basis for mobilization plans compiled by the troops. The main executors of the calculations were county military commanders, and civil institutions were determined as executive bodies - county and city military presences, police departments, county and city zemstvo councils, and volost governments.

8. Kollerov A.L., Samoilov A.V. Decree. op. S. 13.

10. GAVO. F. 709. Op. 1. D. 27. L. 10–10 rev.

11. GAVO. F. 638. Op. 1. D. 1793. L. 38.

12. RGVIA. F. 2000. Op. 3. D. 4057. L. 1.

13. GAVO. F. 638. Op. 1. D. 1793. L. 39.

14. GAVO. F. 638. Op. 1. D. 1722. L. 22.

Andreev Nikolay, Morozov Nikita, Nurtdinov Ildar

Presentation made by the Suvorovites of the Ulyanovsk SVU, to research work about the fate of Simbirsk during the First World War.

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Authors: Suvorov students 7.8 grades Leaders: Abrashina Lyudmila Mikhailovna, Pischaskin Vladimir Nikolaevich, teachers of computer science and ICT FGKOU UGSVU MO RF 2014 FGKOU Ulyanovsk Guards Suvorov military school Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation Competition " Forgotten War”, dedicated to the 100th anniversary of the start of the First World War Simbirsk during the First World War

Research objectives: To expand knowledge about the history of Simbirsk; Analyze the events of the First World War in Simbirsk; Show the activities of the rear city of Simbirsk during the war years; Tell about the hardships of the war that fell on the shoulders of the Simbirians; Determine and indicate the location of some military units and hospitals; Summarize and systematize the available material on the economic situation in Simbirsk, build tables and charts reflecting the rise in prices.

The purpose of the work: to show the life of the rear city at the beginning of the 20th century, to study some questions about the military units and hospitals stationed and formed in the city, determining their location on the maps of Simbirsk (Ulyanovsk) during the First World War and the modern one. First World War became the most difficult test for the vast majority of Simbirians. Hypothesis:

Object of study: the city of Simbirsk during the First World War. Subject of study: the impact of the First World War on the socio-economic situation and moral state of the population of Simbirsk.

Research methods: analysis of literary sources, Internet resources; study of the materials of the book of the local historian Yefimov Yu.D. "Simbirsk during the First World War"; meeting with local historian Gauss Natalya Stepanovna; acquaintance and study of the materials of the Ulyanovsk Regional Museum of Local Lore. I.A. Goncharova.

Project work

The first month of the war The first months of the war passed in the city of Simbirsk calmly, without anti-war protests. The majority of the city's population had a patriotic attitude towards the war, as did the vast majority of the population of Russia.

For Faith, Tsar and Fatherland During the war years, quite a lot of military units were formed and located in Simbirsk.

For the Russian army Hospitals Refugees and prisoners of war Hunger, cold and hardship

For the Russian army The entire economic potential of the city was directed to the production of products for the army.

Hospitals Simbiryane accepted Active participation in the organization and maintenance of hospitals for military personnel. Location of hospitals on the map of Simbirsk

Refugees and prisoners of war Despite all the difficulties, the Simbirians provided assistance and support to those who found themselves in more difficult conditions

Hunger, cold and hardship Most of the Simbirians had a low standard of living. Need was felt everywhere, some of the townspeople lived from hand to mouth, some were starving. On the shoulders of the people fell not only the burden of militarization, the growth of military spending, but also the incalculable "tax in blood", the extermination of millions of people on the fronts of the war.

Despite the war Volga bridge Goncharovsky house Monument to Alexander II

Volzhsky bridge The city received a reliable year-round connection between the banks, new well-equipped stations and river moorings, dams that prevent the coast from being washed away.

Goncharovsky House On the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the birth of I.A. Goncharov, it was decided to build a monument-building, which would house libraries, a museum and an art-industrial school. The monument-building was named the Goncharovsky House.

Monument to Alexander II Simultaneously with the construction of the Goncharovsky House in the city, the construction of a monument to Alexander II was underway. In 1913, the Jubilee Committee was formed to celebrate the 300th anniversary of the Romanov dynasty. It was called " Simbirsk jubilee committee for the construction in the city of Simbirsk of a monument in Bose to the late emperor."

Despite all the difficulties, inconveniences, additional costs during the war years, construction was carried out in the city, the streets were improved, and there were opportunities to carry out what was planned.

CONCLUSIONS: the war, which brings death, suffering and numerous hardships, has become the most difficult test for the vast majority of Simbirians; major problems rear life steel: lack of food and fuel; lack of premises due to the influx of refugees, wounded, deportees and prisoners; a sharp increase in the size of the garrison; an increase in diseases and a lack of medicines; food shortages were caused by the decline in the production of marketable grain due to the general mobilization of men and the diversion of draft animals; food shortages, in turn, led to higher prices. The rise in the price of food and essentials was also influenced by: the fall in the value of money; lack of workers; difficulties in the transportation of goods, raw materials and food due to congestion and disruption of railway traffic; reduction of factory activity; the panic of the population, seeking to purchase products "in reserve"; in the autumn of 1916 the city was on the verge of famine. There were not enough working hands, since the army was mainly replenished at the expense of the peasants.

Thank you for your attention!

Information resources Efimov YD Simbirsk during the First World War: 1914-1918. Samara - Ulyanovsk: Samara book publishing house; Publishing group "Artishok", 2006. Ulyanovsk - Simbirsk Encyclopedia: in 2 volumes / [Editorial Council: N.V. Alekseeva (prev.) and others; ed.-st. V.N. Egorov]. - Ulyanovsk: Simb. book, 2000-2004. Ulyanovsk - Simbirsk encyclopedia: interactive. ref. by Ulyan. region / ed. and comp. V.N. Egorov; editorial board: O.E. Borodin [and others]; developed A. V. Morzhavin [i dr.]. - Ulyanovsk, 2005. Simbirsk region. Brief historical outline - Saratov; Privolzhskoe book publishing house (Ulyanovsk branch), 1989. Manifesto on the beginning of the war with Germany // Simbirsk Gubernskiye Vedomosti. 1914. No. 53. Simbirsk late XIX- beginning of the XX century - URL: http://kvv.mv.ru/ simbirsk /p15.html House-monument of Goncharov - URL: http://kvv.mv.ru/simbirsk/page86.html "Map of Ulyanovsk" - URL : http://ul-map.ru/maps.php - maps of Simbirsk, Ulyanovsk. Simbirsk on old maps - URL: http://ru-simbirsk.livejournal.com/ 1404481.html Simbirsk province - URL: http://simgb.narod.ru/revolution2.html - economic situation in the Simbirsk province.

"KURYANS AT THE FRONT..."

MILITARY CALLS AND MOBILIZATIONS
1914-1917 IN KURSK PROVINCE

Exodus Crimean War 1853-1856, lost by the Russian armed forces, which had a limited supply of recruits, forced to accelerate the process of transition to general military conscription of the population, following the example of France and other Western European countries, including the neighboring German Empire, which was gaining military power.

The introduction of all-class military service in Russia led to a reduction in the terms of service and, as a result, increased the number of those drafted into the troops who passed military training and enrolled in the army reserve to create numerous prepared reserves in case of war. The main advantage of this troop recruitment system was the ability to maintain a small peacetime regular army, which, in the event of hostilities, becomes massive due to the conscription of military-trained reserves from among men who have completed military service. As a result, our lag behind the advanced states on the issue under consideration was eliminated.

The system of general conscription of Russians, having served for more than a century, remains the basis for manning the army and navy of our state right up to the present day. In the conditions of modern military reform, there is a transition to a contract system for the professionalization of the armed forces, but a complete rejection of the existing military service not envisaged in the near future.

The conscription of young people for military service in 1914 on the territory of the Kursk province began on schedule - October 1. 35148 people were subject to the call. , incl. according to additional lists B - 4663 people. 14,045 people had benefits due to marital status. , or 40.0% of the total number of recruits. During the “examination and admission”, 4187 people, or 11.9% of the total number of those called up, were recognized as subject to deferment due to illness or lack of maturity. This is a very high figure, in previous wars it did not exceed 5.5%, which is explained by the large number of those who repeatedly received deferrals for recovery from those included in the additional B lists.

18,068 people, or 51.4% of the total number of conscripts, were accepted into service in 1914, for comparison, in the military year of 1877 - 30.2%, and in 1904 - 38.0%. An interesting fact is that the call of recruits in 1914 continued even after the official closure of the presences. Until January 1, 1915, another 448 people were additionally accepted for service, which, together with 17,620 people enrolled in active service in the October draft, made up the total number of those called up for military service. The number of those additionally called up included conscripts who returned after a detailed examination in medical institutions, as well as after re-examination by the Provincial conscription presence. In total, in Russia in 1914, 700,000 people were accepted. , the share of the Kursk province in this set was 2.6%.

Among accepted recruits 4826 people, or 26.7%, had family status benefits. Such a high rate of those called up with benefits was not observed either in the Russian-Turkish or in the Russian-Japanese war. This was explained by the scale new war superior to all previous ones.

The mood of the conscripts was different. In the reports of the county military commanders, there is various information about the mood among the draftees. So, the Lgovsky military commander pointed out that, despite the closed wine shops, among the recruits, “immoderate use of wine, which they buy in clubbing in in large numbers and partly drunk on the streets of the city. The military chief asked for the governor's orders to actually stop the sale of alcohol in Lgov until all recruits were sent to the troops, fearing that the latter would drink the money they received in presence for the things they brought with them.

In Novooskolsky district the situation was different. According to the military commander, “Conscripts behave in an exemplary manner. There is complete order in the city, there were no cases of military service evasion.

On the whole, the drafting of new recruits in 1914 followed a well-known pattern, only expanding the number of those drafted into the troops. The call was subject to 21-year-old men.

In 1915, in the Kursk province, as well as throughout Russia, there were three early calls for recruits. Information about the results of these appeals, carried out on the territory of the Kursk province, is extremely scarce.

The first enrollment ran from January 15 to February 15, 1915. Subject to the draft were 21-year-old men who were to be drafted in October. In total, 32,311 people were assigned to the military service. Of this number, 16,045 people, or 49.7%, were accepted for military service. 6863 people, or 21.2% of the total number of conscripts, were enrolled in the militia of the second category who were entitled to benefits for marital status of the 1st category. In Russia, this set gave 673,000 people. , incl. 16045 Kuryans, or 2.4%.

An interesting fact is that the recruits accepted into this call to the fleet, the turnout from home leave was delayed until October 1, 1915 "due to the difficulty for the Naval Department of accepting recruits to the fleet outside the time of the usual call." But in March 1915, these recruits were "converted" to the ground forces and sent to serve. Such an agreement was reached under an agreement between the Military and Naval Ministries, according to which it was supposed to call up the number of recruits necessary for the fleet in an early May call.

On May 15, 1915, the second early conscription began in 1916 for recruits born in 1897, i.e. 20 year olds. Recruits were released from it until the end of the war, occupying at the time of recruitment the positions of telegraph operators on all the railways of the empire, except for the Tashkent and Central Asian.

32,358 people were involved in this call for military service, of which 8,098 people, or 25.0%, used the privilege of the 1st category, and 15,590 people were enrolled in the troops. , or 48.2%. Among those accepted in Russia 632,000 people. , the share of the Kursk province was 2.5%.

In the early draft of 1917, which began on August 7, 1915, young people born in 1896 were subject to military service, i.e. 19 year olds. This appeal was carried out on a "mobilization basis", which made it possible to call under the banner of the most more recruits, not taking into account the right to benefits based on marital status. Out of 33505 people, 23246 people were enrolled in the service. , or 69.4%. Of the 932,000 people called up for service throughout Russia, the share of the Kursk province was 2.5%, as in other conscriptions during the First World War.

It should be noted that in the calls of recruits in 1914-1916. only conscripts who were entitled to a benefit for marital status of the 1st category were exempted from entering active military service. Following the early conscription in 1917 of conscripts born in 1896, which ignored the provision of benefits based on marital status, preparations were made for the 1916 conscription of young people born in 1897 in 1916. All those drafted into this recruitment, if fit, were enrolled in the troops, regardless of benefits due to marital status. So, conscripts who had the right to a privilege for marital status of the 1st category, in the sets of 1914-1916, were enrolled in the militia of the 2nd category, from which they were later recruited as militia warriors. Now, preferential 1st category, immediately upon being called up, were enrolled in the service as militias. In the event of the simultaneous call-up of two or more brothers for the service, their families, along with families deprived of a single breadwinner, were entitled to food allowance. In addition, the families of military personnel in need of heating were provided with assistance in this matter.

In order to conduct conscription more quickly in 1915, recruits were given the right to appear at collection points for the performance of military duty at the place of stay. This circumstance allowed conscripts working in factories and factories in other regions not to return home, which significantly saved the time of the call.

Refugees of the drafts of 1914-1917, who were in the inner provinces, were also subject to conscription, incl. and in Kursk. Refugees, when announcing the draft, had to immediately appear at the assembly points of local district military commanders at the place of stay. The presences made the necessary lists for them and carried out the determination of the age “by appearance”.

In 1914-1915. in Russia they retained their force of deferment for completing their education, and starting from 1916, the conscription of students into the active army was announced. In order to avoid conscription, many students made unauthorized transfers from one educational institution to another, which was strictly punished as evasion of military service.

The early conduct of military conscriptions required great tension from the institutions that compiled the draft lists. In total, according to available data for 1914-1915. in the Kursk province, 72,949 recruits were accepted for military service.

The main differences between peacetime and wartime conscription manifested itself in the First World War, during which it was necessary to change some articles of the Charter on military service. The first wartime conscription in 1914 was carried out on schedule and was distinguished by an increased recruitment rate, more than 50% were accepted for service, as well as the actual abolition of benefits for marital status of the 2nd and 3rd categories, which, starting from that moment , lost their power due to wartime.

The active army needed an increasing number of soldiers and in a short time to replenish the loss. Therefore, the appeals of 1915-1917. were carried out ahead of schedule. For this, the recruiting age bar was lowered.

In 1915, for the first time in Russia, there were three early calls for recruits. The conscription, which began on January 15, included 21-year-old conscripts who, in peacetime, should have been called up for military service only on October 1 of this year. Following this, on May 15 - 20-year-olds, and on August 7 - 19-year-old boys, whose turn was to come in 1916 and 1917. respectively. In 1916, the turn came to the 18-year-old youths of the 1918 draft. The age of recruits did not fall below 18;

Starting from August 7, 1915, the recruitment of recruits took place on a "mobilization basis" that did not take into account benefits based on marital status. Now, when called up, all able-bodied men

During the entire war, about 15,500,000 spares, militias and recruits were mobilized, distributed by age as follows: under 20 years old - 2,500,000 people, or 16.8%; 20-29 years old - 7,600,000 people, or 49.0%; 30-39 years old - 4,600,000 people, or 30.0%; 40 years and older - 800,000 people, or 5.0%.

According to the agricultural census of 1917, the percentage of those accepted into the army in Russia was: 11.2% of the entire population, 22.6% of all men and 47.4% of able-bodied men. In the Kursk province, this indicator exceeded the all-Russian one and was equal to: 12.6%, 25.1%, 53.3%, respectively. The percentage of able-bodied men called up in the Kursk province exceeded, on average, by 3% similar figures in other provinces of European Russia, for example, in Yekaterinoslav - 34.2%, in Petrograd - 39.7%, in Moscow it was 45.1%, and in neighboring Chernihiv - 50.6%. Thus, on average, this percentage was higher in the agricultural provinces, which makes it possible to conclude that the Russian peasantry bore the brunt of the war.

In the summer of 1914, by order of the Kursk provincial conscription presence, the district military presences held verification fees for the lower ranks of the reserve, the deadline for holding was set from June 1 to June 24. County presences within the allotted time themselves set the deadlines for appearance. For example, the Rylsk presence performed verification from June 2 to June 19. This verification made it possible a month before the start of the war to obtain accurate information about the availability of spares on the ground, which in turn accelerated the mobilization of spare lower ranks.

After the declaration of war on Serbia by Austria-Hungary on July 15, it was decided in Russia to mobilize. Emperor Nicholas II, despite the persuasion of the General Staff, for a long time did not want to carry out a general mobilization in Russia, believing that it would lead to war with Germany. Only after a long explanation that if a private mobilization is announced, it will interfere with the general mobilization in the future, the emperor gave his consent.

General mobilization was announced on July 18, 1914, during which all reserve lower ranks and part of the state militia of the 1st category were called up according to the 1910 mobilization schedule in force at that time. Prior to this, preparatory work had been carried out on the ground. So, from July 13, in the Kursk province, the “Regulations on the preparatory period for the war” were introduced and events were carried out according to the “Lists No. 1 and No. 2”, such as:

Bringing in full order materials in all institutions responsible for the mobilization of the army and navy;

Termination of the issuance of military passports and certificates for the right to travel abroad;

Additional equipment of assembly points at the offices of military commanders with everything necessary for mobilization;

Checking the readiness of collection points for work.

By order of the governor, for the period of mobilization, all drinking establishments were closed in places of conscription. Closed state and private liquor stores and establishments selling alcoholic beverages were ordered to be protected by police guards. This order played a positive role in maintaining order at the assembly points.

An interesting fact is that local mobilization began one day earlier, namely on July 17th. It so happened that private mobilization was first announced. According to the Highest Command, the troops of Kyiv (it included the Kursk province), Odessa, Moscow, Kazan military districts, the Black Sea and Baltic Fleets and Cossack units. On July 17, in addition to the above order, Kursk received a telegram from the commander of the Kiev Military District, Adjutant General Ivanov, informing that July 17 is considered the first day of mobilization, reserve lower ranks are subject to conscription, militia units are not formed. This circumstance is explained by the indecision of the emperor in declaring a general mobilization, which nevertheless followed on July 18. In order to resolve this inconsistency in the conduct of mobilization, a telegram from Comrade Minister of the Interior Plehve was sent to the localities, in which it was reported that militia warriors of the 1st category were subject to conscription, and “the appearance of spares at collection points on the days of mobilization, starting from July 17, should continue without correcting call-up announcements.

Deferrals from conscription were used by officers and lower ranks of the outdoor police studying in higher educational institutions; reserve lower ranks, warriors of the state militia. In anticipation of the mobilization, it was ordered to release all the lower ranks and warriors of the state militia who were serving in the prisons of the civil department, who were serving sentences for failing to appear at training and verification fees. After their release, they were immediately enrolled in military units by appointment.

Information about the number of called-up spares in the Kursk province varies greatly. So, according to the Survey of the Kursk province for 1914, 42,394 lower ranks of the reserve were called up in the province, or 1.4% of the total number of reserve officers accepted in Russia in 1914. In turn, according to the data contained in the state archive of the Kursk region in profile fund No. 141 of the Kursk provincial presence for military service, there is information about the results of calling up spares in 12 counties out of 15. In 12 counties, this number amounted to 46,128 people. In our opinion, it is more worth trusting the information of the specialized fund, compiled according to the reports of the county conscription presences. This inconsistency in data can be explained as follows. In the Review of the Kursk province, the final figures on the number of those called up, and the number of reserve ranks appointed from the province, could be used. The compilers of the Review could simply be unaware of the real situation at the collection points. Governor N.P. Muratov reported on July 28, 1914 to the commander of the troops of the Kyiv military district, Adjutant General N.I. Ivanov that at many “province assembly points there are still spares who have not been accepted into the troops ... [their - D.S.] the number in some points reaches 700 people” .

For example, in Putivl, 680 spares who were not assigned to military units were accepted in excess of the set, and 800 people in Grayvoron. All these spares were sent to the troops. This is also evidenced by the fact that in Russia as a whole and in the Kursk province in particular there was not a single call for replacements in the future, because. this entire contingent, which was most valuable in the conditions of war, was completely exhausted during the period of general mobilization. In total, according to our calculations, 57,660 reserve ranks were accepted in the Kursk province. More detailed information about the number of people accepted by uyezds of the province will be given below in Table No. 1 "Results of mobilizations in 1914 in the Kursk province."

The adopted Kursk lower ranks of the reserve were sent to units of various branches of the armed forces (infantry, artillery, cavalry, including the fleet).

Let us now consider the number of militia warriors of the 1st category, taken on mobilization on July 18 in the Kursk province. In this mobilization, 2 categories of militias of the 1st category were subject to conscription:

Warriors listed in the militia from the reserve before reaching the age of 43, i.e. who completed the military service of the terms of conscription in 1893-1896, and who by the beginning of the war were from 39 to 42 years old.

Non-serving warriors of the 1st category of calls 1908-1913. between the ages of 22 and 27.

In the work of N.N. Golovin, we find information that is different from what we have identified in regional documentary sources. He claims that the reserve were called up, who had passed the army draft service in 1892-1895, i.e. from 40 to 43 years old and did not serve the drafts of 1910-1913. Under the current legislation on military service, men were in the militia until they reached the age of 43, so 43-year-olds could not be drafted into the troops without changing the law. Thus, it turns out that the upper age limit set by N.N. Golovin for persons who have completed military service is not true. The difference in the ages of militia warriors who did not serve in the army can be explained as follows: in the Kursk province they could expand the age limits for conscription to receive the required number of militiamen appointed from the province.

According to the Survey of the Kursk province for 1914 in the Kursk province in 1914, 19,889 warriors were accepted into the troops, of which: 7,540 people. - 1st category and 12349 people. - 2nd category. The reliability of this information is highly questionable. Firstly, according to all the sources we have met, the conscription of the state militia warriors of the 2nd category in 1914 was not carried out in Russia, since there was no highest order for this. The first recruitment of warriors of the 2nd category took place only on September 5, 1915, after the approval State Duma the law "On the procedure for conscription and appointment of warriors of the state militia of the 2nd category", which amended the Charter on military service. Secondly, the numerical data given in the Review are completely different from those found by us in archival documents. According to the reports of the county military presences, in the province, only on general mobilization, 24907 warriors of the 1st category were accepted, among them were: 6848 people, or 27.5% of the troops passing through the ranks, and 18059 people, or 72.5% of those who did not serve , and in 1914, in addition to the general one, two more private mobilizations took place in the province.

S.S. Oldenburg, a contemporary of those events, wrote: “The mobilization was successful, sooner than expected; Not only were there no protests anywhere, there were no drunken outrages, which are not uncommon in such cases: by the Highest Command, the sale of alcoholic beverages was prohibited for the duration of the mobilization. This information is confirmed by local examples, in particular, the Kursk province. Thus, the Dmitrievsky district police officer reported to the Governor of Kursk the following: “... for the entire time there were no drunken mobilizations, the entire population was imbued with the importance of the present moment, before sending the first echelon of spares, a parting prayer was served and spares with music were brought to the station, after At the end of the call, a prayer service was also served near the cathedral to grant victory to Russian weapons, after which a patriotic demonstration took place with portraits of the Sovereign and national flags, the crowd sang “Save, Lord” and “God Save the Tsar” all the time, music met the demonstrators near the Zemstvo Council, my high spirits intensified... Having reached my apartment, the demonstrators gave me a standing ovation and then went to the Office of the military commander, where they demanded a military commander and gave him a standing ovation...”

The presence of the Rylsky uyezd on military service reported that the appearance of the reserve and militia in the uyezd “was carried out in an exemplary manner and in a timely manner. At the same time, it was observed that among the mass of people arriving in the city of Rylsk, there were absolutely no drunks.

The Novooskolsky district police officer reported that “the spares praised the emperor, many declare a desire to volunteer, the order is exemplary, not a single drunk.”

In the Kursk province, there were cases of capture of those who evaded conscription into the mobilization troops from other provinces. For example, on August 13, 1914, the Shchigrovskaya police detained and handed over to the district military chief the reserve Efim Denyukov, who came from the peasants of the village of Agarkova, Krasnenskaya volost, Maloarkhangelsky district, Oryol province.

In the course of general mobilization, a huge number of conscripted reserve and militiamen accumulated at assembly points, which created great inconvenience in placing them in philistine apartments and conducting an examination. In all counties, collection points were overcrowded, so, only in the Kursk district, 6732 people were called up. , and there were even more people who showed up for mobilization. The timely dispatch of those liable for military service to the troops was hampered by the simultaneous conduct of horse mobilization. So, in the village of Vinnikovo, the arriving team with spares was delayed for several days due to the absence of the local foreman and headman who were obliged to assist in the promotion of such teams. Carts were not prepared in the village to transport team members, because all the local peasants with their horses were in Kursk at the receiving horse site. In total, 82,567 reserve and militias were accepted for general mobilization in the Kursk province.

In 1914, two more private mobilizations of militias of the 1st category took place in the province: on September 20 and November 20. The mobilization, which began on September 20, affected only 3 counties out of 15. According to it, warriors of the militia of the 1st category were subject to conscription, who did not undergo military conscription service in 1911-1913. In total, 540 people were accepted according to it: in Kursk district - 200 people, in Putivl and Timsky - 170 people each.

On November 20, mobilization took place in 12 districts of the province. 2 categories of warriors of the 1st category were called up: those who did military service in 1893-1896, and those who did not serve in the army of conscription in 1908-1914. In total, 6,874 people were accepted through it, of which 183 people, or 2.7%, were in military service, and 6,691 people. , or 97.3% of those who did not pass the ranks of the troops. Such a low rate of those called up in the first category is explained by the complete exhaustion of this class of militia.

In total, in 1914, 89,981 people were mobilized in the Kursk province, or 2.04% of the total number of those called up in Russia that year.

In 1915, only the total number of those mobilized in the Kursk province is known. As a result of seven mobilizations of soldiers of the state militia of the 1st and 2nd category, 72,054 people were accepted, or 2.6% of the all-Russian indicator of mobilized militias in 1915, of which: 39,992 people - the 1st category and 32,062 people. - 2nd category.

In 1916, the Kursk province underwent 5 mobilizations of the militia, during which 53,699 people were called up, of which: 16,279 people. - 1 category and 37420 people. - 2nd. Table No. 1. The total number of mobilized in the Kursk province in 1914

During the war years, there were also examples of desertion. So, the soldier of the state militia of the 1st category of the 140th foot Kursk squad Andrey Alekseevich Shchetinin of the call of 1911, who came from the peasants of the village of Budishcha, Cherno-Oleshensky volost, Sudzhansky district, fled from the Kursk team of convalescents and hid in his native village for 5 months and 3 days . After his detention by the Sudzhan district military commander, he was transferred court-martial at the 679th foot Kursk squad. During the consideration of the case, a sentence was passed: “the defendant warrior Andrei Alekseevich Shchetinin for escaping during the war in order to evade service in the army, to deprive him of his military rank and all rights of the state, to be exiled to hard labor for eight years ...”

During the first three years of the war in Russia, 16 conscriptions of state militia warriors were carried out: three in 1914, seven in 1915 and five in 1916. Subsequently, in Central Russia, until the end of the war, there were no more calls for warriors of the state militia. On January 10, 1917, the militia warriors of the 2nd category were mobilized only in the Caucasus, 30,000 people were accepted through it.

In connection with the decrease in mobilization resources, starting from 1916, the practice of re-examination of white-ticketers was introduced, i.e. persons liable for military service who, during conscription or mobilization, were recognized as “completely incapable of military service and received certificates of exemption forever from such ...”

On January 20, 1916, a circular was received in the Kursk province, informing that in connection with the highest approved on November 18, 1915 regulation of the Council of Ministers, it was decided:

For the duration of the war, to impose on the county conscription presence a verification examination of white-ticketers;

Verification examination to be carried out at the place of residence of white-ticket holders;

All those deemed fit for military service, with the exception of those who have legal deferrals from conscription after examination, are immediately accepted into the troops with enrollment in the militia of the 2nd category.

All white ticket holders who were late for re-examination were ordered to be sent to prison for a period of 3 weeks to 8 months.

Posting announcements about the beginning of the re-examination was carried out in the same way as for recruiting recruits. The summoning of white-ticketers to collection points began at a young age.

The re-examination took place at different times, so the troops received reinforcements at different times. So, in 1916, in the whole country, 100,000 white-ticketers were accepted into the troops, in 1917 - another 100,000 people.

According to documentary materials stored in the state archive of the Kursk region, in the period from March 1916 to January 14, 1917, 3 re-examinations were carried out in the province, as a result of which 7566 people were sent to the troops, and transferred to the militia of the 2nd category 4528 people. with the appointment of a delay in the cure of minor diseases. Thus, according to the results of the re-examination, only in the Kursk province, the mobilization contingent was expanded by 12,094 people.

After February Revolution 1917, the need to attract white-ticketers to the service remained. On April 10, an order was received by the Provisional Government "to resume, at the end of the most acute period of spring rural work, depending on local climatic conditions, the verification examination of all white-ticketers who have not yet been subjected to such until the age of 43." In the Kursk province, it took place mainly in the summer.

In connection with the re-examination, two representatives of public organizations with an advisory vote were introduced into the county conscription presences, namely two deputies from the local garrison. By order of the head of the Kharkov local brigade, all teachers of conscriptions fit for military service in 1906-1918. after re-examination they were sent to the service.

In the Kursk province, data on white-ticket workers accepted into service in 1917 are present in only 10 out of 15 counties, 3450 people were accepted in them.

In total, in the province, after the re-examination of white-ticket workers in 1917, 5175 people were accepted and sent to active military service in the troops. In addition, another 3758 people. was recognized as "not quite fit" and included in the number of militia warriors of the 2nd category.

Here are general data on the mobilization of reserve and militias from 1914 to 1917: Table No. 2. Mobilized in the Kursk province in 1914-1917.

1 See: GAKO. F. 141. Op. 1. D. 168. L. 332-ob.-333; D. 170. L. 319-413; D. 182. L. 65, 176-177, 287, 358-361, 415-416; D. 184. L. 224-rev.-225, 287-rev.-288, 380, 587-rev.-679; Review of the Kursk province for 1914. Kursk, 1915. S. 36-37; the same for 1915. Kursk, 1916, p. 131.

From the above data, it can be seen that the largest number of fifths in the troops was in 1914 - 89981 people, or 39.4% of the total number mobilized for the war, later this figure decreased: in 1915 - 72054 people, or 31.5%, in 1916 - 61265 people, or 26.8% and in 1917 - 2.3%. This decrease is explained by the reduction of the province's mobilization resources.

According to the categories of those mobilized in the First World War, the lower ranks of the reserve amounted to 57660 people, or 25.2% of the total number of those accepted, the militia warriors of the 1st category - 88592 people, or 38.8%, the warriors of the 2nd category - 69482, or 30.4% and white-ticketers - 5.6%.

According to approximate estimates, during the years of the First World War, in the ranks of the armed forces (together with the personnel army), people from the Kursk province were about 340,000 people.

A.E. Kazakov

(PGPU, Penza)

On the question of the organization of military mobilization in Russia in 1914.

As a result of the reforms of the 1860s-1870s, the Russian Empire developed special system military administration, which lasted until 1918. Its main features were: the division of powers between the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of War, as well as the presence of a military district system 1 . By 1914, the structure of the institutions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which ensured the course of conscriptions of the population and supplies from the population of horses and cars, looked as follows: the military service department (UPV); provincial, city by military service presence; county, district on conscription presence. The structure of the military department was as follows: the mobilization department of the Main Directorate of the General Staff (GUGSH), headquarters of military districts, chiefs of local brigades, district military commanders 2 . The final link for both of these verticals were conscription and military horse sections, assembly and delivery points 3 .

For military and civilian institutions on initial stage During the First World War, two factors turned out to be the most important: the general mobilization on July 18 and Russia's entry into the war on July 20, 1914 4 . Initially, a number of military districts received a telegram about the beginning of mobilization on July 17, 1914, which was used as a direct guide to action (draft lists were drawn up, places for conscripts were appointed, etc.). However, its official start was postponed to July 18. The mobilization telegram, signed by the military, naval ministers and the minister of the interior, sent to the General Staff on July 17, 1914, said: “The highest command was to bring the army and navy to martial law and for this to call on reserve ranks and put horses in accordance with the mobilization schedule of 1910, point on the first day mobilization should be considered July 18, 1914” 5 . It is from this telegram that one can count the time of work of the Main Directorate of General Staff and the Department of Internal Affairs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to organize general mobilization. Thus, the first factor involved, first of all, the forces of the mobilization department of the General Staff with its subordinate structures (district headquarters, military commanders) and the forces of the conscription department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs with a system of military presences. First of all, reserve lower ranks were called up and supplied from the population of the horse. The second factor contributed to the transition of all public institutions on a special regime of work in war conditions - a significant restriction on the expenditure of funds for the needs of institutions (for example, almost all business trips were cancelled), the transfer of available funds for military needs, the suspension of construction and repair work, etc. 6.

The problem of organizing mobilization is quite complex and includes a number of particular issues. The work of state institutions in carrying out mobilization can be divided according to administrative criteria. For the top level (UPV and GUGSH) at the first stage of the war, the main tasks were:

Appointment of appeals and supplies;

Distribution of funds for the optimal operation of recruiting stations;

Determination of mobilization areas, based on the needs of wartime and the objective capabilities of the provinces;

Division, if necessary, of mobilization work on the ground into separate stages;

General control and management of the activities of subordinate institutions.

The work of the middle and lower levels can be represented as follows. First, receiving notification of the start of calls and deliveries by telegraph and sending courier to remote areas. Secondly, after receiving these documents, compiling lists of conscripts, organizing assembly points and alerting the population. Thirdly, the examination of those called up by the selection committees (examination and determination of suitability in the case of deliveries of horses) and sending them to military units 7 . It should be noted that the powers of the military command and control bodies were limited to the sphere of organizing conscriptions and work at assembly points. The turnout or delivery to the selection committee was entirely the responsibility of the callee or the owner of the horse.

Military mobilization can also be divided into separate stages depending on:

a) the type of calls (calling for spares, recruits, militia warriors, supplies of horses and cars);

b) forms of appeals (general throughout the empire, additional in individual districts and provinces);

c) the influence of other military factors (the number of prisoners of war and refugees).

Such a classification makes it possible to reveal the specifics of the organizational work of military command and control bodies. Thus, the mobilization of almost all spares took place precisely in the first months of the war and was characterized by a large scale (see Table 1). For example, in the Kazan Military District alone, more than 640,000 lower ranks were called up from the reserve, and in total in the Russian Empire 3,115,000. There was such a phenomenon as an excess of volunteers over draft evaders.

The following list of mobilizations and data on the number of mobilized subjects of the empire and delivered horses in Russia in 1914 can be given:

2) July-August 1914 - 400 thousand warriors of the militia of the 1st category, listed from the category of reserve lower ranks, were called up;

4) August-December 1914 - 900 thousand warriors of the militia of the 1st category were called up, who did not serve in the ranks of the troops 9 ;

Judging by archival documents, the government agencies were either poorly or not at all prepared for such phenomena and events (for example, a large number of volunteers, a wide wave of pogroms). There was a lack of necessary documentation and procedures for recording volunteers. In the case of pogroms and attacks by the lower ranks, often there was simply not enough strength to prevent such incidents or stop them. Calls for recruits only in 1914 were carried out in accordance with the military legislation in force. In 1915-1917 they were early, that is, people under the age of 20 were called up 11 .

Another problem is the organization of the movement of marching teams from the place of conscription to the military unit. Archival and clerical materials indicate that such traffic was often not well organized both on foot sections of the track and on the railway. Lack of timely hot meals at waypoints, shortage of trains, lack of control over teams were commonplace. This state of affairs was aggravated by a wide wave of robberies, robberies, and attacks by conscripts against the local population and officials 12 .

In general, the call for recruits, firstly, was less large-scale (during the summer-autumn of 1914, the reserve was called up several times more). Secondly, according to the data we have from the Police Department on the movements in the troops and the mood of the population in the provinces, most of the speeches of those called up were protests of lower reserve ranks. New recruits are practically not mentioned there. This means that the conclusion that there are significantly fewer protests and conflicts on the part of recruits, both during the examination by the selection committees and after entering military service, looks quite fair.

During the war, the procedure for recruiting recruits has changed significantly. A number of norms of conscription legislation were suspended, while others demanded partial or complete replacement. Thus, the circular of the military service department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs No. 86 of September 3, 1914, addressed to the governors, established similar restrictions and exemptions from the charter on military service. In particular, in connection with the entry into military service of a large number of reserve and warriors, a significant number of young people have acquired the right to benefits for marital status of the first category. Taking into account the need to increase the contingent of recruits by 130 thousand people compared to 1913, the draw was canceled, since it was the preferential first-class people who went through this procedure. Therefore, the persons included in the draft lists were called up in sequential order of numbers. In those cases when there were many conscripts in the counties, the recruits were divided into two lines - for the convenience of the work of the presences and the acceleration of the recruitment of military units. The deadline for admission to military service for the draft in 1914 was postponed from February 15 to April 1, 1915. Students studying in foreign educational institutions were obliged to return to the empire, and the delay was established only for undergraduates. In areas located in the area of ​​the theater of military operations, some deviations from the requirements of the charter were allowed 13 .

Special measures concerned ensuring order at the recruiting stations and in military units, which were a natural continuation of the measures taken by the Ministry of Internal Affairs during the calls of 1906-1913. The governors, in particular, were instructed to “suppress recruits, especially from among factory and factory workers and persons who were in seasonal work, the opportunity to bring criminal proclamations and illegal literature in general to military units ... to make an order for the police to conduct separate inspections things of those from the conscripts, regarding which suspicion arises ... "14. Local authorities collected information about the criminal record and political reliability of recruits. Freelance officers of the gendarmerie observed the mood of the population.

It is very important to consider the features of the organization of mobilization on the example of the Kazan province as the center of the Kazan military district, which was one of the key rear regions of the Russian Empire during the First World War. Note that in Kazan, due to the postponement of the first day of mobilization, a number of problems arose. According to the report of the Kazan police chief: “... by order of the Kazan mayor, who, according to the second telegram received on July 17, considered the first day of mobilization on July 18, [the actions of the selection committees] were suddenly stopped and the horses, wagons and harness delivered to the designated points taken away by their owners and taken back” 15 . So, the owners of the horses, whose animals were to be accepted in the first place, left the collection points, however, as a result of the measures taken, they were returned back by the police. This case shows that any change in the plan led in a number of cases to a failure in military mobilization work.

The supply of horses for military horse duty took place from the very beginning in the conditions of hidden protests of the population (non-delivery to the collection point, unauthorized replacement). Many cases of unskilled work of selection committees were not properly evaluated by the central institutions. There were numerous facts of abuse at the county and provincial levels 16 . If central institutions were entrusted with the responsibility of determining general issues of mobilization 17, then the main practical work lay down at the provincial county level. The headquarters of the districts insisted mainly on carrying out the quantitative side of the plan. In such a situation, there were numerous cases of abuse by officials of state institutions. Separate deliveries were divided into two or three queues with weekly or more intervals between them, the duration of replenishment of the shortage of horses could reach a month or more. In addition, significant factors that determined the success of mobilization were weather, the remoteness of the areas where deliveries took place, the workload of transport hubs, the deplorable state of the "horse population" of the districts 19 .

For a holistic characterization of mobilization in this region, the chronicle of events presented in the collection “The Great Patriotic War. Kazan province. Brief essay for the first year. 1914 19/VII - 1915" 20 . This source emphasizes that for the leadership of the province from the very beginning of the war, one of the main concerns was the coordination of the actions of various institutions, there were frequent calls for joint efforts and close cooperation. public figures, individual corporations and organizations to unite the people in the difficult conditions of war. A special role in this was played by the appeals of the governor P.M. Boyarsky to the inhabitants of the city of Kazan, in which the emphasis was on religious and moral principles. According to

Reaction Russian society at the beginning of the war was ambiguous, as well as in the future, its assessment by contemporaries, descendants and researchers. The first experience of understanding the organization and conduct of mobilization activities during the First World War is presented in the memoirs of the direct participants in these events, who noted that mobilization was a manifestation of the patriotic feelings of the Russian people. As negative factors that prevented the successful implementation of the tasks assigned to the army, the researchers called the low preparedness of recruits, the underdevelopment of transport infrastructure.

In Soviet historiography, the study of issues related to the First World War was considered within the framework of social class issues. In the 1990s, in contrast to the concept Soviet historians, V Russian historiography the idea that the country's entry into the war was accompanied by a patriotic upsurge in all sectors of society prevailed, and the war itself was perceived as Patriotic.

In the last decade, there has been a trend towards a more detailed study of the attitude of Russian society towards the war. The literature contains conflicting assessments of the consciousness and behavior of people in the conditions of the outbreak of war, riots among conscripts during mobilization in July - August 1914. The results of the historiographic study of the problem are summed up in the article by the Penza researcher OA Sukhova. In modern historical literature based on the interpretation and analysis of data on the degree of involvement of the population in mobilization activities, on the nature of public initiative, on the activities of various voluntary societies, charitable organizations, conclusions are drawn about the specifics mass consciousness and behavior during the First World War, gives an interpretation of socio-political sentiments on the eve of the revolution of 1917. The specifics of mass mobilization in Russia during the war was associated with Russian state and nation, socio-cultural characteristics of the country. The values ​​and attitudes of the consciousness of the peasantry, which constitutes the majority of the country's population, largely contradicted the ideas of the political elite. Mobilization contributed to an increase in the migration activity of the population, the displacement of a significant part of it, and created the ground for the emergence of mass forms of behavior.

The news of Russia's entry into the First World War caused a patriotic upsurge of the population in the provinces of the Volga region. Processions, demonstrations, prayers were held everywhere. On July 22, the first patriotic manifestation took place in the Strukovsky Garden in Samara. Such solemn events preceding the mobilization were typical. For example, in the article “The Solemn Prayer and Manifestation on July 22”, published in the “City Bulletin”, it was reported that after Mass, Bishop Tikhon, with the participation of the clergy of all Samara churches, a prayer service was served, before which a manifesto about the war was publicly read from the porch of the churches. with Germany, which was accompanied by shouts of Orthodox "Hurrah". On behalf of the governor, the text of a loyal telegram from the residents of Samara was read. In front of the cathedral, the troops marched to the cries of "cheers", and then the demonstrators and the numerous city public.

It was noted that in front of the procession “they carried portraits of the Sovereign, the Empress and the Heir, followed by a military music orchestra, followed by troops, demonstrators with national flags and the public”, and on the flags “flaunted the inscriptions”: “Long live the army and navy!”, “Long live France!”, “Down with Austria and Germany!”. The demonstrators proceeded along the central streets of Pochtovaya and Dvoryanskaya to the monument to Alexander II, where a crowd was waiting for them, shouting "cheers" to the Russian administration and people. Most of the inhabitants of the cities were sure that the victorious howl would not last at most 3-4 months. Events of this kind were held in all provincial centers of Russia.

In the first days of the war, meetings of city dumas, zemstvo and noble district and provincial meetings were held everywhere in Russia, at which loyal patriotic addresses to Nicholas II were adopted on the occasion of Russia's entry into the war. On July 26, 1914, the All-Russian Congress of Provincial Marshals of the Nobility took place, proposing that all extraordinary provincial assemblies discuss the following issues on the ground: about uniting all noble societies to create common organization helping the wounded; for this purpose, the election of representatives with broad powers from each noble organization to the All-Russian Congress; creation of a common cash register. This initiative was widely supported by the nobility of the Volga region. On August 28-29, 1914, a congress of the all-noble organization for helping sick and wounded soldiers was held. It was decided to allocate all the funds raised (about 1,700,000 rubles) to the creation and staffing of 20 ambulance trains that took the wounded to the rear hospitals. Noble trains served the Southwestern Front.

The Volga nobles actively participated in the activities of the Red Cross organizations, for example, in Samara, the formation of military sanitary convoys for the fronts and the training of military orderlies were established. Ten infirmaries have been equipped in addition to those already available in the city. Reserve officers were drafted into the army. The youth of the nobility, seized with patriotic feelings, voluntarily went to the front. The provincial marshals of the nobility received numerous letters with proposals for various assistance. The nobility was actively involved in raising funds for the needs of the war. In the committees created by the zemstvos for the supply and equipment of the army, the nobles occupied responsible posts. They chaired congresses to combat high prices, participated in military-industrial committees, and were members of the provincial departments of the Central Committee for Assistance to Refugees. The war opened up a number of new sources of income for the noble landowners, connected with military supplies. The most important channel through which these incomes went to the landowners was the All-Russian Zemstvo Union.

According to his orders, various commissary supplies for the army were manufactured on the landowner's estates, food, livestock, timber, etc. were supplied. Almost all large noble estates supplied bread for the army and timber for the railways. As the war continued, the network expanded public organizations in the rear, contributing to the strengthening of the country's defense capability. The Moscow Zemstvo initiated the unification of the Zemstvos to help the wounded. Commission composed of G. E. Lvov, F. V. Shlippe and others developed a project for a general sanitary organization. On July 30, 1914, the All-Russian Zemstvo Congress was convened in Moscow, at which a decision was made to form the All-Russian Zemstvo Union. All provincial zemstvo organizations joined him, with the exception of the Kursk provincial zemstvo. There were such organizations helping the army as the City Union, military-industrial committees. On June 5, 1915, in Moscow, at the congresses of the unions of cities and authorized provincial zemstvos, it was decided to create a special joint Main Committee of both unions for supplying the army - Zemgor [ibid, p. 132-143]. Although their official goal was to help the wounded and refugees, in fact they became a structure for organizing the opposition. Therefore, the Minister of the Interior, N. A. Maklakov, insisted that the activities of the unions be limited to the time of the war and subordinated to the governors. The emergency provincial zemstvo meetings held in July - August 1914, in which the nobles played the leading role, also discussed issues related to the needs of wartime.

Already on July 25, 1914, the Saratov Extraordinary Provincial Zemstvo Assembly was held, at which the most loyal address was adopted, ending with the assurance that "strong in its unity with the Tsar, Rus' will endure all the trials of the war." Assistance to sick and wounded soldiers becomes the main activity of the Volga region zemstvos in the conditions of war. Everywhere, the city dumas of the Volga cities adopted resolutions on raising funds to help the families of the reserve, organizing assistance to the wounded. The Saratov city duma also sent an address to the emperor, declaring its readiness to support the war and the tsar by all means. She allocated 600 thousand rubles. for the "good of the Fatherland". Newspapers of that time - "Saratov Leaf", "Saratovskaya Kopeyka", "Saratov Vestnik" - talked about numerous donations. Here are a few such messages: on August 28 - the colonists of the Saratov and Samara provinces expressed a desire to collect up to 50 thousand rubles. and with this money to equip and maintain a 100-bed military infirmary; September 6 - the peasants of the Pereyezdinsky and Slastukhinskaya volosts of the Atkarsky district drew up a sentence on the return of bread from public barns for the needs of the army. On August 20, 1914, the Regional Committee for Assistance to Sick and Wounded Soldiers was created in Samara, headed by the mayor S. E. Permyakov.

At the same time, he was a representative of the All-Russian City Union, whose duties included organizing the transportation of the wounded and their treatment, as well as distributing the funds received for this. City canteens were opened for poor families of reserve lower ranks called up for military service. On the basis of legislation, families of lower ranks in active service in the mobilized parts of the army and navy enjoyed the right to charity at the expense of the State Treasury. The effect of the law extended to the next of kin - wife, parents, minor children, as well as minor brothers and sisters, if they were supported by the called. The total cost of the feed norm was determined individually for the provinces. The families of soldiers were assisted by volost, rural and city guardianships. For each adult member of the family, the state share in the Samara province was 1 p. 28 f. flour per month, 10l. cereals, 4 f. lard and 1 f. vegetable oil.

In addition to state support, various organizations provided charitable assistance to the families of the substitutes. In the provincial cities of the Volga region, there were ladies' committees that collected donations from private individuals. Every month, several thousand rubles were received by the cash desk of the committees, which were used to prepare linen and warm clothes for soldiers, and to help the families of soldiers. The Tsaritsyno Ladies' Committee, which consisted of the wives of the Avar regiment sent to the front, organized a broad campaign to attract donations. Both large industrialists (I.V. Maksimov, A.M. Shlykov, V.F. Lapshin, the Kistov brothers and others) and ordinary residents donated money for the organization and maintenance of the hospital.

The most revealing moment of the general assistance to the army is the case when several high school students gave 72 kopecks received from their parents for breakfast to the ladies' committee. To help the sick and wounded soldiers, the families of the dead were deducted 2 percent of the salary of the teacher of the women's four-year school, gendarmerie ranks and workers of other enterprises and institutions of the city. As far as possible, each citizen tried to contribute to equipping the army in order to achieve an unequivocal positive result - victory. The best traditions of Russian entrepreneurship - charity and patronage - were manifested during the war years. At the expense of L. S. and P. S. Arzhanov, A. F. Vakano, infirmaries were opened in Samara already in the first months of the war. K. P. Golovkin, the owner of a two-million fortune, in the autumn of 1916 twice applied to the City Duma with a proposal to build a House of Science and Culture, in which he wanted to place the Alexander Library, a reading room, a city museum, an art gallery, showroom, meeting and concert halls. At an emergency meeting of the Samara Stock Exchange Committee in July 1914, a committee was created to collect donations, provide benefits and food to the families of military personnel. At the expense of the committee, by the end of July 1914, a medical detachment was formed, and an infirmary for the wounded was opened.

Attorney-at-law A.G. Elshin wrote in his diaries that Samara women from all classes were on duty for days in hospitals deployed around the city. Active preparations were underway in the provinces for the reception of the wounded, infirmaries and hospitals were prepared. From the beginning of hostilities, echelons with the wounded were sent to the cities of the Volga region in continuous streams. The hospitals were overcrowded. The creation, maintenance and equipment of new hospitals fell on the balance of city councils. One of the first serious problems was the delivery of the wounded from railway station Samara to the hospital. A detachment of orderlies-cyclists was created. In the future, thanks to the efforts of the public, not only a significant number of hospital beds were equipped in Samara and the province, but even a floating hospital-sanatorium, as well as leisure activities for recovering soldiers were organized. Saratov was appointed district distribution point for the wounded.

A provincial aid committee was formed in the city. By mid-August 1914, on his next meeting he noted the readiness of Saratov to receive the wounded: more than 20 infirmaries for 2183 beds were equipped, including at the university, the provincial zemstvo, the Peasants' Bank, the 6th mixed school, the spiritual department, the building of the Russian Railways, in the St. Sergius Church and in the almshouse. The provinces of the Volga region were declared in the position of emergency protection, and then in the military. The powers of governors were greatly expanded. Cases of certain types of crimes and misdemeanors (“known”, according to the definition of legislation, but without clarification) were withdrawn from general jurisdiction and transferred to the military court for consideration. The governor acquired the right to issue binding decrees on matters that prevent violations of order and security; impose penalties in an administrative (out-of-court) procedure; prohibit all public gatherings; close commercial and industrial establishments; impose a sequestration on immovable and arrest on movable property if the proceeds from them were used for criminal purposes; dismiss for the duration of the position of officials of all departments (except for persons of the first three classes), as well as employees for elections in class, zemstvo and city institutions; suspend the activities of periodicals for the duration of the provision; close educational institutions for up to one month, etc.

The practice of using the Statute on Enhanced (Emergency) Protection developed in the context of the struggle against the revolutionary movement, which explains its pronounced counter-revolutionary orientation. The problems of centralization of administration in the region, the introduction of unity of command, and the rigidity of the vertical of power were not discussed here, except for the appointment of the governor with a new rank that corresponded to the realities of the time. The life of the population of the provinces was subject to regulation on the basis of mandatory decrees of the governors, administrative acts that established new regulations.

These decrees had to be observed strictly, the penalties were more severe than in peacetime. On July 25, 1914, Governor N.V. Protasyev adopted a resolution providing for measures to maintain order on the territory of the Samara province. It prescribed registration of the population, weapons, prohibited meetings and demonstrations without the permission of the chief of the local police, the distribution of articles inciting hostility to the government, as well as the patentless sale of alcoholic beverages. Cases related to robbery, destruction of food and fodder, deliberate arson, organization of strikes, resistance or failure to comply with the requirements of the authorities were transferred to the jurisdiction of a military court or administration.

In the future, the local press regularly published new administrative acts due to wartime. Mobilization campaigns became the first serious test for the Russian society in the conditions of the First World War. In July 1914, for the first time in Russian history there was a general conscription for military service, at the very beginning of the war the Russian village lost about 2.5 million, or 14% of the entire male full-time work force. The beginning of the mobilization campaign took place at the height of the field season, which complicated the situation. In the shortest possible time, local authorities had to solve many problems related to the organization and provision of mobilization. According to the All-Russian Agricultural Census of 1917, from rural areas 10,932.6 thousand people were mobilized in 47 provinces and regions of European Russia. The first call to active military service, which affected the provinces of the Volga region, was carried out in accordance with the imperial decree of July 18, 1914 in relation to the lower ranks of the reserve.

For the non-combatant population, mandatory supplies of horses and carts were introduced to the troops. On August 5, 1914, the Appeal to the Russian People was issued on behalf of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, which explained the purpose of Russia's participation in the war. In total, during the war years, the inhabitants of the Volga region were affected by 19 mobilizations, including 5 - in 1914, 6 - in 1915, 7 - in 1916, 1 - in 1917. At many points, the collection of recruits was well organized, mobilization was carried out without excesses, with the spiritual uplift of the townspeople, a vivid expression of patriotic feelings. So, “safely”, “calmly” mobilization took place in July - September 1914 in Balakovo, Nikolaevsk (now Pugachev), Buguruslan, Novouzensk, Melekess settlement, in Balashov, Kuznetsk, Khvalynsk, Dubovka settlement; in July 1914 - in the city of Cheboksary; in September 1914 - in Kazan; in October - November 1914 - in the city of Yadrin and the city of Tetyushi; by the end of 1914 - in Sviyazhsk, Kozmodemyansk, Spassk and others.

About the first mobilization during the First World War in the city of Nikolaevsk, the sergeant major of the additional staff of the Samara GZhU in a report dated July 25, 1914 reported: “... the mobilization of reserve troops in the city of Nikolaevsk ... is going well. The mood of the reserve and the population in general is peaceful and patriotically upbeat ... the reserve behave approximately: not a single case of any charlatanism or expression of grumbling about the war was observed. However, the patriotic upsurge that captured the public consciousness was overshadowed by cases of aggressive behavior of conscripts, recorded in almost all provinces of the empire. But the most large-scale performances took place in Samara, Saratov and Penza. The unrest caused by the mobilization was due to objective reasons: the evasion of a number of categories from conscription, the conduct of mobilization during the period of field work, and the radicalization of mass sentiments. First of all, the sharp dissatisfaction of the peasants was caused by the fact that police officers and guards, who in the eyes of the peasants personified representatives of local authorities, did not fall under the mobilization.

Bugulma district police officer F. V. Lyubenetsky in a report to the Samara governor N. V. Protasyev about the unrest during mobilization in the city of Bugulma on July 24, 1914, noted that among the mobilized there were shouts - “why the guards do not go to work, they receive a large content , and we, the only workers in the family, are forced to leave women and children!” In the Saratov province, the situation escalated to the limit in the city of Tsaritsyn, where on July 21, 20 participants in the performance were killed and 24 were injured, and the main role in the riots that resulted in the defeat of the assembly point was played by women - the wives of conscripts. As A. V. Posadsky notes, the events initially developed according to the patriotic scenario. On the evening of July 18, about 300 local residents and reserve lower ranks in the village at the Ural-Volga plant staged a patriotic demonstration.

The same manifestation with a total number of up to 5,000 people took place in the city. At the request of the participants, the clergy served a prayer service. But on July 21, a crowd of several thousand women, with the participation of substitutes, demanded the immediate issuance of benefits for their husbands. In addition, many peasants feared for the fate of their families and relatives, believing that the cash allowance due to the mobilized would not reach them, and the family would be left both without a main worker and without a livelihood. The police officer reported that some peasants "impudently declared that they would not sit on carts until benefits were given to their families in advance, since in the Japanese war they were deceived by foremen and elders when issuing cash benefits" .

In the documents of the local GZhU, it was especially noted that the slightest delay in processing documents for receiving benefits caused “murmur and indignation” among the wives of peasants who were mobilized into the army. In September 1914, the governor of Samara, N.V. Protasyev, issued a circular to the zemstvo chiefs on the suspension of the collection of food debts from families drafted into the troops [ibid, p. 344]. Often, riots during mobilization were associated with a large concentration of conscripts, as well as their relatives at mobilization points. For example, during the period of the July draft of 1914, up to 11 thousand conscripts concentrated in Bugulma, despite the fact that the population of the city itself did not reach 9 thousand people, in Saratov - up to 30 thousand spare and 1500 combatants with the composition inhabitants in 242.4 thousand, in the city of Atkarsk - up to 35 thousand recruits with a local population of less than 14 thousand people, in the city of Serdobsk - 2028 recruits with a local population of 23.8 thousand people, in the city of Balashov by October 1914 - 17 thousand conscripts with 23 thousand population. In November 1914, the marshal of the nobility of Samara, M. N. Tolstoy, informed the governor N. V. Protasyev about the congestion of the recruiting stations of the county. Reception in each of them lasted 6-7 days, delaying for this period the recruits and relatives who arrived to see them off. In the Saratov province, the premises where it was supposed to organize an overnight stay for the spares were not intended for him.

There was not even the required number, and the conscripts were left to their own devices. The situation was aggravated by the drinking of alcoholic beverages, which negatively affected the behavior of the mobilized. Despite the introduction of the “dry law” during the First World War, the issue of the consumption of alcoholic products was quite acute. The ban on the sale of alcohol was not a spontaneous and ill-conceived action. On July 17, 1914, a ban was introduced in the country on the sale of strong liquor for the entire duration of the mobilization campaign, tentatively until August 15. However, the simple closure of trade failed to eradicate the causes of aggression and alcohol abuse. Those leaving "for the war" sought to take a last walk. The so-called drunken riots had an adverse effect on the mood of society during the mobilization in July 1914 in the cities of the Samara province - Nikolaevsk, Samara, Buzuluk, Stavropol, the cities of the Saratov province - Volsk, Kamyshin, Balashov, the Simbirsk province - Sengilei. Moreover, very often the abuse of alcoholic beverages was accompanied by attempts to pogrom institutions for the protection of order. In the city of Stavropol on July 20, 1914, during the mobilization, two wine shops and Kiselyov's Rens cellar were destroyed, two guards were killed and many were wounded; local authorities demanded that troops be sent to eliminate the uprisings, they were even forced to suspend mobilization. Moreover, it turned out that the replacements arrive in the city already drunk.

It was noted that during the pogrom of the liquor store, a crowd of about a thousand people heard cries - threats against the guards - "do not dare to interfere, we will doubt everyone, we will kill." The pogrom of the neighboring shop continued until the evening, and to find out "both the instigators and instigators of the attack on the guards and the destruction of wine shops, as well as to arrest both them and those who threw bricks" into the guards "it was not possible due to the small number of guards", which in consisting of 8 people, including police officer Senkevich, counteracted a crowd of 4-5 thousand rioters. Reception of spares was resumed only on the morning of July 22, when a prayer service was served, a manifesto was read out, 50 guards arrived from Samara to pacify the "violence". "Calm" in the city was restored only by July 23. In the city of Buguruslan on July 22, in the evening, with the participation of about thirty mobilized spares, a state-owned wine shop was broken. On July 23, in the city of Buzuluk, spares from the Saratov province, who arrived at the station, stole wine from the shop of the urban village, as well as fish and several pounds of bread. On July 25 in the city of Novouzensk, the spares, having arrived in a crowd at the state-owned wine warehouse, “persistently”, “with abuse” demanded to open it and give vodka, promised to bring all the spares and break the warehouse.

The authorities were forced to turn to the governor for reinforcements due to insufficient police forces. In the city of Samara on July 30, during the mobilization, two reserve soldiers demanded at the store of S. Krylov to release their wine, brandishing sabers. In the city of Nikolaevsk in August 1914, it was noted that “with the permission of the red wine trade among the troops, drunkenness develops, and among the drunken quarrels and fights are observed among themselves”, “some of them in a drunken state behave indecently and defiantly towards the public and even the police”, wine “is bought by quarters and drunk in tea glasses, and as it is not very effective, they use it in large quantities and drink a lot of money”. The accumulation of significant masses of people in the immediate vicinity of the assembly points, the common emotional perception of what was happening was aggravated by the drinking of alcoholic beverages, which provoked the crowd to take decisive action and did not reflect real moods. The pogroms of liquor stores represented only the first emotional reaction of the villagers to military reality.

For the bulk of the mobilized, the reasons for the war were incomprehensible, there was no idea of ​​its necessity, since the majority of Russian peasants did not identify their local interests with national interest states. One of those mobilized from the Samara province and sent to the Caucasian front wrote in June 1915: “Here some are so stupid that they have never seen a German, so they ask if Germany is hostile to us and whether we will shoot at him if we get on howl well ". Any misdeeds of representatives of the local administration, such as, for example, untimely information, delays in sending parcels to the front, poor organization of mobilization, granting a deferment from conscription to a number of categories of the population, had an “unpleasant dampening impression” on the residents and gave rise to numerous rumors. A destabilizing effect was exerted by communication with soldiers arriving from the front for treatment, who spoke about Russia's poor preparedness for war.

The fact that mobilization did not apply to a number of categories of the population had a negative effect on the behavior of those called up. In 1914, workers from military factories were taken to the front, but since 1915, a limit was set for their mobilization, as well as railway workers. Defense enterprises in the period 1914-1918. in the territory of the Samara province there were 137, Kazan - 88, Saratov - 180. Workers who received a deferment from military service were equated with military personnel. Agitators, organizers of strikes were counted according to the laws of wartime, entered into special lists, which were sent to all enterprises; many "restless" were sent to the front. The evacuees from the western regions, refugees, peasants came to the place of the mobilized workers. In 1914, nine industrial establishments that produced consumer goods were closed in Samara, including the Zhiguli brewery, three sawmills, a brick and mechanical plant, and a furniture factory.

By January 1, 1914, there were 43,980 people at 253 industrial enterprises of the province subject to factory inspection supervision, and by the beginning of 1915, 43,939 people were employed only at 59 supervised factories and factories in Samara, and about 17 thousand more worked at factories military department. In total, there were about 60 thousand workers in Samara at that time, including 19,100 workers at the Pipe Plant as of January 1, 1917, and 13,376 people at Samara-Sergievsky. The number of construction workers (5 thousand people), railway and water transport workers (22 thousand people) has significantly increased. About two thousand children and adolescents were employed at the industrial enterprises of Samara. Among the workers of the province, the proportion of women was 30.5%, and at the Pipe Plant - 40.5%. Military enterprises switched to a two-shift system, overtime work was allowed. By law, they were allowed only with the consent of the workers, overtime work of children and adolescents was prohibited. Of course, there were also violations.

Overtime work was paid extra. The number of working days per month in continuous production increased from 26-27 to 28-29. Skilled workers were in short supply. The factories of the military department, as well as private factories transferred to a war footing, constantly turned to the authorities with a request to provide them with engineers and skilled workers. Since 1915 industrial enterprises began to use the labor of prisoners of war. In May 1915, a decision was made to grant a deferment to persons holding the positions of telegraph operators of all kinds on all railways of the empire. In July 1915, the conscription of all police officers and guards was postponed indefinitely. The release of some workers and representatives of law enforcement agencies from service in the army by the townspeople who lived in the territory where the recruiting station was located and the collection and dispatch of conscripts was systematically observed was perceived ambiguously. Some inhabitants were sure that they would stay in the city, others did not understand why someone was called up, and someone could live in peace, as in peacetime.

On the territory of the Volga provinces, there were both individual cases of a negative attitude of the inhabitants to the conscription of the population in the army, and a tendency to evade conscription. The memoirs of M. V. Dubinin, who worked at a defense enterprise in Samara, reflect the position of a man who is sure that he will not be drafted into the army. He writes: “In 1916, I worked as a mechanic in Samara at the military-industrial plant No. 3 ... This plant was small, worked for defense. Therefore, all the workers who worked at this plant were exempted from being drafted into the tsarist army ... In May 1916, I read announcements pasted around the city about the mobilization of the youth of my year of birth. I thought that since I work at a military-industrial plant, it means that I should be in service in royal army they won’t take it ... When we were announced about the mobilization, I was somehow confused from surprise, I could not understand what was the matter ... The manager announced to us that we were removed from the armor. Even in the first mobilization campaign on the territory of some cities of the Volga region, cases of exemption from the conscription of wealthy inhabitants by bribing officials were recorded.

So, in a secret report to the Samara governor dated July 18, 1914, the head of the Samara GZhU reported that “among some of the reserve there is strong indignation at the release of Jews from service fictitiously and even a desire to organize a Jewish pogrom is expressed.” Wealthy people tried to refuse mobilization by providing sickness certificates. Rumors spread among the townspeople that these persons were exempted from military service for bribes. Citing a list of wealthy residents of Balakovo released from mobilization, including 15 surnames, a non-commissioned officer of the additional staff of the Samara GZhU in the Nikolaevsky district at the point of Balakovo on August 6, 1914 informed the assistant head of the Samara GZhU in the Nikolaevsky and Stavropol districts that among the local population there is a "persistent conversation" about the release of these persons for money, and "takes on a serious character."

In March 1915, the Volzhskoye Slovo newspaper published an anonymous letter from a Samara worker to the newspaper's editor V.V. He cites as an example a gendarme with railway, Samara furrier and son of the machinist Mukhin. All of them did not need factory earnings, but they entered the factory and "agree to work for nothing, just not to get into the war." The correspondent notes with humor that he would have done the same himself, but he does not have money for a bribe. And he adds: “... if we do everything this way, then the German will not only take Warsaw, but also Petrograd, and perhaps reach Samara.” In April 1915, a group of conscripts wrote a letter to the Samara governor N.V. Protasyev that among the draft evaders there were mainly rich merchant youth who “run away from incurring debt in all directions”.

In September, S.D. Evreinov, acting governor of Samara, instructed the head of the provincial gendarme department, M.I. The head of the Samara GZhU in November 1915 noted that in order to evade the draft, financially well-to-do persons get a job at the Samara Pipe Plant, whose employees have a "booking". At the end of 1916, information appeared in the city of Samara - “leaving for workers” became so “popular” that one could enter the service at this plant only by giving a bribe to the senior clerk Kombiriap. X.X. Berger wrote about the same phenomenon from Saratov to Samara in February 1916: at the plant, the manager or someone else, in a word, Cheremissky remained only because he entered the plant. In October 1915, the head of the Railway Administration forbade the employment of militia warriors of the 2nd category due to the massive influx of people leaving more profitable work in order to evade conscription. Draft evasion was common in 1916 - early 1917. In a report dated February 22, 1916, the head of the Samara GZhU reported that several residents from the city of Syzran were living in Samara and hiding from military service. At the beginning of 1917, the Samara GZhU received information that on the embankment of the river. Volga, under the guise of agents of the detective department, there is a brothel where, in addition to selling pure denatured alcohol, playing cards for money, they hide those who evade military service.

Samara Governor L. L. Golitsyn on January 17, 1917, at the disposal of zemstvo chiefs and district police officers, noted that “in the rear, unfortunately, sometimes we have to observe cases of evasion of individuals from carrying military service". He emphasized the prevalence of the phenomenon of draft evasion by wealthy people who, for this purpose, "act as simple workers in factories working for defense, or as small employees for the railway." Some residents tried to avoid being drafted into the active army by getting an education. For example, in September 1915, rumors appeared in Samara that in School of Music Karklin of the Samara branch of the Imperial Russian Musical Society (IRMS) "many people entered not for the purpose of further musical education, but with only the intention to evade active military service" . In 1916 - autumn 1917, courses organized by the engineer Ovchinnikov and the head of the Samara telegraph office, Yu. The forms of expressing a negative attitude towards mobilization were different. One of them is that condemning speeches about calls that lead to death are organized because of the stupidity and miscalculations of the government. So, in the city of Samara, the locksmith S. I. Spylnik in August - September 1914 “looked around the city and convenient occasions started talking with people he met about the course of military events, ”asserted that“ all the newspapers are lying, in reality, the situation of the Russians is very bad, the Germans and Austrians entered 390 miles inland and took many Russian cities ”; opposed conscription into the army. After all, he was sent outside the province for the period of emergency protection. On the territory of some Volga cities, where there was a large percentage of Muslims and representatives of the German ethnic group, a “special” attitude on their part to mobilization was manifested.

For Muslims, participation in a war not with the Turks meant taking up arms against fellow believers, therefore it was unacceptable, and the ethnic Germans rejected the war with Germany, which is presented as a struggle with their historical homeland. So, in the city of Nikolaevsk in August 1914, it was noted that “the mobilized Germans who are in the squads openly do not express any displeasure and behave well, but they do not look cheerful and always keep themselves apart from the Russians, and in general most of them, like soldiers and settlers of the colonies secretly sympathize with the Emperor Wilhelm and his German subjects. The non-commissioned officer of the additional staff of the Simbirsk GZhU reported that the attitude of “the Russian and Chuvash population to frequent military conscriptions is normal, that is, they are already used to them ... they say that everyone needs to go and defend the Motherland, no matter how hard it is to see off their sons on howl, but still they want Germany and Austria to be defeated. He also pointed out: “Muslims are dissatisfied with frequent military conscriptions, they are indignant that they are escorting their children to war, and in order to get rid of military service, they deliberately spoil themselves ... by starvation, perforation of the eardrum in the ears, damage to the eyes, etc., for which they many were held accountable." Another way to evade service in the army was the unauthorized delay in returning to the front after undergoing treatment. E. Yu. Semenova revealed similar cases in the Samara province. So, in July 1915, Private of the 218th Gorbatov Infantry Regiment Y.A. th team of convalescents in the city of Samara, was placed under arrest by the court.

The same story in June 1915 happened to the private of the 186th Andalusian infantry regiment V.P. Lobachev, who was sent in September to the 1st convalescent team; in August 1915 with a soldier E.K. Reiman, who left the 1st reserve artillery battalion until June 1916 (detained by the gendarmerie police), and a number of others. At the end of December 1915, Governor A. A. Stankevich adopted a mandatory resolution to combat unauthorized absences from military units, in January 1916 a law was approved that increases the penalties for unauthorized absences, failure to appear on time for service and evasion from service. The families of the lower ranks who surrendered were deprived of state benefits. Mobilization was an extraordinary event in the life of the conscript and his relatives, which was reflected in the behavior and mood of the townsfolk, patriotic feelings merged with indignation against the police. Samarets M. V. Dubinin in his memoirs describes the call to the active army in 1916: “Three days later we came to the military commander of the city of Samara with knapsacks.

Here at that time there was a huge crowd of mourners: fathers, mothers, relatives and friends ... The wooden fence from the side of Panskaya and Uralskaya streets could not withstand the pressure of the recruits and, together with the gate, collapsed onto the pavement. The jubilant recruits mingled with the mourners. An attempt by the policemen to restore order turned into a general dump. In this dump, cries were heard: “Beat the pharaohs!” ... With great difficulty, with the help of the arrived armed soldiers and Orenburg Cossacks, a fence was raised and order was restored ... From the military commander to the pier, we were driven through the streets of the city of Samara under a reinforced escort of the police and Orenburg Cossacks ... Those seeing us off were not allowed, so they followed us along the sidewalks. With the outbreak of hostilities, the Volga region turned into the main base for the formation of spare military units. In Saratov, called-up spares were placed in government and some private houses. Engaged under the military units of the building of gymnasiums, colleges, schools, including theological educational institutions. In 1915, out of 41 schools, 32 (241 classes) were occupied by the troops; out of 12,000 students, only 5,100 children could study. According to rough estimates, in the territory of the Saratov province in 1917 there were already about 150 thousand soldiers and. The largest garrison (three infantry and two machine-gun regiments, two artillery brigades, two separate artillery battalions and a foot squad) was stationed in Saratov.

Two reserve infantry regiments were located in Petrovsk, Volsk, Balashov, one each - in Pokrovsk, Novouzensk, Nikolaevsk, Atkarsk. Four regiments of the 2nd Orenburg Cossack division. And only Khvalynsk was free from standing troops. The same situation developed in other provinces of the Volga region. The First World War did not change the army supply system; state food purchases were introduced. District and provincial commissioners from among local public figures and government officials appeared on the ground. The provinces of the Volga region were the main suppliers of bread and fodder for the needs of the army. The size of the food task was so great, the growth and severity of food needs increased so rapidly in the areas of military operations, requiring urgent measures and orders, that this activity became a priority for the authorities both in the center and in the field. With the development of hostilities in Russia, a system of emergency bodies of military and economic regulation took shape, the basis of which was the Special Conferences on Defense, Fuel, Transportation and Food, which began their activities in August 1915.

Formally, they were considered equal authorities, but in fact the leading role belonged to the Special Defense Conference. The functions of the chairman of the Special Conference on Food included the preparation of provisions and fodder for the army, the regulation of trade, prices, general and private audits of livestock, food products, seeds, the abolition of local authorities' decrees on the rules for trade and supply of cities. The Special Meeting included members of the State Council and the Duma, delegates from zemstvos and cities, representatives of the military-industrial and exchange committees, trade unions - flour millers, etc. The Ministry of Agriculture had never previously been engaged in food supply and had no technical apparatus for this. In 1925, on the initiative of General A.S. Lukomsky, the collection “Russian Supply in the Great War” was published in the United States. In it, Naumov placed his note on the food supply of Russia in wartime and described the measures that were initiated at that time. There were no digital data on accounting for the stocks of products that existed in the country, even for essentials. There were no statistical data to calculate the production and consumption of bread, meat, etc. In this situation, it was decided to conduct a general agricultural census.

It took place in May - July 1916 on the territory of 77 provinces and regions of European and Asian Russia. The census was not carried out only in the areas occupied by the enemy, four regions in the Caucasus and two in the extreme north-east of Siberia. The immediate task was to account for the agricultural population. The 1916 census contains county-by-county information on the number of farms, the absolute number of the population, the area under crops, with distribution by individual crops, and the number of working and productive livestock. It was carried out in difficult wartime conditions, which adversely affected the reliability of its information.

However, thanks to the census and the collection of data, it was possible to establish a more or less planned relationship between the productive and consumer areas, between the requirements of the front and the needs of the rear. The priority measures of the Special Food Conference were the fight against speculation and high prices, as well as the procurement of food supplies for the population. During the first months of ministerial activity, Naumov managed to procure about 30,000,000 poods of grain, transferred to cities and zemstvos, first of all for the capital, then for other needy areas. Food loans were issued. At the height of the war, the Ministry of Agriculture in a number of cases had to make hasty purchases that did not correspond either to the volume of needs or to the size of food reserves.

During the war years, meat consumption increased. However, there was no plan for his preparations, the cattle disappeared along the way, the meat spoiled, since there were no refrigerators. In a short time, 20 refrigerators were installed at the junction railway stations and marinas, which made it possible to prevent spoilage of meat. The head of the Kazan railway, N.K. von Meck, placed at the disposal of Naumov refrigeration equipment at the Moscow railway station and in some other centers of the Moscow-Kazan railway. In addition, railway workshops began to produce refrigerated cars [ibid., p. 406]. Already in 1915, the annual consumption of meat by the army amounted to 60% of the pre-war consumption of the entire population of Russia.

In absolute terms, these were relatively small numbers, but they could have reduced the domestic cattle herd. In addition, the Minister of Agriculture A. N. Naumov noted that the meat allowance of the village increased to 150% compared with the pre-war period. After his resignation on July 1, 1916, he published in Russkoye Slovo some data on the state of the food business in Russia; in particular, that “we should expect a shortage in the supply of meat to the population. But even here there can be no question of the specter of hunger, and in the worst case, the population will have to come to terms with the need to endure some hardships. This is already recognized by the army, where the meat portion is reduced. The more the state can demand this from the population, because the meat capital, in the name of the interests of the whole country, must be protected. On February 16, 1916, the Ministry of Agriculture reported that the front required more than 100,000 poods of meat a day. Consequently, taking into account stocks, by January 1, 1917, about 3.5 million heads of cattle will be required.

Since it is no longer possible to obtain it by free purchase, mandatory deliveries are necessary, the fulfillment of which requires the introduction of fixed prices for meat and livestock. It was decided that these prices were set by the provincial zemstvos. The Ministry of Agriculture determines the amount of livestock for the army in the distribution for each province, then the provincial authorities distribute it by counties, and those - by volosts. Fixed prices for meat and livestock were introduced on May 19, 1916. The government tried to solve the problem in its area of ​​responsibility. The most effective measure could be to reduce meat consumption to pre-war levels.

The Minister of Agriculture A. N. Naumov proposed to act for these purposes by organizing the joint work of central and local authorities. The wide involvement of zemstvo bodies could provide not only grassroots support for government measures, but also control over the implementation of its decisions. During the First World War, mobilization measures became one of the most important phenomena that determined the socio-political situation both in the cities and villages of the Volga region. Large-scale mobilization processes were a factor in socio-demographic shifts, deepening contradictions in the Russian countryside, and an increase in non-sowing and landless farms. The village lost its workers, there was a gradual change in gender roles, female soldiers became the head of the family.

The way of life of the population changed under the influence of unfavorable conditions, among which one can highlight the rise in food prices; unpunished infliction of damage to the property of the townsfolk by pogrom of trading establishments; the constant fear of residents for themselves in connection with the influx into the city of an uncontrolled, drunk, alien to the urban environment contingent; revealing the weakness of law enforcement structures that could not resolve the "dangerous" tricks of the local public that arrived in the city and became more active. The situation was most unfavorable in those cities where their own population did not have a significant quantitative advantage over the mobilized, and the local authorities did not provide conditions for the reception of conscripts. The mobilization reflected the contradictions existing between society and the authorities, which manifested themselves during the war years in the unwillingness of some and the desire of others to serve the state in the form that it requires from the subject. At the same time, the mobilization also showed the best qualities of a person, expressed in a patriotic mood, an enthusiastic attitude towards potential defenders of the Fatherland, and indignation at the unpatriotic actions of fellow countrymen.

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